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Ethics Textbook

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Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-203

Ethics Theory and Contemporary Issues Ninth Edition Barbara MacKinnon University of San Francisco, Professor of Philosophy, Emerita Andrew Fiala California State University, Fresno, Professor of Philosophy Australia • Brazil • Mexico • Singapore • United Kingdom • United States Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-203

Ethics: Theory and Contemporary Issues, © 2018, 2015, 2012 Cengage Learning Ninth Edition Barbara MacKinnon, Andrew Fiala ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. No part of this work covered by the copyright herein may be reproduced or distributed in any form or by any means, Product Director: Paul Banks except as permitted by U.S. copyright law, without the prior written Product Manager: Debra Matteson permission of the copyright owner. Content Development Manager: Megan Garvey For product information and technology assistance, contact us at Content Developer: Adrienne Zicht Devlin Cengage Learning Customer & Sales Support, - - - Project Manager: Julia Giannotti Content Development Project Manager: Matt For permission to use material from this text or product, Gervais, Lumina Datamatics, Inc. submit all requests online at www.cengage.com/permissions. Associate Content Developer: Ryan McAndrews Further permissions questions can be emailed to Product Assistant: Staci Eckenroth [email protected]. Marketing Manager: Jillian Borden Senior Content Project Manager: Margaret The Library of Congress Control Number is on file. Park Bridges Art Director: Marissa Falco Student Edition: Manufacturing Planner: Julio Esperas ISBN: 978-1-305-95867-8 IP Analyst: Alex Ricciardi IP Project Manager: Nick Barrows Loose-leaf Edition: Production Service: Cenveo® Publisher ISBN: 978-1-305-95958-3 Services Compositor: Cenveo® Publisher Services Cengage Learning Text designer: Cenveo® Publisher Services 20 Channel Center Street Cover designer: Gary Ragaglia Boston, MA 02210 Design credit: Illustrart/Shutterstock.com USA Cover Images: © Samir Hussein/Getty Images Cengage Learning is a leading provider of customized learning solutions with © Photos.com/Getty Images employees residing in nearly 40 different countries and sales in more than © Cengage Learning 125 countries around the world. Find your local representative at © Georgios Kollidas/Alamy Stock Photo www.cengage.com. © Rob Melnychuk/Digital Vision/Getty Images © Joseph Sohm/Shutterstock.com Cengage Learning products are represented in Canada by © AP Images/Matthew Putney Nelson Education, Ltd. © Scott Peterson/Getty Images News/Getty Images To learn more about Cengage Learning Solutions, visit www.cengage.com. © Jose Luis Cereijido/EPA/Newscom Purchase any of our products at your local college store or at our preferred online store www.cengagebrain.com. Printed in the United States of America Print Number: 01 Print Year: 2016 Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-203

Contents Preface ix Ethics, Religion, and Divine History of Ethics Time Line xiii Command Theory 25 Part One ETHICAL THEORY 1 Pluralism and the Golden Rule 28 The Problem of Evil and Free —1— Ethics and Ethical Reasoning 1 Will 29 Secular Ethics and Toleration 31 Why Study Ethics? 1 READING Criticisms of Secularism and Global What Is Ethics? 2 Ethical and Other Types Ethics 32 of Evaluation 3 Euthyphro  •  Plato 35 Sociobiology and the Naturalistic Letter to a Christian Nation  •  SAM HARRIS 38 Fallacy 5 Religion and Truth  •  Mohandas K. Ethical Terms 6 Gandhi 39 Ethics and Reasons 7 Intuitionism, Emotivism, Review Exercises 42 Subjectivism, Objectivism 7 —3— Ethical Relativism 44 Ethical Reasoning and Descriptive versus Normative Arguments 9 Ethical Relativism 45 The Structure of Ethical Reasoning Individual versus Cultural and Argument 9 Relativism 46 Evaluating and Making Good Strong and Weak Relativism 47 Arguments 10 Reasons Supporting Ethical Ethical Theory 11 Relativism 48 Types of Ethical Theory 12 Can Ethics Be Taught? 13 The Diversity of Moral Views 48 Tolerance and READING Ethical Judgments and Matters of Fact  •  David Hume 14 Open-Mindedness 48 Emotivism and Ethics  •  Moral Uncertainty 48 C. L. Stevenson 15 Situational Differences 48 Review Exercises 19 Are These Reasons Convincing? 49 The Diversity of Moral Views 49 Tolerance and —2— Religion and Global Ethics 20 Open-Mindedness 50 Moral Uncertainty 50 Freedom, Cosmopolitanism, and the Situational Differences 50 European Enlightenment 22 Is Relativism 51 Religion, Civic Life, and Civil Self-Contradictory? Disobedience 24 Moral Realism 52 Moral Pluralism 53 iii ❮❮ Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-203

iv CONTENTS READING Who’s to Judge?  •  Louis Pojman 55 —6— Deontological Ethics and Relativism and Its Benefits  •  John Immanuel Kant 114 Lachs 62 Review Exercises 67 Deontology and the Ethics of Duty 115 —4— Egoism, Altruism, and the Social Contract 68 Immanuel Kant 117 READING Psychological Egoism 71 What Is the Right Motive? 117 What Is Psychological Egoism? 71 What Is the Right Thing to Do? 118 Is Psychological Egoism True? 72 READING The Categorical Imperative 119 Ethical Egoism 73 The First Form 120 What Is Ethical Egoism? 73 The Second Form 121 Is Ethical Egoism a Good Theory? 73 Evaluating Kant’s Moral The Social Contract 75 Theory 122 The Moral Point of View 76 The Nature of Moral Why Be Moral? 77 Obligation 122 The Ring of Gyges  •  Plato 79 Self Love  •  Thomas Hobbes 85 The Application of the Categorical The Social Contract and Imperative 122 Altruism  •  Steven Pinker 88 Duty 123 Review Exercises 92 Moral Equality and Impartiality 123 —5— Utilitarianism Perfect and Imperfect Duties 124 and John Stuart Mill 93 Variations on Kant and Deontology 125 Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals  •  Immanuel Kant 126 Review Exercises 137 Weighing Consequences 95 —7— Natural Law and Human Historical Background 96 Rights 138 Jeremy Bentham and John Natural Law Theory 140 147 Stuart Mill 96 Historical Origins 141 Evaluating Natural Law The Principle of Utility 97 Pleasure and Happiness 97 Theory 143 Calculating the Greatest Amount of Natural Rights 145 Evaluating Natural Rights Happiness 98 Quantity versus Quality Theory 146 Is There a Human Nature? of Pleasure 100 Evaluating Utilitarianism 101 READING On Natural Law  •  Thomas Aquinas 149 Application of the Principle 101 Second Treatise of Civil Utilitarianism and Personal Government  •  John Locke 151 Integrity 101 Ends and Means 102 Review Exercises 154 The Trolley Problem 102 —8— Virtue Ethics 155 Act and Rule Utilitarianism 103 “Proof” of the Theory 105 Virtues and Everyday Life 156 Aristotle 157 READING Utilitarianism  •  John Stuart Mill 107 Review Exercises 112 Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-203

CONTENTS v READING Virtue as a Mean 158 Combining the Types of Nature, Human Nature, and the Euthanasia 213 READING Human Good 158 Making Moral Judgments About Euthanasia 214 Cross-Cultural and Contemporary The Moral Significance of Virtue Ethics 160 Voluntariness 214 Active versus Passive Evaluating Virtue Ethics 161 Euthanasia 216 The Nicomachean Ethics  •  Aristotle 163 The Wrongfulness of Euthanasia  •  J. Gay-Williams 221 Review Exercises 170 Active and Passive Euthanasia  •  James Rachels 224 —9— Feminist Thought and the Ethics of Care 171 Review Exercises 228 Discussion Cases 230 Gender in Moral Reasoning and the Ethics of Care 174 —11— Abortion 231 READING Is There a Gender Difference in Stages of Fetal Development 233 Morality? 176 Methods of Abortion 235 Abortion and the Law 237 The Source of Feminine Abortion: The Moral Question 240 Morality 177 Arguments That Do Not Depend Evaluating Gender-Specific on the Moral Status of the Approaches to Morality 178 Fetus 240 Feminist Thought 179 Utilitarian Reasoning 240 Evaluation of Feminist Thought Some Rights Arguments 241 and the Ethics of Care 181 Arguments That Depend on the Moral Status of the Caring  •  Nel Noddings 184 Fetus 242 The Need for More Than Justice  •  Annette Baier 185 Method I 242 What Is Feminist Ethics?  •  Hilde Method II 245 Lindemann 192 Review Exercises 198 Part Two ETHICAL ISSUES 199 READING A Defense of Abortion  •  Judith Jarvis Thomson 251 —10— Euthanasia 199 Why Abortion Is Immoral  •  Don Marquis 252 Euthanasia for Infants The Value of Choice and the Choice and the Disabled 201 to Value: Expanding the Discussion About Fetal Life within Prochoice Criteria for Death 203 Advocacy  •  Bertha Alvarez Types of Euthanasia 206 Manninen 261 Active and Passive Review Exercises 275 Euthanasia 206 Discussion Cases 276 Voluntary, Nonvoluntary, and —12— Sexual Morality 278 Involuntary Euthanasia 207 Current Issues 280 Advance Directives 208 Conceptual Problems: What Is and Physician-Assisted Suicide 209 Pain Medication and Palliative Is Not Sexual 285 Sedation 211 Ordinary and Extraordinary Measures 212 Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-203

vi CONTENTS Relevant Factual Matters 286 —14— Economic Justice 344 Sexual Morality and Ethical Economic Inequality 346 Theories 287 Poverty, Education, and Health Consequentialist or Utilitarian Care 349 Considerations 287 Non-consequentialist Conceptions of Social Justice 350 or Deontological Considerations 288 Process Distributive Justice 352 End-State Distributive Natural Law Considerations 289 Justice 353 Same-Sex Marriage 291 Equal Opportunity 354 READING U.S. Supreme Court Decision June 26, Political and Economic 2015  •  Obergefell v. Hodges 296 Theories 356 Law, Morality, and “Sexual Orientation”  •  John Finnis 298 Libertarianism 356 “It’s Not Natural”  •  John Corvino 306 Capitalism 357 Socialism 357 Review Exercises 307 Modern Liberalism 359 360 Discussion Cases 308 John Rawls’s Theory of Justice Communitarianism 363 READING Justice as Fairness  •  John Rawls 367 Distributive Justice  •  Robert —13— Equality and Nozick 368 Discrimination 309 Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal  •  Ayn Rand 369 Discrimination 310 Evangelii Gaudium  •  Pope Racial Discrimination 311 Francis 370 The Principle of Equality 316 Review Exercises 373 Justice 316 Discussion Cases 374 Social Benefits and Harms 316 READING Proof and Reality of —15— Punishment Difference 316 and the Death Penalty 375 Relevant Differences 317 Challenges to the Principle 318 The Nature of Legal Punishment 377 Current Issues and the Law 320 Profiling 322 The Deterrence Argument 378 Hate Crimes 324 The Retributivist Argument 379 Punishment and Affirmative Action and Preferential Treatment 325 Responsibility 381 Consequentialist Prisons 383 Considerations 326 Non-consequentialist Race 384 Considerations 328 Restoration and Rehabilitation 385 Five Faces of Oppression  •  Iris Marion The Death Penalty 386 Young 333 Racisms  •  Kwame Anthony Legal Issues 386 Appiah 334 Exonerations 388 White Privilege, Black Rights  •  Naomi Racial Bias and Fairness 388 Zack 335 Costs 389 Deterrence Considerations 390 Review Exercises 342 Retributivist Considerations 391 Discussion Cases 343 Mercy and Restorative Justice 392 Humane Executions 394 Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-203

CONTENTS vii READING The New Jim Crow  •  Michelle Approaches to Animal Ethics 468 Alexander 400 Sentience, Equal Consideration, Are Prisons Obsolete?  •  Angela Y. READING and Animal Welfare 469 Davis 401 Animal Rights 472 Speech in Favor of Capital Punishment (1868)  •  John Stuart Mill 402 All Animals Are Equal  •  Peter A Theory of Just Execution  •  Lloyd Singer 477 Steffen 406 The Case for Animal Rights  •  Tom Regan 486 Review Exercises 415 Speciesism and the Idea of Discussion Cases 416 Equality  •  Bonnie Steinbock 487 —16— Environmental Ethics 417 Review Exercises 488 Discussion Cases 489 The Environment and Its —18— Biotechnology and Value 419 Bioengineering 490 READING Anthropocentrism 420 Current Issues 492 Cost–Benefit Analysis 421 Athletic and Cognitive Environmental Justice 422 READING Enhancement 492 Stem Cell Research 493 Ecocentrism 423 Cloning 495 Deep Ecology 425 Genetic Engineering and Genetic Ecofeminism 426 Screening 496 Genetically Modified Plants and Current Issues 427 Animals 499 Climate Change 427 Ozone Depletion 431 Legal and Ethical Issues 500 Waste Disposal and Athletic and Cognitive Pollution 431 Enhancement 501 Wilderness Preservation 433 Stem Cell Research 502 International Environmental Cloning 503 Conventions 434 Genetic Engineering and Genetic Global Justice and the Tragedy of the Screening 506 Commons 435 Genetically Modified Organisms 509 People or Penguins: The Case for Transhumanist Declaration  •  Various Optimal Pollution  •  William F. Authors 514 Baxter 442 Ageless Bodies, Happy Souls  •  Leon R. Deep Ecology  •  Bill Devall and George Kass 515 Sessions 443 In Defense of Posthuman Radical American Environmentalism Dignity  •  Nick Bostrom 525 and Wilderness Preservation: A Third World Critique  •  Ramachandra Review Exercises 526 Guha 449 Discussion Cases 527 Review Exercises 455 Discussion Cases 456 —17— Animal Ethics 457 —19— Violence and War 528 Current Issues 460 Realism 531 Moral Vegetarianism 460 Pacifism 533 Animal Experimentation 463 Just War Theory 534 Endangered Species 466 Jus ad Bellum 534 Jus in Bello 536 Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-203

viii CONTENTS READING Current Issues 538 Justice 565 Terrorism 538 Rights 567 Targeted Killing and Drones 540 READING Weapons of Mass Practical Considerations 568 Destruction 542 Global Inequality 568 War Crimes and Universal Human Levels of International Aid 569 Rights 544 Causes of Global Poverty 570 Torture 546 Solutions and Progress 573 Peace  •  Andrew Fitz-Gibbon 548 Globalization and Its Critics 573 The Triumph of Just War Theory (and Economic Impacts 574 the Dangers of Success)  •  Michael Cultural Diversity 575 Walzer 554 The Singer Solution to World Review Exercises 558 Poverty  •  Peter Singer 580 Discussion Cases 559 Living on a Lifeboat  •  Garrett Hardin 584 —20— Global Justice and Review Exercises 591 Globalization 560 Discussion Cases 592 Moral Arguments About Global GLOSSARY 593 Poverty 563 INDEX 603 Self-Interest 565 Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-203

Preface This ninth edition of Ethics: Theory and Contem- This edition offers expanded and continued cov- porary Issues contains a substantial revision of the erage of the following topics: global (non-Western) text and extensive update of the empirical mate- philosophy and religion, the prisoner’s dilemma rial contained in the chapters focused on contem- and the tragedy of the commons, social justice and porary issues. Andrew Fiala joined as coauthor on economic inequality, mass incarceration and decar- the eighth edition. In the ninth edition, we have ceration, restorative justice, environmental justice, included new learning apparatus, especially tables biotechnology and bioengineering, gene editing, that outline possible moral positions with regard vegetarianism and the ethics of hunting, circuses, to the issues considered. As in past editions, each race and racism, pacifism, gay marriage, global pov- chapter begins with a detailed, accessible intro- erty, LGBT and transgender issues, Black Lives Mat- duction that prepares the student to read accom- ter, Syrian refugees, the precautionary principle, and panying selections from important and influential climate change. This edition includes some famil- philosophers. The book remains a comprehensive iar readings from previous editions and some new introduction to ethics in theory and practice. It also additions. In some cases, older readings have been continues to emphasize pedagogy through clear shortened to make room for new readings and short summaries, engaging examples, and various study excerpts by a more diverse set of authors, includ- tools—such as review exercises and discussion ing some emerging voices. New readings include: cases. Each chapter begins with a list of learning John Lachs on relativism, Hilde Lindemann on femi- objectives, and the book ends with an extensive nism, a new essay on abortion by Bertha Alvarez glossary of key terms. Manninen, U.S. Supreme Court Obergefell Deci- sion, Naomi Zack on Black Lives Matter, Iris Marion ADDITIONS AND CHANGES Young’s “Five Faces of Oppression,” Pope Francis and Ayn Rand on economic issues, Michelle Alex- Although the basic elements remain the same, this ander on the New Jim Crow, Tom Regan on ani- new ninth edition includes the following additions mal rights, the Transhumanist declaration, Andrew and changes from the eighth edition. Each chapter Fitz-Gibbon on peace, and Garret Hardin on global in Part I has been revised to focus on readability. All poverty. introductory and empirical material in each chapter in Part II has been updated to incorporate the latest Key Elements information about contemporary issues and current affairs. These updates include recent statistics, rel- Each chapter of Ethics: Theory and Contempo- evant cases, and contemporary examples. rary Issues contains an extended summary of key ix ❮❮ Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-203

x PREFACE concepts and issues written in clear, accessible prose. Pedagogical Aids This text is designed as an acces- These detailed summaries go beyond the short intro- sible, “user-friendly” introduction to ethics. To aid both ductions found in most ethics anthologies to provide instructor and student, we have provided the following students with a thorough grounding in the theory pedagogical aids: and practical application of philosophical ethics. ❯ a list of learning objectives at the beginning of As previously noted, these discussions have been thoroughly updated to include detailed information each chapter (new to this edition) on current events, statistics, and political and cul- tural developments. ❯ a real-life event, hypothetical dialogue, or The theory chapters in Part I present detailed updated empirical data at the beginning of each summaries of the theories and major concepts, posi- chapter tions, and arguments. The contemporary issues chapters in Part II include summaries of: ❯ diagrams, subheadings, and boldface key terms ❯ current social conditions and recent events, with and definitions that provide guideposts for read- ers and organize the summary exposition special emphasis on their relevance to students’ lives ❯ study questions for each reading selection ❯ review exercises at the end of each chapter that ❯ conceptual issues, such as how to define key can be used for exams and quizzes words and phrases (for example, cloning, terrorism, and distributive justice) ❯ a glossary of definitions of key terms (new to ❯ arguments and suggested ways to organize an this edition) ethical analysis of each topic ❯ discussion cases that follow each chapter in ❯ tables outlining possible moral positions, linked Part II and provide opportunities for class or group discussion to normative theories and key authors. ❯ topics and resources for written assignments in Throughout this text, we seek to engage read- ers by posing challenging ethical questions and then the discussion cases offering a range of possible answers or explanations. The aim is to present more than one side of each issue ❯ tables outlining moral positions (new to this so that students can decide for themselves what posi- tion they will take. This also allows instructors more edition). latitude to emphasize specific arguments and con- cepts and to direct the students’ focus as they see fit. A Digital Solution for Students and Instructors: Where possible throughout the text, the rela- tion of ethical theory to the practical issues is indi- MindTap for Philosophy for Ethics: Theory and cated. For example, one pervasive distinction used Contemporary Issues is a personalized, online throughout the text is between consequentialist and digital learning platform providing students with an non-consequentialist considerations and arguments. immersive learning experience that builds critical The idea is that if students are able to first situate thinking skills. Through a carefully designed chapter- or categorize a philosophical reason or argument, based learning path, MindTap allows students to then they will be better able to evaluate it critically easily identify the chapter’s learning objectives; in their thinking and writing. Connections to related draw connections and improve writing skills by concepts and issues in other chapters are also high- completing essay assignments; read short, manage- lighted throughout the text to help students note able sections from the e-book; and test their content similarities and contrasts among various ethical knowledge with critical thinking Aplia™ questions. positions. ❯ Chapter e-Book: Each chapter within MindTap contains the narrative of the chapter, offering an easy to navigate online reading experience. ❯ Chapter Quiz: Each chapter within MindTap ends with a summative Chapter Test covering the chapter’s learning objectives and ensuring Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-203

PREFACE xi students are reading and understanding the ❯ Digital flash cards are premade for each chapter, material presented. and students can make their own by adding ❯ Chapter Aplia Assignment: Each chapter images, descriptions, and more. includes an Aplia assignment that provides auto- MindTap gives students ample opportunities for matically graded critical thinking assignments improving comprehension and for self-evaluation to with detailed, immediate feedback and expla- prepare for exams, while also providing faculty and nations on every question. Students can also students alike a clear way to measure and assess choose to see another set of related questions if student progress. Faculty can use MindTap as a turn- they did not earn all available points in their first key solution or customize by adding YouTube videos, attempt and want more practice. RSS feeds, or their own documents directly within the e-book or within each chapter’s Learning Path. ❯ Ethics Simulations: Each chapter offers an MindTap goes well beyond an e-book and a home- work solution. It is truly a Personal Learning Experi- interactive simulated ethical dilemma, allowing ence that allows instructors to synchronize the reading students to make decisions and see the implica- with engaging assignments. To learn more, ask your tions of their choices. Cengage Learning sales representative to demo it for you—or go to www.Cengage.com/MindTap. ❯ Chapter Essay Question: Every chapter ends Instructor’s Resources: with essay prompts that ask students to explore and reflect on concepts from the chapter and The Instructor’s Companion Site features an Instruc- build writing and critical thinking faculties. tor’s Manual, PowerPoint Lecture Slides, and a robust Test Bank (Cengage Learning Testing pow- ❯ KnowNOW! Philosophy Blog: The KnowNOW! ered by Cognero). Philosophy Blog connects course concepts with The Instructor’s Manual provides useful sug- real-world events. Updated twice a week, the gestions for lectures and classroom activities, based blog provides a succinct philosophical analysis of directly on the content in this book. Answers to major news stories, along with multimedia and many review exercises or study questions are pro- discussion-starter questions. vided, as well as questions for further thought. MindTap also includes a variety of other tools that The PowerPoint Lecture Slides offer a chapter- support philosophy teaching and learning: by-chapter breakdown Cengage Learning Testing, powered by Cognero, new to this edition, allows ❯ The Philosophy Toolbox collects tutorials on instructors to author, edit, and manage Test Bank content. Instructors can create multiple test versions using MindTap and researching and writing aca- and instantly deliver them through their learning demic papers, including citation information and management system right to the classroom. tools, that instructors can use to support students in the writing process. Interested instructors can find and access all this content by adding the ninth edition of this book to ❯ Questia allows professors and students to search their bookshelf on Cengage.com. a database of thousands of peer-reviewed jour- IN SUMMARY nals, newspapers, magazines, and full-length books—all assets can be added to any relevant We have sought to make this ninth edition of Ethics: chapter in MindTap, and students can Theory and Contemporary Issues the most compre- hensive ethics text available. It combines theory ❯ Kaltura allows instructors to create and insert and issues, text and readings, as well as up-to-date empirical information about contemporary moral inline video and audio into the MindTap platform. ❯ ReadSpeaker reads the text out loud to students in a voice they can customize. ❯ Note-taking and highlighting are organized in a central location that can be synced with Ever- Note on any mobile device a student may have access to. Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-203

xii PREFACE problems. It is designed to be flexible, user-friendly, of South Carolina; Dusan Galic, College of DuPage; current, pedagogically helpful, and balanced. Erin Anchustegu, Boise State University; Christina Tomczak, Cedar Valley College; Susan Brown, Uni- ❯ The flexible structure of the text allows instruc- versity of West Florida; Philip Cronce, Chicago State University; William Rodriguez, Bethune Cookman tors to emphasize only those theories and applied University; Robert Arp, Johnson County Community ethical topics which best suit their courses. College; Jason Gooch, Yakima Valley Community College; Jason Flato, Georgia Perimeter College; and ❯ The text is user-friendly, while at the same time Eric Severson, Seattle Pacific University. philosophically reliable. It employs pedagogical Barbara MacKinnon especially wants to thank aids throughout and at the end of each chapter, the students in her classes at the University of San and provides extensive examples from current Francisco. Over the years, they have contributed events and trends. The exposition challenges greatly to this text by challenging her to keep up students with stimulating questions and is with the times and to make things more clear and interspersed with useful diagrams, charts, and more interesting. She also appreciates the support headings. of her husband and fellow philosopher, Edward MacKinnon. She dedicates this book to her two ❯ The text not only provides up-to-date coverage wonderful daughters, Jennifer and Kathleen. Andrew Fiala is thankful for Barbara’s hard work throughout of developments in the news and in scientific the previous editions of this book and for the oppor- journals but also on ethical issues as they are tunity to transform his classroom teaching experi- discussed in contemporary philosophy. ence into a useful text for teaching ethics. ❯ It offers a balanced collection of readings, includ- We also wish to acknowledge the many profes- sional people from Cengage Learning and its ven- ing both the ethical theories and contemporary dors who have worked on this edition, including: sources on the issues. Debra Matteson, Product Manager; Adrienne Devlin, Content Developer; Megan Garvey, Content Devel- ❯ Ethics: Theory and Contemporary Issues, ninth opment Manager; Lauren MacLachlan, Production Manager; Margaret Park Bridges, Senior Content edition, is accompanied by a broad range of Project Manager; Marissa Falco, Art Director; and online and textual tools that amplify its teach- Kritika Kaushik, Project Manager, at Cenveo Pub- ability and give instructors specific pedagogical lisher Services. tools for different learning styles. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS We wish to thank the many people who have made valuable suggestions for improving the ninth edi- tion of the text, including Marie Gaudio-Zaccaria, Georgia Perimeter College; K.C. Warble III, University Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-203

HISTORY OF ETHICS TIME LINE xiii 500 B.C.E. 400 300 Ancient 0 100 C.E. 200 200 100 Socrates Jesus ? 4 B.C.E.–C.E. 29 Sappho 469–399 Zeno Plotinus Philo Judaeus 205–270 637–577 351–270 20 B.C.E.–C.E. 40 Plato Buddha 427–347 557–477 Aristotle Sextus Empiricus Confucius 384–322 60–117 Marcus Aurelius 552–479 121–180 C.E. 300 400 500 600 700 Medieval 1000 1100 1200 1300 800 900 Augustine Boethius 345–400 480–524 Anselm Aquinas 1033–1109 1224–1274 Mohammed 570–632 Abelard Scotus 1079–1142 1265–1308 Avicebron Ockham 1021–1058 1285–1347 Maimonides 1135–1204 Avicenna Averroes 980–1037 1126–1198 Modern 1500 1600 1700 1800 1900 2000 Bacon Locke Hume Kierkegaard Moore 1561–1626 1632–1704 1711–1776 1813–1851 1873–1958 Hobbes Leibniz Kant Marx Rawls 1724–1804 1818–1883 1921–2002 1588–1679 1646–1716 Spinoza Hegel Nietzsche Habermas 1632–1677 1770–1831 1844–1900 1929– Rousseau Mill Sartre Singer 1712–1778 1806–1873 1905–1979 b. 1946– Wollstonecraft Gandhi Noddings 1759–1797 1869–1948 b. 1929– Bentham DeBeauvoir 1748–1832 1908–1986 James 1846–1910 Dewey 1859–1952 Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-203

Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-203

Ethics and Ethical Reasoning 1 Learning Outcomes After reading this chapter, you should be able to: • Describe the philosophical study of ethics. • Differentiate between instrumental and • Discuss the difference between normative • intrinsic values. Jack Hollingsworth/Photodisc/Getty Images • and descriptive claims. Distinguish consequentialist from Define key terms: intuitionism, emotivism, nonconsequentialist approaches to • objectivism, and subjectivism. • ethics. Explain the difference between Use the distinctions among motives, acts, and consequences to analyze • metaethics and normative ethics. ethical phenomena. Decide whether naturalistic explanations of ethics commit the naturalistic fallacy. For more chapter resources and activities, go to MindTap. WHY STUDY ETHICS? It is clear that we often disagree about questions of value. Should same-sex marriage be legal? Should women have abortions? Should drugs such as marijuana be legal- ized? Should we torture terrorists in order to get information from them? Should we eat animals or use them in medical experiments? These sorts of questions are sure to expose divergent ideas about what is right or wrong. Discussions of these sorts of questions often devolve into unreasonable name- calling, foot-stomping, and other questionable argument styles. The philosophical study of ethics aims to produce good arguments that provide reasonable support for our opinions about practical topics. If someone says that abortion should (or should not) be permitted, he or she needs to explain why this is so. It is not enough to say that abortion should not be permitted because it is wrong or that women should be allowed to choose abortion because it is wrong to limit women’s choices. To say that these things are wrong is merely to reiterate that they should not be permitted. Such an answer begs the question. Circular, question-begging arguments are falla- cious. We need further argument and information to know why abortion is wrong or why limiting free choice is wrong. We need a theory of what is right and wrong, good or evil, justified, permissible, and unjustifiable, and we need to understand how our theory applies in concrete cases. The first half of this text will discuss various Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-203

PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY theories and concepts that can be used to help us basic ethical questions. In Chapter 2, we discuss the avoid begging the question in debates about ethical world’s diverse religious traditions and ask whether issues. The second half looks in detail at a number there is a set of common ethical ideas that is shared of these issues. by these traditions. In this chapter, we clarify what ethics is and how ethical reasoning should proceed. It is appropriate to wonder, at the outset, why we need to do this. Why isn’t it sufficient to simply state WHAT IS ETHICS? your opinion and assert that “x is wrong (or evil, just, permissible, etc.)”? One answer to this ques- On the first day of an ethics class, we often ask stu- tion is that such assertions do nothing to solve the dents to write one-paragraph answers to the ques- deep conflicts of value that we find in our world. We tion, “What is ethics?” know that people disagree about abortion, same- sex marriage, animal rights, and other issues. If we How would you answer? Over the years, there are to make progress toward understanding each have been significant differences of opinion among other, if we are to make progress toward establishing our students on this issue. Some have argued that some consensus about these topics, then we have ethics is a highly personal thing, a matter of private to understand why we think certain things are right opinion. Others claim that our values come from and others are wrong. We need to make arguments family upbringing. Other students think that ethics and give reasons in order to work out our own con- is a set of social principles, the codes of one’s soci- clusions about these issues and in order to explain ety or particular groups within it, such as medical our conclusions to others. or legal organizations. Some write that many people get their ethical beliefs from their religion. It is also insufficient to appeal to custom or authority in deriving our conclusions about moral One general conclusion can be drawn from these issues. While it may be appropriate for children to students’ comments: We tend to think of ethics as simply obey their parents’ decisions, adults should the set of values or principles held by individuals strive for more than conformity and obedience to or groups. I have my ethics and you have yours; authority. Sometimes our parents and grandparents groups—professional organizations and societies, are wrong—or they disagree among themselves. for example—have shared sets of values. We can Sometimes the law is wrong—or laws conflict. study the various sets of values that people have. And sometimes religious authorities are wrong—or This could be done historically and sociologically. authorities do not agree. To appeal to authority on Or we could take a psychological interest in deter- moral issues, we would first have to decide which mining how people form their values. But philosoph- authority is to be trusted and believed. Which reli- ical ethics is a critical enterprise that asks whether gion provides the best set of moral rules? Which set any particular set of values or beliefs is better than of laws in which country is to be followed? Even any other. We compare and evaluate sets of values within the United States, there is currently a conflict and beliefs, giving reasons for our evaluations. We of laws with regard to some of these issues: some ask questions such as, “Are there good reasons for states have legalized medical marijuana or physi- preferring one set of ethics over another?” In this cian assisted suicide, others have not. The world’s text, we examine ethics from a critical or evaluative religions also disagree about a number of issues: standpoint. This examination will help you come to for example, the status of women, the permissibil- a better understanding of your own values and the ity of abortion, and the question of whether war values of others. is justifiable. And members of the same religion or denomination may disagree among themselves Ethics is a branch of philosophy. It is also called about these issues. To begin resolving these con- moral philosophy. In general, philosophy is a dis- flicts, we need critical philosophical inquiry into cipline or study in which we ask—and attempt to answer—basic questions about key areas or sub- ject matters of human life and about pervasive and Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-203

Chapter ❮❮ Ethics and Ethical Reasoning significant aspects of experience. Some philoso- Ethics, or moral philosophy, asks basic questions phers, such as Plato and Kant, have tried to do this about the good life, about what is better and worse, systematically by interrelating their philosophical about whether there is any objective right and wrong, views in many areas. According to Alfred North and how we know it if there is. Whitehead, “Philosophy is the endeavor to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas One objective of ethics is to help us decide what in terms of which every element of our experience is good or bad, better or worse. This is generally can be interpreted.”1 Some contemporary philoso- called normative ethics. Normative ethics defends phers have given up on the goal of building a sys- a thesis about what is good, right, or just. Norma- tem of general ideas, arguing instead that we must tive ethics can be distinguished from metaethics. work at problems piecemeal, focusing on one partic- Metaethical inquiry asks questions about the ular issue at a time. For instance, some philosophers nature of ethics, including the meaning of ethical might analyze the meaning of the phrase to know, terms and judgments. Questions about the relation while others might work on the morality of lying. between philosophical ethics and religion—as we Some philosophers are optimistic about our ability to discuss in Chapter 2—are metaethical. Theoretical address these problems, while others are more skep- questions about ethical relativism—as discussed in tical because they think that the way we analyze the Chapter 3—are also metaethical. The other chapters issues and the conclusions we draw will always be in Part I are more properly designated as ethical influenced by our background, culture, and habitual theory. These chapters present concrete normative ways of thinking. Most agree, however, that these theories; they make claims about what is good or problems are worth wondering about and caring evil, just or unjust. about. From the mid 1930s until recently, metaeth- We can ask philosophical questions about many ics predominated in English-speaking universities. subjects. In the philosophical study of aesthetics, In doing metaethics, we often analyze the mean- philosophers ask basic or foundational questions ing of ethical language. Instead of asking whether about art and objects of beauty: what kinds of things the death penalty is morally justified, we would do or should count as art (rocks arranged in a cer- ask what we meant in calling something “morally tain way, for example)? Is what makes something justified” or “good” or “right.” We analyze ethical an object of aesthetic interest its emotional expres- language, ethical terms, and ethical statements to siveness, its peculiar formal nature, or its ability determine what they mean. In doing this, we func- to reveal truths that cannot be described in other tion at a level removed from that implied by our ways? In the philosophy of science, philosophers definition. It is for this reason that we call this other ask whether scientific knowledge gives us a picture type of ethics metaethics—meta meaning “beyond.” of reality as it is, whether progress exists in science, Some of the discussions in this chapter are metaethi- and whether the scientific method discloses truth. cal discussions—for example, the analysis of vari- Philosophers of law seek to understand the nature ous senses of “good.” As you will see, much can be of law itself, the source of its authority, the nature learned from such discussions. of legal interpretation, and the basis of legal respon- sibility. In the philosophy of knowledge, called ETHICAL AND OTHER TYPES epistemology, we try to answer questions about OF EVALUATION what we can know of ourselves and our world, and what it means to know something rather than just to “That’s great!” “Now, this is what I call a delicious believe it. In each area, philosophers ask basic ques- meal!” “That play was wonderful!” All of these tions about the particular subject matter. This is also statements express approval of something. They do true of moral philosophy. not tell us much about the meal or the play, but they do imply that the speaker thought they were good. These are evaluative statements. Ethical statements Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-203

PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY or judgments are also evaluative. They tell us what “That is a good knife” is an evaluative or nor- the speaker believes is good or bad. They do not sim- mative statement. However, it does not mean that ply describe the object of the judgment—for exam- the knife is morally good. In making ethical judg- ple, as an action that occurred at a certain time or ments, we use terms such as good, bad, right, that affected people in a certain way. They go further wrong, obligatory, and permissible. We talk about and express a positive or negative regard for it. Of what we ought or ought not to do. These are evalu- course, factual matters are relevant to moral evalua- ative terms. But not all evaluations are moral in tion. For example, factual judgments about whether nature. We speak of a good knife without attribut- capital punishment has a deterrent effect might be ing moral goodness to it. In so describing the knife, relevant to our moral judgments about it. So also we are probably referring to its practical usefulness would we want to know the facts about whether for cutting. Other evaluations refer to other systems violence can ever bring about peace; this would of values. When people tell us that a law is legiti- help us judge the morality of war. Because ethical mate or unconstitutional, that is a legal judgment. judgments often rely on such empirical informa- When we read that two articles of clothing ought not tion, ethics is often indebted to other disciplines such to be worn together, that is an aesthetic judgment. as sociology, psychology, and history. Thus, we When religious leaders tell members of their com- can distinguish between empirical or descriptive munities what they ought to do, that is a religious claims, which state factual beliefs, and evaluative matter. When a community teaches people to bow judgments, which state whether such facts are good before elders or use eating utensils in a certain way, or bad, just or unjust, right or wrong. Evaluative that is a matter of custom. These various normative judgments are also called normative judgments. or evaluative judgments appeal to practical, legal, Moral judgments are evaluative because they “place aesthetic, religious, or customary norms for their a value,” negative or positive, on some action or justification. practice, such as capital punishment. How do other types of normative judgments • Descriptive (empirical) judgment: Capital punish- differ from moral judgments? Some philosophers ment acts (or does not act) as a deterrent. believe that it is a characteristic of moral “oughts” in particular that they override other “oughts,” such • Normative (moral) judgment: Capital punishment as aesthetic ones. In other words, if we must choose is justifiable (or unjustifiable). between what is aesthetically pleasing and what is morally right, then we ought to do what is morally We also evaluate people, saying that a person is right. In this way, morality may also take prece- good or evil, just or unjust. Because these evalua- dence over the law and custom. The doctrine of civil tions also rely on beliefs in general about what is disobedience relies on this belief, because it holds good or right, they are also normative. For example, that we may disobey certain laws for moral reasons. the judgment that a person is a hero or a villain is Although moral evaluations differ from other nor- based upon a normative theory about good or evil mative evaluations, this is not to say that there is no sorts of people. Normative Judgments in Descriptive Judgments in Ethics Law Aesthetics Religion Custom Sociology Psychology Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-203

Chapter ❮❮ Ethics and Ethical Reasoning relation between them. In fact, moral reasons often against simplistically deriving an ought from an is form the basis for certain laws. But law—at least in Hume’s law. From this perspective, it is not logi- the United States—results from a variety of political cal, for example, to base our ideas about how we compromises. We don’t tend to look to the law for ought to behave from a factual account of how we moral guidance. And we are reluctant to think that actually do behave. This logical mistake was called we can “legislate morality,” as the saying goes. Of the naturalistic fallacy by G. E. Moore, an influ- course, there is still an open debate about whether ential philosopher of the early twentieth century. the law should enforce moral ideas in the context of Moore maintained that moral terms such as good issues such as gay marriage or abortion. are names for nonempirical properties that cannot be reduced to some other natural thing. Moore claimed There may be moral reasons supporting legal that to attempt to define good in terms of some mun- arrangements—considerations of basic justice, for dane or natural thing such as pleasure is to com- example. Furthermore, the fit or harmony between mit a version of this fallacy. The problem is that we forms and colors that ground some aesthetic judg- can ask whether pleasures are actually good. Just ments may be similar to the rightness or moral fit because we desire pleasure does not mean that it is between certain actions and certain situations or good to desire pleasure. As Moore suggested, there beings. Moreover, in some ethical systems, actions is always an open question about whether what is are judged morally by their practical usefulness for natural is also good. producing valued ends. For now, however, note that ethics is not the only area in which we make norma- Now, not everyone agrees that appeals to nature tive judgments. in ethics are fallacious. There are a variety of natu- ralistic approaches to thinking about ethics. One SOCIOBIOLOGY AND THE NATURALISTIC traditional approach to ethics is called natural law FALLACY ethics (which we discuss in detail in Chapter 7). Natural law ethics focuses on human nature and The distinction between descriptive and norma- derives ethical precepts from an account of what tive claims is a central issue for thinking about eth- is natural for humans. Natural law ethicists may ics. We often confuse these issues in our ordinary argue, for example, that human body parts have thinking, in part because we think that what we natural functions and that by understanding these ordinarily do is what we ought to do. Many people natural functions, we can figure out certain moral are inclined to say that if something is natural to ideas about sexuality or reproduction. Opponents us, then we ought to do it. For example, one might might argue that this commits the naturalistic fal- argue that since eating meat is natural for us, we lacy, since there is no obvious moral content to be ought to eat meat. But vegetarians will disagree. seen in the structure and function of our body parts. Indeed, there is no necessary relation between what is ethical and what is natural or customary. It is thus A more recent version of naturalism in ethics not true that what is natural is always good. But focuses on evolutionary biology and cognitive sci- people often make the mistake of confusing facts of ence. From this perspective, to understand morality, nature and value judgments. Most of the time, we we need to understand the basic functions of our are not attentive to the shift from facts to values, species, including the evolutionary reasons behind the shift from is to ought. Consider an example used moral behavior. We also need to understand how by the eighteenth-century philosopher David Hume, our brains function in order to explain how pleasure who noticed that incest appears to be quite natural— works, why some people are psychopathic, and why animals do it all the time. But human beings con- we struggle to balance egoistic and altruistic moti- demn incest. If it is natural, why do we condemn it? vations. One version of this naturalism is known Hume pointed out the problem of deriving an ought as sociobiology—an idea that was introduced by from an is; philosophers after Hume named the rule the biologist E. O. Wilson.2 “If the brain evolved Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-203

PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY Jeannette Katzir Photog/Shutterstock.com Dawkins’s idea is that our genes use our altruistic and other behaviors to spread themselves. Thus, Does animal behavior provide a guide for human when we cooperate within groups that share a ethical behavior? genetic endowment, we help to preserve the group and help to disseminate our shared genetic char- by natural selection, even the capacities to select acteristics, often in competition with rival genetic particular esthetic judgments and religious beliefs groups.4 must have arisen by the same mechanistic process,” Wilson explained.3 The basic idea of sociobiology In discussing sociobiology and interpreting bio- is that human behaviors result from the pressures logical evidence, we must be careful, however, not of natural selection. Understanding human moral- to anthropomorphize.5 When we look at the natu- ity involves understanding the adaptive advantage ral world, we often interpret it in anthropomorphic of certain behaviors, which can be studied by com- terms, seeing in animals and even in genes them- paring human behaviors with the behavior of other selves the motivations and interests that human social animals—from insects to chimpanzees. beings have. In other words, we must be careful that our value judgments do not cloud or confuse our Sociobiology attempts to understand altruism, for description of the facts. example, in terms of evolutionary processes. From this perspective, altruistic concern develops through While the naturalistic approach of sociobiology natural selection because altruistic animals will is provocative and insightful, we might still worry help each other survive. Biologist Richard Dawkins that it commits the naturalistic fallacy. Just because explains a related idea in terms of “the selfish gene.” altruistic behavior is natural and useful in the evo- lutionary struggle for survival does not mean that it is good, just, or right. To see this, let us return to Hume’s example of incest. Incest might be useful as a method for disseminating our genetic material— so long as the negative problems associated with inbreeding are minimized. We do inbreed animals in this way in order to select for desirable traits. But it is still appropriate to ask whether incest is mor- ally permissible for human beings—the question of ought might not be settled by what is. ETHICAL TERMS You might have wondered what the difference is between calling something “right” and calling it “good.” Consider the ethical meaning for these terms. Right and wrong usually apply to actions, as in “You did the right thing,” or “That is the wrong thing to do.” These terms prescribe things for us to do or not to do. On the other hand, when we say that something is morally good, we may not explic- itly recommend doing it. However, we do recom- mend that it be positively regarded. Thus, we say things such as “Peace is good, and distress is bad.” It is also interesting that with “right” and “wrong” there seems to be no in-between; it is either one or Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-203

Chapter ❮❮ Ethics and Ethical Reasoning the other. However, with “good” and “bad” there is of making good judgments. Sometimes this is surely room for degrees, and some things are thought to be true, as when we are overcome by anger, jealousy, better or worse than others. or fear and cannot think clearly. Biases and preju- dice may stem from such strong feelings. We think Other ethical terms require careful consideration. prejudice is wrong because it prevents us from judg- For example, when we say that something “ought” ing rightly. But emotions can often aid good deci- or “ought not” to be done, there is a sense of sion making. We may, for example, simply feel the urgency and obligation. We can refrain from doing injustice of a certain situation or the wrongness of what we ought to do, but the obligation is still there. someone’s suffering. Furthermore, our caring about On the other hand, there are certain actions that we some issue or person may, in fact, direct us to more think are permissible but that we are not obligated carefully examine the ethical issues involved. How- to do. Thus, one may think that there is no obliga- ever, some explanation of why we hold a certain tion to help someone in trouble, though it is “mor- moral position is still required. Simply to say “X ally permissible” (i.e., not wrong) to do so and even is just wrong” without explanation, or to merely “praiseworthy” to do so in some cases. Somewhat express strong feelings or convictions about “X,” is more specific ethical terms include just and unjust not sufficient. and virtuous and vicious. INTUITIONISM, EMOTIVISM, To a certain extent, which set of terms we use SUBJECTIVISM, OBJECTIVISM depends on the particular overall ethical viewpoint or theory we adopt. This will become clearer as we Philosophers differ on how we know what is discuss and analyze the various ethical theories in good. They also differ on the question of whether this first part of the text. moral judgments refer to something objective or whether they are reports of subjective opinions or ETHICS AND REASONS dispositions. When we evaluate something as right or wrong, To say that something is good is often thought good or bad, we appeal to certain norms or rea- to be different from saying that something is yel- sons. If I say that affirmative action is unjustified, I low or heavy. The latter two qualities are empirical, should give reasons for this conclusion; it will not be known by our senses. However, good or goodness acceptable for me to respond that this is merely the is held to be a nonempirical property, said by some way I feel. If I have some intuitive negative response to be knowable through intuition. A position known to preferential treatment forms of affirmative action, as intuitionism claims that our ideas about ethics then I will be expected to delve deeper to determine rest upon some sort of intuitive knowledge of ethi- whether there are reasons for this attitude. Perhaps I cal truths. This view is associated with G. E. Moore, have experienced the bad results of such programs. whom we discussed earlier.6 Another philoso- Or I may believe that giving preference in hiring pher, W. D. Ross, thinks that we have a variety of or school admissions on the basis of race or sex is “crystal-clear intuitions” about basic values. These unfair. In either case, I will be expected to push the intuitions are clear and distinct beliefs about ethics, matter further and explain why it is unfair or even which Ross explains using an analogy with mathe- what constitutes fairness and unfairness. matics: just as we see or intuit the self-evident truth of “2 + 2 = 4,” we also see or intuit ethical truths: Reason-giving is essential in philosophical eth- for example, that we have a duty to keep our prom- ics. However, this does not mean that making ethi- ises. As Ross explains, cal judgments is and must be purely rational. We might be tempted to think that good moral judg- Both in mathematics and in ethics we have certain ments require us to be objective and not let our feel- crystal-clear intuitions from which we build up all that ings, or emotions, enter into our decision making. we can know about the nature of numbers and the Yet this assumes that feelings always get in the way Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-203

PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY nature of duty . . . we do not read off our knowledge of One worry, however, is that our emotions and particular branches of duty from a single ideal of the feelings of sympathy or disgust are variable and rel- good life, but build up our ideal of the good life from ative. Our own emotional responses vary depending intuitions into the particular branches of duty.7 upon our moods and these responses vary among and between individuals. Emotional responses are A very important question is whether our intu- relative to culture and even to the subjective dis- itions point toward some objective moral facts in the positions of individuals. Indeed, our own feelings world or whether they are reports of something sub- change over time and are not reliable or sufficient jective. A significant problem for intuitionism is that gauges of what is going on in the external world. people’s moral intuitions seem to differ. Unlike the The worry here is that our emotions merely express crystal-clear intuitions of mathematics—which are internal or subjective responses to things and that shared by all of us—the intuitions of ethics are not they do not connect us to an objective and stable apparently shared by everyone. source of value. Another view, sometimes called emotivism, Other moral theories aim for more objective maintains that when we say something is good, we sources for morality. From this standpoint, there are showing our approval of it and recommending it must be objective reasons that ground our subjec- to others rather than describing it. This view is asso- tive and emotional responses to things. Instead ciated with the work of twentieth-century philoso- of saying that the things we desire are good, an phers such as A. J. Ayer and C. L. Stevenson. But it objectivist about ethics will argue that we ought to has deeper roots in a theory of the moral sentiments, desire things that are good—with an emphasis on such as we find in eighteenth-century philosophers the goodness of the thing-in-itself apart from our Adam Smith and David Hume. Hume maintains, for subjective responses. The ancient Greek philosopher example, that reason is “the slave of the passions,” Plato was an objectivist in this sense. Objectivists by which he means that the ends or goals we pursue hold that values have an objective reality—that they are determined by our emotions, passions, and sen- are objects available for knowledge—as opposed timents. Adam Smith maintains that human beings to subjectivists, who claim that value judgments are motivated by the experience of pity, compassion, merely express subjective opinion. Plato argues that and sympathy for other human beings. For Smith, there is some concept or idea called “the Good” and ethics develops out of natural sympathy toward one that we can compare our subjective moral opinions another, experienced by social beings like ourselves. about morality with this objective standard. Those who want to ground morality in God are objectivists, Emotivism offers an explanation of moral knowl- as are those who defend some form of natural law edge that is subjective, with moral judgments resting ethics, which focuses on essential or objective fea- upon subjective experience. One version of emotiv- tures of bodies and their functions. Interestingly, the ism makes ethical judgments akin to expressions of approach of sociobiology tends not to be objectivist approval or disapproval. In this view, to say “murder in this sense. Although the sociobiologist bases her is wrong” is to express something like “murder— study of morality on objective facts in the world, the yuck!” Similarly, to say “courageous self-sacrifice is sociobiologist does not think that moral judgments good” is to express something like “self-sacrifice— represent moral facts. Instead, as Michael Ruse yay!” One contemporary author, Leon Kass, whom puts it, we study in Chapter 18, argues that there is wisdom in our experiences of disgust and repugnance—that Objective ethics, in the sense of something written on our emotional reactions to things reveal deep moral tablets of stone (or engraven on God’s heart) external insight. Kass focuses especially on the “yuck factor” to us, has to go. The only reasonable thing that we, as that many feel about advanced biotechnologies such sociobiologists, can say is that morality is something as cloning. Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-203

Chapter ❮❮ Ethics and Ethical Reasoning biology makes us believe in, so that we will further The Structure of Ethical Reasoning our evolutionary ends.8 and Argument One of the issues introduced in Ruse’s rejection To be able to reason well in ethics you need to under- of objectivity in ethics is the distinction between stand what constitutes a good argument. We can do intrinsic and instrumental goods. Instrumental this by looking at an argument’s basic structure. goods are things that are useful as instruments or This is the structure not only of ethical arguments tools—we value them as means toward some other about what is good or right but also of arguments end. Intrinsic goods are things that have value in about what is the case or what is true. themselves or for their own sake. For example, we might say that life is an intrinsic good and funda- Suppose you are standing on the shore and a per- mentally valuable. But food is an instrumental good son in the water calls out for help. Should you try to because it is a means or tool that is used to sup- rescue that person? You may or may not be able to port life. From Ruse’s perspective, morality itself is swim. You may or may not be sure you could rescue merely an instrumental good that is used by evolu- the person. In this case, however, there is no time tion for other purposes. Morality is, from this per- for reasoning, as you would have to act promptly. spective, simply a tool that helps the human species On the other hand, if this were an imaginary case, to survive. The selfish gene hypothesis of Richard you would have to think through the reasons for Dawkins understands individual human beings and against trying to rescue the person. You might instrumentally, as carriers of genetic information: conclude that if you could actually rescue the per- “We are survival machines—robot vehicles blindly son, then you ought to try to do it. Your reasoning programmed to serve the selfish molecules known might go as follows: as genes.”9 This runs counter to our usual moral view, which holds that human beings have intrinsic Every human life is valuable. or inherent value. The idea that some things have Whatever has a good chance of saving such a life intrinsic value is an idea that is common to a variety should be attempted. of approaches that claim that ethics is objective. The My swimming out to rescue this person has a good intrinsic value of a thing is supposed to be an objec- chance of saving his life. tive fact about that thing, which has no relation to Therefore, I ought to do so. our subjective response to that thing. Claims about intrinsic value show up in arguments about human Or you might conclude that you could not save this rights and about the environment. Do human person, and your reasoning might go like this: beings, ecosystems, or species have intrinsic value, or is the value of these things contained within our Every human life is valuable. subjective responses and in their instrumental uses? Whatever has a good chance of saving such a life This question shows us that the metaethical theories should be attempted. are connected to important practical issues. In this case, there is no chance of saving this life because I cannot swim. ETHICAL REASONING AND ARGUMENTS Thus, I am not obligated to try to save him (although, if others are around who can help, I might be It is important to know how to reason well in think- obligated to try to get them to help). ing or speaking about ethical matters. This is helpful not only in trying to determine what to think about Some structure like this is implicit in any ethi- controversial ethical matters but also in arguing for cal argument, although some are longer and more something you believe is right and in critically eval- complex chains than the simple form given here. uating positions held by others. One can recognize the reasons in an argument by their introduction through key words such as since, Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-203

PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY because, and given that. The conclusion often con- what lying actually is. Must it be verbal? Must one tains terms such as thus and therefore. The reasons have an intent to deceive? What is deceit itself? supporting the conclusion are called premises. In a Other conceptual issues central to ethical arguments sound argument, the premises are true and the con- may involve questions such as, “What constitutes a clusion follows from them. In the case presented ear- ‘person’?” (in arguments over abortion, for exam- lier, then, we want to know whether you can save ple) and “What is ‘cruel and unusual punishment’?” this person and also whether his life is valuable. We (in death penalty arguments, for example). Some- also need to know whether the conclusion actually times, differences of opinion about an ethical issue follows from the premises. In the case of the earlier are a matter of differences not in values but in the examples, it does. If you say you ought to do what meaning of the terms used. will save a life and you can do it, then you ought to do it. However, there may be other principles that Ethical arguments often also rely on factual would need to be brought into the argument, such claims. In our example, we might want to know as whether and why one is always obligated to save whether it was actually true that you could save someone else’s life when one can. the drowning person. In arguments about the death penalty, we may want to know whether such pun- To know under what conditions a conclusion ishment is a deterrent. In such a case, we need actually follows from the premises, we would need to know what scientific studies have found and to analyze arguments in much greater detail than whether the studies themselves were well grounded. we can do here. Suffice it to say, however, that the To have adequate factual grounding, we will want to connection is a logical connection—in other words, seek out a range of reliable sources of information it must make rational sense. You can improve your and be open-minded. The chapters in Part II of this ability to reason well in ethics first by being able to book include factual material that is relevant to ethi- pick out the reasons and the conclusion in an argu- cal decisions about the topics under consideration. ment. Only then can you subject them to critical examination in ways we suggest here. It is important to be clear about the distinction between facts and values when dealing with moral Evaluating and Making Good Arguments conflict and disagreement. We need to ask whether we disagree about the values involved, about the Ethical reasoning can be done well or done poorly. concepts and terms we are employing, or about the Ethical arguments can be constructed well or con- facts connected to the case. structed poorly. A good argument is a sound argu- ment. It has a valid form in which the conclusion There are various ways in which reasoning can actually follows from the premises, and the prem- go wrong or be fallacious. We began this chapter by ises or reasons given for the conclusion are true. An considering the fallacy of begging the question argument is poorly constructed when it is fallacious or circular argument. Such reasoning draws on or when the reasons on which it is based are not the argument’s conclusion to support its premises, true or are uncertain. An ethical argument always as in “abortion is wrong because it is immoral.” involves some claim about values—for example, Another familiar problem of argumentation is the that saving a life is good. These value-based claims ad hominem fallacy. In this fallacy, people say must be established through some theory of values. something like, “That can’t be right because just Part I of this book examines different theories that look who is saying it.” They look at the source of the help establish basic values. opinion rather than the reasons given for it. You can find out more about these and other fallacies from Ethical arguments also involve conceptual and almost any textbook in logic or critical thinking. factual matters. Conceptual matters are those that relate to the meaning of terms or concepts. For You also can improve your understanding of ethi- example, in a case of lying, we would want to know cal arguments by making note of a particular type of reasoning that is often used in ethics: arguments Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-203

Chapter ❮❮ Ethics and Ethical Reasoning from analogy. In this type of argument, one com- Ethical Theory pares familiar examples with the issue being disputed. If the two cases are similar in relevant ways, then Ethical Principle whatever one concludes about the first familiar case one should also conclude about the disputed case. Ethical Judgment For example, Judith Jarvis Thomson (as discussed in Chapter 11) once asked whether it would be ethi- We can think of the diagram as a ladder. In prac- cally acceptable to “unplug” someone who had been tice, we can start at the ladder’s top or bottom. At the attached to you and who was using your kidneys top, at the level of theory, we can start by clarifying to save his life. If you say that you are justified in for ourselves what we think are basic ethical values. unplugging, then a pregnant woman is also justified We then move downward to the level of principles in doing the same with regard to her fetus. The reader generated from the theory. The next step is to apply is prompted to critically examine such an argument these principles to concrete cases. We can also start by asking whether or not the two cases were similar at the bottom of the ladder, facing a particular ethical in relevant ways—that is, whether the analogy fits. choice or dilemma. We can work our way back up the ladder, thinking through the principles and theories Finally, we should note that giving reasons to that implicitly guide our concrete decisions. Ultimately justify a conclusion is also not the same as giving and ideally, we come to a basic justification, or the an explanation for why one believes something. elements of what would be an ethical theory. If we A woman might explain that she does not sup- look at the actual practice of thinking people as they port euthanasia because that was the way she was develop their ethical views over time, the movement brought up or that she is opposed to the death pen- is probably in both directions. We use concrete cases alty because she cannot stand to see someone die. to reform our basic ethical views, and we use the basic To justify such beliefs, one would need rather to give ethical views to throw light on concrete cases. reasons that show not why one does, in fact, believe something but why one should believe it. Nor are An example of this movement in both directions rationalizations justifying reasons. They are usually would be if we start with the belief that pleasure reasons given after the fact that are not one’s true is the ultimate value and then find that applying reasons. Rationalizations are usually excuses, used this value in practice leads us to do things that are to explain away bad behavior. These false reasons contrary to common moral sense or that are repug- are given to make us look better to others or our- nant to us and others. We may then be forced to selves. To argue well about ethical matters, we need look again and possibly alter our views about the to examine and give reasons that support the con- moral significance of pleasure. Or we may change clusions we draw. our views about the rightness or wrongness of some particular act or practice on the basis of our theo- ETHICAL THEORY retical reflections. Obviously, this sketch of moral reasoning is quite simplified. Feminists and others Good reasoning in ethics usually involves either have criticized this model of ethical reasoning, partly implicit or explicit reference to an ethical theory. An because it claims that ethics is governed by general ethical theory is a systematic exposition of a par- ticular view about what is the nature and basis of good or right. The theory provides reasons or norms for judging acts to be right or wrong; it provides a justification for these norms. These norms can then be used as a guide for action. We can diagram the relationship between ethical theories and moral deci- sion making as follows. Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-203

PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY principles that are supposedly applicable to all ethi- That was good because it helped Jim develop his cal situations. Does this form of reasoning give due self-esteem—or it was bad because it caused Jim consideration to the particularities of individual, to believe things about himself that were not true. concrete cases? Can we really make a general judg- (Consequences) ment about the value of truthfulness or courage that will help us know what to do in particular cases in Although we generally think that a person’s motive which these issues play a role? is relevant to the overall moral judgment about his or her action, we tend to think that it reflects primar- TYPES OF ETHICAL THEORY ily on our moral evaluation of the person. We also have good reasons to think that the results of actions In Part I of this book, we consider the following types matter morally. Those theories that base moral judg- of moral theory: egoism and contractarianism, utili- ments on consequences are called consequentialist tarianism, deontological ethics, natural law, virtue or sometimes teleological moral theories (from the ethics, and feminist ethics. These theories differ in Greek root telos, meaning “goal” or “end”). Those terms of what they say we should look at in mak- theories that hold that actions can be right or wrong ing moral judgments about actions or practices. For regardless of their consequences are called noncon- example, does it matter morally that I tried to do the sequentialist or deontological theories (from the right thing or that I had a good motive? Surely it Greek root deon, meaning “duty”). must make some moral difference, we think. But sup- pose that in acting with good motives I violate some- One moral theory we will examine is utilitari- one’s rights. Does this make the action a bad action? anism. It provides us with an example of a conse- We would probably be inclined to say yes. Suppose, quentialist moral theory in which we judge whether however, that in violating someone’s rights, I am an action is better than alternatives by its actual or able to bring about a great good. Does this justify the expected results or consequences; actions are then violation of rights? Some theories judge actions in judged in terms of the promotion of human hap- terms of their motive, some in terms of the character piness. Kant’s moral theory, which we will also or nature of the act itself, and others in terms of the examine, provides us with an example of a non- consequences of the actions or practices. consequentialist theory, according to which acts are judged right or wrong independently of their conse- We often appeal to one of these types of reason. quences; in particular, acts are judged by whether Take a situation in which I lie to a person, Jim. We they conform to requirements of rationality and can make the following judgments about this action. human dignity. The other ethical theories that we Note the different types of reasons given for the will examine stress human nature as the source of judgments. what is right and wrong. Some elements of these theories are deontological and some teleological. So, Motive Act Consequences also, some teleological theories are consequentialist in that they advise us to produce some good. But if That was good because you intended to make Jim the good is an ideal, such as virtue or self-realization, happy by telling him a white lie—or it was bad then such theories differ from consequentialist the- because you meant to deceive him and do him harm. ories such as utilitarianism. As anyone who has (Motive) tried to put some order to the many ethical theories That was good because it is good to make people knows, no theory completely and easily fits one clas- happy—or it was bad because it is always wrong to sification, even those given here. Feminist theories tell a lie. (Act) of care provide yet another way of determining what one ought to do (see Chapter 9). In Part II of this text, we will examine several concrete ethical issues. Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-203

Chapter ❮❮ Ethics and Ethical Reasoning As we do so, we will note how various ethical theo- Most moral philosophers think that a course on ries analyze the problems from different perspectives ethics is ethically useful. It should help students and sometimes reach different conclusions about understand the nature of ethical problems and help what is morally right or wrong, better or worse. them think critically about ethical matters by pro- viding conceptual tools and skills. It should enable CAN ETHICS BE TAUGHT? them to form and critically analyze ethical argu- ments. It is up to the individual, however, to use It would be interesting to know just why some col- these skills to reason about ethical matters. A study lege and university programs require their students of ethics should also lead students to respect oppos- to take a course in ethics. Does this requirement ing views because it requires them to analyze care- stem from a belief that a course in ethics or moral fully the arguments that support views contrary to philosophy can actually make people good? their own. It also provides opportunities to consider the reasonableness of at least some viewpoints that When asked whether ethics can be taught, stu- they may not have considered. dents have given a variety of answers. “If it can’t be taught, then why are we taking this class?” a stu- In this opening chapter, we have learned some- dent wondered. Another student responded, “Look thing about what the philosophical study of ethics at the behavior of certain corporate executives who is. We have considered a few metaethical issues. We have been found guilty of criminal conduct. They have provided a description of ethical reasoning and surely haven’t learned proper ethical values.” Still arguments. We have briefly considered the nature of others disagreed with both views. Although certain ethical theories and the role they play in ethical rea- ideals or types of knowledge can be taught, ethical soning. We will examine these theories more care- behavior cannot be taught because it is a matter of fully in the chapters to come, and we will see how individual choice, they said. they might help us analyze and come to conclusions about particular ethical issues. The ancient Greek philosopher Plato thought that ethics could be taught. He argues that “All evil is The reading selections for this chapter come from ignorance.” In other words, we do what is wrong David Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature, first pub- because we do not know or believe it is wrong; and lished in 1739, and from C. L. Stevenson, a philoso- if we truly believe that something is right, we should pher associated with the Anglo-American tradition necessarily do it. Now, we are free to disagree with in twentieth-century philosophy. The excerpt from Plato by appealing to our own experience. If I know Hume discusses the problem of deriving normative that I should not have that second piece of pie, does claims from descriptive claims, the problem of deriv- this mean that I will not eat it? Ever? Plato might ing an ought from an is, with a particular focus on attempt to convince us that he is right by examining the question of the morality of incest. Stevenson dis- or clarifying what he means by the phrase to know. cusses the difficulty of connecting ethics and natural If we were really convinced with our whole heart science, while also outlining an emotivist approach and mind that something is wrong, then we might to understanding ethical terms. be highly likely (if not determined) not to do it. However, whether ethics courses should attempt to NOTES convince students of such things is surely debatable. 1. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality Another aspect of the problem of teaching ethics (New York: Macmillan, 1929), p. 4. concerns the problem of motivation. If one knows something to be the right thing to do, does there still 2. E. O. Wilson, Sociobiology: The New Synthesis remain the question of why we should do it? One (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975). way to motivate people to be ethical may be to show them that it is in their own best interest to do the 3. E. O. Wilson, On Human Nature (Cambridge, MA: right thing. Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 2. Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-203

PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY 6. G. E. Moore, Principia Ethics (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus, 1903). 4. See Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). 7. W. D. Ross, Foundations of Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1939), pp. 144–45. 5. See Frans de Waal, Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals 8. Michael Ruse, Sociobiology: Sense or Nonsense? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996). (New York: Springer, 1985), p. 237. Also see Morton Hunt, The Compassionate Beast: What Science Is Discovering about the Human 9. Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 30th Side of Humankind (New York: William Morrow, Anniversary Edition (Oxford: Oxford University 1990). Press, 2006), p. xxi. READING Ethical Judgments and Matters of Fact* DAVID HUME For more chapter resources and activities, go to MindTap. Study Questions As you read the excerpt, please consider the following questions: 1. How does Hume employ the fact of animal incest to advance his argument that morality does not consist merely of “matters of fact” and that morality is not merely an “object of reason”? 2. Explain Hume’s idea that morality is a matter of feelings and sentiments. 3. Why does Hume have a problem with deducing an ought from an is? I would fain ask any one, why incest in the human or praise: But still this discovery supposes a separate species is criminal, and why the very same being in these moral distinctions, and a being, which action, and the same relations in animals have depends only on the will and appetite, and which, not the smallest moral turpitude and deformity? If both in thought and reality, may be distinguished it be answered, that this action is innocent in ani- from the reason. Animals are susceptible of the same mals, because they have not reason sufficient to relations, with respect to each other, as the human discover its turpitude; but that man, being endowed species, and therefore would also be susceptible of with that faculty which ought to restrain him to his the same morality, if the essence of morality con- duty, the same action instantly becomes criminal to sisted in these relations. Their want of a sufficient him; should this be said, I would reply, that this is degree of reason may hinder them from perceiv- evidently arguing in a circle. For before reason can ing the duties and obligations of morality, but can perceive this turpitude, the turpitude must exist; and never hinder these duties from existing; since they consequently is independent of the decisions of our must antecedently exist, in order to their being per- reason, and is their object more properly than their ceived. Reason must find them, and can never pro- effect. According to this system, then, every animal, duce them. This argument deserves to be weighed, that has sense, and appetite, and will; that is, every as being, in my opinion, entirely decisive. animal must be susceptible of all the same virtues and vices, for which we ascribe praise and blame From David Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, (1739; Project to human creatures. All the difference is, that our Gutenberg, 2010), bk. III, pt. 1, sec. 1, http://www.gutenberg.org/ superior reason may serve to discover the vice or files/4705/4705-h/4705-h.htm virtue, and by that means may augment the blame *Title supplied by the editor. Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-203

Chapter ❮❮ Ethics and Ethical Reasoning Nor does this reasoning only prove, that moral- regarded as a considerable advancement of the specu- ity consists not in any relations, that are the objects lative sciences; though, like that too, it has little or no of science; but if examined, will prove with equal influence on practice. Nothing can be more real, or certainty, that it consists not in any matter of fact, concern us more, than our own sentiments of plea- which can be discovered by the understanding. This sure and uneasiness; and if these be favourable to is the second part of our argument; and if it can be virtue, and unfavourable to vice, no more can be req- made evident, we may conclude, that morality is uisite to the regulation of our conduct and behaviour. not an object of reason. But can there be any dif- ficulty in proving, that vice and virtue are not mat- I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an ters of fact, whose existence we can infer by reason? observation, which may, perhaps, be found of some Take any action allowed to be vicious: Willful mur- importance. In every system of morality, which I have der, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way which you call vice. In which-ever way you take it, of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or you find only certain passions, motives, volitions makes observations concerning human affairs; when and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the of a sudden I am surprized to find, that instead of case. The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, consider the object. You never can find it, till you I meet with no proposition that is not connected with turn your reflection into your own breast, and find an ought, or an ought not. This change is impercep- a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, tible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as towards this action. Here is a matter of fact; but it this ought, or ought not, expresses some new rela- is the object of feeling, not of reason. It lies in your- tion or affirmation, it is necessary that it should be self, not in the object. So that when you pronounce observed and explained; and at the same time that any action or character to be vicious, you mean noth- a reason should be given, for what seems altogether ing, but that from the constitution of your nature you inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduc- have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the con- tion from others, which are entirely different from it. templation of it. Vice and virtue, therefore, may be But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, compared to sounds, colours, heat and cold, which, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and according to modern philosophy, are not qualities in am persuaded, that this small attention would subvert objects, but perceptions in the mind: And this dis- all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that covery in morals, like that other in physics, is to be the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason. READING Emotivism and Ethics C. L. STEVENSON For more chapter resources and activities, go to MindTap. Study Questions As you read the excerpt, please consider the following questions: 1. What does Stevenson mean when he says that ethical terms are not (or not simply) descriptive? 2. How does the example of stealing illustrate Stevenson’s understanding of the meaning of ethical terms? 3. What does he mean by the “emotive meaning” of ethical terms? Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-203

PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY I. FACTS AND VALUES accordingly an old branch of the subject; and writ- ers on normative ethics have rarely been content to I want to “place” [my work] within ethics as a ignore it, simply because normative ethic has been whole—as I can best do by mentioning the three thought to need the near-logical discipline that ana- branches into which the subject is commonly lytical ethics has sought to provide. . . . divided. The need of such a specialized approach to ethics First, there is “descriptive” ethics, which studies is readily seen when we say that so and so is good, the moral practices and convictions that have been etc., we usually try to avoid dogmatism by giving current among these or those peoples, and thus reasons for what we say, and in many cases we have studies what has been implicitly or explicitly con- a dependable half-knowledge of how to go about sidered good, obligatory, etc. At the present time this. But we are not always aware of the potential this part of ethics is developed less by philosophers complexity of the reasons, or of the extent to which (though philosophers must of course study it) than the reasons we manage to give can be supplemented by social scientists. by further reasons. Nor do we clearly understand just what is involved in saying that our reasons Second, there is “normative” ethics, which seeks “justify” our conclusions. An analytical study, tem- to reach conclusions about the justice of this or that porarily letting us see our issues in a neutral per- law, for instance, or the value of this or that type spective, is needed to provide us with something of conduct, and which often (though not always) rather more than this sort of half-knowledge—doing attempts to systematize these conclusions under so not by attempting to give further support to some general principles, such as the greatest happiness given conclusion, but rather by pointing out what principle of Bentham and Mill, or the categorical general kind of support is possible. imperative of Kant. Normative ethics differs from descriptive ethics in an obvious way: it does not An unanalyzed half-knowledge may have one of seek conclusions about what others have implic- two effects. It may lead us to an illusory conviction itly or explicitly considered good, etc., but instead of having said the last word on a normative issue, seeks well founded conclusions that are intended to this conviction being attended by a contempt for supplement, back up, or stand in opposition to what those who fail to see the “obvious cogency” of our others have considered good. In a somewhat similar arguments. Or it may lead us, when controversies way, a research worker in medicine does not recount attending our “last word” eventually become dis- what others have considered to be cures for a dis- couraging, to a growing conviction that reasoning ease, but instead seeks well founded conclusions about ethical matters is never really worthwhile. that supplement, back up, or stand in opposition to Such convictions are not easily dispelled; but it is not what others have considered cures. too much to say, I think, that they spring in good measure from ignorance, and from a kind of igno- Third, there is a branch of ethics that surveys rance that analytical ethics can hope to correct. . . . normative ethic with the intent of clarifying its problems and its terminology, and with the intent, By what methods of argument or inquiry may in particular, of examining the sorts of reasons by disagreement about matters of value be resolved? It which its conclusions can be supported. It is called will be obvious that to whatever extent an argument “analytical” ethics though it also goes under alterna- involves disagreement in belief, it is open to the tive names such as “meta-ethics” and “critical” eth- usual methods of the sciences. If these methods are ics. Socrates was engaged in analytical ethics when the only rational methods for supporting beliefs— he asked, for instance, whether virtue is knowledge, as I believe to be so, but cannot now take time to whether virtue, like knowledge, can be taught. It is discuss—then scientific methods are the only ratio- nal methods for resolving the disagreement in belief From C. L. Stevenson, Facts and Values (New Haven, CT: Yale that arguments about values may include. University Press, 1963), pp. v–vii; 6–8; 16–18; 21, 23–25. Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-203

Chapter ❮❮ Ethics and Ethical Reasoning But if science is granted an undisputed sway in though both were possessed of the complete sci- reconciling beliefs, it does not thereby acquire, with- entific truth. Whether this logical possibility is an out qualification, an undisputed sway in reconciling empirical likelihood I shall not presume to say; but attitudes. We have seen that arguments about val- it is unquestionably a possibility that must not be ues include disagreement in attitude, no less than left out of account. disagreement in belief, and that in certain ways the disagreement in attitude predominates. By what . . . I conclude, therefore, that scientific methods methods shall the latter sort of disagreement be cannot be guaranteed the definite role in the so- resolved? called normative sciences that they may have in the natural sciences. Apart from a heuristic assump- The methods of science are still available for tion to the contrary, it is possible that the growth that purpose, but only in an indirect way. Initially, of scientific knowledge may leave many disputes these methods have only to do with establishing about values permanently unsolved. Should these agreement in belief. If they serve further to estab- disputes persist, there are nonrational methods for lish agreement in attitude, that will be due simply to dealing with them, of course, such as impassioned, the psychological fact that altered beliefs may cause moving oratory. But the purely intellectual methods altered attitudes. Hence scientific methods are con- of science, and, indeed, all methods of reasoning, clusive in ending arguments about values only to may be insufficient to settle disputes about values the extent that their success in obtaining agreement even though they may greatly help to do so. For in belief will in turn lead to agreement in attitude. the same reasons I conclude that normative ethics is not a branch of any science. It deliberately deals In other words, the extent to which scien- with a type of disagreement that science deliber- tific methods can bring about agreement on val- ately avoids. Ethics is not psychology, for instance; ues depends on the extent to which a commonly for although psychologists may, of course, agree or accepted body of scientific beliefs would cause us to disagree in belief about attitudes, they need not, as have a commonly accepted set of attitudes. psychologists, be concerned with whether they agree or disagree with one another in attitude. Insofar as How much is the development of science likely normative ethics draws from the sciences, in order to achieve, then, with regard to values? To what to change attitudes via changing people’s beliefs, it extent would common beliefs lead to common atti- draws from all the sciences; but a moralist’s pecu- tudes? It is, perhaps, a pardonable enthusiasm to liar aim—that of redirecting attitudes—is a type of hope that science will do everything—to hope that activity, rather than knowledge, and falls within no in some rosy future, when all men know the con- science. Science may study that activity and may sequences of their acts, they will all have common help indirectly to forward it; but is not identical with aspirations and live peaceably in complete moral that activity. accord. But if we speak not from our enthusiastic hopes but from our present knowledge, the answer I can take only a brief space to explain why the must be far less exciting. We usually do not know, ethical terms, such as “good,” “wrong,” “ought,” and at the beginning of any argument about values, so on, are so habitually used to deal with disagree- whether an agreement in belief, scientifically estab- ment in attitude. On account of their repeated occur- lished, will lead to an agreement in attitude or not. rence in emotional situations they have acquired It is logically possible, at least, that two men should a strong emotive meaning. This emotive meaning continue to disagree in attitude even though they makes them serviceable in initiating changes in a had all their beliefs in common, and even though hearer’s attitudes. Sheer emotive impact is not likely, neither had made any logical or inductive error, or under many circumstances, to change attitudes in omitted any relevant evidence. Differences in tem- any permanent way; but it begins a process that can perament, or in early training, or in social status, then be supported by other means. . . . might make the men retain different attitudes even Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-203

PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY II. THE EMOTIVE MEANING OF ETHICAL TERMS interests. This can be seen plainly from more general observations. People from widely separated commu- . . . [Some traditional] theories hold that ethical nities have different moral attitudes. Why? To a great statements are descriptive of the existing state of extent because they have been subject to different interests—that they simply give information about social influences. Now clearly this influence doesn’t interests. (More accurately, ethical judgments are said operate through sticks and stones alone; words play to describe what the state of interests is, was, or will a great part. People praise one another, to encour- be, or to indicate what the state of interests would age certain inclinations, and blame one another, to be under specified circumstances.) It is this emphasis discourage others. Those of forceful personalities on description, on information, which leads to their issue commands which weaker people, for compli- incomplete relevance. Doubtless there is always some cated instinctive reasons, find it difficult to disobey, element of description in ethical judgments, but this quite apart from fears of consequences. Further influ- is by no means all. Their major use is not to indicate ence is brought to bear by writers and orators. Thus facts, but to create an influence. Instead of merely social influence is exerted, to an enormous extent, by describing people’s interests, they change or intensify means that have nothing to do with physical force them. They recommend an interest in an object, or material reward. The ethical terms facilitate such rather than state that the interest already exists. influence. Being suited for use in suggestion, they are a means by which men’s attitudes may be led this For instance: When you tell a man that he oughtn’t way or that. The reason, then, that we find a greater to steal, your object isn’t merely to let him know that similarity in the moral attitudes of one community people disapprove of stealing. You are attempting, than in those of different communities is largely this: rather, to get him to disapprove of it. Your ethical ethical judgments propagate themselves. One man judgment has a quasi-imperative force which, operat- says “This is good”; this may influence the approval ing through suggestion, and intensified by your tone of another person, who then makes the same ethical of voice, readily permits you to begin to influence, to judgment, which in turn influences another person, modify, his interests. If in the end you do not suc- and so on. In the end, by a process of mutual influ- ceed in getting him to disapprove of stealing, you will ence, people take up more or less the same attitudes. feel that you’ve failed to convince him that stealing is Between people of widely separated communities, of wrong. You will continue to feel this, even though he course, the influence is less strong; hence different fully acknowledges that you disapprove of it, and that communities have different attitudes. . . . almost everyone else does. When you point out to him the consequences of his actions—consequences The emotive meaning of a word is a tendency of which you suspect he already disapproves of—these a word, arising through the history of its usage, to reasons which support your ethical judgment are produce (result from) affective responses in people. simply a means of facilitating your influence. If you It is the immediate aura of feeling which hovers think you can change his interests by making vivid about a word. Such tendencies to produce affective to him how others will disapprove of him, you will do responses cling to words very tenaciously. It would be so; otherwise not. So the consideration about other difficult, for instance, to express merriment by using people’s interest is just an additional means you may the interjection “alas”. Because of the persistence of employ, in order to move him, and is not a part of such affective tendencies (among other reasons) it the ethical judgment itself. Your ethical judgment becomes feasible to classify them as “meanings”. . . . doesn’t merely describe interests to him, it directs his very interests. The difference between the traditional . . . Consider the case of a mother who says to her interest theories and my view is like the difference several children, “One thing is certain, we al1 like between describing a desert and irrigating it. . . . to be neat”. If she really believed this, she wouldn’t bother to say so. But she is not using the words Thus ethical terms are instruments used in the descriptively. She is encouraging the children to complicated interplay and readjustment of human Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-203

Chapter ❮❮ Ethics and Ethical Reasoning like neatness. By telling them that they like neatness, A word must be added about the moral use of she will lead them to make her statement true, so to “good”. This differs from the above in that it is about speak. If, instead of saying “We all like to be neat” in a different kind of interest. Instead of being about this way, she had said “It’s a good thing to be neat”, what the hearer and speaker like, it is about a stron- the effect would have been approximately the same. . . . ger sort of approval. When a person likes something, he is pleased when it prospers, and disappointed Strictly speaking, then, it is impossible to define when it doesn’t. When a person morally approves “good” in terms of favourable interest if emotive of something, he experiences a rich feeling of secu- meaning is not to be distorted. Yet it is possible to rity when it prospers, and is indignant, or “shocked” say that “This is good” is about the favourable inter- when it doesn’t. These are rough and inaccurate est of the speaker and the hearer or hearers, and that examples of the many factors which one would have it has a pleasing emotive meaning which fits the to mention in distinguishing the two kinds of inter- words for use in suggestion. This is a rough descrip- est. In the moral usage, as well as in the non-moral, tion of meaning, not a definition. But it serves the “good” has an emotive meaning which adapts it to same clarifying function that a definition ordinarily suggestion. does; and that, after all, is enough. REVIEW EXERCISES 1. Determine whether the following statements about e. I ought not to turn left here because the sign says the nature of ethics are true or false. Explain your “No Left Turn.” answers. a. Ethics is the study of why people act in certain ways. f. We ought to adopt a universal health insurance b. The solution to moral conflicts and ethical dis- policy because everyone has a right to health putes is to accurately describe the way the world care. actually is. c. The statement “Most people believe that cheating 3. Discuss the differences between the ideas that ethics is wrong” is an ethical evaluation of cheating. is subjective and that it is objective. 2. Label the following statements as either normative 4. Explain emotivism and intuitionism in ethical theory. (N) or descriptive (D). If normative, label each as ethics 5. Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of using (E), aesthetics (A), law (L), religion (R), or custom (C). a. One ought to respect one’s elders because it is naturalistic explanations in ethics. one of God’s commandments. 6. As they occur in the following statements, label the b. Twice as many people today, as compared to ten years ago, believe that the death penalty is morally reasons for the conclusion as appeals to the motive justified in some cases. (M), the act (A), or the consequences (C). c. It would be wrong to put an antique chair in a a. Although you intended well, what you did modern room. d. People do not always do what they believe to be was bad because it caused more harm than right. good. b. We ought always to tell the truth to others because they have a right to know the truth. c. Although it did turn out badly, you did not want that, and thus you should not be judged harshly for what you caused. For more chapter resources and activities, go to MindTap. Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-203

2 Religion and Global Ethics Learning Outcomes After reading this chapter, you should be able to: • Describe the challenge of developing a • Differentiate between humanistic and global ethical perspective. • religious approaches to ethics. iStockphoto.com/Scott Hailstone Apply the argument made in Plato’s • Explain the idea of universal human rights. • Define key terms: cosmopolitan, civil • Euthyphro. Defend your own ideas about ethics, disobedience, pluralism, secularism, • humanism, and Eurocentrism. religion, and global cultural diversity. Evaluate the divine command theory of ethics. For more chapter resources and activities, go to MindTap. We live in an increasingly integrated world. With the click of the mouse, you can instantly interact with people from a variety of cultures and religions. It is inspiring to see how well we human beings get along despite our differences. But we should also admit that diversity—especially religious diversity—can create tension and difficulty. Religious tension has become a major concern. Religious fundamentalists of vari- ous denominations have asserted the supremacy of their preferred religious texts, tra- ditions, and interpretations. Politicians have asserted claims of cultural and religious supremacy. Some religious people have resorted to violence in defense of their faith. Other religious people proclaim that religion ought to be tolerant and peaceful, despite the intolerance of some radicals. One solution to religious tension is respect for persons grounded on basic claims about human rights, including the right to freedom of religious belief (we discuss human rights in more detail in Chapter 7). The idea of religious freedom is enshrined in the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Religious freedom is also featured in international agreements and institutions. In 1948, the United Nation’s member nations ratified the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which lays out a set of basic moral principles. The nations of the world are supposed to share these principles despite our vast cultural, religious, and political differences. Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-203

Chapter ❮❮ Religion and Global Ethics The preamble to the UN Declaration begins by which called for the death of novelist Salman Rush- affirming the “inherent dignity” and “inalien- die in 1989 for writing a novel the Ayatollah con- able rights” of all members of the human family. It sidered blasphemous. Meanwhile major political explains that disregard for these rights has resulted candidates, such as Donald Trump, have called for in barbarous acts that outrage the moral conscience a ban on Muslim immigration to the United States. of mankind. It continues, “the advent of a world in And some religious leaders, such as the Reverend which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech Franklin Graham, have claimed that Islam is not and belief and freedom from fear and want has been compatible with American values.2 proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people.” It goes on to state that the purpose of the While the example of Islam in the United States United Nations is to promote universal respect for has been in the forefront, we should understand that human rights and fundamental freedoms.1 religious diversity is a challenge across the globe. There have been clashes between Sikhs and Hindus The UN Declaration aims for global agreement in India, between Tibetan Buddhists and Chinese about basic rights, the inherent dignity of human forces in Tibet, and between Israelis and Palestin- beings, and equal rights for men and women, with ians. And in previous centuries, Christian sects the broader goals of fostering world peace and har- fought against one another, while Jews were perse- mony. As ongoing religious and cultural disputes cuted and exterminated. These examples suggest a illustrate, however, there are outstanding disagree- serious clash of values, with the basic idea of free- ments about the nature of these basic rights. The dom of expression and respect for religious diversity UN document asserts the importance of freedom of running up against rigid religious convictions and speech and freedom of religion. Article 18 of the religious bigotry. Religious differences continue to UN Declaration explicitly states, “Everyone has the be flashpoints for conflict. From some religious per- right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; spectives, the basic ideas of toleration and freedom this right includes freedom to change his religion or of religion may be seen as immoral. It might be that belief, and freedom, either alone or in community the ideas we find in the First Amendment to the with others and in public or private, to manifest his American Constitution or in the UN Declaration only religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and make sense within the context of Western secular observance.” democracies. Are these values shared by people who adhere to Buddhism, Confucianism, Islam, or other But does freedom of speech run up against a limit traditions in the world’s vast array of faiths? And when such speech defames important religious fig- which set of values is more fundamental: the secular ures (say, when a cartoonist draws a caricature of value of respect for religious liberty or the sectarian a saint or prophet)? Does freedom of speech hit a values that are dear to the religious faithful? limit when such speech advocates for practices and social arrangements that are viewed by religious This points to the important question of how people as immoral (say, when it advocates abortion, ethics relates to religion. While recent events con- gay marriage, or other practices that some religious tinue to bring these matters to the forefront, there people reject)? In some parts of the world, freedom are deep historical precedents for this discussion. of religion is viewed as leading to apostasy and blas- Socrates—the father of the Western philosophical phemy, which is a punishable offense. In previous tradition—ran into trouble with the religious and centuries, Christians burned witches and heretics political authorities of Athens. Socrates asked people alive. And today, according to some interpretations how they defined moral terms, trying to understand of Islam, blasphemy and apostasy are punishable ideas such as justice, courage, love, and friendship. by death. One famous example of this is the fatwa But his philosophical inquiries were tinged with or religious decree announced by the Iranian cleric skepticism. He questioned traditional religion, tradi- and supreme leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, tional political authority, and conventional wisdom. Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-203

PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY He called himself a “gadfly,” by which he meant tend to tell a Eurocentric or Western-focused story that he buzzed around Athens, nipping at and prob- about the development of tolerance, liberty, and ing things. He believed that his effort would help individual rights. Athenians understand morality and help to make them virtuous. Many Athenians found Socrates to That standard story often begins with Socrates, be offensive and even immoral. Some viewed him his trial and execution, and the development of his as a dangerously subversive figure. Eventually, he ideas by his student, Plato, and Plato’s student, was brought to court and formally charged with not Aristotle. One of Socrates’s other followers was believing in the gods of the city and with corrupting Diogenes the Cynic, a free spirit who refused to its youth. Many suspected him of being an atheist. conform to social conventions and had an antago- As a result, he was sentenced to death. nistic relationship with the authorities of his time. One ancient legend explains that when Alexan- FREEDOM, COSMOPOLITANISM, AND der the Great was a young man, about to embark THE EUROPEAN ENLIGHTENMENT on his conquest of the ancient world, he went to see Diogenes, who was lounging in the sun. After The story of Socrates demonstrates the inherently demanding that the young prince stop blocking his controversial nature of philosophical inquiry and sunbath, Diogenes asked Alexander what he was up the complicated relationship between philosophy to. Alexander explained that he was about to depart and religion. If it is difficult for us to imagine how with his armies to conquer the world. Diogenes Socrates could have been sentenced to death for asked, “Then what?” and Alexander said that he asking questions about Athenian morality and reli- supposed he would relax after that. Diogenes said, gion, it is because we are used to extensive freedom “Why not sit in the sun with me now and relax, and when it comes to religion and morality. Americans save yourself all of the trouble?” When the aston- like to believe that our freedom is unique—a product ished Alexander asked Diogenes where he was from, of a distinctly Western tradition of tolerance and plu- Diogenes replied, “I am a cosmopolitan,” which ralism. However, we should be careful when mak- means a citizen of the world. ing sweeping generalizations about history. There have been many tolerant and open-minded epochs In this anecdote, Diogenes displays skepticism in the history of the world. The Buddhist emperor toward conventional authority, while asserting his Ashoka is known for sponsoring a tolerant regime, freedom and claiming independence from any partic- as is the Muslim emperor Akbar. And under Confu- ular nation or culture—values that we have come to cianism, China was tolerant toward a variety of reli- associate with the Western philosophical approach. gious perspectives. We forget that China proclaimed This approach emphasizes individual freedom over an “Edict of Toleration” in 1692, which permitted traditional hierarchies and universal morality over Christian missionary work—at around the same local customs and traditions. Like Diogenes, it makes time that Protestants were still being persecuted in a cosmopolitan claim: it aspires for a single moral Europe. Indeed, at the time, the philosopher Leibniz community of humanity not bound by national, cul- and other Europeans praised China and Confucian- tural, or, in many cases, religious traditions. And it ism for its open and tolerant spirit. questions many things we take for granted. Why do we salute superior officers? Why do we drive on World history includes a number of free the right? Why do we eat with knives and forks? Or, thinkers—both within the lineage that follows after for that matter, why do we adopt certain religious Socrates and in others of the world’s traditions. beliefs and practices rather than others? Is it simply Nonetheless, much of our terminology for under- a matter of where and to whom we were born? standing these sorts of issues is rooted in Western thinking. The terms philosophy, politics, and ethics While it is true that there are a variety of differ- come to us from the Greek language. And we still ences across the globe, including vast religious dif- ferences, the cosmopolitan perspective holds that Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-203

Chapter ❮❮ Religion and Global Ethics certain ethical principles are universally valuable, liberty the law of the land (in the so-called “free such as respect for life and for liberty. In the Western exercise” clause), while also prohibiting government world, we have institutionalized these ideas in the from getting involved in religion (in the so-called laws of the modern nation state. And a growing “establishment clause”). The American system can body of international law, including the UN Decla- thus be seen to explicitly reject the kind of society ration, emphasizes a set of basic ideas about indi- that executed Socrates, where an “established” state vidual liberties and human rights. religion allowed the authorities to punish (by death) speech perceived to be blasphemous. We’ve come a Although we’ve noted that toleration and free- long way from ancient Athens. dom are not uniquely Western values, the usual historical account emphasizes the development It should not be surprising that philosophers of these values during the seventeenth and eigh- emphasize individual liberty. Philosophical specu- teenth centuries in Europe. This era is known as the lation involves wide-ranging inquiry into an ever- Enlightenment. It is the period during which many expanding set of topics. We cannot philosophize of the philosophers we’ll discuss in the book were properly unless we are free to question, argue, and active: Locke, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and others. think. Nor is it surprising that philosophical reflec- These philosophers tended to think that liberty and tion on morality points in a cosmopolitan direction. tolerance were key values. They were optimistic that When Jefferson claims that “all men are created history was developing in a progressive direction. equal,” he implies that inalienable rights—of life, lib- They thought that progress would occur through erty, and the pursuit of happiness—are the endow- the employment of human reason. And they were ment of all people, from all cultures (despite the interested in discovering common values and learn- sexist language that uses the word “men” for what ing from other cultures. Also during this time, many we should properly call “humanity”). philosophical ideas were put into practice in revolu- tionary politics, as was the case in the American and A quick glance at world history or today’s paper French revolutions. makes it clear that no such consensus exists. For a long time, even in the United States, there was a The American Revolution can be seen to begin substantial disagreement about whether all “men” with a famous phrase from the Declaration of Inde- really were created equal, with slavery, racism, and pendence: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, sexism as obvious problems. Even after slavery was that all men are created equal, that they are endowed abolished, we continued to disagree about the status by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, of women. In the global context, these issues are far that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit from resolved. of Happiness.” Drawing on the natural law tradi- tion as developed by John Locke (see Chapter 7), the Philosophical freedom can lead to conflicts with Declaration enshrines individual liberties at the core authority, especially religious authorities. At around of American society. The Constitution of the United the same time that the American revolutionaries States goes further, detailing areas of individual lib- were fighting in the name of liberty, the German phi- erty upon which government must not intrude. The losopher Immanuel Kant defined enlightenment in most important example, for our purposes, is the terms of freedom. He thought that progress would First Amendment to the Constitution, which reads, occur when we were permitted freedom to argue “Congress shall make no law respecting an estab- and when we were courageous enough to use this lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise freedom to imagine ways to improve society. Kant thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the wrote, press; or the right of the people peaceably to assem- ble, and to petition the Government for a redress of Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self- grievances.” The First Amendment makes religious incurred immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one’s own understanding without the guidance of another. This immaturity is self-incurred if its cause is Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-203

PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY not lack of understanding, but lack of resolution and by which individuals and societies strive to achieve Bob Fitch/Take Stock/The Image Works courage to use it without the guidance of another. moral maturity through rational inquiry. Like The motto of enlightenment is therefore: Sapere Socrates, King expresses faith in logical question- Aude! (dare to know) “Have courage to use your own ing of accepted dogmas as a means of overcoming understanding!”3 injustice. And like Kant, King also sees his efforts in explicitly cosmopolitan terms, as a quest for univer- Kant thought that history would develop in a cos- sal justice. But King combined philosophical critique mopolitan direction, with European nations forming with nonviolent civil disobedience. It is important a confederation based upon shared moral ideas. This to note, however, that advocates of civil disobedi- federation—an idea that foreshadowed the develop- ence criticize existing traditions and institutions ment of the United Nations—would ensure perpetual while also demonstrating a kind of loyalty to those peace. It would take two long centuries of war and traditions and institutions: they break the law—and misery for Europe and the rest of the world to finally accept punishment—as a way of pointing out injus- achieve Kant’s idea. And the idea still seems a bit tices and failures in the system. The critical stance naive, given remaining cultural and religious differ- and civil disobedience of the civil rights movement ences across the globe. was not merely negative. It had the positive goal of helping the United States realize the full promise of RELIGION, CIVIC LIFE, AND CIVIL its founding documents, while remaining faithful to DISOBEDIENCE the moral ideals of American political, moral, and religious ideology. Like Socrates, Kant advocated gradual reform through public argument about morality, politics, Martin Luther King Jr. in his Atlanta office, and religion. This philosophical approach can seem standing in front of a portrait of Mohandas K. naive when faced with entrenched and powerful Gandhi. unjust systems, such as slavery, serfdom, colonial- ism, and apartheid. What if the rulers simply have no interest in listening to the ruled? After Kant, a variety of thinkers and activists— from Henry David Thoreau to Mohandas K. Gandhi to Martin Luther King, Jr.—concluded that principled resistance to an unjust system required something more than argument. Rather than advocate the vio- lent overthrow of the regime, these thinkers called for civil disobedience, the open, nonviolent refusal to obey unjust law, with the intent of accepting the penalty and arousing the conscience of the commu- nity as a whole. King developed his ideas about non- violent civil disobedience from Gandhi, the Indian political activist and religious leader who advocated ahimsa (or nonviolence) as a key to the struggle for Indian independence. King also drew inspira- tion from Jesus and from Socrates. King argues in his “Letter from Birmingham Jail” that Socrates and other philosophers are gadflies who nonviolently point out conflicts within society. In King’s era, those conflicts had a lot to do with racial injustice. In a sense, King is an heir to the Enlightenment dream, Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-203

Chapter ❮❮ Religion and Global Ethics This last point is particularly important to bear to categorize as “liberal” or “conservative.” Religion in mind as we consider the relationship between is not one thing. There are a variety of sects and philosophical inquiry and religious traditions and denominations, just as there are a variety of reli- institutions. Sometimes, it might seem that the most gious people who belong to these sects and denomi- serious impediment to free-ranging philosophical nations. And this reminds us of the importance of criticism is religion—especially those forms of reli- religious liberty. Religious liberty along with the free- gious belief that want to limit freedom in the name dom of philosophical inquiry is essential in a world of conformity to the will of God. With regard to that includes a wide variety of people who disagree morality, it is often thought that what is required about religious, political, and moral questions. is obedience to God’s commandments, his laws, his prophets, and the institutions that have developed to ETHICS, RELIGION, AND DIVINE defend and disseminate the faith. (We will hear more COMMAND THEORY about this view of morality in the next section.) And it may seem that philosophy has nothing to offer a Many people get their ethical or moral views from faith-centered worldview, that it has no interest in their religion. Although religions include other ele- the sacred, and views human life in exclusively sec- ments, most do have explicit or implicit requirements ular terms. (A recent survey of nearly one thousand or ideals for moral conduct. In some cases, they con- philosophers indicates that 15 percent of the philos- tain explicit rules or commandments: “Honor thy ophers surveyed accept or lean toward theism [belief father and mother” and “Thou shalt not kill.” Some in the existence of god or gods], while 73 percent religions recognize and revere saints or holy people accept or lean toward atheism.4) who provide models for us and exemplify virtues we should emulate. And most religions have a long his- But such a stark opposition between philosophy tory of internal arguments and interpretations about and religion ignores that, for most of human his- the nature and content of moral law. tory, the two subjects have been deeply intertwined or even indistinguishable. Both are concerned with Most contemporary philosophers, however, the most fundamental questions of human exis- believe that ethics does not necessarily require a reli- tence: Why are we here? What is the meaning of gious grounding. Rather than relying on holy books life? How should we treat one another? And both or religious revelations, philosophical ethics uses have frequently challenged ruling powers and con- reason and experience to determine what is good ventional ways of thinking. The example of Martin and bad, right and wrong, better and worse. In fact, Luther King is a case in point; King was a devout even those people for whom morality is religiously Baptist minister who also thought that philosophi- based may want to examine some of their views cal critique was necessary to make moral progress. using reason. They may want to examine various King drew his primary inspiration from Jesus’s interpretations of their religious principles for inter- teachings on poverty, tolerance, and love. King also nal consistency or coherence. Or they may want to valued Socrates’s example. It is not necessarily true know whether elements of their religious morality— that philosophical ethics is atheistic or opposed to some of its rules, for example—are good or valid religious belief. The philosophers mentioned here— ones given that other people have different views of Socrates, Locke, and Kant—remained committed to what is right and wrong, and given that the prob- some form of theistic belief. lems of contemporary times may be different from those of the past. Religion remains at the center of many of the applied ethical topics that we will discuss later in this If right and wrong can only be grounded in reli- text: same-sex marriage, euthanasia, abortion, the gious belief, then nonbelievers could not be said to status of women, the death penalty, to name a few. have moral views or make legitimate moral argu- Religious perspectives on such topics are not easy ments. But even religious believers should want to be able to engage in constructive dialogue with Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-203

PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY nonbelievers and evaluate their claims. In fact, even that atheists have no reason to be moral or to be religious believers regularly make moral judgments concerned with doing the morally right thing. How- that are not based strictly on their religious views ever, this is not necessarily so. For example, a reli- but rather on reflection and common sense. gious person may be inclined to disregard the moral stakes of what occurs in this life if he or she thinks Thinking further about religious morality also of it as fleeting and less important than the afterlife. raises challenges to it. A key element of many reli- And an atheist who believes that this life is all there gious moralities is the view that certain things are is may in fact take this life more seriously and care good for us to do because this is what God wants. more about living morally. Furthermore, religious This conception is often referred to as the divine and nonreligious people live together in contempo- command theory. The idea is that certain actions rary society and have pressing practical reasons to are right because they are what God wills for us. think clearly and reason well about morality. The reading at the end of this chapter from Plato’s dialogue Euthyphro examines this view. In this For at least three reasons, we should all seek to dialogue, Socrates asks whether things are good develop our moral reasoning skills. First, we should because they are approved by the gods or whether be able to evaluate critically our own or other views the gods approve of them because they are good. of what is thought to be good and bad or just and To say that actions are good simply because they unjust, including religious views. Second, believers are willed or approved by the gods or God seems to of various denominations as well as nonbelievers make morality arbitrary. God could decree anything ought to be able to discuss moral matters together. to be good—lying or treachery, for example. It seems Third, the fact that many of us live in organized more reasonable to say that lying and treachery are secular communities, cities, states, and countries bad, and for this reason, the gods or God condemns requires that we be able to develop and rely on or disapproves of them and that we should also. One widely shared reason-based views on issues of jus- implication of this view is that morality has a certain tice, fairness, and moral ideals. This is especially independence; if so, we should be able to determine true in political communities with some separation whether certain actions are right or wrong in them- of church and state, where no state religion is man- selves and for what reason. dated, and where one has freedom to practice a cho- sen religion or practice no religion at all. In these This argument does not imply, however, that reli- settings, it is important to have nonreligiously based gion cannot provide a motivation or inspiration to ways of dealing with moral issues. This is one goal be moral. Many believe that if life has some eternal of philosophical ethics. significance in relation to a supreme and most per- fect being, then we ought to take life and morality The Russian novelist Fyodor Dostoevsky pro- extremely seriously. This is not to say that the only vides the kernel of one argument that is often reason religious persons have for being moral or used in defense of divine command ethics. Dosto- doing the morally right thing is so that they will be evsky’s writings contain the famous claim that, “If rewarded in some life beyond this one. Such a view God is dead, then everything is permissible.”5 This might be seen to undermine morality, since it sug- expresses the worry that if there were no God, then gests that we should be good only if we are “bribed” there would be no morality. There are two concerns to do so. Rather, if something is morally right, then here: one about religion as the source of morality this is itself a reason for doing it. Thus, the good and another about religion as providing a motiva- and conscientious person is the one who wants to tion for morality. The first concern is that without do right simply because it is right. God as a source for morality, there would be no eternal, absolute, or objective basis for morality. Questions about the meaning of life, however, We will deal with the first worry in more detail in often play a significant role in a person’s thoughts Chapter 3 when we consider relativism—which about the moral life. Some people might even think Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-203

Chapter ❮❮ Religion and Global Ethics is the claim that there are no eternal, absolute, or ethical. We turn to the issue of motivation in our objective values. Theists often hold that God is the discussion of egoism in Chapter 4. In that chapter, source of moral law, provided through the words of we consider a story from Plato about Gyges, a man a prophet, such as Moses, who receives the moral who can literally get away with murder. If you were law directly from God. Some theists worry that if able to do whatever you wanted without fear of get- that prophetic origin of morality is denied, we are ting caught, would you commit immoral deeds? Or left without any objective moral principles. Most do you think that we need some idea of a God who of the rest of the first half of this book focuses on observes our deeds and punishes us or rewards us providing an account of values that avoids this crit- accordingly? icism; the ethical theories we will study try to pro- vide reasons and justifications for ethical principles One of the most important problems for defend- without reference to God. ers of divine command ethics is the fact of religious diversity. Even if we agree with Dostoevsky that The second concern is that without a divine judge God is required for ethics, we still have to figure out who gives out punishments and rewards in the which God or religious story is the one that provides afterlife, there would be no motivation to be ethical. the correct teaching about morality. Saying that eth- A version of this concern led Kant to postulate God ics is based in religion does not really help us that and immortality as necessary for morality—so that much because we must also determine which reli- we might at least hope that moral actions would be gion is the correct one. Given the incredible amount rewarded (and immoral actions would be punished) of religious diversity in the world, it is easy to see in an afterlife. In response, atheists might argue that that the divine command approach is not really very the demands, rewards, and punishments of human helpful without a much broader inquiry into the social life are sufficient to provide motivation to be truth of various religions. Giulio Origlia/Getty Images Samir Hussein/Getty Images Pope Francis and the Dalai Lama represent the wide range of religious diversity in the world. Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-203

PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY The problem of diversity holds even within spe- like the Golden Rule. John Hick argues that, “all cific religious traditions. This problem was recog- the great traditions teach the moral ideal of gener- nized at the time of Socrates and Plato. Plato asks ous goodwill, love, compassion, epitomized in the us to consider which versions of the Greek religious Golden Rule.”7 The Tibetan Buddhist leader, the stories are the correct or proper ones. The same con- Dalai Lama, put it this way: “All of the different reli- sideration applies to contemporary religions. Not gious faiths, despite their philosophical differences, only do we have to determine which religion is cor- have a similar objective. Every religion emphasizes rect, we also have to determine which version of this human improvement, love, respect for others, shar- religion is the correct one. Consider, for example, ing other people’s suffering. On these lines every that Christianity includes a range of denominations: religion has more or less the same viewpoint and Eastern Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Protestant the same goal.”8 The reading from Gandhi that fol- (which includes a range of groups from Menno- lows at the end of this chapter makes a similar point. nites and Quakers to Methodists, Presbyterians, and The religious pluralist idea is a friendly and optimis- Southern Baptists). Similar diversity can be found tic one; it hopes to be able to reconcile the world’s within Islam, Judaism, and the religious traditions religious traditions around an ethical core. Indeed, that come out of South Asia. Even if we think that there is some evidence for such a convergence in the ethics comes from God, how can we decide which existence of interfaith organizations that promote account of God’s commands is the correct one? The philosophical approach reminds us that we would have to use reason and experience—including espe- cially our own human insight into ethics—to decide among the world’s religious traditions. PLURALISM AND THE GOLDEN RULE eyepix/Alamy Stock Photo One approach to resolving the problem of diversity In this image, American painter Norman Rockwell is to look for common ground among the world’s imagined that the common idea of all the world’s cultures cultural and religious traditions. This general idea and religions was the Golden Rule: Do unto others as you is known as religious pluralism. A more specific would have them do unto you.” philosophical view is often called value pluralism, which argues that there are multiple and conflict- ing goods in the world, which cannot be reduced to some other good. (We will discuss pluralism again when we deal with relativism in Chapter 3.) Plu- ralists about religion often make a different sort of argument. Religious pluralists, such as John Hick, claim that there is a common core of ideas found among the world’s religious traditions. As Hick puts it, quoting the Islamic poet Rumi, “the lamps are many, but the light is one.”6 The usual candidate for this common core among religions is something like the Golden Rule: “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you” or “treat others as you would like to be treated.” Many people have claimed that each of the world’s religious and cultural systems includes something Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-203

Chapter ❮❮ Religion and Global Ethics religious diversity and pluralism. One example do we explain holy wars and religious violence? If of this is the Parliament of the World’s Religions, all religions are basically variations on the theme of which is a group dedicated to creating peaceful and love and compassion, then how do we explain reli- harmonious relations between the world’s religions. gious texts and ideas that are not very compassion- ate? Would a purely compassionate and loving God Unfortunately, this hopeful reconciliation must destroy the earth with a flood, threaten punishment ignore much; the very deep differences that exist in Hell, or require gruesome tests of faith? Would among religions, the fact of apparently immoral ele- compassionate and loving religious believers stone ments in some of the world’s religious traditions, the adulterers and homosexuals and burn witches alive? reality of religious conflict, and the moral importance While interpreters of religion can explain these of our deep differences over metaphysical questions. things in various ways, the specific details of reli- As religion scholar Stephen Prothero suggests, the gious ethics matter as much as the general principle idea that all religions are basically the same “is a of compassion or love. lovely sentiment but it is dangerous, disrespectful, and untrue.”9 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL AND FREE WILL Consider for example, the Hindu idea of dharma, A further ethical question arises in the context of which is a complex concept that refers to laws of thinking about religion and ethics: the problem of natural order, justice, propriety, and harmony. The evil. This issue provides a concrete example of the idea of dharma is connected to the traditional Indian problem of religious diversity, since different reli- caste system. Now there are parallels between the gions will deal with the problem of evil in different idea of destiny and caste in India and medieval Chris- ways. How do we explain the presence of suffering tian ideas about natural law and the great chain of and evil in the world? Buddhists explain that life is being. But the differences between these ideas are as characterized by suffering, or dukha. They explain important as the similarities. The end goal of Hindu that suffering comes from attachment to the fleet- ethics is to attain some form of self-realization and ing goods of this world and from wrongful actions. connection with the eternal soul of Brahman. While Christians also struggle with the problem of evil. But this may sound like the kind of insight and beatifica- for Christians, the existence of evil creates a meta- tion (or holiness) that occurs in Christian unity with physical problem. How can evil exist in a world God, the differences are again quite important. Other that is supposedly created by a benevolent and all- differences and similarities exist among the world’s powerful God? The Christian tradition developed traditions. For example, Islam emphasizes zakat, or elaborate theodicies, or arguments that attempt to alms-giving, as one of its five pillars. This includes a justify God as all-powerful and all-knowing, despite universal duty to build a just society, help the poor, the problem of evil. Important thinkers such as and eliminate oppression. While this sounds quite a Augustine and Leibniz responded to this problem bit like the idea of charity and tithing in the Christian by focusing on sin and on freedom of the will. For tradition, zakat may be more important and more Augustine, original sin is passed down from Adam obligatory than mere charity—closer to a tax than to the rest of us. Leibniz clarifies that God provided a gift. And so on. The differences are as important us with free will so that we might choose between and pervasive as the similarities among the world’s good and evil and argues that the best of all pos- traditions. sible worlds is one that contains both freedom and the related possibility of evil. Optimistic religious pluralists want to reduce all of these differences to common values such as love, Humanistic philosophers have subjected these compassion, and the Golden Rule. But it is easy to sorts of disputes to skeptical criticism. How do we see that religious ethics is not simply about love and know that all life is suffering and that suffering is compassion. If all the world’s religions agree about caused by attachment? How do we know that there compassion, love, and the Golden Rule, then how Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-203

PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY is a God, that this God created freedom, and that results from the laws of karma, the law of continu- original sin is passed down? The metaphysical com- ity between causes and effects: bad deeds lead to plexities introduced by religion point toward myster- suffering and good ones lead to reward—whether ies and paradoxes that give humanistic philosophers in this life or the next. Whether the idea of karma reasons to be skeptical. is compatible with free will is an open question. The Confucian and Taoist traditions also maintain Consider the question of free will. If we are not that human beings have the freedom to choose. free, then we are not responsible for our actions— But Confucianism holds that such free choices are in which case, the enterprise of moral philosophy constrained by destiny or fate, while the Taoists begins to seem shaky. As the well-known atheist emphasize freedom experienced in harmony with author Sam Harris explains, nature. In the Chinese traditions, there is, again, no God who judges or punishes. Morality, law, politics, religion, public policy, intimate relationships, feelings of guilt and personal As noted, the idea of religious pluralism focuses accomplishment—most of what is distinctly on the ethical “core” of the world’s religions. But it human about our lives seems to depend upon is difficult to see how such radically different ideas our viewing one another as autonomous persons, could converge. As Stephen Prothero acknowl- capable of free choice. . . .Without free will, sinners edges, “the world’s religious traditions do share and criminals would be nothing more than poorly many ethical precepts. . . . The Golden Rule can be calibrated clockwork, and any conception of justice found not only in the Christian Bible and the Jewish that emphasized punishment (rather than deterring, Talmud but also in Confucian and Hindu books.”11 rehabilitating, or merely containing them) would But the Golden Rule is a very weak common link. appear utterly incongruous.10 Philosophers have also subjected the Golden Rule to criticism. One problem for the Golden Rule is that Despite this admission, Harris denies the idea if it tells us to love our neighbors as ourselves, we of free will—based upon natural scientific account need a definition of “neighbors.” Does this mean of human beings—while still arguing that moral- we should love only those who are related to us— ity makes sense. (We will read a brief excerpt from our co-religionists, for example? Or do we have Harris regarding religion at the end of this chapter.) obligations to distant human beings and future Philosophers have pondered the problem of free will generations who do not live in our geographic (or for millennia. Some deny that there is free will in an temporal) neighborhood? Even if we all accept the entirely deterministic universe. Others have argued Golden Rule as a basic moral starting point, there that free will remains compatible with determinism. are still very difficult questions of application. How does the Golden Rule apply to sexual ethics, abor- Free will is a puzzle even within Christianity, tion, euthanasia, or the death penalty? And what where there are questions about how much free- does the Golden Rule tell us to do about evil? Should dom we can have in a universe that is created by we punish evildoers? Or should we follow Jesus, an omnipotent (all-powerful) and omniscient (all- who explained that in addition to loving our neigh- knowing) God. Different Christian denominations bors, we should love our enemies and refrain from have different ideas about this issue, with some returning evil for evil? The problem of respond- emphasizing the idea of predestination, by which ing to wrongdoing and evil is a complex moral God ordains things in advance, and others respond- issue, one that is subject to multiple interpretations ing to this issue differently. Other religions have even within specific religious traditions. Different responded to the problem of free will in a variety of traditions—even different sects and denominations ways. Buddhists and Hindus, for example, appear within the same tradition—give divergent answers to believe in free will—although there are differ- about these applied ethical issues, including the ences within these vast and complex traditions. But Buddhists, at least, do not believe in a God who punishes evil. Rather, they believe that suffering Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-203

Chapter ❮❮ Religion and Global Ethics very deep question of where evil comes from and secular. One recent study concludes that seculariza- how we should deal with it. tion “suggests a trend, a general tendency toward a world in which religion matters less and various We will see that the normative theories defended forms of secular reason and secular institutions by philosophers also suffer from a similar problem: matter more. It is a trend that has been expected they appear to conflict and can be applied in various at least since modernity and has been given quasi- ways. But the conflicts among the different theories scientific status in sociological studies advancing in philosophical ethics may be easier to reconcile, a secularization thesis.”12 While this same study since philosophical arguments are usually not sub- presents a somewhat critical perspective on the ject to the same ambiguities of interpretation and secularization thesis, the idea does help to explain translation that tend to plague ancient scriptural much of recent history, including the spread of sources. secular cosmopolitan ideas such as those we find in the UN document discussed at the outset of It may be possible to imagine a pluralistic con- this chapter. Of course, in some parts of the world vergence of the world’s religions around certain (even in some parts of the United States), religious key moral principles and central human values. fundamentalism—whether it be Christian, Muslim, However, until this convergence occurs, we will Jewish, Hindu, or the like—still remains a potent have to find some way to coexist despite our differ- force, with some religious leaders arguing for the ences. The challenge of coexistence is exacerbated subordination of women, arguing against scientific by our growing diversity. As more and different naturalism, and trying to defend traditional ideas religious people come to share our common life, from previous centuries. we have to find some set of values that can allow us to live together even though we disagree about One of the most important philosophical sources religion. for thinking about secularism is John Locke, who is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7. In the SECULAR ETHICS AND TOLERATION 1680s, Locke published his influential “Letter Con- cerning Toleration,” which has served as an impor- The effort to find ways to coexist despite our reli- tant touchstone. Locke argues that the state should gious differences gives rise to secular ethics. Sec- tolerate religious dissenters. For Locke, religious ular means “based in this world or this age” (as belief must be a matter of inward persuasion, which opposed to the eternal and otherworldly focus of is not amenable to the use of force. Locke’s basic religion). When we say that an ethical idea or the- point is that force is simply not effective to produce ory is secular, we mean that it is divorced from any genuine religious belief. If that’s the case, then polit- source in religion. A secular ethic can develop out of ical efforts to establish conformity of belief by the religious conflict, as members of different religious use of coercion will ultimately be ineffective. Locke groups agree to coexist despite their differences. goes on to argue that spiritual and civil authorities Indeed, this is how the secular system that we cur- must operate in wholly different spheres—the for- rently have in the Western world developed through mer through persuasion and conversion and the lat- the course of several centuries of religious wars ter through laws backed by coercive force. Religions beginning with the Protestant Reformation. are to be left alone to deal with spiritual issues. And the state is supposed to focus only on issues related By the end of the seventeenth century, Euro- to public order. This argument forms the basis of the pean philosophers of the Enlightenment era were constitutional doctrine that is often called “separa- arguing that public toleration of religious diversity tion of church and state.” was necessary. A hallmark of secularism is the idea of freedom of religion and toleration of religious Locke’s ideas had a significant impact on Jefferson diversity. For many, the progress of secularization and the other founders of the United States—and is a central aspect of modernization: as cultures and polities modernize, they also become more Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-203

PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY they have gone on to influence ethical and political person on the planet has equal dignity and value as thought, including the ideas found in the UN Decla- a person, and this transcends the limits of national, ration of Human Rights. The question of toleration ethnic, religious, racial, or linguistic boundar- and religion has also been taken up by a number of ies or identities.”13 Kurtz’s idea hearkens back to important philosophers. The great American politi- the Enlightenment ideal of a cosmopolitan world cal philosopher John Rawls has argued that societies grounded in shared ethical values. need to work to develop “overlapping consensus” among people who adhere to divergent religious CRITICISMS OF SECULARISM AND and moral worldviews. He calls these deeply held GLOBAL ETHICS worldviews “comprehensive doctrines.” According to Rawls, societies should focus on agreement in the The dream of global consensus around secular prin- political realm, instead of trying to force a deeper ciples may seem like an appealing solution to centu- agreement about these comprehensive moral and ries of violent conflict and contention over religion. religious ideas. This leads to a theory of political jus- But it remains an open question as to whether this tice that Rawls calls “political liberalism,” as well as is possible. One significant problem is that some reli- a basic conception of human rights that emphasizes gious people reject any taint of secularism on doc- toleration for religious diversity. trinal grounds. For religious believers who think that God requires absolute obedience to his com- Rawls’s goal is to find a way to establish peace- mandments, or that those commandments must be ful coexistence in a just society among people who embodied in the laws of the state, a secular ethic disagree about the highest good. Rawls’s solution is that does not explicitly embrace God as the source to suggest that there can be “overlapping consen- of morality will appear to be morally suspect and sus” among people who disagree about religion. This blasphemous. overlapping consensus about political issues would leave us with something like a secular ethic: a sys- Such responses can present advocates of toler- tem of values and fair rules that can be agreed upon ance with a problem called the paradox of tolera- by people who come from quite different religious tion. The paradox revolves around the question traditions or by people who have no religion at all. of whether there is a good reason to tolerate those (Rawls’s influential theory of justice is discussed in who are intolerant or those who reject the very idea greater detail in Chapters 4 and 14.) of toleration. Some defenders of toleration simply bite the bullet here and admit that there are lim- In contrast to Rawls’s view, there are some who its to toleration. Locke, for example, did not extend have a more radical understanding of the term secu- toleration to atheists or to Catholics. He thought lar that equates it with atheism. Some religious peo- atheists were untrustworthy since they did not ple denounce “secular humanism” as nothing more believe in God, and he thought that Catholics were than atheism. One of the most influential propo- too loyal to Rome to be trusted. Although Locke nents of the idea of secular humanism, Paul Kurtz, defended toleration, he clearly thought that there has worked hard to clarify that secular humanism were some people who could not be tolerated. can remain open to religious believers, even though We’ve come a long way since the time of Locke. it is grounded in a nonreligious approach to ethics. But the rise of new fundamentalist movements Kurtz has recently focused on what he calls “neo- within such religions as Judaism, Christianity, and humanism,” which is an attempt to reconcile athe- Islam has posed new challenges for the idea of tol- ists and religious believers around a global ethics. erance. (Fundamentalism is characterized by rigid Kurtz’s “Neo-Humanist Manifesto” states, “The adherence to a literal interpretation of religious doc- challenge facing humankind is to recognize the basic trines and a reaction against compromise with sec- ethical principle of planetary civilization—that every ularism and modernity.) The political philosopher Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-203

Chapter ❮❮ Religion and Global Ethics Jürgen Habermas argues that “a fundamentalism European culture and values that come at the that leads to a practice of intolerance is incompat- expense of alternative ideas about morality and pol- ible with the democratic constitutional state.”14 He itics. A related criticism develops from Karl Marx’s concludes, “in multicultural societies, the national critique of “bourgeois morality” as the product of constitution can tolerate only forms of life articu- a certain strand of European thinking, associated lated within the medium of such non-fundamen- with the ruling class. (Marxists, by the way, tend talist traditions.”15 Habermas is saying that we to view religion as “the opiate of the people,” that cannot tolerate those who reject liberal-democratic is, as a drug that reconciles oppressed people to the principles of toleration on fundamentalist religious injustices of the social order by promising an oth- grounds. Indeed, it is not difficult to imagine cir- erworldly reward.) More recently, scholars such as cumstances in which religious fundamentalists vio- Enrique Dussel have expanded this critical perspec- late the shared principles of secular ethics. What do tive to argue that Eurocentrism is at the heart of we do about religious pacifists who refuse to serve continual cultural divisions and economic inequali- in the military or pay their taxes, pastors who think ties that plague the globe (as we discuss in more that it is acceptable for thirteen-year-old girls to be detail in Chapter 20). An influential Latin American married to older men, or religious communities that philosopher, Dussel critiques the traditional Anglo- mutilate the genitals of their daughters? And what American and European approach to philosophy of religious groups who get involved in democratic and ethics. For Dussel, European philosophy begins politics to advance intolerant agendas—or who may with conquest—as the colonial conquests of the be explicitly opposed to democracy itself? In many Americas, Asia, and Africa coincide with the dawn- cases, even those who want to embrace religious ing of European Enlightenment.17 Dussel gives diversity will have to say that there are ethical lim- voice to the concern that there may be a connec- its to what they are willing to tolerate in terms of tion between European imperialism and European religious belief and practice. ethics—that moral ideas about a variety of topics from sex and gender to individualism and human A further problem is that secularization, cosmo- rights, to the use of drugs and the morality of war politanism, and modernization sometimes appear to have a lot to do with the economic and political spring directly from the post-Reformation philoso- power structures at work in the world. phy and politics of the West. One charge against secular and cosmopolitan ethics is that it is Euro- For people who identify with non-Western reli- centric, meaning that it is an idea that makes sense gions and cultures, the approaches to ethics that only within the context of European culture and his- we are taking in this book can appear to be Euro- tory. As the sociologist of religion, José Casanova, centric. From this standpoint, one might argue that explains, the approach of this book reflects the biases of a predominantly Christian and European worldview. Cosmopolitanism remains a faithful child of the Indeed, the main normative traditions discussed in European Enlightenment.16 this book—utilitarianism, virtue ethics, natural law, and Kantian deontology—are rooted in the ideas of A significant point of such a criticism has to European philosophers. do with the role of political and economic power. According to this way of thinking, European cul- In response, one might admit that even though ture, with its emphasis on individualism and the the goal of understanding ethics in an objective and separation of church and state, spread across the universal fashion, without reference to religion, is a world along with European colonial power. While goal that is widely shared by many in the Western some may think that this is a progressive devel- world, this goal is not uniquely Christian or Euro- opment, critics will view it as an imposition of pean. Indeed, it is a goal that is shared by many Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-203

PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY people around the world. As Amartya Sen and oth- Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ers have pointed out, the move toward philosophi- 1991), p. 54. cal and cosmopolitan ethics is also deeply rooted in 4. http://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl non-Western intellectual traditions. It is true that we 5. Although this claim is often attributed to must be sensitive to the diverse cultural and reli- Dostoevsky, it is not directly stated by any one of gious starting points from which we begin reflecting Dostoevsky’s characters. Nonetheless, it is the basic on ethics. But this does not mean that we should idea of his atheist characters: Ivan Karamazov in not attempt to move beyond narrow allegiances and The Brothers Karamazov and Kirilov and Stavrogin prejudices toward a broader, more impartial, and in Devils. more objective perspective—that is, toward a cosmo- 6. John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion: politan and pluralist point of view that would incor- Human Responses to the Transcendent, 2nd ed. porate the insights of the world’s great moral and (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005), religious traditions. Whether we can attain this goal p. xl. is an open question. In Chapter 3, we confront this 7. Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 316. problem more directly as a question of relativism. 8. Dalai Lama, Kindness, Clarity, and Insight The question of that chapter will be whether there (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 2006), really is such a thing as a universal, objective point p. 58. of view or whether we are hopelessly stuck within a 9. Stephen Prothero, God Is Not One: The Eight Rival perspective and worldview that we inherit from our Religions That Run the World—And Why Their culture or religion. Differences Matter (New York: HarperCollins, 2010), p. 2. The first reading for this chapter is from Plato, 10. Sam Harris, Free Will (New York: Free Press, who offers a critique of religious ethics in his dia- 2012), p. 1. logue, Euthyphro. In this dialogue, Socrates dis- 11. Prothero, God Is Not One, p. 2. cusses religion with Euthyphro, a young man who 12. Craig Calhoun, Mark Juergensmeyer, and claims to know what piety demands. Socrates sug- Jonathan VanAntwerpen, Rethinking Secularism gests that the idea of what is good is somehow (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), prior to our understanding of what religion requires. p. 10. Following this is a short excerpt from an essay by 13. Paul Kurtz, “Neo-Humanist Statement of Secular Sam Harris, which outlines a contemporary argu- Principles and Values,” http://paulkurtz.net/ ment against religion and about the need to evolve 14. Jürgen Habermas, “Struggles for Recognition in beyond religion. The next reading is from Mohandas the Democratic Constitutional State,” in K. Gandhi, who argues for a pluralistic convergence Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of of religious ideas. In this essay, Gandhi considers Recognition, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton, NJ: the idea that the world’s religions converge around a Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 132–33. common ethical core. 15. Jürgen Habermas, “Struggles for Recognition,” p. 133. NOTES 16. José Casanova, “Public Religions Revisited,” in Religion: Beyond a Concept, ed. Hent de Vries 1. http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/ (New York: Fordham University Press, 2007), 2. http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/15/politics/franklin- p. 119. 17. See Enrique Dussel, Beyond Philosophy: graham-halt-all-immigration/ (Accessed January 5, Ethics, History, Marxism, and Liberation 2016). Theology (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 3. Immanuel Kant, “An Answer to the Question: 2003). ‘What Is Enlightenment?’” in Kant: Political Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-203

Chapter ❮❮ Religion and Global Ethics READING Euthyphro PLATO For more chapter resources and activities, go to MindTap. Study Questions As you read the excerpt, please consider the following questions: 1. Do the gods have different conceptions about what is good and evil, just and unjust? Why does this pose a problem for Euthyphro’s account? 2. Which comes first: being pious or being loved by the gods? 3. What does Socrates suggest is yet needed to give a definition of piety or goodness? Euthyphro. Piety . . . is that which is dear to the Socrates. Or suppose that we differ about mag- gods, and impiety is that which is not dear to nitudes, do we not quickly end the differences by them. measuring? Socrates. Very good, Euthyphro; you have now Euthyphro. Very true. given me the sort of answer which I wanted. But Socrates. And we end a controversy about heavy whether what you say is true or not I cannot as yet and light by resorting to a weighing machine? tell, although I make no doubt that you will prove Euthyphro. To be sure. the truth of your words. Socrates. But what differences are there which Euthyphro. Of course. cannot be thus decided, and which therefore make Socrates. Come, then, and let us examine what us angry and set us at enmity with one another? we are saying. That thing or person which is dear I dare say the answer does not occur to you at the to the gods is pious, and that thing or person which moment, and therefore I will suggest that these is hateful to the gods is impious, these two being enmities arise when the matters of difference are the the extreme opposites of one another. Was not that just and unjust, good and evil, honourable and dis- said? honourable. Are not these the points about which Euthyphro. It was. men differ, and about which when we are unable Socrates. And well said? satisfactorily to decide our differences, you and I and Euthyphro. Yes, Socrates, I thought so; it was all of us quarrel, when we do quarrel? certainly said. Euthyphro. Yes, Socrates, the nature of the dif- Socrates. And further, Euthyphro, the gods ferences about which we quarrel is such as you were admitted to have enmities and hatreds and describe. differences? Socrates. And the quarrels of the gods, noble Euthyphro. Yes, that was also said. Euthyphro, when they occur, are of a like nature? Socrates. And what sort of difference creates Euthyphro. Certainly they are. enmity and anger? Suppose for example that you Socrates. They have differences of opinion, as and I, my good friend, differ about a number; do dif- you say, about good and evil, just and unjust, hon- ferences of this sort make us enemies and set us at ourable and dishonourable: there would have been variance with one another? Do we not go at once to arithmetic, and put an end to them by a sum? From Plato, Euthyphro, trans. B. Jowett. (Project Gutenburg, 2008), Euthyphro. True. http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1642/1642-h/1642-h.htm Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-203


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