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Plato: Book X of The Republic 45 And the same may be said of lust and anger and all the other affections, of desire and pain and pleasure, which are held to be inseparable from every action — in all of them poetry feeds and waters the passions instead of drying them up; she lets them rule, although they ought to be controlled, if mankind are ever to increase in happiness and virtue. I cannot deny it. Therefore, Glaucon, I said, whenever you meet with any of the eulogists of Homer declaring that he has been the educator of Hellas, and that he is profitable for education and for the ordering of human things, and that you should take him up again and again and get to know him and regulate your whole life according to him, we may love and honour those who say these things — they are excellent people, as far as their lights extend; and we are ready to acknowledge that Homer is the greatest of poets and first of tragedy writers; but we must remain firm in our conviction that hymns to the gods and praises of famous men are the only poetry which ought to be admitted into our State. For if you go beyond this and allow the honeyed muse to enter, either in epic or lyric verse, not law and the reason of mankind, which by common consent have ever been deemed best, but pleasure and pain will be the rulers in our State. That is most true, he said. And now since we have reverted to the subject of poetry, let this our defence serve to show the reasonableness of our former judgment in sending away out of our State an art having the tendencies which we have described; for reason constrained us. But that she may not impute to us any harshness or want of politeness, let us tell her that there is an ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry; of which there are many proofs, such as the saying of ‘the yelping hound howling at her lord,’ or of one ‘mighty in the vain talk of fools,’ and ‘the mob of sages circumventing Zeus,’ and the ‘subtle thinkers who are beggars after all’; and there are innumerable other signs of ancient enmity between them. Notwithstanding this, let us assure our sweet friend and the sister arts of imitation, that if she will only prove her title to exist in a well- ordered State we shall be delighted to receive her — we are very conscious of her charms; but we may not on that account betray the truth. I dare say, Glaucon, that you are as much charmed by her as I am, especially when she appears in Homer? CU IDOL SELF LEARNING MATERIAL (SLM)

46 Literary Criticism and Critical Approaches - I Yes, indeed, I am greatly charmed. Shall I propose, then, that she be allowed to return from exile, but upon this condition only — that she make a defence of herself in lyrical or some other metre? Certainly. And we may further grant to those of her defenders who are lovers of poetry and yet not poets the permission to speak in prose on her behalf: let them show not only that she is pleasant but also useful to States and to human life, and we will listen in a kindly spirit; for if this can be proved we shall surely be the gainers — I mean, if there is a use in poetry as well as a delight? Certainly, he said, we shall be the gainers. If her defence fails, then, my dear friend, like other persons who are enamoured of something, but put a restraint upon themselves when they think their desires are opposed to their interests, so too must we after the manner of lovers give her up, though not without a struggle. We too are inspired by that love of poetry which the education of noble States has implanted in us, and therefore we would have her appear at her best and truest; but so long as she is unable to make good her defence, this argument of ours shall be a charm to us, which we will repeat to ourselves while we listen to her strains; that we may not fall away into the childish love of her which captivates the many. At all events we are well aware that poetry being such as we have described is not to be regarded seriously as attaining to the truth; and he who listens to her, fearing for the safety of the city which is within him, should be on his guard against her seductions and make our words his law. Yes, he said, I quite agree with you. Yes, I said, my dear Glaucon, for great is the issue at stake, greater than appears, whether a man is to be good or bad. And what will any one be profited if under the influence of honour or money or power, aye, or under the excitement of poetry, he neglect justice and virtue? Yes, he said; I have been convinced by the argument, as I believe that any one else would have been. CU IDOL SELF LEARNING MATERIAL (SLM)

Plato: Book X of The Republic 47 And yet no mention has been made of the greatest prizes and rewards which await virtue. What, are there any greater still? If there are, they must be of an inconceivable greatness. Why, I said, what was ever great in a short time? The whole period of three score years and ten is surely but a little thing in comparison with eternity? Say rather ‘nothing,’ he replied. And should an immortal being seriously think of this little space rather than of the whole? Of the whole, certainly. But why do you ask? Are you not aware, I said, that the soul of man is immortal and imperishable? He looked at me in astonishment, and said: No, by heaven: And are you really prepared to maintain this? Yes, I said, I ought to be, and you too — there is no difficulty in proving it. I see a great difficulty; but I should like to hear you state this argument of which you make so light. Listen then. I am attending. There is a thing which you call good and another which you call evil? Yes, he replied. Would you agree with me in thinking that the corrupting and destroying element is the evil, and the saving and improving element the good? Yes. And you admit that every thing has a good and also an evil; as ophthalmia is the evil of the eyes and disease of the whole body; as mildew is of corn, and rot of timber, or rust of copper and iron: in everything, or in almost everything, there is an inherent evil and disease? Yes, he said. CU IDOL SELF LEARNING MATERIAL (SLM)

48 Literary Criticism and Critical Approaches - I And anything which is infected by any of these evils is made evil, and at last wholly dissolves and dies? True. The vice and evil which is inherent in each is the destruction of each; and if this does not destroy them there is nothing else that will; for good certainly will not destroy them, nor again, that which is neither good nor evil. Certainly not. If, then, we find any nature which having this inherent corruption cannot be dissolved or destroyed, we may be certain that of such a nature there is no destruction? That may be assumed. Well, I said, and is there no evil which corrupts the soul? Yes, he said, there are all the evils which we were just now passing in review: unrighteousness, intemperance, cowardice, ignorance. But does any of these dissolve or destroy her? — and here do not let us fall into the error of supposing that the unjust and foolish man, when he is detected, perishes through his own injustice, which is an evil of the soul. Take the analogy of the body: The evil of the body is a disease which wastes and reduces and annihilates the body; and all the things of which we were just now speaking come to annihilation through their own corruption attaching to them and inhering in them and so destroying them. Is not this true? Yes. Consider the soul in like manner. Does the injustice or other evil which exists in the soul waste and consume her? Do they by attaching to the soul and inhering in her at last bring her to death, and so separate her from the body? Certainly not. CU IDOL SELF LEARNING MATERIAL (SLM)

Plato: Book X of The Republic 49 And yet, I said, it is unreasonable to suppose that anything can perish from without through affection of external evil which could not be destroyed from within by a corruption of its own? It is, he replied. Consider, I said, Glaucon, that even the badness of food, whether staleness, decomposition, or any other bad quality, when confined to the actual food, is not supposed to destroy the body; although, if the badness of food communicates corruption to the body, then we should say that the body has been destroyed by a corruption of itself, which is disease, brought on by this; but that the body, being one thing, can be destroyed by the badness of food, which is another, and which does not engender any natural infection — this we shall absolutely deny? Very true. And, on the same principle, unless some bodily evil can produce an evil of the soul, we must not suppose that the soul, which is one thing, can be dissolved by any merely external evil which belongs to another? Yes, he said, there is reason in that. Either, then, let us refute this conclusion, or, while it remains unrefuted, let us never say that fever, or any other disease, or the knife put to the throat, or even the cutting up of the whole body into the minutest pieces, can destroy the soul, until she herself is proved to become more unholy or unrighteous in consequence of these things being done to the body; but that the soul, or anything else if not destroyed by an internal evil, can be destroyed by an external one, is not to be affirmed by any man. And surely, he replied, no one will ever prove that the souls of men become more unjust in consequence of death. But if some one who would rather not admit the immortality of the soul boldly denies this, and says that the dying do really become more evil and unrighteous, then, if the speaker is right, I suppose that injustice, like disease, must be assumed to be fatal to the unjust, and that those who take this disorder die by the natural inherent power of destruction which evil has, and which kills CU IDOL SELF LEARNING MATERIAL (SLM)

50 Literary Criticism and Critical Approaches - I them sooner or later, but in quite another way from that in which, at present, the wicked receive death at the hands of others as the penalty of their deeds? Nay, he said, in that case injustice, if fatal to the unjust, will not be so very terrible to him, for he will be delivered from evil. But I rather suspect the opposite to be the truth, and that injustice which, if it have the power, will murder others, keeps the murderer alive — aye, and well awake too; so far removed is her dwelling-place from being a house of death. True, I said; if the inherent natural vice or evil of the soul is unable to kill or destroy her, hardly will that which is appointed to be the destruction of some other body, destroy a soul or anything else except that of which it was appointed to be the destruction. Yes, that can hardly be. But the soul which cannot be destroyed by an evil, whether inherent or external, must exist for ever, and if existing for ever, must be immortal? Certainly. That is the conclusion, I said; and, if a true conclusion, then the souls must always be the same, for if none be destroyed they will not diminish in number. Neither will they increase, for the increase of the immortal natures must come from something mortal, and all things would thus end in immortality. Very true. But this we cannot believe — reason will not allow us — any more than we can believe the soul, in her truest nature, to be full of variety and difference and dissimilarity. What do you mean? he said. The soul, I said, being, as is now proven, immortal, must be the fairest of compositions and cannot be compounded of many elements? Certainly not. CU IDOL SELF LEARNING MATERIAL (SLM)

Plato: Book X of The Republic 51 Her immortality is demonstrated by the previous argument, and there are many other proofs; but to see her as she really is, not as we now behold her, marred by communion with the body and other miseries, you must contemplate her with the eye of reason, in her original purity; and then her beauty will be revealed, and justice and injustice and all the things which we have described will be manifested more clearly. Thus far, we have spoken the truth concerning her as she appears at present, but we must remember also that we have seen her only in a condition which may be compared to that of the sea-god Glaucus, whose original image can hardly be discerned because his natural members are broken off and crushed and damaged by the waves in all sorts of ways, and incrustations have grown over them of seaweed and shells and stones, so that he is more like some monster than he is to his own natural form. And the soul which we behold is in a similar condition, disfigured by ten thousand ills. But not there, Glaucon, not there must we look. Where then? At her love of wisdom. Let us see whom she affects, and what society and converse she seeks in virtue of her near kindred with the immortal and eternal and divine; also how different she would become if wholly following this superior principle, and borne by a divine impulse out of the ocean in which she now is, and disengaged from the stones and shells and things of earth and rock which in wild variety spring up around her because she feeds upon earth, and is overgrown by the good things of this life as they are termed: then you would see her as she is, and know whether she have one shape only or many, or what her nature is. Of her affections and of the forms which she takes in this present life I think that we have now said enough. True, he replied. And thus, I said, we have fulfilled the conditions of the argument; we have not introduced the rewards and glories of justice, which, as you were saying, are to be found in Homer and Hesiod; but justice in her own nature has been shown to be best for the soul in her own nature. Let a man do what is just, whether he have the ring of Gyges or not, and even if in addition to the ring of Gyges he put on the helmet of Hades. Very true. CU IDOL SELF LEARNING MATERIAL (SLM)

52 Literary Criticism and Critical Approaches - I And now, Glaucon, there will be no harm in further enumerating how many and how great are the rewards which justice and the other virtues procure to the soul from gods and men, both in life and after death. Certainly not, he said. Will you repay me, then, what you borrowed in the argument? What did I borrow? The assumption that the just man should appear unjust and the unjust just: for you were of opinion that even if the true state of the case could not possibly escape the eyes of gods and men, still this admission ought to be made for the sake of the argument, in order that pure justice might be weighed against pure injustice. Do you remember? I should be much to blame if I had forgotten. Then, as the cause is decided, I demand on behalf of justice that the estimation in which she is held by gods and men and which we acknowledge to be her due should now be restored to her by us; since she has been shown to confer reality, and not to deceive those who truly possess her, let what has been taken from her be given back, that so she may win that palm of appearance which is hers also, and which she gives to her own. The demand, he said, is just. In the first place, I said — and this is the first thing which you will have to give back — the nature both of the just and unjust is truly known to the gods. Granted. And if they are both known to them, one must be the friend and the other the enemy of the gods, as we admitted from the beginning? True. And the friend of the gods may be supposed to receive from them all things at their best, excepting only such evil as is the necessary consequence of former sins? CU IDOL SELF LEARNING MATERIAL (SLM)

Plato: Book X of The Republic 53 Certainly. Then this must be our notion of the just man, that even when he is in poverty or sickness, or any other seeming misfortune, all things will in the end work together for good to him in life and death: for the gods have a care of any one whose desire is to become just and to be like God, as far as man can attain the divine likeness, by the pursuit of virtue? Yes, he said; if he is like God he will surely not be neglected by him. And of the unjust may not the opposite be supposed? Certainly. Such, then, are the palms of victory which the gods give the just? That is my conviction. And what do they receive of men? Look at things as they really are, and you will see that the clever unjust are in the case of runners, who run well from the starting-place to the goal but not back again from the goal: they go off at a great pace, but in the end only look foolish, slinking away with their ears draggling on their shoulders, and without a crown; but the true runner comes to the finish and receives the prize and is crowned. And this is the way with the just; he who endures to the end of every action and occasion of his entire life has a good report and carries off the prize which men have to bestow. True. And now you must allow me to repeat of the just the blessings which you were attributing to the fortunate unjust. I shall say of them, what you were saying of the others, that as they grow older, they become rulers in their own city if they care to be; they marry whom they like and give in marriage to whom they will; all that you said of the others I now say of these. And, on the other hand, of the unjust I say that the greater number, even though they escape in their youth, are found out at last and look foolish at the end of their course, and when they come to be old and miserable are flouted alike by stranger and citizen; they are beaten and then come those things unfit for ears polite, as you truly term them; they will be racked and have their eyes burned out, as CU IDOL SELF LEARNING MATERIAL (SLM)

54 Literary Criticism and Critical Approaches - I you were saying. And you may suppose that I have repeated the remainder of your tale of horrors. But will you let me assume, without reciting them, that these things are true? Certainly, he said, what you say is true. These, then, are the prizes and rewards and gifts which are bestowed upon the just by gods and men in this present life, in addition to the other good things which justice of herself provides. Yes, he said; and they are fair and lasting. And yet, I said, all these are as nothing either in number or greatness in comparison with those other recompenses which await both just and unjust after death. And you ought to hear them, and then both just and unjust will have received from us a full payment of the debt which the argument owes to them. Speak, he said; there are few things which I would more gladly hear. Well, I said, I will tell you a tale; not one of the tales which Odysseus tells to the hero Alcinous, yet this too is a tale of a hero, Er the son of Armenius, a Pamphylian by birth. He was slain in battle, and ten days afterwards, when the bodies of the dead were taken up already in a state of corruption, his body was found unaffected by decay, and carried away home to be buried. And on the twelfth day, as he was lying on the funeral pile, he returned to life and told them what he had seen in the other world. He said that when his soul left the body he went on a journey with a great company, and that they came to a mysterious place at which there were two openings in the earth; they were near together, and over against them were two other openings in the heaven above. In the intermediate space there were judges seated, who commanded the just, after they had given judgment on them and had bound their sentences in front of them, to ascend by the heavenly way on the right hand; and in like manner the unjust were bidden by them to descend by the lower way on the left hand; these also bore the symbols of their deeds, but fastened on their backs. He drew near, and they told him that he was to be the messenger who would carry the report of the other world to men, and they bade him hear and see all that was to be heard and seen in that place. Then he beheld and saw on one side the souls departing at either opening of heaven and earth when sentence had been given on them; and at the two other openings other souls, some ascending out of the earth dusty and worn with travel, some descending out of heaven clean and CU IDOL SELF LEARNING MATERIAL (SLM)

Plato: Book X of The Republic 55 bright. And arriving ever and anon they seemed to have come from a long journey, and they went forth with gladness into the meadow, where they encamped as at a festival; and those who knew one another embraced and conversed, the souls which came from earth curiously enquiring about the things above, and the souls which came from heaven about the things beneath. And they told one another of what had happened by the way, those from below weeping and sorrowing at the remembrance of the things which they had endured and seen in their journey beneath the earth (now the journey lasted a thousand years), while those from above were describing heavenly delights and visions of inconceivable beauty. The story, Glaucon, would take too long to tell; but the sum was this:— He said that for every wrong which they had done to any one they suffered tenfold; or once in a hundred years — such being reckoned to be the length of man’s life, and the penalty being thus paid ten times in a thousand years. If, for example, there were any who had been the cause of many deaths, or had betrayed or enslaved cities or armies, or been guilty of any other evil behaviour, for each and all of their offences they received punishment ten times over, and the rewards of beneficence and justice and holiness were in the same proportion. I need hardly repeat what he said concerning young children dying almost as soon as they were born. Of piety and impiety to gods and parents, and of murderers, there were retributions other and greater far which he described. He mentioned that he was present when one of the spirits asked another, ‘Where is Ardiaeus the Great?’ (Now, this Ardiaeus lived a thousand years before the time of Er: he had been the tyrant of some city of Pamphylia, and had murdered his aged father and his elder brother, and was said to have committed many other abominable crimes.) The answer of the other spirit was: ‘He comes not hither and will never come. And this,’ said he, ‘was one of the dreadful sights which we ourselves witnessed. We were at the mouth of the cavern, and, having completed all our experiences, were about to reascend, when of a sudden Ardiaeus appeared and several others, most of whom were tyrants; and there were also besides the tyrants private individuals who had been great criminals: they were just, as they fancied, about to return into the upper world, but the mouth, instead of admitting them, gave a roar, whenever any of these incurable sinners or some one who had not been sufficiently punished tried to ascend; and then wild men of fiery aspect, who were standing by and heard the sound, seized and carried them off; and Ardiaeus and others they bound head and foot and hand, and threw them down and flayed them with scourges, and dragged them along the road at the side, carding them on thorns like wool, and declaring to CU IDOL SELF LEARNING MATERIAL (SLM)

56 Literary Criticism and Critical Approaches - I the passers-by what were their crimes, and that they were being taken away to be cast into hell.’ And of all the many terrors which they had endured, he said that there was none like the terror which each of them felt at that moment, lest they should hear the voice; and when there was silence, one by one they ascended with exceeding joy. These, said Er, were the penalties and retributions, and there were blessings as great. Now when the spirits which were in the meadow had tarried seven days, on the eighth they were obliged to proceed on their journey, and, on the fourth day after, he said that they came to a place where they could see from above a line of light, straight as a column, extending right through the whole heaven and through the earth, in colour resembling the rainbow, only brighter and purer; another day’s journey brought them to the place, and there, in the midst of the light, they saw the ends of the chains of heaven let down from above: for this light is the belt of heaven, and holds together the circle of the universe, like the under-girders of a trireme. From these ends is extended the spindle of Necessity, on which all the revolutions turn. The shaft and hook of this spindle are made of steel, and the whorl is made partly of steel and also partly of other materials. Now the whorl is in form like the whorl used on earth; and the description of it implied that there is one large hollow whorl which is quite scooped out, and into this is fitted another lesser one, and another, and another, and four others, making eight in all, like vessels which fit into one another; the whorls show their edges on the upper side, and on their lower side all together form one continuous whorl. This is pierced by the spindle, which is driven home through the centre of the eighth. The first and outermost whorl has the rim broadest, and the seven inner whorls are narrower, in the following proportions — the sixth is next to the first in size, the fourth next to the sixth; then comes the eighth; the seventh is fifth, the fifth is sixth, the third is seventh, last and eighth comes the second. The largest (or fixed stars) is spangled, and the seventh (or sun) is brightest; the eighth (or moon) coloured by the reflected light of the seventh; the second and fifth (Saturn and Mercury) are in colour like one another, and yellower than the preceding; the third (Venus) has the whitest light; the fourth (Mars) is reddish; the sixth (Jupiter) is in whiteness second. Now the whole spindle has the same motion; but, as the whole revolves in one direction, the seven inner circles move slowly in the other, and of these the swiftest is the eighth; next in swiftness are the seventh, sixth, and fifth, which move together; third in swiftness appeared to CU IDOL SELF LEARNING MATERIAL (SLM)

Plato: Book X of The Republic 57 move according to the law of this reversed motion the fourth; the third appeared fourth and the second fifth. The spindle turns on the knees of Necessity; and on the upper surface of each circle is a siren, who goes round with them, hymning a single tone or note. The eight together form one harmony; and round about, at equal intervals, there is another band, three in number, each sitting upon her throne: these are the Fates, daughters of Necessity, who are clothed in white robes and have chaplets upon their heads, Lachesis and Clotho and Atropos, who accompany with their voices the harmony of the sirens — Lachesis singing of the past, Clotho of the present, Atropos of the future; Clotho from time to time assisting with a touch of her right hand the revolution of the outer circle of the whorl or spindle, and Atropos with her left hand touching and guiding the inner ones, and Lachesis laying hold of either in turn, first with one hand and then with the other. When Er and the spirits arrived, their duty was to go at once to Lachesis; but first of all there came a prophet who arranged them in order; then he took from the knees of Lachesis lots and samples of lives, and having mounted a high pulpit, spoke as follows: ‘Hear the word of Lachesis, the daughter of Necessity. Mortal souls, behold a new cycle of life and mortality. Your genius will not be allotted to you, but you will choose your genius; and let him who draws the first lot have the first choice, and the life which he chooses shall be his destiny. Virtue is free, and as a man honours or dishonours her he will have more or less of her; the responsibility is with the chooser — God is justified.’ When the Interpreter had thus spoken he scattered lots indifferently among them all, and each of them took up the lot which fell near him, all but Er himself (he was not allowed), and each as he took his lot perceived the number which he had obtained. Then the Interpreter placed on the ground before them the samples of lives; and there were many more lives than the souls present, and they were of all sorts. There were lives of every animal and of man in every condition. And there were tyrannies among them, some lasting out the tyrant’s life, others which broke off in the middle and came to an end in poverty and exile and beggary; and there were lives of famous men, some who were famous for their form and beauty as well as for their strength and success in games, or, again, for their birth and the qualities of their ancestors; and some who were the reverse of famous for the opposite qualities. And of women likewise; there was not, however, any definite character in them, because the soul, when choosing a new life, must of necessity become different. But there was every other quality, and the all mingled CU IDOL SELF LEARNING MATERIAL (SLM)

58 Literary Criticism and Critical Approaches - I with one another, and also with elements of wealth and poverty, and disease and health; and there were mean states also. And here, my dear Glaucon, is the supreme peril of our human state; and therefore the utmost care should be taken. Let each one of us leave every other kind of knowledge and seek and follow one thing only, if peradventure he may be able to learn and may find some one who will make him able to learn and discern between good and evil, and so to choose always and everywhere the better life as he has opportunity. He should consider the bearing of all these things which have been mentioned severally and collectively upon virtue; he should know what the effect of beauty is when combined with poverty or wealth in a particular soul, and what are the good and evil consequences of noble and humble birth, of private and public station, of strength and weakness, of cleverness and dullness, and of all the natural and acquired gifts of the soul, and the operation of them when conjoined; he will then look at the nature of the soul, and from the consideration of all these qualities he will be able to determine which is the better and which is the worse; and so he will choose, giving the name of evil to the life which will make his soul more unjust, and good to the life which will make his soul more just; all else he will disregard. For we have seen and know that this is the best choice both in life and after death. A man must take with him into the world below an adamantine faith in truth and right, that there too he may be undazzled by the desire of wealth or the other allurements of evil, lest, coming upon tyrannies and similar villainies, he do irremediable wrongs to others and suffer yet worse himself; but let him know how to choose the mean and avoid the extremes on either side, as far as possible, not only in this life but in all that which is to come. For this is the way of happiness. And according to the report of the messenger from the other world this was what the prophet said at the time: ‘Even for the last comer, if he chooses wisely and will live diligently, there is appointed a happy and not undesirable existence. Let not him who chooses first be careless, and let not the last despair.’ And when he had spoken, he who had the first choice came forward and in a moment chose the greatest tyranny; his mind having been darkened by folly and sensuality, he had not thought out the whole matter before he chose, and did not at first sight perceive that he was fated, among other evils, to devour his own children. But when he had time to reflect, and saw what was in the lot, he began to beat his breast and lament over his choice, forgetting the proclamation of the prophet; for, instead of throwing the blame of his misfortune on himself, he CU IDOL SELF LEARNING MATERIAL (SLM)

Plato: Book X of The Republic 59 accused chance and the gods, and everything rather than himself. Now he was one of those who came from heaven, and in a former life had dwelt in a well-ordered State, but his virtue was a matter of habit only, and he had no philosophy. And it was true of others who were similarly overtaken, that the greater number of them came from heaven and therefore they had never been schooled by trial, whereas the pilgrims who came from earth having themselves suffered and seen others suffer, were not in a hurry to choose. And owing to this inexperience of theirs, and also because the lot was a chance, many of the souls exchanged a good destiny for an evil or an evil for a good. For if a man had always on his arrival in this world dedicated himself from the first to sound philosophy, and had been moderately fortunate in the number of the lot, he might, as the messenger reported, be happy here, and also his journey to another life and return to this, instead of being rough and underground, would be smooth and heavenly. Most curious, he said, was the spectacle — sad and laughable and strange; for the choice of the souls was in most cases based on their experience of a previous life. There he saw the soul which had once been Orpheus choosing the life of a swan out of enmity to the race of women, hating to be born of a woman because they had been his murderers; he beheld also the soul of Thamyras choosing the life of a nightingale; birds, on the other hand, like the swan and other musicians, wanting to be men. The soul which obtained the twentieth lot chose the life of a lion, and this was the soul of Ajax the son of Telamon, who would not be a man, remembering the injustice which was done him in the judgment about the arms. The next was Agamemnon, who took the life of an eagle, because, like Ajax, he hated human nature by reason of his sufferings. About the middle came the lot of Atalanta; she, seeing the great fame of an athlete, was unable to resist the temptation: and after her there followed the soul of Epeus the son of Panopeus passing into the nature of a woman cunning in the arts; and far away among the last who chose, the soul of the jester Thersites was putting on the form of a monkey. There came also the soul of Odysseus having yet to make a choice, and his lot happened to be the last of them all. Now the recollection of former toils had disenchanted him of ambition, and he went about for a considerable time in search of the life of a private man who had no cares; he had some difficulty in finding this, which was lying about and had been neglected by everybody else; and when he saw it, he said that he would have done the same had his lot been first instead of last, and that he was delighted to have it. And not only did men pass into animals, but I must also mention that there were animals tame and wild who CU IDOL SELF LEARNING MATERIAL (SLM)

60 Literary Criticism and Critical Approaches - I changed into one another and into corresponding human natures — the good into the gentle and the evil into the savage, in all sorts of combinations. All the souls had now chosen their lives, and they went in the order of their choice to Lachesis, who sent with them the genius whom they had severally chosen, to be the guardian of their lives and the fulfiller of the choice: this genius led the souls first to Clotho, and drew them within the revolution of the spindle impelled by her hand, thus ratifying the destiny of each; and then, when they were fastened to this, carried them to Atropos, who spun the threads and made them irreversible, whence without turning round they passed beneath the throne of Necessity; and when they had all passed, they marched on in a scorching heat to the plain of Forgetfulness, which was a barren waste destitute of trees and verdure; and then towards evening they encamped by the river of Unmindfulness, whose water no vessel can hold; of this they were all obliged to drink a certain quantity, and those who were not saved by wisdom drank more than was necessary; and each one as he drank forgot all things. Now after they had gone to rest, about the middle of the night there was a thunderstorm and earthquake, and then in an instant they were driven upwards in all manner of ways to their birth, like stars shooting. He himself was hindered from drinking the water. But in what manner or by what means he returned to the body he could not say; only, in the morning, awaking suddenly, he found himself lying on the pyre. And thus, Glaucon, the tale has been saved and has not perished, and will save us if we are obedient to the word spoken; and we shall pass safely over the river of Forgetfulness and our soul will not be defiled. Wherefore my counsel is, that we hold fast ever to the heavenly way and follow after justice and virtue always, considering that the soul is immortal and able to endure every sort of good and every sort of evil. Thus shall we live dear to one another and to the gods, both while remaining here and when, like conquerors in the games who go round to gather gifts, we receive our reward. And it shall be well with us both in this life and in the pilgrimage of a thousand years which we have been describing. CU IDOL SELF LEARNING MATERIAL (SLM)

Plato: Book X of The Republic 61 2.4The RepublicSummary of Book X “The Recompense of Life” Summary: Book X The final book ofThe Republicbegins with Socrates return to an earlier theme, that of imitative poetry. He reiterates that while he is still content with having banished poetry from their State, he wishes to explain his reasons more thoroughly. Taking a bed as his example, Socrates relates how in the world there are three levels at which phenomena occur. First and original is the level of God, who creates the bed as an idea; second is the carpenter who imitates God’s idea in making a particular bed; and last is the poet or painter, whose bed imitates the imitator’s. Homer is offered as an unfortunate case. The great poet, Socrates laments, would have helped his country more truly had he taken a political role. An artist imitates that which he does not understand; the poet sings of the cobbler, but does he know the trade? Not at all. Imitation, says Socrates, is a game or sport; it is play. Socrates warms his auditors of the common imbalance of the soul toward the affective, “the rebellious principle,” toward grief and lamentation‹of which opportunistic poetry takes advantage. Thus it uselessly commemorates human irrationality and cowardice, and worse, for the sake of a popular audience. The audience is seduced, as it were, into feeling undesirable emotions. The only poetry that Socrates will allow in the State is “hymns to the gods and praises to famous men.” Poetry, and especially musical verse, on the other hand, is pleasurable and serves neither truth nor the State‹in fact, just the opposite. And so, after admitting his own love for poetry and Homer in particular, Socrates must leave it out. But Socrates lifts his spirits and the spirits of his auditors by illustrating the rewards of the virtuous man. He begins, to Glaucon’s incredulity, to state that the human soul is immortal. Like the healthy body, the human soul, fortified by the good, lives on eternally. The soul, Socrates continues, cannot be purely known otherwise than through the faculty of reason. And its final and greatest recompense is attained in the afterlife, when the gods‹having observed the good soul’s pursuit of god-like virtues–honor it accordingly. Whereas the unjust man suffers in life, more often in the long run than the short, and is viciously scorned by the gods thereafter. CU IDOL SELF LEARNING MATERIAL (SLM)

62 Literary Criticism and Critical Approaches - I The book closes with Socrates’ long narration of the tale of Er, an ancient hero who, after being slain in battle, entered the afterlife only to return again. The tale defies facile summary except to say that every man and woman arriving in the afterlife is held accountable and judged for his or her actions. A tyrant is condemned to hell for a thousand years. The primarily righteous, however, ascend to heaven where they are made to choose their next mode of life. Some elect to return as animals, others as a famous athlete or ruler; Odysseus, for example, chooses the life of a humble man. But the choice is their own: based on the wisdom they carry with them. Finally the souls drink from the river of Forgetfulness, become oblivious, and return to earth in their new forms. Throughout the story Socrates is careful to warn Glaucon of all the pitfalls and mistakes and, most importantly, of how the account recapitulates everything they have heretofore determined in their dialogue. 2.5 Analysis: Book X The argument presented against poetic imitation is, however arduously maintained, not entirely convincing. Plato believes poetic knowledge to be of appearances only because, were it otherwise, the poet would dedicate himself to “realities” not “imitations,” or images. The poet knows no trade and produce nothing of real, that is, necessary value. In fact, Plato’s portrait of the artist makes him seem superfluous. Plato’s second objection is that the artist knowingly manipulates the passions of his audience. In a purely rational State, there is no room for the stirring up of “evil constitutions,” nor the retelling of misfortunes or misadventures in the past. What lies behind Plato’s dislike of maudlin dramas or even great tragedy is his conviction that the audience will identify with and in turn imitate whatever it sees. The immortality of the soul, for Plato, does not depend on the justice and cannot be destroyed even as the body is destroyed. Its fate, on the other hand, is contingent upon its relationship with the good; it feeds and nourishes itself on the wisdom. The souls of the wicked are a more complicated issue, for, insofar as they are immortal, evil cannot destroy them. However, Plato warns, there are various manifest parts to the soul, and evil-doing damages these. And unjust men also injure their own bodies and the bodies of others. In any case the afterlife is CU IDOL SELF LEARNING MATERIAL (SLM)

Plato: Book X of The Republic 63 what is most important; there the good soul enjoys the benefits it may or may not have experienced in life. The moral of the tale of Er, if we may drain it of its colour, is that of the eternal return, or recurrence. After death the soul is ultimately judged. This judgment determines the owner of the soul’s order of choice in lots for the next life. Then, whatever wisdom he has accumulated previously helps him make his choice when his lot comes up. Both moments are essential because they represent choices between good and evil. One is an ongoing choice, alive in mortal life, and the other is the ultimate choice–the sum of what the soul has learned in life. Man is responsible for his own behaviour, says Plato. And the final twist is that, it seems, the wise man does not really forget, since if he is truly wise he will choose yet another wise existence. 2.6 Philosophical Themes, Arguments & Ideas Justice as the Advantage of the Stronger In Book I ofThe Republic, Thrasymachus sets up a challenge to justice. Thrasymachus is a Sophist, one of the teachers-for-hire who preached a creed of subjective morality to the wealthy sons of Athens. The Sophists did not believe in objective truth, including objective moral truth. They did not think, in other words, that anything was absolutely “right” or “wrong”; instead they viewed all actions as either advantageous or disadvantageous to the person performing them. If an action was advantageous then they thought you should engage in it, and if it was disadvantageous then they thought that you should refrain. Taking this belief to its logical conclusion, some of them went so far as to claim that law and morality are nothing but mere convention, and that one ought to try to get away with injustice and illegality whenever such action would be to one’s advantage. Plato meant to combat this attitude inThe Republic. Thrasymachus introduces the Sophist challenge by remarking that justice is nothing but the advantage of the stronger. He does not mean to define justice with this statement, but to debunk it. His claim proceeds from the basic Sophistic moral notion: that the norms considered just are nothing more than conventions which hamper those who adhere to them, and benefit those who flout them. Those who behave unjustly naturally gain power and become the rulers, the strong people in society. Justice is the advantage of the stronger because when stupid, weak people CU IDOL SELF LEARNING MATERIAL (SLM)

64 Literary Criticism and Critical Approaches - I behave in accordance with justice, they are disadvantaged, and the strong (those who behave unjustly) are advantaged. An alternate reading of Thrasymachus’s bold statement makes his claim seem slightly more subtle. According to this reading (put forward by C. D. C. Reeve), Thrasymachus is not merely making the usual assertion that the norms of justice are conventions; he claims further that these mores and norms are conventions that were put in place by the rulers (the “stronger”) for the purpose of promoting their own interests. Conceptions of justice, in this reading, are the products of propaganda and tools of oppressors. Regardless of the interpretation we give to Thrasymachus’ statement, the challenge to Socrates is the same: he must prove that justice is something good and desirable, that it is more than convention, that it is connected to objective standards of morality, and that it is in our interest to adhere to it. His attempt to meet this challenge occupies the rest ofThe Republic. The Principle of Specialization Before he can prove that justice is a good thing, Plato must first state what justice is. Instead of defining justice as a set of behavioural norms (as the traditional Greek thinkers did) Plato identifies justice as structural: political justice resides in the structure of the city; individual justice resides in the structure of the soul. The just structure of the city is summed up by the principle of specialization: each member of society must play the role for which his nature best suits him and not meddle in any other business. A man whose nature suits him to farming must farm and do nothing else; a man whose nature best suits him to building objects out of wood must be a carpenter and not bother with any other sort of work. Plato believes that this is the only way to ensure that each job is done as well as possible. The principle of specialization keeps the farmer from carpentering, and the carpenter from farming. More important, it keeps both the farmer and the carpenter from becoming warriors and rulers. The principle of specialization separates society into three classes: the class of producers (including farmers, craftsmen, doctors, etc.), the class of warriors, and the class of rulers. Specialization ensures that these classes remain in a fixed relations of power and influence. Rulers control the city, establishing its laws and objectives. Warriors carry out the commands of CU IDOL SELF LEARNING MATERIAL (SLM)

Plato: Book X of The Republic 65 rulers. Producers stay out of political affairs, only worrying themselves about the business of ruling insofar as they need to obey what the rulers say and the warriors enforce. A city set up in this way, Plato contends, is a just city. The Tripartite Soul Just as political justice consists in the structural relations among classes of society, Plato believes, individual justice consists in correct structural relations among parts of the soul. Paralleling the producers, warriors, and rulers in the city, Plato claims that each individual soul has three separate seats of desire and motivation: the appetitive part of our soul lusts after food, drink, sex, and so on (and after money most of all, since money is the means of satisfying the rest of these desires); the spirited part of the soul yearns for honour; the rational part of the soul desires truth and knowledge. In a just soul, these three parts stand in the correct power relations. The rational part must rule, the spirited part must enforce the rational part’s convictions, and the appetitive part must obey. In the just soul, the desires of the rational, truth-loving part dictate the overall aims of the human being. All appetites and considerations of honour are put at the disposal of truth-loving goals. The just soul strives wholly toward truth. Plato identifies the philosopher (literally “truth lover”) as the most just individual, and sets him up as ruler of the just city. The Sun, the Line, the Cave Explaining his idea of a philosopher-king, Plato appeals to three successive analogies to spell out the metaphysical and epistemological theories that account for the philosopher’s irreplaceable role in politics. The analogy of the sun illuminates the notion of the Form of the Good, the philosopher-king’s ultimate object of desire. The line illustrates the four different grades of cognitive activity of which a human being is capable, the highest of which only the philosopher- kings ever reach. The allegory of the cave demonstrates the effects of education on the human soul, demonstrating how we move from one grade of cognitive activity to the next. In the allegory of the cave, Plato asks us to imagine the following scenario: A group of people have lived in a deep cave since birth, never seeing any daylight at all. These people are bound in such a way that they cannot look to either side or behind them, but only straight ahead. CU IDOL SELF LEARNING MATERIAL (SLM)

66 Literary Criticism and Critical Approaches - I Behind them is a fire, and behind the fire is a partial wall. On top of the wall are various statues, which are manipulated by another group of people, laying out of sight. Because of the fire, the statues cast shadows on the wall that the prisoners are facing. The prisoners watch the stories that these shadows play out, and because this is all they can ever see, they believe that these shadows are the most real things in the world. When they talk to one another about “men,” “women,” “trees,” “horses,” and so on, they refer only to these shadows. Now he asks us to imagine that one of these prisoners is freed from his bonds, and is able to look at the fire and at the statues themselves. After initial pain and disbelief, he eventually realizes that all these things are more real than the shadows he has always believed to be the most real things; he grasps how the fire and the statues together caused the shadows, which are copies of the real things. He now takes the statues and fire as the most real things in the world. Next this prisoner is dragged out of the cave into the world above. At first, he is so dazzled by the light in the open that he can only look at shadows, then he is able to look at reflections, then finally at the real objects — real trees, flowers, houses, and other physical objects. He sees that these are even more real than the statues were, and that those objects were only copies of these. Finally, when the prisoner’s eyes have fully adjusted to the brightness, he lifts his sights toward the heavens and looks at the sun. He understands that the sun is the cause of everything he sees around him — of the light, of his capacity for sight, of the existence of flowers, trees, and all other objects. The stages the prisoner passes through in the allegory of the cave correspond to the various levels on the line. The line, first of all, is broken into two equal halves: the visible realm (which we can grasp with our senses) and the intelligible realm (which we can only grasp with the mind). When the prisoner is in the cave he is in the visible realm. When he ascends into the daylight, he enters the intelligible. The lowest rung on the cognitive line is imagination. In the cave, this is represented as the prisoner whose feet and head are bound, so that he can only see shadows. What he takes to be the most real things are not real at all; they are shadows, mere images. These shadows are meant to CU IDOL SELF LEARNING MATERIAL (SLM)

Plato: Book X of The Republic 67 represent images from art. A man who is stuck in the imagination stage of development takes his truths from epic poetry and theatre, or other fictions. He derives his conception of himself and his world from these art forms rather than from looking at the real world. When the prisoner frees himself and looks at the statues he reaches the next stage in the line: belief. The statues are meant to correspond to the real objects of our sensation — real people, trees, flowers, and so on. The man in the cognitive stage of belief mistakenly takes these sensible particulars as the most real things. When he ascends into the world above, though, he sees that there is something even more real: the Forms, of which the sensible particulars are imperfect copies. He is now at the stage of thought in his cognition. He can reason about Forms, but not in a purely abstract way. He uses images and unproven assumptions as crutches. Finally, he turns his sights to the sun, which represents the ultimate Form, the Form of the Good. The Form of the Good is the cause of all other Forms, and is the source of all goodness, truth, and beauty in the world. It is the ultimate object of knowledge. Once the prisoner has grasped the Form of the Good, he has reached the highest stage of cognition: understanding. He no longer has any need for images or unproven assumptions to aid in his reasoning. By reaching the Form of the Good, he hits on the first principle of philosophy which explains everything without the need of any assumptions or images. He can now use this understanding derived from comprehending the Form of the Good to transform all his previous thought into understanding— he can understand all of the Forms. Only the philosopher can reach this stage, and that is why only he is fit to rule. Plato is unable to provide direct detail about the Form of the Good, and instead illustrates his idea by comparing it to the sun. The Form of the Good is to the intelligible realm, he claims, as the sun is the visible realm. (In the metaphor, the fire in the cave represents the sun.) First of all, just as the sun provides light and visibility in the visible realm, the Form of the Good is the source of intelligibility. The sun makes sight possible, and, similarly, the Form of the Good is responsible for our capacity for knowledge. The sun causes things to come to be in the visible world; it regulates the seasons, makes flowers bloom, influences animals to give birth and so on. CU IDOL SELF LEARNING MATERIAL (SLM)

68 Literary Criticism and Critical Approaches - I The Form of the Good is responsible for the existence of Forms, for their coming to be in the intelligible world. Why It Pays to Be Just One of Plato’s objectives inThe Republicwas to show that justice is worthwhile — that just action is a good in itself, and that one ought to engage in just activity even when it doesn’t seem to confer immediate advantage. Once he has completed his portrait of the most just man — the philosopher-king — he is in a position to fulfill this aim. In Book IX, Plato presents three arguments for the claim that it pays to be just. First, by sketching a psychological portrait of the tyrant, he attempts to prove that injustice takes such a wretched toll on a man’s psyche that it could not possibly be worth it (whereas a just soul is untroubled and calm). Next, he argues that, though each of the three main character types (money-loving, honor-loving, and truth-loving) have their own conceptions of pleasure and of the corresponding good life (each choosing his own life as the most pleasant sort), only the philosopher is in the position to judge since only he is capable of experiencing all three types of pleasure. Finally, he tries to demonstrate that only philosophical pleasure is really pleasure at all; all other pleasure is only cessation from pain. In all likelihood, Plato did not consider any of these to be the primary source of justice’s worth. Plato’s goal was to prove that justice is worthwhile independent of the advantages it confers, so for him to argue that the worth of justice lies in the enormous pleasure it produces is beside his point. To say that we should be just because it will make our life more pleasant, after all, is just to say that we should be just because it is to our advantage to do so. Instead, we should expect to find him arguing that the worth of justice lies in some other source, preferably having something to do with objective goodness. This is why many philosophers, from Plato’s student Aristotle down to modern scholar Richard Kraut, believe that Plato’s real argument for the worth of justice takes place long before Book IX. They think, plausibly, that Plato locates the worth of justice in justice’s connection to the Forms, which he holds to be the most good things in the world. Justice is worthwhile, on this interpretation, not because of any advantage it confers, but because it involves grasping the Form of the Good and imitating it. The just man tries to imitate the Forms by making his own soul as orderly and harmonious as the Forms themselves. CU IDOL SELF LEARNING MATERIAL (SLM)

Plato: Book X of The Republic 69 Yet on our understanding of what makes any virtue worthwhile — its connection to the Forms — Plato has sufficiently demonstrated the worth of both sorts of virtue. Philosophical virtue might be more worthwhile because it not only imitates the Forms, but aims at and consorts with them, but civic virtue is worthwhile as well because it involves bringing the Forms into your life by instituting order and harmony in your soul. Bloom, though, also has another plausible hypothesis for why Plato included the myth of Er, and this one coheres well with our understanding of justice’s worth. The myth of Er, Bloom explains, illustrates once again the necessity of philosophy. The civic virtues alone are not enough. Only the philosophers know how to choose the right new life, because only they understand the soul and understand what makes for a good life and a bad one. The others, who lack this understanding, sometimes choose right and sometimes wrong. They fluctuate back and forth between good lives and miserable ones. Since every soul is responsible for choosing his own life, every person must take full responsibility for being just or unjust. We willingly choose to be unjust because of our ignorance of what makes for a just or unjust soul. Ignorance, then, is the only true sin, and philosophy the only cure. 2.7 Keywords/Abbreviations  Aporia:Aporia is the Greek term for the state of helplessness—the inability to proceed— that ends all of Plato’s early dialogues. Through his pointed questioning,Socrates succeeds in showing that his interlocutors have no appropriate definition for thetopic under consideration (be that topic piety, love, courage, justice, or whatever else),but nor is he able to supply one himself. In Book I ofThe Republic, Socrates brings his friends to a state of aporia on the topic of justice, but then in the next nine books, he manages to move beyond the aporia and give an actual answer to the question at hand.  Appetite:Appetite is the largest aspect of our tripartite soul. It is the seat of all our various desires for food, drink, sexual gratification and other such pleasures. It contains both necessary desires, which should be indulged (such as the desire to eat enough to stay alive), unnecessary desires, which should be limited (such as the desire to eat a ten pound sirloin steak at every meal), and unlawful desires, which should be suppressed at CU IDOL SELF LEARNING MATERIAL (SLM)

70 Literary Criticism and Critical Approaches - I all costs (such as the desire to eat one’s children). Though the appetite lusts after many things, Plato dubs it “money-loving,” since money is required for satisfying most of these desires. In a just man, the appetite is strictly controlled by reason and reason’s henchman, spirit.  Auxiliary:Plato divides his just society into three classes: the producers, the auxiliaries, and the guardians. The auxiliaries are the warriors, responsible for defending the city from invaders, and for keeping the peace at home. They must enforce the convictions of the guardians, and ensure that the producers obey.  Belief:Belief is the second lowest grade of cognitive activity. The object of belief is the visible realm rather than the intelligible realm. A man in a state of belief does not have any access to the Forms, but instead takes sensible particulars as the most real things.  Elenchus:Elenchus is the Greek term for Socrates’s method of questioning his interlocutors. In an elenchus, he attempts to show that their own beliefs are contradictory, and thus to prove that they do not have knowledge about some topic about which they thought they had knowledge.  Empirical:When something is an empirical question, that means the question can only be settled by going out into the world and investigating. The question, “What percentage of the population of the United States likes ice cream” is an example of an empirical question, which can only be answered through empirical investigation. The question “What is the square root of two,” on the other hand, is not an empirical question. In order to answer this question, all you have to do is think about the mathematics involved; you do not have to investigate evidence in the world.  Form:According to Plato’s metaphysical theory, there is an aspect of reality beyond the one which we can see, an aspect of reality even more real than the one we see. This aspect of reality, the intelligible realm, is comprised of unchanging, eternal, absolute entities, which are called “Forms.” These absolute entities—such as Goodness, Beauty, Redness, Sourness, and so on—are the cause of all the objects we experience around us in the visible realm. An apple is red and sweet, for instance, because it participates in the Form of Redness and the Form of Sweetness. A woman is beautiful because she CU IDOL SELF LEARNING MATERIAL (SLM)

Plato: Book X of The Republic 71 participates in the Form of Beauty. Only the Forms can be objects of knowledge (i.e., Forms are the only things we can know about).  Form of the Good:Among the Forms, one stands out as most important. This is the Form of the Good. Plato is unable to tell us exactly what the Form of The Good is, but he does tell us that it is the source of intelligibility and of our capacity to know, and also that it is responsible for bringing all of the other Forms into existence. He compares its role in the intelligible realm to the role of the sun in the visible realm. The Form of the Good is the ultimate object of knowledge; it is only once one grasps the Form of the Good that one reaches the highest grade of cognitive activity, understanding. Therefore, it is only after he grasps the Form of the Good that a philosopher-in-training becomes a philosopher-king.  Guardian:Plato divides his just society into three classes: the producers, the auxiliaries, and the guardians. The guardians are responsible for ruling the city. They are chosen from among the ranks of the auxiliaries, and are also known as philosopher-kings.  Hesiod:Hesiod was a famous Greek poet. His long poem Works and Days outlines the traditional Greek conception of virtue and justice.  Imagination:Imagination is the lowest grade of cognitive activity. Someone in the state of imagination takes mere images and shadows as the most real things. Probably, this means that such a person derives his ideas about himself and the world from products of art, such as poetry in Plato’s day and movies and television in our own. See also Belief, Thought and Understanding.  Instrumental Reason:Instrumental reason is reason used to attain some end, by engaging in means-end analyses. These ends are dictated by a part of the soul such as appetite or spirit, or even reason itself.  Intelligible Realm:Plato divides all of existence up into two parts: the visible realm and the intelligible realm. The intelligible realm cannot be sensed, but only grasped with the intellect. It consists of the Forms. Only the intelligible realm can be the object of knowledge. CU IDOL SELF LEARNING MATERIAL (SLM)

72 Literary Criticism and Critical Approaches - I  Kallipolis:Kallipolis is the Greek term for Plato’s just city.  Knowledge:According to Plato, knowledge can only pertain to eternal, unchanging truths. I can know, for instance that two plus two equals four, because this will also be the case. I cannot know, however, that Meno is beautiful. For this reason, only the intelligible realm, the realm of the Forms can be the object of knowledge. See also Opinion.  Lover of Sights and Sounds:“Lovers of sights and sounds” is Socrates’s term for the pseudo-intellectuals who claim to have expertise regarding all that is beautiful, but who fail to recognize that there is such a thing as the Form of the Beautiful, which causes all beauty in the visible realm. Socrates is adamant that lovers of sights and sounds be distinguished from philosophers, who grasp the Forms, and thus have knowledge. Lovers of sights and sounds have no knowledge, only opinion.  Philosopher-king:The philosopher-king is the ruler of the kallipolis. Also called guardians, philosopher-kings are the only people who can grasp the Forms, and thus the only people who can claim actual knowledge. Since the philosopher-king yearns after truth above all else, he is also the most just man.  Pleonexia:A Greek term meaning “the desire to have more,” pleonexia refers to the yearning after money and power. In Book I, Thrasymachus presents the popular view that justice is nothing more than an unnatural restraint on our natural pleonexia.  Producers:Plato divides his just society into three classes: the producers, the auxiliaries, and the guardians. The producing class is the largest class of society; it is a catch-all group that includes all professions other than warrior and ruler. Framers and craftsmen are producers, as are merchants, doctors, artists, actors, lawyers, judges, and so forth. In a just society, the producers have no share in ruling, but merely obey what the rulers decree. They focus exclusively on producing whatever it is that they are best suited to produce (whether that be metal work, agriculture, shoes, or furniture).  Reason:Reason is one aspect of our tripartite soul. It lusts after truth and is the source of all of our philosophic desires. In the just man, the entire soul is ruled by reason, and strives to fulfill reason’s desires. See also Appetite, Spirit. CU IDOL SELF LEARNING MATERIAL (SLM)

Plato: Book X of The Republic 73  Sensible Particular:Sensible particulars are the objects that we experience all around us—trees, flowers, chairs—any physical objects. They are “sensible” because we can sense them with our sight, smell, hearing, taste, and touch; they are “particular” because they are particular items that undergo change over time, rather than universal, unchanging ideas. According to Plato’s metaphysical picture, the visible realm is made up of sensible particulars. According to his epistemological picture, sensible particulars cannot be objects of knowledge but only of opinion.  Sophist:The Sophists were teachers-for-hire who educated the wealthy men of Athens in the fifth-century B.C. Though they were a diverse group with diverse opinions, they tended to share a disregard for the notion of objective truth and knowledge. This disregard extended to the notion of objective moral truth, which means that they did not believe in such a things as “right” and “wrong.” One of the guiding motivations in all of Plato’s work was to prove the Sophists wrong: to show that there is such a thing as objective truth, and that we can have knowledge of this objective truth.  Specialization:The principle of specialization states that every man must fulfill the societal role to which nature best suits him, and should refrain from engaging in any other business. Those naturally suited to farm should farm, those naturally suited to heal should be doctors, those naturally suited to fight should be warriors, those naturally suited to be philosophers should rule, and so on. Plato believes that this simple rule is the guiding principle of society, and the source of political justice.  Spirit:Spirit is one aspect of our tripartite soul. It is the source of our honor-loving and victory-loving desires. Spirit is responsible for our feelings of anger and indignation. In a just soul, spirit acts as henchman to reason, ensuring that appetite adheres to reason’s commands.  Tripartite Soul:According to Plato, the human soul has three parts corresponding to the three classes of society in a just city. Individual justice consists in maintaining these three parts in the correct power relationships, with reason ruling, spirit aiding reason, and appetite obeying. CU IDOL SELF LEARNING MATERIAL (SLM)

74 Literary Criticism and Critical Approaches - I  Visible Realm:Plato divides existence up into two realms, the visible realm and the intelligible realm. The visible realm can be grasped with our senses. It is comprised of the world see around us—the world of sensible particulars. The objects which comprise the visible realm are not as real as those which comprise the intelligible realm; in addition, they are not the proper objects of knowledge (i.e., we cannot “know” anything about them), but of opinion. 2.8 Unit End Questions (MCQ and Descriptive) A. Descriptive Type Questions 1. To what two things do the number of spheres correspond? 2. Why might a just man suffer? 3. Why is the creation of an artisan closer to truth than the creation of an artist? 4. How does poetry weaken the mind? 5. Why does the first soul to choose its next incarnation in the Myth of Er make a bad decision? 6. In what way are the goals of the dramatist and the rhetor itician similar? 7. Who are Lachesis, Clotho, and Atropos? 8. Why is Odysseus’ choice wise? 9. In what two things does Socrates find proof of the soul’s immortality? 10. To which section of the line do artists’ works correspond? B. Multiple Choice/Objective Type Questions 1. corrupts even the best souls. (a) Philosophers (b) Poetry (c) Kings (d) Logic CU IDOL SELF LEARNING MATERIAL (SLM)

Plato: Book X of The Republic 75 2. Socrates banished from the city. (a) Artists (b) Craftsmen (c) Poets (d) Priests 3. Imitation is . (a) A play (b) Real (c) A futile art (d) A pleasure 4. cannot be purely known otherwise than through the faculty of reason. (a) Body (b) Mind (c) Heart (d) Soul 5. The main focus of argument inThe Republicseeks to determine . (a) The nature of the just life (b) The origin of man (c) Who should be King of Athens (d) Who started the Peloponnesian War Answers: 1. (b), 2. (c), 3. (a), 4. (d), 5. (a). 2.9 References 1. https://www.gradesaver.com/the-republic/study-guide/summary-book-x 2. https://www.sparknotes.com/philosophy/republic/themes/ 3. https://www.enotes.com/topics/platos-republic/quiz/book-10-questions-answers 4. Annas, Julia (1981),An Introduction to Plato’s Republic, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 5. Benardete, Seth (1989),Socrates’ Second Sailing: On Plato’s Republic, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 6. Blackburn, Simon (2007),Plato’s Republic: A Biography, New York: Atlantic Monthly Press. CU IDOL SELF LEARNING MATERIAL (SLM)

76 Literary Criticism and Critical Approaches - I 7. Bosanquet, B. (1895),A Companion to Plato’s Republic, London: Rivington, Percival & Co. 8. Cairns, Douglas, ed. (2007),Pursuing the Good, University of Edinburgh Press. 9. Craig, Leon (1994),The War Lover: A Study of Plato’s Republic, Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 10. Cross, R.C. (1964),Plato’s Republic: A Philosophical Commentary, London: Macmillan. 11. Ferrari, G.R.F., ed. (2007),The Cambridge Companion to Plato’s Republic, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 12. Howland, Jacob (1993),The Republic: The Odyssey of Philosophy, Philadelphia: Paul Dry Books. 13. Kraut, Richard, ed. (1997),Plato’s Republic: Critical Essays, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. CU IDOL SELF LEARNING MATERIAL (SLM)

UNIT 3 ARISTOTLE:POETICS - I Structure: 3.0 Learning Objectives 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Themes, Arguments and Ideas 3.3 Aristotle’s Poetics: Theme Analysis 3.4 Poetics 3.5 Summary 3.6 Analysis 3.7 Keywords/Abbreviations 3.8 Unit End Questions (MCQ and Descriptive) 3.9 References 3.0 Learning Objectives In this unit, the students will study Aristotle’sPoetics:  The earliest surviving work of dramatic theory.  First extant philosophical treatise to focus on literary theory.  An account of what he calls “poetry” which includes verse drama – comedy, tragedy, and the satyr play – as well as lyric poetry and epic poetry. CU IDOL SELF LEARNING MATERIAL (SLM)

78 Literary Criticism and Critical Approaches - I 3.1 Introduction Like many important documents in the history of philosophy and literary theory, Aristotle’s Poetics, composed around 330 BCE, was most likely preserved in the form of students’ lecture notes. This brief text, through its various interpretations and applications from the Renaissance onward, has had a profound impact on Western aesthetic philosophy and artistic production. ThePoeticsis in part Aristotle’s response to his teacher, Plato, who argues in The Republic that poetry is representation of mere appearances and is thus misleading and morally suspect. Aristotle’s approach to the phenomenon of poetry is quite different from Plato’s. Fascinated by the intellectual challenge of forming categories and organizing them into coherent systems, Aristotle approaches literary texts as a natural scientist, carefully accounting for the features of each “species” of text. Rather than concluding that poets should be banished from the perfect society, as does Plato, Aristotle attempts to describe the social function, and the ethical utility, of art. It is important to remember that Aristotle, and the Greek world as a whole, viewed art as essentially representational. Although we certainly have examples of Greek patterns and decorations that are “abstract,” nothing indicates that the Greeks recognized such a category as “abstract art.” One of the most difficult concepts introduced in the Poetics is catharsis, a word which has come into everyday language even though scholars are still debating its actual meaning in Aristotle’s text. Catharsis is most often defined as the “purging” of the emotions of pity and fear that occurs when we watch a tragedy. What is actually involved in this purging is not clear. It is not as simple as getting an object lesson in how to behave; the tragic event does not “teach us a lesson” as do certain public-information campaigns on drunk driving or drug abuse. Hans-Georg Gadamer’s attempt to describe catharsis in his study Truth and Method can serve both as a working definition and an introduction into the problem of establishing any determinate definition of this elusive concept: What is experienced in such an excess of tragic suffering is something truly common. The spectator recognizes himself [or herself] and his [or her] finiteness in the face of the power of fate. CU IDOL SELF LEARNING MATERIAL (SLM)

Aristotle: Poetics - I 79 What happens to the great ones of the earth has exemplary significance. To see that “this is how it is” is a kind of self-knowledge for the spectator, who emerges with new insight from the illusions in which he [or she], like everyone else, lives. (132) The practical and formal concerns that occupy Aristotle in the Poetics need to be understood in relation to a larger concern with the psychological and social purpose of literature. Criticism, according to Aristotle, should not be simply the application of unexamined aesthetic principles, but should pay careful attention to the overall function of a any feature of a work of art in its context within the work, and should never lose sight of the function of the work of art in its social context. The guide provided here takes you through each of the twenty-six books of the Poetics and attempts to give a summary of Aristotle’s arguments. This resource should not be used as a substitute for a careful reading of Aristotle’s text, but might help you to review and clarify your understanding of the terms, concepts, categories, and interrelationships that Aristotle introduces. 3.2 Themes, Arguments and Ideas The Teleology of Nature Teleology is the study of the ends or purposes that things serve, and Aristotle’s emphasis on teleology has repercussions throughout his philosophy. Aristotle believed that the best way to understand why things are the way they are is to understand what purpose they were designed to serve. For example, we can dissect an animal to see how its anatomical organs look and what they’re made of, but we only understand each organ when we perceive what it’s supposed to do. Aristotle’s emphasis on teleology implies that there is a reason for everything. Just as Aristotle sees purpose in anatomical and biological systems, he sees human life as organized and directed toward a final end as well. Because we are essentially rational, Aristotle argues that rationality is our final cause and that our highest aim is to fulfill our rationality. This argument has a deep impact both on Aristotle’s ethics and on his politics. The good life, for which all our virtue and wisdom prepares us, consists primarily of rational contemplation, and the purpose of the city-state is to arrange matters in such a way as to maximize the opportunities for its citizens to pursue this good life. CU IDOL SELF LEARNING MATERIAL (SLM)

80 Literary Criticism and Critical Approaches - I The Primacy of Substance The termsubstancedesignates those things that are most fundamental to existence. However, since there is no clear or definite answer as to what those things are,substanceis effectively a metaphysical placeholder, a word that refers to a problem rather than a definable thing. Aristotle points out that some things do seem to be more fundamental than others. For example, colors can only exist if there are physical objects that are colored, though it seems conceivable that physical objects could potentially exist in a world devoid of color. If there is a hierarchy to being, such that some things are more fundamental than others, there must be a most fundamental thing on which everything else depends. Aristotle thinks that he can approach this most fundamental thing by examining definition. Properly speaking, a definition should list just those items without which the thing defined could not exist as it is. For instance, the definition of a toe should mention a foot, because without feet, toes could not exist. Since we cannot define toes without making mention of feet, we can infer that feet are more fundamental than toes. A substance, then, is something whose definition does not rely on the existence of other things besides it. Aristotle’s insistence on the primacy of substance reflects his view that there is no single category of being. We can talk about existence in connection with all sorts of things. Colours exist, ideas exist, places exist, times exist, movements exist, and so on. Part of Aristotle’s insight is that these things do not all exist in the same way. That is, there is not some one thing called “existence” in which colors and places partake in markedly different ways. Rather, there are different categories of existence that apply to different categories of things. Colours and places have two entirely different kinds of existences. However, if different sorts of things exist in different ways, how is it that there seems to be a single cosmos in which colour, place, time, and all the rest, seem to exist together? The fact that color and substance have two different kinds of existence does not prevent substances from being coloured. For the cosmos to be unified, there must be a base unit of existence on which all other kinds of existence depend. Aristotle’s argument for the primacy of substance, then, is his way of saying that it is substance, and not time or location, that binds the cosmos together. CU IDOL SELF LEARNING MATERIAL (SLM)

Aristotle: Poetics - I 81 The Rejection of Plato’s Theory of Forms By rejecting Plato’s Theory of Forms, Aristotle clears the way for his empirical approach, which emphasizes observation first and abstract reasoning second. Aristotle received his philosophical education at Plato’s Academy, so it is natural that he would feel obliged to justify at length why he departs from the doctrines of his teacher. He provides detailed arguments against many of Plato’s doctrines in almost all of his major works, focussing in particular on the Theory of Forms. In Aristotle’s view, this theory is essentially an assertion of the superiority of universals over particulars. Plato argues that particular instances of, say, beauty or justice exist only because they participate in the universal Form of Beauty or Justice. On the contrary, Aristotle argues that universal concepts of beauty and justice derive from the instances of beauty and justice in this world. We only arrive at a conception of beauty by observing particular instances of beauty, and the universal quality of beauty has no existence beyond this conception that we build from particular instances. By saying that the particulars come first and the universals come after, Aristotle places emphasis on the importance of observing the details of this world, which stands as one of the important moments in the development of the scientific method. Biology As a Paradigm Aristotle’s methods in biology reveal a great deal about his general methods in philosophy. He was the son of a doctor, and his work shows a particular aptitude for biology. We might contrast this fact with Plato’s aptitude for mathematics. Throughout Plato’s work, we see a continual reference to the forms of reasoning involved in mathematics as the paradigmatic example of what reasoning ought to be. By contrast, we find Aristotle applying the lessons he draws from his biological studies to philosophical questions far removed from biology. Two pertinent examples are Aristotle’s emphases on teleology and classification. Aristotle finds it useful when studying living organisms always to ask what function an organ or a process serves, and from this practical method he infers in general that all things serve a purpose and that we can best understand the workings of things by asking what ends they serve. Similarly, Aristotle develops an ingenious system of classifying the various kinds of living organisms according to species and genus, among other things, and proceeds to find systems for classifying everything from the forms of poetry to the categories of being. Most important, perhaps, is that Aristotle CU IDOL SELF LEARNING MATERIAL (SLM)

82 Literary Criticism and Critical Approaches - I draws from his biological research a keen eye for detail and an emphasis on observation as the key to knowledge. The Vagueness of the Practical Sciences Aristotle rarely sets down hard and fast rules in the practical sciences because those fields are naturally inclined to a degree of vagueness. Aristotle is generally credited with being the first thinker to recognize that knowledge is compartmentalized. For example, he recognizes that the practical sciences, such as ethics or politics, are far less precise in their methods and procedures than, say, logic. This is not a failure of ethics and politics to live up to some ideal, but rather just the nature of the beast. Ethics and politics deal with people, and people are quite variable in their behaviour. In thePolitics, Aristotle seems to waver in determining what kind of constitution is best, but this is not so much ambiguity on his part as a recognition that there is no single best constitution. A thriving democracy relies on an educated and unselfish population, and failing that, another form of government might be preferable. Similarly, in theNicomachean Ethics, Aristotle does not lay down any hard and fast rules regarding virtue because different behaviours are virtuous in different situations. The vagueness of Aristotle’s recommendations regarding the practical sciences are then a part and parcel of his general view that different forms of study require different approaches. The Unmoved Mover As First Cause Aristotle’s theology is based on his perception that there must be something above and beyond the chains of cause and effect for those chains to exist at all. Aristotle perceives change and motion as deep mysteries. Everything is subject to change and motion, but nothing changes or moves without cause. Tracing how things cause one another to change and move is the source of many of Aristotle’s most fundamental insights. He believes that all causes must themselves be caused and all motion must be caused by something that is already in motion. The trouble with this belief is that it leads to an infinite regress: if all causes have antecedent causes, there is no first cause that causes motion and change to exist in the first place. Why is there change and motion rather than stillness? Aristotle answers that there must be a first cause, an unmoved mover, that is the source of all change and motion while being itself unchanging and unmoving. To CU IDOL SELF LEARNING MATERIAL (SLM)

Aristotle: Poetics - I 83 motivate the heavens to move, this unmoved mover must be perfect, so Aristotle comes to associate it with God. 3.3 Aristotle’s Poetics: Theme Analysis Poetry as Mimesis (Imitation) Aristotle defines all poetry as mimesis (imitation). In other words, poetry imitates nature, which is to say it imitates life, whether natural objects or human actions. For Aristotle, tragedy is an imitation of human action. The concept of art as imitation proved vastly influential in Western literature right up until the eighteenth century, when the Romantic age gave birth to the expressive theory, that poetry arises from the emotions, feelings and impressions of the artist. Aristotle insisted, perhaps consciously in opposition to Plato, that poetry represents something that is real, something that exists in the world. Whereas Plato believed that the poet was cut off from reality, Aristotle saw the poet’s act of imitation as directly connected to life itself, instead of an attempt to reach a larger ideal. In his analysis of the origins of poetry, Aristotle argues that imitation is natural to childhood, and children learn most of their first life lessons through the imitation of others. People are also naturally given to taking pleasure in imitation. Unity of Plot In his analysis of tragedy, Aristotle argues that the most important element is plot. Further, he insists on the necessity of unity in the plot. All the events portrayed must contribute to the plot. There must be no subplots or superfluous elements. Every element of the plot must work together to create a seamless whole. If any part were to be altered or withdrawn, this would leave the play disjointed and incomplete in some way. The plot must have a beginning, a middle, and an end, in which each event follows either in likelihood or necessity from the previous one. There must be a clear cause and effect relationship in the events depicted. The Structure of Tragedy In his analysis of the structure of tragedy, Aristotle uses four terms that are of particular importance: reversal (peripety), recognition or discovery (anagnorisis), purification (catharsis), and tragic error (harmartia). Reversal means a sudden reversal in the hero’s fortunes, a shift from CU IDOL SELF LEARNING MATERIAL (SLM)

84 Literary Criticism and Critical Approaches - I one thing to the opposite. In tragedy this would mean from good to bad; in comedy it would mean the opposite. The reversal often marks a climax or turning point in the action. The example Aristotle gives is from Sophocles’ play,Oedipus Rex, in which a messenger informs Oedipus that the man he believes was his father, and who is now dead, was his foster father but not his biological father. This sets in motion a new stage in the play, leading to Oedipus’s discovery of his real parents and the tragic outcome. Reversals often depend (as in this case), on a “discovery” or “recognition,” which refers to a move from a lack of knowledge to the possession of knowledge, the recognition of a situation. One of the clearest examples of recognition occurs in Oedipusat the moment when Oedipus achieves an awareness of his true identity. Recognition combined with peripety can arouse an audience’s emotions to pity or fear. This results in the purification (catharsis) of those emotions. Catharsis is a Greek word that has passed into the English language. In catharsis the emotions are aroused but then released, resulting in a restored state of equilibrium. Tragedy therefore serves a useful function for the audience since it experiences the downfall of the hero vicariously, feels deep emotion at witnessing the spectacle, but then emerges from it in a more balanced psychological condition. “Tragic error” refers to the mistake made by the hero that leads to his downfall. One common example of the tragic error in Greek literature is that of hubris or pride, as for example when a man refuses to acknowledge the authority of divine law. An example would be Pentheus, the king of Thebes in Euripides’The Bacchae, who refuses to acknowledge the power of the god Dionysus, resists the god with all his might, and ends up paying for his defiance with his life. 3.4 Poetics I. ‘Imitation’ the common principle of the Arts of Poetry I propose to treat of Poetry in itself and of its various kinds, noting the essential quality of each; to inquire into the structure of the plot as requisite to a good poem; into the number and nature of the parts of which a poem is composed; and similarly into whatever else falls within the same inquiry. Following, then, the order of nature, let us begin with the principles which come first. CU IDOL SELF LEARNING MATERIAL (SLM)

Aristotle: Poetics - I 85 Epic poetry and Tragedy, Comedy also and Dithyrambic: poetry, and the music of the flute and of the lyre in most of their forms, are all in their general conception modes of imitation. They differ, however, from one: another in three respects,―the medium, the objects, the manner or mode of imitation, being in each case distinct. For as there are persons who, by conscious art or mere habit, imitate and represent various objects through the medium of colour and form, or again by the voice; so in the arts above mentioned, taken as a whole, the imitation is produced by rhythm, language, or ‘harmony,’ either singly or combined. Thus in the music of the flute and of the lyre, ‘harmony’ and rhythm alone are employed; also in other arts, such as that of the shepherd’s pipe, which are essentially similar to these. In dancing, rhythm alone is used without ‘harmony’; for even dancing imitates character, emotion, and action, by rhythmical movement. There is another art which imitates by means of language alone, and that either in prose or verse―which, verse, again, may either combine different metres or consist of but one kind―but this has hitherto been without a name. For there is no common term we could apply to the mimes of Sophron and Xenarchus and the Socratic dialogues on the one hand; and, on the other, to poetic imitations in iambic, elegiac, or any similar metre. People do, indeed, add the word ‘maker’ or ‘poet’ to the name of the metre, and speak of elegiac poets, or epic (that is, hexameter) poets, as if it were not the imitation that makes the poet, but the verse that entitles them all indiscriminately to the name. Even when a treatise on medicine or natural science is brought out in verse, the name of poet is by custom given to the author; and yet Homer and Empedocles have nothing in common but the metre, so that it would be right to call the one poet, the other physicist rather than poet. On the same principle, even if a writer in his poetic imitation were to combine all metres, as Chaeremon did in his Centaur, which is a medley composed of metres of all kinds, we should bring him too under the general term poet. So much then for these distinctions. There are, again, some arts which employ all the means above mentioned, namely, rhythm, tune, and metre. Such are Dithyrambic and Nomic poetry, and also Tragedy and Comedy; but CU IDOL SELF LEARNING MATERIAL (SLM)

86 Literary Criticism and Critical Approaches - I between them the difference is, that in the first two cases these means are all employed in combination, in the latter, now one means is employed, now another. Such, then, are the differences of the arts with respect to the medium of imitation. II. The Objects of Imitation Since the objects of imitation are men in action, and these men must be either of a higher or a lower type (for moral character mainly answers to these divisions, goodness and badness being the distinguishing marks of moral differences), it follows that we must represent men either as better than in real life, or as worse, or as they are. It is the same in painting. Polygnotus depicted men as nobler than they are, Pauson as less noble, Dionysius drew them true to life. Now it is evident that each of the modes of imitation above mentioned will exhibit these differences, and become a distinct kind in imitating objects that are thus distinct. Such diversities may be found even in dancing,: flute-playing, and lyre-playing. So again in language, whether prose or verse unaccompanied by music. Homer, for example, makes men better than they are; Cleophon as they are; Hegemon the Thasian, the inventor of parodies, and Nicochares, the author of the Deiliad, worse than they are. The same thing holds good of Dithyrambs and Nomes; here too one may portray different types, as Timotheus and Philoxenus differed in representing their Cyclopes. The same distinction marks off Tragedy from Comedy; for Comedy aims at representing men as worse, Tragedy as better than in actual life. III. The Manner of Imitation There is still a third difference―the manner in which each of these objects may be imitated. For the medium being the same, and the objects the same, the poet may imitate by narration―in which case he can either take another personality as Homer does, or speak in his own person, unchanged―or he may present all his characters as living and moving before us. These, then, as we said at the beginning, are the three differences which distinguish artistic imitation,―the medium, the objects, and the manner. So that from one point of view, Sophocles is an imitator of the same kind as Homer―for both imitate higher types of character; from another point of view, of the same kind as Aristophanes―for both imitate persons acting and doing. CU IDOL SELF LEARNING MATERIAL (SLM)

Aristotle: Poetics - I 87 Hence, some say, the name of ‘drama’ is given to such poems, as representing action. For the same reason the Dorians claim the invention both of Tragedy and Comedy. The claim to Comedy is put forward by the Megarians,―not only by those of Greece proper, who allege that it originated under their democracy, but also by the Megarians of Sicily, for the poet Epicharmus, who is much earlier than Chionides and Magnes, belonged to that country. Tragedy too is claimed by certain Dorians of the Peloponnese. In each case they appeal to the evidence of language. The outlying villages, they say, are by them called {kappa omega mu alpha iota}, by the Athenians {delta eta mu iota}: and they assume that Comedians were so named not from {kappa omega mu alpha zeta epsilon iota nu}, ‘to revel,’ but because they wandered from village to village (kappa alpha tau alpha/kappa omega mu alpha sigma), being excluded contemptuously from the city. They add also that the Dorian word for ‘doing’ is {delta rho alpha nu}, and the Athenian, {pi rho alpha tau tau epsilon iota nu}. This may suffice as to the number and nature of the various modes of imitation. IV. The Origin and Development of Poetry Poetry in general seems to have sprung from two causes, each of them lying deep in our nature. First, the instinct of imitation is implanted in man from childhood, one difference between him and other animals being that he is the most imitative of living creatures, and through imitation learns his earliest lessons; and no less universal is the pleasure felt in things imitated. We have evidence of this in the facts of experience. Objects which in themselves we view with pain, we delight to contemplate when reproduced with minute fidelity: such as the forms of the most ignoble animals and of dead bodies. The cause of this again is, that to learn gives the liveliest pleasure, not only to philosophers but to men in general; whose capacity, however, of learning is more limited. Thus the reason why men enjoy seeing a likeness is, that in contemplating it they find themselves learning or inferring, and saying perhaps, ‘Ah, that is he.’ For if you happen not to have seen the original, the pleasure will be due not to the imitation as such, but to the execution, the colouring, or some such other cause. Imitation, then, is one instinct of our nature. Next, there is the instinct for ‘harmony’ and rhythm, metres being manifestly sections of rhythm. Persons, therefore, starting with this natural CU IDOL SELF LEARNING MATERIAL (SLM)

88 Literary Criticism and Critical Approaches - I gift developed by degrees their special aptitudes, till their rude improvisations gave birth to Poetry. Poetry now diverged in two directions, according to the individual character of the writers. The graver spirits imitated noble actions, and the actions of good men. The more trivial sort imitated the actions of meaner persons, at first composing satires, as the former did hymns to the gods and the praises of famous men. A poem of the satirical kind cannot indeed be put down to any author earlier than Homer; though many such writers probably there were. But from Homer onward, instances can be cited,―his own Margites, for example, and other similar compositions. The appropriate metre was also here introduced; hence the measure is still called the iambic or lampooning measure, being that in which people lampooned one another. Thus the older poets were distinguished as writers of heroic or of lampooning verse. As, in the serious style, Homer is pre-eminent among poets, for he alone combined dramatic form with excellence of imitation, so he too first laid down the main lines of Comedy, by dramatising the ludicrous instead of writing personal satire. His Margites bears the same relation to Comedy that the Iliad and Odyssey do to Tragedy. But when Tragedy and Comedy came to light, the two classes of poets still followed their natural bent: the lampooners became writers of Comedy, and the Epic poets were succeeded by Tragedians, since the drama was a larger and higher form of art. Whether Tragedy has as yet perfected its proper types or not; and whether it is to be judged in itself, or in relation also to the audience, ― this raises another question. Be that as it may, Tragedy―as also Comedy―was at first mere improvisation. The one originated with the authors of the Dithyramb, the other with those of the phallic songs, which are still in use in many of our cities. Tragedy advanced by slow degrees; each new element that showed itself was in turn developed. Having passed through many changes, it found its natural form, and there it stopped. Aeschylus first introduced a second actor; he diminished the importance of the Chorus, and assigned the leading part to the dialogue. Sophocles raised the number of actors to three, and added scene-painting. Moreover, it was not till late that the short plot was discarded for one of greater compass, and the grotesque diction of the earlier satyric form for the stately manner of CU IDOL SELF LEARNING MATERIAL (SLM)

Aristotle: Poetics - I 89 Tragedy. The iambic measure then replaced the trochaic tetrameter, which was originally employed when the poetry was of the Satyric order, and had greater affinities with dancing. Once dialogue had come in, Nature herself discovered the appropriate measure. For the iambic is, of all measures, the most colloquial: we see it in the fact that conversational speech runs into iambic lines more frequently than into any other kind of verse; rarely into hexameters, and only when we drop the colloquial intonation. The additions to the number of ‘episodes’ or acts, and the other accessories of which tradition; tells, must be taken as already described; for to discuss them in detail would, doubtless, be a large undertaking. V. Definition of the Ludicrous, and a brief sketch of the rise of Comedy Comedy is, as we have said, an imitation of characters of a lower type, not, however, in the full sense of the word bad, the Ludicrous being merely a subdivision of the ugly. It consists in some defect or ugliness which is not painful or destructive. To take an obvious example, the comic mask is ugly and distorted, but does not imply pain. The successive changes through which Tragedy passed, and the authors of these changes, are well known, whereas Comedy has had no history, because it was not at first treated seriously. It was late before the Archon granted a comic chorus to a poet; the performers were till then voluntary. Comedy had already taken definite shape when comic poets, distinctively so called, are heard of. Who furnished it with masks, or prologues, or increased the number of actors―these and other similar details remain unknown. As for the plot, it came originally from Sicily; but of Athenian writers Crates was the first who, abandoning the ‘iambic’ or lampooning form, generalised his themes and plots. Epic poetry agrees with Tragedy in so far as it is an imitation in verse of characters of a higher type. They differ, in that Epic poetry admits but one kind of metre, and is narrative in form. They differ, again, in their length: for Tragedy endeavours, as far as possible, to confine itself to a single revolution of the sun, or but slightly to exceed this limit; whereas the Epic action has no limits of time. This, then, is a second point of difference; though at first the same freedom was admitted in Tragedy as in Epic poetry. CU IDOL SELF LEARNING MATERIAL (SLM)

90 Literary Criticism and Critical Approaches - I Of their constituent parts some are common to both, some peculiar to Tragedy, whoever, therefore, knows what is good or bad Tragedy, knows also about Epic poetry. All the elements of an Epic poem are found in Tragedy, but the elements of a Tragedy are not all found in the Epic poem. VI. Definition of Tragedy Of the poetry which imitates in hexameter verse, and of Comedy, we will speak hereafter. Let us now discuss Tragedy, resuming its formal definition, as resulting from what has been already said. Tragedy, then, is an imitation of an action that is serious, complete, and of a certain magnitude; in language embellished with each kind of artistic ornament, the several kinds being found in separate parts of the play; in the form of action, not of narrative; through pity and fear effecting the proper purgation of these emotions. By ‘language embellished,’ I mean language into which rhythm, ‘harmony,’ and song enter. By ‘the several kinds in separate parts,’ I mean, that some parts are rendered through the medium of verse alone, others again with the aid of song. Now as tragic imitation implies persons acting, it necessarily follows, in the first place, that Spectacular equipment will be a part of Tragedy. Next, Song and Diction, for these are the medium of imitation. By ‘Diction’ I mean the mere metrical arrangement of the words: as for ‘Song,’ it is a term whose sense every one understands. Again, Tragedy is the imitation of an action; and an action implies personal agents, who necessarily possess certain distinctive qualities both of character and thought; for it is by these that we qualify actions themselves, and these―thought and character―are the two natural causes from which actions spring, and on actions again all success or failure depends. Hence, the Plot is the imitation of the action: for by plot I here mean the arrangement of the incidents. By Character I mean that in virtue of which we ascribe certain qualities to the agents. Thought is required wherever a statement is proved, or, it may be, a general truth enunciated. Every Tragedy, therefore, must have six parts, which parts determine its quality―namely, Plot, Character, Diction, Thought, Spectacle, Song. Two of the parts constitute the medium of imitation, one the manner, and three the objects of imitation. And these complete the list. These elements have been CU IDOL SELF LEARNING MATERIAL (SLM)

Aristotle: Poetics - I 91 employed, we may say, by the poets to a man; in fact, every play contains Spectacular elements as well as Character, Plot, Diction, Song, and Thought. But most important of all is the structure of the incidents. For Tragedy is an imitation, not of men, but of an action and of life, and life consists in action, and its end is a mode of action, not a quality. Now character determines men’s qualities, but it is by their actions that they are happy or the reverse. Dramatic action, therefore, is not with a view to the representation of character: character comes in as subsidiary to the actions. Hence the incidents and the plot are the end of a tragedy; and the end is the chief thing of all. Again, without action there cannot be a tragedy; there may be without character. The tragedies of most of our modern poets fail in the rendering of character; and of poets in general this is often true. It is the same in painting; and here lies the difference between Zeuxis and Polygnotus. Polygnotus delineates character well: the style of Zeuxis is devoid of ethical quality. Again, if you string together a set of speeches expressive of character, and well finished in point of diction and thought, you will not produce the essential tragic effect nearly so well as with a play which, however deficient in these respects, yet has a plot and artistically constructed incidents. Besides which, the most powerful elements of emotional: interest in Tragedy Peripeteia or Reversal of the Situation, and Recognition scenes―are parts of the plot. A further proof is, that novices in the art attain to finish: of diction and precision of portraiture before they can construct the plot. It is the same with almost all the early poets. The Plot, then, is the first principle, and, as it were, the soul of a tragedy: Character holds the second place. A similar fact is seen in painting. The most beautiful colours, laid on confusedly, will not give as much pleasure as the chalk outline of a portrait. Thus Tragedy is the imitation of an action, and of the agents mainly with a view to the action. Third in order is Thought―that is, the faculty of saying what is possible and pertinent in given circumstances. In the case of oratory, this is the function of the Political art and of the art of rhetoric: and so indeed the older poets make their characters speak the language of civic life; the poets of our time, the language of the rhetoricians. Character is that which reveals moral purpose, showing what kind of things a man chooses or avoids. Speeches, therefore, which do not make this manifest, or in which the speaker does not choose or avoid anything whatever, are not CU IDOL SELF LEARNING MATERIAL (SLM)

92 Literary Criticism and Critical Approaches - I expressive of character. Thought, on the other hand, is found where something is proved to be. or not to be, or a general maxim is enunciated. Fourth among the elements enumerated comes Diction; by which I mean, as has been already said, the expression of the meaning in words; and its essence is the same both in verse and prose. Of the remaining elements Song holds the chief place among the embellishments. The Spectacle has, indeed, an emotional attraction of its own, but, of all the parts, it is the least artistic, and connected least with the art of poetry. For the power of Tragedy, we may be sure, is felt even apart from representation and actors. Besides, the production of spectacular effects depends more on the art of the stage machinist than on that of the poet. VII. The Plot must be a Whole These principles being established, let us now discuss the proper structure of the Plot, since this is the first and most important thing in Tragedy. Now, according to our definition, Tragedy is an imitation of an action that is complete, and whole, and of a certain magnitude; for there may be a whole that is wanting in magnitude. A whole is that which has a beginning, a middle, and an end. A beginning is that which does not itself follow anything by causal necessity, but after which something naturally is or comes to be. An end, on the contrary, is that which itself naturally follows some other thing, either by necessity, or as a rule, but has nothing following it. A middle is that which follows something as some other thing follows it. A well constructed plot, therefore, must neither begin nor end at haphazard, but conform to these principles. Again, a beautiful object, whether it be a living organism or any whole composed of parts, must not only have an orderly arrangement of parts, but must also be of a certain magnitude; for beauty depends on magnitude and order. Hence a very small animal organism cannot be beautiful; for the view of it is confused, the object being seen in an almost imperceptible moment of time. Nor, again, can one of vast size be beautiful; for as the eye cannot take it all in at once, the unity and sense of the whole is lost for the spectator; as for instance if there were one a thousand miles long. As, therefore, in the case of animate bodies and organisms a certain magnitude is necessary, CU IDOL SELF LEARNING MATERIAL (SLM)

Aristotle: Poetics - I 93 and a magnitude which may be easily embraced in one view; so in the plot, a certain length is necessary, and a length which can be easily embraced by the memory. The limit of length in relation to dramatic competition and sensuous presentment, is no part of artistic theory. For had it been the rule for a hundred tragedies to compete together, the performance would have been regulated by the water-clock,―as indeed we are told was formerly done. But the limit as fixed by the nature of the drama itself is this: the greater the length, the more beautiful will the piece be by reason of its size, provided that the whole be perspicuous. And to define the matter roughly, we may say that the proper magnitude is comprised within such limits, that the sequence of events, according to the law of probability or necessity, will admit of a change from bad fortune to good, or from good fortune to bad. VIII. The Plot must be a Unity Unity of plot does not, as some persons think, consist in the Unity of the hero. For infinitely various are the incidents in one man’s life which cannot be reduced to unity; and so, too, there are many actions of one man out of which we cannot make one action. Hence, the error, as it appears, of all poets who have composed a Heracleid, a Theseid, or other poems of the kind. They imagine that as Heracles was one man, the story of Heracles must also be a unity. But Homer, as in all else he is of surpassing merit, here too―whether from art or natural genius―seems to have happily discerned the truth. In composing the Odyssey he did not include all the adventures of Odysseus - such as his wound on Parnassus, or his feigned madness at the mustering of the host―incidents between which there was no necessary or probable connection: but he made the Odyssey, and likewise the Iliad, to centre round an action that in our sense of the word is one. As therefore, in the other imitative arts, the imitation is one when the object imitated is one, so the plot, being an imitation of an action, must imitate one action and that a whole, the structural union of the parts being such that, if any one of them is displaced or removed, the whole will be disjointed and disturbed. For a thing whose presence or absence makes no visible difference, is not an organic part of the whole. IX. (Plot continued) Dramatic Unity It is, moreover, evident from what has been said, that it is not the function of the poet to relate what has happened, but what may happen,―what is possible according to the law of CU IDOL SELF LEARNING MATERIAL (SLM)

94 Literary Criticism and Critical Approaches - I probability or necessity. The poet and the historian differ not by writing in verse or in prose. The work of Herodotus might be put into verse, and it would still be a species of history, with metre no less than without it. The true difference is that one relates what has happened, the other what may happen. Poetry, therefore, is a more philosophical and a higher thing than history: for poetry tends to express the universal, history the particular. By the universal, I mean how a person of a certain type will on occasion speak or act, according to the law of probability or necessity; and it is this universality at which poetry aims in the names she attaches to the personages. The particular is―for example―what Alcibiades did or suffered. In Comedy this is already apparent: for here the poet first constructs the plot on the lines of probability, and then inserts characteristic names;―unlike the lampooners who write about particular individuals. But tragedians still keep to real names, the reason being that what is possible is credible: what has not happened we do not at once feel sure to be possible: but what has happened is manifestly possible: otherwise it would not have happened. Still there are even some tragedies in which there are only one or two well known names, the rest being fictitious. In others, none are well known, as in Agathon’s Antheus, where incidents and names alike are fictitious, and yet they give none the less pleasure. We must not, therefore, at all costs keep to the received legends, which are the usual subjects of Tragedy. Indeed, it would be absurd to attempt it; for even subjects that are known are known only to a few, and yet give pleasure to all. It clearly follows that the poet or ‘maker’ should be the maker of plots rather than of verses; since he is a poet because he imitates, and what he imitates are actions. And even if he chances to take an historical subject, he is none the less a poet; for there is no reason why some events that have actually happened should not conform to the law of the probable and possible, and in virtue of that quality in them he is their poet or maker. Of all plots and actions the epeisodic are the worst. I call a plot ‘epeisodic’ in which the episodes or acts succeed one another without probable or necessary sequence. Bad poets compose such pieces by their own fault, good poets, to please the players; for, as they write show pieces for competition, they stretch the plot beyond its capacity, and are often forced to break the natural continuity. But again, Tragedy is an imitation not only of a complete action, but of events inspiring fear or pity. Such an effect is best produced when the events come on us by sunrise; and the effect is CU IDOL SELF LEARNING MATERIAL (SLM)