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professional development to long ignored government teachers, and creating classrooms in rural areas, and in crowded city streets. Each life we touch touches another. Everyone becomes both teacher and student, sharing what they have learned about learning. As a teacher, I cannot make a student learn—I cannot give an assignment to induce change. But I can fill my classroom with experiences that guide students to recognize their strengths and encourage them to use the power to learn that is inside, Education is not linear—it has no beginning and no end. A teacher’s work must be on-going—recursive—looking backwards to be guided by tradition and values—stepping onwards into the unknown. Our work must be collaborative—filled with alternatives—many voices –all ages—both genders. It must be more than words—greater than policy. It must change lives. Education is more than a Discipline: It is Emotion : It is a dream that changes lives. 25

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Judith M Findlay, EdD Dr. Judith Findlay brings more than 40 years of sustained work in education, including extensive experience managing academic exchange programs, designing and directing international education programs, and mentoring education development. She is a literacy and learning specialist – teacher and teacher educator- with expertise in Professional Development for private and government educational systems. She places emphasis on leadership and learning as a source of personal and economic empowerment, and a catalyst for change. Dr. Findlay is adept at leading teams of senior Educators and is an experienced program administrator. Most recently, she was Director of the American International School System-George Washington University Professional Development Project, designed to create literacy resources within school communities of the Muslim world. As Project Director of the South Asian Teacher Training Project, Dr. Findlay collaborated with the Fulbright Commissions in India and Pakistan to bring secondary English foreign language teachers to GWU. Prior to that, she coordinated six international universities to develop a MA degree in elementary teacher education in Ethiopia, and, in response to a request of the Saudi Arabian Royal family, Dr. Findlay directed the adaptation of MA curriculum in Reading and Literacy to the Kingdom’s educational needs. She has a strong theoretical and practical knowledge of pedagogy and the practice of teaching and learning in international settings, and has 26

designed and taught graduate and undergraduate courses in the Middle East, Eastern Europe and Africa. Currently, she is Project Director of The newly acclaimed Teacher Symposium on Change, and Founding President and CEO of One Sky International, a consultancy of International Literacy and Learning Specialists. 27

Linguistic Analysis of Hindi - A Study of Learners of Hindi as a Foreign Language Dr. Ruchi Sehgal Assistant Professor, IIM, Jammu Email: [email protected] Keywords: Hindi Language teaching, foreign language teaching, Teaching of Hindi as a second language. Hindi is the official language of India and is widely used in education, media and administration. It is the language spoken by a majority of people in India. Hindi is an Indo-Aryan language which has its origin in Khariboli that was basically adopted by the Afghans, Persians and Turks as a common language of interaction (Koul 2009). Although India is a multilingual country, it allows Hindi to enjoy the status of a dominant language. The dominant nature of Hindi language or in other words, the imposition of Hindi as a language of communication is not free of problems. On the contrary, Hindi is a successful tool for communication amongst speakers belonging to different mother tongues. In the modern era of globalization, Hindi has developed a preference to be learnt by foreign language speakers. The reasons for the adult choosing to learn Hindi as a second language can either be an interest in culture, Bollywood, job requirements or a trip to India. The current paper provides a linguistic analysis of Hindi learnt as a foreign language by non-native speakers in the US. The linguistic analysis of Hindi as Foreign Language (HFL) will provide an insight into new avenues for the development of strategies for teaching of HFL. Researchers are trying to develop interactive techniques to teach HFL (Bhatt 2013, Meena 2016, Ranjan 2013). Most of the studies in the field of second language teaching have considered the role of English as L2. Szalkowska-Kim (2014) have pointed out the role of English as L2 in limiting the understanding of the important and interesting aspect of second language acquisition as there exist many features which are not evident in English. The aim of this paper is to provide a comprehensive linguistic analysis of HFL, thereby identifying the reasons for the problems faced by 28

the second language learners. The paper provides the learning outcomes at the phonological, morphological, syntactic, semantic and lexical level. Methodology The study was done primarily for a project submitted for the course “Assessment of Teaching English to speakers of other languages” at Kansas University, US. The informants constituted of students of the beginner’s group for learning Hindi language at Kansas University, USA. A total of 9 students participated in the study. The Beginner’s Group attended formal language learning classes of Hindi for one year wherein the average age of informants in the group was 21. 4 students were from South Asian background with their parents being from India or Pakistan. Only 1 student had both the parents from India and who spoke Hindi. Despite this fact, the student had never interacted with the parents in Hindi. The other 3 students had only one parent who spoke Hindi. In all the 3 cases, the Hindi-speaking parent had married an American and due to this, no one ever interacted in Hindi at home. Material Used: The Group was subjected to three tests: Gender and Number identification, Picture description task and Sentence- construction task. The first two tasks were oral tests and the third was a written task. Task description: Gender and Number identification task is an objective task wherein informants have to decide the Number (Singular or Plural) and Gender (Masculine and Feminine) for the words (Nouns) presented orally. The list comprised of 15 Nouns from Hindi (Appendix 1). Picture description involved describing 10 different black and white pictures (Appendix 2) in 10 simple sentences each. The sentence complexity was kept low as these students belonged to the beginner’s level of Hindi language learning. The Sentence-construction task was aimed at assessing the level of Tense at the sentence level in the beginner’s group. The students were asked to describe the picture (present in Appendix 2) in one sentence with a target tense. Every picture was marked with a target “Tense”. The data obtained from these three tests were employed to conduct the linguistic analysis for Group 1. 29

Data acquired from the Group were not analyzed statistically due to the low number of students, but a descriptive analysis was done to identify the features being absent or difficult to acquire from the foreign language, Hindi. Phonology: 46 Consonants in Hindi were divided into different groups based on their manner and place of articulation. The prime concern for teaching HFL arises at the phonetic level where in new phonemes or sounds are introduced. The need to achieve target pronunciation and word meanings lead to the efforts of learning the apt pronunciation. A difference in the phonemic utterance can change the meaning of the word. The class of phoneme, within the consonant group, which was difficult to not only teach, but even introduce, was the “Reteroflex Flap”. Students had problems pronouncing words containing reteroflex flap. The teacher had difficulties in helping the students comprehend the two sounds. They could not comprehend the sound, when presented orally, even by the end of the year. “Aspiration” could not be perceived to be phonemic by both the Groups. Errors were prevalent across the two groups in comprehending and producing aspiration in the phonemes. E.g. laŗhka instead of laŗka (boy); bɑi instead of bʰɑi (brother); ʧori‑ʧɪpe instead of ʧori-ʧʰɪpe (stealthily); ʤʰɑnwar instead of ʤɑnwar. The feature of aspiration was interchanged within the sounds belonging to the same word, thereby providing an indication of understanding the concept of aspiration but also exhibiting the inability to use it appropriately. Hindi Vowels are more difficult to comprehend and produce in comparison to the Hindi Consonants by the HFL learners. The learner found it difficult to understand the difference in “Vowel Length”. The three pairs of short and long vowels in Hindi are /i/ and /i:/; /a/ and /a:/ and /u/ and /u:/ (Koul, 2009). Vowels with different length were not comprehended by Group 1 and had to undergo extensive practice. Another phonological error evident across the beginner’s group was the inability to pronounce two consecutive Vowels in a word. This was observed when the “future tense” was introduced to the beginner’s group. The suffix “-ũŋga:” or “-ega:” when attached to the bare stem of verbs ending with Vowels 30

ʤa: + ũŋ+ga: = ʤa:ũŋga: go + Future marker/First Person/singular+ masculine= will go kʰa:+ ũŋ+gi: = kʰa:ũŋgi: eat + Future marker/First Person/singular + feminine = will eat la: + e + ga: = la:ega: get + Future marker/Second person/ singular/ informal+ masculine= will get The highlighted portion represents the case of two consecutive vowels in a word. The proficiency to produce two vowel sounds consecutively was not achieved even in Group 2. Suprasegmental features like length and nasalization were a prime concern for the tutor and the teaching assistant. Nasalization, like length, has a phonemic status in Hindi. Students in both groups found it hard to acknowledge these two features in production or comprehension. Major problem in these two suprasegmental features could be identified while teaching the “Future tense” to Group 1. When the learners had to combine the three aspects - vowel length, vowel sequences and nasalization, - they faced immense pressure in appropriate production. Morphology: While analyzing the morphology of the language of the learners a very obvious, yet important aspect that was put forth was “Gender”. In Hindi all Nouns are classified as Masculine or Feminine. The animate Nouns are assigned their natural gender, but the inanimate Nouns are assigned a gender randomly. No rule can be generated for the assignment of Gender to inanimate objects. Hence it becomes difficult to explain why tʃa:val (rice) is masculine and da:l (lentils) is feminine even though both words end with the same sound. The students not only had problems in the class, but also in the test conducted to identify the Gender and Number of the nouns. The students were able to identify number better than the gender of the word. The best performance had an accuracy of 60% for determining the gender of the words. Ranjan 31

(2013) has handled the aspect of grammatical gender discussed above and has made a successful attempt at teaching the gender of different words in Hindi. More such methods need to be developed and employed so that the concept is easy to understand. The other two areas of concern in Hindi learnt by the students at beginner’s level were Case and Postpositions. Case suffixes and Postpositions are used to express syntactic and semantic functions. They also express the relationship of the noun phrases with verb phrases in a sentence. Direct case was easier to comprehend and employ in production in comparison to the Oblique Case. The students would usually avoid the use of the Oblique Case as it involved not only the Oblique forms of the nouns or pronouns but also led to the blocking-effect in the sentence. Sentences like the following will be avoided or reconstructed to avoid most of the constructions involved. E.g. larki Ne larke ko seb diya dative apple give- girl (oblique Ergative boy form) marker (oblique perfective, form) singular singular The girl gave the apple to the boy. Instead, the sentence produced will be Larki larke seb di Girl boy apple give The “Pronouns” were also difficult to learn in their oblique form. The prime reason can be attributed to the fact that the Oblique forms of the pronouns were presented in a list format and were asked to be memorized. The difficulty in understanding the Oblique pronouns was the highest for the Possessive pronouns. None of the students produced the Possessive pronouns in any of the tests. The easiest Postpositions were “mĕ” (in) and “par” (on) for the students to comprehend and use in sentences. The most difficult PP was “ko” (to) for the group. 32

Verbs were primarily used in habitual or progressive forms which were not used with discretion. The other forms, especially, future markings on the verbs were avoided. Examples: Habitual form Laŗka: kʰelta: tʰa: (boy played) ma:ta: kʰuʃ hota tʰa: (mother used to get happy) vahã: ra:t hota: tʰa: (it used to get night there) laŗki piti hɛ (girl use to drink) Progressive form Kutta kʰa raha: tʰa: (the dog was eating) Future tense form billi ja:ega (the cat will go) [The gender on the verb in this case is wrong] bandar seb kʰaege (the monkey will eat the apple) [The number on the verb is wrong] babaji kita:b paraunge (The father will read the book) [The vowel sequencing on the verb is wrong] Syntax: The syntax was a very complicated stage as the students had not mastered the concept of Case and Postpositions. The speech was primarily a telegraphic speech. In the task involving picture description, the sentences primarily constituted of demonstratives like “ye” (this) and “vaʰ” (that). The pictures were not described by stating the activities that were represented, but with the objects present in the pictures. As these were students at beginner’s level, the complex and compound sentences were not introduced. Discussion The linguistic analysis of Hindi as a Foreign Language has been done as a pilot-study to understand the problems that the learners face in Hindi language classrooms. Some of the aspects like the 33

gender of nouns and phonological errors have been discussed by various authors. However the problems faced in acquiring Case and Postpositions in Hindi have not been discussed in details. All the more, Tense has also not been given as much credit as Gender in the language has. The deflection in the Phonology while learning Hindi as a Foreign Language has also not received much attention. The current study puts forth some of the most important aspects of the problems that Foreign language learners face. The paper provides a platform for the Second Language Trainers to develop teaching strategies which are designed exclusively for these areas. The observations presented in the paper will contribute in planning new teaching strategies, that will help teachers in gaining better results and outcomes as well as benefit the students in understanding and acquiring the language easily. Shortcomings: No study is without any shortcomings. The primary shortcoming of the present study was the number of informants. There were only nine students who were enrolled in the course and thus the low number of informants. This factor was not in control of the researchers as the enrollment was done before the researcher joined in the teaching process. Owing to the low number of informants it was difficult to present the data statistically. Bibliography: Bhat, S.K. 2013. The popular culture of Bollywood in Teaching Hindi as a Foreign Language: Facilitator or Debilitator? Electronic Journal of Foreign Language Teaching 10, 321-333. Gopinath, G. 2010. Teaching Hindi as a communication language: perspectives and innovations at the global level. Studia Orientalia 108, 59-64. Koul, O.N. 2009. Modern Hindi Grammar. Indian Institute of Language Studies, Delhi. Mathur, C. 2008. Teaching Hindi as a “Second Language” to Non‑Hindi Speaking Children. Gavnesha 89. Meena, R.L. 2016. Methodologies in Hindi teaching as second/ Foreign Language. Critical Discourse Studies 34

Ranjan, R. 2013. Teaching Strategies of grammatical gender in L2 Hindi/Urdu. Arizona Working Papers in SLA and Teaching 20, 1-19 Szalkowska-Kim, E. 2014. Factors influencing the pronunciation of adult speakers of a foreign language. The Poznan Society for the Advancement of the Arts and Science 141-158. https://www.actfl.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/TLEsamples/ TLE_Apr10_Article.pdf viewed on 12 Feb 2017. Appendix 1 List of words (F-Feminine, M-Masculine, S-Singular, P-Plural) 1. ʧʰa:ṯra: (Female Student) (F,S) 2. ʤuṯe (shoes) (M,P) 3. ʤa:n (life) (F, S/P) 4. ʤʰanda: (Flag) (M,S) 5. saŗak (Road) (F, S/P) 6. ṭama: ṭar tomato) (M, S/P) 7. tʰᵊtʰere (coppersmith) (M,P) 8. da:kiya: (postman) (M, S) 9. dʰolak (tambour) (M,S/P) 10. bʰindiyã (okra) (F,P) 11. laŗa:iyã (fights) (F,P) 12. kaŗ ʰa:hi: (wok, pan) (F,S 13. ṯoṯa: (parrot) (M,S) 14. ma: ḏa: (female) (F, S/P) 15. ḏarva:je (doors) (M,P) 35

Appendix 2 (1) (2)

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Dr. Ruchi Sehgal Dr. Ruchi Sehgal is an Assistant Professor at the Indian Institute of ManagementJammu(IIMJammu).ShehasbeenawardedtheFulbright Foreign Language Teaching Assistantship by USIEF and IIE, USA. Her other achievements involve “University Teaching Assistantship” in Department of Linguistics, University of Delhi and “Junior Research Fellowship” in Linguistics by UGC-HRD, Government of India. She has taught Communication Skills and English for Specific Purpose (ESP) at renowned engineering colleges and universities, namely, Bharati Vidyapeeth’s College of Engineering, CBP Government Engineering College, Sharda University, NIT Delhi before joining IIM Jammu. Her earlier publications have been in the field of language teaching and child language. 37

Global Peace and Conflict

Pakistan as a factor in India’s outreach to Afghanistan A Critical Analysis of India-Pakistan bilateral relations Manzar Imam Ph.D. Research Scholar, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi Email: [email protected] Keywords: Geostrategy, India, Pakistan, India’s outreach to Afghanistan, India-Pakistan bilateral relations, Indo-Afghan relations, energy, security, trade, education. Abstract India’s connection with Afghanistan is old. It has maintained cordial relations with Afghanistan for many reasons. Afghanistan is an important element of discussion in India’s bilateral relations. India’s most convenient land route to Central Asia goes through Afghanistan via Pakistan. This mapping of geography places Afghanistan at the centre of its outreach to many Asian subregions like Central Asia, West Asia and Southwest Asia. Geostrategically, India is trying to counter its Asian counterpart China. While China has shown leniency towards Pakistan in pursuit of strategic goals, Afghanistan’s convergence of interests with and its inclination toward India for the same is understandable. It is therefore vital for India to keep up its relation with Afghanistan in view of its relations with several Asian countries. But, while doing so, India cannot wish away Pakistan as being the direct land route to connect the two nations. The Pakistan factor comes between India and its interconnection with Afghanistan. This paper therefore evaluates the India-Afghanistan bilateral relations and looks at the role and position of Pakistan as an important bridge that connects both the countries. Introduction India’s connection with Afghanistan is centuries old. Its nature varies. Before Partition in 1947, India shared direct border 39

with Afghanistan. Although the Partition created new lines of demarcation, the relationships continued. The birth of Pakistan deprived India from immediate neighbourhood of two friendly countries – Iran and Afghanistan. Though the Partition altered India’s neighbours, it failed to change its friends. For both Afghanistan and Iran continue to remain friends of India. The one shift that has happened is that these countries now stand as extended neighbours instead of immediate neighbours. This extension has not weakened the existing linkages. Rather, it has added to their dynamism. However, the Pakistan factor is an undeniable reality for India’s outreach to both Iran and Afghanistan, the latter being the focus of study here. Being a sovereign state the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan has its separate identity and maintains its relations with the Republic of India according to its own needs and interests. This paper will first shed light on the two countries historical connections, bilateral relations and avenues of cooperation. Thereafter, it will offer a brief analysis of India-Pakistan bilateral relations and then discuss how Pakistan factors as an important part for the Indo- Afghan ties. Indo-Afghan linkages In ancient times Afghanistan was known as Aryana, India as Aryavarta. It was a world without borders. Before Partition India and Afghanistan were direct neighbours and enjoyed historical, traditional and cultural closeness. Although the Partition disconnected them geographically, their friendship not only continued but strengthened through business, diplomatic, security and other ties. From Amir Abdur Rahman (1880-1901) to King Zahir Shah (1933-73) to the Sovietization of Afghanistan (1979-89), India kept up a cordial relation with Afghanistan and maintained the status quo till the 21st century except for a brief period beginning with the 1996 Taliban regime. Mir writes, “Afghanistan and India have always enjoyed fruitful constructive relations. History has seen India’s sustained support of the Afghan government during challenging circumstances. The only time India did not recognize the regime in Kabul was during the Taliban era, when that regime adopted a hostile policy toward New Delhi.” 4 4 Mir, Haroun, “Is Regional Consensus on Afghanistan Possible?” in Shanthie Mariet D’Souza (ed.) Afghanistan in Transition Beyond 2014?( New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2012), p.134. 40

Chaos left Afghanistan in ruins. War and conflict were not new to the Afghans, but the rise of the Taliban brought serious destruction and shattered its social fabric, devastated its economic bases and destroyed its institutional infrastructures. Need emerged for rebuilding the country for which role of the regional players is most significant for different reasons. Irrespective of the order of importance, some of the regional players with crucial role in Afghanistan’s peace, progress and stability are Pakistan, Iran, India, Central Asian Republics, Saudi Arabia, Russia, China, and Turkey. The list is not comprehensive, but formidable. UK, Japan and Germany’s help as donors and, the overarching role of the US both in the destruction and rebuilding of Afghanistan cannot be denied. However, this paper looks at the bilateral ties, areas of cooperation and avenues of opportunities between India and Afghanistan. Let us first locate the India-Afghanistan bilateral relations historically and see what future promises the two countries hold and what possibilities they have. As pointed earlier the historical linkages and cultural ties between the two countries are centuries old. This “shared-history” draws the two countries toward each other in many areas of “shared-interest”. But past can only evoke memories unless those relations are connected with and continued to meet present needs and hold on to future demands. Despite mostly smooth rides, there have been occasional hiccups as pointed out by Kumar that the relationship between India and Afghanistan remained fluid and its graphs always changed depending on who ruled there [that is in Afghanistan]. It is also because India’s understanding of Afghanistan affair has always been blurred and full of confusion. 5 Examining the Afghanistan-India relationship during an international conference on “Indo-Afghan Relations: Evaluating the Development and Strategic Partnership” on 21-22 March, 2017 held at Jamia Millia Islamia in New Delhi, Shah Mahmood Miakhel, Director of the United States Institute of Peace, Kabul maintained that the partnership between the two countries is on broader development policies and the Indian aid is mainly used in three 5 Kumar, B.B., “India and the Af-Pak Phenomenon” (Editorial Perspective), Dialogue, Vol. 16, No. 4, (2015), p.7. 41

activities: Line of credits, capacity-building activities and Grants Assistance projects, all of which had certain political influence as well certain economic, diplomatic and strategic objectives. India-Afghanistan relations in the backdrop of post-Cold war events faced three challenges. The first challenge began with the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979, the second was related to dealing with the post-Soviet withdrawal regime and the third one arose with the 1996 rise of the Taliban. On all these occasions, India has been supportive to the Afghan cause. Former Prime Minister of India Dr Manmohan Singh once said, “Our cooperation with Afghanistan is an open book. We have civilizational links, and we are both here to stay.” Avenues of cooperation Since the last quarter of the 20th century, the demand for energy has been constantly growing. Security, one of the important bases for most international relations, is now seen as security in terms of energy. This changed phenomenon has re-drawn the world’s attention to Afghanistan which sits at the crossroads of some of the most energy-rich nations. Afghanistan itself is viewed with renewed interest besides its geostrategic location, also because of its new found sources of wealth. Ahmed Abbas writes, “The hunt for energy resources has assumed a preeminent position on the global chessboard of power and politics. The quest for energy resources has compelled countries to foster regional cooperation in the energy sector.” 6 Thus, the one sector where regional collaborations can be sought and forged is the energy sector where among other regional actors, India can look for better prospects of peace and security in Afghanistan through bilateral agreements and joint projects. Besides energy, India’s support in traditional security sector can be pivotal. India has emerged as a great regional power with the potential to alter the existing traditional balance of power in South Asia. With international forces pulling off since 2014, India along 6 Abbas, Ahmed, “Daulatabad-Gwadar Gas Pipeline Agreement” in Musa Khan Jalalzai (ed.) The Pipeline War In Afghanistan: Oil, Gas and the New Energy Great Game in Central Asia (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2003), p.179. 42

with Iran and Turkey and other countries in the larger West Asian region can play a vital role. In this context, the Agreement of Strategic Partnership between India and Afghanistan 7 has great possibilities of addressing Afghanistan’s security requirements. The agreement in fact is a re-assertion of the fundamental and lasting spirit of the Treaty of Friendship signed between the two countries in January 1950. A Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation of Local Governance was also signed by India and Afghanistan in 2008. This was to train Afghan local government officials. Pakistan, however, despite failure to provide the required assistance to Afghanistan, does not very much like this relationship to grow stronger. However, this collaboration is of utmost importance and should be welcomed both by Pakistan and Afghanistan as Afghan Ambassador to India Shaida Mohammad Abdali writes, “The key to unlock the current regional impasse derives from cooperation between the regions two strategic rivals: India and Pakistan.” 8 Political impediments have often preceded pragmatism between the two nuclear powers hampering many prospects. This needs to be avoided as has been suggested by experts from time to time. Even in the past, India’s Afghanistan policy has been not to derive any mileage vis-à-vis Pakistan. For example Shanthie D’Souza notes, “[T]he Nehruvian tradition in New Delhi has underlined the need to engage Pakistan rather than pursuing a strategy that isolates the country.” 9 The third sector where the two countries hold promise is business and trade. This is where a new approach can also be brought in to address the situations in Afghanistan which so far has been addressed mostly with geo-strategic angle. In this respect good progress has been made. Here is a table to look at the figures: 7 The agreement signed on 4 October, 2011 at New Delhi between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Hamid Karzai focuses on political and security cooperation, trade and economic cooperation, capacity development and education, and, to strengthen social, cultural, civil society and people-to-people relations. 8 Abdali, Shaida Mohammad. Afghanistan-Pakistan-India: A Paradigm Shift ( New Delhi, Pentagon Press, 2016), p.11. 9 D’Souza, Shanthie Mariet, “India’s Evolving Policy Contours towards post-2014 Afghanistan.” Journal of South Asian Development , Vol. 8, No. 2 (2013), p.195. 43

India’s Trade Volume with Afghanistan, 2009-14 Year 09-10 10-11 11-12 12-13 13-14 US Million 588.74 568.44 643.41 632.18 683.1 Dollars (Source: Indian Ministry of Commerce and Industry) 10 Except for the period 2012-13, there has been a constant increase in India’s trade volume with Afghanistan which has further scope. All the member countries of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) need to shed inhibitions and make it a powerful tool not only for business and trade related issues but other areas of common interests and threats. Apart from energy, security, business and trade, education is one area where India is doing great. It offers scholarships to Afghan students. Since 2001, more than 10,000 students have studied in several Indian universities with scholarships offered by the Indian government and universities. Students have also benefitted from Indian academic institutions through self-financed courses. Multi-sectoral assistance for capacity-building As India grows in strength from a regional power to a global player, it is likely that its relations with its neighbours will undergo substantial changes. The recent India-China faceoff and India-Nepal border issue can be cited as examples. India’s engagement in Afghanistan is not security-centric; it is one part of it though. According to Government of India, President Hamid Karzai’s Strategic Partnership Agreement with India during his 2011 visits comprised of “Political & security cooperation; trade & economic cooperation; capacity development and education; and social, cultural, civil society & people-to-people relations.” 11 10 As cited by WANG, Jin, “India’s Policy toward Afghanistan: Implications to the Regional Security Governance”, in Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, Vol. II, No. 4 (2017), p.114 (URL: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/ pdf/10.1080/25765949.2017.12023321?needAccess=true, pdf, accessed on 12 June, 2020). 11 Government of India, Lok Sabha, Unstarred question number 596, answered 27 February 2013,http:meanindia.nic.in/mystar.php?id=500410153, also available at URL https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/afghanistan-aug-2012.pdf, (accessed on 25 May, 2017). 44

And “Within this framework India has pledged just under $2 billion to Afghanistan, and spent around $1 billion, making it the fifth largest bilateral donor... Most Indian assistance fits into three broad categories: humanitarian assistance (such as food aid), infrastructure projects and capacity building.” 12 It is likely that this nascent scenario will affect India’s relations with such big powers as the US, China and Russia and each of them might impact the shape of things to come. The ongoing standoff between some of the major powers since the global spread of coronavirus has created a Cold War like situation as pointed out by political observers during an international symposium on public diplomacy attended by diplomats and experts from South Asia and members from countries of Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia held on Friday 12 June, 2020 which I attended. India, however, would be trying to cement its ties with and strengthen its security, trade and diplomatic relations with most of the countries of South, Central and West Asia including Iran and Afghanistan to maintain its growing global image or to check competition from the other two major powers vis-à-vis China and Russia. India-Pakistan bilateral relations India’s relation with Pakistan is as old as the latter’s birth. However, this relationship has been quite complex and more often than not very bitter as well. Among the South Asian countries Pakistan and Bangladesh are the latest as sovereign independent states. However, after India, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan is the most prominent country among all the countries of the South Asian bloc for many reasons. India and Pakistan are also the only two nuclear powers in South Asia having highly professional militaries. And that, according to area studies experts, is one of the significant factors for their rivalry. However, that is just one side of the coin. The other side of it shows a different picture which is also the focus of this paper. The commonest understanding is that India and Pakistan are arch rivals. There is some truth in it though, but that is not the whole 12 Price, Gareth, “India’s Policy Towards Afghanistan”, Chatham House. 5, (URL: http:// www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Asia/0813pp_ indiaafghanistan.pdf, accessed on 4 April, 2015). 45

story. Both India and Pakistan have many similarities and the two countries have had some convergence of interests and successful bilateral agreements. Common historical legacy of the British rule is an emotional factor for closeness. Linguistic and cultural similarities are so deep that if they are worked well, they can do wonders in deepening diplomatic ties and fostering people-to-people contacts. Apart from these similarities, both countries face many similar challenges and problems like poverty, disease, domestic violence, extremism and border conflict, to cite just few. The Pakistan factor in India-Afghanistan relations As noted earlier, Pakistan does not like the Indo-Afghan relationship to grow strong. Pakistan’s fear for India’s growing interest in Afghanistan rises from the traditional rivalry as also from India’s engagement in the 1971 war, while India’s ostensible desire to engage in Afghanistan, as claimed by the Indian government, is not to encircle Pakistan, but to help stabilize Afghanistan’s economy. The main driver of Indian policy has shifted from an anti-Pakistan strategy to a desire for stability in Afghanistan. According to D’Souza, India’s wide-ranging assistance programme, provided directly to the Afghan government and locals, is designed to build on the Afghan state institutions and at the same time maximize Afghan participation both at the government and community levels.  13 However, India also needs to change its Afghanistan approach in view of its security calculations with Pakistan. In fact, a trilateral approach could help the three countries gain maximum. Abdali precisely says that: “The three countries have an unprecedented level of stakes in each other’s stability, ranging from the economic sphere to the ones of politics and security.” 14 The conflict between India and Pakistan is the primary security dynamic in the South Asian region. This has caused many problems, one of which is failure of a collective approach to regional security. SAARC has not moved beyond certain trade agreements. The main 13 D’Souza, Journal of South Asian Development, pp.189-190. 14 Abdali, Afghanistan-Pakistan-India, p.13. 46

factor has been the Indo-Pak rivalry. If European Union is nothing without France and Germany, so is the case with South Asia and the SAARC without India and Pakistan. Therefore, the rivalry between the two countries needs to be changed to a revolutionary approach to cooperation. The Afghanistan problem then only would look peaceable and be ameliorated. Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh rightly terms the Afghan issue as peripheral. She says that “the problem of Afghanistan is at the periphery, rather than at the core,…the security problems of the South Asian Security Complex,…are related to resolving their own internal insecurities…This means that as long as the core insecurities within the South Asian RSC [Regional Security Complex] are not resolved, negative influences many continue to hamper stabilization in Afghanistan.” 15 Many experts even call it the problem of the mindset. Among points of rivalry, conflict and dissatisfaction in the India‑Pakistan relations are the historical legacy of Partition. Absence of major economic ties is another factor. According to Roy, “Baggage of history or partition, deep suspicions and lack of trust and perceived grievances have made India and Pakistan adversorial neighbours.” 16 Problems also creep in over distribution of water and the off and on dispute over the Indus Water Treaty and related agreements. The conflict gets augmented due to the fact that both are nuclear powers and both are desirous to be considered and/or accepted as leaders in South Asia. This also fetches major powers who keep on favouring one country or the other to draw political mileage and subsequent influence in the region. However, the two countries that can benefit more from a stable Afghanistan and a peaceful South Asia are certainly India and Pakistan. And this cannot be achieved without shedding apprehensions, giving up inhibitions, embracing each other and opening up with broader areas of cooperation and collaboration in tackling poverty, illiteracy, internal insecurities and domestic and cross-border extremism. 15 Tadjbakhsh, Shahrbanou, “South Asia and Afghanistan: The Robust India-Pakistan Rivalry”, Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2011, p.v. 16 Roy, J.N., “Indo-Pak Relations: Awaiting Better Times”, Dialogue quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 4, (2015), p.40. 47

Conclusion India has been assisting Afghanistan in state-building process. It has helped build electricity transmission lines, hospitals, roads, schools, wells, and even as important a building as the Afghanistan Parliament. Similarly, Pakistan has been providing assistance to Afghanistan in various fields like banking, telecommunication, training in English language and computer, providing education and scholarships. Geostrategically, Afghanistan’s location provides both opportunity and obstacle to both the direct neighbours. But it is left to these two nuclear powers to make better choices, work on Confidence Building Measures for their own good and for the good of Afghanistan. Roy suggests that “Any change must address the need for an attitudinal and structural shift” 17 both by India and Pakistan or it will be what some experts call “akin to chasing a mirage”. For Harpviken and Tadjbakhsh “Afghanistan is both a source of conflict … and a possible focus for neighbourly cooperation…Cooperation would not only curb the destructive behavior of non-state actors, but could also lead to positive externalities, such as economic dividends… ” 18 Given the huge human resources, natural gifts, technical expertise and potential talents a lot can be achieved with a collaborative approach than a conflictual tendency. This will not only solve the long continuing Indo-Pak conflict but also result in a better Afghanistan which is the gateway for both India and Pakistan to the wider regions of Central Asia, the Persian Gulf, West Asia and Southwest Asia. References Abbas, Ahmed, “Daulatabad-Gwadar Gas Pipeline Agreement” in Musa Khan Jalalzai (ed.) The Pipeline War In Afghanistan: Oil, Gas and the New Energy Great Game in Central Asia (Lahore: Sang-e- Meel Publications, 2003). Abdali, Shaida Mohammad, Afghanistan-Pakistan-India: A Paradigm Shift (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2016). 17 Ibid 18 Harpviken, Kristian Beg and Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh. A Rock Between Hard Places: Afghanistan as an Arena of Regional Insecurity (London: Hurst & Company, 2016), p.2. 48

D’Souza, Shanthie Mariet, “India’s Evolving Policy Contours towards post-2014 Afghanistan.” Journal of South Asian Development, Vol. 8, No. 2, (August 2013) pp. 185-207. Dialogue Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 4, (New Delhi: Astha Bharati, April- June, 2015), pp.7-10, 40-46. Government of India, Lok Sabha, Unstarred question number 596, answered 27 February 2013,http:meanindia.nic.in/mystar. php?id=500410153, available at URL: https://www.mea.gov.in/ Portal/ForeignRelation/afghanistan-aug-2012.pdf, (accessed on 25 May, 2017). Harpviken, Kristian Beg and Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, A Rock Between Hard Places: Afghanistan as an Arena of Regional Insecurity (London: Hurst & Company, 2016). Mir, Haroun. “Is Regional Consensus on Afghanistan Possible?” in Shanthie Mariet D’Souza (ed.) Afghanistan in Transition Beyond 2014? (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2012). Price, Gareth. “India’s Policy Towards Afghanistan”, Chatham House. 5, URL: http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/ chathamhouse/public/Research/Asia/0813pp_indiaafghanistan. pdf, (accessed on 4 April, 2015). Tadjbakhsh, Shahrbanou, “South Asia and Afghanistan: The Robust India-Pakistan Rivalry”, Paper 2 of the PRIO Project ‘Afghanistan in a Neighbourhood Perspective’, Norway, Peace Research Institute Oslo, (2011), www.prio.no. WANG, Jin, “India’s Policy toward Afghanistan: Implications to the Regional Security Governance”, in Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, Vol. II, No. 4 (2017). ***** 49

Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: A Challenge to Regional Peace and Security Miugaliu Gonmei Ph.D. Research Scholar, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi Email: [email protected] Keywords: Azerbaijan, Armenia, South Caucasus, Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, Minsk-group, Peaceful Settlement, Peace and Security. Abstract History has witness conflict does no good to humanity. The South Caucasus region which was once under the mighty rule of the Soviet Union was devastated by war and conflict on boundary issues after the Soviet disintegration. One of the places where conflict did great harm is the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous oblast which was established within the territory of Soviet Azerbaijan. Majority of its populations were ethnic Armenians. Soon after independence, the Karabakh region became a conflict zone where the predominant community declared to join with Armenia. This escalated into a tension between Armenia and Azerbaijan which fought an undeclared war in 1989-1994 in which millions of peoples were killed and devastated. The war rendered many refugees in neighbouring countries and thousands were internally displaced. The protraction of this conflict bogged down by two decades of failed negotiations has made it heavily militarized. In such a situation this paper seeks to question the role of International Community, the designated Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Minsk Group that failed to bring a peaceful settlement with the understanding that external powers interfering directly or partially to the party in conflict will weaken the peace process. As the region is volatile to ethnic issues and geopolitical interests are evolving, it can further escalate into a full-scale war. The paper therefore suggests that a prolonged Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is a challenge to regional peace and security if not negotiated. 50

Introduction The South Caucasus countries namely; Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia are multifaceted and endemic with ethnic and linguistics issues bound by the international boundary which was drawn by the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 re-opened the Soviet-defined borders which were drawn in the 1920s under the Soviet rule. After gaining independence ‘self-determination’ of the ethnic groups has politically resurfaced the South Caucasus region. One example of it is the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Azerbaijan inherited the decade’s old Nagorno-Karabakh issue which paralyzed the bilateral relationship between Azerbaijan and Armenia from the beginning of their independence. Since then, it has been a subject of dispute between the two countries. The disputed territory which is internationally recognized as the territory of Azerbaijan is predominantly inhabited by Armenians. The peace process to the conflict was initiated under the umbrella of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nation Security Council (UNSC) to bring peaceful settlement in the early 1990s. In January 1992 Armenia and Azerbaijan became members of the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). Following the same year in March, both the countries became members of the United Nations. Joining as the members of the International Organisation has given an ambiance to both the countries to address the ongoing issue to resolve at the international levels. It was after the Khojali carnage, the CSCE had decided to convene a meeting on the Nagorno- Karabakh issue in Minsk to stabilize the relationship between the two countries and to bring negotiation to the status of Karabakh. 19 By 1991 Armenia had blocked all communication links to Khojali and Aghdam. In 1992 Armenian began to expel the inhabitants of Azerbaijanis because Khojali had been the focus of Azerbaijan resettlement program. 20 The killings of Khojali inhabitants triggered a crisis in Baku that led to full military confrontation between the two countries. Taking note of the conflict the Security Council Meeting in 1993 Resolution 822, expressed serious 19 Nassibli, Nasib (2004) Azerbaijan: Policy Priorities towards the Caspian Sea, in Akiner Shirin (ed), The Caspian: Politics, Energy and Security, Routledge, London, p.145. 20 Waal, Thomas De. (2003) Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Peace and War, New York University Press, New York and London, pp. 170-172. 51

concern at the deteriorating relationship between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the displacement of a huge number of people and humanitarian emergencies. Also, it reassured the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the states in the region and demanded immediate cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of all occupying forces from the Kelbadjar district and all recently occupied territory of Azerbaijan. 21 Following the negotiation process under the ambit of OSCE, UNSC, and unilateral and also through bilateral platforms, it failed to bring negotiation despite all the initiatives taken up by different organizations until today. The UNSC in its 1993 meeting warned the concerned members that the conflict will destabilize regional peace and security if left unsolved. Leading causes to the conflict The root cause of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is due to purported borders. It was when the Russian Empire was nearing its end that Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia became briefly independent from 1918-20 until the Soviet Union formation. During these two years of independence Armenia and Azerbaijan fought wars over three territories; Nakhchivan, Zangezur, and Nagorno-Karabakh. These three regions have a mixed population which is the core issue. First, it was under the Stalin administration that the three regions were distributed; Zangezur was allotted to Armenia, Nakhchivan to Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh was given an autonomous oblast with administrative rights to the ethnic Armenian majority under the Azerbaijan Republic. This is the primary cause and conflict sown seed by Stalin’s decision between the two countries. Since then, Armenia claims this part of the region as the Armenian territory which was given to Azerbaijan by the Soviet Union. Secondly, ethnic and cultural elements have triggered unrest in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. “The specific endeavour of different ethnic groups and nationalities in upholding their own culture, language, and religion has created an obstacle for proper inter-ethnic assimilation.” 22 Predominant inhabitants of 21 United Nations Security Council Meeting, Resolution 822, 30 April 1993, pp.1-2. 22 P L. Dash, “Nationalities problems in USSR discord over Nagorno-Karabakh,” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 24(2), (Jan 14, 1989), p.72. 52

Nagorno‑Karabakh ethnic Armenians profess Christianity and ethnic Azerbaijanis belong to the Muslim community and thus the ethnic, cultural tangle. To its dismay during the Ottoman Empire conquest period the Armenians were said to be persecuted by the Turks. The 1915 massacre remains collective memory and antagonizes over Nagorno-Karabakh due to a close relationship of Turkish and Azerbaijan governments. Moreover, Armenians feared their language and culture being stifled by the Azerbaijani government (scrapped from being taught in an educational institution) and demonstrated to merge with Armenia that led to riots and conflict. Third, the drastic political atmosphere of the Gorbachev administration in 1986 with twin policies Glasnost (openness) and Perestroika (restructuring) aggravated the growing national self-conception of the ethnic Armenians to join with Greater Armenia, the de facto province of Armenia which was given away to Azerbaijan under the de jure Soviet administration. Armenian academicians sent a petition to Moscow in 1987 demanding Karabakh and Nakhchivan to be separated from Azerbaijan, also local administrative council of Karabakh passed a resolution to join with Soviet Armenia. 23 Cultural identity became the basis for political mobilization that ignited the spark of animosity when Armenia renewed its claim on Karabakh. Fourth, in subsequent response to the petition, Moscow withdrew Karabakh from the jurisdiction of Azerbaijan in January 1989 bringing it under direct control of the central command from Moscow. However, article 78 of the 1977 Soviet Constitution clearly states that “the territory of the Union Republic may not be altered without its consent. The boundaries between Union Republics may be altered by mutual agreement of the republic concerned, subject to rectification by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic.” 24 23 Nassibli N, p.144. 24 The Constitution of the Soviet Union has three versions of the Constitution effect from 31 January 1924- 26 December 1991. The first version is 1924 Soviet Constitution which was adopted on 31 January 1924, 1936 Soviet Constitution adopted on 5 December 1936 commonly known as Stalin Constitution, and 1977 Soviet Constitution was adopted on 7 October 1997 known as Brezhnev Constitution. It is said that the 1924 and 1936 constitution was enacted by the Congress of Soviets, the supreme governing body of the SU since its founding in 1922. Later in 1936 the constitution of 1924 was dissolved and replaced by the supreme governing body with the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union which enacted the 1977 Constitution. 53

In light of the Constitution, Azerbaijan was not consulted and the withdrawal was null and void. In response to the popular demand, Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet adopted the law “on sovereignty” to be enforced throughout the territory of Azerbaijan. Finally, retaliating against the Azerbaijan Supreme law, Soviet Armenia adopted a new law in December 1989 and declared Nagorno-Karabakh merge with Armenia. The juxtaposition of the two communities’ brutal killings began rampantly. The state of emergency was declared throughout the Azerbaijan territory followed by the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Following independence backed by the Soviet military, the Karabakh separatist movement became more antagonized against Azerbaijanis and tried to drive them out of Karabakh. Direct Military confrontation continued to ensue until the 1994 cease- fire was brokered by Russia. By then Armenia backed military had occupied twenty percent of the Azerbaijan territory and millions were killed, many became refugees and internally displaced by the raving war to both ethnic groups. Roles of international community in resolving the conflict The intervention of the international community in resolving the conflict is critically challenging. Negotiations and peace settlement on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue has failed to achieve a tangible result until today. Lack of constructive and legitimate process has bogged down in resolving the conflict. OSCE Minsk Group was created in 1992 by CSCE, a forum to oversee the peaceful settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict through negotiations and peaceful means between Armenia and Azerbaijan based on principles, obligations, and charter of the OSCE. It began handling the conflict after the Soviet Union collapsed. It is co- chaired by France, the Russian Federation and the United States, and the Minsk group participating states; Belarus, Germany, Italy, Portugal, and the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Turkey as well Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Minsk Conference in 1992 set out the framework to settle the conflict through this forum. The Minsk group of the CSCE report to the UNSC expressing its serious concern on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and deterioration of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, escalation of armed 54

conflict, a concern to peace and security in the region. The UNSC affirms its full support for the peace process being pursued within the framework of the CSCE, and for the tireless effort of the CSCE Minsk group. 25 It also demands immediate cessation of the hostilities, calls all the concerned parties to reach and maintain the durable cease-fire. 26 Budapest CSCE summit 1994 recognizes Nagorno-Karabakh as a party to the conflict besides Armenia and Azerbaijan. CSCE Lisbon summit 1996 laid out three principles, territorial integrity of the Republic of Armenia and the Azerbaijan Republic; Legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh defined in an agreement based on self- determination which confers on Nagorno-Karabakh the highest degree of self-rule within Azerbaijan; and guaranteed security for Nagorno-Karabakh and its whole population, including mutual obligations to ensure compliance by all the Parties with the provisions of the settlement”. 27 Besides the OSCE Minsk group, trilateral meeting was initiated by France in 2001 inviting the President of Armenia and Azerbaijan for two days negotiations in finding a political solution to the conflict. 2006 Prague Process of negotiation, 2008 proposing a referendum on the status of the territory, negotiated by the US, France, and Russia, and multiple dialogues have held but the crisis could not be settled. In 2016 President Putin host trilateral summit over Nagorno-Karabakh in St. Petersburg. Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan, and his Azerbaijani counterpart Ilham Aliyev agreed to increase the number of the international observer in the conflict zone. Yet the two countries are stockpiling military weapons and their defense budget has been double. The settlement of the ongoing Nagorno-Karabakh conflict that poses a serious challenge to regional peace and security in the South Caucasus remains elusive. More than two decades have passed since the 1994 cease-fire was signed. It continues to violate the cease-fire agreement resulting into frequent clashes, 25 See, UNSC Resolution 874 October 14, 1993, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/ UNDOC/GEN/N93/557/41/PDF/N9355741.pdf?OpenElement (accessed 15 March 2020). 26 See, UNSC Resolution 853, July 29, 1993, http://unscr.com/files/1993/00853.pdf (accessed 12 April 2020). 27 OSCE Lisbon Summit Document, “Statement of the OSCE Chairman- In- Office”, Annex 1, 1996, p.15. 55

skirmishes in the border. A constructivist approach is necessary to attain a peaceful solution to the conflict. The key elements of the proposed package include; • “The withdrawal of Armenia-backed Nagorno-Karabakh military forces from the occupied district of Azerbaijan surrounding entity, • The renunciation by Azerbaijan of the use of force to reintegrate the entity, • The deployment of international peacekeepers, • The returns of displaced persons, and • And the re-opening of trade and communication links” 28 The international community’s intervention in the peace process has failed to attain a final status on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Also Armenia and Azerbaijan are reluctant to negotiate under the proposed package and state that it is against their interest. At the same time the international community’s attention was diverted by the present political scenario in the Middle East issue. Question of regional peace and security For more than twenty years, several talks, summits, and dialogues have been held to find solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by the international community. Despite many failures, it continues to support and initiate a peaceful settlement. This unresolved conflict poses a serious threat to peace and security in the region. Prolonging the conflict, attacking in the line of contact, and counter-attacks can deteriorate the country’s social structure, its economy, and security. In recent years military build-up has been increased enlarging their offensive weapons. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan’s military budget has been doubled to enlarge their weapon arsenal. Looking at their growing military expenditure, a prospect for a lasting cease-fire is uncertain. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict led to huge military spending by procuring advanced weaponry to secure 28 International Group Crisis Report, Nagorno-Karabakh: Viewing the conflict from ground, Insight Turkey, Vol. 7(4), (Oct-Dec, 2005), p.94. 56

their national interest. Excessive military spending is likely to increase due to prolong conflict. “Azerbaijan military expenditure in relations to its total spending increased during the period from 1994 to 2012 by 95 %, while the defense budget in 2015 grew by 27 % in comparison to 2014.” 29 According to Stockholm International and Peace Research Institute data between 2009 and 2018, Azerbaijan’s military spending totaled almost US $24 billion. In 2019 Azerbaijan increased its military spending by 4.6 percent more than 2018 by the US $14.8 billion it makes up 13.4 percent of the state budget. 30 Armenia’s military spending between 2009 and 2018 was in tune with US$ 28 billion. In 2018, 21 percent of Armenian government spending was directed towards military expenditure. Armenia has been in relative terms one of the biggest military spenders lately. In 2015 its military spending was approximately US$500 million and in 2018 the country military spending roughly to the US $489 million while in 2019 it allocates the US$ 620 million for defense purposes. 31 Looking at the two countries’ military spending there is no doubt the arms market is booming and the supplier countries are taking advantage of the ongoing conflict. Armenia and Azerbaijan buy weapons from Russia, USA, Turkey, Iran, and Israel. Armenian has demonstrated that the clash on April 2, 2016, was caused due to Moscow’s sale of weapons to Azerbaijan and their uses against her country. The military build-up will deteriorate the peace process as it strengthens their military morale and military confrontation will complicate in facilitating the peace process. Conclusion International communities have failed to negotiate the Nagorno- Karabakh issue between Armenia and Azerbaijan despite several efforts. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict intensifies insecurity 29 Schumacher, Tobias “Armenia, Azerbaijan and the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Why the ‘black garden’ will not blossom anytime soon”, Egmont Institute, 2016, p.3. 30 Mehdiyev Mushviq, “Azerbaijan announces all-time high defense Budget for 2019”, Caspian News, January 22, 2019, https://caspiannews.com/news-detail/azerbaijan- announces-all-time-high-defense-budget-for-2019-2019-1-22-18/ (accessed 14 May 2020). 31 CIVILNET Report, ‘Armenia Military Spending Increased by 33 percent in one year’, 8 May 2019, https://www.civilnet.am/news/2019/05/08/Armenia-s-Military-Expenditure- Increased-by-33-in-One-Year/360213 (accessed 15 May 2020). 57

since there are several cease-fire violations in line of contact between the two countries. The military build-up, stockpiling armaments are causing stalemate to the peace process. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict should be resolved diplomatically through different channels to achieve a lasting solution to avoid any untoward future war in the region. Supporting the warring parties by external players will deteriorate the peace process. It will harbinger separatist activities to a larger scale in the region if the conflict is left unsolved. Finding prerequisite aspects is important in building a peace process like cooperation in various fields, people-to-people contact, trade, and commerce, etc. Though the conflict is between two countries, the risk is not limited to regional level. The catastrophe caused by the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict can have spill-over effects for the neighboring countries like Russia, Iran, and Turkey. These countries are critically aware of the complexities they might face in the border if hostilities continue. Yet, political settings have aggravated the peace process by external players directly or partially by taking advantage of the conflict to gain its national interest. Establishment of confidence- building measures between the parties will enhance negotiations. Maintaining the ceasefire agreement should continue to achieve final status on Nagorno-Karabakh. If left unresolved, regional peace and security are at stake. References CIVILNET Report, Armenia Military Spending Increased by 33 Percent in One Year, 8 May 2019, (URL: https://www.civilnet.am/ news/2019/05/08/Armenia-s-Military-Expenditure-Increased- by-33-in-One-Year/360213, accessed 15 May, 2020). Dash, P L. Nationalities Problems in USSR Discord over Nagorno‑Karabakh, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 24(2), (Jan 14, 1989), pp.72-74. International Crisis Group report, Nagorno-Karabakh: Viewing the Conflict From Ground, Insight Turkey, Vol. 7(4), (Oct-Dec, 2005), pp.93-98. 58

Mushvig, Mehdiyev, Azerbaijan Announces all-time High Defense Budget for 2019, Caspian News, January 22, 2019, (URL: https:// caspiannews.com/news-detail/azerbaijan-announces-all-time-high- defense-budget-for-2019-2019-1-22-18/, accessed 14 May, 2020). Nassibli, Nasib (2004), Azerbaijan: Policy Priorities Towards the Caspian Sea, in Akiner Shirin (ed) The Caspian: Politics, Energy and Security, Routledge, London. OSCE Lisbon Summit Document, Statement of the OSCE Chairman- in-office, Annexure-1, 1996, pp.1-27 (URL: https://www.osce. org/files/f/documents/1/0/39539.pdf, accessed 11 April 2020). Schumacher, Tobias (2016) Armenia, Azerbaijan and the Nagorno- Karabakh Conflict: Why the ‘Black Garden’ Will Not Blossom Anytime, Security Policy Brief, No.71, Egmont Institute, pp.1-6. Waal, Thomas De., (2003) Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan peace and war, New York University Press, New York and London. United Nations Security Council Meeting, Resolution 822, 30th April 1993, pp.1-2, (URL: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/ doc/822, accessed 10 March, 2020). United Nations Security Council Meeting, Resolution 874, 14 October 1993, pp.1-2, (URL: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/ doc/874, accessed 15 March, 2020). UNSC Resolution 853, 29 July 1993, pp.1-2 (URL: http://unscr. com/files/1993/00853.pdf, accessed 12 April 2020). ***** ABOUT THE AUTHOR Miugaliu Gonmei is pursuing Ph.D. from MMAJ Academy of International Studies, Jamia Millia Islamia (JMI), New Delhi. She obtained her Bachelor’s degree in Political Science (Hons) from Delhi University and earned her Master’s degree in International Relations from Pondicherry University, and MPhil from the Academy of International Studies, JMI. 59

India’s Energy Security: Transnational Gas Pipelines- A Case Study of the Middle East to India Deep-Water Gas Pipeline (MEIDP) Ya d u r a j S i n g h F o u j d a r Ph.D. Research Scholar, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi Email: [email protected] Keywords: MEIDP, Energy, Security, Gas Pipeline, Oil, Coal. Abstract Today the issue of energy security is one of the prominent concerns not only for individual states but also for the entire international politics. Every state whether developed or developing is willing to secure its energy needs. Availability of energy especially hydrocarbons like crude oil, natural gas and coal are vital components of development as every aspect of human life is very much dependent on it. In this regard India is not an exception: due to insufficient domestic energy resources India has to import around 82% of its oil needs, 45% of its natural gas needs and around 80% of its thermal coal requirements. After the Paris agreement on climate change in 2015, India pledged to reduce the carbon and other greenhouse gas emission. In this respect Government of India is paying heed to increase the use of natural gas as carbon emission from this source is lesser than other hydrocarbons like oil and coal. As India does not possess and produce sufficient amount of natural gas, the country is willing to import natural gas through gas pipeline. In this regard many pipeline projects have been proposed from Iran, Turkmenistan and Myanmar; recently proposed Middle East to India Deep-Water Gas Pipeline (MEIDP) presents a good prospect for quenching India’s energy thirst. The paper analyses the implications and benefits of the pipeline and how far the pipeline is possible to materialize keeping in mind the current geopolitical scenario. 60

Introduction The issue of energy security is one of the prominent concerns not only for individual states but also for the entire international politics. In every nation’s Foreign Policy making, the issue has acquired prominent place. Every state, whether developing or developed, is willing to secure its energy needs. Now consistent availability of energy especially hydrocarbons like crude oil, natural gas and coal are vital components of development as every aspect of human life is very much dependent on it. In this regard India is not an exception. With the second largest population in the world India is a huge consumer of energy resources. Despite the fact that India is one of the fastest growing economies, it’s a huge disparity that India is home to 18% of the world Population and accounts for only 6% of the world energy consumption (IEA 2017). Moreover, due to insufficient domestic energy resources India has to import around 82% of its oil needs, 45% of its natural gas needs and around 19% of its thermal coal requirements. After the Paris agreement on climate change in 2015, India has pledged to reduce the carbon and other greenhouse gas emission. In this respect Government of India is paying heed to increase the use of natural gas, as carbon emission from this source is lesser than other hydrocarbons like oil and coal. Natural gas has been regarded as transition fuel and the bridge to renewable energy. Carbon emission from natural gas is around half the emission from coal, so it has been promoted as a prospective bridge between an economy that depends mostly on coal and one that is based fully on renewables. India wants to move towards a gas based economy by increasing the penetration of gas in its ecosystem and has targeted to increase the share of natural gas in India’s energy mix from present 6 % to 15 % by 2030. 32 India’s emphasis to make it a gas-based economy can be understood by the fact that India is investing above USD 60 Billion to develop supply and distribution gas infrastructure development in India. 33 32 “Energising India”, a Joint project report of National Institution for transformation in India (NITI Aayog) and The Institute of Energy Economics, Japan(IEEJ), June 2017, p.7. Available at https://niti.gov.in/writereaddata/files/Energising-India.pdf, (accessed on 1 July, 2010). 33 “$60billioninvestmentcomingingasinfrastructure:DharmendraPradhan”,TheEconomic Times, Oct 13, 2019. Available at https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/energy/ oil-gas/60-billion-investment-coming-in-gas-infrastructure-dharmendra-pradhan/ articleshow/71566401.cms?from=mdr (last accessed on 1 July, 2010 61

As India does not possess and produce sufficient amount of natural gas the country is willing to import natural gas through gas pipeline. In this regard many pipeline projects have been proposed to import gas through pipelines. For example Iran–Pakistan–India (IPI) gas pipeline from Iran, Turkmenistan – Afghanistan – Pakistan – India (TAPI) gas pipeline from Turkmenistan, Myanmar-Bangladesh‑ India Gas Pipeline (MBI) from Myanmar and recently proposed Middle East to India Deep‑Water Gas Pipeline (MEIDP). Here my topic of discussion is MEIDP Gas Pipeline which presents a good prospect for quenching India’s energy thirst. The paper analyses the implications and benefits of the pipeline and how far the pipeline is possible to materialize keeping in mind the current geopolitical scenario. India’s Energy Mix Before going further it is necessary to know about India’s domestic energy scenario and what contribution all energy resources make in the country’s total energy Mix. Due to population growth, rapid urbanisation and infrastructure development India’s energy resource consumption has been increasing rapidly. In India’s energy basket share of coal is highest as it accounts for 56% while other hydrocarbon resources like oil and natural gas are accounted for 30% and 6% respectively. Although, Indian government has emphasised to increase the share of renewable energy resources (and planned to achieve 175GW installed capacity target by 2022) yet the share of hydro-power and renewable energy is very minimal comparing to the world renewable energy consumption. In India’s Energy mix hydropower is accounted for 4% and use of nuclear energy only is only 1%. Data in the Table indicates that in the year 2017 around 92.2% of total primary energy demand (TPED) in India came from the Hydrocarbons like Coal Oil and natural Gas while other resources like Hydro-electricity, Nuclear Energy and Renewables only accounted for around 7.8% share of TPED which is about 7% less than the world average contribution, which steed at 14.71%. Among all energy resources coal dominates India’s total energy mix with the share of more than 56 %. On the other hand contribution of oil is highest in terms of TPED on global level. While global share of natural Gas and nuclear energy is 6.8 62

and 3.6% respectively, India’s domestic energy production does not commensurate with its growing energy consumption. India possesses only 0.4% of world oil reserves and around 0.6 % of natural gas reserves. In 2017, India’s share in total World’s Oil and gas Consumption was 4.8% and 1.5%, while its domestic oil and gas Production was 0.9% and 0.8% of world’s production share (BP Statistical 2018). In terms of natural Gas share in global energy mix is around 24% while In India’s energy Mix the commodity accounted for only 6.2 %. So there is a big gap between production and consumption of oil & gas in India’s energy balance. With the current trend of economic development it is going to increase until any significant finding occurs and domestic production increases. Hence India’s dismal domestic energy scenario and high energy consumption makes the country dependent on imported energy resources. In this scenario India is willing to access energy resources from every possible source. Consumption by type of Fuel (in mtoe) and Share in TPED (in %) of India and World in 2016 and 2017 India in 2016 World in 2016 India in 2017 World in 2017 Type of fuel Volume Share Volume Share Volume Share Volume Share in mtoe of in mtoe of in mtoe of in mtoe of Oil Natural Gas 217.1 TPED 4557.3 TPED 222.1 TPED 4621.9 TPED (in %) (in %) (in %) (in %) Coal Nuclear 30.05 34.37 29.48 34.20 Hydro- Electricity 43.7 6.05 3073.2 23.17 46.6 6.10 3156 23.35 Renewables 405.6 56.15 3706 27.95 424 56.25 3731.5 27.61 Total 8.6 1.19 591.2 4.45 8.5 1.12 596.4 4.41 29 4.01 913.3 6.88 30.7 4.07 918.6 6.79 18.3 2.53 417.4 3.14 21.8 2.89 486.6 3.60 722.3 100 13258.5 100 753.7 100 13511 100 (Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2018, p.9.) Middle East to India Deep Sea Gas Pipeline (MEIDP) Keeping in mind the security concerns of on land gas Pipeline transit routes an alternate idea of deep water gas pipeline from the Gulf region to India first initiated in 1990s as Oman India deep water gas pipeline (OIP). In 1995, the Oman Oil Company headed 63

by the maverick John Duess proposed laying a 1,100 Km deep water pipeline of 24 inch diameter that would link Oman gas field to a landfall point in the state of Gujarat in India. 34 The proposed pipeline could not be taken ahead due to technical insufficiency at that time. But now due to rapid technical advancement it is feasible to lay pipeline at the depth of 3500 meters securely. In 2008, South Asian Gas Enterprises (SAGE) supported by Sidhomal Groups of Delhi, revived the Oman India Pipeline (OIP) project as Middle East to India Deep water Pipeline (MEIDP). The pipeline project has been envisaged as a Natural gas highway that will be linking the energy-rich Gulf region to energy-deficient India to quench India’s rapidly increasing energy thrust. “SAGE is working with a Global Consortium of some of the most reputed companies in the field of Deepwater Pipelines, to create a Multi-Billion Dollar “Energy Corridor”.” 35 The Pipeline that will be transiting gas via Arabian Sea has been regarded as the shortest and safest route from the Gulf region to India bypassing the insecure on land route of Pakistan that has been the main concern for the realization of earlier pipeline projects (IPI and TAPI) of India. 1300 Km. Pipeline will be laid at the maximum water depth of 3400 meters across the Arabian Sea. The pipeline would transmit 8 Trillion Cubic Meters (Tcm) of Gas to India over the span of 20 years. The gas exporting states would be Iran, Iraq, Qatar and Turkmenistan; these states can provide gas to India via swap deal with each other. For example, Iran can use the gas that is delivered by Turkmenistan for its own use and in return can feed same amount of gas to India. On route to India gas would also be supplied to UAE and Oman. Estimated cost of the pipeline is around dollars 5 billion and the construction would be completed in 5 years. The pipeline would be bringing 31.5 MMSCMD of gas per day to India and would be completed in two years from the date of essential approvals and a gas sale and purchase agreement (GSPA) being signed. 36 34 Batra, Ravi Kumar, “Natural Gas Pipelines: Geopolitics, Affordability, Security Dimensions”, in Ligia Noronha and Anant Sudarshan Ed. India’s Energy Security, Routledge, New York, 2009, p. 92. 35 “Creation of an Energy Corridor - India’s Energy security”, SAGE - Middle East to India Deep Water Gas Pipeline, Available at: http://www.sage-india.com/index.php?option=com_ content&view =article&id=48&Itemid=54, (last accessed on 21 June, 2020). 36 “Undersea Pipeline from Iran Can bring Cheaper Gas to India” The Economic Times, New Delhi, September 2017, Available at: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/ industry/energy/oil-gas/undersea-pipeline-from-iran-can-bring-cheaper-gas-to-india/ articleshow/60378372.cms (last accessed on 1 July, 2020). 64

“3 Natural Gas pipelines are envisaged over the next 10 years each having similar capacity. SAGE pipelines are envisaged as “Common Carriers” which Gas sellers in the Gulf can use as infrastructure to transport gas to the Indian region, by payment of a Pipeline Tariff.” 37 Two route options were being considered for laying the line; one, a single uniformly sized pipeline from Ras-al-Jifan in Oman to Gujarat in India; and two, the same route via a midline offshore compression station on Qualhat Seamount. 38 At this point the depth of water is only around 300 meters. A pipeline from Iran’s Chahbahar port to India that would be connected through the Oman India gas pipeline also envisaged but keeping in mind recent developments; re-imposition of sanctions on Iran by US the possibility of the gas from Iran depends on future political development and geopolitical situation. INTECSEA, a UK-based firm has updated the report of technically and commercially feasibility of the pipeline project, DNV.GL (Norway), an international firm certified that the project is feasible. 39 Associated Chambers of Commerce of India (ASSOCHAM) also suggested that implementation of the SAGE Pipeline project is a win-win situation for everyone in a study titled as “The Middle East to India Deep-Water Gas Pipeline: A Favourable Situation for for All” 40 Benefits of the Project: If the project is finalized it would be very beneficial from India’s energy security perspective, not only India will reduce its dependence on Coal and Oil but also get cheaper energy which would also be environment friendly as use of Natural gas emits lesser carbon than Coal and Oil. The gas from the SAGE pipeline 37 “Creation of an Energy Corridor - India’s Energy security”, SAGE - Middle East to India Deep Water Gas Pipeline, Available at: http://www.sage-india.com/index.php?option=com_ content&view =article&id=48&Itemid=54, (last accessed on 21 June, 2020). 38Dietl, Gulshan, India and the Global Game of Gas Pipelines, (Routledge, November, 2006) p. 52. 39 “Iran-Oman to India Gas Pipeline Presentation”, South Asia Gas Enterprise PVT Ltd, January, 2018, Available at: http://www.sage- india.com/download.php?fp=dXBsb2FkL3ByZXNlbnRhdGlvbi8=&f= MTUxNzIwNDQ0M19NRUlEUCBQcmVzZW50YXRpb24gSmFudWFyeSAxOC5wZGY=, (last accessed on 21 June, 2020). 40 “The Middle East to India Deep-Water Gas Pipeline: A Favourable Situation for All”, Associated Chambers of Commerce of India, August 2017, Available at: http://www. sage-india.com/download .php?fp=dXBsb2FkL3ByZXNlbnRhdGlvbi8=&f=MTUwNTY1M- jk1MV9NRUlEUCBTVFVEWSAyMDE3LnBkZg==, (last accessed on 21 June, 2020). 65

would be cheaper than some of the domestically supplied gas, as it will cost dollar 5 to 5.50 per million British thermal unit at the Indian coast. 41 It will also be cheaper than the LNG that India gets through ships from spot market at the rate of dollar 7 to 7.50 per mBtu. The cost of landed gas through an undersea pipeline will be at least dollar 2 cheaper than importing LNG, saving about $1 billion annually. 42 Besides this LNG from international market is subject to geopolitical and market risks. The deep sea pipeline will not require passing through any third country, hence no transit fee to be paid. SAGE has signed various MOUs and agreements with purchasers & suppliers like IOC, GAIL, GSPC, Oman Ministry of Oil and Gas and National Iranian Gas Exports Company, Iran. To develop the project agreements have been also signed by SAGE with several International firms that are working in the sectors like Pipe mills, Engineering & Consultancy and Installation contractors. Indian firm GAIL has signed an agreement with SAGE for cooperation in the project in august 2009. A senior official of the GAIL was quoted saying – “We expect that the pipeline will draw good investment response from players in India and West Asia. GAIL has procured intensive studies conducted by leading oil and gas industry deep-water pipeline specialists, Heerema Marine Contractors and INTECSEA, who have said that the Mideast pipeline project is technically feasible. This was an important consideration in signing the deal with SAGE.’’ 43 A huge development took place in 2014, when for the first time the project was discussed at a foreign Minister level meeting when India External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid met with the foreign ministers of Oman Yousuf bin Alawi bin Abdullah and 41 “Undersea Iran-India Gas Pipeline Can Bring Cheaper LNG to India”, Live Mint, New Delhi, September 2017, Available at: https://www.livemint.com/Industry/ wj8PfRvGGyAfh1p8aoPX9K/ Undersea-IranIndia-gas-pipeline-can-bring-cheaper-LNG- to-I.html, (accessed on 21 June, 2020). 42 Ibid. 43 “A Qatar-to-India Pipeline?”, South Asia Gas Enterprise PVT Ltd, September 2009, available at: http://www.sage-india.com/index.php?option=com_news&view=detail&news_id=18, (last accessed on 21 June, 2020). 66

Iran Javad Zarif. 44 Recently in September 2017, the Gas pipeline project was discussed in New York trilaterally as Indian External Affairs Minister Shushma Swaraj along with the foreign ministers of Oman (Yousuf bin Alawi) and Iran (Javad Zarif) discussed the Gas pipeline project along with cooperation in other fields. The meeting aimed to enhance the relations among the three countries in economic field mainly in energy sector. 45 The main advantage of this under sea pipeline is that, it has to go through under sea via Oman Gulf to India without entering the disputed land route or territorial water of Pakistan. When all things were going smoothly a setback struck when in March 2015, United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) extended Pakistan’s seabed Territory from 200 nautical miles to 350 nautical miles. 46 Hence the area through which pipeline has to pass comes under the Especial Economic Zone (EEZ) of Pakistan. This sudden change has put the project’s development in danger but later on SAGE proposed a route which is deviated for another 50 Km. form original pipeline route and that does not come under the EEZ of Pakistan. On the materialization of the SAGE pipeline project India will be getting Gas from Iran Turkmenistan, Iraq, and Qatar and after the recent findings of Gas in Oman, UAE and Saudi Arabia gas from these states can also be imported to India. But the whole pipeline project now depends on the US Iran relations. As of now, due to economic sanctions, International firms are not willing to invest in this project. 44 Jacob, Jayanth, “India, Iran, Oman to Start Discussing Gas Pipeline”, Hindustan Times, February 2014, Available at: https://www.hindustantimes.com/business/india-iran- oman-to-start-discussing-gas-pipeline/story-6KS1sO1pR4TrQt3RiFfMSI.html (last accessed on 1 July, 2020).. 45 “Oman, Iran, India discuss gas pipeline at trilateral meeting in New York” Times of Oman, New York, September, 2017, Available at: https://timesofoman.com/article/117889/ Oman/Oman-Iran-India-discuss-undersea-gas-pipeline-Iran-nuclear-deal-at-trilateral- meeting-in-New-York (last accessed on 1 July, 2020). 46 Ranjan, Amitav, “Stuck in the Pipeline: A $4 bn Deep Sea Gas Project”, Financial Express, Ahmedabad, September 2015, Available at: https://www.financialexpress.com/economy/ stuck-in-the-pipeline-a-4-bn-deep-sea-gas-project/138160/, (last accessed on 1 July, 2020). 67

Conclusion It is evident that India does not possess and produce sufficient amount of Oil and Gas to meet is growing demands. Keeping in mind the environment and sustainable energy perspective India is focusing on low carbon emission resources. Hence India is willing to access gas through Pipeline projects. In this respect the SAGE Project can be a game changer if it is materialized as it is comparatively more secure and economical for India. But for the time being the project cannot go ahead due to present International upheavals. Now it will be a huge challenge for India to achieve its foreign policy goal at the same time maintain its energy security. References “A Qatar-to-India Pipeline?”, South Asia Gas Enterprise PVT Ltd, September 1, 2009. Batra, Ravi Kumar, “Natural Gas Pipelines: Geopolitics, Affordability, Security Dimensions”, in Ligia Noronha and Anant Sudarshan Ed. India’s Energy Security, Routledge, New York, 2009. “Creation of an Energy Corridor - India’s Energy security”, SAGE - Middle East to India Deep Water Gas Pipeline. Dietl, Gulshan, India and the Global Game of Gas Pipelines, (Routledge, November, 2006). “Energising India”, a Joint project report of National Institution for transformation in India (NITI Aayog) and The Institute of Energy Economics, Japan (IEEJ), June 2017. “Iran-Oman to India Gas Pipeline Presentation”, South Asia Gas Enterprise PVT Ltd, January, 2018. Jacob, Jayanth, “India, Iran, Oman to Start Discussing Gas Pipeline”, Hindustan Times, February 2014, Available at: https:// www.hindustantimes.com/business/india-iran-oman-to-start- discussing-gas-pipeline/story-6KS1sO1pR4TrQt3RiFfMSI.html “Oman, Iran, India discuss gas pipeline at trilateral meeting in New York” Times of Oman, New York, September, 2017. 68

“Undersea Pipeline from Iran Can bring Cheaper Gas to India” The Economic Times, New Delhi, September 2017. “$60 billion investment coming in gas infrastructure: Dharmendra Pradhan”, The Economic Times, Oct 13, 2019. Ranjan, Amitav, “Stuck in the Pipeline: A $4 bn Deep Sea Gas Project”, Financial Express, Ahmedabad, September 2015. “The Middle East to India Deep-Water Gas Pipeline: A Favourable Situation for All”, Associated Chambers of Commerce of India, August 2017. “Undersea Iran-India Gas Pipeline Can Bring Cheaper LNG to India”, Live Mint, New Delhi, September 2017. ***** ABOUT THE AUTHOR A Ph.D. Research Scholar at Department of Political Science, Jamia Millia Islamia (JMI), New Delhi, Yaduraj Singh Foujdar did his Master’s from the same department in Political Science. He did an MPhil from MMAJ Academy of International Studies, JMI on “Geopolitics of Central Asia and India’s Interest”. He is currently working on his Doctoral thesis on “India’s Energy Security: Problems and Prospects”. 69

Biology & Medicine

Carcinogenesis – 1. From normal to cancerous Dr. Aparna Bagwe Retired as Senior Scientific Officer, Advanced Centre for Treatment, Research and Education in Cancer, Tata Memorial Centre, Kharghar, Navi Mumbai. [email protected] Keywords: Carcinogenesis, normal life processes, cancer, hallmarks. Abstract Cancer is a chronic disease that has impacted the lives of a large number of people across the world since time immemorial. This review article aims at placing before the readership of this journal some fundamental aspects about carcinogenesis (the development of cancer) in a lucid and simplified manner. In this first article in a two part series, the author focuses on what are the normal life processes and what goes wrong when a normal cell turns cancerous. Introduction to Cancer We are now nearing the end of the second decade of the 21st century and all of us are familiar with the term Cancer. I am sure that there must be hardly anyone amongst the readers of this journal who has not had a relative or friend who has contracted this dreaded disease. Somehow even today there is a lot of ignorance and needless fear about this disease. Through this series of articles, I aim to unravel the some of the fundamental processes at the root of this chronic disease named cancer, placing before you a mix of existing knowledge and new information that has come to light through recent cancer research. The crux of the matter is that cancer is not a single disease entity but a group of diseases that are caused by different causative mechanisms and agents, in which the end result is the uncontrolled division of the cells of our body. The process by which cancer forms 71

and develops is termed as carcinogenesis. Learning about cancer requires a basic understanding of the biology of normal cells and how our system works. Normal life processes In our body, we have millions of cells that form our bones, muscles, connective tissue, fatty tissue, lymphatic and blood forming tissues, and the nervous system and brain. Each cell in our body runs to a master plan: it has a function that it is meant to perform, and it waits for chemical signals that tell it what to do and when to do it, and also when to stop doing it. The signals come in the form of proteins such as enzymes, peptides, antigens, hormones, etc. There are four fundamental and critical phenomena that take place in living cells and normally the body is finely tuned to balance these phenomena of cell growth, division, differentiation and apoptosis. Within a tissue or organ, the cells are held together in a 3D package that has to occupy a fixed space within a tissue or organ. Thus for each cell type, its size is fixed and a cell will grow only till it reaches the size - which is programmed into its genome (the genetic master plan). Within a solid tissue, a cell is required to divide only if another cell in its vicinity is injured, dies and is removed, and the gap has to be filled by another cell. Normally, each cell within a tissue grows in size till a critical mass is achieved, then divides and, after division, it goes back into a quiescent (dormant) stage. Another vital phenomenon in a cell’s life is its death or apoptosis (programmed cell death). All cells have a finite life and, after going through a fixed number of cell cycles, the cells have inbuilt mechanisms that tell them that it is time to die. This is also signalled through the shortening of telomeres – terminal portions of the chromosomes. Sometimes some damage can occur to the cell, through a process called mutation. If the damage is major and the cell cannot repair it, it undergoes cell death. Apoptosis or programmed cell death is the process by which a cell that is no longer required is nudged into the death pathway, and is then removed from the body. (Fig. 1) 72

There are cells within our body that are precursors to other cells, and these are required to differentiate into the terminal cell types only when required. Stem cells are vital precursor cells that can form different cell types and organs. Our body’s dependence on these precursor cells is particularly heavy during embryogenesis, childhood and it continues, though to a lesser extent, even in adult life. As cells die and need to be replaced, the body sends signals to precursor cells sitting quietly within the system which then go through various stages of differentiation to form the required terminal cell type. This is clearly seen during haematopoiesis – the production of various types of blood cells. Within our body, the genetic material is packaged safely in the nucleus of each cell. If a mutation (damage that brings about change in the DNA sequence) occurs, the body first tries to repair it through DNA repair enzymes. But if the damage is so massive that 73

it cannot be repaired, then the body decides to sacrifice the cell for the good of the body. Thus, our body functions for the well being of the entire organism, and the individual cells are dispensable and replaceable. If a cell is damaged or has undergone a change in its genetic material, the body senses it and tells the damaged cell to undergo apoptosis. But who or what runs this master plan? We know about chromosomes – structures that hold the DNA in position within the nucleus of each cell with the help of proteins called histones. Chromosomes are superfolded structures that house our genome, and its component units – the genes that encode for all the proteins including enzymes that are required for the life as well as death of the body. A gene is the fundamental physical and functional unit of heredity. In humans, genes are made up of a chemical called deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA). Nucleotides comprising of a phosphate group, a sugar group and one of four types of nitrogenous bases – Adenosine, Thymine, Cytosine and Guanine, form the building blocks of our genome. To form a strand of DNA, nucleotides are linked into chains ultimately forming a twisted ladder like structure. This architecture ensures that the huge amount of genetic material is compressed into the smallest possible space. In a process called transcription that takes place inside the nucleus, small snippets of the chromosome get opened up so that the sequence of a gene can be read by mRNA (messenger RNA – a ribonucleic acid). The mRNA then moves out of the nucleus and into cytoplasmic organelles called ribosomes, where the message is translated into a chain of amino acids. Amino acid chains after post processing form a protein. If a cell requires a protein, it activates a set of genes that produce this protein (or more of it) and, after the requirement is fulfilled, the genes are switched off. Certain processes that can harm the organism are always kept in a switched off position. Thus several processes are controlled by well oiled master switches that ensure the smooth functioning of the organism. 74