Another Malaysia is Possible (2004)

Fifty Minus Ten Reasons Why 26. It is un-free and loves it. 27. It supports the notion of convicting someone first and then looking for evidence later to prove the conviction. 28. It avoids statements critical of the establishment like the plague. 29. It does not show any courage in defence of the principles of justice. 30. It makes us waste valuable time and money engaging with it. 31. It substitutes ‘critical development journalism’ with ‘government hand-out development journalism’. 32. It misrepresents critical thinking as anti-establishment and worse, as contributing to anti-nationalistic and anti-patriotic views. 33. Other sources of news on Malaysia are available and accessible. 34. It changes colour so fast to adapt to the political environment that it makes the poor chameleon feel inferior. 35. It is a truth-slayer. 36. It does not carry editorials but ‘dictat-orials’. 37. It considers threats to democracy as an out-of-Malaysia problem by definition (so if you want, you can safely read or see foreign news). 38. It can adversely affect your English; for instance, instead of ‘thoughts’, you may write ‘thots’. 39. It has a strange notion that providing news is like making a plate of kueh teow! 40. Malaysian mass media? It is a contradiction in terms! 31



of the Political status Quo Published in Malaysiakini. Context: Original version written around November 2000. Politics-at-the-level-of-everyday-life in Malaysia is hardly a conscious reality. Politics largely occupies the field of the spectacular and the public. Politics also does not address the ‘taken for granted-ness’ of our social world. In a sense, we do not examine the beliefs and values that are below the level of consciousness (hence, ‘taken for granted’) and that animate us. Very often, this kind of situation leads to political engagement based purely on unexamined faith rather than on conscious reasoning. It is based on the ‘routine’ and the ‘ritual’. Just Kidding and ‘Taken-for-Granted’ Worldview Just Kidding is a fairly-popular TV programme here. Have you ever wondered why the programme is interesting or amusing? One way to go about explaining it is to understand that all of us carry a ‘taken for granted’ world in our head. This is a world we do not think about but which we know about. This is our everyday world. We know what rules apply and what don’t. And we can navigate in this world like fish in water. Though we live our life by it, the rules, or views, of the taken-for-granted world are generally unconsidered or unexamined. We are mostly unconscious of it, unless something happens to bring them to our attention. Thus, the taken-for-granted world is something one does not normally question. A programme like Just Kidding involves breaking the rules of the taken-for- granted world of people and then depicting people’s response to it. People express themselves verbally or through their facial expressions or gestures to deal with the fact that their taken-for-granted world is not working the way it used to. For example, it could be very confusing to most of us if suddenly there was a traffic light system on escalators. We would find it hard to respond to it. The situations that are depicted are usually funny and we have a good laugh or 33

Making Sense of the ‘Taken-for-Granted’ Worldview Other needs are neither needed nor important. Cari makan, literally and figuratively. (“Stay out of politics. That is our business.”) because it has provided, and continues to provide, for our economic well- being. (\"What will you do without us?\") Alternatively, if you are not grateful, your patriotism is questionable. UMNO-led, BN-led government because they will be taken care of. BN-led government. It is immoral. And, certainly, it is, by definition, unlawful. irrationality and will result in rupturing tranquillity in this country. This will bring undue international attention on and shame to the country. disharmony and conflict. Malaysia will ‘choke and die’ without proper leadership. only for those who support the BN-led government. government will protect. Malaysians only have privilege(s) bestowed on them by the BN, which it can withdraw at any moment. misunderstanding or is the opposition way of misleading the people of Malaysia. people want. economic events in Malaysia will be directed by one master narrative influenced by the BN. Other narratives are essentially funded by hostile foreign agencies, like ABC, XYZ, *.#@, etc., or arise from unpatriotic intentions, or both. 34

Making Sense of the ‘Taken-for-Granted’ Worldview find the behaviour of those in the programme amusing. So much for Just Kidding. Though it is part of the ordinariness of life, the taken-for-granted world is a serious matter. It can be sort of compared to status quo. An attempt to do something that may disrupt the taken-for-granted world can disorient people or make them see it as a threat. Consider this discussion in the context of what happened on the Kesas Highway near Shah Alam recently and what went on in parliament on the topic of the \"meeting of the 100,000 people\" (opposition party supporters) on that highway. Consider a nagging question that confronted the ruling coalition, Barisan Nasional (BN), in relation to the Malay votes during the last general election: \"How come so many in the Malay Malaysian community, who had benefited so much from the UMNO-led, BN-led government, had voted for opposition candidates?\" One way of making sense of these events is to consider the taken-for-granted world of many Malaysians in general and the members/ supporters of the BN in particular. It reveals some unquestioned and unconscious ‘lived’ views and rules that are part of people’s unexamined everyday life existence. Making Sense of the ‘Taken-for-Granted’ Worldview of the Ruling Coalition BN and those who do not. The former are nation-loving citizens, and the latter, ungrateful critics. are those who may or may not have critical opinions but who will nevertheless maintain public silence; and (2) those who cannot be tolerated are those vocal members of opposition parties or people-oriented NGOs. immature, confused and very ungrateful. They are really less Malaysian than the others and are certainly a potential threat to the Nation. 35

Making Sense of the ‘Taken-for-Granted’ Worldview with BN.\" \"If the BN is not tough, we will have all kinds of problems.\" \"The Opposition consists of ungrateful people … you know, they are supported by foreign governments.\" They are many more questions or ‘analyses’ that sustain the taken-for- granted view. In fact, many things that go on in our world simply ‘prove’ the views and rules to be ‘true’. For instance, take the political wrangling within the Barisan Alternatif (BA) over the candidature for the Lunas constituency (see chapters 6 and 7). And also consider the ethnic basis of it. The possible reading of the episode is not that DAP is ‘victimised’ but that the BA is rather confused, fitting into the BN’s worldview. To believe that all the responses of members/supporters of the ruling front, or even the security apparatus, are part of a conscious design is to carelessly overlook the serious political role of the taken-for-granted world in our everyday life. While to politically confront a design is necessary, it is equally important to confront the more difficult views/rules of the taken-for-granted world. There is an equally important need to change the quality of people’s everyday life experience, to sow the basis for a more politically sustainable, democratic society. Oppositional politics (not to be conflated with opposition party politics) needs to consider an additional strategy, to move from the ‘spectacular’ to the ‘ordinary’, and to confront the politics of the taken-for- granted view on a more regular basis, if not a daily one. This is an essential activity to create a critical populace. 36

Making Sense of the ‘Taken-for-Granted’ Worldview investors, who may, among other things, thoroughly exploit Malaysian workers. liberalisation need not be accompanied by political liberalisation. and justice, that is good. in Malaysia. Non-racial politics is some people’s unfortunate wet dream. policies and programmes, and to freely demonise the opposition. only we have contributed to the modernisation of Malaysia. led government’ not the ‘Malaysian government’. Conclusion Imagine for a moment, a world organised around the views/rules mentioned above. Irrespective of the political motivation or interests that generate these views, or rules, they are what possibly many people believe in and live by, day in and day out, without consciously considering or critically examining them. Although the views and rules provide the basis for authoritarian monologues, many people believe that what they are doing is the right thing. That we do not confront these views/rules in our everyday life is because the routine of most Malaysians involves the ‘apolitical’ activity of cari makan (both literally and figuratively). And cari makan involves not rocking the boat, neither in the private sphere of our everyday life nor the public sphere. There are a lot of questions and self-censoring strategies that are raised to maintain the taken- for-granted world. \"Why get involved?\" \"Why talk about it?\" \"No point talking about it.\" \"Yes, the BN may not be always correct, but who else do we have to lead us?\" \"Please, there is no viable opposition in this country…Look at them.\" \"It is a waste voting for them [the opposition]. They will never win.\" \"You cannot fight the BN ... Look at what is happening to Terengganu.\" \"PAS is Islamic, Keadilan is anyway the ex3t7ension of UMNO, the socialists are inconsequential and DAP is Chinese-led; where can the Indians go? Better to be



5 Published in Malaysiakini. Context: Written in October 2000. Noor Suzaily, a 24-year-old computer engineer, was raped and murdered in an express bus by the 34-year-old driver in the early hours of 7 October 2000. Two years later, the rapist was convicted and sentenced to death. Noor Suzaily’s rape was brutal enough to have jolted a large number of Malaysians, although we are told that it was just a ‘rare’ occurrence and there is no need for us to be alarmed. This rationalisation, supported by a mode of thinking influenced by the statistical approach for the purpose of administrative and political consumption, really kills our humanity and substitutes cold numbers in its place. Even if a nation does not grieve over this very unfortunate incident, we could avoid being unkind. Domination and Destruction In the rapist’s life, one aspect of civilisation melts away in a moment. Another aspect of it pushes the cold, calculative, predative male animal out into the open. Therefore, it must be clear that it is not about numbers we are dealing with here. In dealing with rape, mere statistics make little sense. It is really about democracy and humanity, its pervasiveness and its expression in our norms and values. What matters is how democratic norms can be made to work better so that the ‘weak’ and defenceless are assured of their safety and how members of society can be encouraged to develop their humanity through norms and values that govern our private and public behaviour in the context of social relationships. Rape is condemned as ‘uncivilised behaviour’ (so we call a rapist an ‘animal’). But in actual practice there is an aspect of our ‘civilised practice’ (which incorporates undemocratic and inhumane norms and behaviour) in which rape can be socially located. This aspect of our civilisation needs to be intensely interrogated, confronted and neutralised. If not numbers, what are we really dealing with here? 39

Rape! The ‘Woman Provoked It’ Logic When dealing with social problems in this country, the general tenor is to further punish the victim. That is part of our national problem-solving strategy! So when we are faced with a violent crime in which a woman’s body is violated, there is a tendency, overtly or covertly, to blame women. Thus, men involved in the act of rape are represented before the law by making women share the blame. The blame on the male is sought to be reduced, if not in legal terms, at least in terms of public opinion. There is an attempt to frame a non-binding, but damaging, social verdict: women are also partly or fully responsible. The other side to this ‘woman-provoked-it’ argument is that “men will be men, women have to watch out”. This general sociobiological position, or the wisdom of the evolutionist-biologist, simply implies that “women should take care”. In a sense, this argument also suggests that “all men are potential rapists”. So, for one group of people (certainly not outside civilisation) the cause of rape is a man’s biology. He just cannot help what he is doing. As the evolutionist-biologist likes to argue, it is a violent “form of male reproductive behaviour”. The male rapes in order to maintain the continuity of our species. What perverse logic! An extension of this argument is one that tries to shift the blame to a lack of guidance, irrationality and poor upbringing, among other things. Thus, rape is presented as the act of an individual. Is it? Patriarchy These attempts to explain away or rationalise rape hide a ‘cause’ that is embedded deep in the structures and attitudes of our society. While we can take the individual rapist to task through a legal process, how do we take to task the patriarchal society we live in – an ideology and practice that privileges men – the ‘societal womb’ that is the Father of all rapists? In fact, it is one aspect of our so-called civilisation that is at the root of what happened to Noor Suzaily. 40

Rape! Noor Suzaily is certainly the victim of our patriarchal patterns of behaviour as much as the poor public security measures that we have and of the individual who actually committed the act, an individual produced by the same society that treats women differently from men. Different set of principles apply. Rape as an Expression of a Patriarchal Society There are many kinds of rape situations, some of which are: (a) Rape taking place when an anonymous male rapes a woman in a place not ‘visible’ to the public – ‘anonymous male’ rape; (b) Rape taking place during social conflict – communal/ethnic confrontation or war; (c) Rape within marriage when a husband rapes a sexually unwilling wife – ‘domestic’ rape; (d) Rape taking place within a family – adult and senior male member of a family raping a younger female member of the family; (e) Rape during a period of captivity, either as prisoner – ‘prison’ rape – or in a ‘slave-like’ work situation; and (f) Rape during a date – ‘date/acquaintance’ rape. Consider these situations against the following observations. Among the social inequalities existing in Malaysia is certainly that which exists between the male and the female – gender inequality. This form of inequality is articulated at the economic, political and sociocultural levels. This has serious consequences. Work, an activity central to our lives, is by definition ‘male work’; ‘housework’ certainly is not. Housework, and consequently women’s work, is as free as fresh air, or seen to be of poor quality. Thus, a typical structuring of a patriarchal society contributes to the economic marginalisation of women and the assertion of the male position. The power to make important domestic or public decisions is hardly in the hands of women. The consequence of this contributes to her marginal status. Stop for a while and make a casual calculation of women’s housework in terms of hours of work. Put a wage bill on it and you will soon realise how much her contribution outstrips men’s. This is not about her larger contribution as much as how we treat her despite her larger contribution. What civilisation are we talking about? Then there is serious ‘cultural framing’ of the female in terms of values, norms or her expected behaviour. The cultural framing also defines the ‘masculine’ 41

Rape! logical conclusion of this development is rape. Another serious development is the threat the male can present to the female in many areas of social life in which he ‘rules’, which can force her to agree to do many things, including providing sexual favours. The ‘sex-as-strategy’ used by women only makes sense if one evaluates why it has become a strategy in the first place. The media adds to the problem – eroticising, commodifying and marginalising women. And with the Internet, the commodification of women has reached a new height. There is almost an infinite classification of the sex act in which the framing of the act is always from the point of view of the “male gaze”. The images almost always portray the physical satisfaction of male sexual desire through penetration or ejaculation within a context of the male dominating the female or her unalloyed attention to satisfying his desire. They even have a category called “bondage” (sex) where images represent the eroticising of male brutality. Images and depiction of situations in our popular books, magazines and advertisements also contribute to our children and youth acquiring a view of society in which the female is eroticised and commodified as an object. The general features cited above are aspects of the patriarchal society that we live in. This is supposedly a civilised society. It is not difficult to see that ‘civilisation’ is as much responsible for Noor Suzaily’s death as the individual and the poor public security measures. Modernisation and Patriarchy The modernisation of society has opened up and enlarged the public sphere of our activities. This process puts women in the public sphere but does not adequately prepare support structures or a democratic environment for her protection in that sphere. There is hardly a careful consideration of serious public security measures or procedures. Consequently, there are many lonely places in the public sphere or lonely situations in the private sphere, where there is neither protection derived from democratic norms, which is more pervasive, nor police protection, which is more localised. * See Rohana Ariffin (ed.), Shame, Secrecy and Silence: Study of Rape in Penang (Penang: Women’s Crisis Centre, 1997) 42

Rape! and the ‘feminine’. A close examination of this will also reveal how we treat our womenfolk or the girl child at home and in society. For instance, career is about the upward mobility of men. She is expected to move where he goes, even give up her career. Far more serious is the socialisation of our children. Socialisation is gender- biased and, through the process, we build a number of myths about women’s inferior position in relation to men. It helps to culturally sustain her marginalisation. In all these, the ‘male supremacy complex’ is subtly introduced. And, along with it emerges a sense of a man’s privileges and the expectations placed on women. In relation to this, a close and careful examination of some of our laws will also reveal gender bias and insensitivity. Our religions contain aspects of gender inequality. Some commentator on the rape incident mentioned that in Hindu society some control over rape behaviour is provided in the practice of Mother Goddess worship. I do not have the comparative figures, but some of the worst atrocities on women – like bride burning – can be found in India and among the Hindus, which is the predominant religion there. In fact, the contradiction puzzles the average Indian social scientist – Mother Goddess worship on one side and the beating and killing of women on the other. Cultural framing also influences the assignment of work and to what levels a woman can ascend in an organisation. There is a ‘glass ceiling’ that obstructs her career path. Culturally, an unkind aspect of this social conditioning is the general negative opinion about raped women (extrapolating the findings of a 1977 study of rape in Penang)*. A rape victim would have to go through a shame-filled existence and daily face a society that will look at her as a ‘spoilt’ woman. A critical look at the socialisation process will reveal a democratically unsustainable gendering process in place. Within a supposedly caring atmosphere of the home environment, a difference between the male and female child is slowly converted into a socially-unequal situation. Many amongst us certainly privilege the male child. This shift also has a serious societal presence. A logical development of this shift involves the transformation of a physical difference between the male and female in strength into an expression of social power. A physical difference, in combination with other features described above, becomes symbolically evaluated and loaded. And one very serious 43

Nat Rape! Practically speaking, the police cannot be everywhere. The chances of the police being present at a place of possible rape are really low. We therefore need actively sustained public security procedures and measures that can help ordinary folks defend themselves. But the only serious and sustainable defence we have is normative pressure within a democratised culture. If not, a combination of lonely public or private spaces and a patriarchal mentality or social ethos based on the male supremacy complex that turn women into erotic commodities makes a perfect ground for social predation, and that can certainly lead to rape. Our patriarchal society is certainly guilty of doing to women, on a daily basis, more harm than we can imagine. For now, we have convicted the individual rapist but patriarchy is still at large. We need to address the roots of the patriarchal society we live in and weed out unsustainable expressions of the woman-man relationship. There is a need to build an all-round democratic culture. That will eventually reduce the unfortunate occurrences like the one in which Noor Suzaily got entangled. And lost her life. 44

6 Keadilan Published in the ‘Letter & Comment’ section of The Sun, 28 November 2000. Written with S. Nagarajan and Charles Santiago. See next chapter for some background information. The by-election announcement in the Lunas state constituency following the death of Dr. Joe Fernandez has sparked the normal frenzy among aspirants on both sides of the political divide. As usual, one would have expected the main contenders – the Barisan Nasional (BN) and the Barisan Alternatif (BA) – to have made their choices after the initial wrangling among potential candidates. But it's not to be this time. The sparks from the BA fallout have ignited another controversy: the issue of minority representation and alienation of a fellow ally. The BN’s choice seems to follow its time-tested, ‘party-is- above-the-individual’ policy. Despite rumours of unhappiness on the part of Kedah UMNO, the BN is fielding an Indian in a mixed constituency. At least on the surface, this seems to be above race politics. But the acrimony in spelling out the criteria for a BA candidate and the lobbying strategy of certain elements in Parti Keadilan Nasional raise serious concerns. These elements created a climate of intimidation, misinformation and deceit. First, Keadilan supporters demonstrated outside the Democratic Action Party (DAP) operations room in Lunas which, according to some observers, created a situation that could have gotten out of hand. It certainly was not in the spirit of solidarity and mutual respect among allies. Second, Keadilan youth leaders from Penang and Kedah had sent intimidating letters warning DAP to move out of Lunas or face something untoward on nomination day. Third, a signature campaign was orchestrated in the Chinese community to deceive the BA’s party leaders that DAP’s candidate 45

Keadilan (Justice) the Casualty The choice of a Malay candidate from Keadilan was based on the assumption that it will prove to be politically advantageous. It is seen as a decision with a \"larger interest\" in mind. Put differently, this argument suggests that only a Malay candidate can ensure the support of Malays that will lead to a BA victory. But the BN’s Teluk Kemang victory refutes this argument. There, its MIC candidate comfortably defeated Keadilan’s Malay candidate in a largely-Malay constituency. Political reality indicates that the contesting parties' programme, machinery, resources, critical issues of the day, local sentiments and problems play a decisive role in electoral outcomes. The stature of a candidate does play a role, but only a minor one. Certainly, concerns for the \"larger interest\" would have taken into consideration the impact of Keadilan's forced decision on DAP. Did they not realise what it would do to the party? Sure enough, DAP is now faced with a crisis. What kind of a partnership is that? Further, would it not be worthwhile, on the basis of the \"larger interest\", to have an Indian Malaysian candidate as an elected opposition member, given that there is no elected minority representative in any of the state assemblies or in parliament? This was an opportune moment for the minority problem and aspirations to be put on the national agenda. The underlying attitude of the BA appears to be \"win at any cost\", even if it means giving up some principles of political wisdom that guided its very existence. This is like a greedy corporation formulating strategies to make profits at any cost. Suddenly, anything becomes reasonable: the end justifies the means. Now, \"Be practical, be realistic\" means \"Forget about principles, just win, win, win!\" Give up principles, and soon we will find that there is no more ‘political will’ to defend those principles. Then, giving up more principles becomes easy. In this context, even Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS) has been simply silent on the minority issue. Where is the party's religion-centred politics, which it raises as its distinguishing feature? What is its interpretation of the status of minority representation in 46

Keadilan (Justice) the Casualty was not popular in Lunas. Fourth, a carefully thought-out media campaign was launched to undermine DAP and its candidate towards nomination day. Is this the new political culture that Keadilan is putting forward? Keadilan’s distinguishing qualification for the choice of its candidate is that he is a Malay. The DAP’s candidate was dropped because he is an Indian. What do you think this kind of decision-making is based on? Political wisdom or racism? Certainly, this is straightforward racism of Keadilan camouflaged under the cloak of political wisdom. This is unbecoming, given that about two years ago, Keadilan rightly captured the imagination of a large number of Malaysians with its cry for justice, fair play and democracy. What emerges from this episode is the extent to which these elements in Keadilan will go to get their way. And all this for a state seat, which in the larger equation is not going to determine who governs Kedah for the next three years. Yes, it may deny the state BN a two-thirds majority and send a message to the BN federal government but it is not going to change the state government for the moment. In the process, it has alienated a trusted ally, deeply hurt the sentiments of a minority community and has caused disarray in the infant BA formation. But is the damage done to the coalition's long-term interests worth it? The long-term cost appears to be high. Several other critical issues have emerged in the context of the Lunas by-election. First, how strong is the relationship between the component parties of BA? The impression one gets from the recent wrangling is that it is only a weak bond among the older members, rather than a firmly entrenched united coalition. The fact that Keadilan party members demonstrated in front of the DAP office does not show any positive sign of a mature and disciplined collectivity, working towards its long-term goals. This wrangling simply affirms BN's claim that the BA is just a convenient anti-BN formation that will break down anytime. Second, in the last general election, there was a lot of talk among BA leaders of moving towards a non-racial political future. The Lunas episode does not indicate that this vision of the future still animates the BA. On that score, at least in the Lunas by-election, the BN seems to be doing better. 47

Keadilan (Justice) the Casualty Islam? How are the position and interests of the marginalised communities to be accommodated in the BA? Are they going to be merely \"the led\"? When a large number of Indians left Keadilan before the last general election, they were perceived to be impatient. Given Keadilan’s behaviour in the Lunas by-election, there seem to be some good reasons for the Indian exit then. As a political entity, the BA has to work out a way to discipline its rogue elements, work out a level of honesty and transparency among its leaders and move the platform towards non-racial and non-discriminatory politics. Otherwise, the BA will replicate the BN. If the decision-making follows a pattern in which the Lunas by-election is one element, the minorities including Indian Malaysians, within the BA will be further marginalised. And certainly, they would think that it is better to be marginalised in the BN than in the BA. BA may win a seat here and there but it is moving away from principles that are supposed to guide it. When principles are pushed aside just to win a seat, politics degenerates into a game of numbers and business-like wheeling and dealing. If this is the direction in which the BA is moving or is set to move, soon it will become irrelevant even to its own supporters. Malaysians will just see through the BA's inability to provide a better platform, and realise that it is just more of the same. 48

Published in Malaysiakini, December 2000. Context: A by-election was announced in the Lunas state constituency (in Kedah) following the killing of MIC State Assemblyman, Dr. Joe Fernandez, on the afternoon of 4 Nov. 2000. He died of gunshot wounds. The announcement of a by-election had sparked the normal frenzy among aspirants on both sides of the political divide, i.e. the Barisan Nasional (BN), and the Barisan Alternatif (BA). Unfortunately, the political wrangling among potential candidates in the BA ignited a controversy: the issue of minority representation and alienation of a fellow ally (DAP). Many commentaries have poured into the print and e-newspapers on the Lunas by-election and the victory of BA. There seems to be a ‘serves-the-BN- right’ mood. And for many in BA – particularly, members of Keadilan – they stand vindicated, proved right about their choice of the candidate. For the moment, everyone is talking about BA's ‘victory’. Of course, BN is unable to accept BA's victory or its loss and is raising all kinds of allegations. While these allegations are part of BN's political damage control, is the behaviour of BA so superior that we do not have to stop and consider it critically? Commentators believe that the Lunas by-election is critical and will remain a ‘watershed political event’, implying a critical point in people's growing disenchantment with BN's politics and a sign of the consolidation of the Opposition forces. They are, of course, particularly attracted to the fact that the victory in the election has contributed to the realisation of a dream – the denial of a two-thirds majority, if not nationally, at least in the Kedah state assembly. 49

Let’s Not Get Too Cocky, BA Blindly Enthusiastic The mostly working class Indians, who may be anti-MIC for a variety of reasons, including the condescending nature of its leadership, seem to have voted significantly for the BA candidate. But as the voting numbers show, there is a sort of break-even situation. Commentators seem to forget that 9,981 citizens in Lunas voted for the BN as against the 10,511 votes for BA. To make all kinds of analysis based on this seems a little too blindly enthusiastic and is overstretching the inferences. To re-emphasise a point, the one thing that is clear from the figures is that BA's choice of a candidate based on Cotillions rationale was simply untenable. And my hunch is that the individual citizens of Lunas had decided to vote against the BN for a variety of reasons much before the polling day. Collectively, that meant a vote for BA. It would not have really mattered who stood on the BA side, provided the campaigning was ‘right’. The one important lesson that we need to learn from the last general elections and this by-election really is about the Malaysian electorate. In Lunas, they made a choice with what was given to them. They made the best use of what was available. The electorate did not fall into the game played by politicians. They had their own ‘agenda’ and they made their selection. Collectively, the people of Lunas have signalled – a reflection of the register of votes – to us that neither BN nor BA really makes a difference, at least not yet. 50

Let’s Not Get Too Cocky, BA Unhealthy Trajectory Unfortunately, in the midst of all this, there are many things that went on to make the political event in Lunas seem to have systematically gone out of focus. In many of us, the ‘child’ has come out, and now, we are just doing what spectators all over the world do when their team wins – cheer and jeer. All that matters now is ‘BN lost, BA won’. The end justifies the means, though in peaceful times, we like to preach the opposite. A cursory re-examination of the Lunas victory shows a prefiguration of a possible unhealthy trajectory of BA's political future. In the last general elections, when BN won with a small margin, BA would see it positively. For all of us who wanted a strong opposition party/coalition, it was a ‘victory’. For us, the narrow margin really meant that the opposition voice was rising. While the same logic may be used, the Lunas win – certainly by a very narrow margin – means that BA represents an area that does not support it by almost half. And what does BA aim to do in the constituency it has won, where half the citizens do not support it? Stop the redrawing of the constituencies in the state? Greatly Influenced In Lunas, voting for the candidates did not really show any significant ethnic or racial factor in the choice of the candidate. And among other things, a mere 530- vote majority isn't sufficient to convincingly suggest that. That an Indian Malaysian in a mixed constituency, where the Malays form the single largest group, lost by a mere margin of 530 votes makes BA's stand, reflecting Keadilan's analysis, questionable. In Lunas, people voted for many reasons. A large number of Chinese may have voted the BA for reasons that have been suggested by many other commentators. The Chinese have been greatly influenced by many events affecting their community and organisations, which took place before the election, all of which are fresh in their memory and some of which are still to be resolved. The Malays possibly voted for ‘more democracy’, ‘more Islam’, ‘more Malay-ness’ and/or ‘less Mahathir’, individually or collectively considered. 51

Let’s Not Get Too Cocky, BA decision in which they showed that they meant Politics is not business. The last general election is certainly a about end states lesson both for the BN and BA. as much as Dangerous Path about the process of Not having learnt its lesson well, the BN continues to getting there. take the people for granted. On the other hand, BA is beginning to think the people owe it to them. Sadly, some elements in BA, and those who sing for them, are beginning to get the idea that they are the chosen future of Malaysia. That is a dangerous path. How did BA achieve its ‘victory’ in Lunas? First, under the guise of being ‘realistic’, it fielded a Malay candidate hoping that race will contribute to its victory. Not as much principles. Or ideology. The vision of BA's non-racial political future is a casualty in a decision that is now – indicated by the voters in Lunas – questionable. The other problem is the doubt this kind of decision-making casts over the motives espoused by a member of the BA, Keadilan. Are they really transparent? What does Keadilan stand for? Justice? Justice for all Malaysians? Justice for Anwar Ibrahim? While justice for Anwar is a necessary political demand, it must not be conflated with justice for all Malaysians. Opposition in Crisis What will be Keadilan's status when Anwar is released? Will it transform and be absorbed as part of UMNO, representing perhaps a particular (and hopefully a democratic) tendency within that larger formation? Will it become a formation like the BN representing all ethnic groups, but without the ethnic party outfits, but still promoting largely Malay interests? Second, the ‘victory’ was achieved with DAP pushed towards a serious problem. If victory for BA is celebrated, it is being done without any sensitivity to the fact that victory has been achieved at the expense of a DAP in crisis. 52

Let’s Not Get Too Cocky, BA It Is the Process That Counts And what that really means is: How is BA going to show Malaysian citizens that it is really different? Overwhelmed by its victory, BA simply refuses to see beyond or behind its victory. For those who have been hoping for a new ethical political culture, a strong opposition that cares for values and principles and that defends them is a must. In conceiving such a political practice, merely winning is certainly not the issue. A cursory examination of history of those who have been the leaders of such politics will show that. It is the process that counts. The opposition to BN is not just about winning an election but also, and more importantly, about the process we must set in place, guided by values and principles, so that a victory is a victory of one set of principles over the other, of democracy over authoritarian politics. Politics is not about end states as much as about the process of getting there. Blooming Political Initiatives The one thing that is of particular importance in reflecting the above in the last general election is the setting in motion of a process for the mobilisation and consolidation of opposition politics in this country. For many citizens and observers of politics in Malaysia, it was yet another attempt, another experiment. For the first time, the country saw activist-leaders taking to the election. A large number of groups and people’s coalitions came into existence prior to the election, proposing a rich and creative variety of democratic visions for Malaysia. It was our ‘Alternative Vision 2020’ and beyond. People discussed. Internet activism came of age in Malaysia as part of the process. Collectively, the people of Malaysia ‘used’ the opposition to send a message to BN that support for it is not unconditional. The opposition coalition did not, however, win the legitimate right to govern Malaysia in terms of seats. But, against the background of being taken for granted, the people had ‘won’ by sending a significant message. The Malaysian people established a voting 53

Let’s Not Get Too Cocky, BA \"DAP never got the larger picture\" is the claim of many who find fault with it. What is this ‘larger picture’ or the ‘larger interest’ that many have yet to make sense of? Surely, making a clear statement that the BA is for honest and clean politics is part of the larger picture. Surely, signalling to people that BA will not do what we have seen BN do is part of the larger picture. Surely, being principled and maintaining party discipline is part of the larger picture. Surely, giving minority communities and women political opportunities as a matter of coalition/party policy is part of the larger picture. Surely making a principled political decision rather than a race-based decision is part of the larger picture. Unless what is meant by the larger picture is the single point programme of defeating BN or embarrassing its leaders without regard to the process! How can opposition politics in this country make any worthwhile contribution with such a limited scope of action and thought? If BA is just going to be a “knee-jerk reaction”, it will certainly make the opposition coalition quite irrelevant in time to come. The Lunas by-election has been a spectacle. And now it is over. Until the next spectacle, which is already in the offing, we have time to think about the character of opposition politics in this country. And it is important that we demand that it has a principled, democratic character, even as it strategises to win. It would be a mistake to wait for it to win to have a character. 54

Let’s Not Get Too Cocky, BA With little resources, instead of concentrating on larger political issues, it will have to work harder now to keep its members together. And what is the use of a victory, when it puts whatever little opposition force we have in this country into a crisis? Whatever those aligned to various groups within the opposition coalition may think about DAP, is this the process we want to see more of in the fledgling coalition and/or its members? Street Brawls Collective leadership is being substituted by leadership of jeering the other person down – both from inside and outside the coalition, both directly and indirectly. What kind of politics is that? In the world of real-life politics, situations for political street brawls may arise. But do we need a Coalition that transforms that behaviour into something acceptable and of value, defending it and losing the sense of a strategy of abstaining from it inside or outside the Coalition? Consider BA's victory against the dishonesty, peer pressure, and ‘arm-twisting tactics’ that went on for Keadilan to have its way. This is the underside of victory. Nothing that happened within BA, between DAP and the rest, really matters to those commenting on the elections. What is worse is that all fingers are pointed at DAP for getting it all wrong – this even after seeing the behaviour of Keadilan members and its leadership, after PAS ‘suggesting’ that DAP cannot go it alone and that it needs BA or after seeing how little values guided Keadilan’s behaviour on this matter. DAP is even more wrong now since there has been a victory. The issues of dishonesty or pressure tactics within the opposition coalition between its members do not matter and can be swept under the carpet. It is okay. Now, we can all fall back on our belief that ‘victors are always right’. The Larger Picture And, of course, if they are right, how can they be dishonest? In this, is there really any difference between the BA – or components within it – and the BN? The worldview they share is similar if not the same. Is this the character of the opposition coalition we asked for? 55



Published in Malaysiakini, March 2001. Context: The published version was edited and entitled Political Hailing Withering Malaysianisation. There was not only a loss of support for UMNO from the Malay Malaysian community during the last election (late November 1999), but also splitting of the community votes between UMNO, PAS and Keadilan supporters. UMNO had to regain its lost ground and legitimacy with the community. As a result, there was a call for \"Malay Unity\" talks, particularly with PAS, which had captured Kelantan and Terengganu in the elections. The meeting was to be held in February 2001 (later postponed). Non-Malay Malaysians felt that the meeting was not healthy or should be more inclusive. The idea of Malaysia is a contested one. There is no single notion of Malaysia. We live in many ‘frames’ of Malaysia. As in most post-colonial societies that underwent change from a sort of mono-ethnic population to a definite multiethnic one, Malaysia is still in search of an identity. The national sociocultural fabric that we as a people have tried to weave together, despite the many odds against us, is a delicate and fragile thing, like the wings of a butterfly. Those among us who felt that we were at home among our families, friends and fellow citizens, to whatever degree, nurtured a vision of creating a ‘dialogically unified, a co-existential but highly differentiated multiethnic/multicultural Malaysia’. However, the events of our nation's recent past have ripped the tapestry cruelly here and there, causing the tenuous areas of co-existence to be damaged, if not destroyed altogether. Again. The events – bloody or otherwise – we have seen in the recent, troubled past seem to set us behind to an earlier era. Where do we start tracing this string of events? An examination of our recent past indicates ‘socio-seismic’ movements at the end of last year and the beginning of this year. There was a juncture in our nation's history when we had all the reasons to further strengthen our national commitment as a multiethnic/multicultural society by a call for ‘Malaysian unity’ talks. It would 57

Malaysia Today down to its knees, though the community made the pleas from that position. GPMS even proposed a set of counter-demands, including gazetting the PM’s position as an exclusive right of the Malays. As the problem with Suqiu was in progress and reaching a crescendo, UMNO set in motion calls for talks on Malay unity. The Malay unity talks in the context of what was going on prior to and at the time it was proposed sent a definite signal to the non-Malays. The ethno- culturescape underwent a convulsion. Malaysianisation was pushed aside; the Malay element, or ‘Malay-sianisation’, re-appeared. It is perhaps worthwhile keeping in mind here the issue of Malay hegemony. The Malay hegemony issue developed generally in the context of a multiethnic Malaysia and the position of Malays. Another area not usually addressed involves the classification of ‘Malay’, which by itself is a hegemonic process. Like the classification of bumiputeras, the ‘Malay community’ is really a collection of a number of communities. For instance, the Mandailings are classified as Malays. Ask a Mandailing privately and s/he will probably not agree with that classification. There is a belief among them that they are different. So, we have Minangs, Kelantanese, Penang Mamak (Penang Indian Muslim), Acehnese, etc., who are all classified as Malay. Such a hegemonic classification has a political function. To continue, Malay hegemony in the first instance cited above is seen as a function of Malay nationalism. The underlying assumption of Malay hegemony is the belief that Malaysia is part of the Malay world and that the Malays must necessarily have ‘more’ rights – symbolic or real – than the others in the country. Their numbers and their control of both repressive and ideological institutions offer the community the power to establish hegemonic status. To offer the other communities equal status in every aspect is politically and culturally inadvisable, as it may upset the hegemonic status of the Malay community and take the tanah Melayu away from them. 58

Malaysia Today have contributed to and strengthened the efforts of weaving our fragile national sociocultural fabric. It would have further encouraged the imagination of ‘Malaysia’ as our common home. But instead what did we do? A cursory examination of online mailing/ discussion lists such as beritamalaysia or sangkancil or the online newspaper Malaysiakini reveals a focus on the Malays in recent times particularly centred on “Malay unity” talks, with a subsidiary but critical concern of ‘Malay hegemony’. A critical elaboration of these concerns seems to show some serious consequences. The Malay unity talks arose out of UMNO's urgent need to address its loss of legitimacy among a growing number of the Malay people defined either by the specific practice of their religion, their association and support for Anwar or by their age/generation. The Malay unity talks were to set in motion a process that will in time come to displace PAS, and possibly Keadilan, and bring back the Malay people under UMNO's wing. UMNO had to find ways to regain its lost legitimacy. Well, in the dynamics of a modern multi-party based democratic system, this seems to be an acceptable strategy for any party to take. Why not? But because of the position of Malays in Malaysia, the historical context in which the talks were proposed, among other factors, set the events that were to follow in an unfortunate trajectory, with a seemingly impersonal force of ‘fragmentation’ having a directive influence. Around the time of the Lunas by-election (late 2000), Malaysia was caught with a number of developments that seem to have adversely affected the ‘Malaysianisation’ process. There was first the debate over \"vision schools\" with the Chinese community having a reservation about it, perhaps not so much about the idea itself as much as about the way it will be implemented. People in power and those associated with them took the community to task without reasonably addressing the fears of the community. Following on the heels of that was the issue of the “demands” of the Malaysian Chinese Organisations Election Appeals (Suqiu) Group. The “demands” of Suqiu, though not criticised during the election, for that would have meant the possibility of loss of Chinese votes, was addressed much later after the BN had won the election, again sometime around the end of 2000. The “demands” were supposedly unreasonable and anti-Malay. Naturally, groups like UMNO and Gabungan Pelajar Melayu Semenanjung (GPMS) attacked Suqiu to bring it 59

Malaysia Today Hardly. It seems to have continued steadily – like an arrow from an unknown source looking for its helpless victim – into the harsh squatter reality of Kampong Medan and its vicinity. That set in motion another fragmentation. This fragmentation was achieved not by confronting a reasonable demand with an unreasonable counter-demand at the level of consciousness and/or strategy, but by driving deep into the flesh, bones and psyche of many innocent Malaysians, an experience of bloody, intense pain. It is a pain with an eye that sees only ‘us’ and ‘them’. It is a pain that increases the fault lines and intensifies separation. Third fragmentation: Indian Malaysians Do we have the wisdom begin to feel insecure and become ‘Indians in Malay-sia’. today to make a choice of the Back to Square One collective future we want, a multiethnic/multicultural The dominant cycle involving the future that is governed by three major communities is complete. The ‘Malay-sianisation’ process is participatory and re-established with a vengeance. deliberative democracy The symbolic territories of the communities are now re-defined in (from the local level space and time. The ‘Malay unity’ upwards), culturally rich talks will hail the Malays, ‘Damansara’ with diversity, socially and ‘education’ will hail the ‘Chinese inclusive institutionally in Malay-sia’ while ‘the squatter’, and dialogically unified? ‘University Hospital’ and the ‘prison’ will hail the ‘Indians in Malay-sia’. This periodic, culturally and economically motivated political hailing, like religious hailing, will bring the individual members of the communities together, but unlike religious hailing, will keep the communities separate and fragmented. It is back again to square one – in that struggle to define ourselves, to seek an identity that is consistent with our ‘feeling at home’ within the career of the two main frames, Malaysia or ‘Malay-sia’. 60

Malaysia Today Malay hegemony is a cultural agenda with a political programme; Malay unity is a political agenda with a cultural programme. Both these agenda are critical for the survival of the Malay people in the peninsula, which they see as belonging to them, while the others, who may be citizens here formally, must remain ‘that much less’. It is a Malaysia of ‘Malay-sians’. Malaysia may be a shared reality but common and general cultural and political ownership of it is for now a dream for a faraway future. Against this backdrop, the fragile ethnocultural reality centred on an imagination of a dialogically unified multiethnic/multicultural Malaysia broke like a looking glass into a hundred pieces yet again. An unfortunate fragmentation process was already in progress. First fragmentation: the Malay unity talks re-affirmed the Malay/non-Malay ethnocultural fields. It made the point that we are not in Malaysia but in ‘Malay-sia’. Like a child who must commit a lesson to memory, we were always made to remember the Malay-non-Malay divide, never allowed to create a new memory of a possible future. In addition to the above consequence of the Malay unity talks, the non-Malay communities were also positioned as silent spectators to a spectacle. The Malay unity talks were as much for non-Malay consumption as it was for Malays. The representation of Suqiu’s demands as unreasonable and anti-Malay allowed them to be interpreted as an external threat to ‘Malay-sianisation’, a factor critically important for intra-communal bonding and for crystallising the Malay unity talks. Added to this problem faced by members of the Chinese community was another that directly affected their children. Our children. This relates to the problem of the Damansara Chinese Primary School, built with community donations 71 years ago. It was to be closed because of its close proximity to a highway. Parents were unhappy and children were unhappy. Second fragmentation: The Chinese Malaysian became ‘Chinese in Malay-sia’. Even as the need for Malay unity talks proceeded, ‘Malay-sianisation’ was in progress. Whether or not the Malay unity talks will be eventually held and whether or not the expected results will be achieved, the consequences of the proposal are visible if one only cares to look. Did the process of fragmentation stop, with the Chinese committing to their memory that they were Chinese in ‘Malay-sia’? 61

Malaysia Today They produce different subjects and they offer different trajectories, different futures. Do we have the wisdom today to make a choice of the collective future we want, a multiethnic/multicultural future that is governed by participatory and deliberative democracy (from the local level upwards), culturally rich with diversity, socially inclusive institutionally and dialogically unified? 62

Published in Malaysiakini, May 2001. Context: The riot and killing of six persons in a squatter area in Kuala Lumpur (Petaling Jaya Selatan/Kampung Medan) in early 2001 led to active discussions on racism in Malaysia. Much later, the newly-formed Human Rights Commission of Malaysia (SUHAKAM) released its maiden report. While it addressed all aspects of discrimination, unfortunately, it left out racism. SUHAKAM is indeed a ray of hope in a country where violations of human rights are legitimised generally under the framework of ‘our Asian way’, which has brought some disrepute to Asia. As if Asia does not have traditions of participatory and deliberative democracy that lie outside what many political leaders in the region today define as democracy and human rights. SUHAKAM has done well and provided the nation some confidence that we may be able to take a step towards reclaiming what our inalienable rights are, those rights that have been appropriated from us by the state claiming to do the ‘Asian’ thing. Its maiden report, which has received the support of many concerned Malaysians, seems to cover a number of critical areas and issues very pertinent for citizens' political survival in this nation of ours. In the report, as a number of news reports convey to us, SUHAKAM has concluded that many laws in Malaysia infringe on or restrict basic human rights. Among the many laudable suggestions, SUHAKAM has demanded for relaxation on tight curbs on public meetings, asked for a transparent and accountable government, removal of the perpetual ‘state of emergency’ we are in, suggested an independent commission for the appointment of judges, raised 63

SUHAKAM Must Open the Pandora’s Box of Racism xenophobia and related intolerance since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, we note that despite the development of international, regional and national laws underpinning equality, racist attitudes remain deeply entrenched and that political, economic and social conditions often inhibit their implementation. We also note with sadness that minorities, indigenous people, migrants, asylum seekers and refugees and others still suffer from widespread inequality and racial discrimination. The obstacles to equality lie in the mind and the spirit as well as in political, economic and social conditions. Education, development, and the faithful implementation of international human rights norms are the keys to future action for equality and non-discrimination. We recognise that certain persons and groups may experience other forms of discrimination on the basis of their gender, age, disability, genetic condition, language, religion, sexual orientation, economic status or social origin, and that, in addition, they may experience acts of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance. We note that this situation can result in such persons being victims of multiple forms of discrimination, and stress that special attention should be given to the elaboration of strategies, policies and programmes, which may include affirmative action, for such persons. Blind to Reality In the conclusion and recommendations section of the document produced by the Asia-Pacific Seminar of Experts in preparation for the World Conference against Racism: Migrants and Trafficking in Persons with Particular Reference to Women and Children, which met in Bangkok in September last year [2000], one will find the following observation: \"The Seminar noted that there was no country in the region which was free from racism and racial discrimination as defined in the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.\" Though this preparatory conference focused on the migrant communities, the point made on the pervasiveness of racial discrimination in Asia is all too clear. In fact, one fails to see how an august body like SUHAKAM can miss the point that a multiracial society like ours with so many inequalities can possibly escape the social outcome of racism or racial discrimination, either as retail 64

SUHAKAM Must Open the Pandora’s Box of Racism our attention to gender discrimination and the infringement of the rights of indigenous people faced with a development that has displaced them. By asking for all these, SUHAKAM's report can be placed within a universe of texts that have emerged in Malaysia in the recent past animated by an imagined future that is authentically democratic and genuinely Malaysian. These texts, which are all publicly available, offer, if not for us immediately, at least for the future generations, a pathway to a society unlike the one we are living in today. Wrong Signals But sadly, SUHAKAM has looked away from a reality that hurts human rights and the quality of social relationships in this country. That reality is racism, racial discrimination and hate crimes. By doing this, SUHAKAM has missed a historical opportunity to direct the country in correcting a situation that officialdom has so far refused to accept. It lost the power of ‘dramatic intervention’ in terms of its first report to draw racism, racial discrimination and hate crimes into official discourse. By doing this, it has sent wrong signals to many concerned Malaysians. Its failure on this matter is really puzzling. Racism, hate crimes and racial discrimination are serious problems faced the world over. Their seriousness has been recognised by the UN, which is holding an important conference on the issue, the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance in Durban, South Africa, from 31 August to 7 September this year [2001]. Here are three items in the draft declaration and programme of action of the Conference issued in March 2001, which the Commission may want to look at (emphasis mine): We also understand that intolerance and racial discrimination breed and fester in inequitable political, economic and social conditions, and that genuine equality of opportunity for development is fundamental for the eradication of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance. We therefore call for urgent national, regional and international measures to provide the chance for a decent life for all the peoples of the world in their magnificent diversity. In reviewing progress made in the fight against racism, racial discrimination, 65

SUHAKAM Must Open the Pandora’s Box of Racism Who Is a ‘Malaysian’? Second, among the many directions SUHAKAM will have to take to seek the causes, addressing race and ethnic issues in terms of racism or racial discrimination, one will certainly take it straight back to the New Economic Policy and into the affirmative action policy for the majority racial/ethnic community. It will eventually lead to questions related to the affirmative action policy based on exclusive racial categories rather than inclusive economic categories. In addition, the career of this inquiry has far-reaching implications. It will reach into the examination of many public and private institutions and their b e h a v i o u r. It will raise the issue of: ‘Who is a Malaysian?’ It will lead to action to harmonise the principle of citizenship based on equality with the reality of human rights based on universality. All these will become a serious problem to deal with on what has come to be categorised as a ‘sensitive issue’, not a ‘human rights’ one. Yes, it will open a Pandora’s Box, but if it helps straighten the human rights situation in this country and further democratise it, then is that not the brief of SUHAKAM? Third – optimistically speaking – SUHAKAM is aware of the problems but does not know how to address the issues. If this were the case, perhaps it would be a worthwhile effort for it to look at the working of race and human rights commissions across the globe that have recognised the problem of racial discrimination almost as a norm and have sought to deal with it directly and indirectly both at the level of the individual and public institution. It needs to establish and encourage a proper reporting system and it needs to work out a way to evaluate the reports in which there may have been human rights violations (as a result of racism or racial discrimination). If SUHAKAM had a discussion on the issue and had decided to drop it from inclusion in the report, perhaps the public should know about it and its reasons. A response to SUHAKAM can then be more considered. If it did not consider the issues of racism, racial discrimination and hate crimes in the everyday life of Malaysians worth engaging with seriously, it is time that it takes another more critical, reflexive look at Malaysia. 66

SUHAKAM Must Open the Pandora’s Box of Racism incidents or as institutionalised practices or both. Even if we give SUHAKAM the benefit of doubt about its refusal to investigate the Petaling Jaya Selatan issue on the basis of lack of evidence, one fails to understand how it is possible for it to be blind to the reality as a whole. Who While it has addressed all kinds of possible human is a rights violations in our nation – relating to undemocratic Malaysian? laws, gender discrimination or violation of the rights of indigenous people in the name of development – at all? SUHAKAM’s blindness to racism, racial discrimination or hate crimes is not comprehensible. In fact, it raises a question: Why has SUHAKAM not addressed the issue First, SUHAKAM’s first report carried just about all forms of human rights violations but did not recognise human rights violations through racial discrimination, and therefore, it was not included in the report. This implies that, as far as SUHAKAM is concerned, there is no racism or racial discrimination or hate crimes in Malaysia. To believe that in a multiracial society with a clear ethnic division of labour highly influenced by serious levels of inequality articulating itself, among others, in terms of ownership, patterns of educational achievements and employment and residential locations, there will be no racism or racial discrimination is, to say the least, naive. To believe that in a society that imports a large Nat group of non-professional, unskilled or semi- skilled migrant workers from the neighbouring countries, there will be no racism or racial discrimination or hate crimes is to put an unrealistic faith on Malaysians in their treatment of foreign labour. We need only examine some newspaper reports closely to find out how wrong it is. 67



Published in Malaysiakini in May 2002 and Vettipechu in June 2002. Context: In early 2002, a controversy raged in Malaysia regarding university admissions for young Malaysians. Many students, who scored very high marks in their pre-university examination and were therefore eligible to gain admission to local universities and university colleges, did not get places in these institutions. These were largely Chinese and Indian Malaysian students. This situation led to a major debate on the nature of meritocracy in Malaysia. Another controversy is sweeping through the nation. This time around it is about \"meritocracy\". It is now common knowledge to many Malaysians that the source of the controversy was the recently-announced admission to our public universities. The differential numbers of admissions in relation to the various ethnic groups to the 11 universities and 6 university colleges is seen to be unfair to some young Malaysians in contrast to others. A cursory examination of letters, news items, articles and editorials in various newspapers, online or otherwise, in English and the vernacular indicate that the differential admissions of our young people for university education is perceived to be ethnically discriminatory, indicating or resulting from a poorly worked out and managed meritocracy system or from a carefully planned unfair \"meritocracy system without merit\". Meritocracy is a component of our present mode of governance in matters dealing with education, particularly in relation to the distribution of opportunities for university education. Since the target of governance is always a population, meritocracy refers to the distribution of university education to a population. Is this population a general one, i.e. all eligible young Malaysians? 69

Meritocracy, Modes of Governance and the Making of a High-Risk Society mode of governance. Only liberalism and/or conservatism supports state-directed meritocracy, i.e. moderated meritocracy, which we are accustomed to here. Against the equality- merit spectrum, liberalism slants towards equality, in an attempt to generalise educational opportunities from the rich to the middle-classes and downwards, while conservatism slants towards merit, maintaining that educational opportunities be available to a selected few in society. Both liberalism and conservatism work within an elite model of education, the former maintaining a ‘soft version’ while the latter maintaining a ‘stronger version’ of the elite model. Our notion of meritocracy seems to slant towards the stronger version of elitism. Our present mode of governance of tertiary educational opportunities through a meritocratic system will work if there is a level-playing field between the players, a common university entrance system and transparency to examine the processes that contribute to the moderated meritocratic system. Unfortunately, we have a situation where none of the above is applicable. How can we create a meritocratic system with affirmative action policy that is based on the exclusive category of race/ethnicity? A level playing field can never be established in this way. In addition, we do not have a common entrance system. Two systems operate to distribute tertiary educational opportunities, resulting in an outcome that hardly realises the principle of merit. Malaysia is never known for its transparency. As a people, we have hardly been active subjects of policymaking but merely the passive objects of policies. This kind of situation disadvantages some segments of the Malaysian population in contrast to others. First, meritocracy is based on the \"survival of the fittest\" formula and contributes to a social Darwinist future (\"The fittest have the right to survive and the others can be damned!\") Meritocracy is essentially elitist and disadvantages a number of segments against an elite few. In this case, it is possible that a meritocratic system can exclude not only members of the poorer community but also such groups as women. In a highly unequal society with vast differences in income differentials and where the Gini coefficient* does not show any significant downward trend, a level-playing field cannot be established, thus making meritocracy actively 70

Meritocracy, Modes of Governance and the Making of a High-Risk Society And, does this mode of governance adequately address the tertiary educational needs of all our young people? The literature on the issue of distribution of educational opportunities in a highly stratified and unequal multicultural society suggests two key debates. The first debate is about \"quota vs. merit\". Ensuing from this is a mode of governance oriented to an affirmative-action policy and equality. The affirmative action policy forms a mode of governance of the rights of a segment of the population that has suffered historically in a social, cultural and political sense. A quota system offers a social corrective – providing a historically disadvantaged group a fixed offer in a planned strategy of opportunity distribution and not through a competitive avenue. In Malaysia, as in many other countries, the quota system has a political function. The quota system is offered to the majority and politically-powerful ethnic community. This has created a query on the real purpose of the quota system, which has led, among other things, to see the system as promoting Malay hegemony rather than addressing a social disadvantage. In recent times, there has been an effort in Malaysia to change the distribution of tertiary educational opportunities from quota to merit system, which brings us to the second debate and the centre of the present controversy. The second debate relates to \"equality vs. merit\". Ensuing from this are three alternative modes of governance available for redistribution of (tertiary) educational opportunities – egalitarian, moderated meritocracy and unrestricted meritocracy. A vision of a society that celebrates diversity and differences and systematically undermines patterned and inter-generational forms of social inequality is a social potential that is yet to be realised. Thus, equality achieved through recognising differences in abilities, in contribution and in needs is a non- existent one today. At present the egalitarian mode of governance is non- existent. Similarly, a society of radical individualism in an imagined libertarian future, in which the state/bureaucracy is reduced in size and scope, makes unrestricted meritocracy – minimum restriction on the fittest to reach the top – an unrealised * See http://william-king.www.drexel.edu/top/prin/txt/factors/dist4.html. December 2003. 71

Meritocracy, Modes of Governance and the Making of a High-Risk Society matters dealing with education, particularly in relation to university education. Among the critical objectives of governance in any society are ones that attempt to reduce the social security risks of its members so that they may have a future, realise their potentials, achieve a meaningful and secure life (and in the process, provide legitimacy to the regime). However, as it is practised here today, meritocracy reflects a mode of governance that systematically increases the social risk of a number of non-Malay Malaysian segments of the population while reducing it for the Malay Malaysians. Against this background, there is an argument that is appearing in some quarters that relates to the fact that tertiary education is now available not just at the eleven public universities and six university colleges, but also available at the 600-over private institutions of higher education, i.e. private colleges. It is assumed that tertiary education can be more equitably distributed among young Malaysians by the mix of public and private institutions of higher education and also by different entry requirements. While this is reasonable enough, the real issue of the distribution of educational opportunities among all young Malaysians from the perspective of ‘education as a right’ is not addressed or resolved by such an argument or strategy. In relation to the above, three unfortunate developments can be discerned, which have created a high social risk environment, particularly for a number of ethnic and poor communities. First, sadly in Malaysia, the public institutions serve the needs of the young Malay Malaysians while the private institutions serve the young Chinese Malaysians, with the other communities, including young Indian Malaysians, running between these two sites. Notwithstanding the rhetoric of \"Malaysia as a regional centre for higher education\", private institutions are hardly a solution to a problem of equitable distribution of educational opportunities but are more reflective of an adaptive strategy of the Chinese Malaysian community to a lack of such opportunities and to the critical educational needs of their young. Second, much due to the ‘success’ of the government’s privatisation policy, the creation of educational opportunities has transformed over the years from a social objective with economic implications into a thoroughly economic activity. The privatisation of education has reduced the government’s responsibility and redistributive role and shaped education into just another commodity, governed by the vagaries of the market. For many among the poorer communities, it is 72

Meritocracy, Modes of Governance and the Making of a High-Risk Society Semparuthi contribute to elitism. The meritocratic system will eventually benefit the middle classes and the richer lot and men among them. Thus, this mode of governance presents a high social risk for the poor and the tribals in Malaysia. What happens to those outside the merit system? What do we have in place for them and their well- being? Second, while the above discussion presents the meritocratic system itself as a serious problem in distributing educational opportunities to all the young members of a population, the situation is further aggravated by a careless and poorly thought out approach to organising meritocracy in contemporary Malaysia. We do not just have one problem in establishing a level playing field. We have economic status, gender and ethnicity all contributing to maintaining a much- skewed playing field. By critically examining the outcome of the state-managed moderated meritocratic system, we know that the young among the Malay Malaysians – and particularly the well-off among them – have better opportunities and a more certain future than the young of other ethnic communities. Added to this, the differential system for university entrance has also contributed to their well- being. The lack of transparency, the third important factor, in a highly controlled political environment harms the critical social learning feedback mechanisms and consequently increases the social risks of an uncertain future for the young non-Malay Malaysians. Moderated meritocracy is a component of our present mode of governance in 73

Meritocracy, Modes of Governance and the Making of a High-Risk Society still difficult to get into private institutions. And those with the opportunity for education ask a very disturbing question: \"Which is the easier course to pass?\" Education has become a ‘thing’ you can buy and sell. Thirdly, education has moved from a national concern to a communal one, again removing government’s responsibilities in a multicultural society. If communities are forced to look after themselves, why do we need a national government then? Notwithstanding our vision of a \"caring society\", increasingly the modes of governance that are adopted by the government seem to suggest that even as we are moving towards a developed society status, we are also moving towards an unsustainable high-risk society. We are becoming a society with modes of governance that leave huge sections of our population without a future, at the social risk of being unable to take care of themselves and/or their families or realise their potential or participate fully in national life. Our peculiar kind of moderated meritocracy, like our tax system, which seems to be moving towards giving more importance to indirect than direct taxes, or our strategies for the post-retirement period of millions of workers, all show unsustainable modes of governance that increase social risks. Some segments may be getting richer but we are increasing the vulnerabilities and risks of many other segments. Among these are young Malaysians and their delicate futures. A meritocratic system that systematically increases the social risks of sections of young Malaysians is hardly practical or moral. 74

Published in Aliran Monthly, Malaysiakini, and Vettipechu in late 2002. Context: This article is based on a country report written for the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions-Asian and Pacific Regional Organisation (ICFTU-APRO), based in Singapore, and the Malaysian Trade Union Congress (MTUC). The report covered the reality about taxation, social safety net and social development in Malaysia. It was converted into an article. Departing from their traditional concerns such as collective bargaining/ agreements or issues regarding disputes in the workplace, Malaysian trade unionists gathered here in Kuala Lumpur on 12 and 13 June 2002 to discuss a very critical relationship of importance to workers’ social protection: Taxation and Social Development. The national workshop was organized by MTUC. It is part of an ICFTU-APRO initiative on Taxation and Social Development, in which three other countries – India, Mongolia and Australia – are involved. The initiative began as part of a response to the 1997 Asian financial crisis. In paying attention to the crisis, the emphasis was on how it affected social development in general and social protection of the labouring community in particular. For ICFTU-APRO social protection involved social safety nets covering the following: (1) old age/retirement benefits, (2) unemployment insurance benefits, (3) retrenchment compensation, (4) medical benefits and other benefits specific to women, (5) guaranteed minimum wage and (7) general social development {(a) education, (b) vocational and skills training and retraining (c) general health (d) housing (e) social assistance for specific groups (f) community development and (g) natural disaster relief}. In addressing social safety nets and social development, an important aspect is, of course, funding: How will social development be funded? Funding for social development, according to ICFTU-APRO, must be the responsibility of national governments and achieved through taxation. With this focus, the ICFTU-APRO is conducting country case studies examining the issues of taxation and social 75

Labour and Social Development in Malaysia government in re-distribution of wealth, an important social goal. With privatisation and economic liberalisation, the market is seen as a more suitable instrument for achieving redistribution to all citizens. It is important to national vision Policy note here that Malaysia has among the highest income differentials between income national development Policy share of the highest 20 percent and the lowest 20 percent of households in the region. A 1996 report also indicates that the income share of the lowest 40 percent of households is only 12.9 percent. Recent studies also indicate that privatisation has not really benefited individual citizens as much as corporate citizens. ‘Privatisation Culture’ and Social Protection The culture of privatisation (a mentality and a set of (with social agenda) institutionalised practices) has spread out from the economy to social sectors. There is therefore a tendency to reduce the provision of social protection by the government and to shift the responsibility to the individual and the institution of the family. In fact, this is a central part of Vision 2020 and society social Policy national Economic Policy Malaysia: Towards a Caring or High-Risk Society? 76

Labour and Social Development in Malaysia development as well as carrying out national level workshops to discuss the issue with trade unionists. For Malaysia, MTUC played a key part. While comparatively, Malaysia has a reasonably well-developed social security system for the labouring community, the following observations offer a view of some critical issues that need reflection and closer attention. Caring Society? The social agenda of the various national policies in Malaysia (from the New Economic Policy to the National Development Policy to the National Vision Policy) implicitly first, and explicitly later, propose the creation of a ‘caring society’. However, a careful examining of the actual state of affairs, with particular reference to the labouring community, suggests that instead of moving towards a caring society, the nation is a moving towards a ‘high-social- risk society’ (and an unjust one). Malaysia Incorporated and Social Policy For all practical purposes, social development policy is located within the framework of Malaysia Incorporated. And Malaysia Incorporated works within a larger ‘economic growth framework’, a framework highly influenced by the neo-liberal ideology, directed by the central tendency of capitalist development, i.e. profit making, wealth creation and its skewed distribution and concentration. In such an economic environment, the economic security of businesses is more crucial than the social security of workers. Privatisation and Redistribution of Wealth The premise on which the above is based is the fact that if the economy is dynamic, it will certainly benefit all citizens, including workers. However, growth and redistribution are two different issues. Because there will always be winners and losers in the economic growth model we adopt, we need comprehensive and sustainable wealth re-distribution policies for all citizens to benefit. While there was redistribution focus in the seventies, the introduction of the privatisation policy in the early 80s set the trend towards not only a reduction of governmental inefficiency but also a reduction of the role of 77

Labour and Social Development in Malaysia Privatisation (c) It is also not clear that decision-making power displaces real over the use of communal or collective resources, ‘need’ with including financial and productive resources, is actually shifting, along with ownership patterns, market ‘demand’. towards individual workers or their families. Processes and policies to shape and strengthen a self-conscious civil society in which the family plays an important comprehensive role are almost non-existent in Malaysia. For all practical purposes, the present emphasis of the privatisation process and indiscriminate marketisation seem to expose the family to high levels of social risks, hardly indicating a movement towards a caring society. The privatisation of healthcare, for instance, would certainly expose the poor to great health and social risks. (MTUC has been consistent in saying ‘no’ to privatisation of healthcare.) Vulnerable Economic System The economic strategy has moved from ‘redistribution with growth’ to ‘growth with redistribution’ to one with primarily a ‘growth’ focus. As mentioned above, one of the consequences of a high performing economy is the belief that social development will take care of itself. However, the long- term sustainability of our economy in its present shape is questionable. Though the economy seemingly did well before the financial crisis, with approximately 8 percent growth, the 1997 financial crisis revealed many serious inherent weaknesses in the economic system; for instance, the near absence of any mechanism for necessary and effective technology development to enhance competitiveness or the pervasive problems of lack of transparency and corporate governance, and cronyism. The recent episode involving the withdrawal of investments by the pensions fund manager, California Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS), from Malaysia (in addition to Thailand, Indonesia and Philippines), based on criteria such as transparency and productive labour practices, seem to at least suggest that all is not well with the economy. We seem to be held prisoner by the ups and downs of the stock market rather than focusing our efforts on building the real economy. Our Corruption Perception Index is 5.6 (‘0’ – highly 78

Labour and Social Development in Malaysia Cahayasuara the ‘caring society’ ideal! Privatisation of social protection rather than its socialisation is the general tendency today. While some argue that this is in the right direction, as the government cannot indefinitely support social safety net programmes, the government’s role in strengthening the family institution is not exactly clear or focused. A privatisation culture can also upset priorities and introduce a careless, high-risk society. For instance, if health services are privatised, the best health care would be available to those who can afford them but not necessarily to those who need them. Those who do not have money do not make the ‘demand’ of the market. Privatisation displaces real ‘need’ with market ‘demand’. Situation of the Family (a) While there are a number of family- centred action programmes in place, they are hardly commensurate with the kind of stress the family is exposed to today. Housing for the poor labouring community is not a priority for the government and studies show its poor performance in the area, hardly meeting the demand for low-cost housing. Housing for the poor is also much too politicised. In addition, living space management within low-cost housing does not allow for a comfortable habitable space for an extended family, which indirectly encourages neglect of the older generation, and indirectly contributes to neglect of children in families where both husband and wife are working. (b) Working hours are long, with the result that breadwinners spend long hours in the economy and do not have the opportunity of spending quality time at home.Apoorly protected post-retirement period, poorly regulated retrenchment, unemployment particularly not of one’s own making, poorly protected workers in the informal sector, absence of unemployment benefits and the need for a double job to \"make ends meet\" all put major stresses on the family. 79

Labour and Social Development in Malaysia into social development, which will eventually contribute to a sustainable and dynamic economy. Crisis, Ad Hocism and One-time Dispensation Approach The labouring community needs support during times of crisis – natural or socio-economic or sociopolitical or a combination of these – which are not of their making but which results from the growth model on which the economy is based. While Malaysia has promoted some social protection programmes, it has neither institutionalised social protection of the labouring community nor set up a stable ‘crisis-response’ mechanism during crisis times. The career of the recently set-up National Economic Recovery Plan, a part of the National Economic Action Council (NEAC), to deal with the impact of the 1997 financial crisis needs to be seen for its long-term applicability, given the periodic crisis tendency of the present model of growth. The available social protection is only part of an ad hoc package and it follows a ‘one-time dispensation’ approach. This is categorically not a good practice. Tripartism? Tripartism is supposed to be the main process through which the workers, employers and government are to resolve their differences and promote co-operation for mutual benefit, growth and development. Tripartism should involve the three stakeholders – the government, the employers and the workers – meeting and negotiating their differences on an equal footing. This is hardly so in Malaysia. Consider EPF for instance. It is the money accumulated from the contributions of employers and workers. The government’s role is only one of trusteeship and regulatory oversight. However, in the real dispensation of the Employee’s Provident Fund (EPF), the government gets undue privilege. In an atmosphere of poor and questionable transparency, government actions in the use of the funds do not really benefit the labouring community. This has been one of the major concerns of MTUC. The funds have * See http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2002/cpi2002.en.html. March 2004. ** See http://www.attac.org/fra/orga/doc/ngls.htm. December 2001. 80