The English version of Das Kapital 21st century

J   – the Capitalists (New York: Crown Business, 3&&.), and L. Zingales, A Capitalism for the People (New York: Basic Books, 3&$3), or Acemoglu, Robinson, and Ver- dier, “Can’t We All Be More Like Scandinavians.” Some sociologists also take this line: see David B. Grusky, “Forum: What to Do about In e qual ity?” Boston Re- view, March 3$, 3&$3. 2%. Contrary to an idea that is o) en taught but rarely veri' ed, there is no evidence that executives in the period $%/&– $%+& made up for low pay with compensation in kind, such as private planes, sumptuous o: ces, etc. On the contrary, all the evi- dence suggests that such bene' ts in kind have increased since $%+&. /&. To be precise, +3 percent. See Piketty et al., “Optimal Taxation of Top Labor In- comes,” table /. /$. Note that the progressive tax plays two very distinct roles in this theoretical model (as well as in the history of progressive taxation): con' scatory rates (on the order of +&– %& percent on the top &./ or $ percent of the distribution) would end indecent and useless compensation, while high but noncon' scatory rates (of /&– -& percent on the top / or $& percent) would raise revenues to ' nance the social state above the revenues coming from the bottom %& percent of the distribution. /3. See Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson, Winner- Take- All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer— And Turned its Back on the Middle Class (New York: Si- mon and Schuster, 3&$&); K. Schlozman, Sidney Verba, and H. Brady, ! e Un- heavenly Chorus: Unequal Po liti cal Voice and the Broken Promise of American Democracy (Prince ton: Prince ton University Press, 3&$3); Timothy Noah, ! e Great Divergence (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 3&$3). /.. See Claudia Goldin and Lawrence F. Katz, ! e Race between Education and Tech- nology: ! e Evolution of U.S. Educational Wage Di* erentials, #%$(– '((, (Cam- bridge, MA: Belknap Press and NBER, 3&$&), Rebecca M. Blank, Changing In e qual ity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 3&$$) and Raghuram G. Rajan, Fault Lines (Prince ton: Prince ton University Press, 3&$&). /2. # e pay of academic economists is driven up by the salaries o! ered in the private sector, especially the ' nancial sector, for similar skills. See Chapter +. //. For example, by using abstruse theoretical models designed to prove that the rich- est people should pay zero taxes or even receive subsidies. For a brief bibliography of such models, see the online technical appendix. #,. A Global Tax on Capital $. # e additional revenue could be used to reduce existing taxes or to pay for addi- tional ser vices (such as foreign aid or debt reduction; I will have more to say about this later). 3. Every continent has specialized ' nancial institutions that act as central reposito- ries (custodian banks or clearing houses), whose purpose is to record own ership of various types of assets. But the function of these private institutions is to provide a ser vice to the companies issuing the securities in question, not to record all the 

J   – assets owned by a par tic u lar individual. On these institutions, see Gabriel Zuc- man, “# e Missing Wealth of Nations: Are Eu rope and the U.S. Net Debtors or Net Creditors?” Quarterly Journal of Economics $3+, no. . (3&$.): $.3$– -2. .. For instance, the fall of the Roman Empire ended the imperial tax on land and therefore the land titles and cadastre that went with it. According to Peter Temin, this contributed to economic chaos in the early Middle Ages. See Peter Temin, ! e Roman Market Economy (Prince ton: Prince ton University Press, 3&$3), $2%– /$. 2. For this reason, it would be useful to institute a low- rate tax on net corporate capi- tal together with a higher- rate tax on private wealth. Governments would then be forced to set accounting standards, a task currently le) to associations of private accountants. On this subject, see Nicolas Véron, Matthieu Autrer, and Alfred Galichon, L’information \" nancière en crise: Comptabilité et capitalisme (Paris: Odile Jacob, 3&&2). /. Concretely, the authorities do what is called a “hedonic” regression to calculate the market price as a function of various characteristics of the property. Transac- tional data are available in all developed countries for this purpose (and are used to calculate real estate price indices). -. # is temptation is a problem in all systems based on self- reporting by taxpayers, such as the wealth tax system in France, where there is always an abnormally large number of reports of wealth just slightly below the taxable threshold. # ere is clearly a tendency to slightly understate the value of real estate, typically by $& or 3& percent. A precomputed statement issued by the government would provide an objective ' gure based on public data and a clear methodology and would thus put an end to such behavior. *. Oddly enough, the French government once again turned to this archaic method in 3&$. to obtain information about the assets of its own ministers, o: cially for the purpose of restoring con' dence a) er one of them was caught in a lie about evading taxes on his wealth. +. For example, the Channel Islands, Liechtenstein, Monaco, etc. %. It is di: cult to estimate the extent of such losses, but in a country like Luxem- bourg or Switzerland they might amount to as much as $&– 3& percent of national income, which would have a substantial impact on their standard of living. (# e same is true of a ' nancial enclave like the City of London.) In the more exotic tax havens and microstates, the loss might be as high as /& percent or more of national income, indeed as high as +&– %& percent in territories that function solely as do- miciles for ' ctitious corporations. $&. Social insurance contributions are a type of income tax (and are included in the income tax in some countries; see Chapter $.). $$. See in par tic u lar Table $3.$. $3. Recall the classic de' nition of income in the economic sense, given by the British economist John Hicks: “# e income of a person or collectivity is the value of the maximum that could be consumed during the period while remaining as wealthy at the end of the period as at the beginning.” 

J   – $.. Even with a return on capital of 3 percent (much lower than the actual return on the Bettencourt fortune in the period $%+*– 3&$.), the economic income on .& billion euros would amount to -&& million euros, not / million. $2. In the case of the Bettencourt fortune, the largest in France, there was an addi- tional problem: the family trust was managed by the wife of the minister of the bud get, who was also the trea sur er of a po liti cal party that had received large do- nations from Bettencourt. Since the same party had reduced the wealth tax by two- thirds during its time in power, the story naturally stirred up a considerable reaction in France. # e United States is not the only country where the wealthy wield considerable po liti cal in9 uence, as I showed in the previous chapter. Note, too, that the minister of the bud get in question was succeeded by another who had to resign when it was revealed that he had a secret bank account in Switzer- land. In France, too, the po liti cal in9 uence of the wealthy transcends po liti cal boundaries. $/. In practice, the Dutch system is not completely satisfactory: many categories of assets are exempt (particularly those held in family trusts), and the assumed re- turn is 2 percent for all assets, which may be too high for some fortunes and too low for others. $-. # e most logical approach is to mea sure this insu: ciency on the basis of average rates of return observed for fortunes of each category so as to make the income tax schedule consistent with the capital tax schedule. One might also consider mini- mum and maximum taxes as a function of capital income. See the online techni- cal appendix. $*. # e incentive argument is central to Maurice Allais’s tendentious L’impôt sur le capital et la réforme monétaire (Paris: Editions Hermann, $%**), in which Allais went so far as to advocate complete elimination of the income tax and all other taxes in favor of a tax on capital. # is is an extravagant idea and not very sensible, given the amounts of money involved. On Allais’s argument and current exten- sions of it, see the online technical appendix. Broadly speaking, discussions of a tax on capital o) en push people into extreme positions (so that they either reject the idea out of hand or embrace it as the one and only tax, destined to replace all others). # e same is true of the estate tax (either they shouldn’t be taxed at all or should be taxed at $&& percent). In my view, it is urgent to lower the temperature of the debate and give each argument and each type of tax its due. A capital tax is useful, but it cannot replace all other taxes. $+. # e same is true of an unemployed worker who has to continue paying a high property tax (especially when mortgage payments are not deductible). # e conse- quences for overindebted house holds can be dramatic. $%. # is compromise depends on the respective importance of individual incentives and random shocks in determining the return on capital. In some cases it may be preferable to tax capital income less heavily than labor income (and to rely pri- marily on a tax on the capital stock), while in others it might make sense to tax capital income more heavily (as was the case in Britain and the United States be- 

J   – fore $%+&, no doubt because capital income was seen as particularly arbitrary). See # omas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, A ! eory of Optimal Capital Taxation, NBER Working Paper $*%+% (April 3&$3); a shorter version is available as “A # eory of Optimal Inheritance Taxation,” Econometrica +$, no. / (September 3&$.): $+/$– +-. 3&. # is is because the capitalized value of the inheritance over the lifetime of the re- cipient is not known at the moment of transmission. When a Paris apartment worth $&&,&&& francs in $%*3 passed to an heir, no one knew that the property would be worth a million euros in 3&$. and a! ord a saving on rent of more than 2&,&&& euros a year. Rather than tax the inheritance heavily in $%*3, it is more e: cient to assess a smaller inheritance tax but to requirement payment of an an- nual property tax, a tax on rent, and perhaps a wealth tax as the value of the prop- erty and its return increase over time. 3$. See Piketty and Saez, “# eory of Optimal Capital Taxation”; see also the online technical appendix. 33. See Figure $2.3 3.. For example, on real estate worth /&&,&&& euros, the annual tax would be be- tween 3,/&& and /,&&& euros, and the rental value of the property would be about 3&,&&& euros a year. By construction, a 2– / percent annual tax on all capital would consume nearly all of capital’s share of national income, which seems nei- ther just nor realistic, particularly since there are already taxes on capital income. 32. About 3./ percent of the adult population of Eu rope possessed fortunes above $ million euros in 3&$., and about &.3 percent above / million. # e annual revenue from the proposed tax would be about .&& billion euros on a GDP of nearly $/ trillion. See the online technical appendix and Supplemental Table S/.$, available online, for a detailed estimate and a simple simulator with which one can estimate the number of taxpayers and the amount of revenue associated with other possible tax schedules. 3/. # e top centile currently owns about 3/ percent of total wealth, or about $3/ per- cent of Eu ro pe an GDP. # e wealthiest 3./ percent own nearly 2& percent of total wealth, or about 3&& percent of Eu ro pe an GDP. Hence it is no surprise that a tax with marginal rates of $ or 3 percent would bring in about two points of GDP. Revenues would be even higher if these rates applied to all wealth and not just to the fractions over the thresholds. 3-. # e French wealth tax, called the “solidarity tax on wealth,” (impôt de solidarité sur la fortune, or ISF), applies today to taxable wealth above $.. million euros (af- ter a deduction of .& percent on the primary residence), with rates ranging from &.* to $./ percent on the highest bracket (over $& million euros). Allowing for de- ductions and exemptions, the tax generates revenues worth less than &./ percent of GDP. In theory, an asset is called a business asset if the own er is active in the as- sociated business. In practice, this condition is rather vague and easily circum- vented, especially since additional exemptions have been added over the years (such as “stockholder agreements,” which allow for partial or total exemptions if a 

J   – group of stockholders agrees to maintain its investment for a certain period of time). According to the available data, the wealthiest individuals in France largely avoid paying the wealth tax. # e tax authorities publish very few detailed statis- tics for each tax bracket (much fewer, for example, than in the case of the inheri- tance tax from the early twentieth century to the $%/&s); this makes the whole operation even more opaque. See the online technical appendix. 3*. See esp. Chapter /, Figures /.2 and following. 3+. # e progressive capital tax would then bring in .– 2 percent of GDP, of which $ or 3 points would come from the property tax replacement. See the online technical appendix. 3%. For example, to justify the recent decrease of the top wealth tax rate in France from $.+ to $./ percent. .&. See P. Judet de la Combe, “Le jour où Solon a aboli la dette des Athéniens,” Libération, May .$, 3&$&. .$. In fact, as I have shown, capital in the form of land included improvements to the land, increasingly so over the years, so that in the long run landed capital was not very di! erent from other forms of accumulable capital. Still, accumulation of landed capital was subject to certain natural limits, and its predominance implied that the economy could only grow very slowly. .3. # is does not mean that other “stakeholders” (including workers, collectivities, associations, etc.) should be denied the means to in9 uence investment decisions by granting them appropriate voting rights. Here, ' nancial transparency can play a key role. I come back to this in the next chapter. ... # e optimal rate of the capital tax will of course depend on the gap between the return on capital, r, and the growth rate, g, with an eye to limiting the e! ect of r > g. For example, under certain hypotheses, the optimal inheritance tax rate is given by the formula t = $ − G/R, where G is the generational growth rate and R the generational return on capital (so that the tax approaches $&& percent when growth is extremely small relative to return on capital, and approaches & percent when the growth rate is close to the return on capital). In general, however, things are more complex, because the ideal system requires a progressive annual tax on capital. # e principal optimal tax formulas are presented and explained in the online technical appendix (but only in order to clarify the terms of debate, not to provide ready- made solutions, since many forces are at work and it is di: cult to evaluate the e! ect of each with any precision). .2. # omas Paine, in his pamphlet Agrarian Justice ($*%/), proposed a $& percent in- heritance tax (which in his view corresponded to the “unaccumulated” portion of the estate, whereas the “accumulated” portion was not to be taxed at all, even if it dated back several generations). Certain “national heredity tax” proposals during the French Revolution were more radical. A) er much debate, however, the tax on direct line transmissions was set at no more than 3 percent. On these debates and proposals, see the online technical appendix. 

J   – ./. Despite much discussion and numerous proposals in the United States and Brit- ain, especially in the $%-&s and again in the early 3&&&s. See the online technical appendix. .-. # is design 9 aw stemmed from the fact that these capital taxes originated in the nineteenth century, when in9 ation was insigni' cant or non ex is tent and it was deemed su: cient to reassess asset values every ten or ' ) een years (for real estate) or to base values on actual transactions (which was o) en done for ' nancial as- sets). # is system of assessment was profoundly disrupted by the in9 ation of $%$2– $%2/ and was never made to work properly in a world of substantial perma- nent in9 ation. .*. On the history of the German capital tax, from its creation in Prus sia to its sus- pension in $%%* (the law was not formally repealed), see Fabien Dell, L’Allemagne inégale, PhD diss., Paris School of Economics, 3&&+. On the Swedish capital tax, created in $%2* (but which actually existed as a supplementary tax on capital in- come since the $%$&s) and abolished in 3&&*, see the previously cited work of Ohlsson and Waldenström and the references given in the appendix. # e rates of these taxes generally remained under $./– 3 percent on the largest fortunes, with a peak in Sweden of 2 percent in $%+. (which applied only to assessed values largely unrelated to market values). Apart from the degeneration of the tax base, which also a! ected the estate tax in both countries, the perception of ' scal competition also played a role in Sweden, where the estate tax was abolished in 3&&/. # is epi- sode, at odds with Sweden’s egalitarian values, is a good example of the growing inability of smaller countries to maintain an in de pen dent ' scal policy. .+. # e wealth tax (on large fortunes) was introduced in France in $%+$, abolished in $%+-, and then reintroduced in $%++ as the “solidarity tax on wealth.” Market val- ues can change abruptly, and this can seem to introduce an element of arbitrari- ness into the wealth tax, but they are the only objective and universally acceptable basis for such a tax. Nevertheless, rates and tax brackets must be adjusted regu- larly, and care must be taken not to allow receipts to rise automatically with real estate prices, for this can provoke tax revolts, as illustrated by the famous Proposi- tion $. adopted in California in $%*+ to limit rising property taxes. .%. # e Spanish tax is assessed on fortunes greater than *&&,&&& euros in taxable as- sets (with a deduction of .&&,&&& euros for the principal residence), and the high- est rate is 3./ percent (3.*/ percent in Catalonia). # ere is also an annual capital tax in Switzerland, with relatively low rates (less than $ percent) due to competition among cantons. 2&. Or to prevent a foreign competitor from developing (the destruction of the na- scent Indian textile industry by the British colonizer in the early nineteenth cen- tury is etched into the memory of Indians). # is can have lasting consequences. 2$. # is is all the more astonishing given that the rare estimates of the economic gains due to ' nancial integration suggest a rather modest global gain (without even allowing for the negative e! ects on in e qual ity and instability, which these 

J   – studies ignore). See Pierre- Olivier Gourinchas and Olivier Jeanne, “# e Elusive Gains from International Financial Integration,” Review of Economic Studies *., no. . (3&&-): *$/– 2$. Note that the IMF’s position on automatic transmission of infor- mation has been vague and variable: the principle is approved, the better to torpedo its concrete application on the basis of rather unconvincing technical arguments. 23. # e comparison that one sees most o) en in the press sets the average wealth of the /./ members of the US House of Representatives (based on statements collected by the Center for Responsible Politics) against the average wealth of the seventy richest members of the Chinese People’s Assembly. # e average net worth of the US House members is “only” $$/ million, compared with more than $$ billion for the People’s Assembly members (according to the Hurun Report 3&$3, a Forbes- style ranking of Chinese fortunes based on a methodology that is not very clear). Given the relative population of the two countries, it would be more reasonable to compare the average wealth of all three thousand members of the Chinese Assem- bly (for which no estimate seems to be available). In any case, it appears that being elected to the Chinese Assembly is mainly an honori' c post for these billionaires (who do not function as legislators). Perhaps it would be better to compare them to the seventy wealthiest US po liti cal donors. 2.. See N. Qian and # omas Piketty, “Income In e qual ity and Progressive Income Taxation in China and India: $%+-– 3&$/,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics $, no. 3 (April 3&&%): /.– -.. 22. For a very long- run perspective, arguing that Eu rope long derived an advantage from its po liti cal fragmentation (because interstate competition spurred innova- tion, especially in military technology) before it become a handicap with respect to China, see Jean- Laurent Rosenthal and R. Bin Wong, Before and Beyond Di- vergence: ! e Politics of Economic Change in China and Eu rope (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 3&$$). 2/. See the online technical appendix. 2-. In the period 3&&&– 3&$&, the rate of permanent integration (expressed as a per- centage of the population of the receiving country) attained &.-– &.* percent a year in several Eu ro pe an countries (Italy, Spain, Sweden, and Britain), compared with &.2 percent in the United States and &.3– &.. percent in France and Ger- many. See the online technical appendix. Since the crisis, some of these 9 ows have already begun to turn around, especially between southern Eu rope and Germany. Taken as a whole, permanent immigration in Eu rope was fairly close to North American levels in 3&&&– 3&$&. # e birthrate remains considerably higher in North America, however. #-. ! e Question of the Public Debt $. See in par tic u lar Table ..$. 3. If we count assets owned by Eu ro pe an house holds in tax havens, then Eu rope’s net asset position vis-à- vis the rest of the world becomes signi' cantly positive: Eu- 

J   – ro pe an house holds own the equivalent of all that there is to own in Eu rope plus a part of the rest of the world. See Figure $3.-. .. Together with the proceeds of the sale of public ' nancial assets (which no longer amount to much compared with non' nancial assets). See Chapters .– / and the online technical appendix. 2. # e elimination of interest payments on the debt would make it possible to reduce taxes and/or ' nance new investments, especially in education (see below). /. For the equivalence to be complete, wealth would have to be taxed in a manner consistent with the location of real estate and ' nancial assets (including sovereign bonds issued in Eu rope) and not simply based on the residence of the own ers. I will come back to this point later. -. I will come back later to the question of the optimal level of long- term public debt, which cannot be resolved in de pen dently of the question of the level of pub- lic and private capital accumulation. *. Other tax schedules can be simulated with the aid of Supplemental Table S$/.$, available online. +. See Chapter $&. %. On the redemption fund, see German Council of Economic Experts, Annual Report '(## (November 3&$$); ! e Eu ro pe an Redemption Pact: Questions and An- swers (January 3&$3). Technically, the two ideas can be perfectly complementary. Po liti cally and symbolically, however, it is possible that the notion of “redemp- tions” (which connotes long and shared su! ering by the entire population) may not sit well with the progressive capital tax, and the word “redemption” may be ill chosen. $&. In addition to debt reduction through in9 ation, a major part of Germany’s debt was simply canceled by the Allies a) er World War II. (More precisely, repayment was postponed until an eventual German reuni' cation, but it has not been repaid now that reuni' cation has occurred.) According to calculations by the German historian Albrecht Ritschl, the amounts would be quite substantial if recapital- ized at a reasonable rate. Some of this debt re9 ects occupation fees levied on Greece during the German occupation, which has led to endless and largely ir- reconcilable controversy. # is further complicates today’s attempts to impose a pure logic of austerity and debt repayment. See Albrecht Ritschl, “Does Germany Owe Greece a Debt? # e Eu ro pe an Debt Crisis in Historical Perspective,” paper given at the OeNB 2&th Economics Conference, Vienna (London School of Eco- nomics, 3&$3). $$. If GDP grows 3 percent a year and debt $ percent a year (assuming that one starts with a debt close to GDP), then the debt- to- GDP ratio will decrease by about $ percent a year. $3. # e special one- time or ten- year tax on capital described above might be thought of as a way of applying primary surplus to debt reduction. # e di! erence is that the tax would be a new resource that would not burden the majority of the popu- lation and not interfere with the rest of the government’s bud get. In practice, 

J   – there is a continuum of points involving various proportions of each solution (capital tax, in9 ation, austerity): everything depends on the dosage and the way the burdens of adjustment are shared among di! erent social groups. # e capital tax puts most of the burden on the very wealthy, whereas austerity policies gener- ally aim to spare them. $.. Savings from the $%3&s were essentially wiped out by the stock market crash. Still, the in9 ation of $%2/– $%2+ was an additional shock. # e response was the “old- age minimum” (created in $%/-) and the advent of a PAYGO pension system (which was created in $%2/ but further developed subsequently). $2. # ere are theoretical models based on this idea. See the online technical appendix. $/. See in par tic u lar the results presented in Chapter $3. $-. # e same would be true in case of a breakup of the Eurozone. It is always possible to reduce public debt by printing money and generating in9 ation, but it is hard to control the distributive consequences of such a crisis, whether with the euro, the franc, the mark, or the lira. $*. An o) en- cited historical example is the slight de9 ation (decrease of prices and wages) seen in the industrialized countries in the late nineteenth century. # is de9 ation was resented by both employers and workers, who seemed to want to wait until other prices and wages fell before accepting decreases in the prices and wages that a! ected them directly. # is re sis tance to wage and price adjustments is sometimes referred to as “nominal rigidity.” # e most important argument in fa- vor of low but positive in9 ation (typically 3 percent) is that it allows for easier ad- justment of relative wages and prices than zero or negative in9 ation. $+. # e classic theory of Spanish decline blames gold and silver for a certain laxity of governance. $%. Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States, #%,&– #$-( (Prince ton: Prince ton University Press, $%-.). 3&. Note that there is no such thing as a “money printing press” in the following sense: when a central bank creates money in order to lend it to the government, the loan is recorded on the books of the central bank. # is happens even in the most chaotic of times, as in France in $%22– $%2+. # e money is not simply given as a gi) . Again, everything depends on what happens next: if the money creation increases in9 ation, substantial redistribution of wealth can occur (for instance, the real value of the public debt can be reduced dramatically, to the detriment of private nominal assets). # e overall e! ect on national income and capital depends on the impact of policy on the country’s overall level of economic activity. It can in theory be either positive or negative, just as loans to private actors can be. Cen- tral banks redistribute monetary wealth, but they do not have the ability to create new wealth directly. 3$. Conversely, the interest rates demanded of countries deemed less solid rose to ex- tremely high levels in 3&$$– 3&$3 (-– * percent in Italy and Spain and $/ percent in Greece). # is is an indication that investors are skittish and uncertain about the immediate future. 

J   – 33. # e sum of gross ' nancial assets and liabilities is even higher, since it amounts to ten to twenty years of GDP in most of the developed countries (see Chapter /). # e central banks thus hold only a few percent of the total assets and liabilities of the rich countries. # e balance sheets of the various central banks are published online on a weekly or monthly basis. # e amount of each type of asset and liabil- ity on the balance sheet is known in aggregate (but is not broken down by recipi- ent of central bank loans). Notes and specie represent only a small part of the bal- ance sheet (generally about 3 percent of GDP), and most of the rest consists purely of bookkeeping entries, as is the case for the bank accounts of house holds, corpo- rations, and governments. In the past, central bank balance sheets were some- times as large as %&– $&& percent of GDP (for example, in France in $%22– $%2/, a) er which the balance sheet was reduced to nothing by in9 ation). In the summer of 3&$., the balance sheet of the Bank of Japan was close to 2& percent of GDP. For historical series of the balance sheets of the main central banks, see the online technical appendix. Examination of these balance sheets is instructive and shows that they are still a long way from the record levels of the past. Furthermore, in9 a- tion depends on many other forces, especially international wage and price com- petition, which is currently damping down in9 ationary tendencies while driving asset prices higher. 3.. As noted in the previous chapter, discussions about possible changes to Eu ro pe an rules governing the sharing of bank data have only just begun in 3&$. and are a long way from bearing fruit. 32. In par tic u lar, a steeply progressive tax requires information on all assets held by a single individual in di! erent accounts and at di! erent banks (ideally not just in Cyprus but throughout the Eu ro pe an Union). # e advantage of a less progressive tax was that it could be applied to each bank individually. 3/. In France, the two hundred largest shareholders in the Banque de France were statutorily entitled to a central role in the governance of the bank from $+&. to $%.- and thus were empowered to determine the monetary policy of France. # e Pop u lar Front challenged this status quo by changing the rules to allow the gov- ernment to name bank governors and subgovernors who were not shareholders. In $%2/ the bank was nationalized. Since then, the Banque de France no longer has private shareholders and is a purely public institution, like most other central banks throughout the world. 3-. A key moment in the Greek crisis was the ECB’s announcement in December 3&&% that it would no longer accept Greek bonds as collateral if Greece was down- graded by the bond rating agencies (even though nothing in its statutes obliged it to do so). 3*. Another, more technical limitation of the “redemption fund” is that given the magnitude of the “rollover” (much of the outstanding debt comes due within a few years and must be rolled over regularly, especially in Italy), the limit of -& percent of GDP will be reached within a few years, hence eventually all public debt will have to be mutualized. 

J   – 3+. # e bud getary parliament might consist of ' ) y or so members from each of the large Eurozone countries, prorated by population. Members might be chosen from the ' nancial and social a! airs committees of the national parliaments or in some other fashion. # e new Eu ro pe an treaty adopted in 3&$3 provides for a “con- ference of national parliaments,” but this is a purely consultative body with no power of its own and a fortiori no common debt. 3%. # e o: cial version is that the virtually 9 at tax on deposits was adopted at the re- quest of the Cypriot president, who allegedly wanted to tax small depositors heav- ily in order to prevent large depositors from 9 eeing. No doubt there is some truth to this: the crisis illustrates the predicament that small countries face in a global- ized economy: to carve out a niche for themselves, they may be prepared to engage in ruthless tax competition in order to attract capital, even from the most disrepu- table sources. # e problem is that we will never know the whole truth, since all the negotiations took place behind closed doors. .&. # e usual explanation is that French leaders remain traumatized by their defeat in the 3&&/ referendum on the Eu ro pe an Constitutional Treaty. # e argument is not totally convincing, because that treaty, whose main provisions were later ad- opted without approval by referendum, contained no important demo cratic in- novation and gave all power to the council of heads of state and ministers, which simply rati' es Eu rope’s current state of impotence. It may be that France’s presi- dential po liti cal culture explains why re9 ection about Eu ro pe an po liti cal union is less advanced in France than in Germany or Italy. .$. Under François Hollande, the French government has been rhetorically in favor of mutualizing Eu ro pe an debts but has made no speci' c proposal, pretending to believe that every country can continue to decide on its own how much debt it wishes to take on, which is impossible. Mutualization implies that there needs to be a vote on the total size of the debt. Each country could maintain its own debt, but its size would need to be modest, like state and municipal debts in the United States. Logically, the president of the Bundesbank regularly issues statements to the media that a credit card cannot be shared without agreement about how much can be spent in total. .3. Progressive income and capital taxes are more satisfactory than corporate income taxes because they allow adjustment of the tax rate in accordance with the income or capital of each taxpayer, whereas the corporate tax is levied on all corporate pro' ts at the same level, a! ecting large and small shareholders alike. ... To believe the statements of the managers of companies like Google, their reason- ing is more or less as follows: “We contribute far more wealth to society than our pro' ts and salaries suggest, so it is perfectly reasonable for us to pay low taxes.” Indeed, if a company or individual contributes marginal well- being to the rest of the economy greater than the price it charges for its products, then it is perfectly legitimate for it to pay less in tax or even to receive a subsidy (economists refer to this as a positive externality). # e problem, obviously, is that it is in everyone’s in- terest to claim that he or she contributes a large positive externality to the rest of 

J   – the world. Google has not of course o! ered the slightest evidence to prove that it actually does make such a contribution. In any case, it is obvious that it is not easy to manage a society in which each individual can set his or her own tax rate in this way. .2. # ere was a recent proposal to pay international organizations the proceeds of a global wealth tax. Such a tax would become in de pen dent of nationality and could become a way to protect the right to multinationality. See Patrick Weil, “Let # em Eat Less Cake: An International Tax on the Wealthiest Citizens of the World,” Policy Network, May 3-, 3&$$. ./. # is conclusion is similar to that of Dani Rodrik, who argues that the nation- state, democracy, and globalization are an unstable trio (one of the three must give way before the other two, at least to a certain extent). See Dani Rodrik, ! e Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy (New York: Norton, 3&$$). .-. # e system of “allowance for corporate equity” adopted in Belgium in 3&&- autho- rizes the deduction from taxable corporate pro' ts of an amount equal to the “nor- mal” return on equity. # is deduction is said to be the equivalent of the deduction of interest on corporate debt and is supposed to equalize the tax status of debt and equity. But Germany and more recently France have taken a di! erent take: limit- ing interest deductions. Some participants in this debate, such as the IMF and to a certain extent the Eu ro pe an Commission, claim that the two solutions are equiva- lent, although in fact they are not: if one deducts the “normal” return on both debt and equity, it is highly likely that the corporate tax will simply disappear. .*. In par tic u lar, taxing di! erent types of consumption goods at di! erent rates al- lows for only crude targeting of the consumption tax by income class. # e main reason why Eu ro pe an governments are currently so fond of value- added taxes is that this type of tax allows for de facto taxation of imported goods and small- scale competitive devaluations. # is is of course a zero- sum game: the competitive advantage vanishes if other countries do the same. It is one symptom of a mone- tary union with a low level of international cooperation. # e other standard justi- ' cation of a consumption tax relies on the idea of encouraging investment, but the conceptual basis of this approach is not clear (especially in periods when the capital/income ratio is relatively high). .+. # e purpose of the ' scal transactions tax is to decrease the number of very high- frequency ' nancial transactions, which is no doubt a good thing. By de' nition, however, the tax will not raise much revenue, because its purpose is to dry up its source. Estimates of potential revenues are o) en optimistic. # ey cannot be much more than &./ percent of GDP, which is a good thing, because the tax cannot target di! erent levels of individual incomes or wealth. See the online technical appendix. .%. See Figures $&.%– $$. To evaluate the golden rule, one must use the pretax rate of return on capital (supposed to be equal to the marginal productivity of capital). 2&. # e original article, written with a certain ironic distance in the form of a fable, is worth rereading: Edmund Phelps, “# e Golden Rule of Accumulation: A Fable for Growthmen,” American Economic Review /$, no. 2 (September $%-$): -.+– 2.. 

J   – A similar idea, expressed less clearly and without allusion to the golden rule, can be found in Maurice Allais’s Economie et intérêt (Paris: Librairie des Publications O: cielles, $%2*) and in articles by Von Neumann ($%2/) and Malinvaud ($%/.). Note that all this work (including Phelps’s article) is purely theoretical and does not discuss what level of accumulation would be required to make r equal to g. See the online technical appendix. 2$. Capital’s share is given by Ǔ = r × ɘ. In the long run, ɘ = s / g, so Ǔ = s × r / g. It follows that Ǔ = r if r = g, and Ǔ > s if and only if r > g. See the online technical appendix. 23. # e reasons why the golden rule establishes an upper limit are explained more precisely in the online technical appendix. # e essential intuition is the follow- ing. Beyond the level of capital described by the golden rule, that is, where the re- turn on capital sinks below the growth rate, capital’s long- run share is lower than the savings rate. # is is absurd in social terms, since it would take more to main- tain the capital stock at this level than the capital returns. # is type of “dynamic ine: ciency” can occur if individuals save without worrying about the return: for example, if they are saving for old age and their life expectancy is su: ciently long. In that case, the e: cient policy is for the state to reduce the capital stock, for ex- ample, by issuing public debt (potentially in large amounts), thus de facto replac- ing a capitalized pension system by a PAYGO system. # is interesting theoretical policy never seems to occur in practice, however: in all known societies, the aver- age return on capital is always greater than the growth rate. 2.. In practice, a tax on capital (or public own ership) can ensure that the portion of national income going to income on private capital (a) er taxes) is less than the savings rate without needing to accumulate so much. # is was the postwar social- democratic ideal: pro' ts should ' nance investment, not the high life of stock- holders. As the German chancellor Helmut Schmidt said, “Today’s pro' ts are to- morrow’s investments and the day a) er tomorrow’s jobs.” Capital and labor work hand in hand. But it is important to understand that this depends on institutions such as taxes and public own ership (unless we imagine unpre ce dented levels of accumulation). 22. In a sense, the Soviet interpretation of the golden rule simply transferred to the col- lectivity the unlimited desire for accumulation attributed to the capitalist. In chap- ters $- and 32 of ! e General ! eory of Employment, Interest, and Money ($%.-), where Keynes discusses “the euthanasia of the rentier,” he develops an idea close to that of “capital saturation”: the rentier will be euthanized by accumulating so much capital that his return will disappear. But Keynes is not clear about how much this is (he does not mention r = g) and does not explicitly discuss public accumulation. 2/. # e mathematical solution to this problem is presented in the online technical appendix. To summarize, everything depends on what is commonly called the concavity of the utility function (using the formula r = ۟ + ࣹ × g, previously dis- cussed in Chapter $& and sometimes called the “modi' ed golden rule”). With in- ' nite concavity, one assumes that future generations will not need a hundredth additional iPhone, and one leaves them no capital. At the opposite extreme, one 

J   – can go all the way to the golden rule, which may necessitate leaving them several dozen years of national income in capital. In' nite concavity is frequently associ- ated with a Rawlsian social objective and may therefore seem tempting. # e di: - culty is that if one leaves no capital for the future, it is not at all certain that pro- ductivity growth will continue at the same pace. Because of this, the problem is largely undecidable, as perplexing for the economist as for the citizen. 2-. In the most general sense, a “golden rule” is a moral imperative that de' nes peo- ple’s obligations to one another. It is o) en used in economics and politics to refer to simple rules de' ning the current population’s obligations to future genera- tions. Unfortunately, there is no simple rule capable of de' nitively resolving this existential question, which must therefore be asked again and again. 2*. # ese ' gures were retained in the new treaty signed in 3&$3, which added a fur- ther objective of maintaining a “structural” de' cit of less than &./ percent of GDP (the structural de' cit corrects for e! ects of the business cycle), along with auto- matic sanctions if these commitments were not respected. Note that all de' cit ' gures in Eu ro pe an treaties refer to the secondary de' cit (interest on the debt is included in expenditures). 2+. A de' cit of . percent would allow a stable debt- to- GDP ratio of -& percent if nominal GDP growth is / percent (e.g., 3 percent in9 ation and . percent real growth), in view of the formula ɘ = s / g applied to the public debt. But the argu- ment is not very convincing (in par tic u lar, there is no real justi' cation for such a nominal growth rate). See the online technical appendix. 2%. In the United States, the Supreme Court blocked several attempts to levy a fed- eral income tax in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and then blocked minimum wage legislation in the $%.&s, while ' nding that slavery and, later, racial discrimination were perfectly compatible with basic constitutional rights for nearly two centuries. More recently, the French Constitutional Court has apparently come up with a theory of what maximum income tax rate is com- patible with the Constitution: a) er a period of high- level legal deliberation known only to itself, the Court hesitated between -/ and -* percent and wondered whether or not it should include the carbon tax. /&. # e problem is similar to that posed by the return on PAYGO retirement systems. As long as growth is robust and the ' scal base is expanding at a pace equal (or nearly equal) to that of interest on the debt, it is relatively easy to reduce the size of the public debt as a percentage of national income. # ings are di! erent when growth is slow: the debt becomes a burden that is di: cult to shake. If we average over the period $%*&– 3&$&, we ' nd that interest payments on the debt are far larger than the average primary de' cit, which is close to zero in many countries, and notably in Italy, where the average interest payment on the debt attained the astronomical level of * percent of GDP over this period. See the online technical appendix and Supplemental Table S$-.$, available online. /$. If the issue is constitutionalized, however, it is not impossible that a solution such as a progressive tax on capital would be judged unconstitutional. 

J   – /3. On the way Stern and Nordhaus arrive at their preferred discount rates, see the online technical appendix. It is interesting that both men use the same “modi' ed golden rule” I described earlier but reverse positions entirely when it comes to choosing the concavity of the social utility function. (Nordhaus makes a more Rawlsian choice than Stern in order to justify ascribing little weight to the prefer- ences of future generations.) A logically more satisfactory procedure would intro- duce the fact that the substitutability of natural capital for other forms of wealth is far from in' nite in the long run (as Roger Guesnerie and # omas Sterner have done). In other words, if natural capital is destroyed, consuming fewer iPhones in the future will not be enough to repair the damage. /.. As noted, the current low interest rates on government debt are no doubt tempo- rary and in any case somewhat misleading: some countries must pay very high rates, and it is unlikely that those that are borrowing today at under $ percent will continue to enjoy such low rates for de cades (analysis of the period $%*&– 3&$& suggests that real interest rates on long- term public debt in the rich countries is around . percent; see the online technical appendix). Nevertheless, current low rates are a powerful economic argument in favor of public investment (at least as long as such rates last). /2. Over the last several de cades, annual public investment (net of depreciation of public assets) in most rich countries has been about $– $./ percent of GDP. See the online technical appendix and Supplemental Table S$-.$, available online. //. Including tools such as the carbon tax, which increases the cost of energy con- sumption as a function of the associated emission of carbon dioxide (and not as a function of bud get variations, which has generally been the logic of gasoline taxes). # ere is good reason to believe, however, that the price signal has less of an impact on emissions than public investment and changes to building codes (re- quiring thermal insulation, for example). /-. # e idea that private property and the market allow (under certain conditions) for the coordination and e: cient use of the talents and information possessed by millions of individuals is a classic that one ' nds in the work of Adam Smith, Friedrich Hayek, and Kenneth Arrow and Claude Debreu. # e idea that voting is another e: cient way of aggregating information (and more generally ideas, re9 ec- tions, etc.) is also very old: it goes back to Condorcet. For recent research on this constructivist approach to po liti cal institutions and electoral systems, see the on- line technical appendix. /*. For example, it is important to be able to study where po liti cal o: cials from vari- ous countries stand in the wealth and income hierarchies (see previous chapters). Still, statistical summaries might su: ce for the purpose; detailed individual data are generally not needed. As for establishing trust when there is no other way to do so: one of the ' rst actions of the revolutionary assemblies of $*+%– $*%& was to compile a “compendium of pensions” that listed by name and amount the sums paid by the royal government to various individuals (including debt repayments, pensions to former o: cials, and outright favors). # is sixteen- hundred- page book 

J   – contained 3.,&&& names and listed detailed amounts (multiple sources of income were combined into a single line for each individual), the ministry involved, the age of the person, the ' nal year of payment, the reasons for the payment, etc. It was published in April $*%&. On this interesting document, see the online techni- cal appendix. /+. # is is due mainly to the fact that wages are generally aggregated in a single line with other intermediate inputs (that is, with purchases from other ' rms, which also remunerate both labor and capital). Hence published accounts never reveal the split between pro' ts and wages, nor do they allow us to uncover possible abuses of intermediate consumption (which can be a way of augmenting the in- come of executives and/or stockholders). For the example of the Lonmin accounts and the Marikana mine, see the online technical appendix. /%. # e exigent attitude toward democracy of a phi los o pher such as Jacques Rancière is indispensable here. See in par tic u lar his La haine de la démocratie (Paris: La Fabrique, 3&&/). Conclusion $. Note, too, that it is perfectly logical to think that an increase in the growth rate g would lead to an increase in the return on capital r and would therefore not neces- sarily reduce the gap r − g. See Chapter $&. 3. When one reads phi los o phers such as Jean- Paul Sartre, Louis Althusser, and Alain Badiou on their Marxist and/or communist commitments, one sometimes has the impression that questions of capital and class in e qual ity are of only mod- erate interest to them and serve mainly as a pretext for jousts of a di! erent nature entirely. 



Contents in Detail Ac know ledg ments vii Introduction $ A Debate without Data? 3 Malthus, Young, and the French Revolution . Ricardo: # e Principle of Scarcity / Marx: # e Principle of In' nite Accumulation * From Marx to Kuznets, or Apocalypse to Fairy Tale $$ # e Kuznets Curve: Good News in the Midst of the Cold War $. Putting the Distributional Question Back at the Heart of Economic Analysis $/ # e Sources Used in # is Book $- # e Major Results of # is Study 3& Forces of Convergence, Forces of Divergence 33 # e Fundamental Force for Divergence: r > g 3/ # e Geo graph i cal and Historical Boundaries of # is Study 3* # e # eoretical and Conceptual Framework .& Outline of the Book .. Part One: Income and Capital . .* $. Income and Output .% # e Capital- Labor Split in the Long Run: Not So Stable 2$ # e Idea of National Income 2. What Is Capital? 2/ Capital and Wealth 2* # e Capital/Income Ratio /& # e First Fundamental Law of Capitalism: Ǔ = r × ɘ /3 National Accounts: An Evolving Social Construct // # e Global Distribution of Production /% From Continental Blocs to Regional Blocs -$ Global In e qual ity: From $/& Euros per Month to .,&&& Euros per Month -2 

3  F # e Global Distribution of Income Is More Unequal # an the Distribution of Output -* What Forces Favor Convergence? -% 3. Growth: Illusions and Realities *3 Growth over the Very Long Run *. # e Law of Cumulative Growth *2 # e Stages of Demographic Growth ** Negative Demographic Growth? +& Growth as a Factor for Equalization +. # e Stages of Economic Growth +- What Does a Tenfold Increase in Purchasing Power Mean? +* Growth: A Diversi' cation of Lifestyles %& # e End of Growth? %. An Annual Growth of $ Percent Implies Major Social Change %/ # e Posterity of the Postwar Period: Entangled Transatlantic Destinies %- # e Double Bell Curve of Global Growth %% # e Question of In9 ation $&3 # e Great Monetary Stability of the Eigh teenth and Nineteenth Centuries $&. # e Meaning of Money in Literary Classics $&/ # e Loss of Monetary Bearings in the Twentieth Century $&- Part Two: ! e Dynamics of the Capital/Income Ratio . $$$ .. ! e Metamorphoses of Capital $$. # e Nature of Wealth: From Literature to Reality $$. # e Metamorphoses of Capital in Britain and France $$- # e Rise and Fall of Foreign Capital $3& Income and Wealth: Some Orders of Magnitude $33 Public Wealth, Private Wealth $3. Public Wealth in Historical Perspective $3- Great Britain: Public Debt and the Reinforcement of Private Capital $3% Who Pro' ts from Public Debt? $.$ # e Ups and Downs of Ricardian Equivalence $.2 

3  F France: A Capitalism without Capitalists in the Postwar Period $./ 2. From Old Eu rope to the New World $2& Germany: Rhenish Capitalism and Social Own ership $2& Shocks to Capital in the Twentieth Century $2- Capital in America: More Stable # an in Eu rope $/& # e New World and Foreign Capital $// Canada: Long Owned by the Crown $/* New World and Old World: # e Importance of Slavery $/+ Slave Capital and Human Capital $-3 /. ! e Capital/Income Ratio over the Long Run $-2 # e Second Fundamental Law of Capitalism: ɘ = s/g $-- A Long- Term Law $-+ Capital’s Comeback in Rich Countries since the $%*&s $*& Beyond Bubbles: Low Growth, High Saving $*. # e Two Components of Private Saving $*- Durable Goods and Valuables $*% Private Capital Expressed in Years of Disposable Income $+& # e Question of Foundations and Other Holders of Capital $+3 # e Privatization of Wealth in the Rich Countries $+. # e Historic Rebound of Asset Prices $+* National Capital and Net Foreign Assets in the Rich Countries $%$ What Will the Capital/Income Ratio Be in the Twenty- First Century? $%/ # e Mystery of Land Values $%- -. ! e Capital- Labor Split in the Twenty- First Century $%% From the Capital/Income Ratio to the Capital- Labor Split $%% Flows: More Di: cult to Estimate # an Stocks 3&. # e Notion of the Pure Return on Capital 3&/ # e Return on Capital in Historical Perspective 3&- # e Return on Capital in the Early Twenty- First Century 3&+ Real and Nominal Assets 3&% What Is Capital Used For? 3$3 # e Notion of Marginal Productivity of Capital 3$. 

3  F Too Much Capital Kills the Return on Capital 3$/ Beyond Cobb- Douglas: # e Question of the Stability of the Capital- Labor Split 3$* Capital- Labor Substitution in the Twenty- First Century: An Elasticity Greater # an One 33& Traditional Agricultural Societies: An Elasticity Less # an One 333 Is Human Capital Illusory? 33. Medium- Term Changes in the Capital- Labor Split 332 Back to Marx and the Falling Rate of Pro' t 33* Beyond the “Two Cambridges” 3.& Capital’s Comeback in a Low- Growth Regime 3.3 # e Caprices of Technology 3.2 Part ! ree: ! e Structure of In e qual ity . 3./ *. In e qual ity and Concentration: Preliminary Bearings 3.* Vautrin’s Lesson 3.+ # e Key Question: Work or Inheritance? 32& Inequalities with Respect to Labor and Capital 323 Capital: Always More Unequally Distributed # an Labor 322 Inequalities and Concentration: Some Orders of Magnitude 32- Lower, Middle, and Upper Classes 3/& Class Struggle or Centile Struggle? 3/3 Inequalities with Respect to Labor: Moderate In e qual ity? 3// Inequalities with Respect to Capital: Extreme In e qual ity 3/* A Major Innovation: # e Patrimonial Middle Class 3-& In e qual ity of Total Income: Two Worlds 3-. Problems of Synthetic Indices 3-- # e Chaste Veil of O: cial Publications 3-* Back to “Social Tables” and Po liti cal Arithmetic 3-% +. Two Worlds 3*$ A Simple Case: # e Reduction of In e qual ity in France in the Twentieth Century 3*$ # e History of In e qual ity: A Chaotic Po liti cal History 3*2 From a “Society of Rentiers” to a “Society of Managers” 3*- 

3  F # e Di! erent Worlds of the Top Decile 3*+ # e Limits of Income Tax Returns 3+$ # e Chaos of the Interwar Years 3+2 # e Clash of Temporalities 3+- # e Increase of In e qual ity in France since the $%+&s 3%& A More Complex Case: # e Transformation of In e qual ity in the United States 3%$ # e Explosion of US In e qual ity a) er $%+& 3%2 Did the Increase of In e qual ity Cause the Financial Crisis? 3%* # e Rise of Supersalaries 3%+ Cohabitation in the Upper Centile .&& %. In e qual ity of Labor Income .&2 Wage In e qual ity: A Race between Education and Technology? .&2 # e Limits of the # eoretical Model: # e Role of Institutions .&* Wage Scales and the Minimum Wage .$& How to Explain the Explosion of In e qual ity in the United States? .$2 # e Rise of the Supermanager: An Anglo- Saxon Phenomenon .$/ Eu rope: More Inegalitarian # an the New World in $%&&– $%$& .3$ Inequalities in Emerging Economies: Lower # an in the United States? .3- # e Illusion of Marginal Productivity ..& # e Takeo! of the Supermanagers: A Powerful Force for Divergence ... $&. In e qual ity of Capital Own ership ..- Hyperconcentrated Wealth: Eu rope and America ..- France: An Observatory of Private Wealth ..* # e Metamorphoses of a Patrimonial Society ..% In e qual ity of Capital in Belle Époque Eu rope .2. # e Emergence of the Patrimonial Middle Class .2- In e qual ity of Wealth in America .2* # e Mechanism of Wealth Divergence: r versus g in History ./& Why Is the Return on Capital Greater # an the Growth Rate? ./. # e Question of Time Preference ./+ Is # ere an Equilibrium Distribution? .-$ 

3  F # e Civil Code and the Illusion of the French Revolution .-2 Pareto and the Illusion of Stable In e qual ity .-- Why In e qual ity of Wealth Has Not Returned to the Levels of the Past .-+ Some Partial Explanations: Time, Taxes, and Growth .*3 # e Twenty- First Century: Even More Inegalitarian # an the Nineteenth? .*/ $$. Merit and Inheritance in the Long Run .** Inheritance Flows over the Long Run .*% Fiscal Flow and Economic Flow .+$ # e # ree Forces: # e Illusion of an End of Inheritance .+. Mortality over the Long Run .+/ Wealth Ages with Population: # e ࢆ × m E! ect .++ Wealth of the Dead, Wealth of the Living .%& # e Fi) ies and the Eighties: Age and Fortune in the Belle Époque .%. # e Rejuvenation of Wealth Owing to War .%- How Will Inheritance Flows Evolve in the Twenty- First Century? .%+ From the Annual Inheritance Flow to the Stock of Inherited Wealth 2&$ Back to Vautrin’s Lecture 2&2 Rastignac’s Dilemma 2&* # e Basic Arithmetic of Rentiers and Managers 2$& # e Classic Patrimonial Society: # e World of Balzac and Austen 2$$ Extreme In e qual ity of Wealth: A Condition of Civilization in a Poor Society? 2$/ Meritocratic Extremism in Wealthy Societies 2$- # e Society of Petits Rentiers 2$+ # e Rentier, Enemy of Democracy 233 # e Return of Inherited Wealth: A Eu ro pe an or Global Phenomenon? 232 $3. Global In e qual ity of Wealth in the Twenty- First Century 2.& # e In e qual ity of Returns on Capital 2.& # e Evolution of Global Wealth Rankings 2.3 

3  F From Rankings of Billionaires to “Global Wealth Reports” 2.- Heirs and Entrepreneurs in the Wealth Rankings 2.% # e Moral Hierarchy of Wealth 22. # e Pure Return on University Endowments 22* What Is the E! ect of In9 ation on In e qual ity of Returns to Capital? 2/3 # e Return on Sovereign Wealth Funds: Capital and Politics 2// Will Sovereign Wealth Funds Own the World? 2/+ Will China Own the World? 2-& International Divergence, Oligarchic Divergence 2-. Are the Rich Countries Really Poor? 2-/ Part Four: Regulating Capital in the Twenty- First Century . 2-% $.. A Social State for the Twenty- First Century 2*$ # e Crisis of 3&&+ and the Return of the State 2*3 # e Growth of the Social State in the Twentieth Century 2*2 Modern Redistribution: A Logic of Rights 2*% Modernizing Rather # an Dismantling the Social State 2+$ Do Educational Institutions Foster Social Mobility? 2+2 # e Future of Retirement: Pay- As- You- Go and Low Growth 2+* # e Social State in Poor and Emerging Countries 2%& $2. Rethinking the Progressive Income Tax 2%. # e Question of Progressive Taxation 2%. # e Progressive Tax in the Twentieth Century: An Ephemeral Product of Chaos 2%+ # e Progressive Tax in the # ird Republic /&3 Con' scatory Taxation of Excessive Incomes: An American Invention /&/ # e Explosion of Executive Salaries: # e Role of Taxation /&+ Rethinking the Question of the Top Marginal Rate /$3 $/. A Global Tax on Capital /$/ A Global Tax on Capital: A Useful Utopia /$/ Demo cratic and Financial Transparency /$+ A Simple Solution: Automatic Transmission of Banking Information /3$ 

3  F What Is the Purpose of a Tax on Capital? /32 A Blueprint for a Eu ro pe an Wealth Tax /3* Capital Taxation in Historical Perspective /.& Alternative Forms of Regulation: Protectionism and Capital Controls /.2 # e Mystery of Chinese Capital Regulation /./ # e Redistribution of Petroleum Rents /.* Redistribution through Immigration /.+ $-. ! e Question of the Public Debt /2& Reducing Public Debt: Tax on Capital, In9 ation, and Austerity /2$ Does In9 ation Redistribute Wealth? /22 What Do Central Banks Do? /2* # e Cyprus Crisis: When the Capital Tax and Banking Regulation Come Together //. # e Euro: A Stateless Currency for the Twenty- First Century? //- # e Question of Eu ro pe an Uni' cation //+ Government and Capital Accumulation in the Twenty- First Century /-3 Law and Politics /-/ Climate Change and Public Capital /-* Economic Transparency and Demo cratic Control of Capital /-% Conclusion /*$ # e Central Contradiction of Capitalism: r > g /*$ For a Po liti cal and Historical Economics /*. # e Interests of the Least Well- O! /*/ Notes /*% Contents in Detail -/* List of Tables and Illustrations --/ Index -*$ 

Tables and Illustrations Tables Table $.$. Distribution of world GDP, 3&$3 . -. Table 3.$. World growth since the Industrial Revolution . *. Table 3.3. # e law of cumulated growth . *- Table 3... Demographic growth since the Industrial Revolution . *% Table 3.2. Employment by sector in France and the United States, $+&&– 3&$3 . %$ Table 3./. Per capita output growth since the Industrial Revolution . %2 Table ..$. Public wealth and private wealth in France in 3&$3 . $3/ Table /.$. Growth rates and saving rates in rich countries, $%*&– 3&$& . $*2 Table /.3. Private saving in rich countries, $%*&– 3&$& . $** Table /... Gross and net saving in rich countries, $%*&– 3&$& . $*+ Table /.2. Private and public saving in rich countries, $%*&– 3&$& . $+- Table *.$. In e qual ity of labor income across time and space . 32* Table *.3. In e qual ity of capital own ership across time and space . 32+ Table *... In e qual ity of total income (labor and capital) across time and space . 32% Table $&.$. # e composition of Pa ri sian portfolios, $+*3– $%$3 . .*$ Table $$.$. # e age- wealth pro' le in France, $+3&– 3&$& . .%2 Table $3.$. # e growth rate of top global wealth, $%+*– 3&$. . 2./ Table $3.3. # e return on the capital endowments of US universities, $%+&– 3&$& . 22+ Illustrations Figure I.$. Income in e qual ity in the United States, $%$&– 3&$& . 32 Figure I.3. # e capital/income ratio in Eu rope, $+*&– 3&$& . 3- Figure $.$. # e distribution of world output, $*&&– 3&$3 . -& Figure $.3. # e distribution of world population, $*&&– 3&$3 . -& Figure $... Global in e qual ity $*&&– 3&$3: divergence then convergence? . -$ Figure $.2. Exchange rate and purchasing power parity: euro/dollar . -/ Figure $./. Exchange rate and purchasing power parity: euro/yuan . -* 

8  = Figure 3.$. # e growth of world population, $*&&– 3&$3 . */ Figure 3.3. # e growth rate of world population from Antiquity to 3$&& . +& Figure 3... # e growth rate of per capita output since the Industrial Revolution . %* Figure 3.2. # e growth rate of world per capita output from Antiquity to 3$&& . $&& Figure 3./. # e growth rate of world output from Antiquity to 3$&& . $&$ Figure 3.-. In9 ation since the Industrial Revolution . $&+ Figure ..$. Capital in Britain, $*&&– 3&$& . $$- Figure ..3. Capital in France, $*&&– 3&$& . $$* Figure .... Public wealth in Britain, $*&&– 3&$& . $3- Figure ..2. Public wealth in France, $*&&– 3&$& . $3* Figure ../. Private and public capital in Britain, $*&&– 3&$& . $3+ Figure ..-. Private and public capital in France, $*&&– 3&$& . $3+ Figure 2.$. Capital in Germany, $+*&– 3&$& . $2$ Figure 2.3. Public wealth in Germany, $+*&– 3&$& . $2. Figure 2... Private and public capital in Germany, $+*&– 3&$& . $22 Figure 2.2. Private and public capital in Eu rope, $+*&– 3&$& . $2/ Figure 2./. National capital in Eu rope, $+*&– 3&$& . $2* Figure 2.-. Capital in the United States, $**&– 3&$& . $/$ Figure 2.*. Public wealth in the United States, $**&– 3&$& . $/. Figure 2.+. Private and public capital in the United States, $**&– 3&$& . $/2 Figure 2.%. Capital in Canada, $+-&– 3&$& . $/* Figure 2.$&. Capital and slavery in the United States . $-& Figure 2.$$. Capital around $**&– $+$&: Old and New World . $-$ Figure /.$. Private and public capital: Eu rope and America, $+*&– 3&$& . $-/ Figure /.3. National capital in Eu rope and America, $+*&– 3&$& . $-/ Figure /... Private capital in rich countries, $%*&– 3&$& . $*$ Figure /.2. Private capital mea sured in years of disposable income . $+$ Figure /./. Private and public capital in rich countries, $%*&– 3&$& . $+2 Figure /.-. Market value and book value of corporations . $+% Figure /.*. National capital in rich countries, $%*&– 3&$& . $%3 Figure /.+. # e world capital/income ratio, $+*&– 3$&& . $%- Figure -.$. # e capital- labor split in Britain, $**&– 3&$& . 3&& 

8  = Figure -.3. # e capital- labor split in France, $+3&– 3&$& . 3&$ Figure -... # e pure rate of return on capital in Britain, $**&– 3&$& . 3&3 Figure -.2. # e pure rate of return on capital in France, $+3&– 3&$& . 3&3 Figure -./. # e capital share in rich countries, $%*/– 3&$& . 333 Figure -.-. # e pro' t share in the value added of corporations in France, $%&&– 3&$& . 33- Figure -.*. # e share of housing rent in national income in France, $%&&– 3&$& . 33- Figure -.+. # e capital share in national income in France, $%&&– 3&$& . 33* Figure +.$. Income in e qual ity in France, $%$&– 3&$& . 3*3 Figure +.3. # e fall of rentiers in France, $%$&– 3&$& . 3*. Figure +... # e composition of top incomes in France in $%.3 . 3*- Figure +.2. # e composition of top incomes in France in 3&&/ . 3** Figure +./. Income in e qual ity in the United States, $%$&– 3&$& . 3%$ Figure +.-. Decomposition of the top decile, United States, $%$&– 3&$& . 3%3 Figure +.*. High incomes and high wages in the United States, $%$&– 3&$& . 3%% Figure +.+. # e transformation of the top $ percent in the United States . .&& Figure +.%. # e composition of top incomes in the United States in $%3% . .&$ Figure +.$&. # e composition of top incomes in the United States, 3&&* . .&3 Figure %.$. Minimum wage in France and the United States, $%/&– 3&$. . .&% Figure %.3. Income in e qual ity in Anglo- Saxon countries, $%$&– 3&$& . .$- Figure %... Income in e qual ity in Continental Eu rope and Japan, $%$&– 3&$& . .$* Figure %.2. Income in e qual ity in Northern and Southern Eu rope, $%$&– 3&$& . .$+ Figure %./. # e top decile income share in Anglo- Saxon countries, $%$&– 3&$& . .$% Figure %.-. # e top decile income share in Continental Eu rope and Japan, $%$&– 3&$& . .3& Figure %.*. # e top decile income share in Eu rope and the United States, $%&&– 3&$& . .3. Figure %.+. Income in e qual ity in Eu rope versus the United States, $%&&– 3&$& . .32 Figure %.%. Income in e qual ity in emerging countries, $%$&– 3&$& . .3* Figure $&.$. Wealth in e qual ity in France, $+$&– 3&$& . .2& 

8  = Figure $&.3. Wealth in e qual ity in Paris versus France, $+$&– 3&$& . .2$ Figure $&... Wealth in e qual ity in Britain, $+$&– 3&$& . .22 Figure $&.2. Wealth in e qual ity in Sweden, $+$&– 3&$& . .2/ Figure $&./. Wealth in e qual ity in the United States, $+$&– 3&$& . .2+ Figure $&.-. Wealth in e qual ity in Eu rope versus the United States, $+$&– 3&$& . .2% Figure $&.*. Return to capital and growth: France, $+3&– $%$. . ./3 Figure $&.+. Capital share and saving rate: France, $+3&– $%$. . ./3 Figure $&.%. Rate of return versus growth rate at the world level, from  Antiquity until 3$&& . ./2 Figure $&.$&. A) er tax rate of return versus growth rate at the world level, from Antiquity until 3$&& . ./- Figure $&.$$. A) er tax rate of return versus growth rate at the world level, from Antiquity until 33&& . ./* Figure $$.$. # e annual inheritance 9 ow as a fraction of national income, France, $+3&– 3&$& . .+& Figure $$.3. # e mortality rate in France, $+3&– 3$&& . .+- Figure $$... Average age of decedents and inheritors: France, $+3&– 3$&& . .+% Figure $$.2. Inheritance 9 ow versus mortality rate: France, $+3&– 3&$& . .%& Figure $$./. # e ratio between average wealth at death and average wealth of the living: France, $+3&– 3&$& . .%$ Figure $$.-. Observed and simulated inheritance 9 ow: France, $+3&– 3$&& . .%% Figure $$.*. # e share of inherited wealth in total wealth: France, $+/&– 3$&& . 2&3 Figure $$.+. # e annual inheritance 9 ow as a fraction of house hold dispos- able income: France, $+3&– 3&$& . 2&2 Figure $$.%. # e share of inheritance in the total resources (inheritance and work) of cohorts born in $*%&– 3&.& . 2&/ Figure $$.$&. # e dilemma of Rastignac for cohorts born in $*%&– 3&.& . 2&+ Figure $$.$$. Which fraction of a cohort receives in inheritance the equivalent of a lifetime labor income? . 23$ Figure $$.$3. # e inheritance 9 ow in Eu rope, $%&&– 3&$& . 23/ Figure $3.$. # e world’s billionaires according to Forbes, $%+*– 3&$. . 2.. Figure $3.3. Billionaires as a fraction of global population and wealth, $%+*– 3&$. . 2.2 

8  = Figure $3... # e share of top wealth fractiles in world wealth, $%+*– 3&$. . 2.- Figure $3.2. # e world capital/income ratio, $+*&– 3$&& . 2-$ Figure $3./. # e distribution of world capital, $+*&– 3$&& . 2-3 Figure $3.-. # e net foreign asset position of rich countries . 2-- Figure $..$. Tax revenues in rich countries, $+*&– 3&$& . 2*/ Figure $2.$. Top income tax rates, $%&&– 3&$. . 2%% Figure $2.3. Top inheritance tax rates, $%&&– 3&$. . /&. 



Index Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, 2/-– 2/* Asset structure, twenty- ' rst vs. eigh teenth Accounting: national, //– /%, %3, 3.&, 3-%; century, $$+– $3&, $33– $3. corporate, 3&. Atkinson, Anthony, $*, $+, .2., /+$nn3$,3., /+3n.-, Accumulation of wealth. See Wealth -&-n.., -$&n3-, -$2n.3, -33n-&, -.+n./ accumulation Austen, Jane, ' ction of, 3, /.– /2, $&/– $&-, 32$, Accumulation principle, in' nite, *– $$, 33+ 2$$– 2$3, 2$/– /$-, -$%n.-, -3&n2&, -3$n/3; Sense Acemoglu, Daron, -32n3&, -.%nn2/,2+ and Sensibility, $$., .-3, 2$.– 2$2; Mans\" eld Africa: production in, -&– -$; income and, -.– -2, Park, $$/, $3&– $3$, 3&*; Persuasion, .-3 --, -+– -%, /+-nn..,.2; growth in, */, *+– *%, Austerity, public debt and, /2$, /2/– /2- %2, .++; capital/income ratio in, $%/, 2-$– 2-3; Australia, $*2, $**– $*+ taxes and, 2%$; capital out9 ow from, /.%. See Autrer, Matthieu, -2$n2 also North Africa; South Africa; Sub- Saharan Africa Badiou, Alain, -//n3 Age- wealth pro' le, .%.– .%% Bagnall, Roger S., -$3n$& Agricultural land: in Britain and France, $$*, $$%; Bakija, Jon, -&*n23 in Germany, $2$; in America, $/$– $/3; Balassa- Samuelson model, /+-n3+ elasticity of substitution and, 333– 33. Balzac, Honoré de, ' ction of, 3, /.– /2, 3&*, 2$$, Albert, Michel, /%3n/ 2$/– 2$-, -&$n3, -$%n.-; Père Goriot, $&2, $&-, Allais, Maurice, -23n$*, -2$n2& $$.– $$/, 3.+– 32&, .2., 2$3, 22&, /%&n., Allen, Robert, 332– 33/, /+&n/, /%+n2 -3&n2.; César Birotteau, $$/, 3&*, 3$2, Alternative investments, 22%– 2/&, 2/2, 2/- 2$3– 2$., /%&nn3,., -$/n.2, -32n$/ Althusser, Louis, -//n3 Banerjeee, Abhijit, $*, -$$n.3, -.2n2% Alvaredo, Facundo, $* Banking information: automatic transmission of, America: income and, -., -+; birth rate and, *%; /$-, /3&, /3$– /32, /3%; Cyprus crisis and, growth in, %.; capital in, $2&, $/&– $/+; structure //2– /// of in e qual ity in, $/3. See also North America Bank of En gland, //$– //3, //* “American exceptionalism,” 2+2 Bank of Japan, //$, //*, -2%n33 American Revolution, .&, 2%. Banks, central. See Central banks Ancien Régime, $&2, $&-; public debt and, Banque de France, -2%n3/ $3*, $3%, $+.; in e qual ity and, 3/$, 3-.– 3-2, Barro, Robert, $./ .2$– .23, 2+&; taxation and, 2%., /&$ Barry, Redmond, -3&n2& Anderson, Gosta Esping, /+*n/ Baudelot, Christian, -&/n3& Andrieu, Claire, /%$n$+ Bebchuk, Lucian, -$$n./ “Annuitized wealth,” .+2, .%$– .%3 Becker, Gary, .+/, -$-n*, -3$n// Aristocats, ! e (cartoon), .-/– .-- Beckert, Jens, -$2n33, -$-n-, -.*n3/, -.+n.. Arnault, Bernard, -3-n.. Béguin, K., /%+n* Arrow, Kenneth, -/2n/- Belle Époque, $&-, $3*, $.3; capital/income ratio Asia: income and, -., --, -+, /+/n32, /+-n.2; and, $2+, $/3, $/2, $%-; income in e qual ity in, investment in, *&– *$; growth in, *+– *%, +3, 3-.– 3-2, 3--– 3-*, 3*3, 3+3, .33; in e qual ity of %2, %%; capital/income ratio in, $%/; ' nancial capital own ership in, ..%, .23– .2/, .-%– .*&; crisis in, /./ age and fortune in, .%.– .%- Assets: public, $./– $.%; prices of, $-%– $*3, $+*– $%$, Bernstein, Eduard, 3$% 2/3– 2/., -3-n.$; ' nancial, 3&%, -3*n2.; real Bettencourt, Liliane, 22&– 22$, /3/, -23n$2 and nominal, 3&%– 3$3, /%+n$$; size e! ects of, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, -3-n.3 2/.– 2/2; taxation of, /$+. See also Net asset Billionaires, 2..– 2.2, 222– 22-, 2/+– 2/%, 2-., positions; Wealth -3.n*, -32n$. 

 Birth rates, *+– +., /+*n2, /++n* reproduction of itself, 22&. See also Foreign Bjorklund, Anders, -.$n3- capital/assets; National wealth/capital; Private Blank, Rebecca, -&+n$3, -2&n/. wealth/capital; Public wealth/capital; Rate of Boisguillebert, Pierre le Pesant sieur de, /-, /%&n$ return on capital Book vs. market value, $+%– $%$ Capital (Marx), %, 33/, 33% Borgerho! Mulder, Monique, /%*n.. Capital, income from, $+, 3$, /.; reduction in, Bourdieu, Jérôme, -$3nn2,% 3*$– 3*/, ..-– ..*; in twenty- ' rst century, Bourdieu, Pierre, 2+- 3**– 3*+, .&$– .&3; top decile and, 3*%– 3+$, Bourguignon, François, /+/n3& 3%&, 3%/, .&$, -&2– -&/n$3; underestimation Boutmy, Emile, 2+* of, 3+$– 3+2, 3%2, -&-n3-; taxation on, Bouvier, Jean, 33/, /+3n.2 /&*– /&+. See also In e qual ity of capital Bowley, Arthur, 3$%, /%%nn$%, 3& own ership Bozio, Antoine, -..n2- Capital, metamorphoses of: nature of wealth and, Brady, H., -2&n/3 $$.– $$-; in Britain and France, $$.– $.%; asset Britain: data from, 3+, /-– /*; national income structure (private) and, $$-– $3&, $33– $3.; and, -+– -%; growth in, %+– %%, $*2– $*/, foreign capital and, $3&– $3.; public and /$&– /$$; monetary system of, $&/, private wealth and, $3.– $3%; public debt and, /+%– /%&nn3+,3%; per capita income in, $&-, $3%– $.2; Ricardian equivalence and, $.2– $./; $33, /%&– /%$n+,%; in9 ation in, $&*, $.., $23, public assets and, $./– $.%; in Germany, $2%; capital in, $$-– $3*, $2+– $2%; foreign $2&– $2-; twentieth century shocks and, capital/assets and, $$*– $$%, $2+, $%$– $%3, $2-– $/&; in the United States, $/&– $/-, /%&n*; public debt of, $32– $3-, $3*, $3%– $.$, $/+– $-.; in Canada, $/*– $/+ $.., /%$n$&, /%$n$3; public assets in, $.-, $.+; Capital accumulation, golden rule of, /-.– /-* Canada and, $/*– $/+; savings in, $**– $*+; Capital controls, /$/– /$-, /.2– /.- capital- labor split in, 3&&– 3&$, 3&2, 3&/, Capital gains: treatment of, 3+., 3%/, -&%n$.; 3&-– 3&+, 3$-, 332– 33/, 33%; taxation and, ..+, United States and, 3%., 3%/, 3%- 2%+– 2%%, /&$, /&/, /&*– /$3, -.-n$-, Capital/income ratio, $%, 3/– 3-, $-2– $%%; -.+nn..,.2,./; wealth distribution in, evolution of, 23; de' ned, /&– /3; fundamental .2.– .22, .2-; inheritances in, 23-– 23*; taxes laws of capitalism and, /3– //, $--– $*&; in as share of national income in, 2*/– 2*-, Britain and France, $$*– $$+, $3-; collapse and -3%n-; social state in, 2**– 2*+, -3%n$3, recovery of, $2-– $/&, 3*/; in the United States, -.$n3/ $/&– $//; capital’s comeback and, $*&– $*., 3%&; Brown, Frederick, 3$%– 33& beyond bubbles and, $*.– $+.; privatization Bubbles, $*3, $%., /%-n3*, /%*n.&; beyond, $*.– $+. and, $+.– $+*; rebound of asset prices and, Bu! et, Warren, -32n$2 $+*– $%$; national capital and net foreign assets Bush, George W., .&% and, $%$– $%2; land values and, $%-– $%+; capital- labor split and, $%%– 3&., 3.3– 3..; Cagé, Julia, -..n2+ falling rate of pro' t and, 33%; 9 ow of Caillaux, Joseph, -.*n32 inheritances and, .+.– .+2; world, 2-&– 2-$ Campion, H., /%$n$% Capitalism, $; misery of, *– +, 22-– 22*; Marx on, Canada, --; in US- Canada bloc, -3– -.; capital in, *– $$, 33*– 3.&, /-/; author’s view of, .$; ' rst $2&, $/*– $/+; foreign capital/assets in, $/*– $/+; fundamental law of, /3– //, $%%; second growth rate of, $*2; savings in, $**– $*+ fundamental law of, //, $--– $*&; ' nancial, /+, “Capabilities” approach, 2+& /$/; key aspects of, $$-– $$+; without capitalists, Capital: human and nonhuman, 3$– 33, 23, $./– $.%; Rhenish, $2&– $2-, $%$, /$$; 2-– 2*; types of, 23, 2-; depreciation and, patrimonial, $/2– $//, $*., 3.*, 2*$; illusion of 2.– 22; de' ned, 2/– 2*, $3.; private vs. public, end of, ./&, .+$, .%*; crisis of 3&&+ and, 2-– 2*; and wealth, 2*– /&; economic 2*3– 2*2; control of, /$+, /3., /.3– /.*, /-3, functions of, 2+; domestic vs. foreign, 2%, /*&; central contradiction of, /*$– /*. $$+– $$%; immaterial, 2%; residential vs. Capital- labor split, +, .%– 2/, $%%– 3.2; capital/ productive, /$– /3; rents and, 23.– 232; income ratio and, $%%– 3&., 3.3– 3..; return on 

 capital and, $%%– 3$*; 9 ows and, 3&.– 3&2; real Clinton, Bill, .&% and nominal assets and, 3&%– 3$3; marginal Cobb, Charles, /%%n$+ productivity of capital and, 3$3– 3$*; elasticity Cobb- Douglas production function, 3$*– 33&, of substitution and, 3$-– 332; stability of, /%%n$*, -&&n3/ 3$*– 33&, 3.$– 3.3; human capital and, Cole, Adam, -&*n23 33.– 332; medium- term changes in, 332– 33*, Colonial empires, $3&– $3$ 3++; falling rate of pro' t and, 33*– 3.&; “two Colonial era, 22– 2/ Cambridges” and, 3.&– 3.3; capital’s comeback Colqhoun, Patrick, 3.& and, 3.3– 3.., 3%&– 3%$; technology and, 3.2 Colson, Clément, /*, /%$n$%, -$*n$& Capital stock, /&– /$, $$., $$%; ' rst fundamental Columbia, .3*, .3% law of capitalism and, /3– //, $%%; accumula- “Common utility,” 2+&, -.&n3& tion of, $--– $*&; too much, 3$3, 3$/– 3$*, 33., Communist Manifesto, ! e (Marx), +– %, 33/ 33*– 3.&; inherited wealth and, 2&$– 2&2, 2$& Communist movements, +, $& Capital tax. See Global tax on capital; Taxation, Competition: pure and perfect, .&, 3$3, 3$2, on capital .$3– .$., ..3, -.%– -2&n2+; ' scal, 3&+, 33$, Carbon tax, -/2n// .//– ./-, .*., .*/, 233, 2%-, /-3; inheritance Carpentier, Vincent, -.3n.2 and unrestricted, 23.– 232 Card, David, .$., -&+n$& Concentration e! ects vs. volume e! ects, 2$& Castel, Robert, -&+n% Condorcet, marquis de, .-., -/2n/- Categorical or schedular tax, /&$ Con' scatory tax rates, 2*.; executive income and, Centile, upper/top, 3/$, 3/3– 3/2, 3/%– 3-2, 3-*, /&/– /&+; ' scal progressivity and, /$3– /$2 .&$; in twentieth century, 3*3, 3*/, 3+2– 3+-; Conservative revolution, %+, $.+– $.%, ..., /$$, /2% in twenty- ' rst century, 3**– 3*+; world of, Consumption taxes, 2%2, 2%-, -/$n.* 3*+– 3+$; underestimation of, 3+$– 3+2; wages Continental blocs, /%– -$, -+ and, 3%&– 3%3, 3%-, 3%+– .&&, .$2– .$/, -$+n3%; Contributive justi' cation, /32– /3/ cohabitation in, .&&– .&.; evolution of by Convergence, 3$– 33, 3*, /*$; forces favoring, country and region, .$/– .33, .3-– .3*, .3%, -%– *$; global, *3 -&%– -$&nn$.,$2,$/,$-,$*,$+,$%, -$&nn33,3.,3/; Corporations, $/-, 3&., ..3; taxation on pro' ts of, wealth distribution and, ..%– .2-, .2+– .2%, /-&– /-$, -/&– -/$n.., -/$n.- .-/– .--, 2.+– 2.%, /&%, -2.n3/; work vs. Creative accounting, 3$2 inheritance and, 2&+– 2$$; return on capital Crédit Suisse, 2.*, -3.n$& and, 2.$; oligarchic divergence and, 2-.; Cross- investments, $%2 taxation and, 2%- Crouzet, François, /%$n$$ Centiles, mea sure ment and, 3/3– 3//, 3-%– 3*&, Cumulative growth, law of, *2– ** 3+- Cumulative returns, law of, */, ** Central banks, 2*3– 2*., -2+n3&, -2%n33; Cyprus Cyprus banking crisis, /$%, //.– //- crisis and, /$%, //.– //-; ' nancial stability and, /2*– //., ///– //- Damages (TV series), 2$% César Birotteau (Balzac), $$/, 3&*, 3$2, 2$3– 2$. Data: importance of, 3– .; national income as, Chabert, A., -&&n3% $$– $., /-– /%, /+2n$+; on income, $-– $*; on Challenges wealth rankings, 223, -32n$+ wealth, $*– 3&; geo graph i cal and historical Charles X, -$.n3$ boundaries of, 3*– .&; developing countries Chavagneux, Christian, -3+n/- and, /+– /% China: income and, -3– -2, --; growth in, +3, %%, Daumond, Adeline, /+3n.. .3%, 23%; income in e qual ity in, .3-– .3*, Davies, James B., -.+n+ -$&n3*, -2-n23; assets of, 2-., -3*– -3+n/&; Debreu, Claude, -/2n/- taxes in, 2%$, 2%3; regulation in, /./– /.- Debt. See Public debt Civil Code, .-3– .--, -$2n3. Decile, upper/top, 3/$– 3/., 3/-– 3-&, 3-$– 3-2; in Clark, Gregory, /%$n$/ twentieth century, 3*$– 3*., 3*/– 3*-, Class designations, 3/&– 3/3 3+2– 3+-, 3++; world of, 3*+– 3+$; underestima- Climate change, /-*– /-% tion of, 3+$– 3+2, 3%2– 3%/; wages and, 

 Decile (continued) Distribution tables, 3-*, 3-%– 3*& 3%&– 3%2, 3%-– 3%%, .$2– .$/; wealth Divergence, 33– 3*, 232, /*$; Eu rope and North distribution and, .33– .32, ..%– .2-, .2+– .2%, America and, /%– -$; supermanagers and, .-/– .--, 2.+– 2.%; return on capital and, 2.$ ...– ../; mechanism of wealth, ./&– ./., 2.$; Deciles, mea sure ment and, 3/$– 3//, -&$n/, global, 2.+– 2.%, 2-$– 2-.; oligarchic, -&3n3&; interdecile ratios and, 3-*– 3-%, 2-.– 2-/, -3*n2% -&.nn3.,32 Divisia, François, /%$n$% Declaration of In de pen dence (US) ($**-), 2*% Django Unchained (' lm), $-. Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen Domar, Evsey, 3.&– 3.$ ($*+%), 2*%– 2+& Domestic capital, 2%; in Britain and France, Defensive nationalism, /.% $$*– $$%; in Germany, $2$, $2.; in the United De9 ation, 3+/ States, $/&– $/$, $//; in Canada, $/*; slavery De Foville, Alfred, /*, -$*n$& and, $/+– $-., /%.n$- De Gaulle, Charles, 3+% Domestic output/production, 22– 2/, /%+n. Delalande, Nicolas, -./n$. Douglas, Paul, /%%n$+ Dell, Fabien, $*, -$/n.+, -2/n.* Dowries, .%3, 2$+ Democracy: challenge to, 3$, 3-– 3*; rentiers and, Du9 o, Esther, -.2n2% 233– 232; transparency and, /$+– /3$; control Duncan, G., -.3n.& of capital and, /-%– /*&, /*. Dunoyer, Charles, +/ Demographic growth, *3– */, $*2; stages of, Dupin, Jean, /%$n$% **– +&; negative, +&– +.; bell curve of global, Durable goods and valuables, $*%– $+&, /%2n$. %%, /+%n32; decreased, $--– $-+ Durkheim, Emile, 233, -3$n// Demographic transition, .– 2, 3%– .&, *+– *%, +$– +3 Duval, Guillaume, /%3n- Denmark, 2%/ Depreciation, 2., $*+ Earned and unearned income: inheritances and, Deregulation movement, $.+– $.% .**– .*%, .%&; taxation and, /&*– /&+ Di Bartolomeo, G., -.*n3- Eastern bloc countries, privatization in, $+-– $+* “Di! erence principle” (Rawls), 2+& ECB (Eu ro pe an Central Bank), /.&, /2/, //&– //3, Dirty Sexy Money (TV series), 2$% //., //*– //+, -2%n3- Disposable income, $+&– $+3 “Ecological stimulus,” /-+ Distribution, equilibrium, .-$– .-- Economic determinism, 3& Distribution of wealth: factorial vs. individual, 2&, Economic 9 ows, .+$– .+. /+.n.; national accounting and, //– /%; global, Economic growth, *3– *2, +2, %.– %2; stages of, /%– -%; regional blocs and, -$– -2; upper +-– +*; in postwar period, %-; social order and, centiles and deciles and, .33– .32, ..%– .2-, %-. See also Per capita output growth .2+– .2%, .-/– .--; in France, ..*– .2., .2-, Economics, ., $&, .3– .., /*.– /** .-2– .--; in Britain, .2.– .22, .2-; in Eu rope, Economies of scale, portfolio management and, .2.– .2/, ./&; in Sweden, .22– .2/, .2-– .2*; 2.$, 22&, 2/&– 2/$ in the United States, .2*– ./&; return on Educational system: convergence and, 33, *$; capital and unequal, .-$, /*$– /*3. See also technology and, .&2– .&*; in e qual ity and, .$., Global in e qual ity of wealth; Inheritance, .$2– .$/, 2$%– 23&, -&+– -&%n$3, -.3n.-; dynamics of public spending in, 2**, 2+3, -3%n$2; social Distribution of wealth debate: data and, 3– ., mobility and, 2+2– 2+* $$– $., $-– $%, 3*– .&; classical po liti cal economy Egypt, /.+ and, .– /; scarcity principle and, /– *; in' nite Elasticity of substitution, 3$-– 332, -&&n.3 accumulation principle and, *– $$; postwar Emerging economies: in e qual ity of labor income optimism and, $$– $/; in economic analysis, and, .3-– ..&; inheritances in, 23+– 23%; social $/– $-; historical sources and, $%– 3&; results of state in, 2%&– 2%3, -..n2% current study in, 3&– 33; forces of convergence Engels, Friedrich, %, /*%n2 and divergence and, 33– 3*; theoretical and En glish Revolution, .& conceptual framework and, .&– .. Entails, .-3– .-., 2/$ 

 Entrepreneurial income, 3&2 Family fortunes: shocks and, .-3, .-2, .-%; Entrepreneurial labor, 2$ taxation and, .*2; desire to perpetuate, Entrepreneurs in wealth rankings, 2.%– 22. .%$– .%3, 2&& Equalization and growth, +.– +/. See also Farmland, as capital: in Britain and France, $$*, Convergence $$%, $33– $3., /%&n$; in Germany, $2$; in Equations: r > g, 3/– 3*, ./.– ./+, .-$, .-/– .--, America, $/&– $/3, $//; pure value of, $%* .*/– .*-, .%/– .%-, 232, /-.– /-2, /*$– /*3, Favre, P., -..n23 -$2n3-; β = s / g, .., /&– //, $--– $*&, $+*, 33+, Federal Reserve, 2*2, /2+– //3, //* 3.&– 3.3; α = r × β, .., /3– //, $-+– $-%, $%%, 3$., Fertility. See Birth rates 3$-– 3$*; g = s / β, 3.&– 3.$; r − g, .-2– .--, 2.$, Financial assets, 3&%, -3*n2.; prices of, $*$– $*3, 2/$; b = μ × m × β, .+.; r = g, /-.; α = s and $+*– $%$, 2/3– 2/. y α > s, /-.– /-2 Financial crisis (3&&+), 3%-– 3%+, 2*3– 2*2, Equilibrium distribution, .-$– .-- /2%– //&, //+ Equipartition, .-3– .-., .-/ Financial globalization, $%.– $%2, .//, 2.& Erreygers, G., -.*n3% Financial intermediation, 3&/, 3$2, 3.., 2.&– 2.$, Estate devolution, rate of, .+%, -$*n$& 2/., /2$ Estate tax, ..*– ..%, .//, 2%*; returns as source of Financial legal structures, 2/$– 2/3 data, $+– $%; accumulation of wealth and, Financial markets, 2%, /+, 2*- .*2– .*/; progressive, /&3– /&/, /&* Financial professions, .&. Eu ro pe an Aeronautic, Defense, and Space Co. Fiscal 9 ows, .+$– .+3 (EADS), 22/ Fiscal pressure, 3&+ Eu ro pe an Central Bank. See ECB (Eu ro pe an Fiscal transactions tax, -/$n.+ Central Bank) Fisher, Irving, /&- Eu ro pe an Commission, //. Fitoussi, Jean- Paul, -&.n3/ Eu ro pe an Constitutional Treaty, -/&n.& Flat tax, 2%/, /&&– /&$ Eu ro pe an Parliament, //% Fleurbaey, Marc, -.$n3. Eu ro pe an wealth tax, /3*– /.& Flows: capital- labor split and, 3&.– 3&2; of annual Eu rope/Eu ro pe an Union: global production and, inheritances, .*%– .+3 /%– -$; as regional bloc, -$– --, -+– -%, /+/n33; Fogel, Robert, $/% demographic growth in, *+– *%, +$– +3; Forbes, Steve, 223, -32n$% economic growth of, +-– +*, %.– %/, %-– %+, %%, Forbes wealth rankings, 2.3– 2.2, 2.%– 22., 2/+, $*2, /%/n3&; inequalities in capital own ership /$+, -3/n3. in, 32.– .2/; income inequalities in, 32*– 3/&, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), 3//, .3$– .3.; wealth distribution in, .2.– .2/, /33– /32 ./&, -2.nn32,3/; inheritances and, 232– 23*; Foreign capital/assets, 2%– /&; convergence and, net assets of, 2-.– 2-2, -3*n/&; taxes in, -%– *$; in Britain and France, $$*– $$%, $2+, 2*/– 2*-, 2%&; social state in, 2**– 2*+, /%&n*; rise and fall of, $3&– $3., .-%– .*&; in -.&n$*; social model of, 2+$; directive on Germany, $2$– $23, /%-n3/; in the United foreign savings of, /33– /32; public debt and, States, $/$, $//– $/-; New World and, $//– $/*; //-– /-3; bud getary parliament for, //%– /-&, in Canada, $/*– $/+; national capital and, -/&n3+; mutualizing public debt in, -/&n.$. $%$– $%2; convergence and, /+*n.- See also Belle Époque Foundations, as private wealth/capital, $+3– $+., Eurozone, $&+, /22– /2/, //2– /-3; de' cits debate 2/$– 2/3, -3-nn.3,.. in, /-/– /-*, -/.n2* Fourquet, François, /+/n$% Exchange rates, -2– -*, /+/– /+-n3/ France: growth in, 2, +$– +3, %+, $*2; estate tax in, Executives: compensation of, ..$– ../, -.%n2*, $+– $%, ..*– ..%; data from, 3+– .&, /-– /*, -2&n2%; con' scatory tax on income of, -&2n+; national income and, -+– -%; /&/– /$3. See also Managers purchasing power and, ++– +%; employment by sector in, %$; monetary system of, $&2, /+%n3*, Fack, Gabrielle, -3-n.2 /%&n3%; per capita income in, $&-, $33, /%&n.$, Factorial distribution, 2&, /+.n. /%&– /%$n+,%; in9 ation in, $&*– $&+, $.., $2%, 

 France (continued) Global in e qual ity of wealth, /%– -%, 2.&– 2-*; /2/, /2-; capital in, $$-– $3*, $2+– $2%; foreign return on capital and, 2.&– 2.3; wealth capital/assets and, $$*– $$%, $2+, $%$– $%3, rankings and, 2.3– 2.-; “Global Wealth /%&n*, /%-n3%; public debt of, $32– $3-, $3*, Reports” and, 2.-– 2.%; divergence and, $3%, $.3– $.., /%$nn$.,$2, /%3n+; taxation in, 2.+– 2.%, 2-.– 2-2; heirs and entrepreneurs $3%, 3*/, .-/, .*&, 2%-, 2%+– /&/, /&*, -&/n$-, and, 2.%– 22.; moral hierarchy and, 22.– 22*; -.2n/, -./– -.-n$/, -./n$$; capitalism without university endowments and, 22*– 2/3; capitalists in, $./– $.%; public assets in, $.-– $.%, in9 ation and, 2/3– 2//; sovereign wealth funds $+2; savings in, $**– $*+; capital- labor split in, and, 2//– 2-&; China and, 2-&– 2-.; rich and 3&$, 3&2, 3&/, 3&-– 3&+, 3$-, 33/– 33*; poor countries and, 2-/– 2-*; transparency in e qual ity in, 3*$– 3+$, 3+2– 3%$; wealth and, /$+– /3$ distribution in, ..*– .2., .2-, .-2– .--; Globalization, ' rst and second periods of, 3+ inheritances in, .*%– .+3, .+/– .%-, .%%, Global tax on capital, /$/– /.%, /*3– /*.; as useful 2&3– 2&%, 2$+, 23&– 23$, 23*; mortality rate Utopia, /$/– /$+; banking information and, in, .+/– .++, -$-n%; voting rights in, 232, /$-, /3$– /32; transparency and, /$-, /$+– /3$; -33n/+; taxes as share of national income in, purpose of, /$+, /3&, /32– /3*; Eu ro pe an 2*/– 2*-, -3%n-; social state and, 2*+, 2%/, wealth tax and, /3*– /.&; historical perspective -.&n$-; wealth tax in, /.., -2.– -22n3-, on, /.&– /.2; regulation and, /.2– /.-; -2/n.+ petroleum rents and, /.*– /.+; immigration France Telecom, $.% and, /.+– /.%; Eurozone and, /-&– /-$; vs. French Revolution: data and, 3%– .&, /-; in9 ation corporate income taxes, -/&n.3 and, $&2; wealth distribution and, .2$– .23, “Global Wealth Reports,” 2.-– 2.% .-3– .-.; Civil Code and, .-2– .--; Godechot, Olivier, -&/n33 progressivity and, /.3 Gold, /%/n$2 Fried, Jesse, -$$n./ Golden rule of capital accumulation, /-.– /-/, Friedman, Milton, /2+– /2% -/$– -/3n2&, -/3n23; de' cit debates and, Furet, François, 33/, /*/– /*-, /+3n.2 /-/– /-* Goldin, Claudia, .&-, .$2– .$/, -&-n.-, -&+n$3, Gabaix, Xavier, -.%n2* -2&n/. Gadenne, Lucie, -..n2+ Goldsmith, Raymond, $%, $/%, /%*n.. Galichon, Alfred, -2$n2 Gold standard, $&*, /2*– /2+, /+%n3+ Gates, Bill, 22&– 22$, 222– 22/, -32nn$2,3&, Google, -/&n.. -3-n.3 Gordon, Robert, %2– %/, /+-n./ GDP, de' ned, 2. Gotman, Anne, -33n-3 Generational warfare, 33, 32- Gourinchas, Pierre- Olivier, /%*n.$, -2/n2$ Germany: national income and, -+– -%; in9 ation Government and security ser vice sector, %$ in, $&*– $&+, $23, $2%, /2/, /2-; capital in, Government bonds: as capital, $$2, $.&– $..; public $2&– $2-; foreign capital/assets and, $2$– $23, debt and, /22 $%3, /%-n3/; public debt in, -2*n$&, $23; Great Depression: faith in capitalism and, $.-– $.*; growth and, $*2; savings in, $**– $*+; public reduction in in e qual ity and, 3*/; managers and, wealth and, $+2; between the two wars, 3+/; in the United States, 3%.– 3%2, /&-– /&*; .32– .3/; inheritances in, 23/– 23-, 23*; policy and, 2*.; central banks in, /2+– /2% taxation and, 2*-, 2%+– /&&, /&2– /&/, /&* Great Recession, 2*3– 2*2, //.– //2 Gi! en, Robert, /-– /*, /+2n$* Greece, debt crisis in, /23, //2, -2%n3-, -/&n3% Gi) s, inheritance 9 ows and, .%3– .%., 23/– 23* Grenelle Accords, 3+% Gilded Age, .2+– ./&, /&- Growth, *3– $&%; per capita output, *3– *2; Gilet, M., /+3n.2, -&&n3* population, *3– */; law of cumulative, *2– **; Gini coe: cient, 32., 3--– 3-*, 3+-, -&.n33, demographic, **– +., /+*n2; equalization and, -3.n$3 +.– +/; economic, +-– +*, .*/, /++n$$; Global distribution of production, /%– -$; regional purchasing power and, +*– %&; diversi' cation blocs and, -$– -2; in e qual ity and, -2– -% of lifestyles and, %&– %.; end of, %.– %/; 

 implications of $ percent, %/– %-; in postwar from wages, 323; total, 3/2– 3//, 3-.– 3-/; period, %-– %%; double bell curve of global, transfers of, 3%*– 3%+; earned and unearned, %%– $&3; in9 ation and, $&3– $&.; monetary .**– .*%, .%&, /&*; replacement, -&3n%. See systems and, $&.– $&%; from $%*& to 3&$&, also Capital, income from; Labor, income $*.– $+.; modern, .&+; return on capital and, from; National income ./$, ./.– .-$, .-2– .--, 2.&– 2.$, /*$– /*3; Income and output: capital- labor split and, .%– 2.; wealth rankings and, 2.3– 2.-; social spending capital and wealth and, 2/– /&; capital/income and, 2+$– 2+3. See also Slow growth ratio and, /&– /3; laws of capitalism and, /3– //; Grusky, David B., -.%n2+ national accounting and, //– /%; global Guesnerie, Roger, -/2n/3 distribution of production and, /%– -$; regional blocs and, -$– -2; convergence and, -%– *$ Hacker, Jacob, -2&n/3 Income in e qual ity, $/, 323– 32.; compression of, Harrison, Anne, $+, .2., /+3n.- $3– $., 3*$– 3*/, 3+2– 3+-, 3%.– 3%2, 3%+; Harrod, Roy, 3.&– 3.$ global, -$– -%; inherited wealth and, 3.+– 323; Harvard University, 22*– 2/&, 2+/, -3-n.&, labor and capital and, 323– 32-, 3/2– 3//, -.3n3%, -.3n.3 3//– 3-&; order of magnitude of, 32-– 3/&; Hayek, Friedrich, -/2n/- class designations and, 3/&– 3/3; deciles/ Health and education ser vice sector, %&– %3, 2**, centiles in mea sur ing of, 3/3– 3//; total income 2+3, -3%n$2 and, 3/2– 3//, 3-.– 3-/; women and, 3/-; Health insurance, public, 2**, 2+-, -3%nn$3,$. synthetic indices and, 3--– 3-*; distribution Heim, Bradley T., -&*n23 tables and, 3-*, 3-%– 3*&; o: cial publications Heirs in wealth rankings, 2.%– 22. and, 3-*– 3-+. See also by country; In e qual ity Henry, James, 3+n/- of capital own ership; In e qual ity of labor Hicks, John, -2$n$3 income Higher education access, 2+/– 2+- Income sources, $*– $+ Historical sources, $&, $%– 3&, 3*– .& Income tax, 2%2, /3*; returns as source of data, $3, Ho! man, P., /%%n$2 $-– $+, 3+$– 3+2, 3%3, .3-, .3+– .3%; twentieth Hollande, François, -/&n.$ century evolution of, 3*/, 3%3, 2%+– /&3; Homer, S., -$.n$- exemptions and, 3+3; rise of progressive, .*2; Hoover, Herbert, 2*3– 2*. Great Depression and, 2*3; Obama House hold surveys, .3%– ..& administration and, 2*. Housing, as capital: in Britain and France, $$*, India: income in, -3– -2; growth in, +3, .3%, $$%– $3&, $33– $3.; in Germany, $2$, $2/; in -$$n.3; taxes in, 2%$, 2%3 America, $/$, $//; rental value of, 3&%, 3$.; “Indicial” tax system, /&$ middle class and, 3-& Individual distribution, /+.n. Human capital, 3$– 33, 23, 2-, /+-– /+*n./; Industrial Revolution, ., $&, /%– -$; world growth convergence and, *&– *$; slavery and, $-3– $-., since, *.– *2, *%, +*– +% /%.n$+; capital- labor split, 33.– 332, 3.2; In e qual ity: subjective dimension of, 3; po liti cal transmission of, 23&; accounting and, -&+n. nature of, 3&; natural, +/. See also Conver- Hypermeritocratic society, 3-2– 3-/ gence; Divergence; Global in e qual ity of Hyperpatrimonial society, 3-2 wealth; Income in e qual ity In e qual ity, concentration and, 3.*– 3*&; work vs. Ibiscus (Tolstoy), 22-– 22* inheritance and, 3.+– 323; labor vs. capital, Identity politics, /.% 323– 32-, 3/2, 3//– 3-&; orders of magnitude IMF (International Monetary Fund), 33&, 2-/, of, 32-– 3/&; class designations and, 3/&– 3/3; /$%, /.2, //.– //2, -2-n2$ deciles/centiles in mea sur ing of, 3/3– 3//; total Immigration, *+, +3, +.– +2; redistribution income and, 3/2, 3-.– 3-/; patrimonial middle through, /.+– /.%, -2-n2- class and, 3-&– 3-3; justi' cation of, 3-2; Incentive justi' cation, /32, /3-– /3* synthetic indices and, 3--– 3-*; distribution Income: per capita, $&-, $33, /%&n.$, /%&n.$, tables and, 3-*, 3-%– 3*&; o: cial publications /%&– /%$n+,%; disposable, $+&– $+3; mixed, 3&2; and, 3-*– 3-% 

 In e qual ity, evolution of, 3*$– .&.; twentieth century Inheritance, dynamics of, .**– 23%; 9 ows and, French reduction of, 3*$– 3*2; chaotic po liti cal .*%– .+3; three forces in, .+.– .+/; life history and, 3*2– 3*-; rentiers to managers and, expectancy and, .+/– .%&; age- wealth pro' le 3*-– 3*+; top decile and, 3*+– 3+$; income tax and, .%&– .%-; impact of war on, .%-– .%+; in returns and, 3+$– 3+2; interwar years and, the twenty- ' rst century, .%+– 2&$, 2$+– 23$, 3+2– 3+-; clash of temporalities and, 3+-– 3%&; -$&nn.3,.2; stock of inherited wealth and, increases in post $%+&s France of, 3%&– 3%$; in 2&$– 2&2; Vautrin’s lecture and, 2&2– 2&-; the United States, 3%$– .&.; ' nancial crisis and, Rastignac’s dilemma and, 2&*– 2&%; rentiers 3%*– 3%+; supersalaries and, 3%+– .&&; upper and managers and, 2$&– 2$$, 2$+– 232; centile and, .&&– .&. patrimonial society and, 2$$– 2$2, In e qual ity, structures of, $%, **, +., 3.2, 3.*– 3.+; -$%nn.-– .*; as condition of civilization, patrimonial society and, 3-&– 3-3, 3-2, 2$/– 2$-; meritocratic model and, 2$-– 23&; .2-– .2*, .*., 2$$– 2$2; hypermeritocratic global and Eu ro pe an, 232– 23% society and, 3-2– 3-/; social tables and, 3*&; Inheritance society, ./$– ./. taxation and, .*.– .*2, 2%/; change in global, Inherited wealth, $+– $%, 3-, 3%; demographics and, .**– .*+; “natural,” 2$$ +.– +2; income from, 3.+– 323, 32-; sharp In e qual ity of capital own ership, 3.+– 322, 3/2, decrease in, 3-3; renewed importance of, 3%&; .&&– .&., ..-– .*-; return of capital and return on capital and, ./$– ./.; taxation and, growth rate and, 3-2, ./.– .-$; decline of 2%., 2%*, /&3– /&., /&+, /3/– /3-, -.*– -.+n.3 hyperconcentrated wealth and, ..-– ..*, ./&, Intellectual property, 2% .-+– .*3, -$$– -$3n.; estate taxes and Interdecile ratios, 3-*– 3-%, -&.nn3.,32 mea sure ment of, ..*– ..%; Belle Époque Interest, e! orts to prohibit, /.&– /.$ Eu rope and, ..%, .23– .2/, .-%– .*&, .*3; Interest rates, /3– /., 3$&, /+2n$/, /+%n$& wealth distribution and, ..%– .2.; patrimonial Intergenerational mobility, 23&, 2+2, -.$nn3-,3* society and, .2-– .2*; in the United States, Intergenerational warfare, 32- .2*– ./&; mechanism of wealth divergence International Comparison Program (ICP), -2 and, ./&– ./.; time preference and, ./+– .-$; International divergence, 2-.– 2-/ equilibrium distribution and, .-$– .-2; Civil International Monetary Fund. See IMF Code and French Revolution and, .-3– .--; (International Monetary Fund) Pareto law and, .--– .-+; failure to return to Internet bubble, $*3 past levels of, .-+– .*/; in the twenty- ' rst Investments: in e qual ity of, 2.&– 2.3, 2/3– 2//; century, .*/– .*-. See also Global in e qual ity of wealth rankings and, 2.3– 22.; university wealth; Inheritance, dynamics of endowments and, 22*– 2/3; alternative, In e qual ity of labor income, 3.+– 322, 3/2, 3-., 22%– 2/&, 2/2, 2/-; petroleum and, 2//– 2-&, .&&, .&2– ../; in twenty- ' rst century, 2-3; sovereign wealth funds and, 2//– 2-& 3**– 3*+; top decile and, 3*%– 3+$, 3%&– 3%., Iraq, /.*– /.+ 3%/– 3%%; in the United States, 3%$– 3%-, Italy: growth rate of, $*2, 22/; savings in, $**– $*+, .$2– .$/; supersalaries and, 3%+– .&&; wages $+/; public wealth in, $+2– $+/; wealth tax in, and, .&2– .&*, .$&– .$.; marginal productivity /3+– /3%, /.. and, .&2– .&+, .$$, .$2– .$/, ..&– ...; role of Ivanishvili, Bidzina, -3/n33 institutions and, .&*– .$&; supermanagers and, .$/– .3$, ...– ../; Eu rope and, .3$– .3/, -&%n$-; James, Henry, ' ction of, $/3, 2$2 emerging economies and, .3-– ..& Jantt, Markus, -.$n3+ In' nite accumulation principle, *– $$, 33+ Japan: national income and, -.– -2, --, -+; growth “In' nite horizon” model, .-&, -$.nn$+– $% in, +-, %., %/, $*2– $*-, /++n$&; savings in, In9 ation: and growth, $&3– $&.; French Revolution $**– $*+; foreign assets in, $%3– $%2; capital/ and, $&2; twentieth century, $&-– $&%, $23, income ratio in, $%/; in e qual ity in, .33, 22/; $2%; redistribution via, $..– $.2; assets and, taxation and, 2%&, 2%+, -.*n.$ 3$&– 3$3, /%%n$.; return on capital and, Japa nese bubble, $*3, /%*n.& 2/3– 2//; public debt and, /2$, /22– /2*, Jeanne, Olivier, -2/n2$ -2+nn$.,$* Je! erson, # omas, $/+, .-. 

 Jobs, Steve, 22&– 22$ Laval, Pierre, 3+/ Joint stock companies, 3&. Lavoisier, Antoine, /- Jones, Alice Hanson, $/%, .2* Law of cumulative growth, *2– ** Jones, Charles I., /+-n./ Law of cumulative returns, */, ** Judet de la Combe, P., -22n.& Laws of capitalism: ' rst fundamental, /3– //; Judicial conservatism, /--, -/.n2% second fundamental, //, $--– $*& Justi' cation of in e qual ity, 3-2 Lebeaupin, A., -&/n3& Le Bras, Hervé, /+*n/, /+%n3& Kaldor, Nicholas, 3.$, -&$n.-, -.2n$, Lefranc, Arnaud, -.$n3- -.+n./ Le mouvement du pro\" t en France au #$e siècle Kaplan, Steven N., -&*n2$ (Bouvier, Furet, and Gillet), /*/, /*-, /+3n.2, Katz, Lawrence, .&-, .$2– .$/, -&+n$3, -&&n3* -2&n/. Leroy- Beaulieu, Paul, .&, 2$*, /&.– /&2, /&-, Kennickell, Arthur, .2* -.-nn3&,3$,33, -.*n3+ Kesztenbaum, Lionel, -$3n2 Le Van, L., /%$n$+ Keynes, John Maynard, $./, 33&, 3.$– 3.3, -&&n33, Levasseur, Pierre Emile, -$*n$& -/3n22 Liberalization, economic, %+– %%, $.+– $.%, 2%3 King, Gregory, /-, $+&, /%&n$, -.*n3+ “Life- cycle theory of wealth,” .+2, .%$– .%3, 23+ King, Willford, .2+, /&-, -$.n$. Life expectancy, inheritance and, .+/– .%&, 2&& Knowledge and skill di! usion, 3$, *$, .$. Limited liability corporations, 3&. Kopczuk, Wojciech, -&*n.+ Linder, Peter, .2. Kotliko! - Summers thesis, 23+, -33n-. Lindert, P., -&.n3-, -3+n. Krueger, Alan, .$., -&+n$& Liquidity, 2*3, /2+, //$ Krugman, Paul, 3%2 Lonmin, Inc., .%– 2&, /*& Kubrick, Stanley, -3&n2& L’Oréal, 22&, -32n$/ Kuczynski, Jürgen, 3$%– 33&, /%%n3& Lower class, 3/&– 3/$ Kumhof, Michael, -&-n.3 Low growth. See Slow growth Kuwait, /.* Lyndon, Barry, -3&n2& Kuznets, Simon, $$– $*, 3&, 3., /+&nn%,$$,$2, /+$nn$/– $-, /+3n.-, -&.n2 Maastricht Treaty, //-, /-/– /-- Kuznets Curve, $.– $/, 3.*, 3*2, ..-, /+&n$2 Maddison, Angus, 3+, /%, --, *2, /+/nn3&– 3$, /+-n.&, /++n$& Labor. See Capital- labor split Mad Men (TV series), $/- Labor, income from, $+, 3$, /.. See also In e qual ity Mahfouz, Naguib, $&% of labor income Malinvaud, Edmond, -/$n2& Labrousse, Ernest, /+3n.2, -&&n3+ Mallet, B., -$3n* Lagardère, Arnaud, 22/ Malthus, # omas, 2– /, /*%n$, /+&n+ Laissez faire doctrine, $.- Managers: super, 3-/, 3%$, .&3– .&., .$/– .3$, Lamont, Michèle, 2$*– 2$+, -3$n2% ...– ../; society of, 3*-– 3*%, .*.; Great Lampman, Robert, $+, /+3n3* Depression and, 3+/; compensation of, ..$– ../, Land: price of, /– -, $/$; rate of return on, /.– /2, /&/– /$3, -.%n2*; basic arithmetic of, 2$&– 2$$ -$.n$-; accounting and, /-; values, capital/ Mans\" eld Park (Austen), $$/, $3&– $3$, 3&* income ratio and, $%-– $%+, /%-n.. Marginal productivity: of capital, -%; theory of, Land, as capital, 2*, -22n.$; in Britain and .&2– .&+, .$$, .$2– .$/, ..&– ../; top marginal France, $$2, $$*– $$%, $33– $3.; in Germany, $2$; tax rates and, /&%– /$3 in America, $/&– $/$, $//; rural vs. urban, Margo, R., -&-n.- $%*– $%+ Marikana tragedy, .%– 2&, -+, /+.n3 Landais, Camille, -&/n3&, -3-n.2, -.2n2 Market(s): imperfections of, 3*m .$3, 23.– 232; Landier, Augustin, -.%n2* ' nancial, 2%, /+, 2*-; perfect capital, 3$2; Landowners, Ricardo and, /– - collective decisions and, /-%, -/2n/- Latin America, -3– -., $%/, 2%$ Market vs. book value, $+%– $%$ 

 Marx, Karl, /, *– $$, 3*, /.$, /-/, /*%n2, /+&nn-,*+; “National Bloc” majority, 2%%– /&& falling rate of pro' t and, /3, 33*– 3.&, -&&n..; National Health Ser vice (Britain), -3%n$3 public debt and, $.$– $.3 National income: concept of, 2.– 2/, /+.n*; Marxists, /3, 3$%, /*-, -//n3 growth of, /&– /$, $*.– $+., /%/n3&; per capita, Masson, André, -..n2. /., /+2n$.; domestic product and, -+; over the McGovern, George, -.+n.. long term, $-2; top decile and, .33– .3. Meade, James, /+3n.-, -.+n./ Nationalization, $.+– $.%, .*& Meer, Jonathan, -.3n.$ National savings, $2%– $/&, $/.; accumulation of Meritocratic model: challenge to, 3$, 3-– 3*; wealth and, $--– $*&, $*.; negative, $+/– $+-, extremism and, ..2, 2$-– 2$+, -3&n2-; belief /%/n$+; China and, 2-3. See also Savings, and hope in, 2$%– 233; education and, private 2+/– 2+* National solidarity tax, .*&, -$/n./ Middle class, 3/&– 3/$; patrimonial, 3-&– 3-3, National War Labor Board, 3%+, .&+ .2-– .2*, ./& National wealth/capital, $%, 2+– 2%, $$+– $$%, $3., Middle East, /.*– /.+ $%*, /+.n+; slavery and, $-3– $-.; in Eu rope vs. Milanovic, Branko, /+/n3&, -&.n3- United States, $-2– $--; net foreign assets and, Military expenditures, -3+n3 $%$– $%2; desirable level of, /-3– /-/ Mill, John Stuart, -.+n./ Natural inequalities, +/ Minimum wage, .&+– .$., -&+n/, -&+nn/,-,*,+,%,$& Natural resources: as capital, 2*; private Mittal, Lakshmi, 22/, -3/n3$ appropriation of, 22-; rent on, 2/%, /.*– /.%, Mixed economies, $.-– $.*, $2&, 2+. -3*n22; climate change and, /-*– /-% Mixed incomes, 3&2 Naudet, J., -3$n2% Mobility: social, +2– +/, 2+2– 2+*; wage, 3%%– .&& Net asset positions, 2%– /&, $%$, $%2; of rich Modigliani, Franco, 3.3, 32/, .+2, .%$, .%-, 2&&, countries, 2-/– 2-*, /2$ 23+, -&$n.-, -3$n//, -33n-. Net domestic product, 2. Monetary History of the: United States (Friedman Net foreign capital/assets, 2%– /&; in America, and Schwartz), /2+– /2% $//– $/-; rich countries and, $%$– $%2, 2-- Monetary policy, /2+– //. Netherlands, -23n$/ Monetary systems: stability of, $&.– $&/; growth New Deal, views of, /2% and, $&.– $&%; in France, $&2, /+%n3*, /%&n3%; New World. See America in Britain, $&/, /+%– /%&nn3+,3%; in Eurozone, Nixon, Richard, -.+n.. $&+; con' dence in US dollar and, $/-; in Noah, Timothy, -2&n/3 Eurozone, /22– /2/, //2– /-3, /-/– /-*, -/.n2* Nonwage workers, 3&.– 3&2 Money: meaning of, in literature, $&/– $&-, $&%; Nordhaus, William, /-+, -/2n/3 twentieth century in9 ation and, $&-– $&%; gold North Africa, -3– -., 2%$ standard and, $&*, /2*– /2+, /+%n3+ North America, /%– -$, -2; growth in, +$, +-, %., Monopoly, 3$2, 222 %/, %*, /++n$&; capital in, $2&. See also Canada; Monopsony, 3$2, .$3, -&+n$& United States Moral hierarchy of wealth, 22.– 22* North Iowa Community College, 22* Mortality, di! erential, -$*n$/ Norwegian sovereign wealth fund, 2//, Mortality multiplier, -$3n* -3-– -3*n.% Mortality rate, .+.– .++ Mullainathan, Sendhil, -$$n./ Obama, Barack, .$&, .$., 2*. Multinational corporations, $/- Obiang, Teodorin, 22- Murnane, R., -.3n.& Occupy Wall Street movement, 3/2 Murphy, Richard, -3+n/- OECD (Or ga ni za tion for Economic Cooperation Mutualization of Eu ro pe an debt, -/&n.$ and Development) reports and statistics, 33&, 3-*– 3-+ Napoleon I, $-3, 2$*, -3&n2-; Civil Code of, Ohlsson, Henry, -$2n3*, -2/n.* .-3– .--, -$.n3$, -$2n3. Oil prices, -– *, 2/%. See also Petroleum National accounting, //– /%, %3, 3.&, 3-% Oligarchic divergence, 2-.– 2-/, /$2, -3*n2% 

 Output. See Income and output; Per capita output Primogeniture, .-3– .-., .-/ growth Prince ton University, 22*– 22% Private wealth/capital, /&– /$, /*, $*&– $+., /2$; Paine, # omas, $%*, -22n.2 abolition of, $&; slavery and, 2-, $/+– $-., Palan, Ronen, -3+n/- /%.n$-; de' ned, 2-– 2%, $3.; and public Pamuk, Orhan, $&% wealth/capital, $3.– $.$, $23– $2/, $/.– $/2, Pareto, Vilfredo, theory of, .-2– .-+, -$&n$%, $+.– $+*, /-%; in Eu rope vs. United States, -$2nn3/,.&,.3 $-2– $--; as disposable income, $+&– $+3; Parsons, Talcott, .+2, -3$n// foundations and, $+3– $+., 2/$– 2/3; world Partnerships, 3&. distribution of, 2-$– 2-3; public debt and, Pasinetti, Luigi, 3.$ /2$– /23, /-*, -2-– -2*n3. See also Capital, Passeron, Jean- Claude, 2+- metamorphoses of; In e qual ity of capital Patrimonial capitalism, $*., 3.*, 2*. own ership; Inheritance, dynamics of Patrimonial society: middle class and, 3-&– 3-3, Privatization, $.-, $.+– $.%, 2*-; capital/income .2-– .2*, .*.; metamorphoses of, ..%– .2.; ratio and, $*., $+.– $+* classic, 2$$– 2$2 Production: wages and pro' ts and, .%; global “Pay for luck,” ../ distribution of, /%– -$; regional blocs and, PAYGO systems, 2+*– 2%&, -..n2/, -2+n$., -$– -2; global per capita output of, -3 -/3n23, -/.n/& Production function, 3$-– 33& Pension funds, .%$– .%3, 2*+, 2+*– 2%&, -3*n2*, Productive capital, /$– /3 -.&n$/ Productivity: knowledge and skill di! usion in, 3$; Per capita income, $&-, $33, /%&n.$, /%&– /%$n+,% slavery and, $-.. See also Marginal productivity Per capita output growth, *3– *2, %*, /$&; stages of, Productivity growth: purchasing power and, +-, ++, +-– +*; purchasing power and, +*– %&; %&; structural growth and, 33+; in twenty- ' rst diversi' cation of lifestyles and, %&– %.; end of, century, .*/; in the United States, /$$ %.– %/; social change implications of $ percent, Pro' ts: nineteenth century, +; vs. wages, .%– 2&; %/– %-; in postwar period, %-– %%; bell curve of rate of, /3, 33*– 3.&, /+2n$/ global, %%– $&3; in9 ation and, $&3– $&.; Progressive taxation: on capital, $, .//, .*&, 2*$, monetary systems and, $&.– $&% 2*., /.3, -$/n./; on income, $3, 2%.; rise of, $/., Père Goriot (Balzac), $&2, $&-, $$.– $$/, 3.+– 32&, .*2, 2%+, /.3– /..; vs. regressive taxation, 3//, .2., 2$3, 22& .//, .*2, .%/– .%*; con' scatory tax rates and, Perfect capital market, 3$2 3*., /&/– /&+, /$3; justi' cation for, 222, 2%*, Persuasion (Austen), .-3 /&/, /32– /3*, -2&n/$; on inheritance, 2%., Petroleum: investments and, 2//– 2-&, 2-3, 2%*, /&3– /&., /&/, /&+, /3*, -.*– -.+n.3; vs. -3*n2%; rents, redistribution of, /.*– /.+ proportional (“9 at tax”), 2%/, /&&– /&$; Petty, William, /-, /%&n$ structure of in e qual ity and, 2%/– 2%-; on Phelps, Edmund, -/$n2& estates, /&3– /&/, /&*; public debt and, Philip, André, -$/n./ /2.– /22; Cyprus crisis and, ///– //-. See also Pierson, Paul, -2&n/3 Global tax on capital P%&/P$& ratio, 3-*– 3-% Progressive taxation, rethinking, 2%.– /$2; Po liti cal economy, .– /, /*2 question of, 2%.– 2%*; twentieth century Poll tax, 2%/, -.2n. evolution of, 2%+– /&3; in the # ird Republic, Pop u lar Front, 3+-, -2%n3/ /&3– /&/; con' scatory tax rates and, /&/– /&+, Population. See Demographic growth; Demo- /$3; executive salary explosion and, /&+– /$3; graphic transition top marginal rates and, /&+– /$2, -./n$2. Postel- Vinay, Gilles, $+, /+3n3+, /%%n$2, -$3nn2,/,% See also Global tax on capital Power laws, .-*– .-+ Proletariat, misery of, *– + Prices: in9 ation and, $&3– $&.; monetary stability Property, 2*, 2%, *&, /-% and, $&.– $&2; e! ects of vs. volume e! ects, Property rights: varying views of, *&, 2+., /./– /.-; $*-– $** division of, $3.; French estate tax and, ..+, .*2; Price system, /– * revolutions and, 2+$ 

 Property taxes, /&$, /$*, /3&, /3%, /.3– /... See also 3$/– 3$*, 33., 33*– 3.&; capital’s comeback and, Estate tax 3.3– 3..; growth rate and, 3.3– 3.., ./$, Prost, Antoine, /%$n$+ ./.– .-$, .-2– .--, 2.$, /*$– /*3; time Protectionism, /$/– /$-, /3., /.2 preference and stability of, 3/+– .-$; Proudhon, Pierre- Joseph, /+&n* inheritance and, .**– .*+; in9 ation and, Public debt, $$2, $$+, /2&– /*&; World War I and, 2/3– 2//; pensions and, 2++– 2+% $&-– $&*; public wealth and, $3.– $3*, $3*– $3%, Rate of return on land, /.– /2 $23, $/.; reinforcement of private capital and, Rauh, Joshua, -&*n2$ $3%– $.$; pro' t from, $.$– $.2; nineteenth vs. Rawls, John, 2+&, -.&n3$, -.$n33, -/3n2/ twentieth century, $.3– $..; Ricardian Reagan, Ronald, 23, %+, .&% equivalence and, $.2– $./; reducing, /2$– /22; Real estate: urban, -, $%*– $%+; as capital/assets, 2+, default on, /23– /2.; in9 ation and, /22– /2*; //, $33, $-2, $*%, 3$&, /%+n$$; return on, /.– /2, central banks and, /2*– //.; Cyprus crisis and, -3-n3+; pricing of, /*– /+, $22– $2/, $2%– $/&, //.– //-; euro and Eurozone and, //-– /-3, $*$– $*., $*-, $+*– $++, $%$; rental value of, 3&%; -/&n.3; government and capital accumulation own ership of by centile, 3-&; size e! ects and, and, /-3– /-/; de' cits debate and, /-/– /-*, 2/2; taxes, /&$, /$* -/.n2*; climate change and, /-*– /-%; Recession (3&&+– 3&&%), 2*3– 2*2, //.– //2 transparency and, /-%– /*&; interest rate on, “Reconstruction capitalism,” .%* /%*– /%+n$, /%+n*; mutualizing Eu ro pe an, Redemption fund proposal, /22, //%, -2*n%, -/&n.$; slow growth and, -/.n/& -2%n3* Public sector, or ga ni za tion of, 2+3– 2+. Redistribution: in9 ation and, $..– $.2, /22– /2*; Public wealth/capital: de' ned, 2-– 2%, $3.; social state and, 2*%– 2+$; of petroleum rents, privatization and, 2-– 2%, $3., $+.– $+*; public /.*– /.+; through immigration, /.+– /.%; debt and, $3.– $./, $23, $/., /2$– /22; ' nancial central banks and, /2*– //.; United States and, and non' nancial, $32; historical perspective -.+n.. on, $3-– $3%; assets and, $./– $.%, $2., /2$– /23; Regional blocs, -$– -2 desirable level of, /-3– /-/ Regressive taxation, 3//, .//, .*2, 2%/– 2%* Purchasing power: parity in, -2– -*, Regulation: transparency and, /$%; global tax on /+-nn3-,3*,3+; increase in, +-– %&; inheritance capital and, /.2– /.-; of central banks, /2+, and, 2$/– 2$- //3– //., //*– //+ Renault, Louis, $.* Qatar, /.* Renault Company, $.*, $.% Qian, Nancy, $*, -.2n/&, -2-n2. Rent control, $2%, $/. Quesnay, François, -&.n3- Rentiers: society of, 3-2, 3*-– 3*+, 3%., .*&, .*3– .*.; fall of, 3*2, .-%; basic arithmetic of, Rajan, Raghuram G., -&-n.3, -&+n$3, -.%n2+, 2$&– 2$$; petits, 2$+– 23$; as enemy of -2&n/. democracy, 233– 232 Rancière, Jacques, -//n/% Rent(s): land, /– -, .%, /.– /2, /-; capital and, $$., Rancière, Romain, -&-n.3 $$/– $$-; meaning of, 233– 232; on natural Rastignac’s dilemma, 3.+– 323, .*%, 2&*– 2&%, resources, 2/%, /.*– /.%, -3*n22 2$3, 2%* Rent- seeking, $$/– $$- Rate of interest, /3– /., 3$&, /+2n$/, /%+n$& Replacement incomes, 2**– 2*%, -&3n% Rate of pro' t, /3, 33*– 3.&, /+2n$2 Residence and taxation, /-3 Rate of return on capital: in e qual ity and, $, 3., Residential capital, 2+, /$– /3 3/– 3*, +2; ' rst fundamental law of capitalism Retail ser vice sector, %$ and, /3– //; average long- run, /.; determina- Retained earnings, $*-– $*+ tion of, $%%– 3$3; pure, 3&$, 3&/– 3&-, 3&+– 3&%, Retirement: pension funds and, .%$– .%3, 2*+, ./.– .//; historical perspective on, 3&-– 3&+; in -3*n2*; future of, 2+*– 2%&, -..n2* twenty- ' rst century, 3&+– 3&%, .*/; uses of Retirement, life- cycle theory and, .+2, .%$– .%3 capital and, 3$3– 3$.; marginal productivity of Return on capital. See Rate of return on capital; capital and, 3$.– 3$/; too much capital and, Rate of return on land 

 Revell, J., /%$n$% Sciences Po, 2+-– 2+*, -.3n.*, -..n2& Rey, Hélène, /%*n.$ Séaillès, M. J., -$3n* “Rhenish capitalism,” $2&– $2- Seligman, Edwin, -./n$. Ricardo, David, /– -, %, /*%n$, /+&n+, /%$n$/; Sen, Amartya, 2+&, -&.n3/ Ricardian equivalence and, $.2– $./ Sense and Sensibility (Austen), $$., .-3, 2$.– 2$2 Rights- based approach, 2*%– 2+$ Ser vice sector, ++, %&– %. Rignano, Eugenio, -.*n3% Shareholder model, $2/– $2- “Rising human capital hypothesis,” 3$– 33 Shares of Upper Income Groups in Income and Risk, $$/– $$-, 2.$ Saving (Kuznets), $$– $. Ritschl, Albrecht, -2*n$& Shocks: in e qual ity and, +, $.– $/, 3/, 3*$– 3*-, Robinson, James A., -32n3&, -.%nn2/,2+ 3%.– 3%2, .3.; growth and, $&*, $&%; capital Robinson, Joan, 3.$ and, $$*, $3$, $.%, $2$, $2-– $/&, $/3– $/., 3+2; Rodrik, Dani, -/$n./ capital/income ratio and, $-2, $-*, $-+, $*&, Roemer, John, -.$n3. $%$, 3&-, .-+– .-%; short- term, 322– 32/, .$$; Roine, Jesper, $+, .22, -$2n3*, -3+n/+ concentration of wealth and, .2-, .2%, ./&, Romer, Paul M., /+-n./ ./-; family fortunes and, .-3, .-2, .-%; Roo se velt, Franklin D., $/., 3+-, 2*3– 2*., inheritance 9 ows and, .+&– .+$, .%-– .%+ /&-– /&* Shorrocks, Anthony, -3.n+ Rosanvallon, Pierre, /++n+, -$2n32, -./n$. Short- termism, 3$2 Rosen, Harvey S., -.3n.$ Siegfried, André, -$/n./ Rosenthal, Jean- Laurent, $+, /%%n$2, -$3nn2,/, Simiand, François, /+3n.2, -&&n3+ -2-n22 Size e! ects of assets, 2/.– 2/2 Roy, René, /%$n$% Skills: and knowledge di! usion, 3$, *$, .$.; supply Rus sia, $+-– $+*, //2 and demand of, .&/– .&+; in e qual ity and, Rus sia- Ukraine bloc, -3– -., /+/n33 2$%– 23& Slavery, capital and, 2-, $/+– $-., /%.n$- Saez, Emmanuel, $*, /$$, /+$nn33,3., -&-nn..,.-, Slim, Carlos, 222– 22/, -32nn$2,3& -&*nn.+,.%, -$.n.3, -.2n2, -.+n.+, -23n$%, Slow growth: in e qual ity and, 3/– 3*, 23, +2, $--, -2.n3$ ./$– ./+; return to, *3– *2, +2, %.– %/, 3.3– 3..; Samuelson, Paul, $.*, 3$+, 3.$– 3.3 beyond bubbles, $*.– $+.; inheritance and, .*+, Sandström, Susanna, -3.n+ 2&&, 2$$; public debt and, -/.n/& Sartre, Jean- Paul, -//n3 Smith, Adam, %, /*%nn$,3, -/2n/- Saudi Arabia, /.+ Social insurance contributions, 2%2– 2%/, 2%-, Saudi Arabia sovereign wealth fund, 2/*– 2/+ -2$n$& Savings, private: rate of, 3-, $*2– $*/, $**, $+-; Socialism, capital and, /.$ components of, $*-– $*+; durable goods and, Socialist movements, + $*%– $+&; middle class and, 3-&; concentration Social justice: democracy and, 3-, 232, /*$; of wealth and, ./$– ./., .**– .*+, -$*n$+; meaning of, .$, 2+&; in e qual ity and, 32$, 3+*, retirement and, .+2, .%$– .%3; in twenty- ' rst .$&, ./&, 2$*, /.* century, 2&&– 2&$. See also National savings Social mobility: growth and, +2– +/; education Say, Jean- Baptiste, %, /*%n3 and, 2+2– 2+* Scandinavian countries: income in e qual ity in, Social norms, executive compensation and, ..3– ../ 32-– 3/&, 3/., 3//– 3/-; Gini coe: cient and, 3-- Social own ership, $2/– $2- Scarcity principle, /– *, %, 3* Social scientists, /*2– /*/ Scheve, Kenneth, -.*n3- Social spending, 2**– 2*%, 2+$– 2+., -3%n$2; Schinke, Christoph, -33n/% education and, 2+2– 2+*; retirement and, Schlozman, K., -2&n/3 2+*– 2%& Schmidt, Helmut, -/3n2. Social state, 2*$– 2%3, -3%n%; crisis of 3&&+ and, Schueller, Eugène, 22& 2*3– 2*2; growth of, 2*2– 2*%; modern Schumpeter, Joseph, $.* redistribution and, 2*%– 2+$; modernizing of, Schwartz, Anna, /2+– /2% 2+$– 2+.; education and, 2+2– 2+*; retirement 

 Social state (continued) Taxation, $3, 2%.– 2%/; as source of data, $3, $-– $+; and, 2+*– 2%&; in poor and emerging on capital, 3&+, .//– ./-, .*&, .*., 2-2, 2*$, countries, 2%&– 2%3; US view of, /2% 2%2, /3/– /3*, -/3n2.; progressive vs. Social tables, 3-%– 3*&, -&.n3- regressive, 3//, .//, .*2, 2%/– 2%*; on wealth, Sole proprietorships, 3&. 232, /32, /3*– /.&; con' scatory tax rates and, Solidarity tax on wealth. See France, wealth tax in 2*., /&/– /&+, /$3; relative to national income, Solow, Robert, $$, $/, 3.$– 3.3, /+&n$&, /+-n./ 2*2– 2*-; transparency and, 2+$; on Soltow, Lee, .2* inheritances, 2%., /&3– /&., /&/, /&+, /3*, Song, Jae, -&*n.+ -.*– -.+n.3; on consumption (“indirect”), Sotura, Aurélie, -3+n/$ 2%2, 2%-, -/$n.*; social insurance contribu- South Africa, $-$, .3-– .3+, ..&; Marikana tragedy tions and, 2%2– 2%/, 2%-, -2$n$&; progressive in, .%– 2&, -+, /+.n3 vs. proportional (“9 at tax”), 2%/, /&&– /&$; South America. See Latin America categorical or schedular, /&$; on property, /&$, South Asia, 2%$ /$*, /3&, /3%, /.3– /..; on earned and unearned Sovereign wealth funds, 2//– 2-& income, /&*– /&+; top marginal rates of, Soviet Union, /.$– /.3, /-/, -.*n3*, -/3n22 /&+– /$2; de' ning norms through, /3&; public Spain, wealth tax in, /.., -2/n.% debt and, /2$– /23; on Eurozone corporate Spanish bubble, $%., /%-n3*, /%*n.& pro' ts, /-&– /-$; residence and, /-3. See also “Speci' c investments” argument, .$3 Competition, ' scal; Estate tax; Global tax on Stag9 ation, $.2, $.+, //* capital; Income tax; Progressive taxation Stakeholder model, $2/– $2-, .$3 Tax havens, 2-/– 2--, /3$– /32, -2$n% Stamp, J. C., -$3n* Tea Party, 2*2 Stantcheva, Stefanie, /$$ Technological progress, durable, $& Stasavage, David, -.*n3- Technology: return on capital and, 3$3– 3$., 3$-; State, economic role of, $.-, $+&– $+$, 2*2, 2*- capital- labor split and, 33.– 332; caprices of, State, social. See Social state 3.2; educational system and, .&2– .&* State interventionism, %+– %%, $.-– $.*, 2*.– 2*2 Temin, Peter, -2$n. Stern, Nicholas, /-*– /-%, -/2n/3 # atcher, Margaret, 23, %+ Sterner, # omas, -/2n/3 # iers, Adolphe, 2$*, -3&n2- Stiglitz, Joseph E., -&.n3/, -&/n3/ # ird Republic, ..%, .22, /&$– /&/ Stock: capital as, /&; in postwar period, $2%– $/&, $/. Time preference theory, 3/+– .-$, -$.n$* Stock market: capitalization of corporations and, Titanic (' lm), $/3 2%, /2; Great Depression and, $/&; prices, Tobin’s Q, $%&– $%$ $*$– $*., $+*– $%$ Tocqueville, Alexis de, $/3, -3&n2- Stone, Richard, /+/n$% Todd, Emmanuel, /+*n/, /+%n3& Structural growth, 33+ Tolstoy, Alexei, Ibiscus, 22-– 22* Structures of in e qual ity. See In e qual ity, structures of Top marginal tax rates, /&+– /$2, -./n$2 Strutt, H. C., -$3n* Total income, 3/2– 3//, 3-.– 3-/ Sub- Saharan Africa, -3– -2, +-, 2%$, /++n% Touzery, Mirelle, -.-n$* Substitution, elasticity of, 3$-– 332, -&&n.3 Training: investment in, 33, *$; system, state of, Superentrepreneurs, -&*n2. .&/– .&*; in e qual ity and, 2$%– 23& Supermanagers, 3-/, 3%$, .&3– .&.; in e qual ity of Transfers in kind, $+3, 2** labor income and, .$/– .3$, ...– ../; merito- Transfers payments, 3%*– 3%+, 2**– 2*% cratic beliefs and, 2$* Transparency: taxation and, $3, 2+$, /&2; lack of, Supersalaries, rise of, 3%+– .&& .3+– .3%, 2.*, 2*., 2+/, 2+*; progressive Supply and demand: extreme changes in prices income tax and, 2//; global tax on capital and, and, -– *, /*%n.; convergence and, 3$; of skills, /$/, /$-, /$+– /3$; banking information and, .&/– .&+ /3$– /32; public debt and, /-%– /*& Suwa- Eisenmann, Akiko, -$3nn2,% Trea sury bonds (US), 2/* Sweden, .22– .2/, .2-– .2*, 2*/– 2*-, 2%+, -$2n3* Trente Glorieuses, $$, $/, %-– %%, 2$$, /+%n3& Sylla, R., -$.n$- Troika, //.– /// 

 Trusts, family, 2/$– 2/3 Wage in e qual ity, 3*3– 3*2, 3+*– .&&, -&/n$%; Two Cambridges Debate, 3.&– 3.3 education and, .&2– .&*; institutions and, “Two- thirds bankruptcy,” $3%, $.. .&*– .$&; wage scales and minimum wage and, .$&– .$.; in e qual ity explosion and, ..&– ...; U-curve: of capital/income ratio, 3., 3/, $/2, $%/; of meritocratic beliefs and, 2$-– 2$+ capital share of income, 3&&, 3$-; of Wages: nineteenth century, *– +, %– $&, /+&n/; vs. inheritances, .+/, 2&., 23/ pro' ts, .%– 2&; income from, 323; mean and, Unemployment insurance, 2*+ 3/*, 3+%; mobility of, 3%%– .&&; minimum, United States: income in e qual ity in, $3– $., 3.– 3/, .&+– .$., -&+nn/,-,*,+,%,$& 32*– 3/&, 3/-– 3/+, 3-2– 3-/; national income Waldenström, Daniel, $+, .22, -$2n3*, -3+n/+, and, -$, -2, --, -+; growth in, *+, +$, %-– %%, -2/n.* $*2– $*/, /$&– /$$, /%/n3&, -.%n22; employment Washington Square (James), 2$2 by sector in, %$; in9 ation in, $&*; capital in, $2&, Wealth: capital and, 2*– /&. See also Distribution $2%, $/&– $/-; foreign capital/assets and, $/$, of wealth; Distribution of wealth debate; $//– $/-, $%2, /%-– /%*n3%, /%*nn.$,.3; public Global in e qual ity of wealth; In e qual ity of debt of, $/.; slavery in, $/+– $-.; savings in, capital own ership; Inheritance, dynamics of; $**– $*+; explosion of in e qual ity in, 3%$– 3%-, Inherited wealth; National wealth/capital; .$2– .$/, .3., ..&– ...; taxation and, 3%3, 2*., Private wealth/capital; Public wealth/capital 2%+– /&&, /&/– /$3, -.-n$-; estate taxes in, ..+, Wealth accumulation, $--– $*&; as divergent force, .2%; wealth distribution in, .2*– ./&; 3.; arbitrariness of, 22-; golden rule of, meritocratic beliefs in, 2$*; inheritances and, /-.– /-*. See also In e qual ity of capital 23*– 23+; universities in, 22*– 2/3, 2+/; taxes as own ership share of national income, 2*/– 2*-, 2%&; social Wealth- age pro' le, .%.– .%% state in, 2**– 2*%, -3%n$., -.&n$*, -.$n3/. Wealth gap. See In e qual ity of capital own ership See also North America Wealth rankings, 2.3– 22., -3.n- Universities: endowments of US, 22*– 2/3, Wealth tax, 232, /32, /3*– /.&, /.., -2.– -22n3-, -3/n3.; cost of, 2+/– 2+-, -.$– -.3n3%, -2/nn.+,.% -.3nn.2,./,.*,.+, -..nn2&,2$ Wedgwood, Josiah, /&+, -.+n.- Upper class, 3/&– 3/$ Weil, Patrick, -/$n.2 Usury, prohibition of, /.&– /.$ Weir, D., /%+n* Welfare, stigma of, 2*+– 2*% Valdenaire, M. -.3n.- Welles, Orson, 2$2 Valuables, $*%– $+& Wilkins, Mira, /%3n$. “Value added,” ..$, /+2n$-, -&&n.& Williamson, Je! rey, -&&n3+, -&.n3- Vanoli, André, /+/n$% Wol! , Edward, .&$, .2*, -&*n.%, Vauban, Sébastien Le Prestre de, /-, /&$, -3.n+ /%&n$ Wong, R. Bin, -2-n22 Vautrin’s lesson, 3.+– 323, .*%, 2&2– 2&*, 2$&, 2$3, World Bank, /.2 -$%n.* World Wars I and II, $&-– $&*, $2*– $2%, $/., 3*/, Veblen, # orstein, -3$n2+ .%-– .%+. See also Shocks Velde, F., /%+n* WTID (World Top Incomes Database), $*– $+, 3+, Verba, Sidney, -2&n/3 3-+, 3+., /+$n3/ Verdier, # ierry, -.%nn2/,2+ Véron, Nicolas, -2$n2 Yale University, 22*– 2/& Victory Tax Act, /&* Young, Arthur, 2, 33/, 2$-, -3&n22 Volkswagen, $2. Young, Michael, -3&n2/ Volume e! ects: vs. prices e! ects, $*-– $**, 33$; vs. concentration e! ects, 2$& Zacharias, Ajit, .&$, -&*n.% Von Neumann, John, -/$n2& Zingales, Luigi, -.%n2+ Voting: in France, 232, -33n/+; collective Zucman, Gabriel, $%, 2--, /+3n.$, -3+n/*, decisions and, /-%, -/2n/- -2&n3 