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Home Explore Underestimated: Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future

Underestimated: Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future

Published by nbaballa05, 2017-04-18 16:32:30

Description: With the world focused on the nuclear crisis in Iran, it is tempting to think that addressing this case, North Korea, and the problem of nuclear terrorism is all that matters and is what matters most. Perhaps, but if states become more willing to use their nuclear weapons to achieve military advantage, the problem of proliferation will become much more unwieldy. In this case, U.S. security will be hostage not just to North Korea, Iran, or terrorists, but to nuclear proliferation more generally, diplomatic miscalculations, and wars between a much larger number of possible players. This, in a nutshell, is the premise of Underestimated: Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future, which explores what nuclear futures we may face over the next 3 decades and how we currently think about this future. Will nuclear weapons spread in the next 20 years to more nations than just North Korea and possibly Iran? How great will the consequences be? What can be done?

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167. The United States suspended all civilian nuclear coop-eration with Russia shortly after it invaded the Crimea. China’scivilian nuclear cooperative agreement with the United States isdue to expire by December 2015. On the questionable safety ofRussian and Chinese reactor construction, see Tara Patel and Ben-jamin Hass, “China Regulators ‘Overwhelmed’ As Reactor Build-ing Steams Ahead,” Bloomberg News, June 20, 2014, available fromwesthawaiitoday.com/news/nation-world-news/china-regulators-over-whelmed-reactor-building-steams-ahead; Luna Lin, “Concerns overChina’s Nuclear Power Expansion,” Chinadialogue (blog), April24, 2014, available from www.chinadialogue.net/blog/6932-Concerns-over-China-s-nuclear-power-expansion/en; Christina MacPherson,“China’s Nuclear Safety Prospects Are Not Good,” nuclear-news,October 29, 2013, available from nuclear-news.net/2013/10/29/chinas-nuclear-safety-prospects-are-not-good/; Eve Conant, “Rus-sia’s Nuclear Reactors Could Take Over the World, Safe or Not,”Scientific American, October 2013, available from www.scientificamerican.com/article/russias-nuclear-reactors-could-take-over-the-world-safe-or-not/; and Quamrul Haider, “How Safe Are the Rus-sian Civilian Nuclear Reactors?” Daily Star (Lebanon), June 12,2013, available from archive.thedailystar.net/beta2/news/how-safe-are-the-russian-civilian-nuclear-reactors/. 168. See Bob Graham et al., World At Risk: The Report of theCommission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism,New York: Vintage Books, pp. 49-50, available from www.cfr.org/terrorism/world-risk-report-commission-prevention-wmd-proliferation-terrorism/p17910. 169. See endnote 143, and Victor Gilinsky and Henry Sokolski,“Is the IAEA’s Safeguards Strategic Plan Sufficient?” a paper pre-sented at the International Atomic Energy Agency Symposium onInternational Safeguards: Linking Strategy, Implementation andPeople, Vienna, Austria, October 22, 2014, available from npolicy.org/article_file/IAEA_Safeguard_Strategic_Plan.pdf; Trevor Finlay,The IAEA and Noncompliance Reporting, Cambridge, MA: Projecton Managing the Atom, Report No. 2015-04, October 2015, avail-able from belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/proliferationalert-web.pdf. 170. On these points, see Octavian Manea, “Lessons from Pre-vious Competitive Strategies,” Small Wars Journal, July 6, 2014,available from smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/lessons-from-previous-competitive-strategies; and Octavian Manea, “The Art of Tailoring 127

Competitive Strategies,” Small Wars Journal, March 24, 2014, avail-able from smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-art-of-tailoring-competi-tive-strategies. 171. See Victor Gilinsky, “Sometimes Major Violations of Nu-clear Security Get Ignored,” in Henry Sokolski, ed., Nuclear Mate-rials Gone Missing: What Does History Teach? Carlisle, PA: StrategicStudies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2014, available fromwww.npolicy.org/books/Materials_Unaccounted_For/Ch4_Gilinsky.pdf; and Robert Zarate, “The Nonuse and Abuse of Nuclear Pro-liferation Intelligence in the Cases of North Korea and Iran,” andLeonard Weiss, “The 1979 South Atlantic Flash: The Case for anIsraeli Nuclear Test,” in Henry Sokolski, ed., Moving Beyond Pre-tense: Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation, Carlisle, PA: StrategicStudies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2014, pp. 345-371, 373-409, available from www.npolicy.org/books/Moving_Beyond_Pre-tense/Ch14_Zarate.pdf and www.npolicy.org/books/Moving_Beyond_Pretense/Ch13_Weiss.pdf. 172. Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries ConstrainTheir Nuclear Capabilities, Washington, DC: Woodrow WilsonPress, 1995, pp. 90-129; and Eugene Kogan, “Coercing Allies:Why Friends Abandon Nuclear Plans,” paper presented at theAmerican Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Chicago,IL, August 2013, available from live.belfercenter.org/files/kogan-apsa-aug-2013.pdf. 173. See David J. Andre, “Competitive Strategies: An Ap-proach against Proliferation” and Henry D. Sokolski, “Nonprolif-eration: Strategies for Winning, Losing, and Coping,” in Henry D.Sokolski, ed., Prevailing in a Well-Armed World: Devising Competi-tive Strategies against Weapons Proliferation, Carlisle, PA: StrategicStudies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2000, pp. 3-25, 51-64,available from www.npolicy.org/thebook.php?bid=16. Also see Hen-ry D. Sokolski, “Fighting Proliferation with Intelligence,” ORBIS,Vol. 38, No. 2, Spring 1994, pp. 245-260, available from fas.org/irp/threat/fp/b19ch16.htm. 174. For specific examples, see endnote 172 and Henry Sokol-ski, “Ending South Africa’s Rocket Program: A NonproliferationSuccess,” Washington, DC: Nonproliferation Policy EducationCenter, August 31, 1993, available from www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=458&tid=2. 128

175. Although today there are virtually no respectable, hawk-ish or hard-headed works on what sorts of nuclear arms controlmight be useful; this was not always the case. Thirty or more yearsago, before arms control practice became dominated by mutualassured destruction theorizing, several distinguished military sci-entists, including Fred Iklé, Albert Wohlstetter, Leon Sloss, Don-ald Brennan and Alain C. Enthoven, all believed unconstrainednuclear competitions and strategic weapons proliferation was lessthan optimal and seriously considered what sort of arms controlmight be practical. See, e.g., See Albert and Roberta Wohlstet-ter, “On Arms Control: What We Should Look for in an ArmsAgreement,” unpublished draft essay, May 20, 1985, available atthe Hoover Institution Archive, Albert and Roberta WohlstetterPapers, Notes, Box 118, Folder 16, available in Robert Zarate andHenry Sokolski, eds., Nuclear Heuristics: Selected Writings of Albertand Roberta Wohlstetter, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute,U.S. Army War College, 2009, pp. 472-500, available from www.npolicy.org/userfiles/file/Nuclear%20Heuristics-On%20Arms%20Control.pdf; Albert Wohlstetter and Brian C. Chow, “Arms Con-trol that Could Work,” The Wall Street Journal, July 17, 1985, avail-able from www.npolicy.org/article_file/Arms_Control_That_Could_Work.pdf; Fred Charles Iklé, “Nth Countries and Disarmament,Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 16, No. 10, December 1960,pp. 391-394, available from csis.org/images/stories/ikle/038.Bulleti-nAtomicSc1960.pdf; Leon Sloss and M. Scott Davis, eds., Game forHigh Stakes: Lessons Learned in Negotiating with the Soviets, NewYork: Harper Business, 1986; Alain C. Enthoven and K. WayneSmith, How Much Is Enough: Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969, New York: Harper and Rowe, 1971; and Donald G. Brennan,ed., Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security, New York:George Braziller, 1969. 176. Cf., J. Peter Scoblic, US vs. Them: Conservatism in theAge of Nuclear Terror, New York: Penguin Books, 2009; and JohnWohlstetter, “Nuclear Zero 2012: We Disarm While Others Arm,”Human Events, September 12, 2012, available from humanevents.com/2012/09/12/nuclear-zero-2012-we-disarm-while-others-arm/. 177. See Henry D. Sokolski, “Preface,” in Henry D. So-kolski, ed., Getting MAD, pp. v-vi, available from npolicy.org/books/Getting_MAD/Preface_Sokolski.pdf; and “Taking ProliferationSeriously.” 129

178. See Henry R. Nau, “Conservative Internationalism: ASmarter Kind of Engagement in World Affairs,” September 30,2013, National Review Online, available from www.nationalreview.com/nrd/articles/358318/conservative-internationalism; and Conserva-tive Internationalism: Armed Diplomacy under Jefferson, Polk, Tru-man, and Reagan, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013. 179. Since George F. Kennan’s publication of American Diplo-macy, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago, 1984, there has been apopular belief that international law that claims to promote in-ternational security is generally at odds with our national secu-rity. However, there are alternative views that could and haveguided U.S. diplomacy and national security policies. Principalamong these is the life work of Elihu Root, U.S. Secretary Stateunder President Theodore Roosevelt, Secretary of War from 1899to 1904, Nobel Peace Prize winner, founding architect of the Per-manent Court of International Justice, and founder of the Ameri-can Society of International Law. On his career and advocacy ofpromoting international laws to promote and protect America’snational interests, see Erik A. Moore, “Imperial InternationalLaw: Elihu Root and the Legalist Approach to American Empire,”Essays in History, 2013, available from www.essaysinhistory.com/articles/2013/172; and Robert E. Hannigan, The New World Power:American Foreign Policy, 1989-1917, Philadelphia, PA: Universityof Pennsylvania Press, 2002. 180. See Henry D. Sokolski, “Ten Regrets,” available fromnpolicy.org/article_file/Ten_Regrets-Americas_Nonproliferation_Efforts_against_Iran.pdf. 130

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE Major General William E. Rapp Commandant *****STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE andU.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS Director Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr. Director of Research Dr. Steven K. Metz Author Henry D. Sokolski Editor for Production Dr. James G. Pierce Publications Assistant Ms. Rita A. Rummel ***** Composition Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil



UNDERESTIMATED: Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future“Everyone worried about nuclear issues will “Underestimated could not be moreprofit enormously from this book.” timely and important. We need a serious–Ambassador John R. Bolton, public debate about nuclear weapons, theformer Under Secretary of State for Arms dangers they still pose, and their roleControl and International Security in twenty-first century policymaking. Sokolski’s thoughtful, provocative“This book is excellent, timely, book is the right place to start.”comprehensive, and persuasive.” –Eric Schlosser,–Ambassador Joseph R. DeTrani, Author, Command and Control: Nuclearformer Director of the National Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and theCounterproliferation Center Illusion of Safetyof the Office of the Director of NationalIntelligence “This is a book that belongs on the shelf of every policymaker.”“Get it. It's required reading.” –Dov S. Zakheim,–Ambassador Robert L. Gallucci, former Under Secretary of DefenseGeorgetown University,former Dean of Edmund A. WalshSchool of Foreign Service“An excellent, short-winded read.” U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE–Carnes Lord,Director, Naval War College Press FOR THIS AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS, VISIT US AT http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ This Publication SSI Website USAWC Website


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