political-philosophy

["anything\tthat\twould\totherwise\ttake\tthem\tabove\tor\tbelow\tsome\tnorm. Again,\t there\u2019s\t no\t real\t problem\t using\t the\t term\t \u2018desert\u2019\t in\t this\t kind\t of\t case.\t It\u2019s important,\tthough,\tto\tsee\tthat\tis\tunlikely\tto\tjustify\tthe\tclaim\tthat\tUsain\tBolt\tdeserves to\t earn\t more\t than\t Jean\t Mason.\t It\t is\t completely\t implausible\t to\t think\t that\t the inequalities\tgenerated\tby\tthe\tmarket\tin\tour\tsociety\tcan\tbe\tjustified\tby\tappeal\tto\tthe idea\t of\t desert\t as\t compensating\t differentials.\t (Some\t economists\t and\t political theorists\t think\t that\t the\t inequalities\t generated\t by\t an\t idealized\t perfect\t market\t could be.\t In\t that\t case\t the\t money\t people\t earned\t \u2013\t the\t price\t for\t the\t job\t \u2013\t would\t reflect nothing\t other\t than\t the\t net\t balance\t of\t advantages\t and\t disadvantages\t involved\t in doing\t their\t job.\t Employers\t would\t then\t have\t to\t pay\t more\t to\t get\t people\t to\t do unpleasant\t work\t than\t pleasant\t work\t \u2013\t whereas\t the\t reverse\t is\t often\t the\t case\t at\t the moment.) The\tthird\tand\tlast\tthought\tto\tbe\tdistinguished\there\tcan\tbe,\tbut\tneed\tnot\tbe,\trelated to\tthis\tidea\tof\tcompensating\tdifferentials.\tThis\tis\tthe\tidea\tthat\tit\tis\tjustified\tfor\tsome people\tto\tearn\tmore\tthan\tothers\tbecause\tthere\twill\tbe\tbad\tconsequences\tif\tthey\twere not\tto\tdo\tso.\tSometimes\tthis\tis\tformulated\tin\tterms\tof\tthe\tidea\tof\tdesert.\tSuppose\twe ask:\t\u2018Do\tbrain\tsurgeons\tdeserve\tto\tearn\tmore\tthan\tnurses?\u2019\tSomebody\tmight\treply: \u2018Yes,\t they\t do.\t Because\t if\t we\t didn\u2019t\t pay\t brain\t surgeons\t more\t than\t nurses\t nobody would\twant\tto\tbe\ta\tbrain\tsurgeon.\tSince\tit\u2019s\tclearly\timportant\tthat\tsome\tpeople\tare brain\tsurgeons,\tthey\tdeserve\tto\tget\tmore\tmoney\tjust\tso\tthat\twe\tcan\tmake\tsure\tthat so me\t peo ple\t cho o se\t that\t jo b.\u2019\t This\t is\t a\t claim\t abo ut\t incentives\t \u2013\t abo ut\t the\t need\t to induce\tpeople\tto\tdo\tsocially\tuseful\ttasks\tand\tthe\tjustifiability\tof\tpaying\tthem\tmore if\tthat\tis\tthe\tonly\tor\tbest\tway\tto\tget\tthem\tto\tdo\tthose\ttasks.\tDoes\tit\thave\tanything\tto do\twith\tdesert? Not\tas\tit\tstands.\tIt\tis\tnot,\tin\titself,\tanything\tto\tdo\twith\tthe\trelative\tdeserts\tof\tbrain surgeons\t and\t nurses.\t It\t is\t simply\t a\t consequentialist\t observation,\t an\t observation about\t consequences,\t about\t what\t would\t happen\t if\t we\t didn\u2019t\t pay\t them\t more.\t As\t it stands,\t we\t do n\u2019t\t kno w\t why,\t to \t g et\t br ain\t sur g eo ns,\t we\t need\t to \t pay\t them\t mo r e\t than nurses.\t Perhaps\t it\u2019s\t because\t potential\t brain\t surgeons\t are\t more\t selfish\t than\t nurses and,\trealizing\tthe\tvalue\tof\ttheir\twork\tto\tsociety,\tare\tprepared\tto\thold\tthe\trest\tof\tus hostage,\tblackmailing\tus\tinto\tpaying\tthem\tthe\textra.\tIf\tthat\twere\tthe\tcase,\twe\twould har dly\t want\t to \t say\t that\t they\t deser ved\t that\t extr a.\t (Any\t mo r e\t than\t we\t wo uld\t say\t that kidnapper s\t who \t will\t o nly\t r elease\t a\t ho stag e\t if\t we\t pay\t them\t a\t r anso m\t \u2018deser ve\u2019\t the money\t\u2013\teven\tif\twe\tthink\twe\tare\tjustified\tin\tpaying\tit\tto\tthem.) It\t can,\t however,\t be\t turned\t into\t a\t desert\t claim\t \u2013\t at\t least\t a\t desert\t claim\t of\t the \u2018compensating\t differentials\u2019\t kind.\t If\t we\t ask\t why\t we\t need\t to\t pay\t brain\t surgeons more\t than\t nurses\t if\t people\t are\t going\t to\t choose\t a\t career\t in\t brain\t surgery,\t the answer\tmight\tbe\tthat\tthey\thave\thigh\tlevels\tof\tresponsibility\tand\tstress,\tor\tthat\tthey need\tto\tundergo\tmany\tyears\tof\ttraining\t\u2013\tforgoing\tmoney\tthey\tcould\tbe\tearning\tin other\t jobs\t and\t going\t through\t the\t arduous\t process\t of\t learning\t skills\t that\t most","people\tdon\u2019t\tneed\tto\tworry\tabout.\tSo\tif\twe\tpay\tthem\tabove\tthe\taverage\twage,\tto\tget them\t to \t do \t the\t jo b,\t this\t is\t just\t a\t co mpensating \t differ ential\t \u2013\t mo ney\t they\t \u2018deser ve\u2019 given\t all\t the\t negative\t aspects\t of\t the\t job.\t The\t thought,\t now,\t is\t not\t simply\t that\t we have\t to\t give\t them\t extra\t money\t in\t order\t to\t get\t them\t to\t do\t the\t job\t \u2013\t which\t is consistent\t with\t the\t blackmail\t scenario.\t It\t is\t that\t they\t actually\t deserve\t the\t extra, deserve\tit\tin\tthe\tsense\tthat\tit\tcompensates\tfor\tall\tthe\tstress,\tlong\thours,\ttraining\tor whatever,\t and\t so\t provides\t the\t necessary\t inducement\t for\t them\t to\t take\t up\t brain surgery.\t Otherwise\t they\u2019d\t be\t worse\t off,\t all\t things\t considered,\t than\t nurses. Construed\t this\t way,\t this\t is\t a\t genuine\t justice\t claim,\t and\t one\t that\t can\t be\t allowed appeal\tto\tthe\tconcept\tof\t\u2018desert\u2019\t\u2013\teven\tif\tit\tis\ta\tdifferent\tconception\tof\tdesert\tfrom the\tmain\tone\tI\u2019ve\tdiscussed.\t(Of\tcourse,\tsuch\ta\tclaim\tcould\twell\tbe\tcontentious.\tThe kind\t of\t university\t education\t that\t some\t would\t present\t as\t investment,\t to\t be compensated\tfor\tby\thigher\tpay,\tmight\twell\tbe\tenjoyable\tand\tvaluable\tin\titself.\tJust because\t so meo ne\t tells\t us\t that\t so mething \t is\t a\t co st\t deser ving \t co mpensatio n\t do esn\u2019t mean\tthat\twe\thave\tto\tagree\twith\tthem.)","Social\tjustice\tv.\tglobal\tjustice This\t chapter\t is\t called\t \u2018social\t justice\u2019\t and\t everything\t in\t it\t so\t far\t has\t taken\t it\t for granted\tthat\tthe\tthing\twe\tcare\tabout\tbeing\tjust,\tor\tunjust,\tis\tsociety.\tBut\tmany\tof\tmy students\tare\tmore\tconcerned\tabout\tinjustice\tacross\tthe\tglobe\tas\ta\twhole.\tThat\u2019s\tnot because\t they\t think\t their\t own\t societies\t can\t afford\t to\t be\t complacent\t on\t the\t justice fr o nt.\t But\t in\t a\t wo r ld\t wher e\t millio ns\t die\t ever y\t year \t fo r \t lack\t o f\t basic\t nutr itio n\t and medical\t care,\t and\t multinational\t corporations\t reap\t huge\t profits\t from\t the\t work\t of millions\tmore\tearning\tsubsistence\twages,\tit\tis\tthe\tinequalities\tbetween\tsocieties\tthat seem\t mo r e\t blatantly\t unjust\t than\t tho se\t within\t them.\t Whether \t affluent\t so cieties\t have organized\t things\t to\t benefit\t their\t least\t advantaged\t members,\t or\t whether\t those members\tget\tpaid\twhat\tthey\tdeserve,\tcan\tindeed\tseem\trather\ttrivial\tfrom\tthe\tglobal perspective.\t Political\t philosophers\t have\t been\t devoting\t increasing\t attention\t to\t the wider\tpicture,\textending\ttheir\tthinking\tbeyond\tthe\tdomestic\tcontext\tand\tconsidering what\tdistributive\tprinciples\tshould\tapply\tat\tthe\tinternational\tlevel. A\t key\t issue\t \u2013\t perhaps\t the\t key\t issue\t \u2013\t is\t whether\t we\t should\t think\t about\t global justice\t as\t something\t like\t social\t justice\t writ\t large.\t Perhaps\t principles\t devised\t for individual\t so cieties\t sho uld\t simply\t be\t extended\t in\t their \t sco pe\t to \t co mpass\t humanity as\t a\t whole.\t If\t it\t matters\t that\t all\t members\t of\t society\t enjoy\t fair\t equality\t of opportunity\t(as\tper\tRawls\u2019s\tprinciple\t2(b)\t\u2013\tsee\tabove,\tp.\t25),\tdoesn\u2019t\tit\talso\tmatter that\tall\thuman\tbeings\tenjoy\tit\ttoo?\tIf\tso,\tthen\tjustice\trequires\tthat\tthe\tmalnourished childr en\t among\t the\t wor ld\u2019s\t bottom\t billion\t should\t have\t the\t same\t chances\t as\t those born\tto\tthe\trichest\tparents\tin\tthe\trichest\tcountries.\tRather\tthan\tinequalities\tbeing\tjust o nly\t if\t they\t ser ve\t to \t maximize\t the\t po sitio n\t o f\t the\t least\t advantag ed\t in\t a\t so ciety\t (as per\tRawls\u2019s\tprinciple\t2(a)),\twhy\tshouldn\u2019t\tthey\tbe\trequired\tmaximally\tto\tbenefit\tthe least\tadvantaged\ton\tthe\tplanet?\t(This\twould\tbe\tthe\t\u2018global\tdifference\tprinciple\u2019.)\tIf so cial\t justice\t invo lves\t peo ple\t g etting \t what\t they\t deser ve,\t why\t no t\t think\t o f\t \u2018peo ple\u2019 as\tall\thuman\tbeings,\tirrespective\tof\tgeography\tor\tnationality,\tand\tthink\tabout\thow far\t the\t world\t falls\t short\t of\t realizing\t that\t principle?\t According\t to\t so-called cosmopolitans,\t the\t idea\t that\t all\t human\t beings\t are\t fundamentally\t equal\t means\t that their\t nationality,\t or\t which\t society\t they\t are\t a\t member\t of,\t should\t not\t make\t a difference\tto\twhat\tthey\tcan\tclaim\tfrom\tothers\tas\ta\tmatter\tof\tjustice. The\t alternative\t view\t insists\t that\t social\t justice\t and\t global\t justice\t really\t are different\t things.\t Members\t of\t a\t society\t have\t duties\t to\t one\t another\t that\t they\t do\t not have\tto\tmembers\tof\tother\tsocieties.\tThose\twho\tshare\ta\tnationality,\tor\tbelong\tto\tthe same\t state,\t are\t in\t a\t particular\t kind\t of\t association\t \u2013\t a\t distinctive\t relationship\t with particular\tothers\t\u2013\tthat\tmakes\ta\tdifference\tas\tfar\tas\tjustice\tis\tconcerned.\tMaybe\tall are\towed\tsome\tduties\tof\tjustice\tsimply\tbecause\tthey\tare\thuman\tbeings.\tThe\tconcept of\thuman\trights\tis\toften\tused\tto\tcapture\tthat\tidea.\tPerhaps,\tfor\texample,\tit\tis\tunjust when\tthose\tin\tsome\tcountries\tare\tdenied\taccess\tto\tthe\tnecessities\tof\tlife\twhile\tthose","in\t others\t have\t far\t more\t than\t they\t need.\t Perhaps\t we\t have\t duties\t not\t to\t harm\t or explo it\t peo ple,\t wher ever \t they\t may\t live.\t But,\t o n\t this\t view,\t the\t pr inciples\t that\t apply across\tborders\tare\tless\tdemanding\tthan\tthose\tthat\tapply\twithin\tthem. In\tcontemporary\tpolitical\tdebate,\tsome\tversion\tof\tthe\tsecond\tposition\ttends\tto\tbe taken\t for\t granted.\t The\t UK\t government\t currently\t devotes\t 0.7\t per\t cent\t of\t GDP\t to foreign\t aid\t and\t any\t politician\t who\t urged\t an\t increase\t would\t immediately\t find herself\t on\t the\t defensive.\t That\u2019s\t partly\t because\t of\t doubts\t about\t the\t efficacy\t of international\t\u2018handouts\u2019.\tAs\talways,\tissues\tof\tphilosophical\tprinciple\tand\tmatters\tof empir ical\t fact\t ar e\t inter twined\t when\t we\t make\t judg ements\t abo ut\t what\t to \t do .\t But,\t as the\t language\t of\t \u2018aid\u2019\t and\t \u2018handout\u2019\t suggests,\t it\t also\t reflects\t the\t widespread\t view that\tglobal\tredistribution\tis\ta\tmatter\tof\tcharity,\tnot\tjustice.\tIt\u2019s\tnot\tonly\tthat\tpeople think\tthey\towe\tmore\tto\ttheir\tcompatriots\tthan\tthey\tdo\tto\tforeigners.\tEven\twhere\tthe aim\t is\t merely\t to\t relieve\t life-threatening\t deprivation\t \u2013\t and\t nothing\t like\t global equality\tof\topportunity\tor\tthe\tglobal\tdifference\tprinciple\t\u2013\tmost\tpeople\tdo\tnot\tthink they\tare\tunder\tan\tenforceable\tduty\tto\tgive\tup\tmuch\tof\twhat\tthey\thave\tto\thelp\tthose who\t live\t in\t other\t countries.\t Since\t even\t those\t philosophers\t who\t reject co smo po litanism\t usually\t ho ld\t that\t we\t do \t have\t so me\t duties\t to \t help\t peo ple\t all\t o ver the\t world\t enjoy\t basic\t human\t rights,\t including\t the\t right\t to\t subsistence,\t this\t is\t yet another\t example\t of\t the\t mismatch\t between\t philosophy\t and\t public\t opinion. Compared\t to\t the\t status\t quo,\t even\t a\t relatively\t undemanding\t take\t on\t global\t justice would\tbe\tradical\tin\tits\timplications. That\t said,\t ther e\t is\t still\t a\t big \t differ ence\t between\t the\t two \t views,\t and\t altho ug h\t the second\tis\tmuch\tmore\tcommonly\theld,\tI\u2019m\tsure\tsome\treaders\twill\tfeel\ta\tstrong\tpull in\t the\t cosmopolitan\t direction.\t After\t all,\t if\t we\t are\t approaching\t the\t issue\t from\t a purely\tphilosophical\tperspective,\tputting\taside\tfor\tnow\tpractical\tquestions\tof\twhat\u2019s feasible\t(including\twhat\tthose\tin\taffluent\tcountries\tcan\tbe\texpected\tto\tvote\tfor),\tthe idea\t that\t duties\t of\t justice\t are\t owed\t to\t people\t as\t such,\t simply\t because\t of\t their humanity\t and\t without\t r egar d\t to\t geogr aphy,\t has\t a\t good\t deal\t going\t for \t it.\t We\t may know,\tas\ta\tmatter\tof\tpsychology,\tthat\twe\ttend\tto\tfavour\tthose\twe\tidentify\twith,\tjust as\t we\t tend\t to\t favour\t members\t of\t our\t family.\t But\t it\u2019s\t tempting\t quickly\t to\t dismiss that\tkind\tof\tthinking\tas\tfailing\tto\tachieve\ta\tproperly\tmoral,\timpartial,\tperspective\t\u2013 one\t that\t recognizes\t the\t fundamental\t equality\t of\t all\t human\t beings.\t That\t temptation should\tbe\tresisted.\tEven\tif\tyou\tdo\tend\tup\tendorsing\ta\tcosmopolitan\tperspective,\tit\u2019s better\t to\t do\t that\t having\t carefully\t considered\t the\t case\t for\t the\t alternative.\t So\t it\u2019s worth\thaving\ta\tsense\tof\tthe\tvarious\ttheories\tdefending\tthe\tclaim\tthat\tthe\tdemands\tof justice\tare\tdifferent\tat\thome\tand\tabroad. Common\tto\tall\tsuch\ttheories\tis\tthe\tidea\tthat\tthe\tkind\tof\tassociation\twe\thave\twith others\tis\trelevant\tto\twhat\twe\towe\tthem\tjustice-wise.\tThere\tmay\tbe\tsome\tvery\tbasic justice\tclaims\tthat\tall\thave\tagainst\tall.\tBut\tdistributive\tjustice\t\u2013\tprinciples\tthat\tapply to\t the\t distribution\t of\t benefits\t and\t burdens,\t or\t how\t much\t people\t should\t have","compared\t to\t one\t another\t \u2013\t applies\t only\t among\t those\t in\t particular\t modes\t of relationship.\t Where\t the\t theories\t differ\t is\t over\t what\t kind\t of\t association\t or relationship\t is\t the\t relevant\t one.\t If\t you\u2019ve\t been\t reading\t carefully\t you\t may\t have noticed\tthat\tI\tstarted\tthis\tsection\ttalking\tabout\t\u2018society\u2019,\tslid\tto\t\u2018nationality\u2019,\tslipped in\t \u2018state\u2019,\t added\t in\t \u2018countries\u2019\t and\t \u2018borders\u2019,\t and\t ended\t up\t with \u2018compatriots\/foreigners\u2019\t and\t \u2018home\/abroad\u2019.\t I\t also\t referred\t to\t \u2018those\t we\t identify with\u2019.\tThese\tcan\trefer\tto\tdifferent\tthings.\tThey\tinvolve\tdifferent\tsets\tof\tpeople\tand different\tideas\tabout\twhy\twe\towe\tmore\tto\tsome\tthan\tto\tothers. One\tstarting\tpoint\tsees\tdistributive\tjustice\tas\tconcerned\tspecifically\twith\tthe\tfair distribution\tof\tthe\tfruits\tof\tsocial\tcooperation.\tIf\tour\tconception\tof\ta\t\u2018society\u2019\tis\tof individuals\t co o per ating \t with\t o ne\t ano ther \t fo r \t their \t mutual\t advantag e,\t then\t it\t makes sense\t to \t think\t o f\t distr ibutive\t justice\t as\t co ncer ned\t with\t distr ibuting \t the\t benefits\t and burdens\tof\tthat\tcooperation.\tThose\twho\tare\tnot\tmembers\tof\tthe\tcooperative\tscheme that\tis\t\u2018society\u2019\tdo\tnot\thave\tthe\tsame\tkind\tof\tclaims\tto\tfair\tshares\tbecause\tthey\tare no t\t invo lved\t in\t pr o ducing ,\t o r \t bear ing \t the\t co sts\t o f\t pr o ducing ,\t the\t g o o d\t thing s\t that are\t to\t be\t distributed.\t But\t in\t today\u2019s\t globalized\t economy,\t with\t high\t levels\t of economic\tinterdependence\tbetween\tmembers\tof\tdifferent\tcountries,\tit\u2019s\timplausible to\tsuppose\tthat\tthe\tpeople\twith\twhom\twe\tare\tcooperating\tto\tproduce\tthose\tfruits\tare o nly\t o ur \t fello w\t natio nals\t o r \t member s\t o f\t the\t same\t state\t as\t us.\t So \t if\t that\u2019s\t the\t idea, then\t it\t looks\t as\t if\t the\t demands\t of\t distributive\t justice\t are\t going\t to\t extend\t way beyond\tmy\tfellow\tcitizens\tor\tfellow\tnationals. A\tsecond\tapproach\tfocuses\ton\tthe\trelationship\tbetween\tthose\twho\tshare\ta\tstate\t\u2013 fellow\t citizens\t living\t together\t under\t the\t same\t coercive\t apparatus.\t That\t seems\t to co r r espo nd\t mo r e\t clo sely\t to \t the\t way\t we\t co nventio nally\t divide\t peo ple\t into \t \u2018us\u2019\t and \u2018them\u2019,\tand\tit\u2019s\tcertainly\tthe\tway\tthat\tour\tstates\tencourage\tus\tto\tthink\tabout\tthings. Within\t this\t kind\t of\t view,\t some\t philosophers\t emphasize\t the\t way\t in\t which compliance\twith\ta\tsystem\tof\tlaws\titself\tcontributes\tto\tour\tmutual\tadvantage.\tA\tfair share\t of\t the\t benefits\t and\t burdens\t of\t social\t cooperation\t is\t what\t we\t should\t get\t in return\tfor\tour\tcompliance.\tThis\tis\ta\tvariant\tof\tthe\tprevious\tperspective,\tbut\tadds\tin the\tidea\tthat\tsubmission\tto\tcoercion\tthrough\tlaw\tis\tpart\tof\tthe\tcooperative\tpackage. Another\t angle\t sees\t citizenship\t as\t relevant\t to\t distributive\t justice\t because\t there\t is so mething \t special\t abo ut\t being \t jo intly\t autho r s\t o f\t the\t laws\t by\t which\t we\t co er ce\t o ne another.\tNot\tonly\tare\tfellow\tcitizens\tsubject\tto\tthe\tdecisions\tthey\tjointly\tmake,\tthose laws\tare\tmade\tin\ttheir\tname.\tPeople\tparticipating\tin\tthat\tform\tof\tassociation\tshould not\tbe\tsubject\tto\tarbitrary\tinequalities\t\u2013\tthey\towe\tone\tanother\ta\tjustification\tof\tany inequalities\t that\t exist\t between\t them\t \u2013\t so\t principles\t of\t distributive\t justice\t apply within\tstates\tin\ta\tway\tthat\tthey\tdo\tnot\tbeyond\tstate\tborders. A\tfurther\treason\tto\ttake\tstates\tseriously\twhen\tit\tcomes\tto\tglobal\tjustice\tappeals\tto the\tvalue\tof\tsovereignty\tor\tcollective\tself-determination.\tCosmopolitans\twho\tclaim that\t the\t same\t distributive\t principles\t should\t apply\t to\t all\t human\t beings\t seem\t to\t be","denying\tthat\tdifferent\tstates\tmay\tmake\tdifferent\tjudgements\tabout\thow\tthey\twant\tto allocate\tresources\tamong\ttheir\tmembers.\tBut\tit\u2019s\tnot\tcrazy\tto\tthink\tthat,\tas\tlong\tas their\t collective\t decisions\t can\t be\t regarded\t as\t legitimate,\t and\t as\t long\t as\t their decisions\trespect\thuman\trights,\tthe\tmembers\tof\ta\tstate\tshould\tbe\tfree\tto\tdecide\tthat for\t themselves.\t (It\u2019s\t a\t big\t question\t what\t counts\t as\t \u2018legitimate\u2019.\t We\t won\u2019t\t get\t to \u2018democracy\u2019\tuntil\tPart\t5,\tso\tI\tcan\u2019t\tgo\tinto\tthat\there.)\tStill,\tthe\tidea\tthat\ta\tjust\tworld would\t consist\t of\t people\t divided\t into\t a\t number\t of\t different,\t legitimate,\t states\t \u2013 perhaps\twith\tdifferent\thistories\tand\tcultural\tnorms\t\u2013\twith\teach\tstate\tmaking\tits\town distributive\t decisions,\t should\t have\t some\t intuitive\t appeal.\t From\t this\t perspective, global\t justice\t is\t not\t about\t applying\t the\t same\t distributive\t principles\t to\t each individual\t human\t being.\t It\u2019s\t more\t about\t making\t sure\t that\t the\t collectives\t (Rawls calls\tthem\t\u2018peoples\u2019)\tin\teach\tindividual\tstate\tare\tprovided\twith\tthe\tjust\tbackground conditions\t within\t which\t they\t can\t exercise\t the\t right\t to\t decide\t such\t matters\t for themselves. A\t third\t way\t of\t resisting\t cosmopolitanism\t appeals\t to\t the\t relationship\t of\t shared nationality.\tAt\tfirst\tsight,\t\u2018shared\tcitizenship\u2019\tand\t\u2018shared\tnationality\u2019\tmay\tseem\tlike the\tsame\tthing.\tThat\u2019s\tbecause\twe\ttend\tto\tthink\tof\tthe\tworld\tas\tdivided\tinto\tdiscrete nation-states,\tin\twhich\tthe\tdistinctively\tpolitical\tassociation\tof\tthe\tstate\tis\tshared\tby those\t who\t are\t members\t of\t a\t group\t with\t the\t same\t national\t (historical,\t linguistic, ethnic\tor\tcultural)\tidentity.\tBut\teven\twhere\tnation\tand\tstate\tdo\tcoincide\t\u2013\tso\twe\tare putting\t to\t one\t side\t multinational\t states\t and\t stateless\t nations\t \u2013\t we\t can\t still\t ask whether\tit\u2019s\tthe\tstatehood\tor\tthe\tnationhood\tthat\tis\tdoing\tthe\twork.\tSuppose\tI\thave an\tintuitive\tbut\tvague\tfeeling\tthat\tI\towe\tmy\tcompatriots\tmore\tthan\tI\towe\tforeigners but\t I\u2019m\t not\t sur e\t why.\t One\t way\t to\t make\t pr ogr ess\t is\t to\t wor k\t out\t whether \t it\t comes from\t a\t sense\t that\t those\t with\t whom\t I\t share\t a\t political\t relationship\t have\t special claims\t on\t me,\t or\t from\t a\t sense\t that\t I\t have\t particular\t duties\t to\t those\t with\t whom\t I shar e\t an\t identity\t based\t o n\t histo r y\t and\t cultur e?\t (I\u2019ll\t say\t mo r e\t abo ut\t this\t distinctio n towards\tthe\tend\tof\tPart\t4\t(pp.\t171\u201382).)\tWhile\tphilosophers\ttend\tto\tanswer\tin\tterms of\tthe\tformer,\talong\tthe\tlines\toutlined\tabove,\tmy\tguess\tis\tthat\tit\u2019s\tthe\tlatter\tthat\tlies beneath\tmuch\tpopular\tanti-cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitans\t are\t doubtful\t about\t these\t various\t attempts\t to\t defend\t the\t idea\t that we\towe\tmore\tto\tour\tfellow\tcitizens\/nationals\tthan\tto\tother\thuman\tbeings.\tBut\tnotice that\t their \t po sitio n\t is\t quite\t co mpatible\t with\t thinking \t that\t we\t do n\u2019t\t actually\t o we\t o ur fellow\thuman\tbeings\tvery\tmuch.\tA\tlibertarian\tlike\tNozick,\tfor\texample,\tmight\thold that\t we\t have\t no \t duty\t o f\t justice\t to \t do \t anything \t to \t help\t the\t wo r ld\u2019s\t po o r \t (just\t as\t we have\tno\tsuch\tduty\tto\thelp\tthe\tpoor\tin\tour\town\tsociety).\tOur\tduties,\ton\tthis\tkind\tof view,\tare\tnegative\t\u2013\tthey\tare\tduties\tnot\tto\tdo\tthings\tto\tothers\t(murder,\ttorture,\trob, etc.)\t Gener ally,\t we\t mig ht\t say,\t what\t is\t mo r ally\t r equir ed\t o f\t us\t is\t simply\t that\t we\t no t harm\tothers.\tThose\tattracted\tto\tthat\tkind\tof\tview\twill\tneed\tto\tthink\thard\tabout\twhat counts\tas\tharm,\tand\tshould\tconsider\tthe\tvarious\tways\tin\twhich\tthe\tglobal\teconomic","order\t\u2013\tregulated\tby\tthings\tlike\tthe\tWorld\tTrade\tOrganization\tmight\tbe\tregarded\tas harming\tmembers\tof\tpoor\tcountries.\tFor\texample,\tthe\tphilosopher\tThomas\tPogge (b.\t 1953)\t argues\t that\t wealthy\t countries\t benefit\t from\t a\t range\t of\t international arrangements\tthat\tencourage\tcorruption\tamong\telites\tand\tthus\tcontribute\tdirectly\tto the\tcontinuation\tof\tglobal\tpoverty.\tEven\tif\tthere\tare\tno\tduties\tpositively\tto\taid\tthose in\tneed,\tthe\tglobal\taffluent\tmight\tstill\tbe\tacting\tunjustly\tsimply\tby\tcolluding\tin,\tand benefiting\tfrom,\ta\tglobal\tsystem\tthat\tharms\tthe\tglobal\tpoor.","Conclusion Each\tof\tthe\tconceptions\tof\tsocial\tjustice\tthat\twe\thave\tlooked\tat\tcan\tbe\tthought\tof\tas presenting\ta\tdifferent\tjustification\tof\tinequality.\tHayek\tthinks\tthat\tthe\twhole\tidea\tof seeking\t social\t justice\t involves\t a\t philosophical\t mistake,\t so\t that\t inequality\t doesn\u2019t really\tneed\tjustification\tin\tthe\tfirst\tplace.\tRawls\tholds\tthat\tinequalities\tare\tjustified if\t they\t conform\t to\t the\t principles\t that\t would\t have\t been\t chosen\t in\t the\t original position,\tmost\tcontroversially\tthe\tdifference\tprinciple\twhich\tholds\tthat\tinequalities must\tserve,\tover\ttime,\tmaximally\tto\tpromote\tthe\twell-being\tof\tthe\tleast\tadvantaged members\tof\tsociety.\tNozick\trejects\tthis\tkind\tof\tthinking\tin\tfavour\tof\ta\tprinciple\tof self-ownership\t that\t leaves\t people\t free\t to\t do\t what\t they\t like\t with\t property\t that\t is their s\t \u2013\t a\t pr inciple\t that\t co uld\t justify\t extr eme\t inequality.\t All\t thr ee\t o f\t these\t thinker s reject\t the\t popular\t view\t that\t people\t deserve\t differently\t depending\t on\t their productive\tcontribution. It\tis\tvery\tcommon\tto\tfind\tpeople\tdefending\tthe\tjustice\tof\tthe\tkinds\tof\tinequality we\tsee\tin\tour\tsociety\tby\tappealing\tto\tsome\tmish-mash\tof\tthese\tdifferent\tideas.\tThat is\tthe\treason\tcarefully\tto\tdistinguish\tbetween\tthem.\tHow\tcould\tit\tbe\tjust\tthat\tUsain Bolt,\tor\tBill\tGates,\tor\tany\tcorporate\tlawyer\tshould\tearn\tmore\tthan\ta\tsocial\tworker, or\t a\t schoolteacher,\t or\t somebody\t who\t is\t involuntarily\t unemployed?\t Does\t the question\t involve\t a\t category\t mistake?\t Is\t it\t because\t their\t earning\t more\t \u2013\t and\t that much\tmore\t\u2013\tserves,\tover\ttime,\tto\thelp\tthe\tpoor?\tIs\tit\tbecause\tthey\town\ttheir\ttalents and\twhatever\tpeople\tare\twilling\tto\tgive\tthem\tfor\texercising\tthem?\tIs\tit\tbecause\tthey are\tin\tsome\tway\tmore\tdeserving?\tThese\tjustifications\tcan,\tin\tspecial\tcircumstances, coincide\t \u2013\t but\t they\t won\u2019t\t always\t do\t so.\t Those\t who\t would\t defend\t the\t justice\t of existing \t inequalities\t \u2013\t o r \t anything \t like\t them\t \u2013\t need\t to \t think\t har d\t abo ut\t which\t way they\t want\t to\t jump\t when\t they\t come\t apart.\t And\t both\t defenders\t and\t critics\t of\t those inequalities\t need\t a\t r eply\t to \t the\t char g e\t o f\t par o chialism.\t Per haps\t it\u2019s\t the\t wo r ld\t as\t a whole,\t not\t any\t particular\t society\t within\t it,\t that\t should\t really\t be\t the\t subject\t of distributive\tjustice. Further\treading Matthew\tClayton\tand\tAndrew\tWilliams\t(eds.),\tSocial\tJustice\t(Blackwell\t2003)\tis\tan excellent\t collection.\t Har r y\t Br igho use\u2019s\t Justice\t (Polity\t 2004)\t and\t Tom\t Campbell\u2019s Justice\t (3r d\t edn,\t Macmillan\t 2010)\t ar e\t bo th\t g o o d\t textbo o ks.\t Cecile\t Fabr e\u2019s\t Justice in\ta\tChanging\tWorld\t(Polity\t2007)\tnicely\tfocuses\ton\tinternational,\tintergenerational and\tmulticultural\tissues. On\t Hayek,\t the\t key\t work\t is\t The\t Mirage\t of\t Social\t Justice\t (Routledge\t &\t Kegan Paul),\tfirst\tpublished\tin\t1976,\tand\tincorporated\tas\tvolume\t2\tof\this\tLaw,\tLegislation and\t Liberty\t in\t 1982.\t \u2018The\t Atavism\t of\t Social\t Justice\u2019,\t in\t his\t New\t Essays\t in","Philosophy,\tPolitics\tand\tEconomics\t(Routledge\t&\tKegan\tPaul\t1978)\tis\tshort\tand\tto the\t point.\t John\t Gray\u2019s\t Hayek\t on\t Liberty\t (2nd\t edn,\t Blackwell\t 1986)\t and\t Chandran Kukathas\u2019s\tHayek\t and\t Modern\t Liberalism\t (Oxford\t University\t Press\t 1989)\t are\t the two\tbest\tcritical\taccounts\tof\tHayek\u2019s\twork\tas\ta\twhole. Rawls\u2019s\tJustice\t as\t Fairness:\t A\t Restatement\t (Harvard\t University\t Press\t 2001)\t is the\t user -fr iendly\t ver sio n\t o f\t his\t theo r y.\t Fr o m\t the\t mo untain\t o f\t seco ndar y\t liter atur e, and\t in\t increasing\t order\t of\t length\t and\t complexity,\t it\t would\t be\t worth\t trying\t the introduction\t to\t Stephen\t Mulhall\t and\t Adam\t Swift\u2019s\t Liberals\t and\t Communitarians (2nd\t edn,\t Blackwell\t 1996),\t Thomas\t Pogge\u2019s\t John\t Rawls:\t His\t Life\t and\t Theory\t of Justice\t (Oxford\t University\t Press\t 2007)\t and\t Samuel\t Freeman\u2019s\t Rawls\t (Routledge 2007). No zick\u2019s\t Anarchy,\t State\t and\t Utopia\t (Blackwell\t 1974)\t is\t an\t enter taining \t r ead\t (as political\t philosophy\t goes);\t the\t middle\t section\t on\t distributive\t justice\t is\t the\t most relevant.\tThe\tbest\tcritical\tcommentary\tis\tJonathan\tWolff\u2019s\tProperty,\tJustice\tand\tthe Minimal\tState\t(Polity\t1991). What\tDo\tWe\tDeserve?\t(Oxford\tUniversity\tPress\t1999),\tedited\tby\tLouis\tP.\tPojman and\tOwen\tMcLeod,\tis\ta\tgood\tcollection\ton\tdesert.\tChapters\t7\u20139\tof\tDavid\tMiller \u2019s Principles\tof\tSocial\tJustice\t(Harvard\tUniversity\tPress\t2001)\tdefend\tthe\tview\tthat\tthe market\tcan\t(though\tit\tcurrently\tdoesn\u2019t)\tgive\tpeople\twhat\tthey\tdeserve.\tChapter\t8\tof Gordon\t Marshall\t et\t al.\u2019s\t Against\t the\t Odds?\t Social\t Class\t and\t Social\t Justice\t in Industrial\tSocieties\t(Oxford\tUniversity\tPress\t1997)\tis\tmore\tsceptical. At\tthe\tmore\taccessible\tend\tof\tthe\tscale,\tBrian\tBarry\u2019s\tWhy\tSocial\tJustice\tMatters (Polity\t2005)\tis\ta\tthought-provoking\tpolemic\tand\tMichael\tSandel\u2019s\tJustice:\tWhat\u2019s the\t Right\t Thing\t To\t Do?\t (Penguin\t 2010)\t brilliantly\t illuminates\t a\t wide\t range\t of topical\tissues\tvia\tsome\tof\tthe\tgreat\tmoral\tand\tpolitical\tphilosophers. Readers\tinterested\tin\tglobal\tjustice\twill\tfind\tmany\tgood\tthings\tin\tThom\tBrooks\u2019s (ed.)\tThe\tGlobal\tJustice\tReader\t(Wiley-Blackwell\t2008),\twhile\tJon\tMandle\u2019s\tGlobal Justice\t (Polity\t 2006)\t is\t more\t than\t a\t good\t textbook.\t Thomas\t Pogge\u2019s\t important argument\t is\t most\t fully\t developed\t in\t his\t World\t Poverty\t and\t Human\t Rights: Cosmopolitan\tResponsibilities\tand\tReforms\t(2nd\tedn,\tPolity\tPress\t2008).","Part\t2","Liberty If\tRawls\u2019s\tA\tTheory\tof\tJustice\tis\tthe\tmost\tinfluential\tbook\tof\tcontemporary\tpolitical philosophy,\tIsaiah\tBerlin\u2019s\t\u2018Two\tConcepts\tof\tLiberty\u2019\tis\tthe\tmost\tinfluential\tsingle essay.\t (It\t was\t his\t inaugural\t lecture\t as\t Professor\t of\t Social\t and\t Political\t Theory\t at Oxfo r d,\t in\t 1958.)\t T his\t is\t the\t essay\t which,\t as\t mentio ned\t in\t the\t Pr eface,\t To ny\t Blair wrote\t to\t him\t about.\t In\t it,\t Berlin\t (1909\u201397)\t draws\t a\t famous\t distinction\t between \u2018negative\u2019\tand\t\u2018positive\u2019\tconcepts\tof\tliberty,\tand\targues\tthat\tthe\tlatter\tshould\tbe\tseen as\ta\twrong\tturning.\tSo\twrong,\tin\tfact,\tthat\ttotalitarian\tstates\tlike\tNazi\tGermany\tand the\tUSSR\tinvoked\tthe\tconcept\tto\tjustify\ttheir\tregimes.\tIf\tthe\tmost\tblatant\tenemies\tof liberty\t could\t persuade\t themselves\t that\t they\t were\t its\t true\t friends,\t something\t very peculiar\tmust\thave\thappened. Berlin\u2019s\tessay\tis\ta\tbrilliant\taccount\tof\tjust\twhat\tdid\thappen:\tof\thow\ttwo\tways\tof thinking\tabout\tliberty,\twhich\tstarted\tout\tvery\tclose\tto\tone\tanother,\tgradually\tdrifted apart\t and\t became\t polar\t opposites.\t It\t is\t an\t insightful,\t stimulating\t and\t plausible tracing\tof\ta\thugely\timportant\tdevelopment\tin\tthe\thistory\tof\tideas.\tIt\tis\tnot,\thowever, as\t clear\t as\t it\t might\t be.\t Berlin\t draws\t the\t distinction\t between\t negative\t and\t positive liberty\t in\t a\t variety\t of\t different\t ways,\t and\t argues\t simultaneously\t what\t are\t actually significantly\t different\t points.\t So\t it\t is\t not\t surprising\t that\t the\t reader\t can\t be\t left confused\tabout\t just\t what\t he\t is\t and\t isn\u2019t\t saying.\t Here\t I\t try\t to\t sort\t out\t some\t of\t the confusion.\t In\t so\t doing,\t I\t will\t explain\t why\t Blair\t was\t standing\t up\t for\t \u2018positive liber ty\u2019,\t which\t Ber lin\t r eg ar ded\t as\t a\t dang er o us\t no tio n,\t r ipe\t fo r \t per ver sio n\t into \t the official\tideology\tof\ta\ttotalitarian\tstate.\tIt\u2019s\tnot\tbecause\tBlair\tis\ta\tcloset\tdictator.\tThe answer\tis\tless\texciting\tthan\tthat.\tIt\u2019s\tbecause\tBerlin\tuses\t\u2018positive\tfreedom\u2019\tto\tmean a\t number \t o f\t differ ent\t thing s,\t o nly\t so me\t o f\t which\t have\t to talitar ian\t tendencies.\t The kind\t of\t \u2018positive\t freedom\u2019\t Blair\t was\t defending\t \u2013\t and\t which\t plays\t a\t key\t role\t in centre-left\tthinking\tacross\tEurope\tand\tNorth\tAmerica\t\u2013\tis\tnot\tthe\tkind\tthat\tled\tto,\tor was\tendorsed\tby,\tHitler\tor\tStalin. As\t well\t as\t clarifying\t the\t distinction\t between\t negative\t and\t positive\t liberty,\t this part\tof\tthe\tbook\tcovers\ttwo\tother\tissues.\tFirst,\tit\texplores\tthe\tconnections\tbetween freedom,\tproperty\tand\tthe\tfree\tmarket.\tThere\tis\ta\tkind\tof\tright-wing\targument\tthat defends\t private\t property\t and\t the\t free\t market\t by\t appeal\t to\t the\t value\t of\t individual freedom.\t Nozick\u2019s\t conception\t of\t justice\t as\t entitlement,\t discussed\t in\t Part\t 1,\t is\t a good\texample\tof\tthis.\tThere\tis\tmore\tthan\ta\thint\tof\tit\tin\tHayek\ttoo.\tSince\tthis\tline\tof","argument\t is\t important\t in\t mainstream\t political\t debate\t \u2013\t low\t tax\t rates\t are\t often defended\ton\tfreedom\tgrounds\t\u2013\tit\tis\tworth\tcareful\tconsideration.\tFinally,\tit\tlooks\tat the\t idea\t of\t positive\t freedom\t that\t Blair\t was\t not\t defending\t \u2013\t the\t kind\t that\t Berlin thinks\t leads\t to\t totalitarianism.\t By\t making\t a\t few\t distinctions,\t we\t can\t better\t see whether\teven\tthis\tkind\tof\t\u2018positive\u2019\tliberty\tis\tquite\tas\tdangerous\tas\tBerlin\tthinks.","Two\tconcepts\tof\tliberty? Most\treaders\tof\tBerlin\u2019s\tessay\tcome\taway\twith\tthe\tidea\tthat\tthe\tdifference\tbetween negative\t and\t positive\t liberty\t is\t that\t between\t \u2018freedom\t from\u2019\t and\t \u2018freedom\t to\u2019. Advocates\t of\t negative\t liberty,\t they\t think,\t believe\t that\t freedom\t is\t essentially\t to\t do with\t being\t free\t from\t things\t (constraints,\t obstacles\t or\t interference),\t whereas advocates\tof\tpositive\tliberty\thold\tthat\tit\tis\trather\tto\tdo\twith\tbeing\tfree\tto\tdo\tthings. (There\tis\tno\tdifference\tworth\tworrying\tabout\tbetween\t\u2018liberty\u2019\tand\t\u2018freedom\u2019,\tso\tI use\t the\t two\t interchangeably.)\t This\t is\t a\t mistake.\t If\t there\t is\t a\t distinction\t between neg ative\t and\t po sitive\t liber ty\t it\t is\t no t\t this\t o ne.\t T he\t \u2018fr eedo m\t fr o m\u2019\t v.\t \u2018fr eedo m\t to \u2019 distinction\t is\t a\t red\t herring.\t The\t way\t to\t see\t this\t is\t to\t notice\t that\t all\t freedoms\t are both\tfreedoms\t\u2018from\u2019\tand\tfreedoms\t\u2018to\u2019.\tTake\tany\tliberty\tyou\tlike,\tit\twill\tbe\tboth\ta freedom\t from\t and\t a\t freedom\t to.\t Take,\t for\t example,\t the\t kind\t of\t freedom\t much beloved\t of\t advocates\t of\t negative\t liberty\t (the\t kind\t Berlin\t likes):\t the\t individual\u2019s religious\tfreedom.\tIs\tthis\tfreedom\t\u2018from\u2019\t\u2013\tfreedom\tfrom\tthe\tstate\ttelling\tyou\twhat religion\tyou\tcan\tpractise?\tOr\tis\tit\tfreedom\t\u2018to\u2019\t\u2013\tfreedom\tto\tpractise\tthe\treligion\tof your\t choice?\t Take\t the\t kind\t of\t freedom\t that\t might\t be\t endorsed\t by\t advocates\t of\t a more\tpositive\tconception\tof\tfreedom\t(the\tkind\tthat\tBerlin\tdoesn\u2019t\tlike):\tfreedom\tas rational\tself-direction.\tIs\tthis\tfreedom\t\u2018to\u2019\t\u2013\tfreedom\tto\tdo\tthe\trational\tthing,\tor\tto act\tin\taccordance\twith\tyour\trational\tself?\tOr\tis\tit\tfreedom\t\u2018from\u2019\t\u2013\tfreedom\tfrom emotion,\t or\t ignorance\t or\t desire,\t or\t whatever\t else\t might\t prevent\t you\t from\t acting rationally? In\t a\t well-known\t critique\t of\t Berlin\u2019s\t essay,\t the\t American\t philosopher\t Gerald MacCallum\t (1925\u201387)\t argued\t that\t Berlin\t was\t wrong\t to\t think\t that\t there\t are\t two concepts\t of\t liberty,\t and\t very\t wrong\t if\t he\t thought\t that\t there\t was\t any\t difference between\t \u2018freedom\t from\u2019\t and\t \u2018freedom\t to\u2019.\t According\t to\t MacCallum,\t all\t claims about\tfreedom\thave\tthe\tfollowing\tform: x\tis\t(is\tnot)\tfree\tfrom\ty\tto\tdo\t(not\tdo,\tbecome,\tnot\tbecome)\tz Freedom\tis\ta\ttriadic\trelation.\tIt\tnecessarily\tinvolves\treference\tto\tthree\tthings:\tx,\tthe agent\tor\tsubject\tof\tfreedom;\ty,\tthe\tconstraint\tor\tinterference\tor\tobstacle;\tand\tz,\tthe goal\t or\t end.\t Whatever\t claim\t about\t freedom\t you\t have\t in\t mind,\t it\t will\t contain\t \u2013 explicitly\t o r \t implicitly\t \u2013\t the\t idea\t o f\t an\t ag ent\t being \t fr ee\t fr o m\t so mething \t to \t do \t o r become\tsomething.\tWhat\tpeople\twho\tdisagree\tabout\tliberty\tdisagree\tabout\tis\twhat counts\tas\tan\tx,\twhat\tcounts\tas\ta\ty\tand\twhat\tcounts\tas\ta\tz. For\tMacCallum,\tBerlin\u2019s\ttalk\tabout\tthere\tbeing\ttwo\tconcepts\tof\tliberty\tis\tdoubly confusing.\tIn\tthe\tfirst\tplace,\tthere\tis\tonly\tone\tconcept,\tthe\tone\toutlined\tin\tthe\ttriadic formula.\tPeople\tdisagree\tnot\tin\ttheir\tviews\tabout\tthe\tconcept\tof\tliberty\tbut\tin\ttheir views\t about\t conceptions\t of\t it.\t Conceptions\t differ\t because\t there\t are\t differences\t of","opinion\tabout\twhat\tshould\tbe\tregarded\tas\tan\tagent,\ta\tconstraint\tand\ta\tgoal.\tNow\tthis is\tconsistent\twith\tthere\tbeing\ttwo\tconceptions\tof\tliberty.\tIf\tthere\twere\tjust\ttwo\tways of\tfilling\tout\tMacCallum\u2019s\tformula,\tthen\twe\tmight\tsensibly\tsay\tthat\tthere\twere\ttwo conceptions\t of\t liberty\t \u2013\t and\t we\t could\t rescue\t Berlin\t simply\t by\t substituting \u2018conception\u2019\t wherever\t he\t says\t \u2018concept\u2019.\t But\t there\t aren\u2019t\t just\t two\t ways\t of\t filling out\tthe\tformula.\tThere\tare\tlots\tof\tdifferent\tways,\tand\tany\tattempt\tto\tdivide\tthem\tinto two\tcategories\tor\ttypes\t\u2013\tas\tBerlin\tdoes\t\u2013\tis\tlikely\tto\tbe\tunhelpful.\tIt\tcan\tbe\tuseful to\t divide\t them\t into\t categories.\t There\t are\t interesting\t ways\t of\t grouping\t different conceptions,\t as\t we\t shall\t see.\t But\t trying\t to\t fit\t them\t into\t just\t two\t boxes\t \u2013\t called \u2018negative\u2019\tand\t\u2018positive\u2019\t\u2013\tis\ttoo\tcrude. On\t this\t view,\t if\t we\t want\t to\t think\t about\t the\t differences\t between\t conceptions\t of freedom,\t we\t should\t focus\t on\t how\t they\t regard\t the\t agent,\t what\t they\t regard\t as constraints\ton\tthat\tagent\tand\twhat\tthey\tregard\tas\tthat\tagent\u2019s\tgoals\tor\tends.\tThat\tis the\t way\t precisely\t and\t carefully\t to\t identify\t what\t is\t going\t on\t in\t debates\t about fr eedo m.\t And,\t having \t identified\t the\t differ ent\t views\t available,\t we\t can\t star t\t to \t think about\twhich\tconception\twe\tourselves\tfavour.\tSome\tissues\tconcern\tthe\tagent.\tIs\tthe agent\tthe\tempirical\tindividual\tthat\twe\tobserve?\tOr\tis\tit\ther\trational\tor\t\u2018higher \u2019\tor \u2018moral\u2019\t self?\t Or\t is\t it\t a\t collective\t or\t group,\t such\t as\t a\t nation\t or\t class?\t Others\t are about\twhat\tcounts\tas\ta\tconstraint.\tIs\tit\tonly\tintentional\tor\tdeliberate\tinterference\tby others?\t Can\t one\t be\t made\t unfree\t by\t one\u2019s\t own\t desires\t (such\t as\t one\u2019s\t desire\t for\t a cigarette)?\t Does\t poverty\t restrict\t freedom?\t Still\t others\t have\t to\t do\t with\t goals.\t Is somebody\tunfree\tjust\twhen\tthey\tare\tprevented\tfrom\tdoing\twhat\tthey\twant\tto\tdo?\tOr what\t they\t might\t want\t to\t do?\t Or\t from\t whatever\t would\t amount\t to\t true\t self- realization\tfor\tthem?\tThese\tare\tthe\tdifficult\tand\timportant\tissues\traised\tby\tBerlin\u2019s essay.\tThe\tnext\tsection\taims\tto\tbring\tthem\tinto\tfocus.","Three\tdistinctions\tbetween\tconceptions\tof\tliberty I\u2019ve\tsuggested\tthat\tit\tis\tnot\thelpful\tto\tdivide\tconceptions\tof\tfreedom\tinto\t\u2018freedom fr o m\u2019\t and\t \u2018fr eedo m\t to \u2019.\t The\t thr ee\t distinctio ns\t o utlined\t belo w\t ar e\t (I\t ho pe)\t helpful. Each\tof\tthese\tis\tmentioned\tby\tBerlin\tas\tpart\tof\tthe\t\u2018negative\u2019\tv.\t\u2018positive\u2019\tdistinction but,\tbecause\tthey\tare\tdifferent,\this\trunning\tthem\ttogether\tgets\tin\tthe\tway\tof\ta\tclear understanding\tof\twhat\tis\tgoing\ton.\tIn\tparticular,\twe\u2019ll\tsee\tthat\the\tlabels\tas\t\u2018positive freedom\u2019\t what\t are\t really\t three\t quite\t different\t conceptions.\t This\t will\t help\t us understand\thow\tBlair\tcould\tendorse\tsomething\the\tcalled\tpositive\tfreedom\twhile\tnot taking\teven\tthe\tfirst\tstep\ton\tthe\troad\tto\ttotalitarianism.","1\t\tEffective\tfreedom\tv.\tformal\tfreedom The\t difference\t between\t effective\t and\t formal\t freedom\t is\t the\t difference\t between having\t the\t power\t or\t capacity\t to\t act\t in\t a\t certain\t way\t and\t the\t mere\t absence\t of interference.\tThe\tfact\tthat\tnobody\tis\tpreventing\tyou\tfrom\tdoing\tsomething\tdoes\tnot necessarily\tmean\tthat\tyou\tcan\tactually\tdo\tit.\tAre\tyou\tfree\tto\tdo\tit\t\u2013\tbecause\tnobody is\tstopping\tyou?\tOr\tunfree\t\u2013\tbecause\tyou\tare\tnot\table\tto\tdo\tit? Consider\t whether\t all\t British\t citizens\t are\t free\t to\t go\t on\t holiday\t to\t the\t Bahamas. Those\tanswering\t\u2018yes\u2019\tmight\tsay:\t\u2018There\tis\tno\tlaw\tagainst\tBritish\tcitizens\tgoing\ton holiday\tthere.\tCompare\tBritain\twith\ta\tcountry\t\u2013\tTotalitaria\t\u2013\tthat\tdenies\tits\tcitizens the\tright\tto\tgo\tanywhere\ton\tholiday.\tThe\tcitizens\tof\tTotalitaria\tare\tnot\tfree\tto\tgo\ton holiday\tto\tthe\tBahamas,\tbecause\tthere\tis\ta\tlaw\tpreventing\tthem\tfrom\tdoing\tso.\tBut Britain\t has\t no\t such\t law,\t so\t its\t citizens\t do\t have\t the\t freedom\t in\t question.\u2019\t Those answering\t \u2018no\u2019\t might\t respond:\t \u2018It\t is\t true\t that\t there\t is\t no\t law\t preventing\t British citizens\tfrom\tgoing\ton\tholiday\tto\tthe\tBahamas.\tBut\tit\tis\ta\tcruel\tjoke\tto\tpretend\tthat all\t citizens\t ar e\t ther eby\t fr ee\t to \t do \t so .\t Tho se\t citizens\t living \t in\t po ver ty,\t with\t bar ely enough\t money\t to\t get\t through\t the\t week,\t are\t obviously\t not\t free\t to\t go\t on\t such\t a holiday.\t They\t may\t have\t the\t formal\t freedom\t \u2013\t in\t the\t narrow\t legalistic\t sense\t that nobody\t is\t actually\t preventing\t them\t from\t doing\t so\t \u2013\t but\t they\t do\t not\t have\t the effective\tfreedom.\u2019 This\t is\t the\t debate\t about\t freedom\t with\t most\t relevance\t to\t contemporary\t politics. Very\troughly,\tthe\tright\targues\tthat\tfreedom\tis\tessentially\tabout\tnot\tbeing\tinterfered with\tby\tothers,\tso\tfreedom\tis\tbest\tpromoted\tby\ta\tstate\tthat\tdoes\tas\tlittle\tas\tpossible and\ta\tlaissez-faire\tfree-market\teconomy,\twhile\tthe\tleft\tclaims\tthat\tthere\tis\tmore\tto freedom\t than\t not\t being\t interfered\t with.\t People\u2019s\t real\t or\t effective\t (or,\t sometimes, \u2018positive\u2019)\tfreedom\tcan\tbe\tpromoted\tnot\tjust\tby\tleaving\tthem\talone,\tbut\tby\tputting them\t in\t a\t position\t to\t do\t things\t they\t would\t not\t otherwise\t be\t able\t to\t do.\t The\t right wants\tto\tlimit\tthe\trole\tof\tthe\tstate\t\u2013\tperhaps\tall\tthe\tway\tdown\tto\tthe\t\u2018nightwatchman\u2019 role\tadvocated\tby\tNozick\t(as\tdiscussed\tin\tPart\t1).\tThe\tleft\tclaims\tthat\ta\tmore\tactive, interventionist,\t redistributive\t and\t \u2018enabling\u2019\t state\t can\t be\t justified\t on\t freedom grounds.\tAccording\tto\tthe\tleft,\tthe\tright\tis\twedded\tto\ta\tsimplistic\t\u2018negative\u2019\tview\tof freedom,\twhereas\tthe\tleft\tsees\tfreedom\tin\ta\tmore\t\u2018positive\u2019\tway.\tIt\tis\tthis\t\u2018positive\u2019 conception\tof\tfreedom\tthat\tBlair\twas\tseeking\tto\tdefend. This\t distinction\t can,\t of\t course,\t be\t expressed\t in\t terms\t of\t MacCallum\u2019s\t triadic relation.\t Those\t endorsing\t this\t variant\t of\t the\t \u2018positive\u2019\t view\t think\t that\t poverty,\t or lack\t of\t resources,\t counts\t as\t a\t constraint\t on\t freedom\t \u2013\t as\t a\t y\t in\t his\t formula. Whereas\tthose\tendorsing\tthe\t\u2018negative\u2019\tview\tthink\tthat\tonly\tdeliberate\tinterference by\t others\t (for\t example,\t by\t laws\t prohibiting\t particular\t actions)\t counts\t as\t such\t a constraint.\tThe\tsuggestion\tby\tthe\tleft\tis\tthat\tthe\tright\thas\tan\tunreasonably\trestricted view\tof\twhat\tcounts\tas\tinterference.\tGiving\tpeople\tmoney\tincreases\ttheir\teffective","freedom.\t So\t too\t does\t giving\t them\t education\t or\t healthcare.\t With\t education\t and\t in goo d\t health,\t they\t ar e\t fr ee\t to \t take\t advantag e\t o f\t oppor tunities\t that\t wo uld\t o ther wise not\t really\t be\t available\t to\t them.\t They\t might\t be\t formally\t available.\t But,\t for\t some people,\tgovernment\taction\tis\tneeded\tto\tmake\tthe\tfreedom\tto\ttake\tadvantage\tof\tthem real\tor\teffective. This\tconception\tof\tfreedom\tas\teffective\t\u2013\trather\tthan\tformal\t\u2013\tfreedom\tis\tone\tof the\t thing s\t that\t Ber lin\t calls\t \u2018po sitive\u2019\t fr eedo m,\t and\t o ne\t o f\t the\t thing s\t that\t he\t war ns ag ainst.\t We\t sho uld\t no t,\t acco r ding \t to \t him,\t co nfuse\t fr eedo m\t with\t \u2018the\t co nditio ns\t o f its\t exercise\u2019.\t On\t this\t view,\t all\t British\t citizens\t are\t free\t to\t go\t on\t holiday\t to\t the Bahamas.\tSome\thave\tthe\tconditions\tto\texercise\tthat\tfreedom,\twhereas\tothers\tdo\tnot. If\twe\tendorse\ta\tconception\tof\teffective\tfreedom,\twe\tare\tconfusing\tfreedom,\twhich sho uld\t r eally\t be\t under sto o d\t in\t ter ms\t o f\t the\t \u2018neg ative\u2019\t idea\t o f\t no n-inter fer ence\t by others,\twith\tother\tvalues\tlike\tequality\tor\tjustice.\tBerlin\tis\there\twarning\tagainst\tthe optimistic\t thought\t that\t all\t good\t things\t necessarily\t coincide.\t Even\t if\t equality\t or justice\trequires\tredistribution\tof\tresources\tfrom\tsome\tto\tothers,\twe\tshouldn\u2019t\tclaim that\t such\t r edistr ibutio n\t pr o mo tes\t fr eedo m\t also .\t The\t state\t may\t be\t r ig ht\t to \t inter fer e in\tpeople\u2019s\tlives\tin\tthe\tname\tof\tjustice\tor\tequality,\tbut\tit\tis\tdangerously\tmisleading to\tclaim\tthat\tthat\taction\tcan\tbe\tjustified\tby\tappeal\tto\tthe\tvalue\tof\tfreedom.\tBerlin\tis right\tthat\tone\tshould\tgenerally\tbe\tcareful\tto\tkeep\tone\u2019s\tconcepts\tdistinct,\trather\tthan letting\t them\t blur\t into\t a\t fuzzy\t mess.\t But\t it\t doesn\u2019t\t follow\t that\t people\t living\t in poverty\t are\t free\t to\t go\t on\t holiday\t to\t the\t Bahamas,\t lacking\t merely\t the\t conditions needed\tto\texercise\tthat\tfreedom. Now\t I\u2019m\t going\t to\t complicate\t things.\t Everything\t I\u2019ve\t said\t about\t it\t so\t far\t has assumed\t that\t the\t distinctio n\t between\t fo r mal\t and\t effective\t fr eedo m\t is\t indeed\t a\t r eal distinction.\tIt\tis\tcertainly\tone\tthat\tplays\ta\trole\tin\tpolitical\targument.\tBut\tlet\u2019s\tpress\tat it\tto\tsee\twhat\tis\treally\tgoing\ton.\tThe\tcontrast,\tin\tthe\texample,\tis\tbetween\tTotalitaria, whose\t citizens\t are\t actually\t not\t allowed\t to\t go\t on\t holiday,\t and\t Britain,\t where\t all citizens\tare\tallowed\tto\tgo\tbut\tsome\tdon\u2019t\thave\tthe\tmoney.\tIn\tthe\tformer,\tthere\tis\ta law\t that\t sto ps\t peo ple\t g o ing .\t In\t the\t latter,\t it\u2019s\t their \t lack\t o f\t r eso ur ces.\t Bo th\t sides\t to the\t dispute\t I\t outlined\t would\t accept\t this\t description\t of\t the\t situation.\t What\t they disagree\t about\t is\t what\t counts\t as\t a\t constraint\t on\t freedom.\t But\t is\t this\t actually\t the right\tway\tto\tdescribe\tthe\tsituation? Think\tabout\twhat\thappens,\tin\tBritain,\twhen\tsomebody\twith\tno\tmoney\ttries\tto\tgo on\t holiday\t to\t the\t Bahamas.\t She\t walks\t or\t hitches\t a\t lift\t to\t the\t airport,\t she\t tries\t to board\t the\t plane,\t she\t is\t stopped\t at\t the\t gate\t because\t she\t doesn\u2019t\t have\t a\t ticket\t (and can\u2019t\t afford\t to\t buy\t one,\t even\t though,\t let\u2019s\t suppose,\t there\t are\t empty\t seats),\t she per sists\t in\t tr ying \t to \t g et\t o n\t bo ar d\t \u2013\t she\t r eally\t wants\t this\t holiday\t \u2013\t and\t eventually, after \t a\t str ug g le,\t she\t is\t ar r ested\t by\t the\t secur ity\t g uar ds\t o r \t air po r t\t po lice.\t What\t is\t it that\t is\t preventing\t her\t from\t going\t on\t holiday?\t It\t is\t the\t law.\t The\t law\t that\t says\t that people\tmust\thave\ta\tvalid\tticket\tbefore\tthey\tcan\tfly.\tTotalitaria\thas\ta\tlaw\tthat\tprevents","any\t citizen\t fr o m\t g o ing \t o n\t ho liday.\t Br itain\t has\t a\t law\t that\t pr events\t any\t citizen\t who does\tnot\thave\ta\tticket\tfrom\tdoing\tso.\tSo\twhat\tactually\tstops\tour\tpoor\tperson\tis\tnot simply\t her\t lack\t of\t money,\t but\t that\t in\t combination\t with\t the\t law\t of\t the\t land,\t as enforced\t by\t the\t police.\t This\t is\t deliberate\t interference\t by\t others\t \u2013\t just\t like\t the interference\tin\tTotalitaria.\t We\t have\t set\t up\t the\t rules\t for\t our\t society\t in\t such\t a\t way that\tthose\twithout\tthe\tmoney\tto\tpay\tfor\ta\tticket\t(or\tto\tget\tone\tby\tsome\tother\tmeans) are\tnot\tallowed\tto\tgo\ton\tthe\tholiday. These\tmay\twell\tbe\tthe\tright\trules.\tI\u2019m\tnot\tsuggesting\tthat\tanybody\twho\twants\tto should\t be\t able\t to\t get\t on\t any\t plane\t (nor\t even\t that\t exotic\t holidays\t should\t be distributed\trandomly,\tby\tballot,\tso\tthat\tpeople\u2019s\tchances\tof\tgetting\tone\thave\tnothing to\t do\t with\t how\t much\t money\t they\t have).\t The\t law\t restricting\t the\t freedom\t of\t those witho ut\t the\t means\t to \t g et\t a\t ticket\t may\t well\t be\t a\t justified\t law,\t and\t the\t r estr ictio n\t o f fr eedo m\t it\t implies\t may\t well\t be\t a\t justified\t r estr ictio n.\t The\t po int\t o f\t the\t example\t is very\tspecific.\tIt\tis\tsimply\tto\tbring\tout\tthe\tfact\tthat\tthe\tkind\tof\tconstraint\ton\tfreedom in\t question\t is\t the\t law\t backed\t up\t by\t the\t coercive\t power\t of\t the\t state\t \u2013\t just\t like\t the kind\t of\t constraint\t on\t freedom\t in\t Totalitaria.\t Having\t money\t gives\t you\t the\t legal right\tto\tdo\tthings\tthat\tyou\twould\tnot\totherwise\thave\tthe\tright\tto\t(i.e.,\tbe\tfree\tto)\tdo: get\t bread\t if\t you\u2019re\t hungry,\t a\t roof\t over\t your\t head\t if\t you\t lack\t shelter.\t We\t may\t be r ig ht\t to \t have\t the\t laws\t abo ut\t pr ivate\t pr o per ty\t and\t mo ney\t that\t we\t do .\t But\t we\t sho uld acknowledge\tthat\tsuch\tlaws\timply\tdeliberate\trestriction\tby\tthe\tstate\t(in\ta\tdemocratic state,\tby\tthe\tpeople\tas\ta\twhole)\tof\tpeople\u2019s\tchoices\tabout\thow\tthey\tlive\ttheir\tlives. They\tare,\tin\tthat\tsense,\t\u2018formal\u2019\trestrictions\ton\tpeople\u2019s\tfreedom. This\t doesn\u2019t\t mean\t that\t the\t distinction\t between\t formal\t and\t effective\t freedom\t is completely\t useless\t \u2013\t another\t red\t herring\t like\t \u2018freedom\t from\u2019\t and\t \u2018freedom\t to\u2019. Unlike\tthe\t\u2018from\u2019\tv.\t\u2018to\u2019\tdistinction,\tthere\treally\tis\tsomething\tat\tstake\tbetween\tthose who\t hold\t the\t different\t views.\t If\t the\t last\t three\t paragraphs\t are\t right,\t then\t the\t way those\tviews\tare\tsometimes\tcharacterized\t(restriction\tas\tlaw\tv.\trestriction\tas\tlack\tof resources)\tcan\tbe\tmisleading.\tBut\tthose\twho\tdo\tand\tdo\tnot\tthink\tredistribution\tcan be\tjustified\tin\tthe\tname\tof\tfreedom\tdo\tstill\tdisagree,\tand\tdisagree\tabout\tsomething important.\tIt\thelps\tto\tdiscuss\twhat\tthey\u2019re\tdisagreeing\tabout.\tRemember\ttoo\tthat\tthe formal\t v.\t effective\t distinction\t does\t not\t always\t have\t something\t to\t do\t with\t money and\t law.\t Think\t about\t somebody\t who\t is\t very\t ill,\t and\t cannot\t pursue\t her\t preferred career\t without\t medical\t treatment.\t If\t freedom\t were\t merely\t absence\t of\t interference by\t o ther s,\t we\t wo uld\t have\t to \t say\t that\t she\t is\t fr ee\t to \t pur sue\t that\t car eer \t \u2013\t she\t simply lacks\tthe\teffective\tcapacity\t(here\thealth)\tto\tdo\tit.\tArmed\twith\tthe\tdistinction\tbetween formal\t and\t effective\t freedom,\t we\t could,\t if\t we\t wanted,\t say\t that\t while\t nobody\t is preventing\ther\tfrom\tpursuing\tthat\tcareer,\tso\tshe\tis\tformally\tfree\tto\tdo\tso,\tshe\twill not\thave\tthe\teffective\tfreedom\tto\tpursue\tit\tunless\tshe\tis\tgiven\tthe\tmedical\ttreatment. Here\t is\t a\t different\t kind\t of\t example\t where\t the\t distinction\t between\t formal\t and effective\tfreedom\tlooks\tcapable\tof\tdoing\tsome\twork,\tand\twhere\tthe\tstate\tmight\tbe","thought\table\tto\tact\tto\tpromote\tthe\teffective\tfreedom\tof\tsome\tof\tits\tcitizens\t(in\tthis case\t by\t providing\t medical\t care).\t It\u2019s\t different\t because\t the\t restriction\t on\t effective freedom\t\u2013\tthe\ty\tof\tMacCallum\u2019s\tformula\t\u2013\tis\tnot\tlack\tof\tmoney\t(and\thence\tlaw,\ta deliberate\tcreation\tprecisely\tdesigned\tto\tstop\tpeople\tdoing\tthings),\tbut\tpoor\thealth.","2\tFreedom\tas\tautonomy\tv.\tfreedom\tas\tdoing\twhat\tone\twants The\tsecond\tdistinction\tis\tcompletely\tdifferent\tfrom\tthe\tfirst\tbut\talso\tgets\tcalled\tthe distinction\t between\t negative\t and\t positive\t liberty.\t This\t is\t the\t difference\t between freedom\t as\t autonomy\t and\t freedom\t as\t doing\t what\t one\t wants.\t Autonomy,\t literally, means\t\u2018self-rule\u2019\tor\t\u2018self-law\u2019\t(\u2018auto\u2019\tas\tin\t\u2018auto-mobile\u2019\t\u2013\ta\tcar\tthat\tgoes\tby\titself; \u2018nomy\u2019\t as\t in\t \u2018astronomy\u2019\t \u2013\t a\t science\t concerned\t to\t discover\t the\t rules\t or\t laws governing\tthe\tstars).\tThe\tthought\tbehind\tthis\tdistinction\tis\tthat\tsomebody\tcould\tbe doing\twhat\tshe\twanted\twithout\treally\truling\t(or\tbeing\tin\tcontrol\tof,\tor\tgoverning) herself.\t She\t would\t then\t have\t negative\t freedom\t \u2013\t nobody\t is\t interfering\t with\t her\t \u2013 but\t would\t she\t have\t positive\t freedom?\t Would\t she\t have\t the\t kind\t of\t freedom\t that consists\tof\tbeing\tin\tcontrol\tof\tone\u2019s\tlife? It\t sho uld\t be\t clear \t ho w\t this\t differ s\t fr o m\t the\t pr evio us\t distinctio n.\t No thing \t in\t my discussion\t of\t formal\t and\t effective\t freedom\t called\t into\t question\t the\t idea\t that fr eedo m\t has\t to \t do \t with\t lack\t o f\t co nstr aint\t o n\t peo ple\u2019s\t do ing \t (o r \t being \t able\t to \t do ) what\tthey\twant\t(or\tmight\twant).\tIf\twe\tgive\tresources\tto\tthe\tpoor\tin\torder\tto\tincrease their\teffective\tfreedom,\twe\tare\tenabling\tthem\tto\tdo\tthings\tthey\twant\t(or\tmight\twant) to\tdo\tbut\twould\totherwise\tnot\tbe\table\tto\tdo.\tWe\tdo\tnot\tadd\tthe\tfurther\tthought:\t\u2018OK, no w\t they\u2019r e\t able\t to \t do \t mo r e\t o f\t what\t they\t mig ht\t want\t to \t do .\t But\t ar e\t they\t r eally\t in control\tof\ttheir\tlives?\tAre\tthey\treally\tliving\tan\tautonomous\tlife\trather\tthan\tsimply going\t along\t with\t whatever\t desires\t they\t happen\t to\t find\t themselves\t having?\u2019 Freedom\t as\t autonomy\t is\t more\t controversial\t than\t freedom\t as\t effective\t power\t or capacity\t to \t act.\t Why?\t Because\t it\t invo lves\t the\t tho ug ht\t that\t a\t per so n\t co uld\t be\t do ing what\t she\t wants\t to \t do \t but,\t because\t her \t wants\t do n\u2019t\t satisfy\t so me\t fur ther \t co nditio n\t \u2013 the\t condition\t that\t would\t make\t those\t wants\t autonomous\t \u2013\t she\t is\t not\t really\t free. Many\t people,\t including\t Berlin,\t think\t that\t this\t is\t a\t dangerous\t idea.\t It\t is\t this, according\tto\tBerlin,\tthat\teventually\tled\tto\tthe\tperverse\tsituation\twhereby\ttotalitarian regimes\tjustified\ttheir\trule\tin\tthe\tname\tof\tfreedom. Befo r e\t seeing \t why,\t let\u2019s\t stick\t with\t the\t distinctio n\t between\t effective\t fr eedo m\t and freedom\t as\t autonomy.\t Think\t about\t what\t the\t state\t is\t doing\t for\t people\t when\t it provides\teducation\tto\tthose\twho\twould\tnot\totherwise\treceive\tit.\tAn\teducated\tperson might\t be\t regarded\t as\t more\t free\t than\t an\t uneducated\t person\t in\t two\t quite\t different ways.\tFirst,\tshe\twill\thave\tmore\toptions\tavailable\tto\ther.\tSomeone\twho\tcan\tread,\tor programme\t a\t computer,\t is\t effectively\t free\t to\t do\t things\t \u2013\t such\t as\t get\t jobs\t that involve\treading\tor\tcomputer\tprogramming\t\u2013\tthat\tsomeone\twho\tdoes\tnot\thave\tthose skills\t is\t not\t effectively\t free\t to\t do.\t By\t teaching\t her,\t the\t state\t is\t increasing\t her effective\t freedom\t \u2013\t her\t freedom\t to\t do\t things\t she\t might\t want\t to\t do.\t In\t that\t sense, giving\t her\t education\t is\t like\t giving\t her\t money.\t But\t there\t is\t a\t second\t aspect\t to education\t that\t is\t not\t like\t money,\t and\t that\t is\t intimately\t related\t to\t freedom\t as autonomy.\t So meo ne\t who\t has\t been\t taught\t r elevant\t infor mation,\t and\t been\t taught\t to","process\t it,\t to\t think\t for\t herself,\t to\t consider\t consequences,\t to\t evaluate\t different courses\t of\t action,\t is\t more\t autonomous,\t more\t in\t charge\t of\t her\t own\t life,\t than somebody\twho\thas\tnot.\tThis\tis\tso\tquite\tindependently\tof\tthe\tfact\tthat\teducation\talso increases\t the\t range\t of\t options\t available\t to\t her.\t We\t might\t think\t of\t education\t as co ming \t in\t two \t par ts:\t the\t par t\t that\t incr eases\t yo ur \t effective\t fr eedo m,\t o pening \t do o r s that\t would\t not\t otherwise\t be\t open\t to\t you,\t and\t the\t part\t that\t makes\t you\t more autonomous,\ttelling\tyou\twhat\tdoors\tthere\tare\tand\tputting\tyou\tin\ta\tbetter\tposition\tto decide\twhich\tof\tthe\topen\tdoors\tyou\treally\tdo\twant\tto\twalk\tthrough. As\t well\t as\t helping\t get\t clear\t on\t the\t difference\t between\t effective\t freedom\t and freedom\t as\t autonomy,\t the\t education\t example\t also\t suggests\t that\t freedom\t as autonomy\tdoesn\u2019t\thave\tto\tbe\tscary.\tIf\tpart\tof\thaving\tautonomy\tis\tsimply\tbeing\table to \t think\t clear ly\t and\t make\t info r med\t judg ements\t abo ut\t what\t o ne\t wants,\t then\t it\t may seem\t hard\t to\t see\t what\t Berlin\t is\t worried\t about,\t hard\t to\t see\t where\t the\t totalitarian menace\tcomes\tin.\tIt\tis\tcertainly\timportant\tto\tsee\tthat\tautonomy\tcan\tbe\tunderstood\tin a\t relatively\t innocuous\t way.\t Indeed,\t I\t will\t end\t this\t part\t of\t the\t book\t by\t outlining various\t other\t ways\t in\t which\t freedom\t as\t autonomy\t need\t not\t be\t as\t dangerous\t as Berlin\tthinks.\tBut,\tto\tsee\twhat\tconcerns\tBerlin,\tthe\tconcept\tof\tautonomy\tneeds\tto\tbe r elated\t to\t the\t idea\t \u2013\t most\t systematically\t developed\t by\t Kant\t \u2013\t that\t we\t can\t think\t of each\tperson\tas\tdivided\tinto\ttwo\tdistinct\t\u2018selves\u2019.\tAn\t\u2018ideal\u2019,\tor\t\u2018inner \u2019,\tor\t\u2018higher \u2019, or\t \u2018rational\u2019,\t or\t \u2018true\u2019,\t or\t \u2018transcendental\u2019,\t or\t \u2018noumenal\u2019\t or\t \u2018moral\u2019\t self,\t and\t an \u2018empirical\u2019,\tor\t\u2018lower \u2019,\tor\t\u2018irrational\u2019,\tor\t\u2018emotional\u2019,\tor\t\u2018phenomenal\u2019\tor\t\u2018base\u2019 self.\tAutonomy\tis\tachieved\twhen\tthe\tfirst\tof\tthese\tselves\t\u2013\tlet\u2019s\tuse\tthe\tterm\t\u2018higher self\u2019\tfrom\tnow\ton\t\u2013\tis\tin\tcontrol\tof\tthe\t\u2018lower\tself\u2019.\tIf\tyou\tact\tin\taccordance\twith mere\tdesire\tor\temotion,\tthen\tyou\tare\tnot\treally\tin\tcontrol.\tYou\tare\tacting,\tin\tKant- speak,\theteronomously\t(\u2018hetero\u2019\t=\t\u2018other \u2019,\tas\tin\t\u2018hetero-sexual\u2019).\tIf\tyou\u2019ve\tever\tfelt torn\tbecause\tyou\twant\tto\tdo\tsomething\tbut\tsomething\tinside\tyou\t\u2013\tyour\thigher\tself \u2013\t tells\t you\t that\t you\t shouldn\u2019t\t (smoke?\t try\t to\t sleep\t with\t your\t best\t friend\u2019s bo yfr iend?),\t then\t yo u\u2019ll\t have\t so me\t under standing \t o f\t this\t idea.\t And\t if\t yo u\u2019ve\t ever gone\tagainst\tthat\tinner\tvoice,\tand\tfelt\tyourself\tto\tbe\tless\tfree\tthan\tyou\twould\thave been\tif\tyou\u2019d\tbeen\table\tto\tdo\twhat\tit\tsaid,\tthen\tyou\t\u2013\tlike\tKant\t\u2013\tthink\tthat\tthere\tis more\t to\t freedom\t than\t doing\t what\t you\t want.\t Where\t this\t idea\t gets\t dangerous,\t of course,\tis\twhen\tsomebody\telse\tclaims\tto\tknow\tbetter\tthan\tyou\twhat\tis\tthe\t\u2018rational\u2019 or\t\u2018higher \u2019\tthing\tfor\tyou\tto\tdo.\tThat\u2019s\twhen\tsomebody\telse\t(such\tas\tthe\tstate)\tmay be\ttempted\tto\tcome\talong\tand\tsay:\t\u2018You\tthink\tyou\twant\tA.\tBut\tthat\tis\tonly\twhat\tyour heteronomous\tself\twants.\tWhat\tyour\ttrue\tself\twants\tis\tB.\tSo\tI\u2019m\tgoing\tto\tgive\tyou B.\tThis\tmay\tfeel\tlike\ta\trestriction\ton\tyour\tfreedom,\tbut\tit\twon\u2019t\tbe\treally.\tActually, by\t g etting \t yo u\t to \t do \t what\t yo ur \t tr ue\t self\t r eally\t wants,\t I\u2019m\t making \t yo u\t mo r e\t fr ee.\u2019 The\t most\t famous\t phrase\t in\t Rousseau\u2019s\t most\t famous\t work\t The\t Social\t Contract (1762)\ttalks\tabout\tpeople\tbeing\t\u2018forced\tto\tbe\tfree\u2019.\tA\tphrase\twhich\tnicely\tcaptures the\tparadox\t(and\tdanger)\tin\tthis\tline\tof\tthought.","Of\t the\t var io us\t differ ent\t thing s\t that\t he\t calls\t \u2018po sitive\t liber ty\u2019,\t this\t is\t the\t o ne\t that Berlin\tis\tmost\tinterested\tin\tand\tconcerned\tabout.\tIt\tis\tthis\t\u2018divided\tself\u2019\tperspective that\t is\t central\t to\t the\t tradition\t in\t the\t history\t of\t political\t ideas\t which\t he\t charts\t so brilliantly,\tthe\ttradition\twhich\tbegins\twith\tRousseau\tand\tmoves\ton\tthrough\tGerman philosophical\tIdealism\t\u2013\tKant\t(1724\u20131804),\tFichte\t(1762\u20131814),\tHegel\t(1770\u20131831) and\t Marx\t (1818\u201383)\t \u2013\t to\t the\t totalitarian\t doctrines\t of\t national\t socialism\t and\t state communism.\tToday,\twith\tthe\tCold\tWar\tover,\tthe\tidea\tthat\thuman\tbeings\thave\tsome higher\t or\t true\t purpose\t which\t justifies\t a\t state\t forcing\t them\t to\t live\t their\t lives\t a certain\tway\t\u2013\tand\tthereby\tputs\tthem\ton\tthe\tpath\tto\ttrue\tfreedom\t\u2013\tis\tmost\tfrequently associated\t with\t religious\t doctrines.\t One\t thinks\t of\t the\t Taliban\t in\t Afghanistan, convinced\tof\ttheir\tfundamentalist\tversion\tof\tIslam\tand\tready\tto\tdeny\twomen,\tand\tof course\t religious\t dissidents,\t all\t kinds\t of\t conventional\t freedoms.\t Berlin\t was essentially\taiming\tat\tsecular\tdoctrines\thostile\tto\tthe\tkind\tof\tfreedom\the\tcared\tabout. But,\t as\t when\t Locke\t and\t other\t key\t figures\t in\t the\t liberal\t tradition\t developed\t their arguments,\this\tmore\tobvious\tenemy\ttoday\twould\tbe\tintolerant\tstate\treligion. One\t development\t within\t this\t way\t of\t thinking\t about\t positive\t freedom\t was particularly\timportant.\tWhat\tone\tfinds\telements\tof\tin\tRousseau\u2019s\t\u2018general\twill\u2019,\tand which\tis\tcompletely\texplicit\tby\tthe\ttime\tone\treaches\tHegel,\tFichte\tand\tMarx,\tis\tnot just\t the\t positing\t of\t a\t higher\t self\t \u2018inside\u2019\t the\t individual\t but\t also\t the\t positing\t of\t a collective\t\u2018higher \u2019\tself.\tFor\tFichte,\tthis\twas\tthe\tnation\t(he\twas\ta\tmajor\tinfluence\ton Nazism).\tFor\tMarx,\tit\twas\tthe\tproletariat\t\u2013\twhich\trepresents,\tfor\thim,\ttrue\thumanity as\t a\t whole.\t The\t individual\u2019s\t higher\t self\t is\t that\t element\t within\t her\t which\t puts\t the interest\t of\t the\t collective\t above\t her\t own\t individual\t interests.\t Not\t only,\t then,\t is\t the true\t subject\t of\t freedom\t something\t other\t than\t the\t empirical\t self\t \u2013\t with\t her\t actual desires,\t beliefs\t and\t emotions;\t it\t becomes,\t in\t these\t theorists,\t something\t other\t than the\t individual.\t And\t o nce\t we\t think\t o f\t fr eedo m\t as\t so mething \t that\t is\t achieved\t by\t the collective\t\u2013\tby\tthe\tnation\tor\tclass\tor\trace\t\u2013\twhen\tit\tachieves\tits\ttrue\tpurpose\t(world domination,\tcommunism),\tthen\tit\tbecomes\teven\teasier\tto\tdenigrate\tthe\tfreedom\tof empirical\tindividuals\tto\tdo\twhat\tthey\thappen\tto\twant\tto\tdo. This\t is\t the\t story\t that\t Berlin\t cares\t most\t about,\t and\t it\t correctly\t identifies\t a pr o fo und\t differ ence\t between\t co nceptio ns\t o f\t liber ty.\t That\u2019s\t why,\t if\t I\t had\t my\t way,\t I would\t insist\t that\t the\t term\t \u2018positive\t liberty\u2019\t should\t be\t restricted\t to\t this\t idea\t of freedom\tas\tautonomy.\tUsing\tthat\tterm\talso\tto\tdescribe\tthe\ttwo\tother\tideas\tI\u2019ve\tlaid out\t does\t Berlin\t and\t us\t no\t favours.\t Clearly\t one\t could\t agree\t with\t Tony\t Blair\t that freedom\tshould\tmean\teffective\t(and\tnot\tmerely\tformal)\tfreedom,\twhile\tdisagreeing with\tKant\t\u2013\tlet\talone\this\tcollectivist\tdescendants\t\u2013\tthat\tfreedom\tconsists\tin\trational self-direction\tor\tliving\tin\taccordance\twith\tthe\tone\ttrue\tfaith\t(rather\tthan\tdoing\twhat one\t wants).\t To\t evaluate\t claims\t about\t freedom\t properly,\t we\t need\t first\t carefully\t to distinguish\t and\t identify\t them.\t Then\t we\t can\t take\t them\t one\t at\t a\t time\t and\t be\t clear about\twhat\tis\tat\tstake\tin\teach\tcase.","As\tMacCallum\u2019s\tformula\timplies,\tthe\tdifferences\tI\u2019ve\tbeen\ttalking\tabout\tconcern what\tcounts\tas\tan\tagent\tx,\ta\tconstraint\ty,\tand\ta\tgoal\tz.\tIs\tfreedom\tessentially\ta\tmatter of\t empirical\t individuals\t (x)\t being\t free\t from\t interference\t by\t other\t empirical individuals\t(y)\t to\t act\t o n\t their \t wants\t (z)?\t (In\t his\t Leviathan\t (1651),\t Tho mas\t Hobbes said:\t\u2018A\tfree\tman\tis\the\tthat\t\u2026\tis\tnot\thindered\tto\tdo\twhat\the\thath\tthe\twill\tto\tdo.\u2019)\tIs\tit a\t matter\t of\t higher\t selves\t being\t free\t from\t desire\t or\t emotion\t or\t ignorance\t to\t act rationally\t or\t achieve\t self-realization?\t Or\t of\t a\t nation\t achieving\t freedom\t from domination\t by\t an\t imperial\t power\t to\t determine\t its\t own\t laws?\t There\t are\t many different\tways\tof\tspecifying\tthe\tconception\tof\tfreedom\tas\tautonomy,\tso\twe\tshould think\t o f\t this\t co nceptio n\t as\t a\t family\t o f\t mo r e\t specific\t co nceptio ns.\t On\t so me\t views, like\tKant\u2019s,\tfreedom\tconsists\tin\tacting\tmorally.\tOn\tother,\tmore\tRomantic,\tviews,\tit consists\t in\t the\t true\t expression\t of\t the\t self.\t It\t may\t be\t identified\t with\t a\t life\t spent\t in accordance\t with\t the\t one\t true\t faith.\t What\t all\t these\t have\t in\t common\t is\t a\t notion\t of agency\t (x)\t which\t allows\t that\t there\t can\t be\t internal\t constraints\t on\t freedom\t \u2013\t that freedom\tcan\tbe\tlimited\tby\tinner\tfactors\t(such\tas\tdesires),\tnot\tjust\tthe\tinterference\tof external\tothers.","3\tFreedom\tas\tpolitical\tparticipation\tv.\tfreedom\tbeginning\twhere\tpolitics ends A\t third\t way\t in\t which\t Berlin\t draws\t the\t distinction\t between\t positive\t and\t negative freedom\t contrasts\t those\t who\t see\t freedom\t as\t being\t achieved\t through\t political activity\t with\t those\t who\t see\t freedom\t as\t being\t essentially\t to\t do\t with\t that\t sphere\t of activity\t which\t is\t left\t to\t the\t private\t individual.\t This\t variant\t of\t \u2018positive\t freedom\u2019 holds\t that\t one\t achieves\t true\t freedom\t through\t political\t participation\t in\t the\t state, through\t taking\t part\t in\t collective\t self-government,\t through\t being\t involved\t in making\tthe\tlaws\tunder\twhich\tone\tlives.\tThe\tcontrast\tis\twith\tthe\tmore\tconventional view\tthat\tthe\tlaws\tare\tthe\trules\tthat\tdetermine\twhat\tthe\tindividual\tis\tand\tis\tnot\tfree to\tdo. This\t version\t of\t positive\t freedom\t can\t clearly\t overlap\t with\t a\t \u2018freedom\t as autonomy\u2019\tconception.\tSuppose\twe\tidentify\tfreedom\twith\ttrue\tself-realization.\tAdd to \t this\t the\t tho ug ht\t that\t human\t being s\t achieve\t tr ue\t self-r ealizatio n\t thr o ug h\t po litical activity,\t and\t one\t will\t conclude\t that\t freedom\t is\t achieved\t through\t political\t activity. Aristotle\tthought\tthat\t\u2018man\tis\ta\tpolitical\tanimal\u2019,\tby\twhich\the\tpartly\tmeant\tthat\twhat is\t special\t about\t human\t beings\t \u2013\t what\t distinguishes\t them\t from\t other\t animals\t \u2013\t is their\t capacity\t to\t come\t together\t collectively\t to\t deliberate\t and\t decide\t how\t they\t are going\t to\t organize\t their\t society.\t Classical\t republicanism,\t on\t traditional interpretations,\t held\t just\t this\t view\t of\t freedom.\t For\t republicans,\t political participation\tis\tthe\ttrue\tend\tof\tman,\tthe\tprivileged\tlocus\tof\tthe\tgood\tlife\tfor\thuman being s,\t and\t thus\t the\t way\t to \t r eal\t fr eedo m.\t (Fo r \t Amer ican\t r eader s,\t I\t sho uld\t say\t that the\tkind\tof\t\u2018republicanism\u2019\tI\u2019m\ttalking\tabout\thas\tnothing\tto\tdo\twith\tmembership\tof the\tRepublican\tParty;\tfor\tBrits,\tthat\tit\tdoes\thave\tsomething\tto\tdo\twith\topposition\tto the\t monarchy.)\t This\t republican\t view\t is,\t of\t course,\t very\t different\t from\t the\t more commonsensical\t liberal\t view\t that\t freedom\t is\t to\t do\t with\t people\t being\t left\t to\t live their\t lives\t as\t they\t think\t best.\t In\t contemporary\t terminology,\t this\t kind\t of republicanism\t would\t be\t seen\t as\t too\t \u2018perfectionist\u2019\t \u2013\t or\t insufficiently\t neutral between\t r ival\t acco unts\t o f\t what\t is\t the\t g o o d\t life\t fo r \t human\t being s\t \u2013\t to \t justify\t state policy\tin\tits\tname.\t(The\tdifference\tbetween\tperfectionist\tand\tneutralist\tviews\tabout what\tthe\tstate\tcan\tdo\twill\tbe\texplained\tin\tPart\t4,\ton\tcommunity.) \u2018Freedom\tas\tpolitical\tparticipation\u2019\tcan\toverlap\twith\t\u2018freedom\tas\tautonomy\u2019\tin\ta different\tway\talso.\tSuppose\twe\tthink\tthat\tthere\thave\tto\tbe\tlaws\t\u2013\tif\tonly\tbecause\tthe alternative\tis\tthe\tstate\tof\tnature\t\u2013\tand\twe\taccept\tthat\twhat\tlaws\tdo\tis\trestrict\tpeople\u2019s freedom.\tA\tgood\tquestion\tis:\thow\tcan\tpeople\tlive\tunder\tlaw\tyet\tstill\tbe\tfree?\t(This was\tRousseau\u2019s\tquestion.)\tThere\tare\ttwo\tdifferent\tkinds\tof\tanswer\tto\tthis.\tThe\tfirst, and\tmore\tobvious,\tanswer\tis\tthat\tlaw\titself\tpromotes\tfreedom.\tThe\tlaw\tcan\trestrict people\u2019s\t freedom\t in\t the\t name\t of\t promoting\t their\t freedom.\t For\t example,\t the\t law against\t murder\t prevents\t me\t murdering\t \u2013\t thereby\t restricting\t my\t freedom\u2013\t but\t it","also \t pr events\t me\t being \t mur der ed\t \u2013\t ther eby\t pr o mo ting \t my\t fr eedo m.\t One\t str and\t o f tho ug ht\t under lying \t the\t so cial\t co ntr act\t tr aditio n\t is\t that\t it\t makes\t sense\t fo r \t peo ple\t to sacr ifice\t their \t fr eedo m\t to \t do \t whatever \t they\t like\t (such\t as\t mur der \t o ne\t ano ther )\t fo r the\tsake\tof\tfreedom\tunder\tlaw,\twhich,\ton\tthe\twhole,\tis\tmore\tworth\thaving.\tThis\tis the\tconventional\tliberal\taccount\tof\tthe\trole\tof\tthe\tstate.\tOn\tthis\taccount,\tthe\tkind\tof freedom\t promoted\t by\t law\t is\t negative\t liberty\t (such\t as\t the\t freedom\t not\t to\t be murdered).\tThis\tlink\tbetween\tlaw\tand\tliberty\tsays\tnothing\tabout\twho\tmakes\tthe\tlaw. My\t freedom\t not\t to\t be\t murdered\t may\t be\t protected\t by\t law\t even\t if\t that\t law\t was decided\tby\ta\tdictator. The\tsecond,\tmore\tinteresting\t\u2013\tand\tdistinctively\trepublican\t\u2013\tanswer\treminds\tus that\t autonomy\t means\t \u2018self-rule\u2019.\t Rousseau\t says\t that\t the\t most\t important\t kind\t of fr eedo m\t co nsists\t in\t o bedience\t to \t a\t law\t we\t g ive\t o ur selves.\t Ho w\t can\t we\t live\t under law\t but\t yet\t be\t fr ee?\t Seco nd\t answer :\t we\t can\t do \t that\t if\t we\t live\t under \t laws\t we\t have given\tto\tourselves.\tThat\tis\twhy\tthere\tis\ta\tkind\tof\tfreedom\tachieved\tby\tcitizens\tof\ta democracy,\tparticipating\tin\tthe\tmaking\tof\tthe\tlaw,\tthat\tis\tnot\tachieved\tby\tsubjects\tof a\t dictator\t (however\t much\t freedom\t of\t the\t more\t conventional,\t negative,\t kind\t that dictator\tgrants\tto\tthose\tsubjects).\tEven\tthose\twho\tare\toutvoted\t\u2013\tand\tso\tare\tforced to\tcomply\twith\tlaws\tthey\tdo\tnot\tthemselves\tfavour\t\u2013\tare\tfree\tin\tthe\tsense\tthat\tthey are\tequal\tmembers\tof\ta\tself-governing\tcollective\trather\tthan\tsubject\tto\tlaw\tdictated by\t others.\t This\t is\t freedom\t as\t non-domination.\t The\t slave\t of\t a\t liberal\t master\t may find\tthat\tshe\tis\tfree\tto\tdo\tall\tkinds\tof\tthings\tthat\tthe\tslave\tof\tan\tauthoritarian\tone\tis not\t free\t to\t do.\t But\t she\t is\t still\t not\t her\t own\t master.\t She\t is\t subject\t to\t the\t will\t of ano ther.\t Ho wever \t much\t her \t o wner \t may\t car e\t abo ut\t and\t lo o k\t after \t her,\t if\t he\t makes the\t decisions,\t she\t does\t not\t enjoy\t freedom\t as\t non-domination.\t In\t MacCallum\u2019s ter ms,\t this\t kind\t o f\t fr eedo m\t is\t fr eedo m\t o f\t a\t citizen\t (x)\t fr o m\t do minatio n\t by\t o ther s (y)\tto\tmake\tthe\trules\tshe\tis\tto\tlive\tunder\t(z). So\tfar,\tI\u2019ve\tdistinguished\ttwo\tways\tof\tspelling\tout\trepublican\tfreedom;\ttwo\tways in\t which\t political\t participation\t might\t be\t regarded\t as\t crucial\t to\t freedom,\t both\t of which\tcan\tbe\tput\tin\tterms\tof\tfreedom\tas\tautonomy.\tOne\tinvolves\tthe\tidea\tof\t\u2018self- realization\t through\t politics\u2019.\t The\t other\t involves\t \u2018freedom\t as\t living\t under\t laws you\u2019ve\t made\t for\t yourself\u2019.\t There\t is,\t I\u2019m\t afraid\t to\t say,\t a\t third\t account\t of\t the r epublican\t po sitio n.\t This\t ho lds\t that\t the\t kind\t o f\t fr eedo m\t r epublicans\t ar e\t inter ested in\t is\t neither\t the\t controversial\t and\t metaphysically\t dodgy\t \u2018freedom\t as\t self- realization\tvia\tpolitics\u2019,\tnor\tfreedom\tas\tnon-domination.\tOn\tthis\tthird\taccount,\tthe kind\t of\t freedom\t republicans\t care\t about\t is\t boring\t old\t negative\t freedom,\t the individual\u2019s\t freedom\t from\t interference\t by\t others.\t Political\t participation\t is\t crucial to\t freedom\t not\t because\t freedom\t is\t achieved\t in\t the\t very\t act\t of\t participation,\t nor because\t participation\t in\t making\t the\t laws\t one\t is\t to\t live\t by\t means\t that\t one\t is\t not subject\t to \t the\t will\t o f\t ano ther,\t but\t because\t par ticipatio n\t is\t the\t mo st\t effective\t means of\t protecting\t it.\t On\t this\t account,\t participation\t is\t instrumental\t to\t freedom,\t not","intrinsic\tto\tit.\tIf\tliberals\tand\trepublicans\tdisagree\tabout\tanything,\tthey\tdisagree\tnot abo ut\t the\t g o o d\t life\t fo r \t human\t being s,\t no r \t what\t co unts\t as\t fr eedo m.\t They\t disag r ee simply\t about\t whether,\t or\t to\t what\t extent,\t an\t active,\t engaged,\t politically\t aware citizenry\tis\tnecessary\tfor\tthe\tsecure\tprotection\tof\tnegative\tliberty. The\tinstrumental\trepublican\targument\truns\troughly\tas\tfollows.\tSuppose\twe\tcare about\tnegative\tliberty.\tNow\tit\tis\tperfectly\tpossible\tto\timagine\ta\tvery\tliberal\tdictator, o ne\t who \t car es\t abo ut\t the\t neg ative\t fr eedo m\t o f\t his\t subjects\t and\t makes\t laws\t that\t ar e maximally\t conducive\t to\t its\t protection.\t The\t people\t aren\u2019t\t involved\t in\t making\t the laws\t\u2013\tso\tthey\tdon\u2019t\thave\tfreedom\ton\tthe\t\u2018freedom\tas\tparticipation\u2019\tor\t\u2018freedom\tas non-domination\u2019\t views\t \u2013\t but\t they\t do\t have\t as\t much\t freedom\t from\t interference\t by others\t as\t they\t could\t possibly\t have.\t Does\t the\t conceivability\t of\t a\t liberal\t dictator mean\t that\t those\t who\t care\t about\t negative\t liberty\t should\t favour\t dictatorship\t as\t the best\tway\tto\tmake\tthe\tlaws?\tOf\tcourse\tnot.\tWhy\tnot?\tBecause\teven\tthough\tthe\tpeople in\t the\t society\t may\t enjoy\t lots\t of\t negative\t liberty,\t that\t liberty\t is\t hardly\t robust\t or secure\tor\tresilient.\tTheir\tenjoying\tit\tdepends\tsolely\ton\tthe\tgood\twill\tof\tthe\tdictator. If\t he\t changes\t his\t mind,\t or\t is\t succeeded\t in\t power\t by\t his\t illiberal\t son,\t then\t their liberty\t will\t just\t disappear.\t What\t system\t for\t making\t the\t laws\t makes\t it\t most\t likely that\t individuals\t will\t enjoy\t negative\t freedom?\t Under\t what\t system\t is\t their\t negative liber ty\t mo st\t r esilient\t (o r \t secur e\t o r \t r o bust)?\t Answer :\t a\t self-g o ver ning \t r epublic,\t in which\tall\tcitizens\tare\tactively\tengaged\tin\tpolitics.\tCitizens\tmust\tbe\tactively\tengaged in\t po litics,\t and\t imbued\t with\t a\t str o ng \t spir it\t o f\t civic\t duty,\t because\t that\t is\t the\t sur est way\t for\t them\t to\t protect\t their\t freedom\t from\t interference\t by\t others.\t There\t is something\t paradoxical\t about\t this\t view.\t (Quentin\t Skinner\t (b.\t 1940),\t the\t English political\t theorist\t who\t proposes\t this\t interpretation\t and\t is\t sympathetic\t to\t the\t view, calls\t one\t of\t his\t articles\t \u2018The\t Paradoxes\t of\t Political\t Liberty.\u2019)\t For\t the\t better protection\tof\ttheir\town\tfreedom,\tit\tmay\tbe\tnecessary\tfor\tcitizens\tto\taccept\tthat\tthey have\t duties\t to \t do \t thing s\t that\t they\t would\t no t\t o ther wise\t cho o se\t to \t do:\t vo te,\t keep\t in to uch\t with\t po litical\t affair s,\t be\t pr epar ed\t to \t die\t fo r \t their \t co untr y\t (to \t pr o tect\t it\t fr o m invasion\tby\tilliberal\texternal\tpowers).\tIf\tthey\tdon\u2019t\taccept\tit,\tit\tmay\tbe\tjustified\tfor the\t state\t to\t impose\t compliance\t with\t the\t duty\t on\t them.\t In\t Australia,\t citizens\t are legally\tobliged\tto\tvote.\tPart\tof\tthe\tjustification\tfor\tthis\trestriction\tof\ttheir\tfreedom \u2013\t they\t aren\u2019t\t free\t not\t to\t vote\t (at\t least\t not\t without\t paying\t a\t fine)\t \u2013\t is\t that\t it encourages\t them\t to\t keep\t in\t touch\t with\t politics,\t and\t thereby\t helps\t to\t protect\t their own,\tnegative,\tfreedom.","Freedom,\tprivate\tproperty,\tthe\tmarket\tand\tredistribution A\t lot\t of\t political\t ar gument\t involves\t debate\t about\t pr ivate\t pr oper ty,\t the\t mar ket\t and redistributive\t taxation.\t The\t concept\t of\t freedom\t often\t plays\t a\t pivotal\t role\t in\t such debate.\tIn\tthis\tsection\tI\u2019m\tgoing\tto\tset\tout\tfive\tpositions\tthat\tone\tmight\ttake\ton\tthis issue.\tBy\tkeeping\tclear\ton\tthe\tdifferences\tbetween\tthem,\tthe\treader\twill,\tI\thope,\tbe better\t placed\t to\t think\t about\t which\t position\t she\t agrees\t with,\t and\t about\t why\t she disagrees\twith\tthe\tothers. 1\t\tJustified\tredistributive\ttaxation\tdoes\tnot\tinfringe\tthe\tfreedom\tof\tthose\twho\tare taxed\tbecause\ttheir\tclaims\tto\tthe\tproperty\tin\tquestion\tcannot\tbe\testablished\tin\tthe first\tplace This\t is\t the\t position\t argued\t for\t by\t the\t American\t philosopher\t Ronald\t Dworkin (1931\u20132013),\twho\tis\tthe\tother\tleading\tegalitarian\tliberal,\talongside\tRawls.\tHe\tsays that\t when\t we\t take\t property\t from\t those\t whose\t claim\t to\t it\t is\t not\t justified,\t we shouldn\u2019t\t think\t of\t ourselves\t as\t restricting\t their\t freedom\t at\t all.\t This\t is\t because judgements\tabout\twhat\tcounts\tas\ta\trestriction\tof\tfreedom\tdepend\tupon\tjudgements about\t what\t property\t rights\t are\t justified\t in\t the\t first\t place.\t Essentially\t the\t opposite view\t is\t put\t forward\t by\t the\t Canadian\t philosopher\t G.\t A.\t Cohen\t (1941\u20132009),\t who believes\t that\t my\t freedom\t is\t restricted\t whenever\t someone\t interferes\t with\t my actions,\t whether\t or\t not\t I\t have\t a\t right\t to\t perform\t them\t and\t whether\t or\t not\t my obstructor\t has\t a\t right\t to\t interfere\t with\t me.\t Dworkin\t thinks\t that\t the\t question\t of whether \t an\t actio n\t is\t a\t r estr ictio n\t o n\t fr eedo m,\t and\t whether \t it\u2019s\t justified,\t bo il\t do wn to\tthe\tsame\tthing.\tCohen\tthinks\tthat\tthey\tare\tdifferent. Suppose\twe\tdecided\tthat\tQueen\tElizabeth\tII\tcould\tnot,\tafter\tall,\tjustify\ther\tclaim to\t own\t \u2018her \u2019\t estate\t at\t Balmoral,\t and\t we\t decided\t instead\t either\t to\t take\t it\t into common\townership\tor\tto\tdivide\tit\tup\tinto\ta\tnumber\tof\tsmall\tplots\twhich\twere\tthen given\tto\tpreviously\tpropertyless\tScots.\tWould\twe\tthereby\tbe\trestricting\tthe\tqueen\u2019s freedom?\tShe\twould\tno\tlonger\tbe,\tas\tshe\twas\tbefore,\tfree\tto\tgo\twherever\tshe\tliked on\t that\t land,\t or\t free\t to\t decide\t who\t else\t could\t cultivate,\t or\t walk\t on,\t it.\t So\t in\t this sense\t it\t seems\t r ig ht\t to \t say,\t with\t Co hen,\t that\t this\t kind\t o f\t r edistr ibutio n,\t even\t when justified,\t does\t indeed\t restrict\t freedom.\t Of\t course,\t whether\t the\t queen\t does\t indeed have\ta\tproperty\tright\tto\tthe\tBalmoral\testate\tis\tcrucial\tto\tthe\tquestion\tof\twhether\twe would\tbe\tjustified\tin\ttaking\tit\taway\tfrom\ther.\tThis\tis\tnot\tan\targument\ttrying\tto\tshow that\tthere\tshould\tbe\tno\tsuch\tthing\tas\tprivate\tproperty,\tor\tthat\tredistribution\t(even\tof large\t estates)\t is\t justified.\t The\t point\t is\t simply\t that,\t even\t if\t it\t were\t justified,\t we should\tacknowledge\tthat\twe\tare\trestricting\tthe\tfreedom\tof\tthose\tfrom\twhom\twe\tare taking\tit.","Others\t take\t a\t similar\t line\t to\t Dworkin.\t In\t his\t Second\t Treatise\t of\t Government, Locke\tsaid\t\u2018that\till\tdeserves\tthe\tname\tof\tconfinement\twhich\thedges\tus\tin\tonly\tfrom bogs\t and\t precipices\u2019.\t In\t contemporary\t language:\t \u2018If\t somebody\t puts\t up\t a\t fence\t to stop\tus\twandering\tinto\tquicksand\tor\tfalling\toff\ta\tcliff,\tthen\twe\tshouldn\u2019t\tcall\tthat\ta restriction\ton\tour\tfreedom.\u2019\t(In\tMacCallum\u2019s\tterms,\t\u2018we\tshouldn\u2019t\tregard\tthat\tfence as\ta\ty\u2019.)\tI\tthink\tit\tmakes\tthings\tclearer\tif\tone\tacknowledges,\twhat\tis\tsurely\tthe\tcase, that\t the\t fence\t does\t restrict\t people\u2019s\t freedom\t but\t that\t this\t might\t well\t be\t a\t justified restriction.\t To\t see\t this,\t think\t about\t the\t contrast\t between\t a\t fence\t that\t actually prevents\tpeople\twalking\tin\ta\tcertain\tdirection\tand\ta\tnotice\tthat\twarns\tpeople\tabout the\tdangers\tbut\tleaves\tthem\t\u2018free\u2019\tto\twalk\twhere\tthey\tlike. Notice\t the\t overlap\t between\t these\t approaches\t to\t freedom\t and\t the\t variant\t of positive\t freedom\t that\t identifies\t it\t with\t autonomy.\t Locke\u2019s\t thought\t is\t that,\t since nobody\tin\ther\tright\tmind\twould\twant\tto\twalk\tinto\tquicksand\tor\tfall\toff\tthe\tedge\tof\ta cliff\t,\tpreventing\ther\tfrom\tdoing\tso\tis\tnot\treally\tinterfering\twith\ther\tfreedom.\tThis makes\tsense\tif\tone\tthinks\tthat\tfreedom\tconsists\tin\tdoing\twhat\tone\twould\tdo\tif\tone were\tin\tone\u2019s\tright\tmind.\tDworkin\u2019s\tthought\tis\tthat,\tsince\tthe\tsuper-rich\tdo\tnot\thave a\t r ig ht\t to \t all\t their \t pr o per ty\t in\t the\t fir st\t place,\t taking \t so me\t o f\t it\t away\t fr o m\t them\t is not\t really\t interfering\t with\t their\t freedom.\t This\t makes\t sense\t if\t one\t thinks\t that freedom\t consists\t in\t doing\t what\t one\t has\t a\t right\t to\t do,\t or\t is\t morally\t justified\t in do ing .\t I\u2019ll\t say\t so mething \t abo ut\t this\t o ver lap\t later \t o n.\t Fo r \t no w,\t it\t is\t wo r th\t po inting out\t that\t Dworkin\t and\t Locke\t are\t both\t working\t with\t what\t some\t call\t \u2018moralized\u2019 definitions\tof\tfreedom,\ta\tconception\tthat\tties\tjudgements\tabout\t\u2018freedom\u2019\tto\tmoral judgements\tabout\twhat\tpeople\tshould\t(and\tshould\tnot)\tbe\tfree\tto\tdo.\tAgainst\tboth\tof them,\tCohen\twants\tto\tseparate\tjudgements\tabout\twhen\tsomebody\tis\tand\tis\tnot\tfree to\tdo\tsomething\tfrom\tthe\tquestion\tof\twhat\tpeople\tshould\t(and\tshould\tnot)\tbe\tfree\tto do.\t First,\t we\t look\t and\t see\t what\t people\t are\t and\t are\t not\t free\t to\t do.\t Then,\t we\t think about\twhether\twhat\twe\thave\tseen\tis\tjustified,\tand,\tif\tnot,\twhat\twould\tbe. The\t distinction\t between\t moralized\t and\t non-moralized\t conceptions\t of\t freedom can\t help\t our\t thinking\t about\t the\t kind\t of\t libertarian\t claim\t we\t came\t across\t in\t our discussion\tof\tNozick\u2019s\tview\tof\tjustice\tas\tentitlement.\tPart\t1\tdiscussed\tthe\tsuggestion that\t those\t who\t value\t freedom\t must\t believe\t in\t private\t property\t rights\t and\t should oppose\t redistributive\t taxation.\t Of\t course,\t few\t in\t real\t politics\t object\t to\t all redistributive\t taxation.\t But\t it\t is\t true\t that\t many\t on\t the\t right\t think\t that\t the\t value\t of fr eedo m\t necessar ily\t suppo r ts\t minimal\t r edistr ibutio n\t fr o m\t mar ket\t o utco mes.\t They think\t that,\t if\t such\t r edistr ibutio n\t is\t to \t be\t justified,\t it\t must\t be\t o n\t g r o unds\t o ther \t than freedom\t (equality,\t justice,\t public\t order).\t So\t it\t is\t worth\t looking\t at\t how\t this argument\tis\tsupposed\tto\twork. It\tis\ttrue\tthat\tthose\twho\thave\tprivate\tproperty\tare\tfree\tto\tdo\tthings\tthat\tthey\twould not\t be\t free\t to\t do\t if\t they\t did\t not\t have\t it.\t Think\t about\t the\t queen\t walking\t around Balmo r al,\t o r \t the\t wealthy\t per so n\t who \t o wns\t a\t fleet\t o f\t aer o planes\t and\t can\t fly\t to \t the","Bahamas\t whenever\t she\t likes.\t But\t what\t about\t those\t who\t do\t not\t have\t private property?\t To\t them,\t the\t fact\t that\t the\t queen\t owns\t the\t hills\t at\t Balmoral\t constitutes\t a restriction\ton\ttheir\tfreedom\tto\twalk\taround\tthose\thills.\tThe\tfact\tthat\tsomebody\telse owns\t the\t planes\t and\t will\t let\t others\t fly\t to\t the\t Bahamas\t only\t if\t they\t pay\t the\t fare constitutes\ta\trestriction\ton\ttheir\tfreedom\tto\tgo\tto\tthe\tBahamas.\tLibertarians\tsay\tthat they\tcare\tabout\tfreedom,\tand\targue\tfor\tprivate\tproperty\trights\ton\tfreedom\tgrounds. But\t they\t don\u2019t\t seem\t to\t care\t about,\t or\t even\t notice,\t the\t unfreedom\t implied\t by\t the existence\tof\tprivate\tproperty\trights. What\texplains\tlibertarians\u2019\tblindness\tto\tthe\tunfreedom\timplied\tby\ttheir\tpreferred arrangements?\t The\t best\t explanation\t is\t to\t see\t them\t as\t working\t with\t a\t moralized conception\t of\t freedom.\t Their\t view\t is\t that\t private\t property\t does\t not\t restrict\t the freedom\tof\tthose\twithout\tit\tas\tlong\tas\tone\tcan\tjustify\tpreventing\tthem\tfrom\tdoing what\tthey\tmight\totherwise\tdo.\tOn\tthis\tview,\twe\tshould\tnot\tthink\tthat\tthose\tprevented fr om\t walking\t o n\t the\t Balmo r al\t hills\t ar e\t depr ived\t o f\t fr eedo m,\t because\t the\t queen\u2019s property\tright\tto\ther\testate\tjustifies\tthat\tconstraint.\tTo\ttake\tthe\testate\taway\tfrom\tthe queen,\thowever,\twould\tinvolve\tan\tinterference\twith\ther\tfreedom,\tprecisely\tbecause it\t is\t rightfully\t hers.\t This\t suggests\t that\t the\t libertarian\t view\t is,\t ultimately,\t a\t view about\t the\t legitimacy\t of\t property\t rights.\t Where\t they\t appeal\t to\t freedom,\t it\t is\t to\t a conception\t that\t makes\t judgements\t about\t what\t does\t and\t does\t not\t count\t as\t a restriction\t of\t freedom\t depend\t on\t judgements\t about\t the\t legitimacy\t of\t particular property\t rights.\t In\t that\t sense,\t the\t term\t \u2018libertarian\u2019\u2013\t with\t its\t appropriation\t of\t the wo r d\t \u2018liber ty\t \u2013\t is\t misleading .\t Tho se\t wo r king \t with\t a\t no n-mo r alized\t co nceptio n\t o f liberty\tare\tgoing\tto\tnotice\tthe\tlack\tof\tfreedom,\tin\ta\tlibertarian\tsociety,\tsuffered\tby all\twho\tare\tprevented\tfrom\tdoing\twhat\tthey\tmight\totherwise\tdo\tby\tthe\tvery\tfact\tthat property\t is\t privately\t owned.\t Such\t people\t might\t advocate\t the\t abolition,\t or r edistr ibutio n,\t o f\t pr ivate\t pr o per ty\t in\t the\t name\t o f\t fr eedo m,\t and\t ar e\t likely\t to \t r esent the\tsuggestion\tthat\tthey\tare\tenemies\tof\tfreedom. 2\t\tEven\tif\tjustified\tredistribution\tdoes\trestrict\tthe\tfreedom\tof\tthose\twho\tare\ttaxed, and\twhether\tor\tnot\tit\tincreases\tthe\tfreedom\tof\tthose\twho\tbenefit,\tit\tmakes\tthem better\toff\tin\tother\tways\tand\tcan\tbe\tjustified\ton\tthese\tnon-freedom\tgrounds Before\tgoing\ton\tto\texplore\tthe\tsuggestion\tthat\tthe\tredistribution\tof\tproperty\tmight be\t justified\t in\t the\t name\t of\t freedom,\t it\u2019s\t worth\t pointing\t out\t that\t it\t might\t also,\t or alternatively,\t be\t justified\t in\t the\t name\t of\t other\t values.\t Even\t if\t we\t think\t that redistribution\t does\t reduce\t the\t freedom\t of\t those\t who\t are\t taxed,\t this\t reduction needn\u2019t\titself\tbe\tjustified\ton\tfreedom\tgrounds.\tWe\tshouldn\u2019t\tthink\tthat\tfreedom\tcan only\tbe\trestricted\tfor\tthe\tsake\tof\tfreedom.\tIt\tmight\tbe\tjustified\tbecause\tit\tpromotes equality,\tor\tjustice,\tor\tsocial\torder,\tor\tutility,\tor\tany\tof\ta\tnumber\tof\tother\tvalues. This\tpoint\tis\tgeneralizable.\tThink\tabout\tlegislation\tmaking\tit\tcompulsory\tto\twear","seat\t belts.\t One\t could\t perfectly\t sensibly\t think\t all\t of\t the\t following:\t (a)\t this\t is\t good leg islatio n;\t (b)\t it\t r estr icts\t peo ple\u2019s\t fr eedo m;\t (c)\t it\t do es\t no t\t also \t pr o mo te\t peo ple\u2019s freedom.\t Locke,\t presumably,\t would\t want\t to\t say\t that,\t since\t they\t are\t protecting\t us from\t worse\t evils,\t seat\t belts\t should\t not\t really\t be\t thought\t of\t as\t restrictions\t on freedom\t(\u2018That\till\tdeserves\tthe\tname\tof\tconfinement\twhich\tdramatically\tdecreases the\t likeliho o d\t o f\t o ur \t dying \t in\t a\t car \t cr ash\u2019).\t But\t this\t lo o ks\t like\t an\t implausible\t and unnecessary\taddition\tto\twhat\tis\talready\ta\tperfectly\tcoherent\tposition.\tOf\tcourse\twe might\t try\t to\t argue\t that\t seat\t belts\t actually\t promote\t the\t freedom\t of\t those\t forced\t to wear\t them.\t Because\t a\t fully\t rational\t self\t would\t choose\t to\t wear\t them\t and\t freedom consists\t in\t doing\t what\t a\t fully\t rational\t self\t would\t choose\t to\t do.\t Because\t people almost\tuniversally\trecognize\tthat\tthey\tare\tbetter\toff\twearing\tseat\tbelts\tand\twelcome laws\t that\t help\t them\t get\t into\t the\t habit\t of\t doing\t something\t they\t actually\t want\t to\t do anyway.\t Or \t because\t anything \t that\t helps\t pr o tect\t peo ple\t fr o m\t death\t must\t be\t tho ug ht of\t as\t promoting\t their\t freedom.\t (How\t free\t are\t the\t dead?)\t But\t these\t look\t like unnecessarily\t controversial\t or\t misleading\t claims.\t Why\t not\t simply\t say\t that\t the legislation\tis\tjustified\tbecause\tit\tmakes\tpeople\tbetter\toff\tthan\tthey\twould\totherwise be,\teven\tthough\tit\tdoes\tthis\tby\trestricting\ttheir\tfreedom?\tThis,\tof\tcourse,\tinvolves the\tclaim\tthat\tpeople\tdon\u2019t\talways\tfreely\tand\tspontaneously\tchoose\tto\tdo\twhat\twill make\t them\t better\t off\t \u2013\t in\t that\t sense\t the\t legislation\t is\t paternalistic.\t It\t implies\t that some,\tlike\tparents\tin\trelation\tto\ttheir\tchildren,\tknow\twhat\tis\tgood\tfor\tpeople\tbetter than\tthe\tpeople\tdo\tthemselves.\tBut\tthis\tlooks\tmore\tplausible\tthan\tclaiming\tthat\tthe legislation\tpromotes\ttheir\tfreedom. 3\t\tRedistribution\treduces\tthe\teffective\tfreedom\tof\tthose\twho\tare\ttaxed,\tbut\tis\tjustified because\tit\tmakes\tfor\tmore\teffective\tfreedom\toverall As\t I\t suggested\t above,\t it\t is\t the\t appeal\t to\t effective\t freedom\t that\t tends\t to\t do\t most wo r k\t in\t the\t kind\t o f\t fr eedo m-based\t justificatio n\t o f\t r edistr ibutio n\t mo st\t co mmo n\t in contemporary\tpolitical\targument\tfrom\tthe\tleft\tand\tcentre-left.\tThink\tof\tall\tthat\ttalk about\t the\t \u2018enabling\t state\u2019.\t Since\t the\t idea\t of\t effective\t freedom\t should\t be\t clear\t by now,\tlet\u2019s\tfocus\there\ton\tthe\tdistinctively\tquantitative\taspect\tof\tthis\tclaim. Why\t might\t redistributive\t taxation\t be\t thought\t to\t increase\t the\t total\t amount\t of effective\tfreedom?\tOne\tanswer\tmight\tbe\tthat\ttaking,\tsay,\t\u00a310,000\tfrom\ta\tvery\twell- off\tperson\tand\tgiving\t\u00a3500\teach\tto\t20\tdifferent\tpoor\tpeople\tmeans\tthat\tthere\tis\ta\tnet increase\t (of\t 19)\t in\t the\t number\t of\t people\t who\t are\t free\t to\t do\t things\t they\t were\t not previously\t free\t to\t do.\t Here\t the\t idea\t that\t redistribution\t produces\t more\t effective freedom\t depends\t on\t the\t thought\t that\t it\t makes\t more\t people\t better\t off,\t in\t terms\t of effective\t freedom.\t Another\t thought\t pointing\t in\t the\t same\t direction\t notices\t that\t the state\t can\t spend\t the\t money\t it\t raises\t in\t taxes\t on\t goods\t that\t are\t available\t to\t many\t \u2013 perhaps\t all\t \u2013\t citizens\t at\t once.\t Leaving\t the\t \u00a310,000\t with\t the\t rich\t individual\t may","leave\t her \t fr ee\t to \t do \t thing s\t she\t wo uldn\u2019t\t be\t able\t to \t do \t witho ut\t it,\t but\t spending \t that money\ton\thigh-quality\tTV,\tor\ton\tpublic\thealthcare,\tmay\tproduce\textra\toptions\t(and hence\teffective\tfreedoms)\tfor\tmany. A\tsecond\tanswer\tmight\tbe\tthat\ttaking\t\u00a3500\tfrom\ta\trich\tperson\tand\tgiving\tit\tto\ta single\t poor\t person\t counts\t as\t a\t net\t increase\t in\t effective\t freedom,\t because\t the marginal\t\u00a3500\tis\tworth\tmore\tto\tthe\tpoor\tthan\tto\tthe\trich.\tHere\tthe\tthought\tis\tnot\tthat more\t people\t have\t more\t effective\t freedom,\t but\t that\t money\t yields\t diminishing marginal\t returns\t of\t effective\t freedom.\t This\t answer\t looks\t a\t bit\t suspicious.\t One mig ht\t ag r ee\t that\t the\t mar g inal\t \u00a3500\t is\t wo r th\t mo r e\t to \t the\t po o r \t than\t to \t the\t r ich,\t and think\t that\t a\t g o o d\t r easo n\t fo r \t r edistr ibuting .\t But\t is\t it\t wo r th\t mo r e\t to \t them\t because\t it gives\t them\t more\t effective\t freedom?\t Isn\u2019t\t it\t rather\t because\t what\t it\t gives\t them\t the effective\t freedom\t to\t do\t is\t more\t valuable\t or\t important?\t Being\t free\t to\t eat\t healthy food,\tor\tto\twatch\ttelevision,\tis\tdoubtless\tmore\timportant\tthan\tbeing\tfree\tto\tbuy\tthat extra\tbottle\tof\tchampagne.\tBut\tthat\tisn\u2019t\tenough\tto\tshow\tthat\tdepriving\tsomebody\tof the\t freedom\t to\t buy\t the\t champagne\t involves\t a\t smaller\t reduction\t in\t their\t freedom than\tthat\twhich\tis\tgained\tby\tthose\tenabled\tto\teat\thealthy\tfood. Comparisons\t of\t amounts\t of\t freedom\t are\t famously\t hazardous.\t Luckily\t they\t are also \t pr o bably\t wo r th\t avo iding ,\t because\t amo unts\t o f\t fr eedo m\t ar e\t no t\t that\t impo r tant. What\t matter s\t is\t no t\t ho w\t much\t fr eedo m\t peo ple\t have,\t but\t what\t it\t is\t that\t peo ple\t ar e and\t ar e\t no t\t fr ee\t to \t do ,\t and\t whether \t the\t r estr ictio ns\t that\t so ciety\t places\t o n\t peo ple\u2019s freedom\tare\tjustified.\tAdapting\tan\texample\tfrom\tthe\tCanadian\tphilosopher\tCharles Taylor\t(b.\t1931),\tcompare\tBritain\tand\tAfghanistan.\tIn\tBritain,\tpeople\thave\tfreedom of\t religion\t but\t there\t are\t lots\t of\t traffic\t lights.\t In\t Afghanistan,\t there\t are\t very\t few tr affic\t lights\t but\t people\t do\t no t\t have\t fr eedo m\t o f\t r elig io n.\t Suppo se\t we\t do n\u2019t\t kno w anything\t else\t about\t the\t two\t countries.\t Which\t gives\t its\t members\t most\t freedom? Well,\t in\t Br itain\t o ne\t is\t co nstantly\t having \t o ne\u2019s\t fr eedo m\t r estr icted\t by\t tr affic\t lig hts. But\t in\t Afg hanistan\t ther e\t is\t o nly\t o ne\t thing \t o ne\t canno t\t do :\t pr actise\t the\t r elig io n\t o ne believes\tin.\tSo\tin\tpurely\tquantitative\tterms\tBritain\tlooks\tas\tif\tit\trestricts\tthe\tfreedom of\t its\t citizens\t more\t than\t does\t Afghanistan.\t Taylor\t thinks\t that\t this\t conclusion\t is absurd.\tHe\tthinks\tit\tis\tobvious\tthat\tBritain\tgives\tit\tcitizens\tmore\tfreedom\tthan\tdoes Afghanistan.\t Taylor\t believes\t that\t this\t shows\t that,\t when\t we\t make\t comparisons\t of fr eedo m,\t we\t canno t\t avo id\t making \t judg ements\t abo ut\t the\t value\t o f\t what\t it\t is\t peo ple are\tand\tare\tnot\tfree\tto\tdo.\tThis\tmay\tbe\tright\tif\twe\tare\tasked\tto\tcompare\tsocieties, or\t even\t individuals,\t in\t terms\t of\t their\t overall\t \u2018freedom\u2019.\t It\t does\t seem\t that judgements\t about\t that\t are\t going\t to\t find\t it\t hard\t to\t avoid\t some\t qualitative,\t and\t not merely\t quantitative,\t input.\t (One\t might\t bite\t the\t bullet\t and\t describe\t Britain\t as\t a society\t in\t which\t peo ple\u2019s\t fr eedom\t is\t mor e\t r estr icted\t than\t it\t is\t in\t Afg hanistan,\t but that\twould\tsurely\tbe\tmisleading.)\tBut\tthe\tlesson\tmight\tbe\tthat\tclaims\tabout\t\u2018overall freedom\u2019\t are\t a\t red\t herring.\t There\t are\t some\t actions\t that\t Britons\t are\t not\t free\t to perform,\tand\tothers\tthat\tAfghans\tare\tnot\tfree\tto\tperform.\tWhat\tmatters\tis\tnot\t\u2018Who","has\t most\t freedom\t overall?\u2019,\t but\t \u2018What\t are\t the\t actions\t that\t are\t restricted\t in\t each country?\u2019,\tand\t\u2018Is\ttheir\trestriction\tjustified?\u2019. 4\t\tPrivate\tproperty\trights\tand\tmarket\trelations\tencourage\tpeople\tto\tmisconceive their\treal\tinterests\tand\thence\trender\tthem\theteronomous\tand\tunfree None\t of\t the\t positions\t discussed\t so\t far\t invokes\t \u2018positive\u2019\t freedom\t in\t its controversial\t \u2013\t \u2018freedom\t as\t autonomy\u2019\u2013\t sense.\t Though\t some\t appeal\t to\t the distinction\tbetween\tformal\tand\teffective\tfreedom,\tnone\tis\tconcerned\twith\tanything other\t than\t the\t actions\t that\t people\t might\t want\t to\t perform.\t There\t is\t no\t mention\t of autonomy,\tor\tthe\tkind\tof\thigher\tor\trational\tor\tinner\tself\tthat\tmight\tlead\tus\tto\tclaim that\t somebody\t was\t unfree\t even\t though\t she\t was\t doing\t what\t she\t wanted\t to\t do. Freedom\tis\tunderstood\tas\tthe\tabsence\tof\tinterference\twith\tactions\tthat\tpeople\twant or\t might\t want\t to\t do.\t There\t are,\t however,\t other\t arguments,\t particularly\t in\t the Marxist\tor\tradical\tleft\ttradition,\tthat\twould\tput\tthe\tcase\tnot\tmerely\tfor\tredistribution but,\t rather,\t for\t the\t abolition\t of\t private\t property\t and\t transcendence\t of\t market relations\taltogether,\tin\tterms\tof\tthis\tmore\tspeculative\tand\tcontroversial\tconception of\tfreedom\tas\tautonomy. Fo r \t example,\t so me\t Mar xists\t claim\t that\t the\t ver y\t existence\t o f\t an\t eco no my\t based on\t private\t property\t and\t market\t exchange\t leads\t people\t to\t misconceive\t their\t \u2018real interests\u2019,\t fostering\t a\t conception\t of\t themselves\t as\t \u2018possessive\t individualists\u2019\t or \u2018materialist\t consumers\u2019\t that\t takes\t them\t away\t from\t a\t proper\t understanding\t of\t the true\t essence\t of\t what\t it\t is\t to\t be\t a\t human\t being.\t True\t self-realization\t for\t human beings\tdoes\tnot\tconsist\tin\tthe\tacquisition\tof\tprivate\tproperty\tthrough\texchange\twith others.\tOnly\tpeople\talienated\tfrom\ttheir\ttrue\tselves,\tmisled\tby\tbourgeois\tideology, the\t functio n\t o f\t which\t is\t to \t leg itimate\t and\t stabilize\t capitalism,\t co uld\t fail\t to \t see\t that true\tself-realization\tfor\thuman\tbeings\tconsists\tin\tcooperative\tor\tcommunal\tactivity with\t other\t human\t beings;\t in\t production\t for\t use,\t rather\t than\t exchange;\t in distribution\t according\t to\t need,\t rather\t than\t according\t to\t productive\t input.\t If\t true freedom\tconsists\tin\tthis\tkind\tof\tself-realization,\tand\tcapitalist\tsocieties\tencourage\ta stunting\t and\t distorted\t conception\t of\t what\t it\t is\t to\t be\t a\t human\t being,\t then\t such so cieties\t lead\t to \t the\t kind\t o f\t heter o no my\t that\t stands\t in\t the\t way\t o f\t fr eedo m.\t A\t fr ee human\t being\t is\t someone\t who\t is\t free\t of\t all\t that\t distorting\t ideology\t and\t the institutions\t that\t embody\t and\t promote\t it.\t So\t true\t freedom\t consists\t in\t rejecting private\tproperty\tand\tmarkets\tas\tembodying\tan\talienated\tand\tdistorted\tunderstanding of\twhat\tit\tis\tto\tbe\thuman. 5\t\tFreedom\t=\tautonomy,\tautonomy\t=\trationality,\trationality\t=\tmorality,\tmorality\t= justice,\tjustice\t=\tredistribution,\ttherefore\tthe\tperson\twho\trecognizes\ther\tduty\tto","redistribute\ther\tresources\tis\therself\tfreer\tthan\tthe\tperson\twho\tdoesn\u2019t\trecognize\tthat duty This\t(last)\tposition\tis\ta\tvariant\ton\tthe\t\u2018freedom\tas\tautonomy\u2019\tidea.\tHere,\tthough,\tthe argument\t does\t not\t run\t through\t the\t idea\t that\t true\t freedom\t consists\t in\t self- realization,\twith\ta\tthickly\tthem\tup\tfor\tpublic\tuse,\tor\tforspecified\tconception\tof\twhat self-realization\t requires.\t Rather,\t it\t goes\t via\t the\t claim\t that\t the\t truly\t free\t (i.e., autonomous)\t person\t is\t someone\t who\t is\t acting\t rationally,\t hence\t morally.\t Suppose acting\tmorally\timplies\tredistribution\tfrom\trich\tto\tpoor.\t(Perhaps\tthis\tis\tfor\treasons concerning\t what\t would\t be\t a\t justified\t distribution\t of\t freedoms\t in\t a\t more co nventio nal,\t neg ative\t sense.)\t T his\t leads\t to \t the\t co nclusio n\t that\t the\t r ich\t themselves are\tmore\tfree\tin\tgiving\ttheir\tmoney\tto\tthe\tpoor\tthan\tthey\twould\tbe\tby\tholding\ton\tto it\t for\t themselves.\t They\t may\t have\t less\t freedom\t understood\t as\t \u2018range\t of\t options available\t to\t one\t without\t interference\u2019,\t but\t they\t have\t more\t freedom\t understood\t as \u2018actio n\t in\t acco r dance\t with\t o ne\u2019s\t hig her \t (=\t mo r al)\t self \u2019.\t If\t we\t assume\t that\t ther e\t is only\tone\tmorally\tcorrect\t(or\trational)\tway\tto\tact\t\u2013\tan\tassumption\tI\u2019ll\tquestion\tin\tthe next\tsection\t\u2013\tthen\twe\thave\tthe\tparadox\tthat\tfreedom\tconsists\tin\tdoing\tjust\tthat\tthing and\tnothing\telse.\tFreedom\tas\tobedience\tindeed.\tObedience\tto\tthe\tmoral\tlaw. This\t suggests\t one\t more\t move.\t Suppose\t we\t think\t that\t the\t queen\u2019s\t claim\t to\t the Balmoral\t hills\t cannot\t be\t justified,\t and\t that\t a\t justifiable\t distribution\t of\t property would\tinvolve\ther\tgiving\tallocation\tto\tthose\tmore\tneedy\tthan\therself.\tThe\tposition we\u2019r e\t co nsider ing \t her e\t ho lds\t that\t she\t her self\t achieves\t r eal\t fr eedo m\t by\t seeing \t and acting\ton\tthis\tmoral\tinsight\t(even\tthough\tshe\talso\tloses\tthe\tfreedom\tto\twalk\taround the\t estate\t without\t worrying\t about\t bumping\t into\t strangers).\t It\u2019s\t not\t just\t that\t those who\tnow\thave\taccess\tto\tthe\thills\tare\tfree\tto\tdo\tthings\tthey\twere\tnot\tpreviously\tfree to\t do\t \u2013\t though\t that\u2019s\t true\t too.\t It\u2019s\t that\t she\t herself\t achieves\t freedom,\t in\t the important,\t\u2018real\u2019\tsense,\tthrough\ther\taction\tof\tgiving\tup\ther\town\t\u2013\tless\timportant\t\u2013 freedoms.\t But\t suppose\t she\t doesn\u2019t\t see\t or\t act\t on\t this\t insight.\t She\t persists\t in\t her mistaken\t belief\t that\t her\t claim\t to\t the\t estate\t is\t justified.\t If\t we\t take\t it\t off\t her nonetheless\t \u2013\t on\t the\t perfectly\t reasonable\t grounds\t that\t it\t wasn\u2019t\t hers\t in\t the\t first place\t\u2013\tcan\twe\tstill\tclaim\tthat\twe\tare\tpromoting\ther\tfreedom?\tAfter\tall,\twe\tare\tonly getting\ther\tto\tdo\twhat\ther\tmoral\tself\twould\tdo\tif\tit\twere\tin\tcontrol,\tunimpeded\tby whatever \t it\t is\t \u2013\t ideo lo g ical\t illusio n,\t unr eflective\t tr aditio nalism\t \u2013\t that\t pr events\t her from\t seeing\t what\t her\t moral\t duties\t really\t are.\t Here,\t of\t course,\t we\t have\t the suggestion\t that\t those\t who\t fail\t correctly\t to\t identify\t the\t \u2018general\t will\u2019\t for\t their community\t \u2013\t a\t co ncept\t that\t tr anslates\t r oughly\t into \t Kant\u2019s\t mo r al\t law\t \u2013\t should\t not think\t of\t the\t coercion\t that\t compels\t them\t to\t comply\t with\t that\t will\t as\t something inimical\tto\ttheir\tfreedom.\tRather,\tthey\tare\tbeing\t\u2018forced\tto\tbe\tfree\u2019.\tThis\tis\tjust\tthe train\tof\tthought\tthat\tBerlin\tdisliked\tso\tmuch.","Resisting\tthe\ttotalitarian\tmenace This\t setting\t out\t of\t various\t positions\t on\t the\t relation\t between\t freedom,\t private property,\tthe\tmarket\tand\tredistribution\tended\tup\twith\ta\tcouple\tthat\tinvoked\tpositive freedom\t in\t the\t sense\t that\t Berlin,\t and\t many\t others,\t regard\t as\t leading\t us\t down\t the slippery\t slope\t to\t totalitarianism.\t It\t is\t this\t prospect\t of\t the\t totalitarian\t menace\t that drives\tBerlin\tto\tdefend\tnegative\tliberty\t\u2013\tfreedom\tfrom\tinterference\tby\tothers\t\u2013\tas the\tbest\tway\tto\tspecify\tthe\tconcept\tof\tliberty.\tIn\tthis\tlast\tsection,\tI\twant\tto\tdraw\ta\tfew distinctions\t that\t might\t lead\t us\t to\t wonder\t whether\t this\t particular\t \u2018positive\u2019 conception\t o f\t fr eedom\t \u2013\t fr eedom\t as\t autonomy\t \u2013\t is\t r eally\t as\t dang er o us\t as\t Ber lin sug g ests.\t We\t do n\u2019t\t want\t to \t thr o w\t the\t baby\t o ut\t with\t the\t bathwater.\t We\t may\t no t\t like totalitarianism,\tbut\tthat\tdoesn\u2019t\tmean\twe\thave\tto\treject\tany\tand\tevery\tconception\tof freedom\tas\tautonomy.\tMy\tinterpretation\tof\tTony\tBlair \u2019s\tletter\tto\tBerlin\tsuggested that\t the\t variant\t of\t positive\t freedom\t that\t he\t was\t trying\t to\t defend\t was\t \u2018effective freedom\u2019,\twhich\twould\tfit\twith\tcentre-left\ttalk\tabout\tthe\tenabling\tstate,\tand\tinvolves no \t co ntr o ver sial\t claims\t abo ut\t hig her \t o r \t tr ue\t selves.\t That\u2019s\t why\t Blair \t was,\t o n\t this score\tat\tleast,\tcleared\tof\tthe\tcharge\tof\tbeing\ta\tcloset\tdictator.\tHere\tI\tpoint\tout\tseven ways\t in\t which\t he\t co uld,\t if\t he\t had\t wanted,\t have\t made\t so me\t o f\t tho se\t co ntr o ver sial claims\tyet\tstill\tsteer\tclear\tof\tthe\ttotalitarian\tmenace. 1\t\tPromoting\tpeople\u2019s\tautonomy\tcan\tinvolve\tjust\tproviding\tinformation\tand\thelping them\tthink\tfor\tthemselves When\t first\t introducing\t the\t contrast\t between\t \u2018freedom\t as\t autonomy\u2019\t and\t \u2018freedom as\t doing\t what\t one\t wants\u2019,\t I\t used\t the\t example\t of\t education.\t As\t well\t as\t increasing people\u2019s\teffective\tfreedom,\tby\topening\tdoors\tthat\twould\totherwise\tremain\tclosed\tto them,\t education\t gives\t people\t a\t sense\t of\t what\t their\t options\t are\t and\t the\t likely outcome\t of\t any\t action\t they\t might\t take.\t This\t is\t the\t information-giving\t aspect\t of educatio n.\t It\t also \t teaches\t them\t to \t think\t \u2013\t to \t evaluate\t the\t differ ent\t o ptio ns\t available to\tthem,\tto\tprocess\tand\treflect\tupon\tthe\tinformation\tthey\thave.\tThis\tis\tthe\taspect\tof education\tthat\tpromotes\trational\treflection.\tImagine\ttwo\tpeople.\tPenny\twants\tto\tbe\ta doctor\t because\t she\t thinks\t that\t doctors\t have\t an\t exciting\t life\t and\t get\t paid\t lots\t of money.\t She\t decided\t to\t be\t a\t doctor\t at\t a\t very\t early\t age\t because\t she\t saw\t a\t TV programme\tfeaturing\ta\tglamorous\tfemale\tdoctor\tand\thas\tnot\tconsidered\tany\tother possible\t careers.\t She\t has\t no\t idea\t about\t what\t it\u2019s\t really\t like\t to\t be\t a\t doctor,\t and doesn\u2019t\tknow\thow\tmuch\tthey\tactually\tearn.\tClaire\talso\twants\tto\tbe\ta\tdoctor.\tShe\thas gathered\ta\tgreat\tdeal\tof\tinformation.\tShe\tknows\twhat\tis\tinvolved,\tthe\tchances\tof\ther succeeding,\t what\t the\t life\t is\t really\t like,\t how\t much\t she\t is\t likely\t to\t earn.\t She\t has thought\t carefully\t about\t her\t various\t options\t and\t decided\t that,\t on\t balance\t and\t all things\tconsidered,\tmedicine\tis\tthe\tthing\tfor\ther.\tSo\tPenny\tand\tClaire\tboth\twant\tto\tbe","doctor s.\t Suppo se\t they\t both\t act\t o n\t this\t desir e.\t Ar e\t they\t bo th\t acting\t equally\t fr eely? Isn\u2019t\t Claire\t more\t autonomous,\t more\t in\t charge\t of\t her\t life,\t and\t in\t that\t sense\t more free,\t because\t her\t desire\t has\t emerged\t from\t rational\t deliberation\t based\t on\t good information? Autonomy\tis\there\tbeing\ttaken\tin\ta\tfairly\tweak\tand\tuncontroversial\tsense.\tPeople who\t can\t think\t properly,\t and\t have\t appropriate\t relevant\t information,\t are\t more autonomous\t than\t those\t who\t can\u2019t\t or\t don\u2019t.\t Does\t this\t way\t of\t thinking\t about autonomy\t involve\t any\t idea\t of\t a\t divided\t self,\t or\t of\t internal\t obstacles?\t Well,\t if\t we think\t Claire\t is\t more\t free\t than\t Penny,\t presumably\t that\u2019s\t because\t we\t think\t that\t her desire\tto\tbe\ta\tdoctor\tis\tsomehow\tmore\trational,\tor\ttruer\tto\ther\tauthentic\tself,\tthan\tis Penny\u2019s.\t Penny\t is\t at\t the\t mer cy\t o f\t her \t ir r atio nal\t beliefs.\t Her \t desir e,\t tho ug h\t her s,\t is less\t truly\t hers\t than\t is\t Claire\u2019s.\t This\t may\t not\t be\t her\t fault.\t She\t may\t not\t have\t been provided\t with\t the\t relevant\t information,\t nor\t taught\t how\t to\t think\t clearly\t about\t the information\tshe\thas\tgot.\tBut\tit\tdoes\tseem\tthat\ther\tignorance\tand\tlack\tof\tdeliberative capacity\tstand\tas\tobstacles\tto\ther\tgenuine\tself-realization,\tto\ther\tbeing\tgenuinely\tin charge\tof\ther\tlife.\tHer\ttrue\tself\tmay\tor\tmay\tnot\twant\tto\tbe\ta\tdoctor.\tPerhaps,\thaving been\t taught\t to\t think\t sensibly\t and\t provided\t with\t full\t information,\t she\t would\t still want\t to\t be\t one.\t That\t desire\t would\t be\t truer\t to\t her\t real\t self\t than\t is\t the\t one\t she happens\tto\thave.\tFreedom\twould\tconsist\tin\tacting\ton\tthe\tdesires\tshe\twould\thave\tif she\twere\tmore\trational\tand\tbetter\tinformed.\tHer\tignorance,\tand\ther\tlack\tof\tcapacity to\t engage\t in\t rational\t deliberation,\t do\t indeed\t seem\t like\t inner\t obstacles\t to\t her freedom. T his\t way\t o f\t thinking \t abo ut\t auto no my\t do es,\t then,\t po sit\t so me\t idea\t o f\t fr eedo m\t as \u2018rational\tself-direction\u2019\tand\tabsence\tof\tinner\tconstraints.\tSo\tit\tdoes\tbelong\twith\tthe views\t that\t Berlin\t dislikes\t so\t much.\t But\t it\t is\t surely\t an\t innocuous\t variant\t of\t this family\t o f\t co nceptio ns.\t We\t ar e\t a\t ver y\t lo ng \t way\t indeed\t fr o m\t any\t fear \t that\t the\t state will\t come\t along\t and\t force\t people\t to\t be\t free.\t Children\t are\t indeed\t forced\t to\t go\t to school\t and\t this\t is\t usually\t justified\t precisely\t on\t the\t plausible\t grounds\t that\t it\t will increase\ttheir\tfreedom\tas\tautonomy\t(as\twell\tas\ttheir\t\u2018freedom\tas\teffective\toptions\u2019) later\t on.\t If\t being\t taught\t about\t the\t world,\t and\t learning\t how\t to\t think\t about\t it, promotes\tautonomy,\tthen\tautonomy\tneedn\u2019t\tbe\tsuch\ta\tdangerous\tidea\tafter\tall. 2\t\tTo\trecognize\tthat\tthere\tcan\tbe\tinternal\tobstacles\tto\tfreedom\tis\tnot\tto\tsay\tthat anybody\tother\tthan\tthe\tagent\therself\tis\tthe\tbest\tjudge\tof\twhen\tthey\texist The\tconventional\tnegative\tconception\tof\tfreedom\tholds\tthat\tsomebody\tis\tfree\tto\tdo something\tjust\tas\tlong\tas\tnobody\telse\tis\tstopping\ther,\tas\tlong\tas\tshe\tcould\tdo\tit\tif she\t wanted\t to.\t This\t view\t rejects\t the\t idea\t that\t there\t can\t be\t internal\t obstacles\t to fr eedo m.\t But,\t as\t Char les\t Taylo r \t ar g ues,\t it\t seems\t undeniable\t that\t we\t do \t exper ience such\t obstacles.\t Imagine\t somebody\t who\t really\t wants\t to\t be\t a\t politician\t but\t is\t so","ter r ified\t o f\t public\t speaking \t that\t she\t canno t\t pur sue\t this\t g o al.\t Other \t peo ple\t may\t no t be\tpreventing\ther\tfrom\tbecoming\ta\tpolitician,\tbut\ther\tfear\t\u2013\tan\tinternal\tobstacle\t\u2013 surely\t is.\t Sometimes,\t indeed,\t we\t may\t experience\t our\t desires\t themselves\t as o bstacles,\t the\t o ver co ming \t o f\t which\t is\t fr eedo m,\t the\t acting \t o n\t which\t is\t unfr eedo m. Imag ine\t a\t would-be\t explo r er \t who se\t desir e\t to\t sleep\t in\t a\t co mfo r table\t bed\t pr events her \t ever \t car r ying \t o ut\t any\t expeditio ns.\t Or \t so mebo dy\t who \t wants\t to \t do \t the\t mo r ally r ig ht\t thing \t but\t finds\t her self\t yielding \t to \t temptatio n.\t Or \t so mebo dy\t who \t wants\t to \t do well\t in\t her\t exams\t but\t finds\t herself\t unable\t to\t resist\t her\t urge\t to\t go\t out\t drinking every\t night.\t Or\t somebody\t who\t really\t wants\t to\t give\t up\t cigarettes\t but\t finds\t her desire\t for\t nicotine\t too\t strong.\t Such\t people\t experience\t true\t freedom\t when\t the desires\t of\t their\t \u2018autonomous\u2019\t or\t \u2018higher \u2019\t selves\t overcome\t the\t desires\t of\t their \u2018heteronomous\u2019\tor\t\u2018lower \u2019\tselves. In\tcases\tlike\tthis,\twe\tare\tthinking\tof\tthe\tself\tas\tdivided\tinto\ttwo\tparts.\tFreedom\tis achieved\twhen\tthe\t\u2018true\u2019\tor\t\u2018higher \u2019\tpart\tis\tin\tcontrol\tof\tthe\t\u2018false\u2019\tor\t\u2018lower \u2019\tpart. No w\t it\t is\t a\t ver y\t g o o d\t questio n\t ho w\t we\t kno w\t which\t par t\t is\t which,\t and\t who \t is\t the best\tjudge\tof\tthat.\tWhat\tmakes\tthese\texamples\tplausible\tis\tthe\tfact\tthat,\tin\teach\tcase, the\t individual\t herself\t is\t making\t that\t judgement.\t So\t one\t obvious\t way\t to\t resist\t the slide\t to war ds\t to talitar ianism\t is\t to \t insist\t that,\t tho ug h\t ther e\t can\t be\t inter nal\t o bstacles to\tfreedom,\tit\tis\talways\tand\tnecessarily\tthe\tindividual\twho\tis\tthe\tbest\tjudge\tof\twhat is\tto\tcount\tas\twhat.\tThat\tshould\tbe\tenough\tto\tprevent\tthe\tstate\tjustifying\tits\tcoercion by\t appeal\t to\t the\t claim\t that,\t because\t it\t knows\t what\t people\t \u2018really\u2019\t want\t better\t than they\tdo\tthemselves,\tits\tcoercion\tis\treally\tforcing\tpeople\tto\tbe\tfree. It\u2019s\tworth\tpointing\tout\twhat\tthis\tposition\tdoes\tnot\tinvolve.\tSomebody\tcan\tbe\tthe best\tjudge\tof\tsomething\twithout\tbeing\talways\tand\tnecessarily\tright\tabout\tit.\tI\tdon\u2019t think\t that\t I\t always\t co r r ectly\t identify\t what\t I\t r eally\t want.\t So metimes,\t fo r \t example,\t I persuade\t myself\t that\t I\t want\t (really\t want)\t something,\t when\t it\t turns\t out,\t with hindsight\tand\ta\tgreater\tdegree\tof\tself-awareness,\tthat\tmy\tjudgement\twas\tbiased\tor disto r ted,\t that\t so me\t kind\t of\t self-deceptio n,\t o r \t at\t least\t lack\t o f\t self-kno wledge,\t had been\tgetting\tin\tthe\tway\tof\tmy\tforming\tan\taccurate\tjudgement.\tBut\tthough\tI\thave\tto accept\tthat\teven\tI\tcan\tbe\twrong,\tI\tdon\u2019t\thave\tto\taccept\tthat\tanybody\telse\tis\tin\ta\tbetter position\t than\t me\t to\t judge\t correctly.\t Of\t course,\t if\t I\t believed\t that\t somebody\t else knew\tme\tbetter\tthan\tI\tdid\tmyself,\tthen\tI\tmight\talso\tbelieve\tthat\tshe\tcould\tbe\ta\tbetter judg e.\t But\t I\t do n\u2019t\t have\t to \t believe\t that,\t and,\t mo st\t r elevant\t to \t the\t po litical\t issues\t we are\tdiscussing,\tI\tcertainly\tdon\u2019t\thave\tto\tbelieve\tthat\tthe\tstate\tis\tin\tthat\tposition. 3\t\tTo\trecognize\tthat\tthere\tcan\tbe\tinternal\tobstacles\tto\tfreedom\tis\tnot\tto\tidentify freedom\twith\trationality The\tidea\tthat\tthere\tcan\tbe\tinternal\tobstacles\tto\tfreedom\tis\toften\tassociated\twith\tthe tho ug ht\t that\t the\t tr ue\t o r \t hig her \t self\t is\t the\t r atio nal\t self.\t This\t is\t clear est\t in\t Kant,\t fo r","whom\tthe\tautonomous\tself\tis\tindeed\tthe\trational\t(and\tmoral)\tself,\tand\twhat\tthat\tself is\t free\t from\t is\t empirical\t desire\t and\t impulse.\t (Kant\t was\t so\t hostile\t to\t wants\t and desires\tthat\the\tis\tsometimes\tinterpreted\tas\tholding\tthat\tsomebody\twho\twants\tto\tdo the\t mor ally\t r ig ht\t thing \t is\t acting \t less\t mo r ally\t than\t so mebo dy\t who\t do esn\u2019t\t want\t to but\t does\t so\t out\t of\t duty,\t that\t duty\t being\t recognized\t by\t her\t rational\t self.)\t The\t idea that\t there\t is\t a\t \u2018right\t answer \u2019\t about\t what\t an\t autonomous\t person\t would\t choose obviously\tgets\ta\tlot\tof\tsupport\tfrom\tthe\tidentification\tof\tautonomy\twith\trationality. Once\t the\t issue\t of\t what\t makes\t people\t free\t turns\t into\t that\t of\t what\t it\t is\t rational\t for them\t to\t do,\t then\t it\t looks\t as\t if\t the\t way\t is\t open\t for\t debate\t about\t what\t is\t indeed rational\t for\t people.\t And\t in\t that\t debate\t it\t might\t seem\t that\t the\t individual\t does\t not occupy\ta\tparticularly\tprivileged\tposition. But\tconsider\tthe\texamples\tgiven\tin\tthe\tprevious\tsection.\tThese\twere\tall\tsupposed to \t be\t cases\t wher e\t it\t is\t plausible\t to \t ackno wledg e\t inter nal\t o bstacles\t to \t fr eedo m,\t but none\t of\t them\t required\t that\t what\t was\t impeded\t was\t the\t exercise\t of\t a\t person\u2019s rationality.\t It\u2019s\t true\t that\t the\t would-be\t politician\t suffering\t from\t a\t fear\t of\t public speaking\tis\tplausibly\tregarded\tas\thaving\tan\tirrational\tphobia,\tbut\twe\tcan\tregard\ther as\tconstrained\tby\tthat\twithout\tknowing\twhether\twanting\tto\tbecome\ta\tpolitician\tis\ta rational\tthing\tfor\ther\tto\twant.\tIt\u2019s\ttrue\talso\tthat\twe\tmay\tbe\tinclined\tto\tsee\tsomeone who\tstudies\tfor\ther\texams\tas\tmore\trational\tthan\tsomeone\twho\tgoes\tout\tevery\tnight, and\t someone\t who\t wants\t to\t give\t up\t smoking\t as\t more\t rational\t than\t someone\t who doesn\u2019t.\t But\t the\t examples\t don\u2019t\t depend\t on\t that.\t We\t could,\t for \t example,\t imagine\t a student\twho\treally\twanted\tto\tgo\tout\tdrinking\tand\twho\texperienced\ther\t\u2018conscience\u2019 as\tan\tirrational\turge\tinculcated\tby\trepressive\tsocialization,\thence\tas\ta\tconstraint\ton the\t freedom\t of\t her\t autonomous\t self.\t I\t might\t really\t want\t to\t go\t and\t watch\t Oxford United\t (or\t the\t Milwaukee\t Brewers)\t play,\t and\t regard\t my\t desire\t for\t warmth\t and co mfo r t\t as\t a\t co nstr aint\t o n\t the\t pur suit\t o f\t that\t tr ue\t pur po se\t o f\t mine.\t But\t tho se\t who have\t watched\t them\t would\t agree\t that\t it\t is\t hard\t to\t describe\t watching\t United\t or\t the Brewers\tas\ta\trational\tway\tto\tspend\tan\tafternoon. One\t way\t o f\t thinking \t abo ut\t this\t \u2013\t develo ped\t by\t the\t Amer ican\t philo so pher \t Har r y Frankfurt\t (b.\t 1929)\t \u2013\t is\t to\t make\t a\t distinction\t between\t \u2018first-order \u2019\t and\t \u2018second- order \u2019\tdesires.\tFirst-order\tdesires\tare\tdesires\tfor\tthings\tlike\ta\tcomfortable\tbed,\tor being\tan\texplorer,\tdoing\twell\tin\texams,\tor\tgoing\tout\tdrinking.\tThese\tdesires,\tas\twe all\t kno w,\t can\t co nflict.\t A\t g o o d\t way\t o f\t thinking \t abo ut\t such\t co nflicts\t is\t the\t idea\t that we\talso\thave\tsecond-order\tdesires,\twhich\tare\tdesires\tabout\tour\tfirst-order\tdesires: they\tare\tdesires\tto\thave\tor\tnot\thave\tother\tdesires.\tTake\tour\twould-be\texplorer.\tDoes she\treally\twant\tto\tbe\tan\texplorer\tand\tget\trid\tof\ther\tpathetic\tdesire\tfor\ta\tcomfortable bed?\t Or\t is\t what\t she\t really\t wants\t to\t sleep\t in\t a\t comfortable\t bed\t untroubled\t by romantic\tyearnings\tfor\texploration?\tTo\tanswer\tthat\tquestion,\tshe\tmust\tlook\tto\ther second-order\tdesires.\tThose\twill\ttell\ther\twhether\tor\tnot\tshe\tis\tbeing\tprevented\tfrom do ing \t what\t she\t r eally\t wants\t by\t a\t desir e\t that\t she\t do es\t no t\t r eally\t want.\t Ano ther \t way","of\tputting\ta\tsimilar\tpoint\tis\tto\ttalk,\tas\tTaylor\tdoes,\tabout\t\u2018strong\tevaluation\u2019.\tWe\tdo not\tjust\thave\t\u2018brute\u2019\tdesires\tthat\twe\tassess\tsolely\tin\tterms\tof\ttheir\tstrength\tor\tforce. We\tare\talso\tcapable\tof\tevaluating\tour\tdesires,\tof\tjudging\tthem\tmore\tor\tless\tworthy or\tappropriate,\tof\tidentifying\twith\tor\tdisowning\tthem.\tThis,\tperhaps,\tis\tsomething that\t distinguishes\t us\t fr om\t other \t animals.\t Unlike\t their s,\t our \t desir es\t ar e\t not\t simply less\tor\tmore\tintense\tthan\tone\tanother.\tWe\tcan\treflect\ton\tthem\t\u2013\tidentify\twith\tsome, repudiate\tothers\t\u2013\tand\tit\tis\tthis\tcapacity\tto\tdiscriminate\tbetween\tdesires\tthat\tallows us\tto\tregard\tsome\tas\tconstraints\ton,\tor\tobstacles\tto,\tour\tfreedom,\twhich\tis\tachieved when\twe\tact\ton\tour\t\u2018real\u2019\tor\t\u2018authentic\u2019\tones.\tTo\tthink\tthat\tdesires\tcan\tbe\tobstacles to\t freedom,\t then,\t we\t don\u2019t\t need\t to\t posit\t freedom\t as\t rationality.\t We\t need\t only\t the idea\t that\t less\t significant\t desires\t can\t get\t in\t the\t way\t of\t the\t realization\t of\t more significant\tones.\tThe\tissue\tof\twho\tis\tthe\tbest\tjudge\twill\tthen\tbe\tformulated\tin\tterms of\twho\tis\tbest\table\tto\tjudge\twhich\tof\ta\tperson\u2019s\tdesires\tare\tmore\t\u2018significant\u2019. 4\t\tTo\tidentify\tfreedom\twith\trationality\tis\tnot\tto\tclaim\tthat\tthe\tsame\tthing\tis\trational for\teach\tperson Though\twe\tdo\tnot\thave\tto,\twe\tmight\tafter\tall\twant\tto\tmake\tsome\tkind\tof\tconnection between\t autonomy\t (and\t hence,\t on\t this\t conception,\t freedom)\t and\t rationality. Somebody\tdoing\tthe\trational\tthing\tis\tdoing\twhat\tthey\tmost\thave\treason\tto\tdo,\tand\tit is\tnot\tabsurd\tto\tthink\tthat\tsomebody\tdoing\tthat\tis\tmore\tfree\tthan\tsomebody\twho\tis acting \t ir r atio nally.\t And,\t tho ug h\t ag ain\t we\t do \t no t\t have\t to ,\t we\t mig ht\t believe\t that\t the individual\tis\tnot\tnecessarily\tthe\tbest\tjudge\tof\twhat\tis\trational\tfor\ther\t\u2013\tat\tleast\tnot\tin areas\twhere\tothers\thave\taccess\tto\tsuperior\tinformation\tor\tare\tbetter\table\tto\tprocess information\t available\t to\t all.\t After\t all,\t most\t of\t us\t believe\t that\t parents\t are\t better judges\t of\t what\t is\t and\t is\t not\t rational\t for\t their\t children\t than\t those\t children\t are themselves.\tMight\tnot\tthe\tsame\tapply,\teven\tif\tonly\tto\ta\tlimited\textent,\tin\tthe\tcase\tof at\tleast\tsome\tadults?\tIf\twe\tmade\tboth\tthese\tassumptions,\trejecting\tthe\tchances\tto\tget off\t the\t slippery\t slope\t offered\t by\t the\t two\t previous\t headings,\t would\t we\t then\t be committed\tto\tgoing\tall\tthe\tway\tto\ttotalitarianism? The\t answer\t is\t no.\t Berlin\t typically\t identifies\t doctrines\t of\t positive\t freedom\t with what\the\tcalls\t\u2018monism\u2019\t\u2013\tthe\tview\tthat\tthere\tis\tone\tharmonious\tand\tcorrect\tsystem o f\t values\t that\t tells\t us\t ho w\t we\t sho uld\t live.\t Ber lin\t thinks,\t by\t co ntr ast,\t that\t ther e\t ar e many\t differ ent\t values\t that\t co nflict\t with\t o ne\t ano ther.\t What\t he\t o bjects\t to ,\t pr imar ily, are\ttheories\tthat\tclaim\tcorrectly\tto\thave\tidentified\tthe\tright\tway\tfor\tpeople\tto\tlive, and\tthen\tforce\tthem\tto\tlive\tthat\tway\tin\tthe\tname\tof\ttheir\town\tfreedom.\tBut\teven\tif we\t do\t identify\t freedom\t with\t rationality,\t we\t don\u2019t\t have\t to\t accept\t monism\t in\t this sense.\t We\t can\t think\t that\t differ ent\t ways\t to \t live\t ar e\t r atio nal\t fo r \t differ ent\t peo ple,\t so that\t a\t state\t helps\t its\t members\t towards\t freedom\t not\t by\t getting\t them\t all\t to\t live\t the same\tway,\tbut\tby\tdoing\twhat\tit\tcan\tto\thelp\tthem\tto\tlive\tin\tways\tthat\tare\trational\tfor","them,\tas\tthe\tindividuals\tthey\tare.\tThere\tmight\tbe\tparticular\tareas\tof\tlife\twhere\twhat is\t rational\t is\t the\t same\t for\t all\t people\t (drive\t around\t without\t getting\t killed,\t avoid drug\taddiction).\tSo\tthere\tmight\tbe\ta\tlimited\tcommon\tcore\tof\tthings\tit\tis\trational\tfor all\t people\t to\t do\t and\t not\t to\t do\t (comply\t with\t traffic\t lights,\t avoid\t getting\t addicted). On\t the\t view\t under\t discussion,\t the\t state\t could\t make\t us\t do\t and\t not\t do\t those\t in\t the name\tof\tour\town\tfreedom.\tBut\tthese\tneed\tnot\tgo\tanywhere\tnear\tas\tfar\tas\tthe\tkind\tof extensive\tmonistic\tclaims\ttypically\tassociated\twith\ttotalitarianism.\tOn\tthe\tcontrary, we\t are\t likely\t to\t end\t up\t with\t a\t pluralistic,\t liberal\t state\t in\t which\t individuals\t are basically\tleft\tto\tdecide\tfor\tthemselves\twhat\tis\trational\tfor\tthem. 5\t\tTo\tidentify\tfreedom\twith\trationality\tis\tnot\tto\tclaim\tthat\tthere\tis\ta\tsingle\tthing\tthat is\trational\tfor\tany\tindividual We\t do n\u2019t,\t then,\t need\t to \t assume\t that\t ther e\t is\t a\t sing le\t way\t o f\t life\t that\t is\t r atio nal\t fo r all\tpeople.\tBut\tnor\tmust\twe\tassume\tthat\tthere\tis\ta\tsingle\tway\tof\tlife\tthat\tis\trational for\tany\tindividual\tperson.\tThink\tabout\tyour\town\tlife.\tIt\tmay\tbe\tthat\tthere\tare\tsome ways\t to \t live\t yo ur \t life\t that\t wo uld\t be\t clear ly\t ir r atio nal.\t Given\t my\t abilities,\t it\t wo uld have\t been\t clearly\t irrational\t for\t me\t to\t pursue\t the\t life\t of\t a\t professional\t footballer. Given\tmy\tinterests,\tit\twould\thave\tbeen\tirrational\tfor\tme\tto\tbecome\ta\tgardener.\tBut that\t doesn\u2019t\t show\t that\t there\t is\t only\t one\t life-plan\t that\t would\t be\t rational\t for\t me. Maybe\t my\t decision\t to\t try\t to\t be\t an\t academic\t was\t no\t more\t or\t less\t rational\t than would\thave\tbeen\tmy\tdecision\tto\ttry\tto\tbecome\tan\tactor.\tPerhaps\treason\tcan\thelp\tus decide\t between\t some\t ways\t of\t life,\t but\t that\t doesn\u2019t\t mean\t it\t can\t help\t us\t decide between\tall\tof\tthem,\tnarrowing\tthe\toptions\tdown\tto\ta\tsingle\tright\tanswer\tfor\teach of\t us.\t Perhaps,\t to\t use\t the\t current\t terminology,\t some\t different\t ways\t of\t life\t are simply\t\u2018incommensurable\u2019:\tnot\tcapable\tof\tbeing\tcompared\tin\tterms\tof\ta\tmetric\tthat would\tallow\tus\tto\tchoose\tbetween\tthem\ton\tthe\tbasis\tof\treason. If\tthat\tis\tright,\tthen\tthe\tidea\tthat\tone\tis\tonly\ttruly\tfree\twhen\tdoing\twhat\tis\trational looks\teven\tfurther\tfrom\tthe\ttotalitarian\tmenace.\tNot\tonly\tare\tdifferent\tways\tof\tlife r atio nal\t fo r \t differ ent\t peo ple,\t but\t differ ent\t ways\t o f\t life\t may\t be\t equally\t r atio nal\t fo r the\t same\t per so n!\t Of\t co ur se,\t the\t state\t mig ht\t still\t claim\t that\t ther e\t ar e\t so me\t ways\t o f life\t that\t would\t be\t irrational\t for\t anybody,\t and\t seek\t to\t promote\t the\t freedom\t of\t its citizens\tby\tpreventing\t(or\tat\tleast\tdiscouraging)\tthem\tfrom\tliving\tthose\tways.\tSome ways\t of\t life\t are\t evil;\t some\t are\t empty\t or\t worthless.\t Nobody\t has\t any\t reason\t to pursue\t those,\t and\t so\t the\t state\t is\t promoting\t the\t freedom\t of\t its\t citizens\t when\t it discourages\t or\t prevents\t people\t from\t doing\t so.\t But\t the\t image\t of\t a\t state\t leaving citizens\tfree\tto\tchoose\thow\tto\tlive,\tand\tchoosing\tfrom\tthe\tarray\tof\toptions\tthat\ttheir own\t reason\t has\t identified\t as\t equally\t rational\t for\t them,\t is\t a\t very\t long\t way\t indeed from\t the\t kind\t of\t totalitarian\t state\t that\t Berlin\t regards\t as\t the\t consequence\t of accepting\ta\tdoctrine\tof\tpositive\tliberty.","6\t\tTo\tidentify\twhat\twould\tbe\trational\tfor\ta\tperson\tdoes\tnot\tnecessarily\tjustify interfering\twith\ttheir\tirrational\taction The\tlast\ttwo\tpoints\tare\tsupposed\tto\treassure\tthose\twho\tdislike\tthe\tstate\u2019s\tinterfering in\tindividuals\u2019\tlives\tin\tthe\tname\tof\t\u2018freedom\tas\trationality\u2019.\tDifferent\tthings\tmay\tbe r atio nal\t fo r \t differ ent\t peo ple.\t Differ ent\t thing s\t may\t be\t r atio nal\t fo r \t the\t same\t per so n. So\teven\ta\tstate\tthat\tbelieves\titself\tjustified\tin\thelping\tits\tcitizens\tto\tchoose\trational lives,\t because\t that\t is\t what\t true\t freedom\t consists\t in,\t can\t be\t pluralistic,\t not\t the monistic\ttotalitarian\tstate\tthat\tBerlin\tfears.\tBut\tthere\tis\tanother\tway\tof\tavoiding\tthe slippery\tslope.\tThis\tconsists\tin\tnoticing\tthat\teven\tif\twe\tcould\tidentify\twhat\twould\tbe rational\t for\t a\t person\t to\t do,\t it\t doesn\u2019t\t automatically\t follow\t that\t we\t can\t justify interfering\tto\tget\ther\tto\tdo\tthe\trational\tthing. Suppose\t you\t have\t a\t friend\t who\t uses\t drugs\t that\t are\t potentially\t addictive.\t You know\t her\t well\t enough\t to\t know\t that\t this\t is\t irrational\t for\t her.\t (She\t hasn\u2019t\t made\t a careful,\treflective\tjudgement\tabout\ther\tchoice\tto\tuse\tdrugs.\tShe\tuses\tthem,\tlet\u2019s\tsay, because\tthat\tis\tthe\tnorm\tamong\ta\tgroup\tof\tfriends\tthat\tshe\twants\tto\tbe\tpopular\twith, but\tyou\tknow\ther\twell\tenough\tto\tjudge\tthat\ther\twanting\tto\tbe\tpopular\tresults\tfrom irrationally\t low\t self-esteem\t and\t that\t drugs\t won\u2019t\t help\t her\t become\t more\t popular.) Even\t if\t you\t are\t completely\t confident\t in\t your\t judgement\t that\t she\t is\t acting ir r atio nally,\t it\t do esn\u2019t\t fo llo w\t that\t yo u\t wo uld\t be\t justified\t in\t using \t fo r ce\t to \t pr event her \t fr o m\t taking \t them.\t Yo u\t mig ht,\t o f\t co ur se,\t be\t justified\t in\t tr ying \t to \t g et\t her \t to \t sit down\tand\tthink\tabout\twhat\tshe\tis\tdoing.\tYou\tmight\teven\tbe\tmorally\trequired\tto\tdo that.\t But\t do ing \t what\t o ne\t can\t to \t g et\t peo ple\t to \t see\t fo r \t themselves\t what\t is\t and\t is\t no t r atio nal\t fo r \t them\t is\t quite\t differ ent\t fr o m\t fo r cing \t them\t to \t do \t that\t which\t is\t r atio nal. The\tlatter\tinvolves\ta\tlack\tof\trespect,\ta\tfailure\tto\trespect\tthe\tvalue\tof\ther\tliving\ther life\tin\ther\town\t(irrational)\tway.\tIt\tinvolves,\twe\tmight\tsay,\tan\tunjustified\trestriction on\tthe\tindividual\u2019s\tfreedom\tto\tchoose\tfor\therself. If\t we\t did\t say\t that,\t then\t we\t would\t not,\t of\t course,\t be\t using\t a\t conception\t of \u2018freedom\t as\t autonomy\t as\t rationality\u2019.\t And\t we\t would\t want\t to\t know\t why\t the restriction\t is\t unjustified\t \u2013\t why\t people\t should\t be\t free\t to\t choose\t irrationally.\t The notion\t of\t \u2018respect\u2019\t is\t part\t of\t one\t answer.\t The\t idea\t that\t people\u2019s\t living\t a\t life\t they themselves\thave\tchosen\tis\tnecessary\tfor\tthat\tlife\tto\tbe\tvaluable\tfor\tthem\tis\tanother. (This\t builds\t o n\t Lo cke\u2019s\t sug g estio n,\t in\t his\t Letter\t on\t Toleration\t (1689),\t that\t fo r cing non-believers\tinto\tchurch\tdoes\tthem\tno\tgood\t\u2013\teven\tif\tevery\tword\tof\tthe\treligious doctrine\t being\t forced\t on\t them\t is\t true.)\t John\t Stuart\t Mill\u2019s\t On\t Liberty\t (1859) provides\t a\t number\t of\t different\t answers.\t Recall,\t from\t Part\t 1,\t Rawls\t regarding\t a person\u2019s\tcapacity\tto\tframe,\trevise\tand\tpursue\ta\tconception\tof\tthe\tgood\tas\tthe\tmost morally\t significant\t capacity\t she\t has.\t Freedom\t matters,\t on\t these\t liberal\t views, because\t of\t the\t importance\t of\t individuals\t being\t able\t to\t live\t lives\t they\t believe\t in\t \u2013 rather\tthan\tthose\tfoisted\ton\tthem\tby\tothers.\tWe\twill\texplore\tthese\targuments\tfurther in\t Par t\t 4.\t In\t this\t co ntext,\t the\t impo r tant\t po int\t is\t simple:\t so mebo dy\t can\t kno w\t better","than\tanother\twhat\twould\tbe\trational\tfor\tthat\tother\twithout\tbeing\tjustified\tin\tusing\tall available\tmeans\tto\tget\ther\tto\tdo\tit. 7\t\tInterference\taimed\tat\tgetting\tpeople\tto\tact\trationally\tmight\tbe\tjustified\twhile acknowledging\tthat\tit\tdoes\tinvolve\ta\trestriction\ton\tfreedom\tand\twithout\tclaiming that\tit\tis\tjustified\ton\tfreedom\tgrounds So\tfar\tthe\tdiscussion\thas\tbeen\twholly\tcouched\tin\tfreedom\tterms.\tBut,\tas\tnoted\tin\tthe case\t of\t private\t property,\t we\t should\t remember\t that\t things\t don\u2019t\t have\t to\t be\t argued this\t way.\t Recall\t the\t discussion\t of\t seat\t belts.\t Freedom-restricting\t legislation\t might be\tjustified\tsimply\ton\tthe\tgrounds\tthat\tit\tmakes\tthose\trestricted\tbetter\toff\tthan\tthey would\totherwise\tbe\t\u2013\tand\t\u2018better\toff\u2019\tin\tterms\tthat\thave\tnothing\tto\tdo\twith\tfreedom. Discussions\tof\tpositive\tfreedom,\tand\tof\tthe\tstate\tinterference\tit\thas\tbeen\tinvoked\tby so me\t to \t justify,\t can\t lead\t us\t to \t fo r g et\t that\t fr eedo m\t is\t o nly\t o ne\t value\t amo ng \t many. As\t always,\t what\t matters,\t ultimately,\t is\t whether,\t all\t things\t considered,\t the\t state\u2019s action\tis\tjustified.","Conclusion The\t concept\t of\t liber ty\t is\t used\t in\t many\t differ ent\t ways,\t with\t differ ent\t theor ists\t and traditions\t invoking\t quite\t different\t conceptions\t of\t it.\t This\t leads\t to\t quite understandable\tconfusion,\tconfusion\tthat\tis\tnot\tdispelled\tby\tBerlin\u2019s\tfamous\tessay. It\t is\t not\t helpful\t to\t divide\t conceptions\t into\t two\t kinds,\t because\t doing\t that\t requires lumping\ttogether\tconceptions\tthat\tare\timportantly\tdifferent.\tAt\tits\tworst,\tit\tleads\tto the\treally\tmisleading\tidea\tthat\tthe\tdistinction\tbetween\t\u2018freedom\tfrom\u2019\tand\t\u2018freedom to\u2019\tcaptures\ta\tcrucial\tfault\tline,\twhen\tit\tfact\tit\tcaptures\tnothing\tat\tall.\tMacCallum\u2019s suggestion\t\u2013\t\u2018x\tis\tfree\tfrom\ty\tto\tdo\t(become)\tz\u2019\u2013\tis\ta\tbetter\tmeans\tto\tclarity.\tArmed with\t this,\t we\t can\t be\t precise\t in\t our\t freedom\t claims\t and\t get\t on\t with\t the\t important business\tof\tdeciding\twho\tshould\tbe\tfree\tfrom\twhat\tto\tdo\tor\tbecome\twhat. Much\t po litical\t debate\t invo king \t the\t co ncept\t o f\t fr eedo m\t has\t fo cused\t o n\t issues\t to do\t with\t property\t and\t redistribution.\t During\t the\t 1970s\t and\t 1980s,\t the\t right appropriated\t the\t concept\t of\t freedom\t for\t its\t own\t purposes.\t To\t believe\t in\t freedom meant\t to\t favour\t the\t free\t market,\t and\t to\t want\t the\t state\t to\t do\t as\t little\t as\t possible, leaving\t individuals\t \u2018free\u2019\t from\t its\t interference.\t The\t left\t responded\t in\t two\t quite different\t ways.\t The\t mainstream\t or\t liberal\t left\t argued\t that\t the\t right\t seemed particularly\tconcerned\twith\tthe\tfreedom\tof\tthose\twho\thad\tproperty\t\u2013\ttheir\tfreedom to\tdo\twhat\tthey\tliked\twith\tit\t\u2013\tand\tnot\tmuch\tinterested\tin\tthe\tfreedom\tof\tthose\twho had\tlittle\tor\tnone.\tThe\tradical\tand\tMarxist\tleft\tquestioned\tthe\tvery\tidea\tthat\tproperty and\tfreedom\twere\tconnected,\targuing\tthat\ttrue\tfreedom\trequired\tthe\ttranscendence o f\t the\t capitalist\t fr amewo r k\t that\t r elied\t o n\t and\t fo ster ed\t a\t \u2018bo ur g eo is\u2019\t co nceptio n\t o f freedom.\tI\thope\tthat\tthis\tpart\tof\tthe\tbook\thas\tmade\tclear\tthe\tbig\tdifference\tbetween these\t two\t responses,\t as\t well\t as\t providing\t some\t more\t detail\t about\t the\t different forms\tthey\tmight\ttake. When\t To ny\t Blair \t sug g ested\t that\t po sitive\t fr eedo m\t mig ht\t have\t mo r e\t g o ing \t fo r \t it than\tBerlin\tacknowledged,\the\twas\tpursuing\ta\tvariant\tof\tthe\tfirst\tstrategy.\tHe\twas\tnot arguing\tfor\ta\tmore\tcontroversial\tconception\tof\t\u2018positive\u2019\tfreedom\tas\tautonomy,\tlet alo ne\t the\t clo set\t to talitar ian\t sug g estio n\t that\t identified\t fr eedo m\t with\t r atio nality.\t T he last\tpart\tof\tthis\tPart\tpointed\tto\tvarious\tways\tin\twhich\t\u2018freedom\tas\tautonomy\u2019\tneed no t\t be\t as\t dang er o us\t as\t it\t seems.\t Ber lin\u2019s\t essay\t br illiantly\t sho wed\t ho w,\t o ver \t time, this\tconception\tof\tpositive\tfreedom\tdeveloped\tinto\tsomething\tthat\tcould\tbe\tinvoked to\t legitimate\t oppressive\t regimes\t in\t the\t name\t of\t freedom.\t But,\t to\t political philosophers,\twhat\tmatters\tis\tless\t\u2018What\thappened?\u2019\tthan\t\u2018What\tis\tthe\tright\tthing\tto think?\u2019\t It\t is\t important\t to\t rescue\t the\t baby\t of\t \u2018freedom\t as\t autonomy\u2019\t from\t the bathwater\tof\t\u2018freedom\tconsists\tin\tdoing\twhat\ta\ttotalitarian\tstate\ttells\tyou\tis\tin\tyour own\tbest\tinterests\u2019. Further\treading","David\t Miller \u2019s\t (ed.)\t The\t Liberty\t Reader\t (Edinburgh\t University\t Press\t 2006)\t has\t a useful\tshort\tintroduction\tand\tcontains\tseveral\tof\tthe\tpapers\tdiscussed\there.\tAnother valuable\t co llectio n\t of\t excer pts\t fr o m\t a\t wide\t r ange\t o f\t histo r ical\t and\t contempor ar y sources,\twith\thelpful\tcommentary,\tis\tFreedom:\tA\tPhilosophical\tAnthology,\tedited\tby Ian\tCarter,\tMatthew\tKramer\tand\tHillel\tSteiner\t(Blackwell\t2006).\tKatrin\tFlikschuh\u2019s Freedom\t(Polity\t2007)\tis\texcellent. Republican\t per spectives\t ar e\t r epr esented\t by\t Phillip\t Pettit\t and\t Quentin\t Skinner \t in both\tcollections.\tFor\tmore\tof\ttheir\tthinking,\tsee\tPettit\u2019s\tRepublicanism:\tA\tTheory\tof Freedom\t and\t Government\t (Oxford\t University\t Press\t 1997)\t and\t Skinner \u2019s\t Liberty Before\tLiberalism\t(Cambridge\tUniversity\tPress\t1998).\tPettit\u2019s\ttheory\twas\texplicitly endorsed\t and\t adopted\t by\t Jos\u00e9\t Luis\t Rodr\u00edguez\t Zapatero,\t prime\t minister\t of\t Spain fr om\t 2004\t to \t 2011.\t For \t a\t fascinating \t account\t o f\t this\t r eal-wo r ld\t attempt\t to\t enact\t a political\t philosophy,\t see\t his\t book,\t co-authored\t with\t Jos\u00e9\t Luis\t Mart\u00ed,\t A\t Political Philosophy\tin\tPublic\tLife:\tCivic\tRepublicanism\tin\tZapatero\u2019s\tSpain (Princeton\tUniversity\tPress\t2010). The\tthoughts\tabout\tmoney\tand\tfreedom\tcome\tfrom\tG.\tA.\tCohen\u2019s\t\u2018Freedom\tand Money\u2019\t in\t his\t sadly\t posthumous\t collection\t edited\t by\t Michael\t Otsuka,\t On\t the Currency\t of\t Egalitarian\t Justice,\t and\t Other\t Essays\t in\t Political\t Philosophy (Princeton\tUniversity\tPress\t2011).\tPhilippe\tVan\tParijs\u2019s\tReal\tFreedom\tfor\tAll:\tWhat (if\tAnything)\tCan\tJustify\tCapitalism?\t(Oxford\tUniversity\tPress\t1997)\tuses\tthe\tidea of\teffective\tfreedom\t\u2013\twhich\the\tcalls\t\u2018real\u2019\tfreedom\t\u2013\tto\targue\tfor\tan\tunconditional basic\tincome. The\t easiest\t version\t of\t Ronald\t Dworkin\u2019s\t view\t is\t \u2018Do\t Liberty\t and\t Equality Conflict?\u2019,\tin\tPaul\tBarker\t(ed.),\tLiving\tas\tEquals\t(Oxford\t University\t Press\t 1996). Ther e\t is\t a\t mor e\t complicated\t o ne\t in\t \u2018The\t Place\t o f\t Liber ty\u2019\t in\t his\t Sovereign\t Virtue (Harvard\t University\t Press\t 2000).\t His\t last\t book,\t Justice\t for\t Hedgehogs\t (Harvard University\t Press\t 2011),\t is\t a\t plea\t not\t for\t animal\t rights\t but\t for\t the\t unity\t of\t value. (According\t to\t an\t ancient\t Greek\t poet,\t \u2018The\t fox\t knows\t many\t things,\t but\t the hedgehog\t knows\t one\t big\t thing.\u2019\t It\u2019s\t unclear\t what\t that\t big\t thing\t is.)\t The\t last\t part applies\t his\t \u2018properly\t understood,\t values\t don\u2019t\t conflict\u2019\t perspective\t to\t liberty, equality,\tdemocracy\tand\tlaw. J.\tJ.\tRousseau\u2019s\tThe\tSocial\tContract\t(1762)\tand\tJ.\tS.\tMill\u2019s\tOn\tLiberty\t(1859)\tare classic\t texts\t available\t in\t a\t range\t of\t cheap\t editions\t and\t online\t free\t at http:\/\/www.constitution.org\/jjr\/socon.htm\t and http:\/\/www.constitution.org\/jsm\/liberty.htm\t respectively.\t Mill\u2019s\t is\t a\t reasonably str aig htfo r war d\t r ead\t \u2013\t the\t ar g uments\t ar e\t g ener ally\t clear.\t I\t wish\t the\t same\t co uld\t be said\tfor\tRousseau.","Part\t3","Equality Equality\t is\t mo r e\t co ntr o ver sial\t than\t justice\t \u2013\t even\t so cial\t justice\t \u2013\t o r \t liber ty.\t Many r eject\t equality.\t Eg alitar ians,\t it\t is\t said,\t endo r se\t the\t po litics\t o f\t envy,\t fo ster \t a\t cultur e of\t dependence\t in\t which\t individuals\t nannied\t by\t the\t state\t lose\t all\t sense\t of responsibility,\t and\t show\t wilful\t ignorance\t of\t the\t functional\t requirements\t of\t a modern,\tdynamic\teconomy\toperating\tin\ta\tglobal\tmarketplace.\tEquality\tis\tregarded, even\t by\t its\t fo r mer \t fr iends,\t as\t an\t o utdated\t ideal.\t Po litically,\t \u2018equality\u2019\t is\t bad\t news, out\tof\ttouch\twith\tthe\tindividualistic,\taspirational\tvalues\tof\ttoday\u2019s\tvoters.\tIn\tthe\tUS, current\t debate\t is\t about\t whether\t inheritance\t tax\t should\t start\t to\t kick\t in\t on\t estates wo r th\t less\t than\t $5\t millio n.\t Br itish\t po liticians\t who \t suppo r t\t incr easing \t the\t shar e\t o f tax\t paid\t by\t the\t wealthy\t are\t immediately\t accused\t of\t reviving\t \u2018class\t war \u2019. Redistributive\t taxation,\t taxing\t the\t better\t off\t to\t help\t the\t worse\t off,\t is\t done\t almost secretly\t\u2013\t\u2018stealth\ttax\u2019,\tnot\t\u2018wealth\ttax\u2019.\tEven\tthose\twho\tstill\tbelieve\tin\tit\tframe\ttheir objectives\tin\tother\tterms:\t\u2018Opportunity\tfor\tthe\tmany,\tnot\tthe\tfew.\u2019 All\tthis\tis\tat\tthe\tlevel\tof\tpopular\tpolitical\trhetoric.\tBut\tequality\thas\tbeen\tgiven\ta har d\t time\t by\t political\t philo so pher s\t too .\t Valuing \t equality,\t they\t ar gue,\t is\t a\t mistake. What\tmatters\tis\tnot\tthat\tpeople\thave\tequal\tshares\tof\tgood\tthings.\tNor\tis\tit\teven\tthat people\t have\t equal\t o ppo r tunity\t fo r \t (o r \t access\t to )\t go od\t thing s.\t What\t matter s,\t if\t we think\t about\t it,\t is\t that\t everybody\t has\t enough,\t or\t that\t those\t who\t have\t least\t have\t as much\tas\tpossible,\tor\tthat\tpeople\twho\tmost\tneed\tthings\ttake\tpriority.\tTo\tcare\tabout equality\tis\tto\tcare\tthat\tpeople\thave\tthe\tsame\tamount\tas\teach\tother,\twhich\tlooks\tlike a\tpeculiar\tthing\tto\tcare\tabout.\tAfter\tall,\ta\tpossible\tworld\tin\twhich\tpeople\thave\tequal amounts\tis\tone\tin\twhich\tnobody\thas\tanything. In\tthe\tdiscourse\tof\ttoday\u2019s\telectoral\tpolitics,\tredistributive\ttaxation\thas\tgot\titself a\t bad\t name,\t is\t car r ied\t o ut\t so mewhat\t sur r eptitio usly\t (wher e\t it\t is\t car r ied\t o ut\t at\t all), and,\twhen\tit\tdoes\treach\tthe\tsurface,\tis\tpresented\tin\tterms\tthat\tmake\tscant\treference to \t equality.\t Meanwhile\t po litical\t philo so pher s\t ar e\t incr easing ly\t abando ning \t equality as\t a\t political\t ideal.\t Against\t this\t background,\t it\t is\t important\t to\t see\t that\t the philosophers\u2019\t arguments\t against\t equality\t are\t not\t necessarily\t arguments\t against redistributive\t taxation.\t Someone\t who\t rejects\t equality\t can\t care\t passionately\t that resources\tshould\tbe\ttransferred\tfrom\tthe\trich\tto\tthe\tpoor.\tRejecting\tequality,\tin\tthis sense,\t means\t rejecting\t a\t particular\t reason\t that\t might\t be\t off\t ered\t to\t justify\t the redistribution.\t One\t can,\t then,\t approve\t of\t the\t fact\t that\t redistributive\t policies\t are","presented\tas\taiming\tnot\tat\tequality\tbut\tat\tother\tgoals\twhile\thaving\tno\tsympathy\twith politicians\u2019\treluctance\tto\targue\tthe\tcase\tfor\tredistribution.\tIt\tis\tperfectly\tcoherent\tto reject\tequality\tat\tthe\tphilosophical\tlevel,\tas\ta\tfundamental\tideal,\twhile\targuing\tthat, for\t other\t reasons,\t resources\t should\t be\t more\t equally\t distributed\t \u2013\t perhaps\t much more\tequally\tdistributed\t\u2013\tthan\tthey\tare\tat\tpresent. But\t it\t is\t also\t important\t to\t distinguish\t between\t philosophical\t and\t practical arguments.\t Philosophical\t objections\t to\t equality,\t which\t point\t to\t the\t oddness\t of fo cusing \t o n\t equal\t shar es,\t ar e\t quite\t differ ent\t fr o m\t pr actical\t o bjectio ns\t that\t o ppo se redistribution\tbecause\tof\tits\talleged\tconsequences.\tSuppose\tI\tcare\tabove\tall\telse\tthat the\t poorest\t members\t of\t society\t should\t be\t as\t well\t off\t as\t they\t can.\t I\t could\t still oppose\ta\tmore\tsharply\tprogressive\ttax-and-transfer\tsystem.\tWhy?\tBecause\tI\tmight believe\t that\t the\t result\t of\t such\t a\t policy\t would\t be\t effects\t on\t economic\t productivity serious\tenough\tto\treduce\tthe\tsize\tof\tthe\tpie,\tand\thence\tthe\tsize\tof\tthe\tsmallest\tpiece, in\tthe\tlong\trun.\tPeople\tdoubtful\tabout\tredistribution\t\u2013\tas\ta\tmatter\tof\tpolicy\t\u2013\tcould doubt\tpurely\ton\tpractical,\tempirical\tgrounds,\twhile\tbeing\tno\tless\tcommitted\tto\tthe goal\tof\thelping\tthe\tdisadvantaged.\tAs\talways\tin\tpolitics,\tone\tmust\tkeep\tclear\ton\tthe distinction\t between\t means\t and\t ends.\t The\t kind\t of\t political\t philosophy\t discussed\t in this\tbook\tclarifies\tconcepts\tand\targuments,\tenabling\tthe\tmore\tprecise\tidentification of\tgoals\tthat\ta\tsociety\tmight\tseek\tto\tachieve.\tWhich\tpolicies\twill\tbest\trealize\tthose goals\tis\ta\tfurther\tand\tseparate\tquestion.","The\tegalitarian\tplateau Political\t philosophers\t have\t recently\t given\t equality\t a\t hard\t time.\t But\t almost everybody\t \u2013\t including\t almost\t all\t political\t philosophers\t \u2013\t believes\t in\t equality\t in some\tsense.\tWith\tthe\texception\tof\ta\tfew\tracists,\tcontemporary\tpolitics,\tand\tpolitical philosophy,\t is\t carried\t out\t on\t what\t the\t Canadian\t philosopher\t Will\t Kymlicka\t (b. 1962)\t has\t called\t an\t \u2018egalitarian\t plateau\u2019.\t Nearly\t all\t agree\t with\t the\t principle\t that members\tof\ta\tpolitical\tcommunity\tshould\tbe\ttreated\tas\tequals,\tthat\tthe\tstate\tshould treat\t its\t citizens\t with\t equal\t concern\t and\t respect.\t What\t they\t disagree\t about\t is\t what \u2018treatment\t as\t an\t equal\u2019\t amounts\t to.\t For\t libertarians\t such\t as\t Nozick,\t as\t we\t saw\t in Part\t 1,\t treating\t people\t as\t equals\t means\t respecting\t their\t property\t rights,\t including their\tright\tto\tself-ownership,\tequally;\tnot\tusing\tsome\tas\tmeans\tto\tothers\u2019\tends.\tThis may\t produce\t vast\t inequalities\t of\t money,\t but,\t for\t Nozick,\t that\t is\t not\t the\t kind\t of equality\t that\t matters.\t Some\t think\t that\t treatment\t as\t an\t equal\t requires\t equality\t of opportunity.\tNo\tprejudice,\tbased\ton\trace\tor\tgender,\tcreating\tbarriers\tto\tindividuals\u2019 efforts\t to\t better\t themselves.\t (I\t will\t discuss\t different\t conceptions\t of\t equality\t of opportunity\t shortly.)\t Others\t take\t it\t to\t imply\t a\t much\t more\t equal\t distribution\t of income\tand\twealth.\tAnd\tso\ton. This\t is\t a\t strange\t state\t of\t affairs.\t Equality\t has\t recently\t been\t subjected\t to fundamental\t criticisms\t by\t political\t philosophers,\t yet\t contemporary\t political philosophy\t takes\t place\t on\t an\t \u2018egalitarian\t plateau\u2019.\t Few\t believe\t in\t equality,\t but everybody\t agrees\t about\t the\t importance\t of\t \u2018treatment\t as\t equals\u2019,\t disagreeing\t only about\t how\t to\t interpret\t this\t claim.\t How\t can\t this\t be?\t The\t answer\t is\t that\t \u2018the\t state should\t treat\t all\t its\t citizens\t with\t equal\t concern\t and\t respect\u2019\t is\t not\t a\t claim\t about equality\tas\ta\tdistributive\tideal\t(which\tis\tthe\tway\tit\tis\tunderstood\tby\tthose\trejecting it).\t What\t it\t really\t says\t is\t that\t all\t citizens\t have\t the\t same\t right\t to\t be\t treated\t with concern\t and\t respect\t \u2013\t and\t that\t the\t respect\t and\t concern\t with\t which\t they\t should\t be treated\t depends\t solely\t on\t their\t status\t as\t citizens\t (and\t not\t on\t their\t race,\t gender, religion,\t how\t clever\t or\t rich\t they\t are,\t or\t whatever).\t Principles\t like\t this\t are\t not designed\t to\t make\t distributions\t more\t equal,\t but\t to\t encourage\t recognition\t that\t the well-being\tof\tall\tcitizens\tcounts.\tAs\twe\twill\tsee\tshortly,\trecognizing\tthat\tall\tcitizens have\t an\t equal\t r ig ht\t to \t co ncer n\t and\t r espect\t may,\t o n\t so me\t views,\t have\t implicatio ns for\t the\t kinds\t of\t distribution\t of\t goods\t that\t are\t acceptable\t \u2013\t including\t perhaps implicatio ns\t fo r \t the\t kinds\t o f\t inequality\t that\t ar e\t per mitted\t \u2013\t but\t the\t fundamental\t o r underlying\tprinciple\tis\tnot\tthat\tof\tequality\tas\ta\tdistributive\tideal. It\tis,\thowever,\tthat\tof\tpeople\trelating\tto\tone\tanother\t\u2013\tand\thence\tthe\tstate\trelating to\t them\t all\t \u2013\t as\t equals.\t Those\t who\t think\t that\t the\t value\t of\t equality\t is\t essentially concerned\t with\t the\t distribution\t of\t goods\t are\t sometimes\t criticized\t for\t failing\t to recognize\t the\t importance\t of\t equality\t in\t social\t relationships.\t What\t those\t who\t care about\t equality\t (sho uld)\t r eally\t object\t to ,\t on\t this\t account,\t is\t not\t the\t fact\t that\t people","have\t unequal\t amounts\t of\t anything\t material,\t but\t that\t relations\t between\t them\t are hierarchical,\tconceived\tas\trelations\tbetween\tsuperiors\tand\tinferiors.\tUnequal\tsocial r elatio ns\t lead\t to \t o ppr essio n\t \u2013\t mar g inalizatio n,\t explo itatio n,\t exclusio n,\t do minatio n \u2013\t which\t typically\t leads\t to\t inequalities\t in\t the\t distribution\t of\t goods.\t But\t it\t is\t the oppression\t and\t inequality\t in\t social\t relations\t that\t is\t the\t fundamental\t problem. Historically,\t egalitarian\t political\t movements\t have\t challenged\t the\t idea\t that\t some people\t \u2013\t whites,\t men,\t aristocrats\t \u2013\t are\t better\t than\t others,\t and\t asserted\t the\t equal value\t of\t all\t human\t beings,\t and\t the\t importance\t of\t their\t relating\t to\t one\t another\t as equal\tmembers\tof\ta\tcommunity.\tToday,\tgroups\tsuch\tas\tethnic\tminorities,\tgays\tand lesbians\t and\t the\t disabled\t seek\t no t\t so \t much\t equal\t amo unts\t o f\t g o o ds\t as\t equality\t o f status\tor\trecognition.\tEven\tif\tthe\tidea\tthat\tthe\tstate\tshould\t\u2018treat\tpeople\tas\tequals\u2019\tis not\t about\t equality\t as\t a\t distributive\t ideal,\t it\t still\t reflects\t a\t commitment\t to relationships\tcharacterized\tby\tequality\trather\tthan\thierarchy. It\t is\t surely\t true\t that\t we\t still\t live\t in\t a\t society\t characterized\t by\t oppressive (exclusionary,\t exploitative,\t etc.)\t social\t relationships\t \u2013\t between\t genders,\t ethnic g r o ups,\t tho se\t o f\t differ ing \t sexualities\t o r \t physical\t abilities,\t and\t so \t o n.\t No netheless, most\tof\tmy\tdiscussion\twill\tbe\tconcerned\twith\tequality\tspecifically\tas\ta\tdistributive idea.\t This\t is\t for\t two\t reasons.\t First,\t I\t don\u2019t\t know\t any\t political\t philosophers\t who defend\tunequal\tand\toppressive\tsocial\trelationships.\tIt\u2019s\ttrue\tthat\tsome\tclaim\tthat\tthe approaches\t of\t others\t too\t often\t neglect,\t or\t perhaps\t unwittingly\t contribute\t to,\t such relationships.\tIt\u2019s\talso\ttrue\tthat\tsome\thave\tdone\tmuch\tto\tbring\tthem\tto\tour\tattention, to\t illuminate\t the\t way\t in\t which\t they\t work,\t and\t to\t identify\t what\t kinds\t of\t political action\tmight\tremedy\tthem.\tBut,\tin\tterms\tof\tthe\tkind\tof\targument\tI\tam\tinterested\tin, that\tisn\u2019t\twhere\tthe\taction\thas\tbeen.\tSecond,\tand\tmore\timportantly,\twhat\tis\tbad\tabout unequal\t and\t oppressive\t social\t relationships\t is,\t presumably,\t that\t they\t are\t bad\t for those\t on\t the\t wrong\t end\t of\t them.\t Translate\t this\t into\t talk\t about\t their\t effects\t on people\u2019s\twell-being\t\u2013\thow\twell\tor\tbadly\toff\tthey\tare,\tall\tthings\tconsidered\t\u2013\tand\tit looks\tas\tif\twe\tcan\timmediately\tstart\ttalking\tin\tdistributive\tterms,\twith\t\u2018well-being\u2019 as\tthe\tstuff\twe\tcare\tabout\tthe\tdistribution\tof.\tI\tmay\tgive\tdisproportionate\tattention\tto inequality\twith\trespect\tto\tobvious\tand\tindividualistic\tgoods\tlike\tmoney,\tbut\tmany\tof the\t points\t made\t could\t be\t generalized\t to\t include\t other\t factors\t relevant\t to\t the distribution\tof\thuman\twell-being,\tsuch\tas\tthe\tquality\tof\tpeople\u2019s\trelationships\twith others. Back\t to\t the\t idea\t of\t \u2018treatment\t as\t equals\u2019.\t This\t formula\t can\t be\t interpreted\t in\t a variety\tof\tdifferent\tways,\tyielding\tless\tor\tmore\tradical\tdistributive\timplications.\tBy way\t of\t example,\t consider\t two\t uncontroversial\t respects\t in\t which\t we\t think\t that\t the state\t should\t treat\t people\t as\t equals:\t equality\t before\t the\t law,\t and\t equality\t of citizenship.\tEquality\tbefore\tthe\tlaw\tcould\tjust\tmean\tthat\tthe\tlaw\tapplies\tto\tall\tpeople without\texceptions:\tthat\tthere\tisn\u2019t\tone\tlaw\tfor\tthe\trich\tand\tone\tlaw\tfor\tthe\tpoor,\tor different\tlaws\tdepending\ton\ta\tperson\u2019s\tstatus\t\u2013\tproperty-holder,\tslave,\tor\twhatever.","That\t would\t be\t a\t very\t thin\t or\t formal\t notion\t of\t equality\t before\t the\t law.\t But,\t by appealing\t to\t considerations\t such\t as\t those\t that\t might\t lead\t someone\t to\t prefer \u2018effective\t freedom\u2019\t to\t \u2018formal\t freedom\u2019\t (as\t discussed\t in\t Part\t 2),\t one\t could plausibly\tclaim\t\u2018equality\tbefore\tthe\tlaw\u2019\tto\timply\tmore\tthan\tthat.\tIt\tcould\tbe\ttaken\tto mean\t that\t inequalities\t in\t the\t resources\t available\t to\t people\t should\t not\t affect\t their standing \t in\t r elatio n\t to \t the\t leg al\t pr o cess\t as\t a\t who le.\t A\t weak\t ver sio n\t o f\t this\t wo uld support\tlegal\taid:\tequality\tbefore\tthe\tlaw\trequires\tthat\tpeople\u2019s\tability\tto\tgo\tto\tlaw, or\tto\tput\tup\ta\tproper\tdefence,\tshould\tnot\tbe\timpeded\tby\tlack\tof\tresources.\tThis\tis weak\tbecause\tit\tdoesn\u2019t\tstop\twealthy\tpeople\tspending\tas\tmuch\tas\tthey\tlike\ton\ttheir legal\trepresentation.\tIt\tmakes\tsure\tonly\tthat\teverybody\thas\tsome\tbasic\tthreshold\tof resources\t available\t for\t legal\t purposes.\t A\t stronger\t view\t would\t hold\t that\t people shouldn\u2019t\t be\t allowed\t to\t spend\t their\t own\t resources\t on\t the\t legal\t process,\t on defending\t their\t claims\t or\t making\t claims\t against\t others,\t if\t that\t results\t in\t a\t very unequal\t input\t by\t litig ants.\t Ther e\t mig ht,\t fo r \t example,\t be\t a\t limit\t o n\t the\t amo unt\t that somebody\t could\t spend\t \u2013\t say\t twice\t the\t amount\t supplied\t by\t legal\t aid.\t And\t the str o ng est\t view\t wo uld\t ho ld\t that\t peo ple\t sho uld\t be\t able\t to \t devo te\t o nly\t str ictly\t equal amo unts\t o f\t r eso ur ces.\t Only\t then\t wo uld\t peo ple\t r eally\t have\t equality\t befo r e\t the\t law understood\tas\tequal\taccess\tto\tthe\tsame\tquality\tof\tlegal\trepresentation. Similar \t mo ves\t apply\t in\t the\t case\t o f\t equal\t citizenship.\t Fo r mally,\t this\t mig ht\t mean simply\t that\t all\t citizens\t have\t the\t r ig ht\t to \t vo te,\t to \t stand\t fo r \t public\t o ffice,\t and\t so \t o n. But\t it\t could\t mean\t rather\t more.\t It\t could\t mean,\t for\t example,\t that\t all\t citizens\t have some\tkind\tof\tbasic\tminimum\tor\tthreshold\tlevel\tof\tthose\tgoods\tthat\tare\trelevant\tto the\t pr oper \t per fo r mance\t o f\t the\t r o le\t o f\t citizen:\t educatio n,\t fr eedo m\t fr om\t po ver ty\t \u2013 those\t preoccupied\t with\t finding\t their\t next\t meal\t are\t not\t in\t a\t position\t to\t deliberate sensibly\tabout\tthe\tpolitical\tissues\tfacing\ttheir\tcommunity\t\u2013\tand\tso\ton.\tIf\tcitizenship is\t about\t informed\t input\t to\t the\t political\t process\t and\t you\t really\t do\t care\t that\t all citizens\t are\t able\t to\t exercise\t their\t citizenship\t rights,\t then\t you\t will\t be\t deeply co ncer ned\t abo ut\t tho se\t who \t ar e\t no t\t in\t a\t po sitio n\t to \t do \t so .\t Mo r e\t str o ng ly\t still,\t o ne may\t worry\t about\t the\t extent\t to\t which\t inequalities\t in\t private\t resources\t lead\t to inequalities\tin\tpolitical\tinfluence.\tPolitics\tin\tthe\tUS\tis\tincreasingly\tabout\tthe\tability of\tcandidates\tto\traise\tfunds\tto\tbuy\tair\ttime\tfor\ttheir\tTV\tcommercials.\tSome\tobject to\t this\t on\t the\t grounds\t that\t it\t violates\t the\t democratic\t principle\t of\t equality\t of citizenship.\t As\t with\t the\t leg al\t case,\t o ne\t ver sio n\t wo uld\t put\t a\t cap\t o n\t the\t amo unt\t that individuals\t or\t parties\t could\t spend,\t in\t order\t to\t keep\t inequalities\t within\t acceptable limits.\tAnother\twould\tinsist\ton\tpublic\tfunding\tof\tpolitical\tcampaigns,\twhich\tcould involve\tstrict\tequality\tof\tfinancial\tinput. In\tboth\tcases,\tthen,\tprinciples\tdemanding\tthat\tall\tshould\tbe\ttreated\tequally\tby\tthe law,\t or\t as\t citizens,\t can\t be\t taken\t to\t have\t less\t or\t more\t stringent\t distributive implicatio ns.\t T hey\t can\t be\t tr eated\t pur ely\t fo r mally,\t with\t no \t such\t implicatio ns\t at\t all, o r \t they\t can\t be\t taken\t to \t r equir e\t cer tain\t distr ibutive\t ar r ang ements.\t If\t the\t latter,\t these","arrangements\t can\t in\t turn\t differ\t in\t terms\t of\t how\t much\t they\t are\t concerned\t with equality.\tMaking\tsure\tthat\tall\tcitizens\tcan\tread,\twrite\tand\tare\tfree\tfrom\tthe\tkind\tof po ver ty\t that\t pr ecludes\t po litical\t par ticipatio n\t implies\t so mething \t \u2013\t a\t lo t\t \u2013\t abo ut\t the distribution\t of\t education\t and\t money.\t But\t it\t implies\t nothing\t about\t how\t equal\t that distr ibutio n\t sho uld\t be.\t A\t co ncer n\t that\t two \t o ppo sing \t par ties\t in\t a\t lawsuit\t sho uld\t no t be\tpermitted\tto\tspend\tvastly\tunequal\tamounts\tof\tmoney\ton\tmaking\ttheir\tcase\tshows some\t concern\t with\t relativities\t \u2013\t with\t how\t much\t people\t can\t spend\t relative\t to\t one ano ther \t \u2013\t but\t no \t co ncer n\t to \t achieve\t str ict\t equality.\t At\t the\t eg alitar ian\t extr eme,\t o ne might\t indeed\t hold\t that\t equality\t of\t citizenship\t would\t only\t truly\t be\t realized\t if people\u2019s\t private\t resources\t made\t no\t difference\t whatsoever\t to\t their\t political influence. Some\t of\t these\t thoughts\t can\t be\t put\t in\t terms\t of\t the\t principles\t that\t \u2018like\t cases\t be tr eated\t alike\u2019,\t o r \t that\t inequalities\t be\t justified\t by\t \u2018r elevant\t r easo ns\u2019.\t Yo u\t and\t I\t may have\t vastly\t unequal\t amounts\t of\t money.\t Perhaps\t you\t are\t a\t brilliant\t entrepreneur who \t spo tted\t a\t lucr ative\t g ap\t in\t the\t mar ket,\t and\t per haps\t this\t is\t a\t r easo n\t r elevant\t to o ur \t having \t such\t unequal\t r eso ur ces.\t It\t justifies\t the\t fact\t that\t yo u\t ar e\t much\t wealthier than\t I\t am.\t But\t that\t reason\t is,\t or\t should\t be,\t irrelevant\t to\t our\t (equal)\t standing\t as citizens.\t As\t citizens\t we\t are\t like\t cases,\t and,\t in\t matters\t relating\t to\t our\t common citizenship,\twe\tshould\tbe\ttreated\talike.\tThis\tway\tof\tthinking\tabout\tthe\tissues\tclearly focuses\t attention\t on\t the\t question\t of\t what\t counts\t as\t a\t relevant\t reason,\t and\t it\t is\t an approach\tthat\thas\tbeen\tmost\tfully\tdeveloped\tby\tthe\tAmerican\tphilosopher\tMichael Walzer\t (b.\t 1935).\t Walzer\t argues\t for\t what\t he\t calls\t \u2018complex\t equality\u2019.\t This\t is\t the idea\t that\t different\t goods\t belong\t to\t different\t distributive\t \u2018spheres\u2019,\t each\t of\t which has\t its\t own\t appropriate\t distributive\t principles.\t There\t is\t nothing\t wrong\t with\t the unequal\t distribution\t of\t money,\t as\t long\t as\t that\t inequality\t results\t from\t the\t right source\t \u2013\t people\u2019s\t ability\t to\t make\t money\t in\t the\t market\t \u2013\t and\t as\t long\t as\t money inequality\t doesn\u2019t\t influence\t (and\t distort)\t the\t distribution\t of\t goods\t belonging\t to other\t spheres,\t such\t as\t health,\t education\t or\t politics.\t What\t is\t objectionable,\t on\t this acco unt,\t is\t not\t inequality\t as\t such,\t but\t inequalities\t that\t ar e\t no t\t justified\t by\t r elevant r easo ns.\t Rather \t than\t wo r r ying \t abo ut\t mo ney\t inequality\t (and\t inequality\t with\t r espect to\t commodities\t that\t are\t quite\t properly\t for\t sale\t in\t the\t market),\t we\t should concentrate\t on\t preventing\t the\t conversion\t of\t money\t into\t goods\t that\t are\t not,\t or should\tnot\tbe,\tmarketable\tcommodities\t\u2013\tgoods\tthat\tshould\trather\tbe\tdistributed\tin accordance\t with\t their\t own,\t internal,\t sphere-specific,\t criteria.\t This\t \u2018spherical\u2019 argument\t isn\u2019t\t really\t an\t argument\t for\t equality.\t But,\t in\t appealing\t to\t the\t idea\t of sphere-specific\t relevant\t reasons,\t Walzer\t does\t rely\t on\t some\t of\t the\t intuitions\t that underlie\tthese\targuments\tabout\tequality\tbefore\tthe\tlaw\tand\tequality\tof\tcitizenship."]