Mayon v. San Francisco 2018

tests are met can we find that a Fourth Amendment interest has beenviolated. In this case, several factors indicate that Sandoval had asubjective expectation of privacy. First, the tent was located in an area thatwas heavily covered by vegetation and virtually impenetrable. Second, themakeshift tent was closed on all four sides, and the bottle could not beseen from outside. Third, Sandoval left a prescription medicine bottleinside the tent; a person who lacked a subjective expectation of privacywould likely not leave such an item lying around. The governmentcounters that Sandoval could not have had a subjective expectation ofprivacy because he was growing marijuana illegally and was notauthorized to camp on BLM land. However, we have previously rejectedthe argument that a person lacks a subjective expectation of privacysimply because he is engaged in illegal activity or could have expected thepolice to intrude on his privacy. See United States v. Gooch, 6 F.3d 673,677 (9th Cir. 1993) 'According to this view, no lawbreaker would have asubjective expectation of privacy in any place because the expectation ofarrest is always imminent.' Id. Sandoval's expectation of privacy was alsoobjectively reasonable. In LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d (9th Cir. 1985), weheld that a person can have an objectively reasonable expectation ofprivacy in a tent on private property. In Gooch, 6 F.3d at 677, we extendedthat holding to find a reasonable expectation of privacy in a tent on apublic campground. Here, the tent was located on BLM land, not on apublic campground, and it is unclear whether Sandoval had permission tobe there. However, we do not believe the reasonableness of Sandoval'sexpectation of privacy turns on whether he had permission to camp onpublic land. Such a distinction would mean that a camper who overstayedhis permit in a public campground would lose his Fourth Amendmentrights, while his neighbor, whose permit had not expired, would retainthose rights. We note that in Zimmerman v. Bishop Estate (9th Cir. 1993),this court held that a squatter in a residential home did not have anobjectively reasonable expectation of privacy because he had no legalMayon v. San Francisco 51 Civil Rights Complaint

right to occupy the home. However, we find Zimmerman distinguishable on two grounds. First, camping on public land, even without permission, is far different from squatting in a private residence. A private residence is easily identifiable and clearly off-limits, whereas public land is often unmarked and may appear to be open to camping. Thus, we think it much more likely that society would recognize an expectation of privacy for the camper on public land than for the squatter in a private residence.” United States v. Sandoval, 200 F.3d 659, 660-61 (9th Cir. 2000)The Colorado State Supreme Court thoroughly dissected privacy in a tent in: “Here, the district court found that Schafer was not in trespass because he was using his tent for camping on unimproved, publicly accessible land which was neither fenced nor posted, and he enjoyed a license or privilege to do so. The Fourth Amendment \"protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public... is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.\" Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). Whether pitched on vacant open land or in a crowded campground, a tent screens the inhabitant therein from public view. Though it cannot be secured by a deadbolt and easily may be entered by those who respect not others, the thin walls of a tent nonetheless are notice of its occupant's claim to privacy unless consent to enter be asked and given. One should be free to depart the campsite for the day's adventure without fear of this expectation of privacy being violated. Whether of short or longer term duration, one's occupation of a tent is entitled to equivalent protection from unreasonable government intrusion as that afforded to homes or hotel rooms. See United States v. Gooch, 6 F.3d 673, 677 (9th Cir. 1993) (reasonable expectation of privacy existed for tent on state campground); Alward v. State, 912 P.2d 243, 249 (Nev. 1996) (person has reasonable expectation of privacy in tent while camping on BLM land). People v. Schafer 946 P.2d 938 (Colo. 1997)Mayon v. San Francisco 52 Civil Rights Complaint

63. Privacy rights during motel occupancy (in the perimeter of the warrantless search): “This court explicitly rejected the principle that criminality undermines privacy expectations in United States v. Washington, holding: 'the notion that drug use or illegal activity eviscerates any right to challenge a search cannot possibly be sustained. A criminal may assert a violation of the Fourth Amendment just as well as a saint.” 573 F.3d 279, 283–84 (6th Cir. 2009). At oral argument, the government suggested that society accepts a celebrity’s hotel registration under an assumed name to avoid the paparazzi, but insisted that society would reject the Domenech brothers’ use of an alias because it hides their illegal activity. Yet Washington holds that “the use of a space for illegal activity does not alter the privacy expectations of a person who would otherwise have” a reasonable expectation. 573 F.3d at 283. United States v. Domenech, The D.C. Circuit focused on the relationship of self-registration to one’s expectation of privacy in a hotel room in United States v. Lyons, where “a key to the room that had Nos. 08-1220/1221 United States v. Domenech, et al. Page 5 been rented on [the defendant’s] behalf was given to him by a third party (whose identity remains secret)” 706 F.2d 321, 324 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The court held that one can possess a reasonable privacy expectation—even though lacking a legally enforceable contract or property right to the room—because “each [guest] regards the space provided for him as his temporary place of abode.” Id. at 327; see also Washington, 573 F.3d at 283 n.1 (“A person may acquire a reasonable expectation of privacy in property in which he has neither ownership nor any other legal interest.”). See United States v. Cunag, 386 F.3d 888, 895 (9th Cir. 2004) (occupant of fraudulently obtained hotel room had expectation of privacy until hotel took affirmative steps to repossess the room); see also Allen, 106 F.3d at 699 (occupant with insufficient funds possessed expectation of privacy until locked out); Washington, 573 F.3d at 284–85 (apartment tenant in violation of lease maintained expectation of privacy because landlord did not evict him); United States v. McClendon, 86 F. 95–96 (6th Cir. 2004) (invalid sublet in violation of lease insufficient to render expectation unreasonable) United States v. Domenech, 623 F.3d 325 (6th Cir. 2010)Mayon v. San Francisco 53 Civil Rights Complaint

64. Plaintiffs show photos (EXHIBIT K) of the home they were living in (and still live in)when S.F.M.T.A. 7.2.54 took effect July 15, 2013 showing “most of the privacycharacteristics of a house”. The book and website are full of home photos. Their socialmedia is full of home photos. Because plaintiffs are a GRT couple, and per tradition, maketheir home in a vehicle, theirs was deemed, at some unknown point, by some unknownforce, to be an “illegal” home, thus the City-Defendant justifies as constitutional: “all invasions on the part of the government, and its employees, of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.” Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)65. A vehicle-home has sheltered them sufficiently that they could raise five children (twobecame Marines), as well as the writing of several books and keeping a chronically-illhusband going for more than two decades. How bad an environment can it be? Why has itbeen deemed an “illegal” home? Should this court find that fundamental rights that arebeing threatened by these parking ordinances, that puts the onus onto the City to explainexactly what is the compelling state interest that justifies this intrusion. Privacy issues hingeon two things: plaintiffs' subjective expectation and society's agreement that plaintiff has aright to thinking that way. If motorhome is in a paid-for RV park, then there is no questionthat the marital privacy wouldn't be raided, much less discussed like the price of eggs in themarketplace. Once the motorhome is in the public realm, that changes. However, usedoesn't change. There exists a reasonable expectation of privacy created to protect theperson, and not just the place when Justice Harlan, concurred with the majority: “I join the opinion of the Court, which I read to hold only (a) that an enclosed telephone booth is an area where, like a home, Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652, and unlike a field, Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 44 S.Ct. 445, 68 L.Ed. 898, a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy; (b) that electronic as well as physical intrusion into a place that is in this sense private may constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment; and (c) that the invasion of a constitutionally protected area by federal authorities is, as the Court has long held, presumptively unreasonableMayon v. San Francisco 54 Civil Rights Complaint

in the absence of a search warrant. As the Court's opinion states, 'the FourthAmendment protects people, not places.' The question, however, is whatprotection it affords to those people. Generally, as here, the answer to thatquestion requires reference to a 'place.' My understanding of the rule that hasemerged from prior decisions is that there is a two-fold requirement: first, that aperson have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second,that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'Thus a man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, butobjects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the 'plain view' of outsidersare not 'protected' because no intention to keep them to himself has beenexhibited.” Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 347 (1967) WHAT MAKES A VEHICLE INTO A HOME?66. This is directly from the “Real Estate Acquisition Guide For Local Public Agencies 49 C.F.R. Part 24 – Subpart A – General (#17 refers to RVs being residences): § 24.1 The purpose of this part is to promulgate rules to implement the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, as amended (42 U.S.C. 4601 et seq.) (Uniform Act), in accordance with the following objectives: (a) To ensure that owners of real property to be acquired for Federal and federally-assisted projects are treated fairly and consistently, to encourage and expedite acquisition by agreements with such owners, to minimize litigation and relieve congestion in the courts, and to promote public confidence in Federal and federally-assisted land acquisition programs; (b) To ensure that persons displaced as a direct result of Federal or federally- assisted projects are treated fairly, consistently, and equitably so that such displaced persons will not suffer disproportionate injuries as a result of projects designed for the benefit of the public as a whole; and (c) To ensure that Agencies implement these regulations in a manner that is efficient and cost effective.Mayon v. San Francisco 55 Civil Rights Complaint

§ 24.2 Definitions and acronyms. (a) Definitions. Unless otherwise noted, the following terms used in this part shall be understood as defined in this section:(8) Decent, safe, and sanitary dwelling. The term decent, safe, and sanitarydwelling means a dwelling which meets local housing and occupancy codes.However, any of the following standards which are not met by the local codeshall apply unless waived for good cause by the Federal Agency funding theproject. The dwelling shall:(i) Be structurally sound, weather-tight, and in good repair;(ii) Contain a safe electrical wiring system adequate for lighting and otherdevices;(iii) Contain a heating system capable of sustaining a healthful temperature (ofapproximately 70 degrees) for a displaced person, except in those areas wherelocal climatic conditions do not require such a system;(iv) Be adequate in size with respect to the number of rooms and area of livingspace needed to accommodate the displaced person. The number of personsoccupying each habitable room used for sleeping purposes shall not exceed thatpermitted by local housing codes or, in the absence of local codes, the policies ofthe displacing Agency. In addition, the displacing Agency shall follow therequirements for separate bedrooms for children of the opposite gender includedin local housing codes or in the absence of local codes, the policies of suchAgencies;(v) There shall be a separate, well lighted and ventilated bathroom that providesprivacy to the user and contains a sink, bathtub or shower stall, and a toilet, all ingood working order and properly connected to appropriate sources of water andto a sewage drainage system. In the case of a housekeeping dwelling, there shallbe a kitchen area that contains a fully usable sink, properly connected to potablehot and cold water and to a sewage drainage system, and adequate space andutility service connections for a stove and refrigerator;(vi) Contains unobstructed egress to safe, open space at ground level; and(vii) For a displaced person with a disability, be free of any barriers which wouldMayon v. San Francisco 56 Civil Rights Complaint

preclude reasonable ingress, egress, or use of the dwelling by such displaced person. (See appendix A, §24.2(a)(8)(vii).) (10) Dwelling. The term dwelling means the place of permanent or customary and usual residence of a person, according to local custom or law, including a single family house; a single family unit in a two-family, multi-family, or multi- purpose property; a unit of a condominium or cooperative housing project; a non-housekeeping unit; a mobile home; or any other residential unit. (11) Dwelling site. The term dwelling site means a land area that is typical in size for similar dwellings located in the same neighborhood or rural area. (See appendix A, §24.2(a)(11).) (17) Mobile home. The term mobile home includes manufactured homes and recreational vehicles used as residences (appendix A, §24.2(a)(17)). https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/real_estate/uniform_act/program_administration/lpa_ guide/ch13.cfmThat would seem to a clear indication that RVs are endowed with legal protections affordedall homesteads. Thus, the actions of the City in their enactment of a policy of running RV-dwellers out of the community is unconstitutional and flatly prohibited under law. When theCarney Court described a motorhome having “most of the privacy characteristics of ahouse”', what does that even mean if there is no curtilage, no front yard, no fence-line, and nodrive-way? For the purpose of a warrantless search, Carney negates privacy, but an analysisof what it is in a vehicle that makes it a home lies in the dissent by Justice Stevens: “Premature resolution of the novel question presented has stunted the natural growth and refinement of alternative principles. Despite age of automobile exception and the countless cases in which it has been applied, we have no prior cases defining the contours of a reasonable search in the context of hybrids such as motorhomes, house trailers, houseboats, and yachts. In this case the Court can barely glimpse the diverse lifestyles associated with recreational vehicles and mobile living quarters. The line or lines separating mobile homes from permanent structures might have been drawn in various ways with consideration given to whether the home is moving or at rest, whether it rests on land or water, the form of the vehicles attachment to itsMayon v. San Francisco 57 Civil Rights Complaint

location, its potential speed of departure, its size and capacity to serve as a domicile and its method of locomotion. Rational decision-making strongly counsels against driving the uses and abuses of the vehicles in the vacuum of the first case raising the question before us. Motorhomes, by their common use & construction, afford their owners a substantial and legitimate expectation of privacy when they dwell within. Unlike a brick bungalow or a frame Victorian, a motorhome seldom serves as a permanent lifetime abode. The motorhome in this case, however, was designed to accommodate a breadth of ordinary everyday living. Photographs in the record indicate its height, length, and beam provided substantial living space inside: stuffed chairs surround a table, cupboards provide room for storage of personal effects, bunk beds provide sleeping space, and a refrigerator provides ample space for food and beverages. Moreover, curtains and large, opaque walls inhibit viewing the activities inside from the exterior of the vehicle.” California v Carney 471 U.S. 386 (1985)67. Some other sample definitions of what defines a home and exactly how a court comesto regard unusual abodes to come under the protection of bankruptcy laws and othergovernment causes to define “home” more broadly than the City-Defendant:§ 50044 CALIFORNIA CODE OF REGULATIONS Title 22 Social Security Division 3.Health Care Services Subdivision 1. California Medical Assistance Program Chapter 2.Determination of Medi-Cal Eligibility and Share of Cost Article 1. Definitions,Abbreviations and Program Terms (Refs & Annos) 613-1F The CDHS has defined a \"home\" as real or personal property, fixed ormobile located on land or water, in which a person or family lives.68. In a case involving whether a California veteran should have a particular piece ofproperty treated as the veteran's home, the Court of Appeals discussed the issue: \"The word 'home' is defined in the dictionary as: '(T)he house and grounds with their appurtenances habitually occupied by a family; one's principal place of residence; DOMICILE.' (Webster's Third New International Dict. 1971,Mayon v. San Francisco 58 Civil Rights Complaint

G. & C. Merriam Co.) \"Home\", def. la, p. 1082. The word home is '[a] relative term, whose meaning must often necessarily depend on the intent as determined by the context; and which may be, and is, often used in different sense… a dwelling house, or dwelling place; a household; the house in which one lives, especially the house in which one lives with his family; the habitual abode of one's family; the place of constant or permanent residence; the place in which, when weary, one can go and rest; the place where one and his family habitually dwell, which they may leave for temporary purposes, and to which they return when the occasion for absence no longer exists; the place where one permanently resides, and to which he intends to return when away from it; residence; some permanent abode or residence where the person residing intends to remain.' (40 C.J.S. \"Home,\" pp. 415-419, footnotes omitted.) The concept of a home has traditionally meant the place of constant residence; the seat of one's family life. (See Estate of Baird (1924) 193, Cal, 225, 285, 223 P. 974.) 'Home is the place where a person dwells and which is the center of his domestic, social and civil life.' (Rest. 2d Conf. Of Laws, §12.)\" Nadler v. California Veterans Board (Civ. No. 22437. Court of Appeals of California, Third Appellate District. 1984.)69. In re Mangano, 158 B.R. 532 United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Florida (1993) “In this case … debtors with virtually no property other than the vehicle in which they live … Here, there is room for judicial discretion within the confines of Bankruptcy Code, Florida Statutes and Florida Constitution. The Court exercises discretion by interpreting the law to allow the Debtors a home-stead exemption for their vehicle dwelling. A liberal construction mandates that the Court focus more on the use of the Sports Coach than its design or size. Here, the Debtors are using the Sports Coach as their home. They live in it and have no other residence. They pay rent to the park in which the Sports Coach sits, and that park provides it with electricity, water, and sanitary waste removal. They do not drive the Sports Coach and legally could not drive it since it has no current license plate or registration. In effect, theyMayon v. San Francisco 59 Civil Rights Complaint

use it as a 'mobile home,' not a 'motor home.' Based on its intended and actual use, the Court finds that the Sports Coach is, in effect, a mobile home which may be exempted as their homestead under Florida law.”70. In re Meola, 158 B.R. 881 United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Florida. (1993) “This case presents an issue of first impression in Florida: whether a travel trailer qualifies as an exempt homestead. There being no question that the trailer home is Mr. Meola's only residence, the issue to be decided is whether his trailer is a \"dwelling house\" within the meaning of the above passage. Clearly, the state legislature's purpose in enacting the homestead exemption was to secure for the householder a home for himself and his family — regardless of his financial condition. Although this appears to be a question of first impression in Florida, the Court's decision is not totally without precedent. In re Scudder, 97 B.R. 617 (Bankr. S.D. Ala.1989), the Court construed an exemption statute [158 B.R. 883] much like that in issue here and concluded that a houseboat, completely equipped for living on board and the debtor's principal place of residence, qualified as a homestead under Alabama law. In re Laube, 152 B.R. 260 (Bankr. W.D.Wisconsin 1993), the Court concluded that a semi-truck cab was a \"dwelling\" so as to qualify as an exempt homestead where the owner clearly resided in his cab tractor and had resided there five or six nights per week, ate, visited with friends, and the owner's testimony clearly established his intent to maintain his truck cab as his homestead. Moreover, Mr. Meola's trailer home, unlike the debtor's dwelling in Laube, has bathroom and cooking facilities. Based on the foregoing discussion, the Court finds that the Debtor's travel trailer is a homestead within the meaning of Fla. Stat. § 222.05. As such, the Debtor may claim a homestead exemption in the travel trailer.”71. In re Laube 260 (Bankr. W.D.Wisconsin 1993) “Wisconsin has a public policy of protecting the homestead exemption and homestead statutes have enjoyed particularly liberal construction. Matter of Neis, 723 F.2d 584, 587 (7th Cir.1983) (citing Schwanz v. Teper, 66 Wis.2d 157, 223 N.W.2d 896 (1974)).Mayon v. San Francisco 60 Civil Rights Complaint

As stated by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, \"homestead statutes are remediallegislation and, as such, [152 B.R. 262] are to be liberally construed in favor ofthe debtor.\" State Central Credit Union v. Bigus, 101 Wis.2d 237, 241, 304N.W.2d 148 (Ct. App.1981). Clearly, a truck cab is not a building,condominium, house trailer or cooperative. Furthermore, it is not a mobilehome. Although unquestionably mobile and arguably a home, Laube's truckcab is not a vehicle designed to be towed as a single unit or in sections upon ahighway by a motor vehicle. Is it a \"dwelling\" under § 990.01(14)? The word\"dwelling\" is not defined in the Wisconsin statutes pertaining to the homesteadexemption. In construing words which do not have a peculiar meaning in thelaw, the court is directed to use \"common and approved usage.\" Wis. Stat. §990.01(1). \"What is common and approved can be established by the definitionfrom a recognized dictionary.\" Farm Credit Bank of St. Paul v. Gibson, 155Wis.2d 325, 329, 455 N.W.2d 674 (Ct. App. 1990), review denied 457 N.W.2d324 (1990), (citing Milwaukee County v. DILHR, 80 Wis.2d 445, 450, 259N.W.2d 118, 121 (1977)) In the 1986 unabridged version of Webster's ThirdNew International Dictionary, a \"dwelling\" is \"a building or construction usedfor residence.\" Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 706 (1986). A\"construction\" is \"something built or erected.\" Id. at 489. A 1972 version ofWebster's, which Laube relied on at the hearing, defines a \"dwelling\" as \"abuilding or other shelter in which people live.\" Webster's Seventh NewCollegiate Dictionary 259 (1972). A \"shelter\" is \"something that covers oraffords protection especially from the elements.\" Webster's Third New Int'lDictionary 2093 (1986). The American Heritage Dictionary is even moregenerous in its definition: a \"dwelling\" is \"[a] place to live in; abode.\" AmericanHeritage Dictionary 431 (2d College ed 1982). Rather circularly, an \"abode\" isdefined as \"[a] dwelling place or home.\" Id. at 67. Regardless of the dictionaryused, the term \"dwelling\" appears to be broad enough to include a cab-tractorwhich is used as a primary residence. It is a \"construction\" which providesprotection from the term \"dwelling\" appears to be broad enough to include acab-tractor which is used as a primary residence. It is a \"construction\" whichMayon v. San Francisco 61 Civil Rights Complaint

provides protection from the elements, and is a \"shelter.\" As contemplated bythe definitions of \"dwelling,\" Laube currently resides in his cab-tractor and hasresided there since March 1, 1992. Not only does Laube sleep in his cab-tractorfive or six nights per week, he eats, visits with friends and completes histrucking paperwork there. In addition to the language and the policy ofWisconsin's exemption statute, \"the creation of a homestead is a fact-boundquestion based primarily on a determination of the owner's intent.\" In re Mann,82 B.R. 981, 984 (Bankr. W.D.Wis.1986) (citing Matter of Neis, 723 F.2d 584,589 (7th Cir.1983)). Laube's testimony at the hearing [152 B.R. 263] and hisconduct since March 1, 1992, clearly establishes his intent to maintain his truckcab as his homestead. Other courts have addressed whether nontraditionalresidences may be exempted under the applicable homestead statute. Laube'shomestead exemption is also not defeated by the absence of real estate. Section990.01(14) states that \"`exempt homestead' means the dwelling...and so muchof the land surrounding it as is reasonably necessary for its use as a home, butnot less than 0.25 acres, if available, and not exceeding 40 acres \" Wis. Stat. §990.01(14). By allowing an exemption in \"so much of the land...as isreasonably necessary for its use as a home,\" Wisconsin recognizes that debtorsmay claim a homestead exemption despite not owning any real estate. Laube'scab-tractor does not require any realty for its use as a home. Section 990.01(14)does not require that the homestead be connected to realty. The trustee arguesthat Laube's cab is not a homestead because it lacks a bath room and cookingfacilities. It is true that the truck cab is not a totally self-contained livingenvironment. It provides shelter from the elements and a place to sleep and eat.It is equipped with a heater and air conditioning, a bunk bed, a refrigerator, aradio and a television. Moreover, because of the nature of Laube's employmentand life style, bathroom facilities and eating establishments are readily availableto Laube. Although Scudder and McMahon suggest that whether the home is aself-contained living environment may be a factor in the determination thatparticular property is a homestead, nothing in the Wisconsin homestead statutesrequires a dwelling to have bathroom and cooking facilities.” In re Laube (152Mayon v. San Francisco 62 Civil Rights Complaint

B.R. 260 (1993) United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Wisconsin. California courts have similarly construed a requirement of actual residence in analogous contexts. For example, the law has long protected a \"home\" from loss through execution by creditors by permitting the debtor to declare a homestead. \"The [Homestead] Act is founded upon the idea that it is good for the general welfare that every family should have a home, a place to abide in, a castle, where it can find shelter from financial disasters and protection against the pursuit of creditors who have given credit with the full knowledge that they cannot cross its threshold.\" (Gregg v. Bostwick (1867) 33 Cal. 220, 228.) And while the homestead law has been liberally construed to effect its purpose, the requirement of actual residence has been strictly construed. (Ibid) … Physical occupancy is insufficient in itself to establish actual residency. (See Johnston v. DeBock (1926) 198 Cal. 177, 181 [244 P. 330].) Such occupancy must be accompanied by a bona fide intention to make the place the home. (Lakas v. Archambault (1918) 38 Cal. App. 365, 373 [176 P. 180])... The home is the center of domestic, social and civil life: the principal place of residence.... fn. The California homestead provisions allow a person or family to preserve a home from execution by creditors by filing a homestead declaration, provided that the property is the actual residence of the declarant. See Rich v. Ervin (1948) 86 Cal. App.2d 386, 390-391 [194 P.2d 809] See Nadler v. California Veterans Board [Civ. No. 22437. Court of Appeals of California, Third Appellate District. March 1, 1984.] PARENT-CHILD BOND COMPLETELY DISREGARDED ON TWO SEPERATE LEGAL OCCASIONS DUE TO HOUSING STATUS72. The plaintiffs' marital privacy is not the only intimate bond mangled by these parkingordinances produced by the City's “custom, policy or practice” to drive out the vehicle-dwellers. Plaintiffs met in Trinity, Texas on May 31, 1993 and were immediately married.Prior to this, Mrs. Mayon had been living on wheels full-time on the road, per heritage andlifelong nomadism. Mr. Mayon joined her lifestyle, which was traveling from region toMayon v. San Francisco 63 Civil Rights Complaint

region of the National Forest and Park systems, particularly the more primitive locations,living in tents while exploring nature intensively. 1992 through 1996, they toured the deepSouth, the Ozarks, Florida, Texas, and the mid-west. Mrs. Mayon had four (home-schooled)children when the couple met. Their mutual son was born on his grandfather's land in southLouisiana on March 8, 1996. The plaintiffs purchased a 1979 Bluebird school-bus andconverted it into a home. They returned to the road, headed west, on Aug 14, 1996 in acontinuation of their lifestyle, which had been going on before the birth of the final child, whois the subject of the two (of the 3) issues about to be discussed. He was 4-months-old whenhe (and his 4 siblings + 2 parents) began living in the school bus and left the Louisiana bayou.They spent a few weeks in the Santa Fe, New Mexico National Forest and then proceeded tothe West Coast by way of Malibu, intending to travel up the entire stretch of Highway 1 toCanada. The last actual nature reserve visited by the plaintiffs was just past San Simeon,where they parked, without incident for several months, alongside the beach highway (inplain view of Hearst Castle) watching the seals come to shore to birth and raise their newbornpups. Thus, plaintiffs intentionally sought after, attained and sustained a nomadic lifestyle,enjoying it full-time until their arrival in San Francisco mid-1997.73. Shortly after arriving in San Francisco, the traveling stopped because Mr. Mayonbecame gravely ill and was diagnosed with chronic Hep. C. The decision was made toreturn to Mr. Mayon's family property in Louisiana, due to his health issues. Plaintiffsattempted to leave the City a few days after their Nov 14, 1997 wedding (which had beentheir goal upon leaving Louisiana: a private wedding in Golden Gate Park), intending to beback home by Christmas, but the clutch on their school-bus completely failed as they wereabout to cross the bridge into Oakland. Instead, they crippled off into an industrial areaknown then as China Basin. That same week, Mrs Mayon met the chairman of theFirefighters' Toy Program. Dec 18, 1997, coincidentally also Mr. Mayon's birthday, theplaintiffs' school-bus engine unexpectedly blew up. Note that it had only been a clutchproblem that derailed the journey home shortly before Thanksgiving 1997, and plaintiffswere awaiting funds for that repair and only that repair, when the engine itself blew up, oddlyenough on a flat stretch of road after running ten minutes, and having previously been in finecondition; it caught on fire (as Mrs. Mayon's journal entry from that day can attest). It wasMayon v. San Francisco 64 Civil Rights Complaint

arranged by the firefighters for the plaintiffs' to appear on the Fox 2 News, which led to anoutpouring of community support, both in-person as well as letters and donations, whichwere unfortunately channeled through the firefighters' local and as such, the matter becomesenclosed in Mayon v. I.A.F.F. local #798 et al, #300155 San Francisco Superior Court,settled out of court w/ SF attorney Stephen Bovarnick. One of the causes of action in thatlawsuit was the subsequent sabotage of the new engine purchased with donations. The repairof the second engine, done by Mr. Mayon due to not a single mechanic in the City willing towork for him at any cost, altogether would take six months to complete while the kids wereforced to endure urban hell in an industrial area, the exact opposite of their formerwilderness lifestyle, not to mention the rural home in Louisiana. They continued to livecomfortably aboard their school-bus, even in these most wretched of circumstance.74. On April 26, 1998, plaintiffs made their first attempt to report fire dept. activities andtheir missing mail to the police department. Within a few hours, three reports were made toChildren's Protective Services (CPS). First reporter was the late chairman & firefighter, whowould eventually be named in the above-stated litigation ~ i.e. affirmed racketeering because#1) theft of mail under colour of authority; #2) plenty of documented intimidation, includingfire to home; #3) financial interests; #4) plaintiffs accused of crimes & things that wouldaffect their reputation; #5) state lines involved ~ lawsuit filed by the plaintiffs in Dec 1998,settled out-of-court July 6/12, 1999. The Family Court's orders were obtained due to City-Defendant's concerns about the plaintiffs (with exact words of the chairman used as a chargeof neglect) and meant family could not leave San Francisco nor continue to home-school.They did however continue to “sustain their alternative lifestyle”. At the end of three yearsof scrutiny under CPS's microscope, the case closed. This action used federal money over athree year/three-trial period, because the City-Defendant found it necessary to keep thefamily in San Francisco jurisdiction with a petition (granted) for legal custody of the in-homeorder to continue to observe the family “due to your family’s nomadic propensities, this in-home dependency is necessary.” (EXHIBIT L) If plaintiff Ramona Mayon had any legalchops, this would be a qui tam filing. Instead, in 2004, she filed a basic complaint in federalcourt (dismissed without prejudice) shortly before the statute of limitations ran out on chainconspiracy should anyone want to toll time. All she asks here is to show statements by CPS.Mayon v. San Francisco 65 Civil Rights Complaint

75. The City-Defendant's agents made numerous written, specific comments andstatements about their opinion of the plaintiffs' “alternative lifestyle” (EXHIBIT M).Plaintiffs firmly state for the record that at no time did they ever lose PHYSICAL custody oftheir children ~ ~ ~ only LEGAL custody ~ ~ ~ not through three years with three, full-length trials (once again highlighting they were demanded by plaintiffs). Although City-Defendant tried hard, they never succeeded in getting the family off the school bus; however,the plaintiffs were forced to submit to regular acts of invasion into the privacy of the home.Beyond refusing to leave their school bus home, the only other thing plaintiffs successfullyresisted (1998 thru 2001) was refusing to comply with the City’s demand that they, as afamily, and individually, all submit to therapy. Being made to stay in San Francisco by liesand threats was bad enough, but no way was any “therapy” happening. One visit each is all.76. The sole purpose of disclosing this long-ago settlement is to justify why the plaintiffswere legally unable to leave the City of San Francisco July 7, 1998 until June 21, 2001 and itwas foundational to their decision to not return to their fully-nomadic lifestyle after June2001 closed the case out with this sentence: “There have been no actual CPS concerns orissues since the initial opening of the case (began April 1998)”. Plaintiffs' italics. Thesubsequent acts of perjury led to a pattern of behavior based on the bias as described in thiscause of action. Other than that, plaintiffs will not burden this honourable Court with the oldcase between themselves and the City-Defendant, except to prove the statements made byCity agents about the GRT lifestyle included sufficient perjury, tampering and manufacturingof evidence used to convince the (State) court to deny the family the right to travel for threeyears (EXHIBIT N).77. Plaintiff Mrs. Mayon produced a website on May 10, 2010 (although only on 7.1.16did she publish it as a paper-bound book on Amazon + eBook download site, which wasimmediately pirated by “Playster” and pending litigation): Collected Letters from the Abyssin which Mrs. Mayon uses over 700 pieces of the City-Defendant's hard paper to documentover 48 examples of perjury; tampering/suppression/ manufacturing of evidence; terroristicthreat and outright spying on the progress of the 1998-1999 racketeering lawsuit with thefirefighters' union. Again, it may be of some passing interest to this court that the two deputyMayon v. San Francisco 66 Civil Rights Complaint

City Attorneys for Louise Renne, in charge of this obviously hard-fought custody battle withthree full trials: CCSF v. Mayon #JD98-3233/JD99-3048/JD99-3049 with trial #1 and #2led by Katherine Feinstein, now a retired judge of the San Francisco Superior Court anddaughter of Senator Dianne Feinstein and trial #3 was held in spite of the several documentsfrom the Children's Protective Service's stating “no actual CPS concerns or issues with thisfamily” - - - obviously it was bias against the GRT status at play - - - in charge of this bigotrywas Kamala Harris, who by the time this is filed, will be the new jr. Senator of Californiaand earmarked in the media on path to the White House. Self-publishing a paper-boundmanuscript of the definitive proof of the perjury, etc. from 1997 – 2001 in light of said(successful) lawsuit against a powerful public employee union is the plaintiffs' instinctiveself-implementation of the Sunshine Act. When people lie about you in court, you areallowed to tell the truth about them in public. Plaintiff Greg Mayon was accused of the mostvile conduct possible for a man to endure. The fact that he was not in any way removed fromthe family and had unfettered access to the younger daughter speaks volumes (legally).A subtle point: Kamala Harris made the unusual step of downsizing her career as a head ofcriminal prosecutors to become head of CPS prosecution in August 2000, taking over fromKatherine Feinstein (who left to be a judge on SF Family Court). An arrest warrant wasissued same month alleging family had somehow vanished. Immediately rescinded when theschool reported kids were there as required by court order to be. Her specialty at herprevious posts had been child sex crimes. She would have been more attuned to the issuethan most people. Not a murmur about molestation. In the third trial of 2001, the issue wastheir 1st son had run away from home and City-Defendant felt the schoolbus/home was soinsufficient and unfit, that they shielded the errant child from his parents' natural authoritywhen he had committed a childish misdeed. At the age of 12, he had gotten off a bus onMasonic and Fulton where there is a serious incline, allowed his two younger siblings to puton roller blades that they were returning to an adult at the school because they were notallowed to have them. The boy was denied a trip to Disneyland as punishment and endured aperiod of less than an hour on his knees (with pillow). No corporal punishment. Withindays, the boy was living with a family friend. Mrs. Mayon invoked the ICWA (Indian ChildWelfare Act), successful due to City-Defendant's pre-existing knowledge of the presence of a“possible Indian child” three years earlier. Family court transferred the boy to his bio-fatherMayon v. San Francisco 67 Civil Rights Complaint

in Texas. Mrs. Mayon has seen her son only once since the transfer of custody, in spite of hisreturn to California after serving in the Marines. “Simply because of a decision of a parent … involves risks, does not automatically transfer the power to make that decision to some agency, or officer of the state.” Parham v. J.R. 422 U.S. 584 (1979)78. The plaintiffs decided to remain here because of the chance of having another CPSagency take the fraudulent file to finish off the job started by San Francisco City Attorney'soffice July 1998. Proof is the final social worker that closed the case June 2001, ShermaBrooks' unnecessary call ahead to Children's Protective Services in Lafayette, Louisiana(EXHIBIT O) where the plaintiffs' family resides. This was malice and is at the root of theplaintiffs' decision to remain in San Francisco, even in light of SFPD 97 and the hatred forthe vehicle-dweller. Plaintiffs continued to live as vehicle-dwellers, on the same beachand/or inside Golden Gate Park for a further twelve years without one single incident or callto CPS. The old fire dept. case brought to light with this litigation is presented as a frame forWHY the plaintiffs had no choice to remain in San Francisco rather than return to Louisiana.79. The family passed three-year observation period and inform this honorable court thatthe CPS final reports (EXHIBIT P) stated “there have been no actual CPS issues since theinitial opening of this case”; nonetheless a third trial was held. Without need or request by theCPS, a child of an ethnic GRT family was transferred to an outsider. Plaintiffs refer to thesecond child of the household, helped like his older sister, by the City-Defendant to run away.The first child left and went straight into the care of the City. Fair enough, she was 17. Butin the second case, the child had been groomed to leave home by a family friend, who hadbeen facilitating an illicit relationship with his sister. The seeking out of an older, belovedsibling was not the problem. The minor had never been forbidden to see his sister. The issuewas the secrecy. It is a well-known trait of a sociopath, grooming a child for sexual purposeswhen the adult and the child engage in any behavior that requires the child to have a hiddenpart of his life is always a signal something is amiss. It eviscerates the child's character andis unconscionable for any one to do that to a parent-child relationship. To give the boy intothe care of this person, and to pay her foster care stipends, which she gave to the boy (and heMayon v. San Francisco 68 Civil Rights Complaint

in turn bragged to his siblings who were still have to go to the same school – where everyoneknew he had run away because he “hated living in a school bus”) was completelyunacceptable to the plaintiffs, who resisted vigorously, forcing yet another trial with the City-Defendant. Once again plaintiffs inform that all three trials (1998 thru 2001) were insistedupon by themselves, because they refused to willingly submit their family to this illegalexamination. Only the guilty submit passively to their punishment. Rather than run from it,plaintiffs embraced it. Programs. Even psych evals – three days of tests with5-hour home interviews by a psychotherapist. Sealed and waiting in the case file for anyonewith the power to demand it, but otherwise to be forever unseen. Plaintiff Ramona Mayonrefused to allow any of her children or herself to be forced into therapy. On the other hand,plaintiff Greg Mayon consistently offered to be tested but no one ever asked that of him, oreven controlled his access to the children, even though he had been accused by the oldest girlof sexual impropriety. At no time was Mr. Mayon restricted from the children or sent tocounseling. This was an issue on paper only and was meant to ruin the plaintiffs' reputation.These are the kind of allegations that any other CPS agency would have been delighted toreceive. There was literally no point in traveling with the children, knowing these files areloaded, ready and waiting to be used at anytime.80. Successfully prosecuted parents are forever inserted into a monster data bank listingthem for restriction in their access to certain types of jobs or in another custody fight. Beforethis court decides on whether or not to consider this controversial evidence line showing theCity-Defendant's written statements about the plaintiffs' family life, please note that plaintiffRamona Mayon completed the State appeal all the way to California's Supreme Court, to bedenied en banc. This was done by herself, most inadequately, since the state-paid appealsattorney refused to complete the process at the final stage. When a new mayor took overfrom Willie Brown, plaintiffs filed a poorly-written brief to the federal court, laying out theirevidence (2004). Showing their proof, yet maintaining silence, so their young children couldhave a simple childhood, even if it had to be an urban one. Plaintiffs have no intent ofanything except to show this court the City-Defendant's written statements showing bigotryabout the plaintiffs “nomadic propensities”, in light of dozens of lies and threats. Privacy soutterly destroyed has ship-wrecked the family in a way words can't convey.Mayon v. San Francisco 69 Civil Rights Complaint

81. Three years under CPS microscope, brought about by documented fraud (EXHIBIT N)produced in the plaintiffs an understanding of an insidious prejudice against vehicle-dwellerscodified by a “policy, pattern and practice”. “If a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the parents and their children, without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children's best interest, I should have little doubt that the State would have intruded impermissibly on 'the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.'” Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977) (Justice Stewart concurring).82. Plaintiffs are now somewhat educated enough to understand they are in the position toask that fundamental question: did the City Attorney actually have the authority to take thattime from the plaintiffs' lives? It stemmed from the “pattern and practice” of discriminatingagainst vehicle-dwellers. It was the family's status as nomadic that caused the City-Defendant's confidence that no one would care how they approached the “truth” about thequite-horrific happenings in the (then-concurrent) case with the firefighters' union of theft ofmail and racketeering. Bigotry blinded City Hall. It has blinded a lot of other people too.No doubt that will continue to be an issue for the plaintiffs for the rest of their public life.83. The CPS's truth was that, after three years of trying their best to make something stick,they had no issues. So who had a problem with this family? The City Attorney's office.Who else could it be? Only ones involved. The boy himself went willingly to his biologicalfather in Texas once it was presented to the lower court that plaintiff Ramona Mayon had,three years earlier, at the first juncture of the minor's case, informed CPS of her great-grandmother being a full-blooded Cherokee. Per the Indian Child Welfare Act, only abiological family member or a member of the child's tribe can foster him. Since earliernotification put the onus onto the commissioner himself (federally-speaking), it wasimmediately ordered the biological father in Texas take custody of the by-then-13-year-old.There was no option allowed of the boy coming home to his mother, because of her housingstatus. Status as a family who lived on wheels is all the CPS case was ever about. The liesMayon v. San Francisco 70 Civil Rights Complaint

were merely about their arrogance. All the plaintiffs care about is for this court to seedocumented proof of the City-Defendant's ingrained bigotry-in-action. Their agents aretrained to react to the vehicle-dweller in such a manner. The consequence of such an attitudeis in the quote in EXHIBIT Q (from plaintiff Ramona Mayon's Sept 11, 2002 letter to theCalifornia Supreme Court): Dr. Karl Menniger, highly respected by the mental health field,was the man who pushed I.C.W.A. into existence. He wrote President Jimmy Carter, urginghim to sign the act into law (1978). “I am convinced that this legislation addresses many ofthe serious problems affecting the welfare of Indian children.” Earlier before subcommittee,Menniger spoke directly of the way in which a child's sense of identity is formed. Animportant consideration was the damage that occurred when children were told that their“language is no good [and] when you tell him that their colour is not right or imply it bysurrounding him with people of different colour, habits or status.”84. In news magazine “This Week” (9.4.15): “Traumatic early-life experiences, such asthe loss of a loved one, abuse, and divorce, can make changes in brain structure that increasea child's risk for anxiety or depression later on, according to a new study. Scientists followednearly 500 mothers and their sons from pregnancy until the boys reached adulthood. Themothers answered questions about 37 types of adversity their children faced at home beforeage 6. The mothers also reported symptoms of anxiety or depression their sons developed bythe time they were 7, 10 and 13. Brains scans performed on the boys between 18 and 21suggest that facing more forms of hardship early in life is associated with lower volume inparts of the brain involved in emotion, decision-making, empathy, and self-awareness.'Research suggests that the experiences early in life really matter, especially before the age of5,' said Duke University child development researcher Jamie Hanson.”85. There were two distinct examples of the government interfering with parental custodybased on their own bigoted views about those who live on wheels. The first, as describedabove section, but then again, using some of the same lies in the CPS files, the JuvenileJustice agency in 2011 when plaintiffs’ youngest son got in trouble at age 14. He was sentaway for nearly a year to a group home 45 miles away, on his first offense with multipleexamples of perjury (EXHIBIT R) contributing to this. The plaintiffs and the child himselfMayon v. San Francisco 71 Civil Rights Complaint

were specifically told that this was happening because the home wasn’t stable because it wasin an RV, and therefore it was necessary to house him properly for the sake of hisrehabilitation (EXHIBIT S). That is stigma in action, even though an official definition in theState's DHS manual per the CalWorks regulation on AU-Composition Page: 19 # 076-2 “Under federal regulations, a home is the family setting maintained or in the process of being established, as evidenced by assumption and continuation of responsibility for day-to-day care of the child by the relative with whom the child is living. A home exists so long as the relative exercises responsibility for care and control of the child, even though the child or the relative is temporarily absent from the customary family setting. Within this interpretation, the child is considered to be living with the relative even though he or she is under the jurisdiction of the Court and receiving probation or protective supervision; or legal custody is held by an agency that does not have physical possession of the child.”Except the child is “homeless” because the City-Defendant's official policy is that a vehiclecannot be considered a proper home. The only reason plaintiffs kept their children from CPSwhen they were young, is because plaintiffs openly, vocally, consistently informed the courtof the City-Defendant's errors. The balance of power flipped once the minor committed aserious crime. Plaintiffs understood that, minor understood that. He (and his parents)endured. He served his time. Accepted his punishment. Nonetheless, the bias was wrong.Plaintiff Ramona Mayon appealed to the State Supreme court to argue the placement in agroup home for 9 months (45 miles away) at age 15 was on basis of fraud, but since he hadplead guilty, there was, of course, no jurisdiction. Again, the plaintiffs seek only to submitthe comments from reports re. plaintiffs' inadequate housing. Fraud in the court documentsmust surely allow examination of both old and new additions in an untrue portrayal on paperand in court petitions about the family. Plaintiffs are fully aware that the City-Defendant'sagents can't be held (legally) responsible for anything they write in a document destined for acourtroom. It's just the bias plaintiffs are submitting for this court's examination.Mayon v. San Francisco 72 Civil Rights Complaint

86. Plaintiffs turn to Brown v. Board of Education 347 U.S. 483 (1954) to explain what itmeant to their developing child and later, a teen-ager, when he witnessed being told to leavehis neighborhood because of his housing status, due to his mother being GRT (thus he, too): “To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law, for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development”. Brown v. Board of Education 347 U.S. 483 (1954)87. Within the California Coastal Act, special attention is given to those who go to work inthe coastal zone. For the teen and young adult, going to school is equally important to a jobin importance to one's stability and well-being and sense of hope. In 2013, plaintiffs'youngest son was in his sr. year in high school, difficult enough already due to diagnosed,IEP-certified dyslexia. Plaintiffs bring his school report cards to the Court (EXHIBIT T)showing that his senior year in high school was completely derailed by the city-countydeportation. He went from B's and C's to a flat F. He quit the football team. He wouldn'teven try out for the basketball team. He dropped out after being transferred to the downtownschool @ Civic Center. Their son has lived in the Sunset since 1997 and has been deeplyangered to be made to leave “his neighborhood”. This new law deprived the plaintiffs oftheir ability to offer a stable home to their child that he obviously needed to finish highschool from. In simplest terms, in 2013-2014, it caused the family to often had to sleep indifferent parts of the town. To drive back and forth, day in and day out, requires a tremendousamount of gas and time, so plaintiffs would stay in whatever neighborhood they were in thenight before, entire day with nothing to do but be on alert for their child's arrival and nightlyneeds, only to have him, two nights out of three, ignore them, preferring to sleep on a friend'ssofa than ride public transit across town to the new place(s) his family home was “allowed”to be. He refused to accept it was necessary to migrate from Ocean Beach/Sunset where heMayon v. San Francisco 73 Civil Rights Complaint

had lived since he was 18-months-old to the industrial neighborhoods downtown, parkingunder freeway eaves. He compared it to how an “illegal” Guatemalan or Nicaraguan teenagermust feel like when his family gets deported back to the homeland.88. Moreover, his anger towards society exploded in petty vandalism for which he wasimmediately caught (on video no less), like any teenager happily outwitting his slow parents,he all-too-cleverly ensured he couldn't leave San Francisco, due to being on probation.He had wouldn't/couldn't move to the property that Mr. Mayon had rented in Antioch,45 miles away. He also informed his parents he felt they were somehow giving in to thefascism of the vehicle-dweller ordinances. There is probably truth in that. The first yearapart was horrible. In an attempt to keep him in school (sr. year), the plaintiffs would stay inthe city several days a week, all the while paying the rent on the place in the country so as tokeep it for the eventual time when they would permanently move there. Unbeknownst tothem, he had told a girlfriend's mother he had been abandoned by the plaintiffs so the womangave the boy a room in her house. The deception went on for almost the entire 2nd half of theschool year. The family home had become little more than a shell for him, a place where hisbelongings are kept. He was made into a couch-surfer by the City-Defendant's “custom,policy, and practice” during the all-important final year of high school, which he slowlyfailed. Was his education unimportant? Was the GRT parent-child bond so irrelevant? As adirect result of S.F.M.T.A. 7.2.54, his emotional connections with his parents fell away(though not financially, since they continued to pay his monthly phone bill until he becameemployed full-time, and of course, they continued to sent regular sums of money via a sharedreloadable debit card; CARE packages; some clothes; the odd visit or phone call). In the lastyear, he has become a member of a local union and is now married with a newborn son.Nonetheless, that doesn't negate the damage done the relationships sheltered in the vehicle-home. Even now the current visits are not easy or comfortable. But by golly, they are legalbecause the plaintiffs are paying rent. The children can only see their childhood home as thelaw allows them to see it. Bad memories made BECAUSE of their mother's insistence onfollowing her ethnicity. “Why can you can't you be like other moms?” was the frequent,heartbreaking refrain of these children to the plaintiff. It was nothing like that during theearlier five years of their childhood, on the road, in other parts of the country, in other parts ofMayon v. San Francisco 74 Civil Rights Complaint

California. This experience was unique to San Francisco, ground zero for that monumentaleffort to get rid of every last damn school bus, van and hippie living in them, since April1971 when the Board of Supervisors first approved SFPD 97 criminalizing eating andsleeping in a vehicle.89. In 2000-2006, the U.K. conducted the first-ever study of suicide rates among Travellers(both Irish and Scottish; the Roma weren't included in this survey) which showed the suiciderate three to five times higher than the suicide rate of settled people. This is considered, bythe GRT community, to be due to the U.K.’s policy since the late 1980’s to criminalize them(copy available here: http://www.nosp.ie/book.pdf). The group at risk were young men undertwenty-five. But it's not just the individual or his family that gets hurt. You can't set apart agroup of people and hold them up to be second-class citizens and expect it to not have aneffect on them – and society – as a whole. FACIAL CHALLENGE #1 to S.F.P.D. 97 status assignation is the required discriminatory intent90. It lessens the status and human dignity of anyone to use the manner in which they liveto automatically classify them, complete with street signs telling the community that acriminal is present (EXHIBIT U). Plaintiff Ramona Mayon is an ethnic nomad, andmoreover, a lifelong vagabond. She has always self-identified as an American-born ScottishTraveller. She has always traveled. Her home has been on wheels since 1992. And she is acriminal because of WHAT she is, that is her status as a nomad, and not what she does:eating and sleeping in a vehicle after 10 pm per SFPD 97. She is a gypsy, lives in a vehicleand is set apart as a criminal when she enters the borders of most municipalities throughoutthe 9th District. If she had a house across the street to which she had a key, then she wouldhave no status to criminalize.91. It was shown earlier that on Sept 13, 2001 the Homeless Coordinating Board signedoff on an item called the Vehicularly-Housed Bill of Rights (EXHIBIT J). The foundation ofthe violation in each and every cause of action is built on the agreement that plaintiffs' home-Mayon v. San Francisco 75 Civil Rights Complaint

on-wheels is illegal. But how did this happen? It's all in the label: “homeless”. Status.Pesky thing, status. But it's status-assignation that brings the City-Defendant millions ofdollars in block grants that rely only on numbers, not success. The City-Defendant uses aslight-of-hand to gently alter the local definition of homelessness so it includes the GRT andany vehicle they live in. The federal and state definitions use the word 'car'; the City-Defendant supplants that word with 'vehicle'. There's a big difference in the activities thatcan take place in a car and those in an RV with electrical outlets, computers, TVs, storage,multiple bedrooms, bath, fridge, water tanks, and a propane-powered kitchen. The word“car” is also used by the media over and over in their articles, as if to reinforce thexenophobic image of an unknown tramp passing through the neighborhood, as opposed tothe family who lives in a schoolbus on the beach and who's oldest son is in high school,working as a bagger at Safeway, counting the days til he can join the Marines. Yeah, a bigdifference. Yet, year after year the lady from the school district would bring by a form for theplaintiffs' to sign stating they “live in a car” (EXHIBIT V), so they could get free Munipasses for the children in school and a backpack with some notebook paper and pencils in it.That is the sum of what the McKinney-Vento act provides “homeless children”, plus thebasic right to not be denied an education while one's parents chase down paperwork. From May 2002 the Civil Grand Jury report called Homelessness in San Francisco www.sfsuperiorcourt.org/index.aspx/page=231 “The term 'homeless' includes those individuals or families who lacked a fixed, regular and adequate nighttime residence and those who a primary nighttime residence in one or more of the following categories: a shelter, the street, a vehicle, a makeshift structure, doubled-up or in transitional housing.The bi-annual reports titled San Francisco Homeless Point-in-Time Count in 2009 + 2011+ 2013 listed definition of homelessness states a portion of the federal McKinney-VentoAct to define homelessness but it fails to print the paragraph that includes the term thatsays car as opposed to vehicle. The State of California definition of homelessness on the California Dept of Education website @ www.cde.ca.gov/sp/hs/cy The term homeless children and youth (per section the federal McKinney-Vento Homeless Education ActMayon v. San Francisco 76 Civil Rights Complaint

of 2001) means individuals who lack a fixed, regular and adequate nighttime residence; may include: sharing the housing of other persons due to the loss of housing, economic hardship, or a similar reason; may be living in motels, hotels, trailer parks, or camping grounds; shelters, or awaiting foster care placement; primary nighttime residence that is a public or private place not designed for or ordinarily used as regular sleeping accommodations for human beings; who are living in cars, parks, public spaces, abandoned buildings, sub-standard housing, bus or train stations or similar settings. Federal definition of homelessness (42 U.S. Code § 11302) (a) For purposes of the chapter, the term “homeless', “homeless individual” and “homeless person” means – 1) an individual or family who lacks a fixed, regular and adequate nighttime residence; 2) an individual or family with a primary nighttime residence that is a public or private place not designed for or ordinarily used as a regular sleeping accommodation for human beings, including a car, park, abandoned building, bus or train station, airport, or camping ground; 3) an individual or family living in a supervised publicly or privately operated shelter (including hotels and motels); 4) an individual who resided in a shelter or place not meant for human habitation and who is existing an institution where he or she temporarily resided. From US Dept of Health and Human Services [Section 330 of Public Service Act (42 U.S.C., 254b)] “an individual who lacks housing including an individual whose primary residence during the night is a supervised facility (e.g. shelters) that provide temporary living accommodations and an individual who is in transitional housing”.In the 2013 homeless census, City-Defendant openly defends it's expanded definition ofhomelessness (EXHIBIT W), even though a federal bill by Senator Dianne Feinsteinattempting this failed.Mayon v. San Francisco 77 Civil Rights Complaint

92. By exchanging “car” for “vehicle”, the City-Defendant immediately expands theRV nuisance, a crime, a danger. Thus police power is needed – and given – to“protect” the community. But exactly why is a home-on-wheels illegal? Who decidedthis? Why CAN'T the parking spaces provided for all citizens (with federal monies) beused by the GRT and their “over-sized vehicles”? IS there really a legitimate,compelling safety/health/welfare reason for the City-Defendant to penalize theplaintiffs' right to privacy, right to enjoy property and right to freely pass and re-pass,besides the stated parking and general beautification of the residential neighborhood?Blight? That's a rather telling label, in and of itself, for there to be people that are seento be the source of blight. Petty crime? Can the City-Defendant actually show dataestablishing the crimes centered around the GRT caused by the presence of theirvehicles in the community, or is this similar to the outcries of “gypsy crime” theirEuropean counterparts have endured for centuries? How can plaintiffs becomecriminals, every night after 10 pm, if they are not criminals at 9:59 pm? And why dothey cease being criminals at 6 am? What is it exactly that makes the RV home acriminal setting when used at night in the public space, but not in the day-time? It'sfine if it's inside an RV park or on private property (well, some places; others not somuch), but the public space – all over this country – is restricted for those who live intheir vehicles. Have we done away with the “Tramp Acts”? No, not in the slightest.Now it's just called “illegal camping”.93. What the plaintiffs (and the GRT in general) are is guilty of is vagrancy-by-vehicle. Theanti-RV laws are based upon the now-passed-away vagrancy laws, which were merely anevolution of the infamous Tramp Acts. It's all about controlling the vagabond. By 1972,the Court found “Persons ‘wandering’ or ‘strolling’ from place to place have been extolled by Walt Whitman and Vachel Lindsay … these activities are historically part of the amenities of life as we have known them. They are not mentioned in the Constitution or the Bill of Rights. These unwritten amenities have been in part responsible for giving our people the feeling of independence and self- confidence, the feeling of self-confidence, the feeling of creativity. TheseMayon v. San Francisco 78 Civil Rights Complaint

amenities have dignified the right of dissent and have honored the right of non-conformists and the right to defy submissiveness. They have encouraged lives of high spirits rather than hushed, suffocating silence.” Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). More than two decades later, in City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999), the Court extensively quoted Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville 405 U.S. 156 (1972) 'There, the Supreme Court held that a city ordinance prohibiting 'vagrancy' — which was applied to 'loitering,' 'prowling,' and 'night-walking,' among other conduct — was unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 158, 163. The Court viewed the ordinance in its historical context as the descendant of English feudal poor laws designed to prevent the physical movement and economic ascension of the lower class. Id. At 161–62. If a statute provides 'no standards governing the exercise of...discretion,' … it becomes 'a convenient tool for harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials, against particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure.' Id. At 170 In America, such laws had been used to 'roundup … so-called undesirables,' and resulted 'in a regime in which the poor and the unpopular [we]re permitted to stand on a public sidewalk... only at the whim of any police officer.' ” Id. at 170, 171 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court concluded that “the rule of law implies equality and justice in its application. Vagrancy laws... teach that the scales of justice are so tipped that even- handed administration of the law is not possible. The rule of law, evenly applied to minorities as well as majorities, to the poor as well as the rich, is the great mucilage that holds society together.”94. Three examples of how state courts have contemplated the status of the homeless andtheir habits of illegal “camping” in public space. In State v. Wicks, Nos. 2711742 &2711743, (Ore. Cir. Ct. Multnomah County 2000) police officers arrested the Wicks, ahomeless father and his son, for violating Portland City Code, Title 14, 14.08.250, whichprohibits “camping” in any place where the public has access or under any bridgeway orviaduct. The Wicks claimed the ordinance violated their right to be free of cruel and unusualpunishment, the right to equal protection under the fourteenth amendment, and their right toMayon v. San Francisco 79 Civil Rights Complaint

travel. The court agreed and found the ordinance as applied to homeless people violatedArticle I § 16 of the Oregon Constitution and the Eighth Amendment to the U.S.Constitution. Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660(1962) holding that drug addiction is a status, the Wicks court held that homelessness is also astatus. Furthermore, the court determined it impossible to separate the status ofhomelessness and the necessary acts that go along with that status, such as sleeping andeating in public when those are “the only locations available to them.” Because theordinance punished necessary behavior due to a person’s status, the court reasoned it wascruel and unusual. Moreover, the court found the ordinance in violation of both equalprotection and the right to travel on the basis that the ordinance denied homeless people thefundamental right to travel. The court rejected the state’s argument that it had a legitimatestate interest in protecting the health and safety of its citizens, noting that there were lessrestrictive means available to address these interests, such as providing sufficient housing forhomeless people and adequate services. According to a newspaper report, the state attorneygeneral’s office has dismissed the appeal, citing its inability to appeal from an order ofacquittal.95. In City of Sarasota v. Tillman, No. 2003 CA 15645 NC (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2004), fivehomeless individuals were charged with violating an anti-sleeping ordinance that prohibitedcamping on public or private property between sunset and sunrise. The public defender whorepresented the defendants challenged the constitutionality of the anti-camping ordinance inthe context of the criminal case, arguing that the ordinance violated substantive due processand was void for vagueness and overbroad because it penalized innocent conduct. Thelowest level county trial court found it was constitutional because it served a valid publicpurpose, that it was not vague in that a person of ordinary intelligence was on notice of theprohibited conduct, and there were sufficient guidelines to prevent selective enforcement ofthe ordinance. The Circuit Court for the Twelfth Judicial Circuit for the State of Floridareviewed the case in its appellate capacity and found the ordinance unconstitutional on thegrounds that the ordinance was void for vagueness and violated substantive due process byeffectively making criminal the non-criminal act of sleeping. The city then petitioned theSecond District Court of Appeal for certiorari review and the court denied the petition.Mayon v. San Francisco 80 Civil Rights Complaint

Instead of asking for rehearing, the city enacted a criminal lodging ordinance. However, thatlodging ordinance was subsequently struck down in City of Sarasota v. Nipper, No. 2005 MO4369 NC (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2005) in which the defendant homeless individuals were charged withviolation of Section 34-41 of the Sarasota City Code, which prohibited lodging out-of-doorsin a wide variety of situations. They defended the charges on the ground that Section 34-41was unconstitutional as applied because it offends substantive due process by penalizingotherwise innocent conduct and did not establish sufficient guidelines for enforcement. InJune 2005, the Sarasota County Court found that Section 34-41 was unconstitutional aswritten.96. In Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 9 Cal. 4th 1069, 892 P.2d 1145 (1995), homeless personsin Santa Ana, California filed suit in state court against the City of Santa Ana faciallychallenging the constitutionality of a city ordinance prohibiting (1) the use of “campparaphernalia”—including cots, sleeping bags, or non-designated cooking facilities; (2)pitching, occupying, or using “camp facilities” including tents, huts, or temporary shelters;(3) storing personal property on any public land within the city; or (4) living temporarily in a“camp facility” or outdoors in public within Santa Ana. The California Court of Appealsoverturned the ruling of the lower court in which the lower court upheld the ordinances withthe exception of the provision prohibiting living temporarily in a camp facility or outdoors.The Court of Appeal held that the anti-camping ordinance violates Appellants’ right to travel,which “includes the ‘right to live or stay where one will,’” and, by punishing them for theirstatus as homeless people, violates their right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.The court also held that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. In 1995,the California Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The court heldthat the challenged ordinance, which may have an incidental impact on travel, does notviolate the right to travel as it has a purpose other than the restriction of travel and does notdiscriminate among classes of persons by penalizing the exercise of the right to travel forsome. In addition, the court found that the ordinance penalized particular conduct asopposed to status and thus did not violate plaintiffs’ rights under the Eighth Amendment, andwas not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. However, the Court noted that the resultmight be different in an as-applied, as opposed to a facial, challenge.Mayon v. San Francisco 81 Civil Rights Complaint

97. The act of assigning a status (“Homeless people who are vehicularly housed” per theminutes of San Francisco's Local Homeless Coordinating Board's Policy CommitteeEXHIBIT J) and then, by intentionally banning a type of (affordable, self-owned) housing,the municipalities have condemned many to live literally on the streets or in slum hotels. Thereason for doing this has little to do with health, safety and welfare concerns, but everythingto do with keeping the streets looking a certain way, similar to the pre-1960s white-onlyneighborhoods of the Deep South. As previously pointed out, the beginning of the evidencethat labels are at play here begins with the historical fact that GRT (a.k.a. vagabond) werespecifically mentioned as being “other” in our country's birth certificate, the Articles ofConfederation, but then they were included back into the protection of the Bill of Rights.Historically, a person who travels without the perquisite point-A-to-point-B itinerary in-hand(and in apparent poverty) has always been persecuted. It's still the same. There is no in-between emotion, much less apathy, when the settled man considers the presence of thenomadic in his community. Therein lies the problem, because the “real” (i.e. voting, tax-paying, land-holding) citizen has empowered his government to squeeze out the free-rangecitizens, because they threaten his fine-tuned sense that his village is his, and his alone.98. At the heart of this case are descriptions of marital bonds as well as parent-child bondswhich is usually “confidential” evidence (EXHIBITS M & Q) but plaintiffs produce it toshow that the City validates the community's hate against GRT in San Francisco. This is ahate crime. For the purpose of highlighting how being forced to live in San Franciscoinstead of returning to the Louisiana family and land waiting for them, how it changed thefabric of this family, with young, impressionable children, plaintiffs show why it matters,as it relates to the City-Defendant's policies, a core maxim of social psychology, quotedfrom Princeton professor, Dr. Susan Friske: “What we think about a person influences howwe see him, how we see him affects how we behave towards him, how we behave towardhim ultimately shapes how he feels about himself, if not actually who he is.” In an article online from the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences @ http://www.aapss.org/news/2011/06/27/susan-fiske-the- nature-of-prejudice On June 2, 2011, (Princeton professor) Dr Susan Fiske was inducted as the Gordon W. Allport Fellow. Jeanne Brooks-GunnMayon v. San Francisco 82 Civil Rights Complaint

remarked, when introducing Dr. Fiske, that “[Susan's] pioneering research on prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination has changed the way that we think about inequity and bias.”Below is a transcript of Dr. Fiske's acceptance remarks: “So, one of the things that we have been finding in my team of researchers is that there are at least two kinds of out-groups particularly relevant to this example. One is the scorned type of out-group who are seen as having no redeeming good features. In the United States, homeless people are an out-group that is three standard deviations out from all the other groups, on not being worthwhile human beings, on not being competent, not being nice, not being trustworthy. And what we find – I have just recently in the last ten years gotten into neuro-imaging work – we find this really strange result. Normally, when people look at a picture of another person or just think about the other person to make sense of the person, this part of the brain called the medial pre-frontal cortex comes online. It is lovely for social scientists because there is part of the brain that just really likes to come online when people think about people, you know? It is just so cool. But the problem is, it does not come online for homeless people and drug addicts. So this is a brain manifestation of what happens when you seen a panhandler on a sidewalk, what do you do? What do I do? You make a detour around the person, you avoid eye contact, you certainly do not want to touch them because you would be contaminated, right? People react to some people as if they are piles of garbage. And that is pretty bad. It is true of immigrants, too, unspecified immigrants which means, you know, of course, those undocumented Latino people. They are seen in the same cluster of out-groups as well. Poor people – and this is not just an American disease, we have comparative data from twenty or thirty countries and poor people all over the world and immigrants all over the world are seen in this kind of scorned, disgusting, contaminating way. And I think in the worst case,Mayon v. San Francisco 83 Civil Rights Complaint

dehumanizing people in this way enables us to torture them, it enables us to not worry about whether they die in the streets. So, you know, this is a really horrible kind of prejudice and it relates to public policy.”99. In considering ordinances that first label, then seek to control (or ban) a particulargroup of people (and their property) from the public space, one only has to change the statedclassification “gypsy”, “Traveller”, “vehicularly-housed”, “those who live in vehicles”, orthat oxymoron label: “homeless RV dwellers” to Negro, homosexual, or Jew, and the truepredatory nature of these laws immediately comes into focus. As clarified in Parr v.Municipal Court (Cal 3d. 861, 479 P.2d 353 (1971)), disallowing Carmel's so-called “hippieordinance” banning them from sitting on the grass: “This Court has been consistently vigilant to protect the racial groups from the effects of official prejudice, and we can be no less concerned because the human beings currently in disfavor are identifiable by dress and attitudes rather than by color”. Parr v. Municipal Court (Cal 3d. 861, 479 P.2d 353 (1971))The signs say: “Habitation of a Vehicle is prohibited” with “fines/jail”. That speaksvolumes to the neighbors – and even more to the GRT. What else would you call a gypsy butsomeone who lives in a vehicle? Fine/Jail for being what you are. Status is subjective. If aperson perceives that they are being singled out because of how they house themselves, that'sstatus. And status cannot be criminalized, only acts can be criminal. Eating. Sleeping.Making Love. Comforting a sick spouse. Caring for children. Making a home. Living.The City-Defendant used SFPD 97 (passed by an irate and probably terrified Board ofSupervisors April 1971) for decades to rid the City of hundreds of hippies left over from theSummer of Love, so of course, the community supported an official policy to use tickets,blocked streets, threats of exorbitant fines and arrest, raids, property seizures, child seizures,and extra scrutiny/less benefits in government programs in order to drive away the GRT andother nomads who continue to stubbornly reside in vehicles. At the root of things, many ofthe so-called vehicularly-homeless are people who due to pride, suspicion, or lack of interest,refuse to participate in the homeless-industry complex set up by the City-Defendant and theMayon v. San Francisco 84 Civil Rights Complaint

various service organizations. For the plaintiffs, it's because they are ethnic nomads and haveno use for “bricks and mortar”, because they have a “home” and don't need the Cityprograms. Its an insult for the plaintiffs to be asked to go separately into Dickensian workhouses styled as “homeless shelters” (same place, but without the element of forced labor).100. Over fifty years ago, the Supreme Court analyzed two separate and independentstatutes and applied the Eighth amendment to each. In Robinson v California 370 U.S. 660 (1962) the Court announced limits on what the State may criminalize consistent with the Eighth Amendment. Robinson established that criminalization of “being” inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment. In Powell v Texas 392 U.S. (1968) established that the State cannot impose punishment for certain conditions, whether the conditions are acquired involuntarily or arising from the individual's own conduct. Justice White, concurring, that the “proper subject of of inquiry is whether volitional acts [sufficiently proximate to the condition] brought about the criminalized conduct or condition (Ibid at 550 n.1).”Further, “Robinson stands for the proposition the 8th amendment prohibits theState from punishing an involuntary act or condition if it is the 'unavoidable consequence of one's status or being.' Jones v. City of Los Angeles 444 F.3d at 1134 (2006) (citing Powell v. Texas 392 U.S. at 548, 550, n.2 551).101. The recent “Statement of Interest” from the Justice Department and the addition of asingle question to HUD's formula for grants (EXHIBIT X) has been the federal nod to whatis happening across the country to the “homeless” at the hands of municipalities.Mayon v. San Francisco 85 Civil Rights Complaint

102. Plaintiffs have received multiple tickets (EXHIBIT A) over the years for being whothey are and have, on more than one occasion, had the indignity of having their mugshottaken at the Hall of Justice in the presence of their then-preschool age child (who, after all, ishalf-Traveller), but then also to have to sit through hours of waiting to see the judge only tohave the case dismissed or be ordered to pay a fine they couldn't afford. On the other hand,the City-Defendant often issues permits (ordinance language provides for this) through Parksand Recreation Department for the huge, luxury motorhomes of rock stars who areperforming in the City and need a place to safely park them or politicians out stumping forthe vote. They are parked – with heavy SFPD presence - on Ocean Beach, while a blockaway plaintiffs are still the same illegal “homeless campers” they have always been. So, theGRT themselves are not inherently criminals, but when they feed or rest their bodies between10 pm and 6 am they become criminals for these involuntary acts. But the future Presidentand Tom Petty aren't ever, ever, ever criminalized for eating or sleeping in their vehiclebecause - - - - - well, logic fails here. This inequality shows that City-Defendant absolutelyknows it's all about who's doing it (i.e. the eating, sleeping and shitting in the vehicle)because it includes an exception (i.e. permit) for those who are of a higher socio-economicrating than plaintiffs and their ilk. There's that pesky status again. Can't get away from it,because it's just sitting there, like an elephant in the room.103. (EXHIBIT Y) Nov 2013 packet of information on S.F.M.T.A.7.2.54 included thisparagraph shows the City's public statement on the issue: “A subcategory of oversize vehicles, those used as housing, are subject to the Police Code prohibition on human habitation of a motor vehicle on any street or public way between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. Established by the Board of Supervisors in 1971, this regulation is signed in many locations around the city, along park and beach borders as well as industrial and undeveloped areas, but it has been very difficult to enforce – since vehicle habitation is a misdemeanor, citations must be served personally, so police officers may knock on the door of an inhabited vehicle, but if no one answers, no person can be cited.”Mayon v. San Francisco 86 Civil Rights Complaint

FACIAL CHALLENGE #2 TO S.F.P.D. 97 unconstitutionally vague104. June 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit struck down a LosAngles ordinance that prohibited people from using a vehicle parked or standing on anycity street or parking lot as living quarters either overnight, or day-by-day, or otherwise,due to unconstitutional vagueness: “A statute is also unconstitutionally vague if it encourages arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. 'Vagueness may invalidate a criminal law for either of two independent reasons. First, it may fail to provide the kind of notice that will enable ordinary people to understand what conduct it prohibits; second, it may authorize and even encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement'.” Desertrain v. City of Los Angeles (No. 11–56957, 9th Cir. (2014))The ruling did succeed in breathing hope into the destitute homeless (and their advocates)that their last major possession may not be arbitrarily penalized. It didn't acknowledgewhat the class of vehicularly-housed suffer on a nightly basis, but poignantly ignored therapidly tightening laws around the nomadic citizen's right to be present in the largercommunity. Nor did it acknowledge that government has codified their citizens' bias. Butthen again, the Court wasn't asked to do any that. The media outcry, with inflammatoryheadlines, might lead people to believe the GRT lifestyle has been legalized, but plaintiffsknow better. Los Angeles has a new plan (EXHIBIT Z) moving forward @ Los AngelesCity Council; indeed they are bragging on themselves for being the first in the nation tosuccessfully segregate the vehicle-dweller. Plan includes a tracking system beingimplemented. That's a questionable surveillance.http://laist.com/2016/11/01/criminalizing_homelessness.phpCity Council Moves Closer To Restricting People From Living In Cars And RVs InResidential Areas by Matt Tinoco, Nov 1, 2016 On Tuesday, the Los Angeles City Council voted in favor of drafting an ordinance that would ban people from living in their vehicles between the hours of 9 p.m. and 6 a.m. in residential districts, or at any time within one block of aMayon v. San Francisco 87 Civil Rights Complaint

school or park. If passed, the ordinance would allow individuals to live in theircars as long as they are parked on streets zoned for industrial or commercialpurposes. According to Councilman Mike Bonin’s office, this would be the firsttime the city designates specific areas where people can legally sleep in theircars. Ten city council members voted in favor of the ban, three were absent andone, Council member Nury Martinez, voted against the ban. Tuesday's voteasked the L.A. City Attorney's office to draft new municipal code in line withthe restrictions outlined in the above council file. Each night, at least 9,500people fall asleep inside cars, vans and RVs parked in various neighborhoodsaround the city. Though the city is proactively attempting to find safe locationsfor these people to park their vehicles at night, those who live inside theirvehicles are, for the time being, parking wherever possible to ensure a peacefulnight. Often, wherever possible translates to quiet residential streets in variousneighborhoods sprinkled around the city. Unsurprisingly, the residents of homesand apartments on streets where people park their cars-turned-homes dislike theoften somewhat dilapidated vehicles being in plain sight. They argue, in lettersto the city and public comment sessions, that the raggedy RVs are a safetythreat, encourage crime and can result in occupants dumping garbage andsewage on the road with little regard for neighbors. Roads adjacent to schoolsand schools and especially public parks are also frequently used, promptingsimilar concerns in those locations. A previous city law, which was struck downby the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, banned individuals from living in a car,truck or RV parked on public streets. Ruling on the case Desertrain v. LosAngeles, the 9th Circuit judges determined the old ban's language was\"unconstitutionally vague\" and promoted \"arbitrary and discriminatoryenforcement.\" The 9th Circuit ruling resulted in a $1.1 million settlement paidto the city to the law offices of Carol Sobel, a Santa Monica based attorneywho's successfully sued the city multiple times over homeless related issues.During Tuesday’s Council meeting, several council members spoke about howthey wanted to ensure that the motion in question does not impede the ultimateimplementation of a safe parking program in the city (the city is in the processof considering a program that would allow for individuals to park their carsovernight in designated lots around the city). The motion passed on Thursdayalso includes a fine schedule for those found to be violating the city's newstatute. The first time someone is found to be illegally living in a vehicle, theywill be cited $25. That amount increases to $50 the second time, and then to$75 for all following citations. This schedule also includes provision for aninitial warning, awarded without a fine. [UPDATE & CORRECTION] Anearlier version of this post incorrectly stated that the ban had been voted intolaw; the City Council voted to direct the City Attorney's office to draft anordinance. The post was also revised to more accurately reflect the fact that thepotential ordinance would allow individuals to legally sleep in their cars onstreets zoned for industrial or commercial uses.Mayon v. San Francisco 88 Civil Rights Complaint

http://www.foxla.com/news/local-news/216625851-storyLA City Council passes new measure on homeless living in cars by: Lauren Sivan (FOX 11 Los Angeles) 11.09.16 The Los Angeles City Council gave tentative approval Wednesday to a ban of living in cars in residential areas and near parks and daycare facilities. The ordinance would still theoretically allow people who live in their cars to park their vehicles in commercial and industrial zones. Just outside LAX, there are blocks and blocks of tents, encampments and mobile homes. Anthony Lucero is a homeless veteran living on the streets with his step-son. \"I don't know where else to go... We were in a shelter but too much anxiety, overcrowded and I had something stolen,\" he said. Lucero prefers to live in the homeless encampment area, like so many others who feel safer inside their vehicle. However, the growing spread of these encampments bring unwanted activity to neighborhoods they inhabit. \"There were a lot of mobile homes coming in and out. A lot of drug activity in the area, especially at night, and police searching all the time,\" nearby resident Leonardo Hosken said. The new measure amends the city's current ban, allowing people to park in commercial areas or designated city lots between 9 p.m. and 6 a.m. But many homeless advocates say this doesn't make life safer for those living in their vehicles. \"There's a significant increase in homeless women, and most of them are escaping violence and domestic abuse,\" advocate Jo Jo Smith said. \"Now you want to put them in isolated, industrial areas? What are you thinking?\" \"There are a lot of working homeless that live in their cars for obvious reasons. Cost of living is insane,\" another advocate told city council. Los Angeles City Councilman Mike Bonin said this may not solve the problem, but it is a step toward decriminalizing homelessness. \"A yes vote on this for the first time says that there are places where you cannot be and places you can be,\" Bonin said. \"That's exactly, exactly what people have been clamoring for for a decade.\" A member of parking enforcement who patrols the area declined to go on camera, but told FOX 11 that they typically turn a blind eye to encampments like the one by LAX because in his words, \"Even if I did ticket them, they couldn't pay it anyway.\" \"A yes vote on this for the first time says that there are places where you cannotbe and places you can be,\" so it's segregation in Los Angeles, while what ishappening in San Francisco is apartheid, because the vehicle-dweller is criminalizedafter curfew. The only way to avoid that is to leave the City.105. Also alarming the citizens was a bill making some measure of progress inSacramento, AB 718 This is the third attempt recently to give some kind of legislativeprotection for the “homeless”. That a citizen of this country might have doors closed to himbecause of “housing status” is unthinkable but the fact that three recent bills have beenattempted, in fairly rapid succession, indicates otherwise. Plaintiffs believe that these do-Mayon v. San Francisco 89 Civil Rights Complaint

gooder bills are like the Desertrain ruling, in that they only serve to aggravate the realcitizen. It was that caused which Ramona Mayon to compile hate comments from all overthe world's mainstream media, My Big Fat Book of Gypsy Traveller Lies, Hate and Bigotryin order to demonstrate how much deep-seated hatred is out there for the vehicle-dweller,the nomad, the vagabond, the Traveller, the gypsy.106. One of the goals of this litigation is to ask the court for a “bright line” definition of“home” that includes the hundreds of thousands of Americans who live full-time on afoundation-less vehicle-home, that is their legitimate property, with inherent ownershiprights. The most recent agency to venture into the morass is H.U.D. with the Proposed Rule:FR–5877–P–01 Manufactured Home Procedural and Enforcement Regulations; Revision ofExemption for Recreational Vehicles https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=HUD-2016-0013 plus a few of the thousands of comments by the public entered by April 11, 2016.H.U.D. wants it out there that RVs are not to be used as primary dwellings, nor for permanentoccupancy. Also wants new sales of RVs to have a sign or placard prominently (thoughtemporarily) displayed stating as much. MIS-LABELING GRT AS “HOMELESS” HAS THESE CONSEQUENCES:107. The following collateral damages comes from this “illegal housing” status: A. The aforementioned struggle to keep one's children because of society's perception ofneglect and that criminals are being allowed to have access to their children unsupervised. B. If plaintiff Greg Mayon were forced to move into a homeless shelter, per City-Defendant's demand in S.F.M.T.A. 7.2.54 - the Social Security Administration (SSA)will only pay his benefits 6 months out of every nine months while he “lives” there.That's a simple, straight-forward way of seeing how being GRT means being less, evenin the eyes of the (federal) law. (EXHIBIT AA) C. Plaintiffs remain uncertain if “Homestead Declaration” can be used to protecttheir home since it is a vehicle first. They cannot automatically access that protectionall other homeowners have. They own their home. They only rent a piece of land toMayon v. San Francisco 90 Civil Rights Complaint

park it on. From the rulings cited earlier, they can possibly protect their home shouldthey declare bankruptcy or be sued, only if they are tethered to a piece of land. Free-range? Probably not. Indeed, plaintiffs attempted to registering their RV as homesteadin San Francisco and were unsuccessful (EXHIBIT BB). They have filed it in ContraCosta county (EXHIBIT CC). It is pending. D. Castle Doctrine is not available for the GRT. United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1973) noting that without the “castle” exception, an attacked person would be forced to retreat as far as reasonably possible. The GRT's home – because it is on wheels – would be no legal refuge to self-protection mechanism inherent in the Castle Doctrine. E. While researching health care options for a declining, chronically-ill spouse @ http://www.dss.cahwnet.gov/shd/res/htm/ParaRegs-Social-Services-In-Home-Supportive- Services.htm 611-2 A person is eligible for IHSS-R who is living in his/her own home and who meets all SSI/SSP eligibility criteria, except for income in excess of SSI/SSP eligibility standards. (§30-755.113) • 613-1B On June 2, 2000, the Sacramento County Superior Court stayed, enjoined and prohibited the CDSS \"from implementing the emergency regulations denying eligibility for In-Home Supportive Services to people who are homeless, including people who live in homeless shelters, transitional housing, and welfare motels as provided for in regulation package ORD #0300-07, including but not limited to new Manual of Policy and Procedure §30-701(o)\" (Lubahn v. Saenz, Preliminary Injunction, Case No. 00C500726, Sacramento County Superior Court, June 2, 2000) F. This is made most plain in the treatment plaintiffs have had in receiving foodstampsand other public benefits. Since 2007, plaintiffs have been denied an allowance for homeutility costs, even though it was first approved, it has been ignored continuously. They shouldhave received $68 federal foodstamps extra each month. Answer is that plaintiffs arehomeless and do not qualify for any additional housing costs allowance (EXHIBIT DD).Mayon v. San Francisco 91 Civil Rights Complaint

G. Plaintiffs in Sept 2011 applied for General Assistance (known as GA). Becausethey live in an RV, they were deemed homeless and received 85% less than the otherrecipients (EXHIBIT EE). The plaintiffs' administrative appeal held an additional step in theprocess that is not applied to non-GRT applicants. (EXHIBIT FF) Legislature requires eachcounty to help the disabled and the destitute. The “Care not Cash” initiative that changedhow G.A. would be distributed, making it dependent on how the recipient was housed. Thiswas voter-approved. The descriptions (then) of the good that the changes would bring to theGRT and other undesirables are clues that the “policy, custom and practice” problem is yetagain present within the policy-maker's mind. Discriminatory intent invalidates anordinance. In other counties throughout California, the receipt of G.A. requires a portion godirect to a landlord, so if one is a vehicle-dweller, only a percentage of the stipend is given. H. This information is compiled by the police because they refer to their “files” on theplaintiffs' group, the “homeless”. Often police officers showed up in the daytime to questionthe plaintiff's presence in the community. They collect data openly about the group. I. An additional insult to the plaintiffs right to equality was being fined by a tribunal ofneighbors in a so-called “Neighborhood Court”, a quasi-judicial panel. That fine was latercanceled out (EXHIBIT GG) J. There are neighborhood watch groups, that go about the neighborhood after 10 pmand take photos of the “offending vehicle” in their neighborhood, notify the police, and thenknock on the GRT's door to hand them a copy of what was faxed to SFPD (EXHIBIT HH) K. Extra scrutiny is another way of realizing that something is amiss and status has beenassigned. Los Angeles /State of California’s Cal Works (i.e. welfare) policy handbook statesthat those who live in RVs are to be put automatically in the caseload of ‘high-risk’ inquiries.That is discrimination by any standard of review. (EXHIBIT I I) Cal Works Policy Handbook (found on DSS website Los Angeles) Pg 35 of 534 CW 40-107.3 – Eligibility Inconsistencies When family composition and/or eligibility factors are inconsistent or difficult toMayon v. San Francisco 92 Civil Rights Complaint

document, the case is “High Risk” and transferred to a specialized file; a high risk caseexists when one or more of the following circumstances exist: Frequent Moves; Frequent Changes in Family Composition; Correspondence Mailed to Other Than the Residence Address; No Verification of Identity; Motor Homes or Campers; Convicted Welfare Fraud CasesCase is transferred within one working day of the discovery of the high risk situation.Review Requirements: The Eligibility Deputy District Director (DDD) assigned to the“High Risk” file must approve all case transfers before the case can be transferred.Eligibility DDD must review cases in the “High Risk” file longer than 6 months. Motor Homes or Campers • The participant continues to live in a motor home or camper when the intake process is completed. The following must be verified: the family intends to reside permanently in California; sleeping, sanitary and eating facilities are available; • The family has permission to park the vehicle on the property and use the address to receive mail; and eligibility requirements are met. When those factors are verified and the living situation remains stable for 6 months, the case is transferred to the appropriate file. At the time of the next and each subsequent re-determination, the case must be reevaluated if the family is still living in a motor home/camper. If the family has not moved since the last evaluation, continues to meet the criteria listed above and there is no other high risk factor involved, the case is transferred to the appropriate file.L. It is not possible to register to vote without a residential address, even though theplaintiff's Driver's License, registration, insurance and other legal papers go to a mailbox service, it is not “valid” for voting, disenfranchising the nomadic as a group.(EXHIBIT JJ)M. Plaintiff Ramona Mayon is an avid baker and would like to apply for the newlyminted “Cottage Food Permit” allowing her to sell her baked goods directly to thepublic. How is that going to work out since she is deemed “homeless”? Theseapplication fees are non-refundable. Pursuit of happiness is blocked yet again. In theMayon v. San Francisco 93 Civil Rights Complaint

beginning of this country, the phrase pursuit of happiness, in the eyes of the court, hasmeant the ability to do the work of one's choosing, unlike life in the Old Country.108. In compiling a list of RV parking/living restrictions throughout the 9th Federal district(EXHIBIT G) plaintiffs noted that the ban rests on the classification of the vehicle that theGRT use, rather than on the GRT themselves. Thus, the nighttime hour and place restrictionsare sufficient to drive the GRT from the village. If there is nowhere to rest, there is nowhereto exist. It begs the simple question of how – under the 14th amendment guaranteeing equalprotection – can the GRT be penalized for using their property at certain times on certainstreets? The City-Defendant cannot be blind to the cause-and-effect w/ S.F.P.D 97 andS.F.M.T.A. 7.2.54 as its own information packet (EXHIBIT Y) describes how hard it is to berid of the vehicle-dweller. However neutral the City-Defendant may claim statements to be,they are not when they result in life-altering raids, fines, and less benefits due to one's status. FACIAL CHALLENGE TO S.F.M.T.A. 7.2.54 violation of the 14th amendment right of equal protection to travel without burden of penalty109. The right to travel is inviolate. Our oldest Court records support this: “We are all citizens of the United States; and as members of the same community, must have the right to pass and repass through every part of it without interruption as freely as in our own states.” Smith v. Turner (Passenger Cases) 48 U.S. (7. How.) 283, 49 (1849) “This freedom of movement is the very essence of our free society, setting us apart. Like the right of assembly and the right of association, it often makes all other rights meaningful — knowing, studying, arguing, exploring, conversing, observing and even thinking. Once the right to travel is curtailed, all other rights suffer, just as when curfew or home detention is placed on a person.” Aptheker v. Secretary of State 378 U.S. 500 (1964)Mayon v. San Francisco 94 Civil Rights Complaint

110. When learning to defend the right to travel, it is necessary to understand:“…what burdens it: erecting an actual barrier to travel (Edwards v.California 314 U.S. 160. 177-186 (1941)); intending to deter it (Zobel v.Williams 457 U.S. 55, 62 n,9 (1982)); intending to penalize it (Shapiro v.Thompson 394 U.S. 618 (1969)); and actually deterring it (Memorial v.Maricopa County 415 U.S. 250, 257-258 (1974)).”The source of the 'right to travel' must be grounded either in due process or the equalprotection clause.“The right of locomotion, the right to remove from one place to anotheraccording to inclination, is an attribute of liberty...secured by the 14thamendment.” Williams v. Fears 179 U.S. 270 (1900)“The right to travel is a part of the liberty of which the citizen cannot bedeprived without due process of law under the 5th Amendment.” and“Freedom of movement is basic in our scheme of values.” Kent v. Dulles 357 U.S. 116, 125, 126 (1958)“The right of the citizen to travel upon the public highways and totransport his property thereon, either by carriage or by automobile, is not amere privilege which a city may prohibit or permit at will, but a commonright which he has under the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit ofhappiness.” Thompson v Smith 154 SE 579 (1930)“The right of every citizen to live where he chooses and to travel freelynot only within the state but across its borders is a fundamental rightwhich is guaranteed both by our own and the Federal Constitutions. Rattiv. Hinsdale Raceway, 109 N.H. 52 270, 249 A.2d 859 (1969); Shapiro v.Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 22 L. Ed. 2d 600, 89 S. Ct. 1322 (1969)Mayon v. San Francisco 95 Civil Rights Complaint

It is fundamental also that both Constitutions guarantee to all persons theequal protection of the laws, (State v. Pennoyer, 65 N.H. 113, 18 A. 878(1889)) so that “'all persons should be equally entitled to pursue theirhappiness '” Id. At 115 as well as acknowledging “that the legislationmay be of some public benefit is not enough, under the state constitution,to give it validity. In addition, it must not impair or destroy private rightsguaranteed by the constitution.” Woolf v. Fuller, 87 N.H. 64, 68, 174 A.193, 196 (1934)In passing upon the reasonableness of a restriction upon private rights theimportance of the public benefit is balanced against the seriousness of therestriction of the private right sought to be imposed. Id.; Dederick v.Smith, 88 N.H. 63, 68, 184 A. 595, 599 (1936); State v. Paille, 90 N.H.347, 352, 9 A.2d 663, 666 (1939)Thus it has been said that “if the legislation is directed to a public interestof minor concern, while imposing serious restrictions in regulation or barof guaranteed rights to accomplish the interest, it tends to show itsunreasonableness.” (Woolf v. Fuller, supra at 68-69, 174 A. at 196) bothrulings from Donnelly v. City of Manchester 111 N.H. 50, 51 274 A. 2d789, 791 (1971)\"Undoubtedly the right of locomotion, the right to remove from one placeto another according to inclination, is an attribute of personal liberty, andthe right, ordinarily, of free transit from or through the territory of anyState is a right secured by the l4th Amendment and by other provisions ofthe Constitution.\" Schactman v Dulles, 96 App D.C. 287, 293 (1955)“The right or tradition we consider may be described as the right to travellocally through public spaces and roadways. Under York's view, a state or localMayon v. San Francisco 96 Civil Rights Complaint

government could constitutionally prohibit all freedom of movement that doesnot involve interstate migration, interstate commerce, business between acitizen and the federal government, and (presumably) travel incident tootherwise protected activity...We conclude that the right to move freely aboutone's neighborhood or town, even by automobile, is indeed 'implicit in theconcept of ordered liberty' and 'deeply rooted in the Nation's history.' Lutz v. City of York 899 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1990)111. Travel includes stopping as well as moving through. “…recognized right to travel ensures the ‘freedom to enter and abide’” Dunn v. Blumstein 405 U.S. 330, 338 Id. at 339 (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969)). The Court also noted that the “classification which serves to penalize the exercise of the [right to travel], unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest is unconstitutional. The Court later emphasized that it is more likely to characterize a law as a ‘penalty’ when it denies the affected party a ‘basic necessity of life’ … And governmental privileges or benefits necessary to basic sustenance have often been viewed as being of greater constitutional significance that less essential forms of governmental entitlements. Id at 618 However, we must also consider 'The prevention of migration by needy persons into the State is constitutionally impermissible.'” Id. at 629 In his concurrence, Justice Stewart wrote of an even stronger right to travel, calling it a “virtually unconditional personal right”. Id at. 643 On Sept 25, 2012 the Board of Supervisors of San Francisco voted 7-4 to pass anamendment to Traffic Code. It was order of business #12014220 and was titled “Shall thisbe passed on first reading?” It was passed without a single study - once again speaking tothe political powerlessness of the vehicle-dwelling community. 12014220. Sponsors: Chu; Cohen Ordinance amending the San Francisco Transportation Code, Division I, Article 7, by adding Section 7.2.54Mayon v. San Francisco 97 Civil Rights Complaint

to prohibit the on-street parking of any vehicle over 22 feet in length or sevenfeet in height, camp trailers, fifth-wheel travel trailers, house cars, trailercoaches, mobile homes, recreational vehicles, or semi-trailers as defined by theCalifornia Vehicle Code and Health and Safety Code, between the hours of 12a.m. and 6 a.m. when Municipal Transportation Agency signs are posted givingnotice; and making environmental findings. Info packet @ SCRIBD106958433-SFBOS-20120925-item20.pdf (EXHIBIT K K)SFMTA Aug 22, 2011 request to the Board of Supervisors to change the trafficcode. Some excerpts: (pg 5) The proposed amendment enables the SFMTA todiscourage habitation in vehicles and overnight or long-term parking in areaswith high demand for parking including residential areas and provides theflexibility and provides the flexibility to address this issue on a street-to-streetbasis. Overview: Issues around parking oversize vehicles, including trailers,semi-trailers, motorhomes, and boats have long been observed by ParkingControl Officers (POC), cops and residents throughout the City. Issues thispolicy seeks to address: lack of available on-street parking for private vehicledue to oversize vehicle being stored on city streets. Illegal trash dumping andgraffiti. Goals of initiative: increase parking availability in residential areas.Continue to allow over-size vehicles to park where they do not cause issues.Oversize vehicles are not actually defined. Vehicle habitation is illegal on citystreets. However, the law is difficult to enforce. As vehicle habitation is amisdemeanor, citations must be served in person. Police may knock on thedoor of an inhabited dwelling but if no one answers, no person can be cited.On four weekends during July, Aug and October 461 oversized vehicles wereobserved. 42% were motorhomes (only motorhomes were mentioned in thepercentile). Registration of 64% were local addresses. The following mapshows the location of parked oversized vehicles observed during the 2011survey. The survey did not cover the entire city, focusing on areas whereoversize vehicles tend to park which typically are streets with no parkingmanagement alongside low-activity land usage such as along Golden GateMayon v. San Francisco 98 Civil Rights Complaint

Park, under freeways, along undeveloped lots, and industrial areas. This proposal continues to allow vehicles to park on some SF streets but gives SFMTA an additional tool to discourage overnight parking in areas where oversize vehicles cause issues, which is often in, or near, residential areas. Gives SFMTA flexibility to address this issue on a street-by-street basis and continue to adjust parking management as the issue evolves. SFMTA will notify residents and business and give information on how to report a violation. Violators will receive written notification with a list of off-street public parking lots in San Francisco that allow oversize vehicles. Thereafter, violators will receive $65 until 5 (tickets) have accumulated then the vehicle will be booted. After 72 hours it will be towed. Vehicles will be returned after all citations, late penalties, towing/storage, and outstanding fines are paid. Six months after the implementation SFMTA will use data collected to determine where the SFMTA should install signs on other streets. The SFMTA will develop a 2nd phrase of implementation … will address an increase in oversize vehicle parking or increase in complaints on streets that have not received ‘no parking’ signs.112. S.F.M.T.A.7.2.54 proponents insist it does not target a group of people butinstead, only seeks to regulate the “over-size” vehicles taking up the real residents'parking spaces. Please note the titles of articles in the media surrounding this law andhow many call it “the RV ban” (EXHIBIT LL). S.F.M.T.A.7.2.54 enforcement areasshown on a map in the info packet (EXHIBIT H) focuses its first wave of streetclosures (July 2013), and plaintiffs' RV was regularly at night using the ‘green curb’(i.e. parking that has no housing or businesses on the passenger side, but rather thebeach or the park or actual areas of greenery) and parking days on the public beach.Plaintiffs took photos of their RV and the place they usually parked it on GreatHighway to show the stated need for parking was false (EXHIBIT MM).113. A second wave of streets were closed April 2014. A news video on the localCBS, September 8, 2014 states Potereo neighbors were planning to meet theirMayon v. San Francisco 99 Civil Rights Complaint

representative at City Hall. That piece starts “Anger is growing in San Francisco’sPotero Hill neighborhood as homeless camps and trash-filled RV’s invade the streets.”.By the next day, other media outlets were picking up the story and adjusting headlinesto read like this one: “Potrero Hill's Design District Is Turning Into An RV Park,Neighbors Complain”. This is educational to other readers who feel too many RVs areon “their” streets. Third wave happened October 2016. (EXHIBIT NN) In Shapiro v.Thompson 394 U.S. 629, 89 S.Ct. 1328-1329 the Court held that the right to travel wastriggered by any attempt to “fence out indigents.”114. The City-Defendant has written a law that covers the whole 7×7 square miles ofthe city, piece-meal, bit-by-bit signs posted at the discretion of SFMTA, signsdemanded by angry citizens, signs that soon won't even be announced in the newspaperanymore, because it will be commonplace to see them. In order to park anywhere inSan Francisco, the GRT must always be looking for the dreaded 7.2.54 signs, especiallyat night when it's hard enough to drive on darkened streets. Thus he will simply beginto avoid the entire region. And isn't that the point? This effectively excludes theplaintiffs’ right to freely travel anywhere in the city. For the gypsy, how is this anydifferent to being told to move to the back of the bus?115. However, beyond the obvious implications for the City-Defendant as far as therequired discriminatory intent, comes a screen shot taken from Carmen Chu'sFaceBook posting 7/26/12 (EXHIBIT OO) showing a photograph of Supervisor Chu onthe beach sidewalk with the Mayor and other dignitaries touting “The Ocean BeachMaster Plan was a two year collaborative endeavor, engaging Ocean Beach neighborsand users, local, state and federal agencies. To read the Master Plan in its entiretyfound @ http://www.spur.org/climate-change/2012-06-12/ocean-beach-master-plan-final-document” Other screen shots over the next year show progress of said plancoinciding with the deportation of the plaintiffs from the streets highlighted forimprovement. One screen shot shows a late-August 2011 posting of an anti-RV articleand a comment by one of Ms. Chu's constituents in the comment section saying, “Therehas to be an answer to this problem.” S.F.M.T.A. 7.2.54 was that answer.Mayon v. San Francisco 100 Civil Rights Complaint