SEEKING JUSTICE Page 25Page 25 with a signature was assembled from following 5 separate images:Page 25 Image #1 covers the whole Page 25 Image #2 placed above thepage. image #1, covers central part of theContains some pieces of a text and a page.part of a blue-purple signature with Contains a number, pieces of a text,letters W iam Freeman III above black an X mark and letters WILLIAMline, typed letter I under it. FREEMAN II at the next row. Image #2 is a black and white.Page 25 Image #3 – Purple blot at Page 25 Image #3 (zoomed view)the top of the page and purple color imitate handwritten letters:letters ill, that fills gaps at the part illof the signature at the Image #1 at Letters have a monochrome purplethis page. color, created as a combination of 48% Cian and 38% Magenta without anyBILL FREEMAN
SEEKING JUSTICE color gradations and other tints at whole surface of the letters, added to signature.Page 25 Image #4 – Purple Page 25 Image #4 (zoomed view) imitatecolor letters iam, that overlap handwritten letters:the corresponding part of the iamsignature at the Image #1 at Letters have a monochrome purple color,this page and enhance its color. created as a combination of 58% Cian and 38% Magenta without any color gradations and other tints at whole surface of the letters, added to the signature.BILL FREEMAN
SEEKING JUSTICEWhole signature at Page 25, assembled from separate images #1, #3 and #4(zoomed view)There are visible thin outlines, created by Adobe Acrobat around separateimages. Also color non-coincidences of the parts of the signature.Page 25 Image #5 (zoomed view) – Recorder’s stamp at the right upper corner. BILL FREEMAN
SEEKING JUSTICEStamp has a monochrome purple color, created as a combination of 66% Cian,58% Magenta and 5% Yellow colors without any color gradations and othertints at whole surface of the stamp. Recorder’s stamp looks like typed lettersand numbers, not like a real stamp, which comprises small dots. BILL FREEMAN
March, 2016 version SEEKING JUSTICE October, 2016 versionText of the page 25 in March, 2016 Text of the page 25 in October 17,version is tilted. 2016 version isn’t tilted. Recorder’s stamp isn’t tilted too.Recorder’s stamp isn’t tilted. Page 26Page 26 with a seal was assembled from following 5 separate images:Page 26 Image #1 covers the whole Page 25 Image #2 placed above thepage. image #1, covers the central topContains a grey line and a grey mark, part of the page. Contains a text.that looks like upside down T letter at Image #2 is a black and white.the top of the page.Image #1 is a black and white.BILL FREEMAN
SEEKING JUSTICEPage 26 Image #3 (zoomed view) – Recorder’s stamp at the right upper corner. BILL FREEMAN
SEEKING JUSTICEStamp has a monochrome purple color, created as a combination of 67% Cian,59% Magenta and 6% Yellow colors without any color gradations and othertints at whole surface of the stamp. Recorder’s stamp looks like typed lettersand numbers, not like a real stamp, which comprises small dots.Page 26 Image #4 – Purple color Page 26 Image #4 (zoomed view) – Purpleletters at the right bottom part color letters, that imitate a stamp:of the page. RECEIVED TOWN OF TIVERTON Jul 13,2005 10:22:29A AND RECORDERED ATTEST NANCE L. MELLO, TOWN CLERK Letters have a monochrome purple color, created as a combination of 59% Cian, 52% Magenta and 2% Yellow without any color gradations and other tints at whole surface of the letters, added to signature.BILL FREEMAN
SEEKING JUSTICEYou can compare view of letters at the Image #4 with the scan of the Town ofTiverton stamp from the Warranty Deed, signed in July, 2005 and held by Mr.William Freeman as original paper document. BILL FREEMAN
SEEKING JUSTICEAll other pages of the document are assembled from different separate imagesby the same way, as mentioned above pages 1, 2, 16, 17, 25 and 26. BILL FREEMAN
SEEKING JUSTICESigned and unsigned versions of Truth in Lending DisclosureStatementChase bank sent to Mr. Freeman signed and unsigned versions of Truth inLending Disclosure Statement. Both versions are registered at ChaseFree withdifferent numbers. Signed version of Truth in Lending Disclosure Statementhas ChaseFree-001663 number. And unsigned version of the same documenthas ChaseFree-001667 number. BILL FREEMAN
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SEEKING JUSTICENew evidence - 2005 Investor Identified -Voiding Chase Ownership Claims. ChaseClaims of Ownership Proven FalseFreeman investor mechanism revealed. Investor NumberAO1 is finally defined, showing WAMU securitized notesprior to FDIC receivershipThe affidavit if Michael McCormick (Chase) and Peter Karikos (Chase) has beenrefuted by Chase Executives in California Superior Court.It is acknowledged that Washington Mutual Bank, Fa, and their parentcompany and affiliates, securitized “every mortgage” they processed (seeSenate Report), known to homeowners. Peter Karikos, an alleged employee ofJPMC, was deposed by my former attorney Stephen Wright.He claimed familiarity with my file, but really all he had knowledge of was --screen shots Chase allowed him to see and ---- the script they provided to him.The investor number AO1, was always a big mystery to many in the industry.Investor Number “AO1“ is notated on the two mortgages Freeman receivedfrom Washington Mutual and other copies from JPMC Enclosed is thefollowing testimony the transcript of the deposition of Peter Katiskas, byStephen Wright, Freeman’s former attorney.I also offer recent testimony from an executive at JP Morgan Chase Bank,offering, (under oath in Superior Court) who revealed the truth of the meaningof AO1, which is very contrary to the representations of Brian Herman and BILL FREEMAN
SEEKING JUSTICEPeter Katiskas, exposing Peter Katiskas and Brian Herman to potential chargesof Fraud Upon the Court:WaMu Investor Code “AO1″ Revealed – Chase Stipulates It Represents “WaMuAssetAcceptance Corp.”#8, “Investor code AO1 in the Loan Transfer History File represents WaMuAsset Acceptance Corporation.”Chase for years now has testified that this investor code (AO1) does notsignify “WAMU/Chase bank owned” loans “on the books of WashingtonMutual Bank,”. rather a large securitization subsidiary of WashingtonMutual, Inc., called WAMU Asset Acceptance Corp.Stipulated fact runs contrary to Chase’s long-standing position, in thousandsof foreclosures across the United States, that it acquired “AO1″ loans becausethey were “on the books” of “Washington Mutual Bank” per the Purchase &Assumption Agreement (PAA) with the FDIC.• This has been a lie, as these “AO1″ loans could not have been a part ofthe PAA (Purchase and assumption Agreement, modified since 2008) due tothe sale and securitization of said loans by WMI, parent of 300 divisionsdedicated to securitization, through its “off-balance sheet activities.”• It has long been known that testimony put forth by Chase witnesses, likethe following by Peter Katsikas, have been downright false. Again, morevindication. Here’s what Katsikas had to say under oath regarding investorcode “AO1″: BILL FREEMAN
SEEKING JUSTICEPETER KATSIKAS, -called as a witness, having been duly sworn, testified asfollows:(Beginning – P. 43):Q. And do you know whether at the time of the acquisition of the assets thatare identified in the purchase and assumption agreement with the FDIC toChase dated September 2008, did it include a list of the loans that Chase wasacquiring?A., I mean, I didn’t see an actual list, but there’s — it’s in the system. It’s in theMSP servicing — that’s a system the bank uses to service the accounts.Q. Is it your testimony that the Freeman loans were owned by WashingtonMutual F.A. at the time the bank failed? A. Yes.Q. Is it your testimony that Washington Mutual Bank or some subsidiary of thebank was not servicing those loan at the time?MR. HERMAN: At what time?MR. WRIGHT: Prior to September 25, 2008, between the time they were madeand September 25, 2008.A. The servicer was Washington Mutual F.A.Q. Okay. Was there an investor?A., It was bank-owned. It’s always been bank-owned.Q. It’s always been bank-owned?A. Correct.Q. And you know that because?A., I reviewed Chase’s books and records.Q. What in the books and records would indicate to you that itwas bank-owned versus not bank-owned?A. Well, they’re through the investor screens and the ID codes, investor IDcodes. BILL FREEMAN
SEEKING JUSTICEQ. Okay. And the ID codes are letters,aren’t they? MR. HERMAN: Objection.A., They consist of letters and numerals.Q. Okay. And what letters would indicate an investor?A. There’s three digits or three characters.Q. Two letters and a number?A. No, it could be a mixture of.Q. So what three characters — well, let’s put it another way. Whatcharacters would indicate a Chase-owned asset — a WaMu-owned asset?Excuse me.A. For these two loans?Q. Yes.A. AO1.Q. AO1?A. Yeah, uh-hu.Compare testimony:WaMu Investor Code “AO1″ Revealed – Chase Stipulates It Represents “WaMuAsset Acceptance Corp.” (see appendix for entire court file)JPMorgan Chase has refused to divulge computer codes rendered ontransaction histories and other documents. It is acknowledged thatWashington Mutual Bank, Fa, and their parent company and affiliates,securitized “every mortgage” they processed (see Senate Report), known tohomeowners. Peter Karikos, an alleged employee of JPMC, was deposed bymy former attorney Stephen Wright. BILL FREEMAN
SEEKING JUSTICEHe claimed familiarity with my file, but really all he had knowledge of was --screen shots Chase allowed him to see and ---- the script they provided to him.The investor number AO1, was always a big mystery to many in the industry.Investor Number “AO1 “is notated on the two mortgages Freeman receivedfrom Washington Mutual and other copies from JPMC Enclosed is thefollowing testimony the transcript of the deposition of Peter Katiskas, byStephen Wright, Freeman’s former attorney.I also offer recent testimony from an executive at JP Morgan Chase Bank,offering, (under oath in Superior Court) who revealed the truth of the meaningof AO1, which is very contrary to the representations of Brian Herman andPeter Katiskas, exposing Peter Katiskas and Brian Herman to potential chargesof Fraud Upon the Court:“Investor code AO1 in the Loan Transfer History File represents WaMu AssetAcceptance Corporation.” BILL FREEMAN
SEEKING JUSTICEAccounting FraudThis report was generated for Bill Freeman with accounting analysisby Paul Rodriguez, on the nature of his payment history. andassociated mortgage loan documentsContext: Mr Freeman has been sent transaction histories herequested since origination in 2005, when the accounting containedwas not clear or understandable, contained mistakes, and accountingcodes were undecipherable.Mr Freeman was sold a predatory, negative amortization, pick apayment loan that did not suit his needs, especially since he qualifiedfor more conventional financing, but brokers were making huge $commissions selling them.The accounting since 2005 has become less and less understandable,and can not be reconciledObservations:Accounting Anomalies, ContinuedPlease note the following transaction taken from the transactionshistories sent by Morgan Lewis Bockius.Jan 19, 2012 - $7510.80 Payment --- This payments wasnot made by Mr.FreemanJan 19,2012 - $2384.55 Payment applied and retractedJan 19, 2012 - $ 22,638.56 Added to FreemanbalanceJan 19, 2012 - $ 20,830.08 added as principal adjustmentBILL FREEMAN
SEEKING JUSTICEJan 18, 2012 - $121,500.00 added as adjustmentJan 17,2012 - $ 3598.85 reversed from Freeman accountFeb, 2012 -March, 2012 - $ 2032.00 Payment credited, never madeDec, 2011 - $ 2032.00 payment credited, never made $13,749.32 added to balanceTotal = $186,317.81 Added to Freeman balance * Asyou will read below, some of these numbers may have been off-set, but it is impossible to tell . Specifically, the loan is nearly impossible to follow in its current form. The transaction history is not complete, but is broken across multiple systems ranging from those used by WAMU and Chase. This fact makes one question the validity of the servicing of the loan in totality and what type of mistakes could have existed during that period. a. Throughout the life of the loan, large amounts were held in suspense without any itemization of the types of transactions or continuous history to verify that the bank is not making a mistake. b. The 2007 1098 highlights a precise amount of late fees paid, which was inaccurate according to the payment history. c. The account history is comprised mostly of unknown codes without a clear way of describing the entries for the perceived consumer of this information, Mr. Freeman. d. In the Chase letter 2/13/12 - Chase admits to miscalculating the interest due during a potential Loan modification, which should have took place in September of 2011. It took five months to correct this error, which is approximately $18,120.18.BILL FREEMAN
SEEKING JUSTICE e. In January of 2012, large Principal and Interest adjustments ($121,500 and $20,830.08) were added and subtracted from the principal loan balance with no explanation or justification. f. In January 2012 $3,598.85 was subtracted across Escrow, Interest Paid, and Principal line items with a description of Misapplication Reversal. No explanation was provided to why this occurred. g. In February 2012 $1,969.49 was subtracted across Escrow, Interest Paid, and Principal line items with the description of Misapplication Reversal. No explanation was provided to why this occurred. This misapplication reversal was later reversed with an adjustment to off book suspense account. h. In November 2011 there are 18 examples of Misapplication Reversals whose values range from $833.33 to $3,598.85. There are no explanations to any of these entries and no reconciliation against the potential phantom suspense account. i. In November 2011 there are two entries that have a description of Principal and Interest Adjustment. The items range between $0 and $14,704.36. This item is in addition to the numerous Misapplication Reversal entries made during the same time frame and lacked any type of explanation. j. In July 2011 there are two Misapplication Reversal entries without any explanation. These items range between $0 to $2,974.04. k. In May 2011 there is a Misapplication Reversal without any explanation with a value of $2,974.06. l. In August 2010 Two Principal and Interest Adjustments were made without explanation. These items ranged between $0 to $14,704.36.BILL FREEMAN
SEEKING JUSTICE 2. Fees were added to the suspense account without a reasonable explanation of their purpose or their magnitude. a. Late fees began with a magnitude of $99.14 in 2005. By 2008 this fee was priced at $123.16 or a 24.22% increase. These fees continued to increase and were set at $157.15 by 2010 or a 58.51% increase since the origination date. b. Unknown fees were assessed and added to the suspense account. The first example of this practice was a $50 fee added on 4/23/07. c. Page 4 of 17 of the mortgage states that late payments will be taken out on the next payment. This does not always occur. 3. As per Page 4 of 17 in the original Mortgage Loan Documentation, the application of payments shall be applied in the following order: a. Interest Due under the Note b. Principal Due under the Note c. Amounts Due under [Escrow Items] d. The actual application of the payments did not follow this methodology. The amount received from a payment is split into two portions despite the fact that it was received on the same day. The first allocation was insufficient to cover the interest and escrow due, forcing a draw from the principal balance. In essence a random amount of negative amortization was taken when additional principal payment was available. The remaining of the amount received is then allocated to theBILL FREEMAN
SEEKING JUSTICE principal balance, but associated with the next month’s payment. 4. Unpaid interest is immediately treated as capitalized interest but called deferred interest 5. The original mortgage note has a 125% limitation on the unpaid principal. With the original note of $595,000 - This limit is $743,750. Despite tens of thousands of dollars in payments every year since 2005, the total amount due is $738,597.91 6. The minimum payment only accelerated the negative amortization and the deceptive banking practices. It is unreasonable for the average consumer to understand the debt incurred by paying the amount the bank told them to pay. 7. At no time do the statements explain how negative amortization works or how it will make servicing the existing loan impossible. 8. At no time does the statements show how the payment structure will affect the payment period or required payment amounts over time. 9. Numerous payments were processed days after the billing date, generating a suspect late fee.10. The limits to the required payments make paying off the loan unobtainable. As the APR increases and the payment stays constant, the amount negatively amortized grows and grows. BILL FREEMAN
SEEKING JUSTICE11. The overall nature of the transaction histories examined, is difficult to follow and full of inconsistencies a. The Escrow payments are arranged sequentially by processed date but are listed as occurring during the previous month activity 12. As per Page 4 of 17 in the original Mortgage Loan Documentation, the application of payments shall be applied in the following order: a. Interest Due under the Note b. Principal Due under the Note c. Amounts Due under [Escrow Items] The actual application of the payments did not follow this methodology. As evident in the figure below the amount received from a payment is split into two portions despite the fact that it was received on the same day. The first allocation was insufficient to cover the interest and escrow due, forcing a draw from the principal balance. In essence a random amount of negative amortization was taken when additional principal payment was available BILL FREEMAN
SEEKING JUSTICE The remaining of the amount received is then allocated to the principal balance, but associated with the next month’s payment. 13. As per the Adjustable Rate Rider to the original Mortgage Note, the adjustable rate is based on an index linked to a specific US Treasury Security. The index uses a rolling 12-month average of these published rates to identify the new effective rate. a. The changing rate is identified in the loan history with each adjustment. b. The principal balance is listed with each adjustment, which provides a reference point. c. As discussed in item 2. In this report, the balance does not reflect the full principal payment made by the Payee.BILL FREEMAN
SEEKING JUSTICE This additional payment is not reflected until the next billing cycle.GAAP- 14. General Inconsistencies - Throughout this history certain fees were not applied consistently from month to month. A suspense account was maintained for all additional requirements for the loan. Within this account are numerous unnecessary fees that were then reversed during the next period. These mistakes bring the accuracy of the entire history into question. 15. Page 4 of 17 of the mortgage states that late payments will be taken out on the next payment. This does not always occur. 16. Late Fees are not consistent from year to year. At times they shift during the year. When the loan originated the fee began at 99.14. By 2010 those fees grew $15715 a 58.5% increase. 17. Multiple Late Fees are assessed on the same day 18. Unknown or explained fees occur throughout the life of the loan. These occurred on the billing statement without explanation and not referenced on the billing history. They also occurred in the billing history without explanation and added to off ledger suspense account (see below). 19. Suspense account (labeled w on billing history) used to hold and allocate numerous types of transactions without any BILL FREEMAN
SEEKING JUSTICE itemization on the ledger or any sort of rolling history or balance information in the billing history. 20. In 2007 the monthly mortgage statements describe the amount of interest paid, but the information filed on the 1098R does not match those documents. The approach is very deceptive. The terminology is shifted to Deferred Interest or Interest Received. 21. Late fees do not add up to the total on the 1098 which highlights the potential for other errors in the loan history ledgers (i.e. W suspense account.) 22. Unpaid interest is immediately treated as capitalized interest but called deferred interest 23. The original mortgage note has a 125% limitation on the unpaid principal. With the original note of $595,000 - This limit is $743,750. Despite tens of thousands of dollars in payments every year since 2005, the total amount due is $738,597.91 24. The minimum payment only accelerated the negative amortization and the deceptive banking practices. It is unreasonable for the average consumer to understand the debt incurred by paying the amount the bank told them to pay. 25. At no time do the statements explain how negative amortization works or how it will make servicing the existing loan impossible. 26. At no time does the statements show how the payment structure will affect the payment period or required payment amounts over time.BILL FREEMAN
SEEKING JUSTICE 27. Numerous payments were processed days after the billing date, generating a suspect late fee.The limits to the required payments: • Make paying off the loan unobtainable as the APR increases and the payment stays constant, the amount negatively amortized grows and grows.WAMU sold this owner a known predatory, subprime, Option Arm loanproduct with negative amortization.The minimum payment (which was lower than the interest paymentand therefore caused the loan to grow without stop. The minimumpayment is determined in a non-GAAP standards manner, usingprojected balances and interest rate to determine the minimum,which was intentionally kept low, it appears.UCC 3- OpinionThe rate of an ARM loan also adjusts monthly and if the loan rate washigher than the required interest in the payment, the balance of theloan would increase (negative amortization).WAMU‘s predatory loan product had another consequence ―The Option Arm loan product had a negative amortization whichpursuant to under UCC sec 3-104 renders the Note as non-negotiable. • (a)UCC § 3-104. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT: Except as provided in subsections (c) and (d), \"negotiable instrument\" means an unconditional promise to pay a fixed amount of money, with BILL FREEMAN
SEEKING JUSTICE or without interest or other charges described in the promise or order.. • The variable, unexplained changing principal balances in the transaction histories and statements fails this test.Thus rendering the note as non-negotiable, also subject to UCC 9.Paul Rodriguez:The owner of a small consulting company (averyharpersolutions.com)that specializes in providing tailored financial services to ourcustomers. They range from the straightforward transaction basedbookkeeping, accounts receivable, and accounts payablemanagement to more complicated financial analysis, budgeting,process improvement, and strategy development.EducationUniversity of Maryland College ParkMaster of Business Administration (M.B.A.)2009 MBA Association class representative - student governmentUS Coast Guard AcademyBachelor of Science (B.S.) BILL FREEMAN
SEEKING JUSTICEWILLIAM FREEMANAFFIDAVIT OF PRIVATE INVESTIGATORWILLIAM J. PAATALOJPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. Defendant.I, William J. Paatalo, being first duly sworn, hereby declare as follows:1. I am an Oregon licensed private investigator under ORS 703.430, and have met the necessaryrequirements under ORS 703.415. My Oregon PSID number is 49411.2. I am over the age of eighteen years, am of sound mind, having never been convicted of afelony or a crime or moral turpitude. I am competent in all respects to make this declaration, andif called to testify, I could and would competently testify thereto.3. I have 17 years combined experience in law enforcement and the mortgage industry. MyResume (\"CV\") is attached as \"Exhibit 1.\"4. I have worked exclusively over the last 6 - years investigatingforeclosure fraud, chain of title, and issues related to the securitization ofresidential and commercial mortgage loans, and have spent nearly 10,000 hours conductinginvestigatory research specifically related to mortgage securitization and chain of titlea5n.alysisI. have performed such analyses for residential real estate located inmany states, including but not limited to, Washington, Oregon, California, Arizona, Nevada,Florida, Ohio, Texas, Montana, New Jersey, and several otherstates.6. As of this date, I have conducted close to 900 investigations in thisarea.7. Because of my education and experience I am familiar with and have sufficient training andexpertise to qualify as an expert, and I have testified as an expert in state and federal judicialproceedings in variousjurisdictions throughout the UnitedStates. BILL FREEMAN
SEEKING JUSTICE8. Most recently, I was admitted testifying at trial as an expert witness onFebruary 25, 2015 in the following California Federal Bankruptcy case:Rivera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company: U.S. BK Court, Northern CA — Oakland- Case No. 14-54193-MEH-13.9. Some specific areas of my expertise that have been deemed qualified by the courts are asfollows: Knowledge of the \"Pooling & Servicing Agreements\" and various Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) filings associated with mortgage-backed securitized trusts. Specific language in the PSA's and Prospectus / Prospectus Supplements involving securitization participants, key dates, \"Servicer Advances,\" sources of third-party payments, and transfer and conveyancing requirements to name a few. Knowledge and use, as well as the interpretation forms Data\" showing \"advance payments\" made to the certificate holders / investors, as well as other information specific to accounting, chain of title, and other aspects of securitization. Chain of Title analyses based upon publicly recorded documents, documents produced in discovery, and documents attached as exhibits to foreclosure complaints. Documents typically include mortgages, deeds of trust, assignments, notes, and allonges; in addition to documents filed under penalty of perjury with the SEC.10. In developing the opinions in this affidavit, I relied upon documents filed under penalty ofperjury with the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC), publicly recorded documents in theFederal Court's PACER System, documents submitted by the parties in this action, documentsfrom current and past investigations, and documents provided by Plaintiff.11. I was retained by the Plaintiff and Plaintiffs’ counsel to review the chain of title andsecuritization of two Mortgages and Notes which are the subject of this action. I was asked topoint out any discrepancies or issues of fact regarding the chain of title and to render an opinion asto whether the subject loans were securitized and sold by the originating entity \"WashingtonMutual Bank,F.A.\"12. The following documents were inspected and/ or marked as exhibits:• Defendant's Affidavit of Michael P. McCormick in Support of Motion forSummary Judgment & Exhibits executed March 2, 2016.Exhibit 2— JPMorgan Chase \"Press Release\" September 25, 2008. Exhibit 3— Deposition Transcript— Crystal DavisExhibit 4— Crystal Davis Deposition Exhibit — Private Investor Codes BILL FREEMAN
SEEKING JUSTICEExhibit 5— Servicer Screenshots for subject loans with investor code \"AOIExhibit 6 —\"3270 Explorer: Loan Transfer History\" screenshot — KelleyCase Exhibit 7 —Deposition Transcript — Cynthia Riley — Orozco CaseExhibit 8 — Freeman MortgagesExhibit 9 — Freeman Notes w/EndorsementsExhibit 10 — Email from Richard C. Naylor — JPMorgan ChaseExhibit 11 — Chase \"Investor\" disclosure letters 13. Having reviewed the above documents, my professional opinions areas follows: a. Washington Mutual Bank, F.A. (WMBFA) securitized the Freeman Mortgages and Notes through one of its non-bank subsidiaries who then sold the securities to private investors. These sales transactions prior to the FDIC's takeover of Washington Mutual Bank (WMB) are being concealed from the Court, along with the identity of the current private investor(s) for the subject loans. And, b. As such, the Defendant (JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.)(hereinafter \"JPMC\") acquired no more than the servicing rights to the Freeman loans from theFDIC, and does not have an undivided ownership interest in either of the subject loans.EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF OPINIONS WaMu's \"Off-Balance Sheet Activities\"14. On April 13, 2011, the U.S. Senate's \"Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations\" publishedan investigative report that includes a detailed analysis of WaMu's securitization activities leadingup to the financial collapse in 2008. The report can found be found at the following governmentwebsite address:https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/medialsenat e-investigations-subcommittee-releases-levin-coburn-report-on-thefinancial-crisis15. The findings of fact in this report, combined with evidence in this case and affidavit, lead meto the opinions I've outlined above.16. Key excerpts from the report are as follows:Pg.116-E. Polluting the Financial SystemWashington Mutual, as the nation's largest thrift, was a leading issuer of home loans. When manyof those loans began to go bad, they caused significant damage to the financial system. BILL FREEMAN
SEEKING JUSTICEAccording to a 2007 WaMu presentation, by 2006. Washington Mutual was the second largestnon-agency issuer of mortgage backed securities in the United States: behind Countrywide.By securitizing billions of dollars in poor quality loans, WaMu and Long Beach could decrease theirrisk exposure while passing along risk to others in the financial system. They polluted the financialsystem with mortgage backed securities which later incurred high rates of delinquency and loss. Attimes, WaMu securitized loans that it had identified as likely to go delinquent, without disclosing itsanalysis to investors to whom it sold the securities, and securitized loans tainted by fraudulentinformation, without notifying purchasers of the fraud that was discovered and known to the bank.Pg. 1 17 -According to a 2007 WaMu presentation at a securities investor meeting in New York, in 2004, WaMuissued $37.2 billion in RMBS securitizations and was the sixth largest RMBS issuer in the UnitedStates. In 2005, it doubled its production, issuing $73.8 billion in securitizations, and became the thirdlargest issuer. 2006, it issued $72.8 billion and was the second largest issuer, behind Countrywide.Pg. 1 19 -\"WaMu Capital Corp. acted as an underwriter of securitization transactions generally involvingWashington Mutual Mortgage Securities Corp. or WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp. Generally, one ofthe two entities would sell loans into a securitization trust in exchange for securities backed by theloans in question, and WaMu Capital Corp. would then underwrite the securities consistent withindustry standards. As an underwriter, WaMu Capital Corp. sold mortgage-backed securities to awide variety of institutional investors. WCC sold WaMu and Long Beach loans and RMBS securities toinsurance companies, pension funds, hedge funds, other banks, and investment banks. It also soldWaMu loans to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. WCC personnel marketed WaMu and Long Beach loansboth in the United States and abroad.Before WCC could act as a sole underwriter, WaMu and Long Beach worked with a variety ofinvestment banks to arrange, underwrite, and sell its RMBS securitizations, including Bank of America,Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Royal Bank ofScotland, and UBS. To securitize its loans, WaMu typically assembled and sold a pool of loans to aqualifying special-purpose entity (QSPE) that it established for that purpose, typically a trust.The QSPE then issued RMBS securities secured by future cash flows from the loan pool. Next, theQSPE — working with WCC and usually an investment bank — sold the RMBS securities to investors,and used the sale proceeds to repay WaMu for the cost of the loan pool. Washington Mutual Inc.generally retained the right to service the loans.17. This analysis is also supported by Washington Mutual, Inc.'s 10-Qfiling with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on June 30,2008 which states on (p.60),Off-Balance Sheet Activities BILL FREEMAN
SEEKING JUSTICEThe Company transforms loans into securities through a process known as securitization. When theCompany securitizes loans, the loans are usually sold to a qualifying special-purpose entity (\"QSPE\"),typically a trust. The QSPE, in turn, issues securities, commonly referred to as asset-backed securities,which are secured by future cash flows on the sold loans. The QSPE sells the securities to investors,which entitle the investors to receive specified cash flows during the term of the security. The QSPEuses the proceeds from the sale of these securities to pay the Company for the loans sold to the QSPE.These QSPEs are not consolidated within the financial statements since they satisfy the criteriaestablished by Statement No. 140, Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets andExtinguishments of Liabilities. In general, these criteria require the QSPE to be legally isolated fromthe transferor (the Company), be limited to permitted activities, and have defined limits on the typesof assets it can hold and the permitted sales, exchanges or distributions of its assets.18. Having investigated the WaMu/FDIC/Chase fact pattern for more than six-years, and havinginvestigated hundreds of foreclosure cases where JPMC claims sole ownership of specific WMB loansby a \"Purchase & Assumption Agreement\" (PAA) with the FDIC, one fact is now well established —no schedule or inventory of assets listing any specific WMB mortgage loan acquired by JPMC exists,or has ever been produced or disclosed. The reason for this fact is the clear majority of residentialmortgage loans were securitized throughWaMu's \"Off-Balance Sheet Activities.\"JPMC did not acquire the Assets of WaMu's Non-Bank subsidiaries.19. The McCormick Affidavit states that JPMC is the owner of both loans by the PAA. (McCormickAff. I's 1 1, 13, 31, 32). For years now, JPMC has been getting away with a massive presumption thatit acquired everything Washington Mutual by the PAA, yet the mortgage loans they claim to haveacquired were not \"on the books\" of \"Washington Mutual Bank\" at the time the \"Office of ThriftSupervision\" (OTS) took control of WMB.20. Attached as Exhibit 2 is JPMorgan Chase's own press release from September 25, 2008 whichstates the following on p.l, 115, \"JPMorgan Chase will not be acquiring any assets or liabilities of thebank 's parent holding company(WM) or the holding company’s non-bank subsidiaries.\"21. As outlined above, the two non-bank subsidiaries of Washington Mutual responsible for thesecuritization of mortgage-backed securities were \"Washington Mutual Asset AcceptanceCorporation\" (WMAAC) and \"Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities Corporation\" (WMMSC).22. Both WMAAC and WMMSC are still active and continue to file regular \"ABS 15G — AssetBacked Security Reports\" with the \"Securities & Exchange Commission\" (SEC.) Here are the SEC linksto both entities most recent filings:WMAAC \"ABS 15G\" filed May 12, 2016:http://www.secinfo.com/dsbR9.wlDu.htm BILL FREEMAN
SEEKING JUSTICEWMMSC \"ABS 15G\" filed May 12, 2016:http://www.secinfo.com/dsbR9.w Id2t3.h.tm Both WMMSC and WMAAC have regularly disclosed the following in these SEC filings:\"WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp., as Securitize, is filing this Form ABS-15G in respect of all mortgage-backed securities representing interests in pools of residential mortgage loans for which it acted asdepositor and which are outstanding during the reporting period. On September 25, 2008,JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association (“JPMCB \") acquired the banking operations ofWashington Mutual Bank from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation(“FDIC, it is JPMCB's position that certain of the repurchase obligations of Washington Mutual Bankremain with the FDIC receivership. Assets are reported herein in accordance with Rule 15Ga-1regardless of the validity of the demand or defenses thereto, and nothing in this report shallconstitute, or be deemed, a waiver of any rights, defenses, powers or privileges of any partyrelating to these assets.\"24. There have been voluminous \"ABS 15G\" reports filed by these entities post receivership, andeach one contains an attached \"Exhibit 99. I \" listing\"Demand in Dispute\" assets, or what is commonly referred to as \"put-back demands\" againstthese entities by investors. The disputed amounts are enormous, and appear to total somewherein the proximity of $145,000,000,000.00 ($ 145B).25. I searched JPMorgan Chase's 10-K filings with the SEC to find out if there was any mention ofthese potential liabilities to its investors. I could not find any disclosures of these potential\"repurchase\" liabilities. Thus, it appears that the investors who own these loans want their moneyback but are being ignored or placed in an indefinite holding pattern. JPMC, as servicer for theseinvestors, is continuing its quest to harvest these assets belonging to these undisclosed investorsthrough foreclosures when by its own admission, JPMC did not acquire these nonbanksubsidiaries' assets.Private investors own the subject loans, and their identity is being concealed.26. Attached as Exhibit 5, p.l is a servicing system screenshot titled,\"3270 Explorer\" which was provided to me by Plaintiff through discovery efforts. This screenshot isdated 03/02/2009 and refers to \"Loan Number 0694342957\" which is associated with the \"135Randolph Ave\" mortgage. This document shows an investor code \"AOI \" directly beneath the topline. The same investor codes\"AOI \" is shown on the servicing screenshot for this loan on 12/31/2005 (Exhibit27. Exhibit 5. P.3 is the servicer screenshot for the \"39 Side Rd\" mortgage (\"Loan Number0690183454\") dated 12/31/2005 which also shows the same investor code \"AOI.\"
SEEKING JUSTICE28. From experience, I have seen and reviewed JPMC's servicing records for WMB originated loanswithin JPMC's \"3270 Explorer\" servicing platform. This system / platform contains a specificscreenshot which shows the \"loan transfer history\" (Screen: \"Explorer 3270 — LNTH\") for theseloans.29. From experience, I have seen complete LNTH screenshots for theseWaMu loans provided by JPMC, but usually they are produced with great reluctance andthrough motions to compel. When produced, these LNTH screens tell an entirely different storyabout the loans; specifically, all the sales and transfers conducted prior to the FDIC'sreceivership.30. Attached as Exhibit 6 is a \"3270 Explorer: Loan Transfer History (LNTH)\" screenshot providedby JPMC in a very similar case which I have been involved captioned Kelley_ v. JPMorgan Chase Bank,N.A.: U.S. BK CT.ND CA, Adv. Case No. 10-05245.31. Like the Freeman loans, the Kelley loan was also originated byWashington Mutual Bank, F.A. Exhibit 6 shows the entire LNTH from origination through the FDICreceivership. The beginning \"Investor Code\" at the inception of the loan is \"030\" on 08/07/07. Theloan is then sold and transferred to a \"New/love\" (new investor) on 09/01/07 with the \"Investor Code— AOI;\" The same code for both Freeman loans on 12/31/2005. It can be logically deduced from thisevidence that the same originator code of \"030\" should also exist on the Freeman loans if WMBFAwas the originator.32. A deposition of JPMC employee \"Crystal Davis\" occurred in the Kelley case on August 13, 2014.A copy of the Davis Deposition Transcript was filed in the PACER System and a copy is attached tothis affidavit as Exhibit 3. Exhibit 4 is a glossary of codes exhibit provided by JPMC in that deposition.33. Crystal Davis explains the investor codes on p.42 as follows:(About Exhibit 4)Q. Now if you look to the right of that, it states that the claim — the investor IDs begin with anA through V; is that correct?A. In the current MSP platform, yes, indicates private investor loans.Q. And what would X, Y,Z indicate?A. Those would indicate bank-owned assets.33. It is very likely that the complete LNTH screenshots for both subject loans, if ever produced,will show similar sales transactions from WMB to \"New/lnv — AOI.\" The identity of investor \"AOI\" has not been disclosed and is being concealed from the Court and the Plaintiff. I believe this isintentional.Chase Admits Then Denies BILL FREEMAN
SEEKING JUSTICE34. In cases I have reviewed across the country, borrowers have made and continue to make,inquiries to their servicer \"Chase\" for the identity of the investor(s) of their WaMu loan(s) only tobe told,\"Your loan was sold into a public security managed by JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. and may includea number of investors. As the servicer of your loan, Chase is authorized by the security to handleany related concerns on their behalf\" (Exhibit 11).35. Exhibit 11 is two letters provided by Chase to borrower clients of mine with this language. Inboth cases, after having made these admissions to the borrowers, JPMorgan Chase took theposition in court that it was the sole owner of the loans by the PAA, and there were no investorsassociated with these loans because WaMu never sold or securitized the loans. Such is the casehere.36. Attached as Exhibit 10 is an email to the Plaintiff dated 12/22/2011 from \"Richard C. Naylor —Operations Manager I — AVP — JPMorgan Chase.\" Mr.Naylor was responding to Mr. Freeman's inquiries regarding a HAMP modification. The email states,\"The lowest possible rate for the HAMP program is 2%, the longest possible term with this investoris 480 months.\" (Exhibit 10, 115).37. This evidence shows that JPMorgan Chase is either lying to the borrowers or the Courts.The Cynthia A. Riley Endorsements \"In-Blank.\" 38. As further proof that WaMu sold and securitized the loans to a private investor(s), both Freeman Notes contain endorsements \"in blank\" by\"Cynthia A. Riley — Vice President — Washington Mutual Bank, N.A.\" (Exhibit9.3) 9. The following is taken from the sworn deposition testimony ofCynthia Riley taken on 01/15/2013 in the matter of JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.v. Eduardo Orozco etal. Florida, I Ith Judicial Circuit Case No. 2009-CA-29997.(Exhibit 7.) I retrieved this deposition transcript from the government's PACER System from theKelley case - James Madison Kelley v. JPMorgan Chase Bank.N.A. U.S. B/C Ct. Northern District ofCA -Div.5. Adv. Case No. 10-05245.40. According to Riley's deposition testimony, she worked inWashington Mutual's \"Secondary Delivery Operations\" from 2004 — 2006. This unit was responsiblefor handling, inspecting, and endorsing notes immediately after origination for purposes of sellinginto the secondary market. The \"bulk\" of the loans endorsed with Riley's stamp were sold to FannieMae andFreddie Mac with the remainder being sold to private investors. From the deposition: BILL FREEMAN
SEEKING JUSTICEQ. Yes. I'll rephrase the question. You were passing loans to the secondary market, andyou've indicated that Freddie and Fannie included some of the — (Object Omitted)A., We sold loans for Freddie and Fannie. The actual percentage I have -- I do not know. The bulkof our work was sold to Freddie and Fannie.Q. Okay. And that's where my question goes. As far as the bulk of your work going to Freddie andFannie, were there also private investors besides Freddie and Fannie that were buying loans inthe secondary market?A. Yes.Q. Okay. And those entities would be entities such as?A. Lehman comes to mind, Ocwen comes to mind, Bayview.(See Exhibit 7 — Cynthia Riley Deposition p. 41 line 12-25, p.42, line 1-5).Q. All right. With regards to your work here in Jacksonville between June of2004 and Novemberof2006, what types of things would you supervise being done for loans to be sold to thesecondary market?(Object Omitted)A. The unit -- I managed one of the units related to the notes that -- the notes comes in the door.It's reviewed for accuracy and moved to the custodian. It's endorsed and moved to the custodian.That was one of the units in secondary delivery operations.(See Exhibit 7 — Cynthia Riley Deposition p. 46, line 9-18).41. Of note, Cynthia Riley testified that she has never personally put an endorsement stamp on anote. (See Exhibit 7 — Cynthia Riley Depositionp. 58 line 19-22). 42. For the reasons outlined above, I reaffirm my opinions as set forthin 114(a-b) above.I declare that the foregoing statements are true and correct to the best of mypresent knowledge, information and belief.Executed at , Montana this 13th day of July 2016.BILL FREEMAN
SEEKING JUSTICESTATE OF MONTANA)) SS. July 13, 2016COUNTY OF STILLWATER)On this 13th day of July 2016, before me, the undersigned officer, personally appeared William Paatalo,whose identity was satisfactorily proved to me, and who executed the foregoing instrument as his freeact and deed and for the purposes therein contained, and acknowledged that the foregoing statementsare true and correct.In witness whereof I hereunto set my hand. FAYE A WROLSON My Commission Expires: NOTARY PUBLIC for State of Montana Residing at Nye. Montana Commission Expires Juty 14, 2016BILL FREEMAN
SEEKING JUSTICEContactWilliam [email protected] FREEMAN
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