RCDL Safety E-Magazine Mar-16 Edition-20

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT & EDITORIAL FLIGHT The posting of stories, articles, reports and documents in SAFETY this magazine does not in any way, imply or necessarilyMAGAZINE express or suggest that all the information is correct. It is based on details gathered from various sources and is for January’16 to March’16 information purpose only. The Flight Safety Department is 20th Edition making this material available in its efforts to advance the understanding of safety. It is in no way responsible for any Published By- errors, omissions or deletions in the reports. Flight Safety Department, Reliance Commercial Dealers Limited Reliance Hangar, In this Issue, in addition to the regular safety updates, we Gate No-08, Old Airport, Kalina Military Camp, are publishing few more articles in brief referred from Santacruz (E), Mumbai-29, India Flightsafety.org. This RCDL Flight Safety E-Magazine is published for These four small articles are concerning on the Safety internal Safety Communication Purpose only. Culture, Crew Resource Management, Maintenance Safety, and another about the ‘In-Flight Safety on IN THIS ISSUE…. importance of crew announcement’. 1 The article ‘Toxic Captains’, emphasizes on the1. Cover Page – Acknowledgement & Editorial…1 importance of CRM and how a toxic captain (read2. Flight Safety Updates …………………………..2 Obnoxious) can lead to a complete failure of CRM.3. RCDL Updates ……………………………….....34. DGCA (Regulatory) Updates ……….……..…..3 If you have any article proposal, manuscript or technical5. Safety Article – Safety Culture ……………..4-5 paper that you believe would make a useful contribution to6. Advisory Article – ‘Toxic Captains’- CRM….6-7 the on-going dialogue about aviation safety, Flight Safety7. Circumstances For Removal Of CVR For The department will be glad to publish. Utmost importance will be given to your valuable comments and feedback. Purpose Of Investigations……………………78. Maintenance Safety Article……………..…..8-9 Please do send an E-Mail to: [email protected]. Listen Up! – In-Flight Safety………………...10 Hope you will enjoy reading this issue and the safety updates will keep you updated with what is happening within RCDL. The articles published are for your reading pleasure and understanding the safety culture. Happy Reading!! EEK SAFETY IM SAFETY Warm Regards, OLLOW SAFETY Saurabh Tyagi NSURE SAFETY (Chief of Flight Safety, RCDL) EACH SAFETY IELD SAFETY

JANUARY’16 TO MARCH’16 20TH EDITION FLIGHT SAFETY UPDATESSafety is being remodelled in RCDL, to include good safety culture in the organization. Where good safety culture exits, every person inthe organization values priorities safe practices whether anyone is watching or not.Many new things has happened in past few months to strengthen the safety culture of RCDL.1. Emergency Response Procedures Manual / ERP Drill / ERP Training: a. ERP Committee: Formulated an ERP Committee for Emergency Response and Chief of Flight Safety has been nominated as Chairman –ERP Committee. b. ERP Training: Emergency response is a key area in any organisation, and emphasizing the same, we organised ERP training by Executive Director and Chief of Flight Safety of Air India. c. ERP Manual: RCDL Flight Safety team has prepared a new Emergency Response Procedure Manual, ERPM has been discussed and distributed to all concerned, and soon it will be printed and sent to all concerned. d. ERP Drill: First ERP drill was conducted by flight Safety department in February where we discussed the individual responsibilities and also did a mock drill for Delhi-Jamnagar Flight.2. Flight Safety Documentation System- FSDS Nodal Officer : Flight Safety Documentation System is part of Flight Safety Department and Chief of Flight Safety has been assigned the responsibility to act as FSDS Nodal Officer. Also, Mr. Panini Phadnis, has been deputed to assist the Nodal Officer- FSDS.3. Flight Safety Targets & Year Planner for the Year 2016 :Planning is the essence of management. To plan and implement the Safety Targets, Flight Safety department has come up withthe Safety Planner, which might help to execute flight safety duties and targets in a planned way. Flight Safety Targets - Year Planner 2016 Task / Month January February March April May June July August September October November DecemberDGCA Checks (Audit & Inspections) RCP & Hazira Station FS Set- Operations Cockpit En- Helicopter Mahalaxmi Facility Up / Office & Route Audit Race- Course INTERNAL AUDIT Inspection Dispatch PFMC / Inspection HELIPAD SURVEILLANCE DFDR Nagothane / COCKPIT SURVEILLANCE Handler Reliance MRO- Rajahmundry- Delhi -CVR / DFDR - FOQA MONITORING / Celebi NAS- Hangar Airworks / Subject to Indamer - Subject to RECORDS UPDATION / FOQA External External Flight Flight UPLOAD FOR READOUT Agency Availibility Agency Availibility Environmental Cell Review and Report to DGCA Juhu Dahej / ERP DRILL Gandhar- Subject to FDTL VIOLATION PREVENTION Flight Availibility Annual Report - Carbon 2nd of Review - Environmental Cell Footprint 2016- 17 3rd of 2016- 1st of 2016- 17 17SAFETY MAGAZINE / BULLETIN Annual EditionSMS TrainingFlight Safety Committee Meeting MEL Compliance Check ERPM - New ERPM ERPM- FINAL PRINTING /FSDS- Review of Manuals Manual Discussed / DISTRIBUTION // FSM- Prepared Dissiminated, Monsoon Training Emergency REVISION // SMSM - REVISION // REVIEW OF Contact Details ALL MANUALS - Verification COMPLIANCE CHECK FOR DGCA AUDIT OBSERVATIONOversight of Engineering ActivitiesWeather Minima Violation CheckFlight Dispatch & Training Set-Up Clubbed Inspection with Internal AuditRAMP CHECKS- 20 / Year IAH / AHI DHA / HMA / AKU / ISH NMA/ NIT IAH JMN/ AHI DHA / HMA JIO AKU ISH NMA/ NIT JMN / JIOSAFA- TCO - REVIEW Received TCO SAFA- TCO SAFA- SAFA- SAFA- TCO SAFA- TCO Approval - Web TCO Web TCO Web Web Interface Web Interface Approval Interface Interface Interface Review Review Review Review Letter kept on Review Board all AircraftsLOAD & TRIM CHECKS MONTHLY ROUTINE CHECK - 10 Loadsheets Every Month APRON INSPECTION MONTHLY ROUTINE CHECK - 05 Apron Inspection and 02 Hangar Inspection Every Month(Aircraft Loading Overview)BA Check Report to DGCA HQ MONTHLY ROUTINE - Before 07th of Every MonthSAFA Check Report to DGCA HQ MONTHLY ROUTINE CHECK - Before 07th of Every Month 2

JANUARY’16 TO MARCH’16 20TH EDITION RCDL UPDATESThe Circulars released in last quarter: Pre-Flight •Operations Control Centre shall make necessary arrangements at outstations for a BA Check qualified Doctor/Paramedics/EMT for conducting Pre-Flight Breath-Analyzer1. FLIGHT SAFETY CIRCULAR 01 OF 2016: Examination. Clarification on Pre/Post Flight Breath-Analyzer •Preference is always given to pre-flight medical check at departure stations. Examination – Lapses, dated 20th January 2016 - On 8th Mar’15, RCDL operated a flight Vijayawada – •The PIC is responsible for Pre-Flight BA Check of self and all Operating Crew by Mumbai Sector. The operating crew had conducted Company Doctor/Paramedics/EMT or through engaged facilities at outstations. and self-certified the Pre-Flight Breath-Analyzer Examination at Vijayawada. The officer from O/o DAS •No Pilot shall do the breath-analyzer examination in absence of the Doctor/Paramedics/EMT. •In Case of any Flight Crew/Cabin Crew missed to carry out Pre-flight/ Post-flight BA examination in presence of a doctor/paramedics, the same shall be deemed as BA positive. •In Case, an RCDL aircraft is flying to multiple sectors with Change of Crew in between and there is fresh set of Crew taking over at any departure station, the fresh crew shall undergo Pre-Flight BA check at Departure station.(WR), Mumbai has raised an Observation during Post-Flight •In Case, the doctor/facility is not available on that base and Operating Crew missedsafety Surveillance of M/s RCDL in the Area of PFMC. BA Check the BA check, for non-availability of Doctor/Facility, Flight Crew and Cabin Crew shallBased on the observation, a new Flight Safety Circular undergo post-flight breath-analyzer examination at first landing.01 of 2016 was issued to reiterate the requirementsand procedures as mentioned in DGCA CAR Section •Post-flight breath-analyzer examination shall be carried out by the on duty company5 Series F Part III Issue III, 04th August 2015, to carry doctor/paramedics, in the aircraft cockpit after its arrival. The time consumed in the post-flight breath-analyzer examination shall not be counted towards duty. •In case of diversion of flights, due to unforeseen circumstances, to an airport where facility for pre-flight breath-analyzer examination is not available, the flight crew and cabin crew shall undergo post-flight breath-analyzer examination at first landing. •No Pilot shall do the post-flight breath-analyzer examination in absence of the Doctor/Paramedics/EMT.out Breathalyzer Examination.2. RCDL OPERATIONS CIRCULARS: JANUARY 2016 TO MARCH 2016a. RCDL Operations Circular 02 of 2016: Prohibition of flight above 10,000' - Un-pressurized Helicopter OperationsIssue Date- 12th January 2016 Reference- CAR Section 8 Series H Part I Fleet- Helicopterb. RCDL Operations Circular 04 of 2016: Crosswind and tailwind landing and take-off limitsIssue Date- 29th February 2016 Reference- DGCA Operations Circular 03 of 2016 Fleet- Allc. RCDL Operations Circular 05 of 2016: Standard Operating Procedure: Load & Trim SheetIssue Date- 29th February 2016 Reference- FCOM PER-LOD-WBA-LTS Fleet- AIRBUSd. RCDL Operations Circular 06 of 2016: Superseded by Operations Circular 01 of 2016 and 03 of 2016Document revision Status and Generic Alerts Issue Date- 03rd March 2016 Valid Till: 31st March 2016Fleet: Ops. Circular 6A for Airbus, 6B for Bombardier, 6E for Embraer, 6F for Falcon Fleete. RCDL Operations Circular 07 of 2016: Policy for use of Electronic Check-list (ECL)Issue Date- 29th February 2016 Reference- FCOM PER-LOD-WBA-LTS Fleet- AIRBUS DGCA UPDATES1. OPERATIONS CIRCULAR NO 01 OF 2016 : Date: 1st February 2016Subject: Oversight of overseas Training Facilities and Instructors To adhere to best Safety Practices, RCDL Flight Safety Department has prepared its RAMP CHECK Calendar for the year 2016 to do thorough2. OPERATIONS CIRCULAR NO 02 OF 2016 : Date: 11th February 2016 ramp check of all the aircrafts.Subject: HELICOPTER EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES (HEMS) 20 Ramp Checks has been planned for the year 2016. VT-IAH and VT- AHI Ramp Checks have been completed with minor observations. A3. CAP 8500 : RAMP INSPECTION MANUAL – First Edition Revision team of Ramp Inspectors comprising members from Flight Safety, 00 February 2016 Cabin Safety, Engineering Quality, Documentation (Flight Operations) was involved in the Ramp Checks.This New CAP 8500 has been released byDGCA to provide foundation for promoting safety CAP 8500 – RAMP CHECK – YEAR PLANNER FOR THE YEAR 2016through proactive safety oversight system. Ramp Check of VT-ISH was done by DGCA Officers, and Observations are yet to be closed.4. DGCA CAR Section 7 Flight Crew Standards Month / Aircraft FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DE C Training & Licensing Series ‘J’ Part ‘I’Issue III Release Date: 24th February 2016 VT- IAH - AIRBUSEffective Date: 01st September 2016Subject: Flight Duty Time and Flight Time VT- AHI - GLOBALLimitations – Cabin Crew VT- DHA - GLOBAL5. DGCA CAR Section 7 Training & Licensing VT- HMA - GLOBAL Series ‘M’ Part ‘I’ Issue III Release Date: 01st VT- JMN - EMBRAER January 2016 Effective Date: 01st April 2016 VT- ISH – FALCON Subject: Cabin Crew Training VT- AKU – FALCON6. DGCA CAR Section 8 Aircraft Operations VT- NMA - SIKORSKY Series ‘C’ Part ‘I’ Issue ‘I’ Revision-08Release Date: 13th June 2011 Effective Date: VT- NIT - SIKORSKY11th January 2016 Subject: All WeatherOperations (AWO) VT-JIO- DAUPHIN 3

JANUARY’16 TO MARCH’16 20TH EDITIONARTICLE - SAFETY CULTURE (Reference- Flightsafety.org)4

JANUARY’16 TO MARCH’16 20TH EDITION5

JANUARY’16 TO MARCH’16 20TH EDITION The Toxic Captain - Crew Resource ManagementA captain who makes the cockpit environment acrimonious can be a safety risk. – Captain Robert I. Baron, Flightsafety.org Reference- Flightsafety.orgShortly after take-off from Douala, Cameroon, on a dark night withconvective activity in the area, the pilots of Kenya Airways Flight 507,a Boeing 737-800, lost control of their aircraft. The captainexperienced confusion and spatial disorientation while trying tomanually recover. His inputs greatly exacerbated the bank angle,and the aircraft entered an unrecoverable spiral dive.The Cameroon Civil Aviation Authority determined the probablecause to be “loss of control of the aircraft as a result of spatialdisorientation ... after a long slow roll, during which no instrumentscanning was done, and in the absence of external visual referenceson a dark night. Inadequate operational control, lack of crewcoordination, coupled with the non-adherence to procedures of flightmonitoring, [and] confusion in the utilization of the [autopilot], havealso contributed to cause this situation.”This accident was the result of missed opportunities, at theorganizational level, to address the captain’s documenteddeficiencies in both his flying skills and crew resource management(CRM). The official investigation highlighted the captain’s knownpsychological traits and deficiencies before, as well as on the day of,the accident. They included his strong character and heightenedego; authoritative and domineering attitude with subordinates;paternalistic attitude toward the first officer on the accident flight;documented deficiencies in upgrade training, which included CRM,adherence to standard procedures, cockpit scan and situationawareness; a “touch of arrogance” and “insufficient flight discipline.”There had been numerous recommendations that he attendremedial training.Sometimes a captain with a personality of this type is paired with a first officer who lacks the ability and/or experience to voice concernsrelated to the captain’s decisions and actions. The Cameroon accident investigation revealed that the first officer was known to be reservedand non-assertive, and that he was subdued by the captain’s strong personality. He was concerned about the weather but did not questionthe decision to depart.Polar OppositesA crew pairing such as this, where there is a strong, domineering captain combined with a reserved and non-assertive first officer,represents polar opposites in terms of crew coordination, adherence to CRM principles, standard operating procedures and generalcommunicative ability. Another perspective suggests that the “trans-cockpit authority gradient” in this accident crew was much too steep.4At best, a crew pairing should fall into what I call the “ideal crew-pairing zone”. In the Kenya Airways accident, the crewmembers were atthe left and right extremes. The topic of crew pairing deserves much more attention. However, the main subject of this article is the behavioural tendencies of “toxic captains” and how the organization handles them. The term “toxic captain” is not likely to be found in a flight training manual. Some people know from unhappy experience what it implies. I define a toxic captain as a pilot-in-command who lacks the necessary human and/or flying skills to effectively and safely work with another crewmember in operating an aircraft. Additionally, the toxic captain, at times, can make the cockpit environment so acrimonious that the successful outcome of the flight may be in serious jeopardy. The pilot-in-command of Flight 507 could be categorized as atoxic captain. His deficiencies were not hidden or hard to detect. In fact, deficiencies documented in the captain’s records clearly indicatedred flags and potential problems. Additionally, multiple first officers did not want to fly with the accident captain because of his reputationfor an overbearing personality and arrogant attitude.One of the clearest ways to determine if there is a “toxic captain problem” is to collect and analyse reports, provided they are made. Ifonly one first officer has reported an issue with a particular captain in, for instance, a one-year period, it was probably just an isolatedincident. However, if 15 different first officers during that year went on record that they did not feel comfortable with, or want to fly with, acertain captain, it is safe to assume the problem lies with the captain.The toxic captain may not have had an accident; however, it may just be a matter of time, as the toxic leadership behaviours go unchecked.Hiding in Plain SightThe fundamental question is why are these toxic captains, who pose a significant safety risk, allowed to fly for a commercial operator?They typically are not concealed in the system. They are usually well known to other flight crewmembers and to flight attendants. Theymay even have documented deficiencies that have been ignored by the airline, as with the Flight 507 captain.Reasons may exist at the organizational level or at the individual level. The following are examples from the organizational aspect: 6

JANUARY’16 TO MARCH’16 20TH EDITION• It could be one of the unusual cases in which the airline is unaware of the toxic captain.• The organization has, perhaps tacitly, recognized the captain’s behavior but believes it is a personality issue rather than a safety risk.• The organization is fully aware, by virtue of safety reports and deficiencies documented in training records, that the captain may be a safety risk. However, the organization feels that the safety risk is minimal and not worth the effort to mitigate.• The managers responsible, at the organizational level, for addressing technical and behavioural deficiencies in flight crews do not want an awkward confrontation with a captain, perhaps very senior, who has been with the airline for decades. In my opinion, that was at least partially the case with the Flight 507 captain. There was a lack of assertiveness, or the ability to speak up to the captain, from the instructor level up to and including upper-level management. All of this was exacerbated by Kenya’s “high power distance” culture, in which citizens tend to accept authoritarianism in employee-to-employer relations.6Some factors at the individual level are these:• Above all, the captain may not acknowledge that he or she has a problem. Many captains believe that the other crewmembers are the source of cockpit strife.• Some of the captain’s arrogance and egotism may actually be a coping mechanism used to ameliorate personal insecurities. The captain may feel more in control of situations by making other crewmembers feel weak.• Captains from a military background, where strong hierarchical gradients and clear positions of power are standard, may have difficulties adapting to their new environment. It is hard for some captains to fully assimilate into civil aviation, where effective leadership styles may be diametrically opposed to those used in the military.• Related to the above, the captain may not buy into CRM principles and the teamwork concept. He or she may believe that CRM is only for weak pilots and that CRM is psychobabble with the sole purpose of making crewmembers enjoy each other’s company on a long trip.Remediation or Termination?An airline has basically two options for taking a proactive position toward the toxic captain. The first option is remediation, or an attemptby the airline to confront the captain and apply some kind of intervention. The second option is termination, which may be appropriate;however, there may be union issues that complicate this option. Termination may also mean that the captain simply goes to another airlineand continues to be a safety risk.Remediation of a toxic captain is the preferred option. However, this can be difficult. It is extremely hard to change ways of doing thingswhen they have been done that way for a long time. It is also very difficult to try to change someone’s ingrained psychological traits andattributes. In many cases, remediation may be out of the question. Some of those vitriolic personality traits may never be reversible.That brings us to the second option for resolution of the toxic captain, termination of employment. This can be a very awkward,uncomfortable undertaking by the airline. However, in some cases, where remediation has been, or would be, ineffective, this may be theonly viable option. At the time of the Flight 507 accident, the captain clearly should not have been in command of a commercial aircraftwith responsibility for 114 lives, including his own. All perished in that accident.I recommend that all flight operations take the toxic captain issue seriously. There are typically red flags and incidents that precede farmore serious events. If not considered part an operation’s safety management system (SMS), this type of aberrant behavior undoubtedlyneeds to be addressed in the safety risk management section of the operator’s SMS. If Kenya Airways had approached this differently,the outcome of Flight 507 might have been different.Do you have a toxic captain in your flight operation? CIRCUMSTANCES FOR REMOVAL OF CVR FOR THE PURPOSE OF INVESTIGATIONSThe new CAR on the reporting of incident and occurrences is now very clear on the circumstances in case of the accident/seriousincidents that mandates its removal.CVR shall be removed in case of the following incidents:  Any failure of aircraft primary structure.  Damage which necessitates repair before further flight due to ingestion, collision, meteorological conditions, hard or overweight landing, overheating, incorrect technique or practices etc.  Any incident where any minor injury is sustained by a passenger or member of the crew while on board the aircraft e.g. injury to a passenger as a result of turbulence, scalding of a member of the cabin staff as a result of faulty design, inadequate servicing or the in correct handling of galley equipment.  Declaration of an emergency situation.  An emergency evacuation of the aircraft.  Fire or Explosion.  Fire or Smoke warning  In-flight engine shut-down or significant loss of power.  Significant leakage of fuel, hydraulic fluid or oil.  Smoke toxic or noxious fumes in crew, passengers or freight compartments.  Abandoned take-off.  Unintentional deviation from the intended track or attitude, caused by a procedural, systems or equipment defect.  Precautionary or forced landing.  Balked landing and Bounced Landing  Unintentional contact with the ground, including touch down before the runway threshold.  Over-running the ends or sides of the runway or landing strip.  The separation between the aircraft was less than prescribed for the situation.  Runway obstructed by foreign objects.  All undershoots/overshoots or aircraft leaving the runway paved areas.  Collision between moving aircraft and vehicles or any other ground equipment’s.  Difficulty in controlling intoxicated, violent or armed passengers. 7

JANUARY’16 TO MARCH’16 20TH EDITIONARTICLE – MAINTENANCE SAFETY (Reference- Flightsafety.org)8

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JANUARY’16 TO MARCH’16 20TH EDITION LISTEN UP! – In- Flight (Cabin Crew) SafetyCreative methods may be the answer to improving passengers‟ attention to safety briefings before take-off. - Flight Safety Australia Reference- Flightsafety.orgDespite efforts and various techniques over the years to improve passenger attention to safety briefings, a large number of passengerscontinue to ignore pre-flight safety briefings. A recent aviation survey found that 52 per cent of passengers watched less than 50 per centof the safety briefing.A common finding of several studies is that cabin crews may face an overwhelming workload during an emergency if large numbers ofpassengers do not know where exits are located or how to use safety equipment such as exit doors, oxygen masks, flotation cushionsand life preservers. Flight attendants cannot predict passenger behavior; therefore, the best practice is to build a foundation of shared knowledge during the pre- departure briefing. The challenge for airlines and cabin crews is to find ways to communicate the safety brief in a manner that passengers find interesting. According to Julie Martin, a senior air safety auditor for cabin safety at CASA, ―It is difficult for cabin crews to maintain interest and conscientiousness in regard to attracting passengers ‘attention to the safety briefing because of the repetitive nature, commercial pressures, workload prior to departure and seeming lack of interest from passengers. We somehow would agree that, not enough emphasis is put on the importance of the pre-flight safety briefing during initial and recurrent trainings. Training often emphasizes the passenger briefings required during a prepared emergency, but not so much the everyday pre-flight safety briefings. Airlines in several countries have also experimented with digitally animated video safety briefings to increase passenger attention. Such videos use computer animation techniques to generate artificial characters and scenes with various degrees of realism, enabling demonstration of safety equipment and procedures. Kevin Galligan, general manager of Windmill Lane Pictures, an Irish video and film production company that has produced several digital animations for airlines, believes that video producers must strike a careful balance between conveying information and entertaining passengers. ―This is the real challenge – trying to get people to watch the video while not boring them Windmill Lane and one airline customer employed a research firm to measure the effectiveness of computer-animated safety videos against traditional cabin crew safety briefings. One thousand five hundred passengers were surveyed and the following results, relating to passenger attention were reported: 1. 70 per cent of the passengers watched all or almost all of the animated in-flight safety video, whereas only 45 per cent of passengers watched the live presentation by cabin crew; 2. 75 per cent found the video interesting compared to 37 per cent whofound the live presentation interesting.RECOMMENDATIONS: In a 1985 aviation report by ICAO, the following recommendations for successful briefings were suggested byvarious cabin specialists:o Leadership and credibility should be established immediately by confident behavior, a pleasant demeanour and showing professional knowledge of aircraft safety features;o Appropriate eye contact and body language should reinforce the spoken message;o Cabin crew members should practice consistently good public-speaking techniques such as thoughtful timing, pacing and articulation of words for a diverse audience;o Crews should master optimum use of the PA system and video system, noticing and reporting promptly any problems that could compromise safety or cause flight delays;o Flight attendants should show personal enthusiasm for the subject during every safety briefing, and;o Crews should avoid hurried safety briefings and work to resolve any systematic problems involving insufficient time to conduct briefings effectively.Many research studies have influenced current airline practices, and important passenger education advances have followed.Nevertheless, techniques that will consistently capture the attention of all passengers have not been identified. While incrementalimprovements continue, cabin crew members have an opportunity to help devise better techniques and to make current techniques aseffective as possible. *** End of Article*** 10

JANUARY’16 TO MARCH’16 20TH EDITIONInternational Women’s Day Celebrations at RCDL11