INTUITIONS 2019 Volume XVI: Issue 2 The Importance of True Friendship in Forming a Full Understanding of, and Participation in, Morality Jeremy Moore, San Diego City College Aristotle’s ethical philosophy is deeply ingrained in our moral intuitions in such a way as to become expressed in many popular formats. “The Good Place”, a television show, seems to lift many of its ideas straight from the pages of Aristotle. In this paper I examine the role that the Aristotelian virtue of friendship plays in a full understanding and participation of morality. Specifically, I claim that “true” or “virtuous” friendships are required to fully participate in morality in a meaningful way. Introduction ways in which I believe it to demonstrate my argument using this Aristotelian background. “The Good Place” is a television series Lastly, I will present my main premises in the on NBC. It is a comedy that deals with form of two hypothetical situations. I will use philosophical material specifically ethics. these as thought experiments to demonstrate Here I will discuss the relationship between that: interaction with others is necessary for morality and friendship and how they interact one to make moral decisions and therefore which is a central theme throughout “The participate in morality, mere participation as a Good Place.” I will argue that true friendship necessary function of interaction with others is essential to a full understanding and practice is not enough to achieve a full understanding of morality. That is, without true friendship a of and participation in morality, and finally full understanding and practice of a moral that one must use true friendship as a vehicle system is not only impossible but if attempted to achieve a full understanding of and will fall short of its intended purposes. participation in morality. I will offer some objections to these arguments as we come First, I will give an overview on a few across them to alleviate any confusion that of Aristotle’s teleological arguments dealing may arise. with happiness or “the good” and virtue as well as his three main classes of friendships. I Background: Aristotle will use these ideas as a general framework for my argument. Second, I will give a short summary of “The Good Place” and explain the 111
INTUITIONS 2019 Volume XVI: Issue 2 In book I of “Nicomachean Ethics” a provides when he says that “the good of man teleological argument of the good. Aristotle is exercise of his faculties in accordance with begins, excellence”. (1 NE 7:15) How Aristotle has now come to this point is clear. If we have an Every art and every kind of inquiry, end or purpose to which all our actions drive, and likewise every act and purpose, that end will be a thing that can have no seems to aim at some good: and so it intrinsic value as a means to some other goal. has been well said the good is that at Happiness falls within this category above all which everything aims. (1 NE 1:1) other things. If we also have any purpose in our actions it would seem reasonable that we Here he is expressing the idea of means and have some sort of function of design as we see ends. Everything that we do, we do for some in all other things. The worm’s function is to purpose, to achieve some goal, whether of our agitate soil, the heart’s function is to pump conscious intention or otherwise. Aristotle blood and so on. These functions are goes on to explain that although there may be determined in part by the ways in which these intermediary ends, an end that for which “we things differ in design. Man differs from many wish for on its own account, choosing all things by its function or end being happiness. others as a means to this” is what he describes Anything that has a function or end that will as “the good or the best of all things.” (1 NE perform that function well can do so in 2:1) This argument says essentially that if accordance with excellence and thereby there is an end that we would choose for the express its “good” through its faculties. A sake of itself only and this thing is not a means car’s function is to get one from point A to of any other end but only an end in itself then point B. A car that does so well or with this thing must be the best of all ends or the excellence is a good car (a car that ultimate purpose of our pursuits. This end, “exercise[s] its faculties in accordance with says Aristotle, is happiness: “it seems that excellence”). (1 NE 7:15) Man differs from happiness is something final and self- most other things by two main ways. One, sufficing, and is the end of all that man does.” man has the capacity for reason. Two, man (1 NE 7:8) Meaning that, the ultimate end of lives in groups which makes it necessary to all acts done by man, or the purpose behind interact with one another on a regular basis. everyone’s acts, eventually leads to the goal of Therefore, the function of man will be to live achieving happiness. Many would accept this in accordance with these traits and if done so basic premise but still quarrel over what with excellence will lead us to our ends. I will exactly happiness is. What are the qualifying say here that many other creatures seem to be traits of happiness? Is it the same for all or can rational and live in groups and therefore I we take different paths to achieve this end? would not want to exclude them from the For this we need a more precise definition of larger moral discussion that will follow. If it happiness or the good, which Aristotle 112
The Importance of True Friendship applies to us then we can assume that it may pleasure that the other person provides. If I apply to them as well, as their design and want to be friends with a very attractive person therefore functions are similar. However, for only because it gives me pleasure to look at the purpose of this discussion I will limit my them then I am motivated by pleasure for this consideration to humans. friendship. Friendship for profit is characterized as being pursued only for the To see what this excellence looks like profit that the other person provides. If I am we must now speak of virtue. My only friends with a very rich person and I only hang purpose here is to establish what virtue is and out with them because they buy me dinner, how it operates in relation to man. I will not then I am motivated by profit for this discuss the myriad ways in which virtue can friendship. In these friendships it is not even behave and the many different kinds of virtue necessary for me to desire the company of the themselves as these are not relevant to the other in any other way, but those ways central point of my argument. Virtue can be described above and the friendships last only viewed as a way in which we choose our as long as the motivation does. If my rich behaviors and as such we can act in a virtuous friend ceases to buy me dinner, then I no or unvirtuous manner. Virtue can be said to be longer have the motivation to be their friend. a means to our ends but also as a good within Similarly, if my beautiful friend ceases to be itself (done for its own sake) as it provides us pleasant to look upon I no longer have the with pleasure to act in a virtuous manner. motivation to continue our friendship. Aristotle’s view in regard to virtue focuses on two main metaphysical points. One, that [T]he perfect kind of friendship, says virtue deals largely with pleasure and pain. Aristotle, is that of good men who Two, that virtue, through pleasure and pain is resemble one another in virtue. For learned by habituation. (2 NE 3:11) This falls they both alike wish-well to one in line with what modern psychology has another as good men… their observed since the rise of behaviorist thought. friendship, therefore, lasts as long as This shows how deeply Aristotle’s basic their virtue. (9 NE 3:6) tenets are ingrained in western thought and borne out by our scientific observations. This is not to say that perfect or true friendship is not pleasurable or profitable. This is so Three main motivations for friendship can be because each of these friends is, by nature of distinguished in book IX of Aristotle’s them being good men, pleasant to be around “Nicomachean Ethics” titled, “Friendship or and pleasant to each other and as well may Love”. Friendship for profit, friendship for profit in some way as is useful to each other. pleasure, and the “perfect kind of friendship”. The main point here of true friendship is that (9 NE 3:6) Friendship for pleasure is through its manifestation it itself becomes a characterized as being pursued only for the 113
INTUITIONS 2019 Volume XVI: Issue 2 virtue or a good and thus perpetuates its own torture them because of their flaws. Eleanor virtue as well as the virtue of those involved. for example is told that Chidi is her soulmate and without reason to doubt what she is being The Good Place told in the afterlife initially accepts this. The problem is that at first glance Chidi and In the television series “the Good Eleanor are greatly incompatible as even Place” the structure of the world is such that friends and it soon becomes torture for them when a person dies, they go to either a good both. Situations are thus set for our four main place or a bad place based on points characters to be tortured in novel ways. accumulated throughout their life on earth. Things quickly begin to crumble for Michael These points are awarded if a person does when Eleanor figures out that in fact they are something traditionally thought as good, such in the bad place. Each time the rouse is as helping others, or taken away if a person discovered Michael resets the simulation and does something traditionally thought of as bad tries to correct his mistakes. Time and time such as harming others. If you have enough again Eleanor uncovers the deception and points when you die you go to the good place. eventually Michael is ousted from his position If you do not have enough points you go to the by his higherups and joins forces with our bad place. The series begins with one of the main characters. main characters Eleanor waking up in what she is told is the good place. It quickly Aristotle’s kinds of friendships can be becomes apparent to Eleanor that her situation seen manifested as the show progresses is a case of mistaken identity and that she through the interactions and personalities of should in fact be in the bad place. She at first our main characters. Eleanor is initially however keeps this information to herself. The portrayed as selfish and dishonest, only ever show introduces three other central characters: acting in ways that will benefit herself. In her Chidi, Jason, and Tahani. It is revealed in the friendships in life she only ever sought a way first season that these characters are in fact not to profit from or find pleasure in them. In fact, in the good place but in an experimental her friendship with Chidi begins in a profit iteration of the bad place which is the seeking way. When Eleanor still thinks she is brainchild of the architect, Michael. Michael in the good place she decides to become a is an architect of the bad place and it is his job good person so that she will not be found out to find the best ways to torture people in the and therefore not sent to the bad place. Chidi afterlife. Generally, torture in the bad place is was in life a moral philosophy professor and pretty straight forward but it is Michael’s idea Eleanor sees this as the perfect resource for to torture these bad people by putting them her endeavor. Tahani also is used to seeking together with “good” people (really just profit from her interactions as she was employees of the bad place acting like good primarily concerned with social status when people) and exposing them to situations that 114
The Importance of True Friendship she was alive. She sought to achieve this by lack the friendships that they relied upon in constantly namedropping and trying to show the afterlife. They do however once again find people how much better she was than each other and in forming true friendships everyone else. Her torture is played out by with each other become more virtuous people. placing her in what she considers very low status conditions, but she can say nothing This short summary and analysis of because she is simultaneously being lauded “the Good Place” demonstrates how closely for her “pure character” that needs no our ideas about morality and our moral validation from status. Thus, she must keep up intuitions track with Aristotle’s ideas of virtue the appearances of happiness with her station and friendship. I believe that the show claims, or risk losing praise. Her friendship with Jason as I do, that true friendship is a requirement of begins as a way of maintaining this virtue and without such we cannot live in a appearance and in such is motivated for profit. virtuous manner which approaches happiness. As the group comes together for their ethics This claim is never explicitly stated within the lessons under the tutelage of Chidi they begin show in this way but can be seen through the to put their lessons to use and thus begin to act successes and failures of its characters. Every in a more virtuous manner. These efforts are moral success is attributed in some way to the often hindered by their unvirtuous flaws that desire for and the practice of true friendships they still possess but they begin to form, between the characters. The show is an through time and commonality, true anecdotal proof of my thesis in that my claim friendships. That is, they begin to value each is so readily accessible to us that it is the other for the sake of the other themselves and subject of a popular television series. not for mere profit or pleasure. Through these burgeoning true friendships, it is possible for Discussion them to again and again thwart Michael in his attempts to torture them. In season three our I come now to the main argument of main characters are sent back to earth and my thesis. I will start with the claim that given a second chance to get into the good interaction with others is necessary for one to place after they argue that while they may make moral decisions. Let us imagine a man have been bad people before, they now know completely isolated from other people. Say he how to be good people. Once on earth is on a tropical island inhabited only by however, their memories are erased so they no himself. For the sake of this argument I will longer know each other or the friendships they say that survival for him is reasonably easy had formed. At first each person tries to be a and he must not struggle on a day to day basis. better person spurred on by a traumatic event Our isolated man would go about his day of some sort, but they soon fall into their old doing whatever came into his mind to do. ways. This, I would argue, is because they Making his decisions based on pleasure and pain. Those things that were pleasurable to 115
INTUITIONS 2019 Volume XVI: Issue 2 him he would do until they weren’t, and those Our isolated man, if suddenly thrust into that were painful or unpleasant, he would society with others, would have to drastically avoid. Throughout his life he would learn to modify his guidelines as he would no longer avoid staying out in the sun too long or eating have to only consider himself but also those fruits that upset his stomach and, in this way, around him. Interaction with only his he would form certain guidelines with which surrounding environment, for our isolated he would use to navigate his environment. In man, is enough for him to learn, in accordance this way one might say that he does participate with his pleasures and pain, a guiding system in a moral system because of the rules that he but without interacting with other moral follows. It could be said that staying out in the agents he does not in fact make any moral sun too long is, in this system, a morally decisions. A decision has consequences. A wrong thing to do. I would disagree with this moral decision is one that has moral stance because while it does follow the same consequences. Since our isolated man’s paradigm of consequences leading to learning decisions do not have any moral to avoid pain and seek pleasure and thus has consequences, he is not making any moral the trappings of virtue, it does not take into decisions. For man then, it would seem that account one of our ways in which man differs the design or function of what we call morality from other things and of which determines necessarily follows from our interactions with part of man’s function. This thing is that man each other and that function is to facilitate lives, for the most part, in groups. Our isolated these interactions. man will only be interacting with a non-moral environment and will only then learn what Let us now consider a man that lives consequences his actions have in relation to within a society in which he must regularly himself. interact with others. This man, however, only participates in friendships of the first two As most of humanity lives in described: those for profit and those for groups and has to interact with pleasure. In participating only in these each other on a regular basis we unvirtuous friendships, he will be must include in our ideas of participating largely in unvirtuous acts. If the morality and virtue what paradigm of habituation and learning hold true consequences our actions will for virtue as stated above as they do for human have on those around us if we are behavior in general then this man will have a to consider our actions to be said very hard time indeed in learning how to act to be participating in morality. in a virtuous way as he has been conditioned for so long to act unvirtuously. Our man in 116 society then is much like our isolated man. Although I can now say that he does
The Importance of True Friendship participate in morality because he must make Those who do participate in true moral decisions when interacting with other friendship will follow a similar paradigm of moral agents, he only seeks out these habituation and learning as those who don’t. interactions as friendships if they have Instead of becoming intrenched in the pleasure or profit to offer. These friendships unvirtuous however, their act of participating often contain little to no reciprocity and as in these friendships will lead them to yet more stated before last only as long as the pleasure habituation of virtue. This however is not the or profit remain as a motivating force. There primary reason true friendship is necessary for may be friendships, say for profit, that our a full understanding and participation in man in society pursues that are reciprocal. morality. This reason can be found in the These friendships could produce profit on nature of true friendship itself. A friendship is both sides and be beneficial to both involved. at its core merely a prolonged interaction This however does not qualify for virtue as it between two people. It is easy to see how is not done for the sake of itself as an end but Aristotle’s first two forms of friendship are rather always as a means to gaining pleasure flawed and could scarcely live up to the or profit. Again, this is a product of the benefits of a true friendship. A friend whose conditioning of our man in society to seek only goal is the pleasure they derive from you ends that will produce for himself better is concerned for you only in so far as that outcomes and these will never follow to our concern will enable you to give them more ultimate end or purpose, happiness. pleasure and this holds true for the friendship for profit as well. A true friend is concerned If the design or function of for your well-being overall because they are morality is to facilitate man’s friends with you not for what they may gain in interactions with each other and terms of profit or pleasure but for the sake of man’s end is happiness it follows you and the friendship itself. In this way the that the end of morality is to bring end or purpose for the interaction lies within about this end for man. If to achieve itself rather than for another purpose. This this final end, or good, one must tracks with the very purpose of morality itself operate within their design with as described above and it is by this nature that excellence, then it would follow that a full understanding and practice of morality one must operate with excellence in become plausible. the practice of morality. Let us think about an objection to the To do this one must practice those goods that scenarios of habituation as described above. are good within themselves as the virtues are One might question how our man in society described above. Our man in society will can hope to achieve true friendship if he is therefore not reach a full understanding of or perpetually conditioned in unvirtuous acts by participation in morality. 117
INTUITIONS 2019 Volume XVI: Issue 2 the nature of his unvirtuous friendships. in the show “The Good Place”. Often this can Wouldn’t he be forever trapped in a cycle of be seen happening with people who have habituation of unvirtuous acts? There are two interacted with each other in some shared goal main solutions to this. One, our man in society merely because they were in the same will most likely see examples of virtue and situation. These accidental friendships of true friendship in the world around him and he circumstance can grow into true friendships will see how others are achieving their end of and thus perpetuate virtue not only for them as happiness through these virtuous interactions. in relation to each other but also for the other This is now where one of our designs or interactions of which they may be involved. functions of man comes in. This design, as stated above, is reason. Our man in society can I will end now with a normative claim use his reason to see where others are based on the discussion above. We ought to be advancing to their end, which most all agree as open as we are able to forming new would be happiness, and begin to change his friendships with those of which one may not behavior as to more closely resemble those he otherwise choose to interact. If the purpose of sees flourishing. This does seem rare but is morality is to facilitate the interactions of possible. people that live in groups and the purpose of a person is to achieve a final end of happiness, A second solution to this is within the then to participate in morality in a meaningful unvirtuous friendships themselves. Often it way would be to do those things which would comes about that a partnership of some sort or facilitate morality itself and by consequence, a friendship for profit can produce true help us to achieve our end. Because the friendship through its duration. If those of purpose of morality is to facilitate the similar virtue are prone to recognize in their interaction of groups of people then one must, counterpart some of themselves then it is then because of the nature of interaction in the natural for us to begin to see the friendship as modern world being so wide-spread and something to value in itself and therefore both prevalent, include everyone (or at least as parties begin to participate in virtuous acts many as one is able to) as part of that with each other as a result. They now care for interaction. Because the nature of true each other’s well-being overall and not only friendship is such that it promotes virtue and because of what profit or pleasure it provides. therefore facilitates meaningful participation This in turn will habituate them to acting in morality, one ought to promote these virtuously and this conditioning, having friendships. Therefore, being as open as one is success within the friendship, will translate able to be to an unlikely friendship will into other virtuous actions. A combination of possibly promote a true friendship by reason and the circumstance of these accident, through duration or a shared purpose accidental friendships is in fact what happens as described above, and one ought to facilitate 118
The Importance of True Friendship the promotion of these friendships. Through Friesen for her time and guidance in helping these friendships one would help to facilitate me to flush out these ideas. the propagation of virtue, and thus morality, and would come full circle back around to References: bringing about our end itself of happiness. Aristotle (1906). The Nicomachean Ethics of Acknowledgments: Aristotle (F.H. Peters, Trans.). London: Kegan, Paul, Trench, I would like to thank all of my professors and Trubner & CO., Ltd. fellow students who let me bounce ideas off of them and also helped me to edit this paper Schur, M. (Executive Producer). (2016). The for clarity and content. I would also like to Good Place [Television series]. thank my good friend and mentor Jessica Hollywood, CA: NBC 119
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INTUITIONS 2019 Volume XVI: Issue 2 ________________ Introducing Kelly N. Giang A Q&A with the author of Motivation Matters: Strawson, The Good Place and Moral Responsibility What is your major and why did you choose to study philosophy? - My majors are philosophy and psychology. I chose to study philosophy because I find all of the philosophical theories and questions extremely fascinating. I also love that philosophy gives me a chance to refine my critical thinking skills. The more I study philosophy the more I realize that it branches out into other disciplines, like psychology. A lot of the principals I’ve learned in class are very useful. Which is why I apply them to my daily life. What was your favorite philosophy class and what did you get out of it? - My favorite philosophy class would have to be philosophy 102A: knowledge and reality. I really enjoyed this class because a lot of the theories we discussed in class I have thought about before. From this class, I was able to refine my analytical and critical thinking skills. What are your interests within the field of philosophy? - I find moral responsibility and free will extremely interesting. I would like to continue to learn more about these two topics throughout my college career. Which school and program are you hoping to transfer to? (if applicable) - I would like to transfer to UCSD, apply for the PATH program, and major in philosophy. What inspired you to come up with the topic for this paper? - The inspiration for the topic of my paper came from The Good Place. As I was watching the show, I found myself being extremely fixated on how the judgement system works. Especially, what criteria the system uses to place judgement on deceased souls. From all of this theorizing, came the topic of my paper. 121
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INTUITIONS 2019 Volume XVI: Issue 2 Motivation Matters: Strawson, The Good Place and Moral Responsibility Kelly N. Giang, San Diego City College Standard accounts of moral responsibility rest on three criteria: agency, control and knowledge. However, these criteria cannot account for our intuitions that an agent is not worthy of praise if their motivation is selfish. In this paper, I offer an analysis of what it is for an action to be praise-worthy that departs from the standard criteria for moral responsibility. I argue that one does not deserve praise for selfishly motivated actions. I draw a distinction between actions that are selfishly motivated and those actions that are partially motivated by self-interest and use a P.F. Strawson’s account of moral responsibility to who that motivation does indeed matter when determining when an agent is worthy of praise for an action. The Good Place is an NBC comedy good person. I think this is a mistake and about the afterlife. Four characters die and are argue that one does not deserve praise for mistakenly placed into the good place selfishly motivated actions. First, I will draw (heaven). The show uses humor to a distinction between a selfishly motivated demonstrate philosophical concepts, such as action and an action that is self-interested. free will, the nature of god, and what we owe Then, I will provide a brief overview of a to one another. In this paper, I aim to explore standard account of moral responsibility. whether motivations matter when Finally, I will show that while the standard determining if an action is worthy of praise or account can’t accommodate our intuitions blame. That is, if your actions have good that motivations matter in determining consequences, does that mean we should whether an account is worthy of praise, P.F. praise you? As much as I would like to say Strawson’s account of why and how we hold yes, it’s simply not true. Many of us have people morally accountable can account for witnessed a person doing a ‘good’ deed that our intuitions that motivation matters. has good consequences, but for selfish reasons. Yet often, these individuals are 123 showered with praise and get labeled as a
INTUITIONS 2019 Volume XVI: Issue 2 Background interchangeably. However, for my purposes, I contrast to selfish action – where someone First, I make a distinction between the is acting primarily for one’s own benefit and selfish action and self-interested action. We is unconcerned with other’s well-being – generally have an intuitive understanding of with self-interested action, which is action what ‘selfish’ means. For this argument, I that takes into account the agent’s benefit, but don’t stray too far from that understanding also takes into account the well-being of but refine it by defining a selfish action as one others. that is concerned excessively or exclusively with oneself. That is, a selfish action is one While selfish and self-interested that seeks one’s own advantage, pleasure, or actions are similar in that they are well-being without concern for others. Those concerned with the agent’s well- who commit selfish actions only focus on being, the difference is the degree their own benefit. They are most concerned to which the agent’s well-being is about their own well-being, and when acting taken into account. will place their own well-being before other’s well-being. They are often so concerned Yes, those who have self-interest do have about their own well-being that they end up concern for their own advantage and well- acting in ways that are detrimental to others. being. However, the characteristic that This is important to note, those who are separates the two is that a person who selfish, are willing to do anything if it commits a self-interested action actually has benefits them; even if it’s at the expense of an awareness and a concern for the well- those around them. being of others that those who commit a selfish action do not.1 So, what about those who are self- interested? Now, I understand that selfish and As we will see, this distinction is self-interested are often used important for determining moral worth of an action. Do those who commit selfish actions 1 Adam Smith also makes a distinction between deserve praise or blame? To better answer selfish and self-interested action in economics. For this question, we need an account of moral Smith, selfish action is action where an agent (in his case, merchants) make choices based on a subjective public interest. While the purpose of the distinction I notion of her interest. In contrast, self-interested make is not the same as the one that Smith makes, actions are those actions that are consistent with our analysis of self-interested action overlaps in that it need not be negatively valued and includes the 124 notion that other’s interests matter.
Motivation Matters: Strawson, The Good Place and Moral Responsibility responsibility. We need an account that tells Why Motivation Matters us when we should hold someone responsible for their actions. That is, we need to know Under a standard account of moral which actions deserve praise and which responsibility, the only things that matter are actions deserve blame. Aristotle’s standard that you are an agent, that your actions are account of moral responsibility, asserts three voluntary (not coerced), and that you know criteria for moral responsibility (Eshleman, what it is that you are doing. Thus, under a 2014): standard account of moral responsibility, the motivations for your actions do not matter 1. Agency: To be held morally and hence it is difficult to ascribe moral worth responsible, one must have the or praise to an action. Let’s imagine that I characteristics that qualifies them as win the 10 million dollars in the lottery and agents. That is, a moral agent must decide to donate half of it to charity. In fact, have the capacity for decision I publicize my donation and as a result news making. outlets and social media are all writing about what an amazing human being I am. This 2. Control: The action must be one that praise seems reasonable. I am an agent. I had is within the agent’s control. That is, control over how to disburse my winnings. I the action must be voluntary; an knew what I was doing and the likely outside forced can’t coerce the outcome of my donations. That is, it seems agent’s action. that I am morally responsible and that I deserve the praise that I am receiving because 3. Knowledge: The agent must know of the positive consequences that my action what they are doing and have a has brought about. However, what social reasonable understanding the results media doesn’t know is that I did not donate of their action. my winnings because I care about the charities or the people the charities help. I The problem with this account of moral was motivated to donate my winnings responsibility is it cannot accommodate our because I wanted to appear on the news and intuitions that one deserves blame for selfish on social media: I wanted everyone to think I actions. In other words, motivation has no place in deciding whether you are worthy of 125 moral praise or morally responsible.
INTUITIONS 2019 Volume XVI: Issue 2 was a kind and generous person. In short, my praise the lottery winner and Tahani because action was selfishly motivated. My donation they fulfill the criteria. They are agents, they was a selfish action. The standard account of had control over what they were doing and moral responsibility, which rests on agency, they knew what they were doing and what the control and knowledge of the consequences results likely were going to be. And since the of an action, can’t account for our intuition results of these actions benefitted others, it that I am not worthy of praise for this action. seems they should be praised. But we know That is, we think that motivation matters. that their motives weren’t in the right place. The inability of the standard account to This intuition is dramatized in The consider the moral agents’ motives, is a Good Place with the character of Tahani. She defect of this account. So how might we be grew up very wealthy in the upper class of able to accommodate our intuitions and England, is extremely intelligent, and is a blame agents for selfish actions? wonderful hostess. Time and time again, she talks about how she’s raised millions of Thankfully, we have P.F. Strawson’s trillions of dollars for charity. And how she’s amendment to the idea of moral thrown hundreds of charity events to help responsibility. Strawson’s account of moral raise awareness for struggling communities responsibility does not rest on control or and raise funds. However, we eventually find knowledge. Strawson (1962) argues that we out that all of these seemingly praise-worthy hold people morally responsible, we praise or actions were committed for selfish reasons: blame them, when they show us good will or Tahani was doing all of these things because ill will. You can think of these two as respect she wanted to win over her parents and out or disrespect. He views moral responsibility shine her older sister. She didn’t actually care as the result of interpersonal interactions in about benefitting others. Her action was which we naturally respond with reactive selfish in that she was solely thinking about attitudes. What this means is that during our her own well-being. In fact, Tahani ended up interactions with others, we have reactive in the bad place because all her selfish actions attitudes all the time. Reactive attitudes are didn’t earn any praise/points. used in interpersonal relationships to express how much we mind the ill will or good will The standard account of moral being handed to us. These reactive attitudes responsibility would say that we should 126
Motivation Matters: Strawson, The Good Place and Moral Responsibility we have towards one another is our way as a selfishly motivated act, I am expressing ill humans of keeping other accountable will to the charities and individuals because I (Strawson, 2008). And we all naturally react don’t care about them. I am disrespecting to when someone is showing us respect or them by not caring about their well-being. As disrespect. In season 2 episode 12 of The a result, I am not worthy of praise, but am Good Place, Eleanor is back on Earth trying worthy of blame. We can also see this in The to become a better person. She decides to quit Good Place. In season 1 episode 11, Eleanor her job selling fake medicine because she becomes desperate to earn points so she can believes that it’s not right to scam people. Her qualify to stay in the “good place.” She and boss asks her to return her company ID, her Tahani try and do as many good deeds as parking pass and proceeds then to ask for her possible to earn these points. They hold the panties. Eleanor is taken aback and yells at door open for their neighbors, greet people him. Her boss is expressing disrespect/ill will and wish them a good day, and even throw towards Eleanor by asking for her panties, in them a party. When Eleanor checks her point return, she takes a feels angry and resentful counter, she discovers that she hasn’t earned and takes a reactive attitude of blame, which a single point for any of the good deeds she she expresses by scolding him for the stunt he has done. That’s because all the good deeds tried to pull. she did were selfishly motivated. She didn’t care about the well-being of those she was Using Strawson’s account, we can greeting or throwing the party for. All she now see why a selfish action is blame- cared about was her own interests: making worthy. A selfish action demonstrates ill sure that she got enough points to stay in the will. It is disrespectful of other’s needs or good place. The show also demonstrates the well-being. I would like to go back to my praise-worthiness of self-interested action. lottery winner example. Sure, I donated Similarly, in season 1 episode 11, Chidi money to those charities, but I don’t actually comes to Eleanor for advice on what to do care about the charities and the people I about the “Real Eleanor.”2 Eleanor gives donated to. All I care about is people Chidi honest and thoughtful advice. Chidi knowing that I am a generous person. This is then points out to Eleanor that she earned a 2 The “Real Eleanor” was a demon posing as a person through a faux mix-up, Eleanor ended taking the who was supposed to be in the good place, but “Real Eleanor’s” place in the neighborhood. 127
INTUITIONS 2019 Volume XVI: Issue 2 few points for giving him advice. Eleanor motivation because the only “evidence” we expresses her good will/respect for Chidi by have for a person’s motives are self-reported. giving him thoughtful, caring advice and in Unlike actions or positive outcomes, where return, Chidi feels grateful, and expresses his we see physical results, we cannot look into reactive attitude of praise. This reactive someone’s mind to see their motives. attitude is also reflected in the fact that Considering all of the factors, analysis of Eleanor earns points that go towards allowing motives is that much more difficult and her to remain in the good place. Note here inconvenient. that Eleanor’s action is self-interested (she does benefit from it) but because it is not If we were to turn a blind selfishly motivated, she is demonstrating her eye, based on the fact that the good will towards Chidi. Sure, her selfishly analysis of motives is difficult and motivated deeds had good outcomes, but that inconvenient for us, this would be shouldn’t be what we’re looking at when we considered a selfishly motivated are determining whether or not a person is action. deserving of praise or blame. Because you are only concerned about your When determining whether an action own well-being by deeming it as is worthy of praise or blame, we often focus inconvenient. In return, by ignoring a on the consequences and not the motive for person’s motivations, you fail to take into the action. It’s not that we don’t care about account the good or ill will she might be motive, but it typically plays second fiddle to expressing towards you, and thus failing to whether the action has positive or negative hold her morally responsible. Chidi sums up consequences. In short, analysis of a person’s this Strawsonian conception of moral motives isn’t given much attention in our responsibility in season 2 episode 11: “I daily interactions. One reason for this might argue that we choose to be good… because of be because we can never truly know a our bonds with other people and our innate person’s intentions. We could approach and desire to treat them with dignity. Simply put, ask them about their motivation, but we are not in this alone.” We hold ourselves regardless of their answer, we can never truly and one another responsible because we are know whether they are misrepresenting their human and want to be treated and to treat others with respect/good will. 128
Motivation Matters: Strawson, The Good Place and Moral Responsibility Acknowledgements: References: I would like to thank my amazing professor Eshleman, A. (2014, March 26). Moral Responsibility. Soon-Ah. She’s always been extremely Retrieved April 13, 2019, from supportive, incredibly inspiring, and I hope https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral- to be able to teach like her one day! I would responsibility/ also like to thank my best friend Maria for not only helping me brainstorm the Schur, M. (Producer). (2018, September 19). The conclusion but for also staying up with me Good Place [Television series]. Los Angeles, till 3:00 am to get this paper done. California: NBC. Smith, A., & Cannan, E. (2003). The wealth of nations. New York, N.Y: Bantam Classic. Strawson, P. F. (2008). Freedom and resentment and other essays. London: Routl 129
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INTUITIONS 2019 Volume XVI: Issue 2 ________________ Introducing Robert Walter A Q&A with the author of Metaethical Utilitarianism is Best Served Through Normative Virtue Ethics What is your major and why did you choose to study philosophy? - I’m majoring in philosophy and cognitive & behavioral neuroscience. I chose philosophy, not only for its intrinsic value, but because I believe empirical investigation can be greatly aided by a deep understanding of philosophical reasoning. Philosophy also allows for a much wider range of intellectual exploration, outside the confines of empirical science. What are your interests within the field of philosophy? - I’m interested in any areas where philosophy and psychology overlap, including naturalized epistemology, naturalized metaphysics, moral psychology, philosophy of cognitive science / psychology, and philosophy of mind / language. What was your favorite philosophy class and what did you get out of it? - Every philosophy class has significantly contributed to my philosophical perspective. However, if I’m forced to pinned down a choice, I’d have to say my first philosophy graduate seminar, philosophy of self, with Prof. Matt Fulkerson. I thoroughly enjoyed the seminar format and engaging with the material at a greater depth convinced me to make philosophy a central part of my academic future. What are your future hopes with your philosophy degree? - I am honored to be starting a joint philosophy and psychology PhD program at Yale this Fall, working with Prof. Brian Scholl, Prof. Josh Knobe, and Prof. Laurie Paul. My aim is to work equally in both fields, as I see them as complementary and not competitive and I hope to bring this interdisciplinary perspective to others as a professor at a top research university. From there I can “pay it forward” by offering the guidance and encouragement I’ve received to the next generation of philosophers. What inspired you to come up with the topic for this paper? - This paper came from taking a class in normative ethics with Prof. Monique Wonderly, where I aimed to see the ontological relations and commitments of each normative theory. I noticed that many criticisms of normative ethics don’t apply to the metaethical foundations of a theory, allowing me to separate the two. 131
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INTUITIONS 2019 Volume XVI: Issue 2 Metaethical Utilitarianism is Best Served Through Normative Virtue Ethics Robert Walter, University of California, San Diego Ethical theories are often assumed to equally apply to metaethics and normative ethics, such that a prescriptive claim of how we ought to act is inexorably linked to a descriptive claim of its ontology. I reject this assumption, and argue that the epistemic, pragmatic, and psychological deficiencies of normative utilitarianism make it an impractical and counter-productive theory to achieve good as described by utilitarian metaethics. Rather, I contend that a utilitarian virtue ethics is superior in achieving the greatest overall good. Moral questions and dilemmas swirl bad,” and the normative “How ought we around us throughout our lives, though they act?” are rarely explicitly recognized or appreciated. Much of who we are and what The metaethical and normative are paths we take are grounded on our often seen as inexorably linked, with representations of right and wrong; virtue multitudes of ethical theories and variations and vice; and good and bad. Often, these to address them; utilitarianism and issues are seen as too personal to discuss, too deontology being the most popular, with confusing to ponder, or too muddled to take virtue ethics coming in at a distant third. definitive action upon. With this in mind, we While the majority of philosophers take for can begin to truly appreciate the mastery of granted that any particular ethical theory “The Good Place,” a TV show which excels should be equally applied to both domains of at bringing these issues to life in non-trivial metaethics and normative ethics, I will ways. Not only are philosophical superstars challenge this notion. Asserting a utilitarian like Hume, Kant, and Aristotle referenced, metaethical framework, this paper will argue but the less popularly known works of Sartre, that normative virtue ethics is superior to Scalon, and Kierkegaard are made normative utilitarianism to achieve the best prominent. Of the many topics explored, two possible moral outcome3. I will begin by major themes revolve around the metaethical outlining utilitarianism and giving some brief question “What makes an action good or abductive arguments for its metaethical 3 I don’t claim that virtue ethics will produce a fully both pragmatically (but not necessarily optimific outcome, as my arguments against metaphysically) impossible and unverifiable. utilitarianism will hold that an optimific outcome is 133
INTUITIONS 2019 Volume XVI: Issue 2 realism4. Next, I’ll describe some of the more unhappiness to the party whose prominent criticisms of utilitarianism which interest is considered” (Bentham, often target its normative aspects while 1780/1986). sparing its metaethics. I’ll then give a positive argument as to why normative virtue In his view, utility would be determined by a ethics is superior to normative utilitarianism hedonic calculus which considered pleasure in reaching metaethical utilitarian outcomes. or pain duration, intensity, certainty, and remoteness. John Stuart Mill further Metaethical Utilitarianism developed a definition of utility by differentiating higher and lower pleasures, The variations and nuances of stating, utilitarianism can’t be adequately or fairly summarized in a few paragraphs; however, Some kinds of pleasure are more this overview should serve to orient desirable and more valuable than unfamiliar readers. Utilitarianism is a form others. It would be absurd that while, of consequentialism, which holds that the in estimating all other things, quality moral weight of an action is largely or is considered as well as quantity, the entirely determined by the consequences and estimation of pleasures should be not by the means of reaching those supposed to depend on quantity alone consequences nor by moral laws or duties. (Mill, 1863/2013). Specifically, utilitarianism holds that an action is moral if its consequence is one that Mill viewed that intellectual pleasures, such maximizes utility. Although utility has been as art, friendship, conversation, and reading defined in many different forms, it has are superior to bodily pleasures, as he traditionally been equated to increasing reasoned that few people would want to trade happiness (Nathonson, n.d.). Jeremey places with the happiest of swine, no matter Bentham, considered the father of how many physical pleasures it experiences. utilitarianism, defined utility as: Utilitarianism has since been developed into multiple flavors, including act, rule, [T]hat property in any object, preference, ideal, motive, and numerous whereby it tends to produce benefit, others (Nathonson, n.d.); however, a full advantage, pleasure, good, or rendering of these goes beyond this paper’s happiness...[or] to prevent the scope and my ontological support and happening of mischief, pain, evil, or this line of reasoning will be well considered, 4 Due to space limitations, I won’t be able to provide particularly by those who are just beginning a study a thorough or nuanced argument for metaethical of philosophical ethics. utilitarianism. While I’m unlikely to convert any staunch deontologists so quickly, my hope is that 134
Metaethical Utilitarianism is Best Served Through Normative Virtue Ethics normative criticisms largely apply to all of considerations influence them (Bauman et al, them. 2014). Utilitarianism’s greatest rival is To bypass this, I will add a layer of almost universally agreed to be deontology abstraction and magnification to give the (literally the science of duty), which holds ultimate trolley problem: For irrelevant that an action can be considered good or bad, reasons, you can only perform action A or not by its consequences, but by whether that action B. Action A will (with 100% action is right or wrong according to a set of certainty) lead to the best possible universe rules or duties (Alexander and Moore, 2016). (as quantified in the best possible way), while One of the most (in)famous thought action B will certainly lead to the worst experiments of this is the Trolley problem, possible universe. Can we imagine any set of created by Philippa Foot in 1967. Highly actions for A or B which would justify not featured in the fifth episode of The Good choosing A? I argue no; we should always Place, appropriately named “The Trolley take the path leading to the best possible Problem,” this experiment asks us to imagine universe and away from the worst, no matter a trolley car out of control and about to hit what action is required to get there.5 I simply (and kill) five people on the track. However, see no duty or virtue that could possibly by pulling a lever, you can divert the trolley justify otherwise. This implies that, at least to another track, killing only one person in this extreme case, consequences are king, (Foot, 1967). There are countless variations and I further see no reason it wouldn’t be of this from the somewhat plausible to the equally true for more practical situations. absurd (see Latz. n.d : https://existentialcomics.com/comic/106). In one further example, imagine there The utilitarian view holds that pulling the are two possible worlds, one ruled by a lever is a good action, as it saves the greatest demon and the other by an angel. However, number of people, preventing a greater both of them are either so incompetent or decrease in utility, while deontology says unlucky that their actions’ outcome is always pulling the lever is bad, as we shouldn’t kill the opposite of their intention. In their someone, irrespective of the lifesaving respective worlds, every kindly-intended act consequences. While Trolley problems are by the angel only brings misery, and every often meant to help probe our moral intended evil act by the demon brings intuitions, they have many criticisms, happiness and prosperity. While it’s very particularly that more than just moral much debatable whether either celestial being 5 Some may object that there can’t be a destroy an entire galaxy populated by innocent and deontologically horrible action that leads to the best sentient baby seals in order to prevent the universal possible universe; however, while implausible, this spread of self-replicating evil nanobots isn’t metaphysically impossible. Imagine needing to 135
INTUITIONS 2019 Volume XVI: Issue 2 is responsible for the fortune or misfortune of differences between them, most critical is the their worlds, it seems clear that the angel’s applicability of the “Ought Implies Can” world is full of moral victims while the demon’s has none of his making. principle. This idea is an ethical formula Irrespective of the intentionality of each, an formulated by Kant, as seen by “For if the act which produces an immense number of moral victims seems clearly to be less good moral law commands that we ought to be than a world with none. Thus, it would seem that a metaethical utilitarian framework can better human beings now, it inescapably still be utilized independent of the virtue or intention of those creating the act. follows that we must be capable of being better human beings” (Kant,1793/2018) and As much as I’d love to refine and fully “The action to which the ‘ought’ applies must develop these arguments further, it takes us indeed be possible under natural conditions” too far away from the aim of this paper. While I hope these thought experiments are (Kant, 1787/2009, A548/B576). In essence, persuasive, I expect not all of my readers will be fully convinced. So that we can be on the it holds that any moral obligation has to be same page moving forward, perhaps I could ask that my utilitarian-skeptic friends allow one where fulfillment is possible. For me to amend my thesis slightly by conditionalizing it to only apply to possible example, I cannot hold you responsible for worlds where utilitarianism is ontologically valid. In my next section, I attempt to not solving world hunger, not curing the demonstrate that the majority of problems associated with utilitarianism apply largely to dysfunction of the US political system, or for the normative aspects, leaving the metaethical views on much firmer ground. not preventing the cancelation of Firefly(RIP)6. However, it should be noted Why Normative Utilitarianism Fails that this is only a normative claim, not an Rather than simply espousing the ontological one. Just because we can’t solve metaethical while disparaging the normative aspects of utilitarianism, I expect that some world hunger or bring back the best space further justification is required as to why one western of all time doesn’t mean that these is valid but not the other. Among the wouldn’t be good acts. This implies that the 6 Canceled over 16 years ago and I’m still bitter. ontological goodness or badness of 136 something is not correlated with its feasibility, allowing us to say that even if we can’t adequately define utility, know how to achieve it, or be responsible for it (i.e. the normative aspects), metaethical utilitarianism can be valid. In this vein, many of the forthcoming attacks on normative utilitarianism home in on its practical and epistemic implausibility. Chief among these epistemic issues is a lack of a clear concept of what is being
Metaethical Utilitarianism is Best Served Through Normative Virtue Ethics optimized. Utility is often held to be a Bounding issues, both spatially and general placeholder for goodness or can be temporally, also adds complications, as we generalized as happiness; however, this is can ask if utility of the entire universe for all poorly defined. Aside from knowing exactly time need to be factored, or just the local what happiness is, we also must ask how to immediate? Ambiguity in bounding can lead balance quality and quantity. Additionally, to the toggle problem, where a single act can almost any definition of utility can lead to be seen as morally positive and negative as counterintuitive results, such as the time goes on. An example would be a robber repugnant conclusion (see Parfit, 1984), or breaking into a house (bad), which saves a that there are cases where promoting torture, child from carbon monoxide poisoning inequality, or injustice is not only permissible (good), who grows up to invent a drug which but is morally required. Fixes to this often causes birth defects (bad), which prompts include adding additional criteria to optimize, increased regulation saving more lives such as egalitarianism7, or by adding rules to (good), and so on. Likewise, it would be constrain the scope of morally sanctioned possible to have an “amplitude increasing actions. However, adding more ill-defined sine wave utility generator,” with no components to utility just compounds definitive way of saying if it is good or bad if ambiguities, including how to justify what to left unbounded. Individual acts that are include (or preclude) or how to balance the necessary but not sufficient for a certain weights of each component. Additionally, outcome would also be very difficult to adding rules to utilitarianism subverts the analyze, leaving us with an infinite number of basic consequentialist assertions of utility conditional judgements. We’d also need a because it says that we should purposely take rational way to determine how fine grained actions that lead to less optimific outcomes. our bounds need to be. Bounding is also required for practical calculation, as we run Even assuming we could find an into the curse of dimensionality, meaning agreed-upon component upon which to each new component of input can maximize, there are issues with determining exponentially increase processing how to perform such a maximization8. requirements. Yet even if we managed to Optimization requires complete and perfect find the exact moral parameters to maximize information, and game theory requires well and use an idealized method of calculating quantified meta-information, both of which them, we would suffer from a lack of precise are impossible to achieve due to and quantified input. Edward Lorenz, in his quantification and measurement problems. 1962 paper, “Deterministic Nonperiodic 7 Egalitarianism is similarly poorly defined, as many 8 Again, our epistemic indeterminacy doesn’t forms of equality preclude others, such as equal preclude there being a real fact of the matter. outcome vs equal reward for effort. 137
INTUITIONS 2019 Volume XVI: Issue 2 Flow” demonstrated how important our bones to reduce weight. Aiming towards incredibly small variations can be in a perfection is only rational and optimal if it complex computational system (in this case also increases our effectiveness in achieving weather prediction), popularly known as the the desired ends. Rather than reaching for butterfly effect. If the outcome of a that which is beyond our ability, it makes calculation is driven by artifacts caused by more sense to be maximally effective at imprecise input, then the result is arbitrary. actions within our capacities. Unfortunately, There are also verification issues, where we effectively understanding and justifying, let have almost no way to tell how close an alone following utilitarian guidelines, goes action comes to actually maximizing utility. beyond our capabilities. In essence, the epistemic challenges Beyond the practical limitations, we should be mindful of the psychological ones. for normative utilitarianism can be The most effective normative theory is one summed up as we don’t know what which people will want to utilize often, and we’re optimizing, how to calculate there are many aspects of utilitarianism which are extremely demotivating. It is very the optimization, how to quantify the difficult to stay committed to something where we lack proper guidance and inputs, or how to verify the output. justification. Many versions of utilitarianism hold that the only moral action is the Although many of the problems for optimific one (Nathonson, n.d.), making virtually every practical action immoral and normative utilitarianism aren’t there is an understandable aversion to following a moral code which we are bound metaphysically insurmountable, we are to fail. Further, utilitarian outcomes can be counter to our moral intuitions, such as simply not pragmatically capable of prescribing torture, lying, or worse, making it a difficult to follow effectively. Normative determining or performing consistent utilitarianism also requires an allocentric viewpoint that many find difficult or optimific actions. An optimal normative unnatural, as humans tend to be extremely egocentric in their thinking. This can be seen theory should not only be efficacious in an in empathy, where we care most about things which we can personally relate, and our idealized world, but also be workable in real- understanding of others is often the most meaningful when we can map it onto an world conditions. A compelling counter argument to this is that not being able to meet an ideal doesn’t preclude it from serving as a goal. After all, perfection in any task is often undefinable and is pragmatically impossible, yet we are often urged to pursue it. However, there are many times where trying to reach an impossible ideal can be counterproductive. For instance, if we determine that an idealized way to move from point A to point B is to fly, we don’t want to prescribe flapping our arms while running or hollowing 138
Metaethical Utilitarianism is Best Served Through Normative Virtue Ethics egocentric framework. This makes moral As we saw, utilitarianism isn’t an impartiality, often a necessary component of effective normative method to reach utility- normative utilitarianism, very difficult or based goals; however, a utility-directed undesirable to achieve. Additionally, the virtue ethics (UDVE) has a potential to be goal of increasing utility into the world is too much more successful. Virtue ethics is abstract to be a compelling motivational perhaps one of the oldest of the prominent force, especially when compared to self- moral theories, with significant contributions fulfillment, which can lead to tragedy of the from ancient Greek philosophy (Aristotle, commons or prisoner dilemma type Plato, and the Stoics) as well as ancient China scenarios. Without a tangible way to track (Confucius). Like other normative theories, progress or advancement, coupled with there are numerous varieties, however a key individual contributions being relatively component is an emphasis on character insignificant to the global whole of utility, development to promote an increasing normative utilitarianism just doesn’t sit well propensity for virtuous actions. Primarily, with reward-based goal-directed behavior. these virtuous actions are described as those that a virtuous person would take, giving a Additionally, due to the epistemic circular and ambiguous definition to what challenges briefly outlined, utilitarianism can virtue entails. However, if we hold that a suffer from not seeing the forest for the trees, virtuous person’s ultimate goal is following a especially when inflexible assumptions are metaethical utilitarian goal (i.e. increasing made about the nature of utility and how to utility), then we can see how a virtue ethics maximize it. What we would call deeply can have a utilitarian foundation. Taking immoral acts, such as eugenics, murder, Aristotle’s Nicomachean ethics, which asks infidelity, slavery, and much more can be us to do “the right things, for the right reason, justified through utilitarianism, or more in the right way, and at the right time,” (50) charitably, through corruptions of we can define “right” as “that which we utilitarianism. When we allow for an ends- believe to be utility increasing.” justifies-the-means mentality, almost any means can be called for, despite a lack of UDVE also shifts focuses on positive certainty in the actual or theoretical ends it duties rather than negative duties. Negative would achieve. This can make normative duties are those that urge us to refrain from utilitarianism expressly counter to its certain actions (often negative actions) while metaethical goal by decreasing the total positive duties urge us to perform actions that utility in the world. we might otherwise not. To abstain from theft would be a negative duty, while to Utilitarian-Directed Virtue Ethics donate to charity would be a positive one. Across variations of both virtue ethics and 139
INTUITIONS 2019 Volume XVI: Issue 2 deontology there tends to be an unequal focus utility. Our moral intuitions don’t give us a on negative duties, which may be rational if path to maximizing utility, but they often we consider that there are many more ways bestow ideas of how to generally increase it. of harming someone than helping them. This makes virtue ethics far superior against Similar asymmetry is found in assigning both the epistemic and practical concerns of moral praise or moral blame (see Knobe, normative utilitarianism. 2003). While the avoidance of harmful actions does increase overall utility and Looking from a psychological should be encouraged, it is inherently limited standpoint, the self-improvement aspects are by a ceiling effect, namely performing no far more motivating. By allowing us to work harmful actions. If adhering to negative within our egocentric bias instead of fighting duties was the prime measure of goodness, it, we have better cognitive tools and abilities then we would find a stump to be more to make progress more effectively. virtuous than us all. However, the amount of Motivation is also assisted from UDVE’s good in the world that one can add has no incremental and self-defined goals, rather firm upper bound. UDVE encourages going than unattainable abstractions of idealized beyond one’s moral obligations, even where behavior as required by normative it involves self-sacrifice. Therefore, rather utilitarianism. For the psychological egoists, than the silver rule of Confucius’ Analects, there is also a clear self-benefit to such which says, “Do not impose upon others what improvements, which is not only a you yourself do not desire” (15.24), UDVE motivating force, but is intrinsically utility should focus on the golden rule of “Do onto increasing. Further, virtue ethics is almost others as you wish done onto you.” always in line with our moral intuitions, thus discarding the moral and cognitive juggling Although a UDVE suffers from required by many other ethical views. While similar epistemic issues in defining utility, utilitarianism can be easily twisted to justify these are not as great a concern due to the terrible actions, virtue ethics doesn’t easily abstracted nature of virtue ethics. Finding allow for such perversions. These acts would Aristotle’s golden mean might sound like an simply not be permissible under most virtue optimization problem, (like finding the ethics, which allows people to have the maximum peak of a bell curve) but it can be flexibility to do “reality checks” on their better viewed as a guideline with much less actions, rather than blindly following stringent goals. Instead of focusing on potentially flawed philosophical doctrines. maximizing the goodness of acts directly, virtue ethics focuses on the person who Increasing utility doesn’t necessarily creates the acts, and this degree of separation lead to more virtuous people, but requires much less precision in defining more virtuous people necessarily leads to increased utility. 140
Metaethical Utilitarianism is Best Served Through Normative Virtue Ethics One major objection is that it is immediately after that six-month period, counter-intuitive to best reach utilitarian those focused on acts will be the winner, but goals by not adopting normative would this persist after the six-month frenzy utilitarianism, as I must justify why it is better of moral focus is over? I think many would to achieve a goal through indirect means. I’ll agree that, in the long term, focusing on begin my reply with an analogy of carrying a virtue is more effective, as the people in this cup of hot coffee filled to the brim across a world will be more intrinsically motivated room. If one continuously focuses on not and habituated to acting morally. In this way, spilling the coffee, they do an inefficient and virtue theory can be seen as building moral poor job of fulfilling their task. Trying to capital, in that when all of us become better understand the general physics and fluid people, we have higher capacities to do moral dynamics involved in the action and acts and with less effort. Mill had a similar calculating every cause and effect would viewpoint when defending utilitarianism similarly be ineffective. If they instead focus against the “one thought too many charge,” on the prerequisites, such as good poise, where he said smooth movements, and not fighting your natural instincts, the coffee is delivered The answer to the objection is, that without a drop spilled. For another example, there has been ample time, namely, imagine you want to get to the top of Half the whole past duration of the human Dome, a peak in Yosemite National Park species. During all that time mankind where one side is a sheer cliff face of almost have been learning by experience the 5000 feet over the valley floor. There are two tendencies of actions; on which paths one can take; the direct route, being a experience all the prudence, as well climb straight up, or a 16-mile round-trip as all the morality of life, is hike, which is aimed away from the summit dependent. (Mill, 1863/2013, pg 420) for the majority of its length. Needless to say, the indirect path is far more popular, Here, Mill is saying that we shouldn’t use a accessible, and (arguably) pleasant. formula or strict rules to optimize utility, but to use our experience which has built moral For a final example, I’ll provide the character. Its seems like Mill, one of the following thought experiment: Imagine two founders and largest proponents of possible worlds, in which every person utilitarianism, could endorse UDVE. spends six months striving to maximize utility through acts in one world, while in the Conclusion: other world, everyone spends six months trying to become more virtuous. Which In this paper, I have proposed that a world will have the highest utility? Perhaps utilitarian metaethical framework is best normatively served by virtue theory and not 141
INTUITIONS 2019 Volume XVI: Issue 2 utilitarianism. I did this by exposing many of Bauman, C. W., Mcgraw, A. P., Bartels, D. M., & the epistemic and pragmatic flaws of Warren, C. (2014). Revisiting External utilitarianism, the psychological difficulties Validity: Concerns about Trolley Problems in effectively implementing utilitarianism, and Other Sacrificial Dilemmas in Moral and how virtue ethics is superior in dealing Psychology. Social and Personality with these concerns. I also countered the Psychology Compass, 8(9), 536-554. objection that it is counterintuitive to better doi:10.1111/spc3.12131 meet an end without focusing on acts that directly serve that end. While I don’t deny Bentham, J. (1986).An introduction to the principles that a normative utilitarian ethics could be of morals and legislation. Birmingham, Ala.: idealized, when our epistemic and Legal Classics Library. (Original work psychological limitations are factored in, published 1780). virtue ethics appears to be far superior. Confucius. (1999). The Analects of Confucius : a Acknowledgments: philosophical translation. (R. T. Ames & H. Rosemont, Trans.). New York :Ballantine I sincerely thank Professor Monique Books, Wonderly for her guidance in normative ethical theory, Professor Dana Nelkin for Foot, P. (2002). The Problem of Abortion and the helping me develop my perspectives on Doctrine of the Double Effect. Virtues and moral responsibility and bioethics, and Vices,19-32. Professor Sam Rickless, who led UCSD’s doi:10.1093/0199252866.003.0002 Ethic’s Bowl Team and demonstrated how to examine ethical dilemmas with vigor and Kant, I. (2009). Critique of Pure Reason. (Guyer, P. precision. Additionally, I’m grateful to the Trans.) Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. students and faculty of the UCSD philosophy (original work published in 1787) department, who all contributed to my philosophical growth. Kant, I. (2018). Religion within the boundaries of mere reason: And other writings. (Wood, A. References: W., Giovanni, G. D., Eds) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Original work Alexander, L and Moore, M. (2016) Deontological published in 1793) Ethics, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward Knobe, J. (2003). Intentional action and side effects N. Zalta (ed.), Retrieved from in ordinary language. Analysis, 63(279), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/ 190-194. doi:10.1111/1467-8284.00419 entries/ethics-deontological/ Lorenz, E.N. (1963): Deterministic nonperiodic flow. Aristotle, Irwin, T. (2007).Nicomachean Ethics. Journal of the Atmospheric Sciences 20, 130– Indianapolis, IN: Hackett. 41.1 142 Mill, J. S. (2011). Utilitarianism (C. Heydt, Ed.). Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press.(Original work published in 1861) Nathanson, S. (n.d.). Act and Rule Utilitarianism. In Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy Retrieved from https://www.iep.utm.edu/util-a-r/ Noah, L. (n.d.). Trolley Madness. Retrieved May 7, 2019, from https://hexistentialcomics.com/comic/106
Metaethical Utilitarianism is Best Served Through Normative Virtue Ethics Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford University Press 143
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