Individual Differences in Affect Regulation 331 functional but instead found its adjustment on the COPE could serve several regulatory correlates to be complex; the positive cor- strategies; it would be interesting to clarify relation with Social Support suggests some empirically the processes that account for positive adjustment implications. Concep- positive effects of religiosity on well-being, tually, we suggest, this scale combines two which may include antecedent processes, distinct processes with potentially different such as reappraisal or distraction, or even adjustment implications. On the one hand, response modulation via lowering suppres- items like “I get upset, and am really aware sion, because prayer may offer a safe place of it” are conceptually related to rumina- for emotional expression by sharing feelings tion (Nolen-H oeksema, Parker, & Larson, with a trusted higher entity. 1994); focusing on a negative emotion will likely intensify the experience of that emo- Consistent with our earlier observation tion further and thus make down-regulation that coping styles are defined rather broadly, more difficult, leading to lower adjustment several COPE scales fall clearly outside and well-being. On the other hand, items the scope of the affect regulation domain. like “I feel a lot of emotional distress and I For example, the Suppression of Compet- find myself expressing those feelings a lot” ing Activities scale and the Restraint Cop- describe an individual whose emotion expe- ing scale involve behavioral responses that rience and expression are congruent (Mauss reflect problem-focused coping, showing et al., 2011); congruence between experience that coping efforts are often directed at and expression, and sharing of emotions problems or events in the external world with others, can increase authenticity and that interfere with the individual’s goals, generate greater closeness with others, lead- even though they do not cause a specific ing to higher well-being (English & John, emotional response. Several other COPE 2013). If the research goal is to understand scales refer to long-term adjustments some individual differences relevant to affect reg- individuals make as a consequence of the ulation and how these individual differences stressful experience, a timescale outside the are related to important life outcomes, such more limited time frame of the immediate as well-being and relationship functioning, emotion regulatory episode. This temporal then less complex measures may be needed issue applies to Behavioral Disengagement to provide conceptual clarity and coherence (“I just give up trying to reach my goal”), in findings. Acceptance (“I learn to live with it”; “I get used to the idea that it happened”), Denial A similar analysis applies to the two Seek- (“I act as though it hasn’t even happened”), ing Social Support scales on the COPE— and the Growth component of Positive Rein- after all, talking to another person about terpretation and Growth (“I try to grow as a one’s problems requires some sharing and person as a result of the experience”). expression of feelings (i.e., low suppres- sion) and will serve to focus the individual Cognitive Emotion on these emotions rather than distract him Regulation Questionnaire or her from them (i.e., low distraction). In Although its name does not refer to stress contrast, the Mental Disengagement scale and coping, Garnefski and Kraaij’s (2007) (e.g., coping by turning to work; going to the Cognitive Emotion Regulation Question- movies) should relate most to distraction; naire (CERQ) also originated in the coping however, as Carver et al. (1989) noted, these approach. Like the COPE, the goal was to items represent a rather loose set of diverse assess a set of regulatory strategies that help activities. The inclusion of items about sleep people “to keep control over their emotions and daydreaming suggest a potential link during or after the experience of threaten- to situation selection as well, because these ing or stressful events” (Garnefski & Kraaij, activities can be performed for reasons other 2007, p. 141). However, the CERQ focuses than distraction (e.g., avoiding the stressful more narrowly than the COPE on cognitive situation). coping strategies, which are said to represent “the conscious, cognitive way of handling Drug and alcohol use “in order to think the intake of emotionally arousing informa- about it less” may also be related to distrac- tion” (p. 141). tion. As noted earlier in our discussion of prayer use, the Turning to Religion scale
332 PERSONALITY PROCESSES AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES The CERQ has a format very similar to ing style measures as well. For example, the the COPE and also consists of relatively brief three CERQ scales—P ositive Reappraisal (“I 4-item scales, “each referring to what some- think that I can become a stronger person as one thinks after the experience of threaten- a result of what has happened”), Refocus on ing or stressful events” (Garnefski & Kraaij, Planning (“I think of what I can do best”), 2007, p. 141). In other words, just like the and Putting into Perspective (“I think that coping styles on the COPE, these cognitive it hasn’t been too bad compared to other regulation dimensions focus on stressful things”)—all share elements of cognitive situations and have the longer time horizons change or reappraisal. Indeed, Garnefski (e.g., after the actual emotional experience) and Kraaij (2007) reported that Positive that differentiate coping styles from the spe- Reappraisal and Refocus on Planning corre- cific emotion-regulation processes defined in lated close to .70 in their adult participants. Gross’s model. Unfortunately, the ERQ (or COPE) was not included, thus providing no information Some of the nine CERQ scales were about the convergent validity of these three adapted from the COPE and other cop- new CERQ scales with earlier measures of ing instruments: “These dimensions were cognitive reappraisal. defined either by taking out or reformulat- ing the cognitive dimensions of existing cop- The second disadvantage of the purely ing measures (Carver et al., 1989; de Ridder, cognitive focus is that emotion researchers 1997), ‘transforming’ non-cognitive coping agree that emotions have not only experi- strategies into cognitive dimensions or add- ential but also behavioral–expressive com- ing new strategies on theoretical grounds” ponents (e.g., Mauss et al., 2011), and the (Garnefski & Kraaij, 2007, p. 142). Cop- coherence of these emotion response systems ing styles that were clearly cognitive, such is likely a function of regulatory processes. as Acceptance, Planning, and Positive Rein- Therefore, the omission of any scales related terpretation and Growth (renamed Positive to individual differences in response modu- Reappraisal) were retained from the COPE. lation, such as expressive suppression, would Behavioral and overly complex coping styles seem to make an instrument less useful for from the COPE, such as Use of Social Sup- research on individual differences in affect port, Substance Abuse, Humor, Religious regulation. Coping, and even Focus on and Venting of Emotions were left out of the CERQ. In conclusion, this comparison of three measures of coping styles and specific emo- In addition, some regulatory processes tion regulation processes suggests that there from other literatures were added, such as is some overlap between the two approaches. Focus on Thought/Rumination (e.g., “I Overall, however, the two approaches are often think about how I feel about what I surprisingly distinct. One core difference is have experienced”), Catastrophizing (e.g., that the constructs measured by all the cop- “I continually think how horrible the situa- ing questionnaires are defined in broader tion has been”), and Self-Blame (e.g., “I feel and more complex terms than the specific that I am the one to blame for it”). Again, emotion regulatory strategies. Several cop- as in the earlier coping measures, many of ing styles, especially the problem-focused the scales do not focus on the regulation ones, fall outside the domain of emotion reg- of internal experiences; rather, they focus ulation processes. A great methodological on the external, stressful situation, as illus- strength of the coping approach is its clear trated by the items on the Acceptance scale focus on stressful situations. Much coping (e.g., “I think that I have to accept the situa- research has studied individual differences tion”; “I think that I have to accept that this within the concrete context of a particular has happened”). stressful encounter (e.g., preparing for an upcoming test), focusing on the individu- In our view, the singular focus on “think- al’s behavioral and cognitive responses in ing” aspects in an instrument with nine dis- this situation. This contextually grounded tinct scales has two potential disadvantages. approach emphasizes what individuals actu- One is discriminant validity, in the sense that ally do, or try to do, in a specific context subsets of the scales become relatively simi- (even when reported on questionnaires or lar and thus highly correlated. This problem in interviews) and contrasts with global has been criticized in the two earlier cop-
Individual Differences in Affect Regulation 333 approaches such as the Big Five trait model by emotional genuineness of expressive dis- (e.g., John et al., 2008) that pay scant atten- play and reciprocity; and (8) capacity for tion to the context and instead assess broad emotional self-efficacy (i.e., individuals can trends in usual or typical behavior. accept their own emotional experiences and view themselves as generally feeling the way Future coping research may take a more they want to feel). Although not necessarily theoretically guided approach to resolve the accepted by all, these eight emotional com- conceptual complexity and heterogeneity petencies provide a formidable set of com- of the coping scales in terms of their affect plex socioemotional skills that researchers regulatory implications. Renewed scale con- in this tradition consider to be part of affect struction efforts may address the confound- regulation. Note that from the perspective ing of regulatory processes and downstream of the specific emotion regulation process adjustment outcomes within the same ques- approach, the capacity for adaptive cop- tionnaire item. Finally, because the coping ing would relate most directly to individual approach and the specific emotion regula- differences in affect regulation. The other tion processes approach differ in terms of competencies seem to specify processes that their time horizons and relevant situational make emotion regulation possible or may contexts, each has unique advantages and help (rather than hinder) the enactment of applications. The various measures of cop- effective regulatory strategies. For example, ing styles provide a useful focus on stressful if an individual has no awareness of his or situations and regulating negative affective her current emotional state, then that person states. would hardly proceed with attempts to regu- late that emotion. The Emotional Competence Approach and Its Major Measures Generalized Expectancies The emotional competence approach origi- for Negative Mood Regulation Scale nated in developmental and clinical analyses The Generalized Expectancies for Negative of what a child needs to learn to become an Mood Regulation Scale (NMR) was devel- emotionally and socially competent adult. oped by Catanzaro and Mearns (1990) and Saarni (e.g., 1999, 2011) analyzed emotional is one of the earliest measures to take the functioning from the perspective of how emotional competence approach. It now has well it serves the adaptive and instrumental fallen out of use. This 30-item self-report goals of the individual, then defined emo- questionnaire focuses on individuals’ beliefs tional competence as a set of affect-oriented that some “behavior or cognition will allevi- behavioral, cognitive, and regulatory skills. ate a negative state or induce a positive one” Simply put, the child needs to learn what it (p. 547), and asks them to indicate the extent means to feel something and to do some- to which they believe their attempts to alter thing about those feelings. their negative moods will work. Saarni (1999, 2011) postulated eight broad Many of the items focus on ways to skills that she considers to be prerequisites eliminate or at least avoid negative emo- for emotional competence: (1) awareness of tions. Thus, the measure has been criti- one’s own emotional state; (2) the skills to cized for equating mood regulation with discern and understand the emotions of oth- the avoidance of negative affect (e.g., Gratz ers; (3) skill in using the common vocabu- & Roemer, 2004); simply avoiding nega- lary of emotion and expression; (4) capacity tive states is assumed to be an indication for empathic and sympathetic involvement of effective regulation, as shown by items in others’ emotional experiences; (5) ability such as “When I’m upset, I believe that I can to realize that one’s inner emotional state forget about what’s upsetting me pretty eas- need not correspond to outer expression; (6) ily” versus “When I’m upset, I believe that capacity for adaptive coping with aversive or I won’t be able to put it out of my mind” distressing emotions by using self- regulatory (reverse scored). Moreover, the NMR does strategies that ameliorate the intensity or not assess aspects of mood regulation, such temporal duration of such emotional states; as awareness, clarity, or acceptance of emo- (7) awareness that relationships are defined tions, that later emotional competence
334 PERSONALITY PROCESSES AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES researchers, such as Saarni (1999), Salovey worth paying attention to your emotions or et al. (1995), and others, deemed important. moods” (reverse scored). As expected, the Finally, regulatory processes are not differ- Attention scale correlates with the Private entiated but are instead measured only in Self-C onsciousness scale, which measures terms of whether the individual thinks he or awareness and attention to private aspects she has access to mood regulation strategies of the self (e.g., thoughts and feelings). One perceived to be effective. would expect the Attention scale to relate negatively to chronic use of the emotion Trait Meta‑Mood Scales regulation strategies distraction and sup- Consistent with their emotional competence pression. The link to distraction is theoreti- perspective, Salovey et al. (1995) aimed to cally interesting, because paying close atten- understand the reflective (or meta) processes tion to negative mood states has been shown that accompany many mood states. These to magnify and intensify the experience of “meta-mood” processes capture how indi- negative affect and the risk for depression viduals reflect on their feelings, including (Scheier & Carver, 1977), whereas in our how they monitor, evaluate, and regulate model, distraction is expected to decrease them (Mayer & Gaschke, 1988). Salovey et negative emotion experience. Indeed, in one al. (1995) assumed that emotions serve as an of the studies by Salovey et al. (1995), the important source of information, and that Attention scale was related to higher depres- individuals differ in how skilled they are at sion scores. Regarding the negative link to processing this kind of information, particu- suppression, being intensely aware of and larly in “their understanding of and ability paying close attention to one’s emotions to articulate their affective states” and their should interfere with the considerable and ability to “regulate such feelings and use them ongoing cognitive effort required to sup- adaptively to motivate behavior” (p. 147). press one’s emotions effectively (Richards & The Trait Meta-Mood Scales (TMMS) were Gross, 2000), and that should be especially designed to measure stable and general atti- true for individuals who experience their tudes about moods and the degree to which emotions intensely. Moreover, individuals individuals attempt to manage (or repair) scoring high on the Attention scale value mood experiences. The TMMS measures their feelings and believe in letting them three constructs—people’s tendency to guide their behavior. That is the opposite of attend to their moods and emotions (atten- individuals who habitually use suppression tion), to discriminate clearly among them and thus show expressive behavior that is (clarity), and to regulate them (repair)—each inconsistent with their inner feelings (Gross capturing individual differences considered & John, 2003). Indeed, the TMMS Atten- “fundamental to the self-regulatory domain tion scale correlated negatively with the of emotional intelligence” (p. 147). ERQ Suppression scale. Given that the TMMS focuses on indi- The TMMS Clarity scale assesses clarity vidual differences in meta-moods—that about one’s feelings, and contrasts aware- is, thoughts and attitudes that accompany ness and acceptance of feelings with confu- mood experiences—w e would not expect sion about feelings and their meaning and any links to regulatory strategies that implications. True-scored item examples occur earlier in the emotion process, prior include “I feel at ease about my emotions” to the onset of an emotional episode itself, versus false-scored items such as “I can’t such as situation selection or modification. make sense out of my feelings.” Low clarity However, attentional processes, cognitive was related not only to ambivalence about change, and response modification should emotional expression but also to vulner- be of considerable relevance. ability to negative affect, such as neuroti- cism, distress, and depression. Salovey et al. The TMMS Attention scale refers to pay- (1995) conceptually linked lack of clarity to ing close attention to feelings, accepting ruminative thought processes (e.g., individu- feelings, valuing them positively, and letting als who do not know how they feel about a oneself experience them fully and inten- negative event have to keep thinking about it) sively, using items such as “I often think and showed empirically that, after watching about my feelings” versus “I don’t think it’s a stressful video, individuals scoring high on
Individual Differences in Affect Regulation 335 the Clarity scale exhibited a decline in rumi- As expected, the Repair scale correlated native thought and recovered their positive substantially with general optimism and low mood to a greater extent than low-scoring vulnerability to distress and depression; it individuals. These findings suggest a positive also predicted lower levels of distress after relation between clarity and distraction (the participants watched a stressful video. In ability to use attentional resources to move terms of specific emotion regulation pro- away from a negative emotion stimulus, cesses, one would expect the Repair scale to rather than ruminating about it), and a nega- relate positively to the use of distraction, as tive relation with suppression. Individuals well as reappraisal: The explicit mood repair who are clear about and comfortable with efforts included in the scale involve (1) using their emotions should feel little need to sup- thought to focus on something other (e.g., press their behavioral expression of emotion, pleasant things; good thoughts) than the dis- and the evidence supported this predicted tressing stimulus, thus implicating distrac- negative relation (Gross & John, 2003). tion, and (2) also trying to think differently (e.g., more positively) about the situation, The TMMS Repair scale assesses attempts thus implicating reappraisal. In contrast, to improve negative mood by thinking posi- expressive suppression is hardly an optimis- tively and taking an optimistic (rather than tic process (Gross & John, 2003); its habit- pessimistic) attitude more generally. Item ual use is related not only to negative emo- examples include “Although I am sometimes tion, as shown in Figure 20.5, but also to sad, I have a mostly optimistic outlook” and feelings of inauthenticity (English & John, “I try to think good thoughts no matter how 2013) and the pessimistic expectation that badly I feel,” contrasted with “Although I others will disapprove if shown one’s “real am sometimes happy, I have a mostly pes- self,” as shown as in Table 20.1. Consistent simistic outlook” (reverse scored). This scale with these considerations, Gross and John seems conceptually similar to coping styles (2003) found that the TMMS Repair scale reviewed earlier, such as Emphasizing the was differentially related to the ERQ Reap- Positive on the original Ways of Coping praisal (r = .36) and Suppression (r = –.26) Questionnaire and Positive Reinterpretation scales. and Growth on the COPE. TABLE 20.1. Examples of Beliefs and Motivations Predicting Individual Differences in the Habitual Use of Reappraisal and Suppression as Measured by the ERQ Emotion regulation strategy Construct studied Reappraisal Suppression Incremental (vs. entity) theory of emotiona .35 .04 (If they want to, people can change the emotions they have) Global emotion regulation self-efficacya .21 .00 (I certainly can control my emotions when running into a former boyfriend/girlfriend) Subjective authenticityb –.02 –.30 (It’s important to me to be true to myself) Fear of negative consequencesc –.05 .31 (I worry that if I express negative emotions, such as fear and anger, other people will not approve of me) Low self-efficacy for self-expressionc –.12 .45 (At times I am just not able to express what I am really feeling) Note. ERQ, Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (Gross & John, 2003). aTamir, John, Srivastava, and Gross (2007, Study 1). bEnglish and John (2013; mean across Studies 1–3). cJohn (2010).
336 PERSONALITY PROCESSES AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES However, the correlations of the ERQ their feelings. Other meta-mood processes scales and the TMMS scales were not large in may represent consequences: Frequent use of size. Suppression was related negatively to all suppression leads to expressive behavior that three TMMS scales, most strongly to Atten- is incongruent with internal feeling states, tion (r = –.41) and least strongly to Repair and may in turn lead to confusion and lack of (r = –.26). This is interesting and worth fur- clarity about one’s emotions (and eventually ther study for two reasons. First, we need an unclear self-c oncept and low self-e steem). to understand better how individual differ- ences in cognitive variables such as attention These considerations imply that research to emotion are linked to behavioral vari- on individual differences in beliefs and moti- ables, such as emotion-expressive behavior. vational factors will be critical in helping Second, we need to address questions about us conceptualize how meta-mood processes causal order: How are cognitive variables and specific emotion regulatory processes such as attention best conceptualized? In our are related. Table 20.1 summarizes the find- view, some may be antecedents (see Figure ings from several initial studies. Incremental 20.6 below): Individuals may use suppres- beliefs that emotions can be changed, and sion frequently because they have learned to self-efficacy beliefs about one’s own ability devalue and ignore their emotions as impor- to change one’s emotions, predicted greater tant sources of information, and because use of cognitive reappraisal, whereas sub- they have the pessimistic belief that others jective inauthenticity, fear of negative con- will respond negatively if they truly express sequences, and low self-efficacy predicted greater use of suppression. DISTAL EMOTION PERCEPTION INDIVIDUAL ANTECEDENTS AND UNDERSTANDING DIFFERENCES IN Attention EMOTION REGULATION Demographic and Awareness Experiential Factors Clarity Use Gender socialization Habitual Aging BELIEFS Situational Acculturation Implicit theories Ability Personality Factors Actual Big Five traits (incremental vs. entity) Perceived Attachment Self-efficacy and Cognitive Factors IQ control beliefs Cognitive control VALUES AND GOALS Ideal affect Hedonic/instrumental goals Self-construal goals NORMS AND EXPECTATIONS Feeling rules Display rules FIGURE 20.6. Examples of several types of individual differences in emotion regulation and their potential antecedents.
Individual Differences in Affect Regulation 337 Difficulties in Emotion Responses (e.g., “When I’m upset, I feel Regulation Scale ashamed with myself for feeling that way”; Gratz and Roemer (2004) defined emotion emphasis added) seems similar to ineffective regulation competencies almost as broadly coping scales such as Self-B laming, which as did Saarni (1999), whose influence they might be a simpler yet clearer label for this acknowledge: “(a) awareness and under- subscale; (4) Difficulties Engaging in Goal- standing of emotions, (b) acceptance of emo- Directed Behavior (e.g., “When I’m upset, tions, (c) ability to control impulsive behav- I have difficulty thinking about anything iors and behave in accordance with desired else”; emphasis added) seems to involve not goals even when experiencing negative emo- goal-directed behavior per se but ineffec- tions, and (d) ability to use situationally tive attentional deployment (Gross, 1998) appropriate regulation strategies flexibly to and resembles what Nolen-Hoeksema et al. modulate emotional responses as desired (1994) conceptualized as ruminative coping in order to meet individual goals and situ- (i.e., difficulty shifting attention and disen- ational demands” (p. 42). gaging from a preoccupying affective state). In devising measures of these four compe- Finally, (5) the Impulse Control Diffi- tency constructs, Gratz and Roemer (2004, culties subscale (e.g., “When I’m upset, I see p. 44) were influenced by the content of become out of control”) is similar to Impulse Salovey et al.’s (1995) TMMS scales, as well Strength or Intensity scales (e.g., Gross & as by the older NMR, which they used as a John, 1997, 1998) that describe individu- template to structure the format of some of als who have very strong feelings that are the items. Specifically, they wrote their items hard to control; and (6) the subscale Lim- assessing difficulties with regulating emo- ited Access to Effective Emotion Regulation tions during times of distress using the same Strategies (e.g., “When I’m upset, I believe general format as the NMR. Thus, many that there is nothing I can do to make myself of their items begin with the sentence stem feel better” and “When I’m upset, I believe “When I’m upset, I . . . ” This focus on a that wallowing in it is all I can do”; empha- global negative affect (upset) is a feature that ses added) is similar to the earlier NMR both the NMR and the Difficulties in Emo- Belief scale and seems to capture the low tion Regulation Scale (DERS) share with the pole of Tamir, John, Srivastava, and Gross’s coping scales discussed earlier. (2007) measure of Emotion Regulation Self- Efficacy Beliefs (see Table 20.1). The 36-item DERS has six subscales. Note that because the authors are interested As with the NMR and the TMMS, these in dysregulation and its link to psychopa- six subscales do not differentiate between thology, they score all the subscales in terms kinds of regulatory strategies. As with the of difficulties with various competencies coping measures in the previous section, considered important for emotion regula- discriminant validity has been noted as a tion. Possibly as a result of this naming con- potential problem with the DERS, because vention, several of the DERS subscales have some of the scale intercorrelations exceed vague or confusing names. It is thus impera- .60 and the subscales tend to correlate simi- tive to review the items that make up each larly with indicators of distress or dysfunc- scale to ascertain what is being measured. tion (e.g., Weinberg & Klonsky, 2009). All six subscales are often simply summed to Two subscales seem rather similar to obtain an overall dysregulation score. existing TMMS scales but label the opposite pole: (1) Lack of Emotional Awareness (e.g., The DERS (and its Adolescent version) “I pay attention to how I feel”—reverse is increasingly being used in studies of scored; emphasis added) captures the low adult pathology and child disorders; find- pole of the TMMS Attention scale; (2) Lack ings show that scores on the DERS are of Emotional Clarity (e.g., “I am clear about correlated with rather diverse psychologi- my feelings”—reverse scored; emphasis cal problems, such as depression, anxiety, added) is very similar to the low pole of the suicidal ideation, eating disorders, alcohol TMMS Clarity scale. use, and drug use (e.g., Weinberg & Klon- sky, 2009). Such a sweeping pattern of Two other subscales seem to assess cop- maladjustment correlates may indicate that ing styles: (3) Nonacceptance of Emotional the DERS assesses a rather undifferenti-
338 PERSONALITY PROCESSES AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES ated self-presentation as a troubled person: respondents to react to hypothetical scenar- Such individuals are overwhelmed by strong ios and evaluate the effectiveness of various affective impulses they do not understand, behaviors and subjective construals for emo- and they feel no confidence (self-efficacy) tion management purposes. For example, that they can control these impulses. With- participants are asked to judge the effective- out some evidence of discriminant validity, ness of strategies to help a friend enhance a it is difficult to interpret correlations of the joyful mood or reduce feelings of sadness. DERS with indicators of psychopathology. Overall, it is not clear which of these six Unfortunately, scientific evaluation and subscales was intended to capture the core research use of the MSCEIT are hindered, regulatory concept defined as the “ability because the test is owned by a commer- to use situationally appropriate regulation cial “test publisher (who) does not autho- strategies flexibly to modulate emotional rize reproduction of actual test items” responses” (Gratz & Roemer, 2004, p. 42). (e.g., Lopes, Salovey, Côté, & Beers, 2005, Certainly, use of the DERS for individual p. 114); thus, we are allowed to provide here cases in clinical and applied contexts seems only two abridged examples that were pub- premature. lished in this form by Lopes et al. (2005, pp. 114–115), each consisting of a vignette paired with separate response options: Emotional Intelligence Test Debbie just came back from vacation. She was We have seen repeatedly that the emotional feeling peaceful and content. How well would competence approach conceptualizes emo- each action preserve her mood? (1) She started tion regulation in terms of a number of spe- to make a list of things at home that she needed cific abilities. Yet all the measures we have to do. (2) She began thinking about where and discussed so far have used self-report ques- when to go on her next vacation. (3) She called tionnaire methodology: that is, research- a friend to tell her about the vacation . . . ers assess self-perceptions (including self- Ken and Andy have been good friends for over efficacy beliefs) and typical experiences and 10 years. Recently, however, Andy was pro- behaviors. In fact, we have seen that some moted and became Ken’s manager. Ken felt of these “competence” scales can be diffi- that the new promotion had changed Andy cult to differentiate from coping styles. This in that Andy had become very bossy to him. is hardly a foolproof way to assess ability How effective would Ken be in maintaining constructs, which are usually measured in a good relationship, if he chose to respond in terms of carefully controlled maximum per- each of the following ways? (1) Ken tried to formance tests of the behavior or process in understand Andy’s new role and tried to adjust question. to the changes in their interactions. (2) Ken approached Andy and confronted him regard- Considerable credit is due to Mayer, ing the change in his behavior . . . Salovey, and Caruso (2002), who acknowl- edged this methodological inconsistency and tackled the difficult task of construct- These examples are from the fourth (Man- ing a test of emotional intelligence that aging Emotions) “branch” of the MSCEIT, is scored in terms of correct and incorrect which comprises two distinct tasks. Five answers, namely, the Mayer–Salovey– vignettes measure ability in emotion man- Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (abbre- agement, and each describes a person (like viated MSCEIT). They define emotional Debbie) who is experiencing a mood or intelligence as a set of skills involved in the emotion. For each of the five vignettes, the processing of emotion-relevant informa- respondent rates (on a 5-point scale) how tion. Due to space limitations, of the four effective four different actions would be for MSCEIT components, we briefly address obtaining a specified effect on the person’s only the component that is most relevant experience (here, to preserve Debbie’s good here, namely, emotion management ability, mood), yielding a total of 20 separate rat- which they define as the capacity to reduce, ings. The second task measures emotional increase, or maintain particular emotions relationship abilities and comprises three in both oneself and other people. The tasks vignettes describing relationships between they use to measure these abilities require persons (like Ken and Andy). In each
Individual Differences in Affect Regulation 339 vignette, the respondent rates how effective For example, Lopes et al. (2005) obtained three different actions would be to maintain eight criterion measures (e.g., interpersonal a good relationship between the persons, for sensitivity; socioemotional competence; a total of nine separate ratings. Each of the friendship nominations) with self-ratings 29 individual ratings is scored according to or peer nominations. When the personal- normative effectiveness ratings provided by ity traits measured by the Big Five Inven- a panel of emotion experts or the group con- tory (John et al., 2008) were controlled, the sensus. MSCEIT emotion management ability scale still significantly predicted two of these cri- Although abbreviated, these two exam- teria. However, with two out of eight signifi- ples are very instructive. First, they illustrate cant correlations, it is hard to say whether that the total emotion management ability the predictive validity goblet is a quarter full score includes more than 30% of ratings that or three quarters empty. Of greater interest assess not emotional but relational skills, to personality researchers is a finding not raising questions about content validity. Sec- highlighted by the authors: By far the high- ond, each vignette and action includes a lot est correlation (r = .40) was not found with of detailed contextual information specific any of the eight predicted socioemotional to that rating, which adds error and keeps outcome measures but, somewhat unexpect- interitem correlations, and thus reliability, edly, with the Big Five trait of Agreeableness. low; with 29 ratings aggregated into the total score, reliability in this study was a In conclusion, the MSCEIT, though an measly .63, and that is higher than in other admirable and conceptually interesting studies (see Føllesdal & Hagtvet, 2009, for undertaking, has not proven to be the deci- a thoughtful psychometric analysis and cri- sive fix for the less compelling self-report tique). Third, as the MSCEIT authors read- measures of emotional “competencies” that ily acknowledge, these vignette ratings do have come before it. Even though, as outsid- not actually measure individual differences ers, we do not know much about the inner in skillful or effective regulation scored or workings of the MSCEIT, it seems unlikely observed objectively in an emotional situa- that a measure consisting of only five emo- tion; instead they tap the individual’s knowl- tion management vignettes and three rela- edge, and capacity to reason, about emo- tionship vignettes can provide the conceptual tions and emotional situations (e.g., Lopes building blocks needed to construct a com- et al., 2005, p. 114). Fourth, the emphasis prehensive conception of emotion regulation on knowledge and complex reasoning pro- in terms of specific competencies. More gen- cesses is likely to introduce correlations with erally, the emotional competence approach measures of other abilities, creating dis- (e.g., Saarni, 1999) includes all manner of criminant validity problems. Fifth, because cognitive, behavioral, self-perception, and there are interpersonal themes even in the emotion perception processes under one emotion management vignettes (e.g., calling broad rubric. This conceptual richness and a friend to share one’s mood, thus capital- reach, and the resulting complexity, is theo- izing on the experience), performance on retically appealing but may be keeping this these items may yield surprising correlations approach from achieving its full empirical with personality variables, again introduc- potential. Fewer constructs, more narrowly ing potential problems with discriminant delineated distinctions, and tighter links validity. In response to these discriminant between construct definitions and actual validity concerns, the test authors and their measures (and items) may prove a fruitful collaborators have tried to demonstrate that avenue for future research on the vast dif- the MSCEIT predicts social, emotional, and ferences in people’s emotional competence. leadership outcomes even when intelligence and broad personality traits are controlled. Continuing Issues, Limitations, So far, however, many researchers have and Future Directions remained unconvinced; the MSCEIT, and In this brief and necessarily limited review, emotional intelligence research more gener- we have covered almost 50 scales purporting ally, is viewed with some skepticism among to measure individual differences in affec- researchers (e.g., Landy, 2005; Joseph & Newman, 2010).
340 PERSONALITY PROCESSES AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES tive regulation. Our review suggests that young and older adults, as well as in samples the most recent arrivals show a great deal from the United States and China (English of redundancies with their forebears, such & John, 2013). as the newer CERQ with the older COPE, and the newer DERS with the older NMR More generally, we recommend that the and TMMS. In our view, the time has come field increase recent efforts (see Table 20.1) to stop the proliferation of self-report scales to link values, goals, and other motivational and to begin a moratorium that refocuses on factors, as well as beliefs, norms, and expec- solid theory development. tations, to emotion regulation, both concep- tually and empirically. We have organized The Need for an Integrative these social-cognitive processing character- Framework and for istics into four boxes in the middle column Mediation Research of Figure 20.6, with arrows indicating that In addition to a great number of affect regu- these concepts have the greatest promise for lation concepts and scales, we have touched explanatory accounts. upon a number of factors that predict or influence individual differences in emotion Finally, Figure 20.6 also illustrates our regulation. As a first, modest step toward a hypotheses about where cognitive meta- broader framework, we have organized these mood processes may belong in such an inte- variables in the first two columns of Figure grative framework. In particular, attention 20.6. In the first column we have included to emotional experience, awareness of emo- broad person factors that we expect to shape tional experience, and clarity of emotional the acquisition and use of particular emo- experience do not seem to us to be isomor- tion regulation strategies, such as gender phic with regulatory processes. Rather, these socialization, acculturation, and aging, all of cognitive meta-mood processes seem to be which have been shown to predict individual important antecedents that can trigger, help, differences in emotion regulation in adult- or hinder the use of various, more or less hood. Broad personality factors, attachment, effective regulatory processes. For exam- and cognitive ability factors also need to be ple, Scheier and Carver (1977) showed that considered, even if only as control variables, focusing attention on an emotional state can as we have seen in the debate over the valid- result in both intensification of that state ity and utility of the MSCEIT. and clarification; intensification may make subsequent regulation efforts less effective, The effects of gender, acculturation, whereas greater clarity may have the oppo- and aging on regulation are unlikely to be site effect. In other words, the nature and direct and thus will need to be explained. In causal direction of the relationships among research on naturally occurring individual the concepts in Figure 20.6 needs to be differences, explanatory research usually tested empirically. takes the form of mediation designs, such as the one depicted in Figure 20.4. In this The Need to Expand Beyond Habitual example, the increasing adoption of cul- Measures of Individual Differences turally transmitted values associated with It is time to acknowledge some limitations independent (but not interdependent) self- in our coverage and in the work presented construal is the mechanism through which here. We have focused almost exclusively on greater acculturation to Western practices habitual differences in affective regulation, and values leads Asian immigrants to use which implies that the individual differences suppression less and less frequently the lon- under study show at least some consistency ger they live in the United States. Another over time and may in fact be chronic in example is a recent series of studies show- nature. It is true that in all three approaches ing that the link between habitual suppres- reviewed here, habitual concepts represent sion and negative social consequences (see the lion’s share of the work, but other kinds Figure 20.5; consequences of regulation are of individual differences in emotion regula- not shown in Figure 20.6) can be explained tion have been studied (see the third column by individual differences in authenticity in of Figure 20.6). For example, a number of recent studies have examined situationally
Individual Differences in Affect Regulation 341 flexible and spontaneous use of emotion reg- general emotional control (Level 1). How- ulation as well as abilities. Using a longitudi- ever, the choice of Level 2 (e.g., Gross & nal design, Srivastava et al. (2009) explicitly John, 2003) should not be taken as an indi- differentiated habitual or stable use from cation that theorists believe regulatory pro- dynamic use of suppression during the tran- cesses operate exactly in the same way for sition from high school and home town to positive and negative emotions (Level 3), or college; they found considerable change dur- that there are no important regulatory differ- ing this transition, with suppression use tem- ences (at Level 4) between discrete negative porarily increasing as students constructed emotions, such as anger and fear, or positive new friendship networks. Feinberg, Willer, emotion, such as pride and joy (e.g., Shiota, Antonenko, and John (2012) studied spon- Keltner, & John, 2006). Indeed, theoreti- taneous, rather than habitual, emotion regu- cal accounts of Asian–White differences in lation. In one study, they had subjects make emotion suggest that Asians’ greater use of moral judgments about a variety of dis- suppression is particularly pronounced for gusting (but not unethical) behaviors; cod- emotions that are positive and highly acti- ing thought protocols, they tested whether vated, such as pride and love. Along similar some individuals had spontaneously used lines, Larsen (2000) suggested that suppres- reappraisal to down-regulate their disgust sion might be “more effective for controlling response and, in turn, made less affectively affects with clear expressive components, driven and therefore less moralistic judg- such as angry moods, compared to affects ments about the behaviors. that are not clearly expressive, such as lone- liness” (p. 138). Webb et al. (2012) note that We have also not been able to cover recent even in the experimental literature few stud- efforts to extend ERQ work to the domain ies compared the effectiveness of a particu- of individual differences in emotion regula- lar strategy in regulating different emotions. tion ability, such as actual differences in the This is certainly an important new direction effectiveness of reappraisal as assessed with in research on individual differences as well. laboratory procedures (e.g., McRae et al., 2012; Troy, Willhelm, Shallcross, & Mauss, Indeed, as shown in Figure 20.7, our con- 2010) and self-p erceived differences in effec- ceptual framework needs to be extended even tiveness in implementing an instructional further downward to include contextual fac- set in the laboratory (e.g., Gruber, Har- tors (at Level 5) that change the meaning of vey, & Gross, 2012). This is exciting work, the emotion for the individual; for example, and we are looking forward to seeing more an Asian American feeling pride in a col- diverse individual-difference measures that lective context (e.g., feeling proud of the go beyond the existing measures of habitual achievements of a younger sibling) should emotion regulation. suppress much less than he or she would in an individualistic context (e.g., having won Limitations and Future Directions a prize for personal achievement). Finally, in Research on Specific Emotion research on individual differences with the Regulation Processes ERQ has focused on two important regula- Finally, lest we forget, we must acknowledge tory processes, reappraisal and suppression. some fundamental limitations of previous Future research needs to extend this focus research using the ERQ. Whereas much of along the horizontal dimension of Level 2 the work in the coping approach has focused shown in Figure 20.7 and add exemplars of specifically on negative affect and stress- the other three families of regulatory pro- ful situations, work using the ERQ (e.g., cesses in Gross’s process model (see Figure English et al., 2012) has studied individual 20.2), namely, situation selection, situation differences more generally, measuring reap- modification, and attention deployment. We praisal and suppression at the global regula- have discussed these processes conceptually tory process level, shown as Level 2 in the throughout this chapter, but we have not yet hierarchical model in Figure 20.7. Certainly, measured them in terms of individual differ- the level of specific regulatory processes is ences. In brief, there is plenty left to do. It is preferable to the even more abstract level of an exciting time to be working on individual differences in affect regulation.
342 Level 1 Emotional Control Global Regulation Level 2 Reappraisal Suppression Regulatory Process Level 3 Negative Positive Negative Positive Emotion Valence Level 4 Fear Anger Pride Joy Fear Anger Pride Joy Specific Emotion Level 5 Individual Collective Low Status High Status Context (e.g., of self) (e.g., of family member) (e.g., with boss) (e.g., with employee) FIGURE 20.7. Hierarchical framework for the study of individual differences in emotion regulation. Emotion regulation is conceptualized at five levels of abstraction: (1) global emotional control, (2) particular regulatory processes, (3) regulation of positive and negative emotion, (4) regulation of specific emotions, and (5) regulation of specific emotions in particular contexts.
Individual Differences in Affect Regulation 343 Acknowledgments mood regulation: Initial scale development and implications. Journal of Personality This work was supported in part by a Retire- Assessment, 54, 546–563. ment Research Foundation grant and a Faculty de Ridder, D. (1997). What is wrong with coping Research Grant (University of California, Berke- assessment?: A review of conceptual and meth- ley) to Oliver P. John, and by a National Science odological issues. Psychology and Health, 12, Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship and a 417– 431. Dissertation Year Fellowship (University of Cali- Ekman, P. (1972). Universals and cultural dif- fornia, Berkeley) to Joshua S. Eng. ferences in facial expression of emotion. In J. Cole (Ed.), Nebraska Symposium on Moti- References vation (pp. 207–283). Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. Abler, B., & Kessler, H. (2009). Emotion Regu- Eng, J., Akutsu, S., Gross, J. J., & John, O. P. lation Questionnaire: A German version of (2013). Emotion regulation in East Asian and the ERQ by Gross & John. Diagnostica, 55, 144–152. European Americans: Effects of regulatory strategy, emotion, and independent construal. Aldao, A., Nolen-H oeksema, S., & Schweizer, S. Unpublished manuscript, Department of Psy- (2010). Emotion-regulation strategies across chology, University of California, Berkeley. psychopathology: A meta-analytic review. English, T., & John, O. P. (2013). Understanding Clinical Psychology Review, 30, 217–237. the social effects of emotion regulation: The mediating role of authenticity for individual Anderson, C., John, O. P., Keltner, D., & Kring, differences in suppression. Emotion, 13, 314– A. M. (2001). Who attains social status? 329. Effects of personality and physical attractive- English, T. E., John, O. P., & Gross, J. J. (2013). ness in social groups. Journal of Personality Emotion regulation in close relationships. In J. and Social Psychology, 81, 116–132. A. Simpson & L. Campbell (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of close relationships (pp. 500– Balzarotti, S., John, O. P., & Gross, J. J. (2010). 513). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. An Italian adaptation of the Emotion Regula- English, T. E., John, O. P., Srivastava, S., & tion Questionnaire. European Journal of Psy- Gross, J. J. (2012). Emotion regulation and chological Assessment, 26, 61–67. peer-rated social functioning: A 4-year longi- tudinal study. Journal of Research in Person- Bariola, E., Gullone, E., & Hughes, E. K. (2011). ality, 46, 780–784. Child and adolescent emotion regulation: Feinberg, M., Willer, R., Antonenko, O., & The role of parental emotion regulation and John, O. P. (2012). Liberating reasons from expression. Clinical Child and Family Psycho- passion: Overriding intuitionist moral judg- logical Review, 14, 198–212. ments through emotion reappraisal. Psycho- logical Science, 23, 788–795. Baumeister, R. F., Zell, A. L., & Tice, D. M. Folkman, S., & Lazarus, R. S. (1980). An analy- (2007). How emotions facilitate and impair sis of coping in a middle-aged community self-r egulation. In J. J. Gross (Ed.), Handbook sample. Journal of Health and Social Behav- of emotion regulation (pp. 408–426). New ior, 21, 219–239. York: Guilford Press. Folkman, S., & Lazarus, R. S. (1985). If it changes it must be a process: Study of emo- Block, J. H., & Block, J. (1980). The role of ego- tion and coping during three stages of a col- control and egoresiliency in the organization lege examination. Journal of Personality and of behavior. In W. A. Collins (Ed.), Minne- Social Psychology, 48, 150–170. sota Symposia on Child Psychology (Vol. 13, Folkman, S., & Lazarus, R. S. (1988). Manual pp. 39–101). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. for the Ways of Coping Questionnaire. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychology Press. Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1994). Situ- Føllesdal, H., & Hagtvet, K. A. (2009). Emo- ational coping and coping dispositions in a tional intelligence: The MSCEIT from the stressful transaction. Journal of Personality perspective of generalizability theory. Intelli- and Social Psychology, 66, 184–195. gence, 37, 94–105. Garnefski, N., & Kraaij, V. (2007). The Cogni- Carver, C. S., Scheier, M. F., & Weintraub, J. K. (1989). Assessing coping strategies: A theoreti- cally based approach. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56, 267–283. Catanzaro, S. J., & Mearns, J. (1990). Mea- suring generalized expectancies for negative
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Chapter 21 Desire and Desire Regulation: Basic Processes and Individual Differences Wilhelm Hofmann Hiroki P. Kotabe Desires pervade everyday life. Accordingly, With this chapter, we hope to show that our language is filled with metaphors of how some new insights may be gleaned by treat- we experience and deal with desire: ing desires as emotions and, consequently, desire regulation as an instance of emo- We burn and are aflame with desire; we are tion regulation. In our reading, the issues pierced by or riddled with desire; we are sick or of desire and desire regulation have been ache with desire; we are tortured, tormented, studied primarily from the vantage point and racked by desire; we are possessed, seized, of addiction research, clinical research, ravished, and overcome by desire; . . . our and cognitive neuroscience. Applying some desire is fierce, hot, intense, passionate, incan- of the insights gained from the burgeoning descent, and irresistible; . . . We battle, resist, emotion regulation literature to the desire and struggle with, or succumb, surrender to, case may broaden our understanding of the and indulge our desires. (Belk, Ger, & Askeg- problem at hand and open up new avenues aard, 2000, p. 99) of inquiry. Even though the described struggle with desire is primarily mental, the downstream We believe that an emotion regulation per- implications of poor desire regulation can spective on desire may also benefit the field be enormous, such as when political leaders of self-control. That is, a focus on desire lose their jobs over a scandalous love affair. and its regulation, may be helpful, wherever Additionally, public health statistics show the motivational conflicts under study can that 40% of deaths in the United States be framed as a struggle between immediate each year are associated with unhealthy desires (e.g., for tasty food, alcoholic drinks, behaviors—b ehaviors that are at least par- sexual interaction) and self-regulatory goals tially attributable to the way people deal and values (e.g., maintaining one’s weight, with certain appetitive desires, such as not driving drunk, staying faithful). Such those for unhealthy foods, tobacco, alcohol, conflicts arguably make up a great deal of unprotected sex, and illicit drugs (Schro- self-control situations in everyday life. Yet eder, 2007). From this perspective, gaining until recently, they have been mainly stud- a better understanding of how and when ied under the rubric of goal conflicts (e.g., desires impact behavior and how unwanted a short-term goal to eat tasty chocolate vs. desires may be successfully regulated is a long-term goal to lose weight). While such clearly needed. a terminology is parsimonious and helpful 346 in many respects, it may not get at a deeper
Desire and Desire Regulation 347 understanding of the specific characteris- ties that provide a relative gain in immediate tics of the two opponents involved in such pleasure (including relief from discomfort). motivational struggles (two opponents, Appetitive desires, in the narrow sense, are which we argue, are quite different). That typically rooted in primary or acquired is, by framing the short-term goal as “just” physiological need states, such as the desires another goal, we might miss a closer analysis for food and drink, alcohol, sex, a cigarette, of the driving force (i.e., of desire) behind and sleep (no story line intended here); how- that short-term motivation, the specific laws ever, we would also include more second- that trigger this driving force, and the most ary, socially learned desires (e.g., the urge effective strategies to tame it. By treating to check one’s smartphone for new messages desire as an essentially emotional phenom- or the desire to watch a favorite TV show) enon (involving motivational and cognitive in a broader definition of appetitive desires. components), we can begin to ask more spe- We therefore use the term desire to refer to cific questions about how desire waxes and appetitive desires of all sorts. Moreover, we wanes in close interaction with environmen- use the term craving to refer to desires across tal characteristics and how it can be strategi- domains that are particularly high-intensity cally up- or down-r egulated. (e.g., drug craving, food craving). Accordingly, self-c ontrol researchers have Desire as Emotion begun to scrutinize the driving forces under- In this chapter, we want to make a strong lying many self-c ontrol struggles (Hofmann, case for treating desires as emotions. Why? Friese, & Strack, 2009; Hofmann & Van Because desires, in our view, share many Dillen, 2012) and to look at how factors of the major hallmark characteristics of an commonly thought to impact people’s con- emotion (see Franken, 2003). Most impor- trol capacity might also affect the strength tant, like emotions, desires are multifaceted of desires and cravings (Schmeichel, Har- phenomena combining affective, motiva- mon-Jones, & Harmon-Jones, 2010; Vohs tional, and cognitive components (see Table et al., 2012). By and large, the science of 21.1). self-control appears to be shifting toward the more balanced view that for many self- First, desires have a clearly affective com- control situations, the role of desire is just as ponent, consisting of a phenomenological important and vital to our understanding as feeling of “wanting” of varying intensity. the role of restraint (Hofmann & Van Dil- On the stimulus side, we perceive objects of len, 2012). desire as appealing; desires signal to us that a given thing, person, or activity has high To advance an emotion regulation per- momentary relevance against the backdrop spective on desire, we address the following of our current goals, bodily need states, three major questions in this chapter: and learning history. Although enacting or 1. What are the main characteristics of thwarting desires may have various emo- desire? TABLE 21.1. Components of Desire 2. How can desire be successfully regu- Component Description lated? Affective A feeling of “wanting” toward 3. How does personality shape desire expe- certain appealing objects of desire (things, activities, people). riences and desire regulation? Motivational A prepotent behavioral driving Desire Characteristics force to acquire, consume, or be Colloquially, there are many usages of the close to the object of desire. word desire, especially as a verb to express all kinds of wishes and wants (e.g., “I desire Cognitive Accompanying thoughts (e.g., that there be more rainbows next year”). expectations, images, and Here, we focus exclusively on so-called fantasies) regarding the enactment appetitive desires, which are those motiva- of desire. tions that propel us to approach and con- sume objects or otherwise engage in activi-
348 PERSONALITY PROCESSES AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES tional consequences (more on this later), fully crowd out opposing mental represen- desires, intrinsically, have a distinct emo- tations such as those of self-control goals tional experience to them, which is that phe- (Hofmann, Friese, Schmeichel, & Baddeley, nomenological feeling of wanting. 2011; Hofmann & Van Dillen, 2012; Kava- nagh et al., 2005). Second, like other emotions, desires pre- pare and motivate behavior. Desiring some- Not All Desires Are Temptations thing means wanting to have, consume, or It is important to clarify that desires and do something that we expect will yield plea- temptations are not synonyms. In our view, sure (or reduce discomfort). When we desire temptations are a special subset of desires. a cupcake, we expect its consumption to To say that somebody is “tempted” by some- provide us with a highly pleasurable experi- thing means that the person has a desire to do ence. When a tobacco addict craves a ciga- A on one hand, and simultaneously has rea- rette, he or she expects that smoking it will son not to do A (Mele, 2001). (In this chap- alleviate distress (including, somewhat iron- ter we use the term temptation to refer to ically, the discomfort of deprivation created the ambivalent psychological state of being by the addiction). Desires therefore motivate tempted, whereas we use tempting stimuli to us through their more or less explicit prom- refer specifically refer to the external objects ise of pleasure or relief. Even though hedonic that give rise to temptation.) Whether a motives may not be the only reasons we pur- person has reason not to do A depends on sue desires, we consider the striving for a whether the behavior implied by the desire relative gain in immediate pleasure the pri- conflicts with a person’s background set of mary motivational underpinning of desire. endorsed values and self-regulatory goals Because desires are directed toward certain (Hofmann, Baumeister, Förster, & Vohs, objects (i.e., things, persons, activities), they 2012). For instance, the desire for mousse share a sense of “aboutness” (Higgins, 1998) au chocolat seems harmless unless one sub- with all other emotions (e.g., being happy, scribes to a low-fat diet. Similarly, the desire sad, angry, disgusted about something). for physical closeness with an attractive Their target-oriented nature distinguishes acquaintance may be completely unproblem- them, among other things, from more dif- atic unless one is subscribed to traditional fuse affective states such as mood.1 Western marriage, and—to add some fur- ther intricacies—that acquaintance is also Third, desires also have an important one’s best friend’s spouse. The problem that cognitive component that is strongly inter- our appetitive desires are so strongly con- twined with the aforementioned affective– nected to whatever provides us with imme- motivational components: According to diate pleasure or relief from discomfort on Kavanagh, Andrade, and May’s (2005) a physiological basis, and that their impli- elaboration–intrusion theory of desire, cations may deviate from what is rationally desire is typically accompanied by intrusive regarded as optimal, proper, or virtuous, thoughts about the object of desire. Such renders occasional self-control conflict an cognitions comprise expectations about the inevitable feature of the human condition. consequences of desire enactment and the feasibility of attaining the desired object, A recent experience-sampling project as well as imagination and fantasies. These called the “Everyday Temptations Study” cognitions may vary on a continuum, from set out to collect base rate information on very realistic to very unrealistic (i.e., overly the prevalence of desires and temptations optimistic), with stronger desires typically in everyday life (Hofmann, Baumeister, leading to more biased and distorted cog- et al., 2012; Hofmann, Vohs, & Baumeis- nitions (Kavanagh et al., 2005). Moreover, ter, 2012). Participants were equipped with the interplay between cognition and affect smartphones for a week. On multiple random is recursive and dynamical; as a person occasions each day, they received a question- mentally elaborates a desire, its strength naire via these smartphones and were asked increases, and more and more mental whether they were currently experiencing resources are allocated to the desire, thus a desire from a list of 15 desire domains, lending desire its well-known potential to including food, nonalcoholic drinks, sleep, escalate. As we elaborate below, this state of affairs can reach a point where desire can
Desire and Desire Regulation 349 sex, social contact, leisure, sports, spending, times yield a combination of (positive and media, alcohol, tobacco, and other drugs. negative) primary and secondary emotions Participants reported a current desire about (pleasure and guilt; frustration and pride). 50% of the time they were signaled. The As we argue elsewhere (Hofmann, Kotabe, lion’s share of desires were reported to be & Luhmann, in press), the net affective out- unproblematic, that is, not in conflict with come of such mixed emotional states may be other important goals (Hofmann, Baumeis- a function of the relative intensities of the ter, et al., 2012). However, more than one- linked emotions involved. Enacting a certain third of desires were experienced as conflict- temptation (e.g., desire to eat cake when on ing with important self-regulatory goals, a diet) may therefore result in a “spoiled such as health goals (e.g., healthy eating, pleasure” effect, a reduction in the overall bodily fitness), abstinence/restraint goals gain in affect as compared with the enact- (e.g., remaining abstinent, saving money, ment of the equivalent desire in an unprob- being faithful), achievement-related goals lematic context (e.g., desire to eat cake when (e.g., educational achievements), social goals not on a diet). (e.g., social recognition, moral integrity), and time use goals (e.g., not delaying things) Although not a focus of the present chap- (Hofmann, Vohs, et al., 2012). Although ter, the linked emotions of desire enact- there were some prominent connections ment and nonenactment can themselves, of between specific desires and specific oppos- course, be subject to emotion regulation. ing goals (e.g., desire for tobacco ↔ reduc- For instance, to increase their affective well- ing health damage; spending ↔ saving being, people may try to down-regulate the expenses), desire–goal conflicts on average frustration ensuing from unproblematic were very multifaceted. Thus, one and the desires that cannot be enacted because of same desire can be experienced as a tempta- external obstacles, or to cherish the pleasure tion for many different reasons. ensuing from their enactment for as long as possible. In the case of temptation, a person Linked Emotions may try to down-regulate guilt after a lapse As noted earlier, the inherent affective core has occurred. Likewise, people may try to of desire (the feeling of “wanting”) needs to maintain or up-regulate pride ensuing from be distinguished from the emotional conse- successful resistance—a self-c onscious emo- quences of desire enactment–nonenactment, tion that some have argued is often not “har- which we call linked emotions. The enact- vested” enough for bolstering self-control ment of desire is typically linked to a relative (Hofmann & Fisher, 2012). short-term gain in pleasure resulting from need satisfaction or relief from discomfort. How Does Desire Emerge Conversely, the prolonged nonenactment of and Impact Behavior? desire typically leads to a period of frustra- Desire emerges in a relatively automatic tion, until the motivational system man- manner as reward processing centers in ages to disengage from the desire altogether midbrain regions (e.g., the ventral striatum) (Carver & Scheier, 1998). Note, however, evaluate external stimuli (or mental images that the primary emotions of pleasure and thereof2) against the backdrop of internal frustration need not be the only linked emo- need states and an individual’s learning his- tions. In the case of temptation, things may tory (Hofmann et al., 2009; Hofmann & become more complicated: Because enact- Van Dillen, 2012). This early reward pro- ing a temptation implies that one may have cessing may have the potential to trigger fast violated important values relevant for one’s impulsive, habitual responses (e.g., Mogen- identity, giving in to temptation may lead son, Jones, & Yim, 1980; Winkielman, Ber- to feelings of guilt or shame (Hofmann & ridge, & Wilbarger, 2005). However, most Fisher, 2012; Shiffman et al., 1997), on top typically, reward signals from midbrain of pleasure. Conversely, not enacting a temp- regions are forwarded to prefrontal regions tation may trigger feelings of pride on top in the brain involved in reward representa- of frustration. Thus, in contrast to unprob- tion and integration, with the orbitofrontal lematic desires, enacting temptations may at cortex (OFC) being among the regions most consistently implicated (Van der Laan, de
350 PERSONALITY PROCESSES AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES Ridder, Viergevera, & Smeetsa, 2011). Even desire may have gathered so much clout in though somewhat speculative, we believe working memory that it may be able to fully that the involvement of prefrontal regions crowd out all other opposing, goal-related such as the OFC is an important element in representations—a state we describe as “all- the conscious representation of desires and consuming passion” in everyday language. cravings. How Can Desire Be As desire gains access to consciousness Successfully Regulated? and, therefore, the global workspace of the Given that desires and cravings may some- mind, it gains the potential to “broadcast” times be experienced as conflicting with its message to a wide range of participat- one’s set of self-regulatory goals and values, ing systems, including those that generate the question that emerges is how can tempt- thoughts and behavioral intentions (Baars ing desires be effectively controlled? In the & Franklin, 2003; Baumeister, Masicampo, remainder of this chapter, we therefore focus & Vohs, 2011; Hofmann & Wilson, 2010). on the down-regulation of tempting desires. Like market criers who try to gather atten- Note, however, that the taming of tempta- tion of those around them, contents of the tions is only one special case of desire regu- global workspace of consciousness com- lation, because desires may be up- or down- pete for mental processing resources. Once regulated for a variety of other reasons. For a desire becomes conscious, it can function instance, in order to enjoy a special dinner very much like an attractor state (Carver & even more, one may deliberately up-r egulate Scheier, 2002) that exerts increasing influ- one’s appetitive desire for food by refrain- ence on conscious processing the more sup- ing from the regular afternoon snack. Or porting working memory resources it is able in order to stay awake on a train ride from to acquire, along the lines of “whoever has Tokyo to Osaka to view Mt. Fuji from the will be given more.” In other words, desire- window, one may deliberately down-r egulate related processing can be subject to a vicious one’s desire to sleep on the train by getting a circle of reprocessing and rumination as good night’s rest the night before. people harbor increasingly elaborated, con- scious mental representations of desire that As laid out by Gross (this volume), emo- bias attentional, affective, and cognitive tion regulation refers to shaping which emo- processing. tions one has, when one has them, and how one experiences them. Applied to tempting As desire grows in consciousness, so does desires, we focus on regulatory processes its potential to instigate concrete action and strategies affecting (1) whether a given plans and behavioral intentions to consume tempting desire is consciously experienced to the object of desire. In the case of tempta- begin with, and, if so, (2) how such a tempt- tion, desires may lead to the inhibition of ing desire can be effectively down-regulated. self-regulatory values and goals (Hofmann, The underlying assumption is that the like- Koningsbruggen, Stroebe, Ramanathan, lihood of a given tempting desire to impact & Aarts, 2010; Stroebe, Mensink, Aarts, behavior, all else being equal, is a function of Schut, & Kruglanski, 2008). Moreover, as the desire’s intensity (more intense desire is people become increasingly occupied by a more capable of hijacking working memory certain desire (Kavanagh et al., 2005), they resources in its favor). Therefore, all mecha- may engage in processes of motivated reason- nisms that help keep the intensity of tempting ing that license and justify indulgence (e.g., desire below a critical enactment level, either “I deserve a special treat today because . . .”; by preventing tempting desire from emerg- “This is going to be my last cigarette, and ing in consciousness in the first place, or by then I’ll quit!”; Kunda, 1990; Sayette & helping the person down-regulate tempting Griffin, 2011). Unless people manage to desire, can be considered effective desire reg- down-regulate desire effectively and/or allo- ulation strategies. Conversely, mechanisms cate attention away from desire-r elated (hot) that increase desire intensity, contrary to the cognitions toward competing (cooler) attrac- desire down-regulation goal, can be consid- tor states such as those of self-control goals, ered ineffective. desires can hijack the very mechanisms that may otherwise support “reasoned” action. In extreme cases of desire escalation, a
Desire and Desire Regulation 351 In close accordance with the process tion toward goal-relevant information in model of emotion regulation (Gross, 1998), working memory) (Knudsen, 2007). Both we review emotion regulation mechanisms types of attention shape desire experiences; and strategies pertaining to situation and therefore, both mechanisms may be har- stimulus control, attention allocation, cog- nessed to regulate desire effectively, though nitive reappraisal, and suppression. The we argue that top-down attention is ulti- emotion regulation strategies reviewed vary mately more important. in the extent to which they may prevent the emergence of conscious desire (i.e., by Regarding bottom-up attention, a grow- preventing exposure to triggering cues or ing number of studies in the addiction interfering with the conscious processing of domain have tried to reduce conscious crav- tempting stimuli) or aid the down-regulation ings and associated behaviors by modifying of conscious desire experiences. automatic attentional biases toward tempt- ing stimuli (see also MacLeod & Grafton, Situation and Stimulus Control this volume). However, the results of these Availability begets desire (Carter & Tiffany, attentional retraining studies have been 2001). Without any doubt, the most effec- mixed. Sometimes the effects generalized to tive strategy to prevent desire is to avoid other contexts, but at other times the effects exposure to tempting situations or stimuli did not extend much beyond the retrain- altogether through techniques of situation ing task (Attwood, O’Sullivan, Leonards, and stimulus control (Mahoney & Thore- Mackintosh, & Munafo, 2008; Fadardi & sen, 1972). Based on the notion that external Cox, 2009; Field, Duka, Tyler, & Schoen- stimuli, in their interaction with a person’s makers, 2009; Schoenmakers, Wiers, Jones, learning history and current need states, Bruce, & Jansen, 2007). The most encour- play a seminal role in the generation of aging results were obtained when several desire as “impellers” (Finkel & Eckhardt, in attentional retraining sessions were used press; Hofmann & Van Dillen, 2012), these and participants were explicitly told about techniques can greatly alter the odds that the purpose and theoretical rationale of the people will experience temptation. Situation retraining task. and stimulus control techniques can either be learned and applied by a person directly Increasing evidence suggests, however, (e.g., keeping one’s home free of unhealthy that top-down attention may be more deci- but tempting foods) or be applied through sive in desire regulation. Top-down atten- paternalistic “nudges” (Thaler & Sunstein, tion has been shown to modulate bottom- 2010) that reduce the availability of temp- up attention (Rauss, Schwartz, & Pourtois, tations in people’s environments (e.g., “no 2011; Van Dillen & Koole, 2009). Top-down smoking” bans in restaurants and bars; caf- attention enables the selective processing of eterias that primarily offer healthy choice information relevant for one’s current goal, options). Because situation and stimulus preventing distracting information from control are not always feasible (e.g., when entering awareness (Knudsen, 2007). Hence, one is “stuck” in a temptation-rich environ- when a current goal directs attention in such ment), however, situation and stimulus con- a way that tempting information becomes trol cannot be the sole answer to effective irrelevant, the attentional capture of tempt- desire regulation. ing stimuli should be substantially reduced or not occur at all. Conversely, people should Attention Allocation process tempting cues more strongly in the Our previous analysis of how desire emerges absence of a specific goal (i.e., when their suggests a fundamental role of attention in top-down attention is free to be captured by desire regulation. Attention can be parsed salient cues), or when their current goal focus into both automatic, bottom-up attention prompts attentional processing of such cues. (i.e., attention driven by salient stimulus Indeed, recent research has shown that cog- properties) and controlled, top-down atten- nitively demanding tasks (unrelated to the tion (i.e., the goal-d riven allocation of atten- temptation at hand), can actually prevent the emergence of desire in response to tempting stimuli (Kemps, Tiggemann, & Christian- son, 2008; Van Dillen, Papies, & Hofmann, 2013). For instance, in the Van Dillen et al.
352 PERSONALITY PROCESSES AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES (Study 1), participants categorized pictures component contained in these interventions: of tempting (e.g., brownies) versus neutral Accepting desires and cravings as transient (e.g., radishes) food stimuli according to their (i.e., fleeting) states instead of trying to sup- spatial location on the screen while rehears- press them may make it easier for people to ing either a one-digit number (low load) or disengage from the maladaptive vicious cir- an eight-digit number (high load) during cle of reprocessing and rumination. each task trial. Participants under low cogni- tive load allocated more attention to tempt- Reappraisal ing than to neutral stimuli, as evidenced by Rather than avoid tempting situations and slower spatial categorizations of attractive stimuli or allocate attention in strategic food pictures compared to neutral food pic- ways, people can also employ strategies that tures. Participants under high cognitive load modify how they appraise tempting stimuli. were equally fast to respond to tasty and For instance, in On Desire: Why We Want neutral food items, suggesting that they may What We Want, William Irvine (2006) not have processed the hedonic relevance of relates advice provided by a Buddhist monk the attractive food (as much). Consequently, on how to deal with tantalizing sexual desire participants in the high load condition by thinking about the human body in less reported lower snack cravings following the favorable terms: “Don’t think about her full categorization task. Hence, the desire to con- breasts and flaxen hair; think instead about sume attractive food temptations may only her lungs, . . . phlegm, pus, spittle.” Accord- surface in consciousness to the extent that ing to the monk, the aim of the mediation people have sufficient attentional resources “is not to produce aversion and disgust but to assess their hedonic value.3 Early power- detachment, to extinguish the fire of lust by ful distraction may therefore facilitate desire removing its fuel” (p. 187). regulation by preventing the emergence of desire and—by implication—the conscious Early pioneering research on delay of grat- pursuit of desire satisfaction. ification by Walter Mischel has shown that cognitive reappraisal of tempting stimuli can The powerful role of top-down attention have a large impact on how well schoolchil- in desire regulation suggests that teach- dren are able to resist immediate rewards, ing people how to distract themselves from such as marshmallows, by cognitively trans- cravings through mentally engaging activi- forming the rewards in nonconsummatory ties may be an effective element in craving ways (e.g., imagining the marshmallows management and relapse prevention (Flor- as white puffy clouds) (Mischel & Baker, sheim, Heavin, Tiffany, Colvin, & Hiraoka, 1975). Recent work applying this idea has 2008). The power of attention is also exem- demonstrated that reappraisal can have a plified in recent applied interventions show- profound impact on affective responses to ing how mindfulness- and acceptance-based tempting stimuli (Fujita & Han, 2009; Hof- interventions can reduce cravings in prob- mann, Deutsch, Lancaster, & Banaji, 2010). lem populations (Alberts, Mulkens, Smeets, Engaging people in an abstract rather than & Thewissen, 2010; Forman et al., 2007). concrete mindset (Fujita & Han, 2009) or The concept of mindfulness (see also Farb, imagining tempting stimuli in nonconsum- Anderson, Irving, Segal, this volume) has matory ways (Hofmann, Deutsch, et al., been tightly linked with effective top-down 2010) appear to interfere with the early attention (Chambers, Lo, & Allen, 2008). reward processing of these stimuli, thus tak- One mechanism through which mindfulness ing the edge of temptation. interventions may work is by increasing peo- ple’s ability to maintain their self-regulatory Findings that cognitive reappraisal can goals in working memory and shield them have far-reaching effects on how people ini- from interference through desire-related tially appraise tempting stimuli align well processing (Hofmann, Gschwendner, Fri- with recent accounts arguing that emotion ese, Wiers, & Schmitt, 2008; Hofmann, regulation can often operate via powerful Schmeichel, & Baddeley, 2012). In addition, automatic or implicit processes (see Gyurak the down-regulation of ongoing desires and & Etkin, this volume). For instance, several cravings may be facilitated by the acceptance lines of work have suggested that, at least
Desire and Desire Regulation 353 under certain circumstances, mental repre- ings after the avoidance treatment, as well sentations of self-control goals may exert an as reduced relapse 1 year after treatment automatic inhibiting effect on mental rep- when compared with control patients who resentations of desire, implying that tempt- only did CBT (Wiers et al., 2011). Relatedly, ing stimuli may lose their desire-activating laboratory work has shown that implemen- potential. For instance, Fishbach, Friedman, tation intentions to avoid tempting stimuli and Kruglanski (2003) argued that tempting can reduce automatic affective reponses stimuli can trigger the automatic activation to these stimuli, presumably because such of an overriding self-control goal in success- implementation intentions reprogram the ful self-regulators (e.g., the sight of a cake mind to appraise the tempting stimulus more activating a dieting goal).4 Thus, strong and negatively (Hofmann, Deutsch, et al., 2010). easily accessible self-control goals may help to reduce desire-related processing because Suppression of the automatic inhibition of goal-irrelevant If accepting a desire may facilitate desire information (Shah, Friedman, & Kruglan- regulation as noted earlier, how does the ski, 2002), which typically implies a relative opposite strategy fare? Is the willful sup- devaluation of the tempting stimulus (Veling, pression or negation of cravings an effective Holland, & van Knippenberg, 2007, 2008). desire regulation strategy? The bulk of the Automatic self-regulatory processes may literature on appetitive thought suppres- thus contribute to desire down-regulation sion across domains suggests not (Barnes and—depending on their potency—may & Tantleff-Dunn, 2010; Erskine, 2008; even make the need for more effortful self- Johnston, Bulik, & Anstiss, 1999; Mann & control obsolete. Ward, 2001). The problem with the forced suppression of desire is that even though The discovery of automatic self-regulatory suppression may provide some short-term processes has raised the intriguing question relief, suppression may often backfire, lead- of whether the initial appraisal of tempt- ing to ironic rebound effects (Wegner, 1994). ing stimuli (i.e., the reward signal triggered According to Wegner’s theory, when one upon exposure) may be altered through tries actively to suppress something, atten- training and intervention techniques. The tion may be repeatedly redirected toward the underlying rationale is that people should very mental content one is trying to avoid. have an easier time keeping desires at bay This feature of suppression may contribute to if the tempting stimuli that typically elicit keeping the desire–processing loop alive, or strong desires and cravings are appraised in even lead to the hyperaccessibility of desire- less positive terms. One method to shape the related thoughts. As we argue below, these initial appraisal of tempting stimuli is evalu- (main) effects do not imply that everybody ative conditioning (Hofmann, De Houwer, suffers from ironic rebound effects to the Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010). Spe- same extent. Suppression may well be effec- cifically, pairing a tempting stimulus (e.g., tive for those individuals who are particu- alcohol) repeatedly with an affectively nega- larly skilled at directing their attention in a tive unconditioned stimulus can decrease top-down manner (Brewin & Smart, 2005). desire for alcohol among problematic drinkers (Houben, Havermans, & Wiers, Individual Differences in Desire 2010; Van Gucht, Baeyens, Vansteenwe- and Its Regulation gen, Hermans, & Beckers, 2010). A second Our main focus, up to this point, has been promising method is avoidance training, in on general mechanisms that facilitate or hin- which people are trained to respond rou- der successful desire regulation. In this last tinely to tempting stimuli with avoidance part of this chapter, we address the research responses (Wiers, Eberl, Rinck, Becker, & on how individual differences may shape the Lindenmeyer, 2011; Wiers, Rinck, Kordts, way people experience and deal with appeti- Houben, & Strack, 2010). In one intrigu- tive desires. ing study, alcoholic inpatients who under- went cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) and four 15-minute training sessions to avoid alcohol stimuli showed reduced crav-
354 PERSONALITY PROCESSES AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES Regarding the intensity of desire experi- at early stages in the self-control process. ences, there is strong evidence that indi- Furthermore, we believe that TSC is dis- viduals high in behavioral approach system tinct from individual differences in what has (BAS) sensitivity experience stronger desires been called the restraint bias (Nordgren, van and cravings than do those low in BAS. This Harreveld, & van der Pligt, 2009), which effect was found both in cue-reactivity para- taps into people’s overoptimistic—and thus digms in the laboratory (Franken, 2002) unrealistic—beliefs about their capacity and when aggregating average self-reported at self-control. As a consequence of their desire strength across many desire domains inflated beliefs, people high in the restraint (Hofmann, Baumeister, et al., 2012). These bias tend to overexpose themselves to tempt- findings clearly support Gray’s (1982) rein- ing situations, leading to more frequent self- forcement sensitivity theory, arguing that control failures in the heat of the moment the BAS is responsible for the reward pro- (Nordgren et al., 2009). Thus, we predict cessing in appetitive motivation, and suggest that individuals high in TSC harbor more an important role for related constructs such realistic impulse control beliefs than do indi- as sensation seeking. viduals low in TSC. This more realistic will- power self-assessment (and a more realistic The Everyday Temptations Study also appreciation of the power of the situation) showed that individuals high in trait self- may lead them to prudently avoid high-risk control (TSC) reported lower average desire situations and remove tempting stimuli from strength (as well as lower average conflict their environment when they can. and less use of active resistance to control desire) (Hofmann, Baumeister, et al., 2012). Individuals also differ considerably in Even though somewhat speculative, we their command of top-down attention. believe this surprising pattern of findings In the cognitive literature on executive may reflect the joint impact of two mech- functioning, top-down attention has been anisms. First, individuals with high TSC strongly linked with the concept of working may make more use of preventive situation memory capacity (WMC; Kane, Bleckley, and stimulus control strategies, thus avoid- Conway, & Engle, 2001), which represents ing tempting desires more often than their the ability to maintain and update relevant low-TSC counterparts (and hence reduc- information in working memory, and to ing the need for effortful control). In sup- shield it from interfering processing or dis- port, independent raters rated the desires traction (Engle, 2002; Kane et al., 2001). reported by high-TSC participants as less This ability may be highly instrumental to problematic for the “average person” than a variety of strategies important for effective the desires reported by low-TSC partici- desire regulation (Hofmann et al., 2011). pants (Hofmann, Baumeister, et al., 2012). First, WMC may help people disengage In other words, high-TSC individuals seem faster and be less influenced by attention- to be navigating an objectively less tempt- grabbing desire-related cues. Eye-tracking ing desire landscape. Second, it is conceiv- studies, for instance, have shown that people able that those with high TSC have more low in WMC are prone to bias eye direction powerful automatic desire regulation pro- toward tempting cues, with the degree of cesses at their disposal. Some support for bias correlating with their automatic affec- this assumption comes from studies reveal- tive reactions toward those cues (Friese, Bar- ing that people who report to be success- gas-Avila, Hofmann, & Wiers, 2010; Friese ful self-regulators in a given domain, such & Hofmann, 2012). Those high in WMC, as dieting, tend to show more effective in contrast, were much less influenced by automatic self-regulation than do unsuc- their automatic affective reactions, which cessful self-regulators (Papies, Stroebe, & suggests that they were faster at disengaging Aarts, 2008a). These findings are intriguing attention from salient cues. because they suggest that, in everyday life, TSC may not so much be about how well Second, WMC may aid a host of emotion temptations are resisted (the type of “late- regulation strategies, such as the efficient stage” self-control typically studied in the use of distraction, reappraisal, and emo- laboratory situations) as about how well tion suppression (Hofmann et al., 2008, temptations are being avoided or appraised Study 3; Hofmann, Schmeichel, et al., 2012; McRae, Jacobs, Ray, John, & Gross, 2012;
Desire and Desire Regulation 355 Schmeichel, Volokhov, & Demaree, 2008). the intriguing issue of whether there are reli- Third, individuals high in WMC seem to able individual differences in the way people be better at controlling their own thoughts, relate to their desires. A number of personal- with fewer thought intrusions (Brewin ity characteristics, such as faith in intuition, & Smart, 2005; Kane et al., 2007). Even trait hedonism, tolerance for ambiguity, as though more direct evidence for the mod- well as demographic variables, such as reli- erating role of WMC in the regulation of giosity, may moderate the extent to which desires and cravings is missing, it does not people see their appetitive desires as integral appear to be great leap to suggest that indi- parts of themselves (leading to high accep- viduals with high WMC are more effective tance) as opposed to “dark and sinister” than those with low WMC at breaking the forces that lack integration with the self and desire-p rocessing cycle. thus need to be kept at bay. In the absence of empirical work that has explored such Because executive functions such as work- possible links between acceptance of appeti- ing memory can be trained, at least to some tive desires and personality traits, we predict extent (for a discussion, see Shipstead, that such personality characteristics should Redick, & Engle, 2012), there is a large (1) relate to how often people go about regu- potential for intervention research aimed at lating their appetitive desires and (2) facili- finding ways to improve the management tate regulation of appetitive desires to the of unwanted desires and cravings. Further- extent that they promote acceptance-based more, fascinating new research suggests that rather than suppression-b ased emotion regu- repeated high-frequency (i.e., excitatory) lation strategies. stimulation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex via transcranial magnetic stimulation Conclusion (TMS) or transcranial direct current stimu- As humans we experience all sorts of appeti- lation (tDCS) may reduce cravings (e.g., tive desires. Sometimes, these stand in strong Amiaz, Levy, Vainiger, Grunhaus, & Zan- opposition to our self-regulatory goals or gen, 2009; Boggio et al., 2008; Camprodon, values, forcing us to face the challenge of Martinez-Raga, Alonso-Alonso, Shih, & how best to “get a grip” on such “unwanted Pascual-L eone, 2007). One highly plausible wants.” In this chapter, we have argued explanation is that the high-frequency stim- that desires can be conceptually treated as ulation leads to an additional mobilization emotions, because, like emotions, desires of executive control processes implied in the have affective, motivational, and cognitive down-regulation of cravings. components. Hence, it may be beneficial to address the issue of desire regulation from Regarding further personality traits, the an emotion regulatory perspective. Everyday Temptations Study showed that a measure of perfectionism (tapping primarily Our review of the available literature into negative, dysfunctional perfectionism) suggests that, as with emotion regulation, was associated with stronger desire inten- effective desire regulation can take place at sity in daily life (Hofmann, Baumeister, et various phases of desire processing. Desire al., 2012), more intense feelings of conflict, regulation strategies can be roughly divided and more frequent desire resistance. Even into those that prevent exposure to desire- though somewhat speculative, this find- eliciting stimuli (situation and stimulus con- ing suggests that people high in this sort of trol), those that may prevent a desire from perfectionism may become overly preoccu- reaching conscious awareness (e.g., atten- pied with regulating their desires, perhaps tion allocation), and those that prevent a making too much use of counterproductive desire from becoming overly dominant (e.g., strategies such as suppression, consistent reappraisal). Mapping a given strategy to with research on the trait’s connection with just one of these different phases may be emotion suppression (Bergman, Nyland, & overly simplistic, however. For example, Burns, 2007). take attention allocation: Sometimes, pow- erful distractors (resulting in mental preoc- Finally, when discussing the positive cupation) may prevent a desire from reach- effects of mindfulness on desire regulation, we highlighted the possible mediating role of desire acceptance as an effective regula- tion strategy. The case of acceptance raises
356 PERSONALITY PROCESSES AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES ing conscious awareness; at other times, involved and sometimes strategically attention allocation may be used strategi- employed by those wanting to instigate cer- cally to down-regulate a desire only after it tain desires in others (e.g., companies using has reached conscious awareness. In a simi- scents to better sell their products; a person lar vein, it is possible that automatic down- wearing sexy clothing on a date), it is also regulation may sometimes be so powerful possible that desires can be activated in a top- that it may even prevent the onset of a real down fashion in the absence of any external desire, whereas at other times, it may make stimuli by willfully activating certain memo- a desire less potent, so that it does not take ries or simulating certain experiences (Kava- up as many mental resources as it otherwise nagh et al., 2005). would. Moreover, it is possible that multiple 3. Note that the effects of cognitive load are strategies may complement each other in quite the opposite of the effects of resource important ways that are worthy of future depletion. Recent work by Vohs et al. (2012) study. For instance, powerful automatic reg- shows that people in a depleted state experi- ulation should reduce the demand for more ence stronger emotional reactions to valenced effortful emotion regulation processes. stimuli, intensified pain in a cold pressor task, and an intensified desire to eat cookies pre- Finally, people appear to differ as to how sented during a taste and rate test. intensely they experience desire and how 4. The reverse process (i.e., inhibition of the they go about regulating it. Individuals high self-control goal) may take place among less in TSC seem to make more use of early pre- successful self-regulators (see Papies, Stroebe, ventive strategies such as situation and stim- & Aarts, 2008b; Stroebe, Mensink, Aarts, ulus control. (Dysfunctional) perfectionists Schut, & Kruglanski, 2008), suggesting may focus too much on suppression, thus important individual differences with regard becoming overly obsessed with their desires. to automatic desire-regulation processes. Being dispositionally high in executive func- tions such as WMC may make it a lot easier References to resist the attentional pull of tempting stimuli. Taking a closer look at what strate- Alberts, H. J. E. M., Mulkens, S., Smeets, M., gies work for what types of people should & Thewissen, R. (2010). Coping with food help practitioners to devise more effective cravings. Investigating the potential of a customized treatments for those who suffer mindfulness-b ased intervention. Appetite, 55, from tempting desires and cravings. As tech- 160 –163. nological possibilities mature, we expect to see fascinating new developments in the Amiaz, R., Levy, D., Vainiger, D., Grunhaus, years to come with regard to one of the cen- L., & Zangen, A. (2009). Repeated high- tral challenges of what it means to be human: frequency transcranial magnetic stimulation how to shape one’s internal landscape of over the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex reduces appetitive desires in a way that strikes a cigarette craving and consumption. Addic- healthy balance between desire enactment tion, 104, 653–660. and the occasional need to curb one’s pas- sion for what might be a pretty good reason. Attwood, A. S., O’Sullivan, H., Leonards, U., Mackintosh, B., & Munafo, M. R. (2008). Notes Attentional bias training and cue reactivity in cigarette smokers. Addiction, 103, 1875– 1. Even though the two are often correlated, 1882. desires are also conceptually distinct from attitudes, because liking does not necessar- Baars, B. J., & Franklin, S. (2003). How con- ily imply wanting and vice versa (Berridge, scious experience and working memory inter- 1996). For instance, one may like lobster in act. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7, 166–172. general but have no desire to eat one right now. A long-term smoker may dislike ciga- Barnes, R. D., & Tantleff-Dunn, S. (2010). rettes (“They’re unhealthy and expensive”) Food for thought: Examining the relation- yet have a craving for one. ship between food thought suppression and weight-related outcomes. Eating Behaviors, 2. Whereas external stimuli are typically 11, 175–179. Baumeister, R. F., Masicampo, E. J., & Vohs, K. D. (2011). Do conscious thoughts cause
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Chapter 22 Emotion Goals: How Their Content, Structure, and Operation Shape Emotion€Regulation Iris€B.€Mauss Maya€Tamir Much of human behavior is purposeful, or goals (i.e., goals that involve specific emo- goal directed (Bandura, 1986; Carver & tional states as the direct desired endpoint), Scheier, 2000; Deci & Ryan, 1985; Fish- and focus mainly on the latter. bach & Ferguson, 2007; Gollwitzer, 1990; Mischel, Cantor, & Feldman, 1996). Goals It follows from this definition that peo- can target our appearance (e.g., to be thin), ple’s emotion goals are foundational to emo- our mind (e.g., to be smart), and our behav- tion regulation. In fact, the activation of an ior (e.g., to spend more time with family or emotion goal is necessary for emotion regu- to work harder). As we argue in this chap- lation (Gross, this volume; Mauss, Bunge, ter, some of our most important goals target & Gross, 2007). Emotion goals determine emotions (e.g., to be happy). A goal is a “cog- whether people engage in emotion regula- nitive representation of a desired endpoint” tion, which emotions they attempt to regu- (Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007, p.€491). There- late, when they cease their emotion regula- fore, we define an emotion goal as the cogni- tory efforts, and people’s satisfaction with tive representation of a particular emotional their emotion regulation attempts. Thus, state that is the desired endpoint. Although understanding emotion goals has crucial any goal may indirectly involve desired implications for understanding emotion reg- emotional endpoints (e.g., “I want to buy a ulation and its effects on well-being. car in order to feel happy as a result”), we focus on goals that directly target emotions To date, research on emotion regulation as the desired endpoint (e.g., “I want to feel has focused on understanding different emo- happy”). Emotion goals are a specific type of tion regulation strategies and their outcomes affect goal. Whereas affect goals target states (Gross & Thompson, 2007; Webb, Miles, & of pleasure or pain, more generally (e.g., “I Sheeran, 2012). As a function of this focus, want to feel pleasant”), emotion goals target research to date has examined the “how” specific emotional states (e.g., “I want to feel (e.g., What strategies do people use to regu- joyful, proud, or amused”). Therefore, in late their emotions?) more than the “why” this chapter, we distinguish nonaffect goals and “what” of emotion regulation (e.g., (i.e., goals that do not involve affective states When do people decide to regulate an emo- as the direct desired endpoint), affect goals tion? What emotional states do people want (i.e., goals that involve pleasure or pain as to attain?). The goal framework we outline the direct desired endpoint), and emotion here emphasizes the importance of under- standing not only the “how” but also the “why” and “what” of emotion regulation. 361
362 PERSONALITY PROCESSES AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES A Goal Framework regulation, which emotions they attempt to for Emotion Regulation regulate, and in which direction (i.e., increase Although relatively little research has directly or decrease). In this chapter we discuss emo- examined emotions as goals, there is ample tion goals, building on available knowledge research on goals and self-regulation in gen- about goal pursuit. We organize this chap- eral (e.g., Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; ter around three features of goals that have Carver & Scheier, 2000; Custers & Aarts, been highlighted in research on goal pursuit 2010). Applying this body of knowledge to (Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007): their content, the emotion domain could greatly advance their hierarchical structure, and their opera- the understanding of emotion regulation (cf. tion. First, we consider the content of emo- Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones, Amodio, & tion goals. We examine what emotion goals Gable, 2011; Koole, van Dillen, & Sheppes, people adopt and highlight two factors that 2011; Webb, Schweiger Gallo, Miles, Goll- determine these goals: hedonic benefits (i.e., witzer, & Sheeran, 2012). People’s goals greater pleasure and less pain) and nonhe- determine their actions as they attempt to donic benefits (e.g., to prepare an organism decrease perceived discrepancies between for fight) of particular emotions. Second, we current and desired states. As Figure 22.1 consider the structure of emotion goals. Mul- illustrates, when applied to emotions, this tiple goals, including emotion and nonemo- idea can help us understand what determines tion ones, coexist at any given point in time the initiation and course of emotion regula- and are hierarchically organized. We con- tion. More specifically, perceived discrepan- sider possible features of this organization cies between current emotional states (e.g., and their implications. Third, we consider “I feel sad”) and emotion goals (“I want to the operation of emotion goals that unfolds feel less sad”) initiate emotion regulation, as people regulate their emotions, distin- which is set in motion to bring current emo- guishing relatively automatic from deliber- tional states closer to desired emotion states. ate types of emotion regulation. Finally, we Thus, the emotion goals people hold deter- highlight the goal framework’s implications mine whether or not they engage in emotion for understanding the links between emotion regulation and well-being.1 Goal Pursuit Emotion Regulation Meta- Emotion Goal Content Comparator Current Emotional State Emotion Goal FIGURE 22.1. Hypothesized operation of emotion goals. Perceived discrepancy between current emotional states and emotion goals initiates and directs emotion regulation, which influences cur- rent emotional states. The evaluation of the difference between current emotional states and emotion goals is emotional in nature (e.g., contentment when discrepancy decreases, distress when discrepancy increases). We therefore refer to the output of this evaluation as meta-e motion.
Emotion Goals 363 The Content of Emotion Goals: behavior to deal with situational demands Emotions as Desired States as effectively as possible (Frijda, 1986). For What emotion goals do people have and instance, joy may promote creativity (Fred- what determines these goals? Because all rickson, 2001). Therefore, when perfor- creatures strive to attain pleasure and avoid mance is likely to benefit from increased cre- pain, and because emotions are pleasant ativity, joy might be useful for performance. or painful subjective states, emotion goals People may be motivated to experience an are often determined by the immediate emotion to attain its performance-related hedonic benefits of emotions. For example, benefits. In support of this hypothesis, we people may be motivated to increase hap- have recently shown that people want to piness because it is pleasant, and they may experience emotions they believe would be motivated to decrease fear because it is promote their performance (Tamir, Salerno, unpleasant. Pleasant emotions generally are Rhodes, & Schreier, 2012). In a series of stud- preferred to unpleasant emotions by people ies, we led participants to expect anger to be from different cultures (Diener, 2000; Tsai, either useful, irrelevant, or harmful for per- Knutson, & Fung, 2006) and with different formance on an upcoming task. Participants personality dispositions (Rusting & Larsen, were motivated to increase the experience 1995). of anger when they expected it be useful for performance, even though it was unpleasant The immediate hedonic benefits of emo- to experience. This effect was obtained even tions are a powerful determinant of emo- when beliefs about usefulness were manipu- tion goals. However, they are not the sole lated outside of conscious awareness. These determinant. Functional theories of emo- findings demonstrate that emotion goals can tions hold that emotions serve to promote a be determined by the expected benefits of broad array of nonhedonic benefits (Frijda, emotions for performance. 1986; Nesse & Ellsworth, 2009). Accord- ing to the instrumental approach to emotion Second, emotions provide people with regulation (Bonanno, 2001; Parrott, 1993; important information about themselves Tamir, 2009), people may be motivated to and their state in the world (Clore et al., experience emotions to attain either hedonic 2001). Such information can support or or nonhedonic benefits. When hedonic ben- conflict with core assumptions about who efits are prioritized, people are motivated we are and what the world is like. People are to experience pleasant emotions and avoid generally motivated to preserve these core unpleasant ones. However, when nonhe- assumptions (Swann & Schroeder, 1995). donic benefits are prioritized, people may Just as people seek feedback that maintains be motivated to experience either pleasant their self-image (Swann & Schroeder, 1995), or unpleasant emotions, depending on their people may be motivated to experience emo- instrumental implications (Tamir, 2009). tions that maintain their self-image (i.e., that have epistemic benefits). In support of Emotions can offer at least three types this proposition, Wood and her colleagues of nonhedonic benefits. First, emotions can showed that people with low self esteem offer performance benefits. By engaging are motivated to maintain sad feelings, various physiological, cognitive, and moti- because such feelings are familiar to them vational processes, emotions can change and because they reinforce their low sense of how effectively we deal with situational personal value (Wood, Heimpel, Manwell, demands (Frijda, 1986). Second, emotions & Whittington, 2009). can have epistemic benefits. They provide us with important information regarding our Third, emotions can reinforce one’s com- state in the world (Clore, Gasper, & Garvin, mitment to and investment in particular 2001). Third, emotions can carry cultural cultural values. For instance, pride is tied to benefits. In group contexts, emotions signal the value of personal achievement, whereas group membership and support of cultural shame is tied to the value of social harmony values (Keltner & Haidt, 1999). (Kitayama, Mesquita, & Karasawa, 2006). Because cultures generally seek to preserve We believe that people may be motivated specific values, they prescribe certain emo- to experience emotions to attain any one tions as more normative than others (Eid of these benefits. First, emotions can orient & Diener, 2001). In support of this notion,
364 PERSONALITY PROCESSES AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES Tsai and her colleagues (2006) have shown But it demonstrates that people can be moti- that cultures vary in the extent to which they vated to experience almost any emotion. value different emotional states. Whereas Thus, and perhaps surprisingly, emotion pleasant high-a rousal states are more highly goals are not limited to pleasant emotions. valued in individualistic cultures, pleasant low-arousal states are more highly valued The Structure of Emotion Goals in collectivistic cultures. Thus, beyond emo- Up to this point, we have treated emotion tions’ hedonic benefits, emotion goals may goals as though they are singular, isolated be determined by values that are prevalent entities. However, people pursue many dif- in people’s cultural context. ferent goals at any given moment. As Figure 22.2 illustrates, goals can be ordered hier- As the research reviewed here demon- archically according to their importance, strates, people are often motivated to expe- centrality, and abstraction, with some goals rience emotions for their immediate hedonic assuming superordinate and others assum- benefits, but they can also be motivated to ing subordinate positions (Carver & Scheier, experience emotions for their performance- 2000; Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007). To fully related benefits, epistemic benefits, or cul- understand emotion goals, it is important to tural benefits. This list of determinants of emotion goals is not exhaustive (for a more complete list, see Tamir & Bigman, in press). Superordinate BE HAPPY goals Subordinate Feel Do well Spend time goals pleasant at work with family Joy Worry Love Superordinate FEEL COMPETENT goals Make Feel Win in friends pleasant confrontations Joy Subordinate Joy Anger goals FIGURE 22.2. Hypothesized organization of emotion goals. Multiple goals are hierarchically orga- nized, with some goals assuming superordinate and others assuming subordinate positions. Goals can be emotional or nonaffective in nature, and they can be compatible or in conflict with one another. As the examples illustrates, goal structure can be characterized by multifinality and equifinality. The goal of “joy” may serve the superordinate goal to be happy or to feel competent (multifinality). The superordinate goal to feel competent can be subserved by either joy or anger (equifinality). Conflict can arise when one goal (e.g., feel anger) subserves one superordinate goal (feel competent) but not another (be happy).
Emotion Goals 365 examine them within the hierarchical struc- Thus, goal conflict may be less likely when a ture of a broader goal system. pleasant emotion promotes both affect and nonaffect superordinate goals, and more Goal systems can be characterized by mul- likely when a pleasant emotion promotes an tifinality and equifinality (Kruglanski et al., affect goal but impairs a nonaffect goal. 2002). Multifinality refers to the idea that a given subordinate goal may serve multiple Goal conflict may be particularly likely superordinate goals (see Figure 22.2). In the when pursuing unpleasant emotions. Like context of emotion goals, this implies that a pleasant emotions, unpleasant emotions can subordinate emotion goal (e.g., to feel joy) either promote or impair the attainment of may serve superordinate affect goals (e.g., to superordinate nonaffect goals (e.g., anger feel pleasant) as well as superordinate non- might help people win a fight but it might affect goals (e.g., to make friends). Equifi- also impair friendships). However, unlike nality refers to the idea that a given super- pleasant emotions, unpleasant emotions ordinate goal may be subserved by multiple often impair the attainment of superordinate subordinate goals (see Figure 22.2). In the affect goals (i.e., they feel bad). Therefore, context of emotion goals, this implies that a the pursuit of unpleasant emotions depends superordinate goal (e.g., to be happy) may be on the relative strength of competing super- served by various affect (e.g., to feel good, to ordinate nonaffect and affect goals. People feel less bad) and nonaffect (e.g., to do well may be more likely to pursue subordinate at work, to spend time with family) goals. unpleasant emotion goals when superor- dinate nonaffect goals become salient, and The pursuit of superordinate goals can such pursuits likely involve some degree of automatically activate related subordinate goal conflict. goals (e.g., Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007). Adapting this principle to the study of emo- These ideas lie at the heart of the instru- tion goals, we have recently shown that emo- mental approach to emotion regulation tion goals can be activated by priming related (Tamir, 2009). According to this approach, superordinate goals (Tamir, Ford, & Ryan, people can pursue either pleasant or unpleas- 2013). Building on the idea that anger can ant emotion goals, to the extent that such impair collaboration, we showed that par- goals serve salient superordinate goals. For ticipants who were nonconsciously primed instance, to the extent that anger promotes with the goal of collaboration became less successful confrontation (e.g., Frijda, 1986), motivated to experience anger before a people may be motivated to feel angry when social interaction. These findings could not it is important for them to win a fight. In be explained by concurrent emotional expe- such cases, people would be motivated to riences and demonstrate that emotion goals experience unpleasant emotions, despite the can operate in the service of superordinate immediate hedonic cost of doing so. nonaffect goals. There is now a body of empirical evidence Multifinality and equifinality of goals can in support of these ideas. For instance, Tamir, thus facilitate goal pursuit because they offer Mitchell, and Gross (2008) tested whether multiple ways to achieve goals. However, as people wanted to increase their anger when Figure 22.2 illustrates, the multifinality of preparing for confrontation. Participants goals can also give rise to goal conflict when were given salient confrontational or non- subordinate goals simultaneously promote confrontational goals (e.g., kill enemies or the pursuit of some superordinate goals and build an empire in a virtual computer game). impair the pursuit of others. This may be To assess emotion goals, participants indi- particularly salient in the context of emotion cated the extent to which they preferred to goals, because emotions have both hedonic engage in various emotion-inducing activi- and nonhedonic implications. Pleasant ties, including those that were neutral, excit- emotions can either promote or impair the ing, and anger-inducing. Although partici- attainment of superordinate nonaffect goals pants acknowledged that the anger-inducing (e.g., joy might help people make friends but activities would be unpleasant, they nonethe- also lead them to spend less time studying less preferred to engage in them when pursu- for an exam). However, pleasant emotions ing the confrontational, but not the noncon- generally promote the attainment of super- frontational, goals. A similar pattern was ordinate affect goals (i.e., they feel good). found in an examination of people’s prefer-
366 PERSONALITY PROCESSES AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES ences for anger before a face-to-face nego- (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Carver tiation task (Tamir & Ford, 2012b). Partici- & Scheier, 2000). When applied to emotion pants who thought they were preparing for a goals, these models direct our attention to confrontational negotiation showed stronger an important element of emotion regula- preferences for anger before the negotiation. tion. Goals can be represented outside of In contrast, participants who thought they conscious awareness, as well as consciously were preparing for a collaborative negotia- (Custers & Aarts, 2010; Fishbach & Fergu- tion showed weaker preferences for anger son, 2007). People pursue conscious goals and stronger preferences for happiness. Such deliberately, whereas they pursue noncon- preferences, in turn, were fully mediated scious goals relatively effortlessly and with by the belief that anger would promote or little or no conscious awareness (automati- impair successful performance. These stud- cally). It follows that emotion goals can ies suggest that emotion goals can subserve set in motion relatively automatic as well nonaffect goals, and that people pursue as deliberate emotion regulation attempts. unpleasant emotions when they expect them Research shows that nonemotion goals, such to subserve salient superordinate goals. as achievement and cooperation, can be pur- sued automatically (e.g., Bargh, Gollwitzer, Interestingly, the relative importance of Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trötschel, 2001). affect and nonaffect goals may shift system- Might emotion goals also be pursued in an atically across the lifespan. Specifically, the automatic manner, with little effort and out- importance of affect goals seems to change side of conscious awareness? with age, with affect goals gaining in relative importance over nonaffect goals (Charles While it has long been hypothesized that & Carstensen, this volume; Carstensen, people can engage in emotion regulation Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999). If people are unconsciously (Freud, 1936), only recently likely to pursue unpleasant emotions when has empirical research begun to explore this they subserve superordinate nonaffect goals, possibility (see Gyurak & Etkin, this vol- unpleasant emotion goals should be more ume; Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2004; Gyurak, prevalent in younger than in older adults. Gross, & Etkin, 2011; Mauss, Bunge, et al., Indeed, wanting to maintain or increase 2007). To examine individual differences in unpleasant emotions and decrease pleasant automatic emotion regulation, we developed emotions is more prevalent in younger than a variant of the Implicit Association Test in older adults (Riediger, Schmiedek, Wag- (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, ner, & Lindenberger, 2009). 1998) that estimates implicit evaluation of emotion control versus expression, the Emo- In this section, we have discussed the tion Regulation IAT (ER-IAT; Mauss, Evers, structure of emotion goals, highlighting Wilhelm, & Gross, 2006, Study 1). We the fact that emotion goals operate within reasoned that people who implicitly evalu- a broader goal system, which includes both ate emotion control positively would tend affect and nonaffect goals that are hierarchi- to engage in automatic emotion regulation cally organized. The features of this orga- (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000; Custers & nization have important implications for Aarts, 2005). understanding how emotion goals interact with one another and with other types of To examine how automatic emotion reg- goals. In the next section, we focus on the ulation predicts emotional responding we operation of emotion goals. assessed whether ER-IAT scores were asso- ciated with responses to a laboratory anger The Operation of Emotion Goals: provocation (Mauss et al., 2006, Study 2). Automatic and Deliberate While most participants became angry Emotion Regulation during the provocation, those with greater As illustrated in Figure 22.1, according ER-IAT scores (i.e., those who implicitly to feedback, or cybernetic, models of self evaluated emotion control more positively) regulation, people initiate self-regulatory reported relatively less anger experience. In attempts when they perceive discrepancies addition, and in line with the notion that between their current state and their goal regulation attempts had taken place, they exhibited a challenge cardiovascular acti- vation pattern, characterized by greater
Emotion Goals 367 cardiac output and lower total peripheral no instructions, were asked to form a goal resistance (cf. Tomaka, Blascovich, Kelsey, intention (“I will not get frightened!”), or & Leitten, 1993). The relative reduction of were asked to form an implementation inten- anger experience appeared to have happened tion (“If I see a spider, then I will remain without conscious effort, because asso- calm and relaxed!”). Afterward, when view- ciations between ER-IAT scores and anger ing spider pictures, participants who formed responding held when researchers controlled implementation intentions reported less for self-reported effortful emotion control. negative affect and exhibited less physiologi- In summary, these findings are consistent cal arousal compared to both other groups. with the idea that people who implicitly val- This research further supports the idea that ued emotion control tended to regulate their emotion regulation can take place without emotion automatically and experienced less conscious awareness. anger. It appears, then, that the nonconscious To examine the possible causal role of pursuit of emotion goals may be just as automatic emotion regulation, we (Mauss, effective as the conscious pursuit of emotion Cook, & Gross, 2007) manipulated noncon- goals. Unlike conscious goal pursuit, how- scious emotion regulation goals by priming ever, nonconscious goal pursuit “eats up” emotion control versus emotion expression less cognitive resources and is less effortful with a sentence-u nscrambling task (Srull & (Custers & Aarts, 2010; Fishbach, Fried- Wyer, 1979). Participants primed with emo- man, & Kruglanski, 2003). Automatic emo- tion control in the laboratory responded tion regulation, therefore, could help people with less anger to a subsequent anger provo- cope with powerful negative situations with- cation than did participants primed with out conscious effort. Given how impor- emotion expression. The fact that partici- tant emotion regulation is to psychological pants were not aware of the purpose of the health (Rottenberg & Johnson, 2007), the priming task suggests that these effects were intriguing possibility arises that the auto- not conscious. These conclusions were con- matic pursuit of emotion goals might play firmed in a study in which participants were a beneficial role in psychological health. A either explicitly instructed or primed outside recent study tested whether this might be of awareness to engage in emotion regula- the case (DeWall et al., 2011). It showed that tion. Participants in the priming condition after social exclusion, participants low in achieved the same decrease in physiological depressive symptoms or high in self-esteem reactivity to an anxiety induction as those automatically (without conscious intent) explicitly instructed to regulate their emo- initiated the up-regulation of positive emo- tion (Williams, Bargh, Nocera, & Gray, tion. Similar findings have been obtained 2009). for individuals with healthy traits such as high action orientation or secure attach- Work on implementation intentions also ment (for review, see Koole & Rothermund, suggests that emotion regulation can unfold 2011). These findings suggest that automatic automatically. An implementation inten- emotion regulation may be part of the psy- tion is a plan that links situations to specific chological immune system: in healthy indi- goal-d irected behaviors (Gollwitzer, 1999), viduals a threat sets in motion an automatic such as “After I get up in the morning, I emotion regulation process that leads to will run 2 miles.” By putting goal-directed increased positive and decreased negative behavior under the control of the situation emotions. in this way, the execution of the goal is removed from effortful and conscious con- This does not imply that automatic emo- trol and rendered relatively automatic (Webb tion regulation is always associated with & Sheeran, 2007). Recent research suggests beneficial outcomes. After all, defensiveness that implementation intentions can be used and repression are based on implicitly rep- in the service of emotion regulation (for a resented goals, yet they are associated with review, see Webb, Schweiger Gallo, et al., negative outcomes (Freud, 1936; Vaillant, 2012). For example, Schweiger-G allo, Keil, 1977; Weinberger, 1995). The goal frame- McCulloch, Rockstroh, and Gollwitzer work may help explain when automatic emo- (2009) showed spider phobics images that tion regulation is beneficial versus harmful. included spiders. Participants were given As we discuss in the next section, automatic
368 PERSONALITY PROCESSES AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES emotion regulation may be beneficial to the on whether they target the emotional situ- extent that people (1) use effective regulation ation, a person’s attention to it, or appraisal strategies and (2) pursue adaptive emotion of it (antecedent-focused) versus a later goals (Hopp, Troy, & Mauss, 2011). component of the emotional response, such as emotion-expressive behaviors (response- Implications for Well‑Being focused). The goal framework leads to several novel predictions regarding when and why emo- Which emotion regulation strategies are tion regulation is associated with healthy most effective for attaining emotion goals versus unhealthy outcomes. Next, we exam- (e.g., decrease anger)? Antecedent-focused ine two particularly important sets of pre- emotion regulation strategies should be rela- dictions and empirical evidence to support tively more effective at altering emotional them. responses because they have the advantage of a preventive strategy: they take place Emotion Goals and Emotion before the emotional response fully unfolds Regulation Strategies and thus should be more effective than People can use a multitude of emotion regu- response-focused emotion regulation strate- lation strategies to attain emotion goals. For gies. A recent meta-a nalysis of 190 studies example, to feel less angry, Person A might is broadly consistent with this hypothesis think of something else whereas Person B (Webb, Miles, et al., 2012). Are the most may vent. The study of emotion regulation effective emotion regulation strategies also strategies and their relative adaptiveness the most adaptive? Research comparing (i.e., to what extent different types of emo- antecedent-focused emotion regulation (i.e., tion regulation strategies are associated with cognitive appraisal) to response-focused greater well-being) has paid relatively little emotion regulation (i.e., expressive suppres- attention to the emotion goals people pur- sion) suggests that, indeed, on average reap- sue. We argue that it is fruitful to examine praisal is associated with better psychologi- emotion regulation strategies in the context cal health (Garnefski & Kraaij, 2006; Gross of emotion goals. The goal framework offers & John, 2003; Troy, Wilhelm, Shallcross, & three specific hypotheses. First, the adaptive- Mauss, 2010). Thus, there is some evidence ness of emotion regulation strategies should that some of the most effective emotion reg- depend on the extent to which they help a ulation strategies are also relatively adaptive. person achieve their emotion goals (i.e., to the extent that they are effective). Second, Importantly, from a goal perspective, the the adaptiveness of emotion regulation strat- adaptiveness of an emotion regulation strat- egies should depend on not only their inher- egy should be determined by its inherent ent features but also the extent to which they properties, but also by how flexibly it is used are used in a goal-s ensitive, flexible manner. to support an individual’s changing emotion Third, the adaptiveness of emotion regula- goals (Bonanno & Burton, in press; Brandt- tion strategies should depend on the extent staedter & Rothermund, 2002; Cheng, to which they are used in the service of adap- 2001; Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010). Find- tive emotion goals. ings in support of this notion have been obtained from daily diary studies in which Much research has focused on classify- participants reported on stressful life events ing the various emotion regulation strategies and how many different coping strategies that exist (Gross & Thompson, 2007; Koole, they used (Cheng, 2001). Flexibility was 2009; Totterdell & Parkinson, 1999). One operationalized as participants’ ability to of the most prominent models distinguishes vary coping strategies with the demand of different emotion regulation strategies based the stressful event. Participants demonstrat- on the stage in the emotion process in which ing greater flexibility exhibited greater well- they intervene (Gross & Thompson, 2007). being compared to participants who adhered According to this model, emotion regulation more rigidly to particular coping strategies, strategies can be characterized depending regardless of the particular type of coping strategy. Bonanno, Papa, Lalande, Westphal, and Coifman (2004) tested a related idea by deriving a laboratory measure of how well
Emotion Goals 369 participants were able to match their emo- as well as the progress of their efforts to tion regulation efforts to changing goals decrease discrepancies between the two. (either increase or decrease emotional Importantly, the output of this monitoring expression). Participants who were better process is emotional in nature. When people able to regulate their emotions in pursuit progress faster than expected toward their of their concurrent goals reported greater goal, they feel positively (e.g., contentment); psychological health after the September when people progress more slowly than 11, 2001 attacks (Bonanno et al., 2004) expected they feel negatively (e.g., distress). and greater well-being after high life stress Because these emotional states are about an (Westphal, Seivert, & Bonanno, 2010). emotional state, they can be referred to as meta-emotion. Considering emotion regu- From a goal framework, emotion regula- lation in the context of this feedback loop tion strategies are therefore adaptive to the leads to two interesting predictions. First, extent that they help people attain their decreasing the discrepancy between current concurrent emotion goals. However, the and desired state should yield better well- adaptiveness of emotion regulation more being, whether the discrepancy reduction generally depends on which emotion goals occurs by changing one’s current emotional people are trying to achieve. If people hold state or by changing one’s desired emotional maladaptive emotion goals, even the most state. Conversely, an increased discrepancy effective and flexible emotion regulation between current and desired state should strategies should not be adaptive. Which yield negative outcomes, whether it is due to emotion goals are adaptive? Perhaps those one’s current or desired emotional state. Sec- that are sensitive to situational demands ond, meta-emotion may play an important and are consistent with superordinate goals role in the effects of emotion regulation on and basic needs (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Troy, well-being. Shallcross, & Mauss, in press) (e.g., increase joy in the service of successfully collaborat- The hypothesis that adjusting one’s goals ing with others, and increase anger in the (in addition to or instead of one’s current service of successfully confronting others). state) plays an important role in well-being Consistent with these ideas, we found that has been supported in the context of cop- the more people wanted to feel angry and ing with stressors (e.g., Brandtstaedter & the less they wanted to feel happy in con- Rothermund, 2002; Wrosch, Scheier, Miller, frontational situations, the higher their Schulz, & Carver, 2003). This research sug- psychological well-being. The converse pat- gests that goal adjustment (e.g., failing to tern was found the more angry and the less disengage from impossible goals) is at least happy people wanted to feel in collaborative as important to well-being as the effective situations (Tamir & Ford, 2012a). pursuit of goals. This principle also appears to apply to emotion goals. In one experi- In summary, the goal framework can help mental study, researchers manipulated par- us understand when and why emotion regu- ticipants’ emotion goals by instructing them lation strategies are adaptive or maladaptive. to make themselves feel as happy as possible Emotion regulation strategies are adaptive to while they listened to emotionally ambigu- the extent that they help individuals attain ous music (i.e., their desired emotional end their emotion goals, are used in a goal- state was set to a highly positive state). In line sensitive and flexible manner, and are used with the idea that unrealistic emotion goals in the context of adaptive emotion goals. can lead to negative emotional outcomes, participants in this condition were less Feedback Processing: Emotion Goals, happy compared to participants who were Evaluation, and Meta‑Emotion not given an emotion goal (Schooler, Ariely, Emotion regulation does not operate in a & Loewenstein, 2003). In another study, linear, one-directional fashion. Rather, as researchers manipulated emotion goals more Figure 22.1 illustrates, it involves recursive subtly by presenting to participants a sham feedback loops. Feedback models of self- newspaper article discussing the advantages regulation (Carver & Scheier, 2000) propose of happiness. Participants induced in this that people monitor the discrepancy between way to assume a happiness goal were less their current state and the desired end state, happy than control participants after subse-
370 PERSONALITY PROCESSES AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES quently watching a happy film clip (Mauss, tainable emotion goals can be self-d efeating. Tamir, Anderson, & Savino, 2011, Study For instance, in the study discussed earlier 2). This research converges to support the (Mauss et al., 2011, Study 2), compared to hypothesis that holding unrealistic emotion participants in the control condition, par- goals (e.g., high levels of happiness) can lead ticipants who were led to pursue happiness to decreased positive emotion. goals ended up feeling more disappointed in their emotional state, which resulted in less Do people who chronically hold unreal- happiness. Interestingly, these effects were istic emotion goals experience more nega- only observed for participants who watched tive well-being outcomes? We examined this a happy film clip, not for those who watched question by measuring the extent to which a sad film clip. This may be because in rela- participants held the goal to be happy, with tively negative situations (e.g., when watch- items such as “Feeling happy is extremely ing a sad film clip), people have a good rea- important to me.” On average, the more par- son not to feel happy, and are less likely to ticipants valued happiness, the lower their feel disappointed if they fail to meet their emotional well-being (Mauss et al., 2011, happiness goal. Conversely, in relatively Study 1), and the higher their likelihood of positive situations (e.g., when watching a being diagnosed with major depressive dis- happy film clip), people have every reason order (Ford, Shallcross, Mauss, Floerke, & to feel happy and ironically end up feeling Gruber, under review). These studies make disappointed when they do not. Whereas the point that one’s emotion goals play an the pursuit of nonemotion goals influences important role in well-being and psychologi- behavior and results in emotions, the pur- cal health. suit of emotion goals influences emotions and results in emotions. Thus, when pursu- The perspective that adjusting one’s emo- ing emotion goals, meta-emotional experi- tion goals is one important avenue to well- ences can interfere with successful goal pur- being brings insight to a puzzling area of suit. research: that of emotional acceptance. Acceptance is defined as the process of non- In summary, the goal framework high- judgmentally engaging with negative emo- lights the fact that people’s well-being is tions (Teasdale et al., 2000). Correlational determined by not only how they pursue and experimental research on acceptance emotion goals but the goals themselves. Set- has consistently found it to be negatively ting exceedingly positive emotion goals or correlated with negative emotion and mood failing to adjust emotion goals can, ironi- disorder (Campbell-S ills, Barlow, Brown, & cally, lead to less positive emotion and to Hofmann, 2006; Kashdan, Barrios, Forsyth, lower well-being. These effects are due in & Steger, 2006; Roemer, Salters, Raffa, part to people’s meta-e motion (how they feel & Orsillo, 2005; Shallcross, Troy, Boland, about their feelings). & Mauss, 2010). The inverse relationship between acceptance and negative affect may Conclusions and Future Directions appear paradoxical at first: How can engag- In this chapter, we argue that it is crucial ing with negative emotions be associated to consider emotion regulation in the con- with less negative emotion? The goal per- text of the emotions people want to feel. spective suggests one solution to this appar- Understanding the content of emotion goals ent paradox: Acceptance may involve more helps us better understand the initiation and realistic emotion goals, which in turn lead course of emotion regulation; understand- to greater well-being. Well-being, therefore, ing the structure of emotion goals helps us is a function of not only effective emotion better understand how emotion and other regulation but also having attainable emo- goals interact with one another in goal hier- tion goals. Or, in the words of the adage, archies; and understanding the operation of “Happiness is not having what you want, emotion goals helps us better understand the but wanting what you have.” emotion regulation process. As there are with nonemotion goals, there Taking a goal perspective can offer are likely costs for inflexibly pursuing emo- answers to questions such as the following: tion goals that are difficult to attain. How- ever, unlike nonemotion goals, because it leads to meta-emotion, the pursuit of unat-
Emotion Goals 371 When do people regulate their emotions? among goals? Of particular interest here How do multiple, potentially conflicting might be conflict among explicit (relatively goals interact with one another? What role conscious) and implicit (relatively uncon- do automatic processes play in the pursuit scious) emotion goals. Understanding con- of emotion goals? How do emotion goals flict among explicit and implicit goals has and pursuit of them affect well-being? In been fruitful in domains such as achieve- addition to guiding us to approach these ment motives (Brunstein, Schultheiss, & novel questions, the proposed goal frame- Grässman, 1998); it would be promising in work helps us critically examine some core the domain of emotion goals as well. assumptions in research on emotion regula- tion. For example, one core assumption is In terms of the operation of emotion that people want to feel pleasant emotions goals, there is still much to learn about their and avoid unpleasant emotions. However, nonconscious representation and automatic the goal framework challenges this assump- pursuit. For instance, what gives rise to indi- tion (Tamir, 2009; Tamir & Ford, 2009). vidual differences in automatic emotion reg- Positioning emotion goals in a broader goal ulation? What are its costs and benefits? In hierarchy leads us to predict that individuals addition, the goal framework makes several will seek more unpleasant emotions in pur- predictions about emotion goals’ implica- suit of superordinate nonaffect goals. tions for well-being. For example, it implies that healthy functioning hinges on the selec- Another core assumption in research on tion of appropriate emotion goals, interac- emotion regulation is that there is something tions among emotion regulation strategies inherently beneficial or harmful about par- and emotion goals, and the meta-emotions ticular emotion regulation strategies. The that arise as a function of emotion goal pur- goal framework suggests that emotion regu- suit. These features and implications of emo- lation and its implications for well-being can tion goals have yet to be fully explored. be fully understood only in the context of a person’s broader goal hierarchy (Bonanno Note & Burton, in press; Thompson, 2011; Troy et al., in press). 1. Our review is selective. We do not cover con- cepts such as emotional effects of goals and While some research has already adopted goal pursuit (e.g., feelings of disappoint- a goal framework in emotion regulation, ment when not attaining a nonemotion goal, more work needs to be done on each of the positive evaluation of goals) or goals that are three domains of emotion goals on which infused with a lot of emotion (e.g., a goal we have focused (i.e., their content, struc- about which one feels passionate). While these ture, and operation). In terms of the content phenomena are important, they are distinct of emotion goals, it will be important to from the focus of this chapter. develop a systematic approach to measur- ing these goals, whether they are transient References or more chronically held. More work is necessary especially to measure implicitly Aarts, H., & Dijksterhuis, A. (2000). Habits as represented emotion goals (those not read- knowledge structures: Automaticity in goal- ily accessible to introspection). In addition, directed behavior. Journal of Personality and important open questions remain about Social Psychology, 78, 53–63. what biological, psychological, and cultural factors shape people’s emotion goals. Bandura, A. (1986). Social foundations of thought and action: A social cognitive theory. In terms of the structure of emotion goals, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. it will be important to obtain a systematic and comprehensive understanding of how Bargh, J. A., Gollwitzer, P. M., Lee-Chai, A., emotion and nonaffect goals interact with Barndollar, K., & Trötschel, R. (2001). The one another, and to identify the implica- automated will: Nonconscious activation and tions of different types of goal conflict. For pursuit of behavioral goals. Journal of Person- example, how malleable are the associations ality and Social Psychology, 81, 1014–1027. between subordinate and superordinate emotion and nonaffect goals? What are the Baumeister, R. F., & Heatherton, T. F. (1996). short- and long-term implications of conflict
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Chapter 23 Self‑Awareness and Self‑Relevant Thought in the Experience and Regulation of Emotion Mark R. Leary Dina Gohar The evolution of human self-awareness con- sometimes experience emotions even when stituted a seismic shift in mammalian psy- they are not self-aware. Thus, conscious self- chology. Although some of our prehuman awareness is not necessary for emotional ancestors may have possessed rudimentary experience. The emotional reactions of ani- forms of self-awareness, much like modern mals that lack self-awareness and those of chimpanzees and orangutans, evidence sug- human beings when they are not self-aware gests that prehistoric people did not begin are controlled by two primary processes that to think consciously about themselves until occur without conscious awareness. First, around 2 million years ago. Moreover, the many stimuli naturally and automatically archeological record indicates that people evoke emotions. For example, most spe- did not have the capacity to think about cies instinctively react to certain threat cues themselves in the abstract and symbolic ways without conscious thought, such as when that characterize modern human beings until the silhouette of a hawk in flight elicits fear culture began to appear between 40,000 in many birds, or when human beings react and 60,000 years ago (Leary & Buttermore, with fear to an object that approaches them 2003). The evolution of self-awareness had suddenly. Other emotions, such as anger, important implications for human beings’ sadness, and joy, appear to be similarly emotional lives, because human emotions hard-wired. often arise from the ways in which people think about themselves and the events that Second, animals may learn to experience happen to them. Self-awareness and self- emotions in response to previously neutral relevant thought have implications for the stimuli through classical conditioning. For stimuli that trigger emotional states, the example, human and nonhuman animals specific emotions that people experience, may come to respond with negative emotions and people’s efforts to manage and regulate to otherwise neutral stimuli that have been their emotions. repeatedly paired with aversive stimuli, or to respond positively to a neutral stimulus that Evidence suggests that most animals has been associated with rewarding events. lack the ability to think consciously about Indeed, clinical psychologists have used themselves. Yet animals nonetheless experi- conditioning techniques such as systematic ence a variety of emotions (Veissier, Boissy, desensitization and counterconditioning to Désiré, & Greiveldinger, 2009), and people change people’s emotional responses and 376
Self-Awareness and Self-Relevant Thought in Emotion 377 improve their emotion regulation in the witzer, & Lee-Chai, 2001); nevertheless, treatment of anxiety problems such as pho- becoming self-aware seems to cause people bias, panic attacks, and posttraumatic stress to compare themselves and their behaviors disorder (Foa, Huppert, & Cahill, 2006). to salient goals. Although emotions can occur without Becoming self-aware induces an evalua- self-awareness, people’s capacity for self- tive process that evokes positive emotions awareness and self-relevant thought renders when conditions meet or exceed one’s stan- their emotional lives far more complex than dards and negative emotions when they do those of animals that lack self-a wareness. In not. Because discrepancies between people’s this chapter, we discuss four basic ways in standards and their behavior are unpleasant, which self-a wareness affects emotional expe- people who are self-aware try to avoid vio- rience and examine how people intentionally lating their personal standards and reduce capitalize on these processes to manage their such discrepancies when they occur (Duval emotions. Specifically, due to their ability to & Wicklund, 1972; Macrae, Bodenhausen, think consciously about themselves, people’s & Milne, 1998; Scheier, Fenigstein, & Buss, emotions are affected when they (1) com- 1974). In brief, many emotional experiences pare themselves to their personal standards, involve a comparison of situations, events, (2) think about themselves in the past and or experiences to goals and standards, and future, (3) evaluate their personal charac- self-awareness is intimately involved in peo- teristics, and (4) think about how they are ple’s emotional reactions to events that have perceived by other people. Each of these pro- implications for their self-r elevant goals. cesses requires the ability to self-r eflect.1 According to self-discrepancy theory Comparisons to Personal Standards (Higgins, 1987), the specific emotions that Emotions often result when people assess the people experience when they fail to achieve implications of a particular situation, event, their goals depend on the nature of the dis- or experience for their personal concerns crepancy involved. When people perceive a (Frijda, 1986). Generally, these assessments discrepancy between how they think they are involve a comparison of real or imagined and how they would like to be (i.e., between outcomes to some goal or standard. Decades their actual and ideal selves), dejection- of research have shown that people’s goals related emotions such as disappointment, and standards influence their reactions to sadness, and depression predominate. In events, particularly when they are thinking contrast, a discrepancy between how peo- consciously about them at the time, which ple think they are and how they think they requires self-a wareness. ought to be (i.e., between actual and ought selves) leads to agitation-related emotions Self‑Awareness such as guilt, fear, and anxiety. Research and Personal Standards has generally supported the notion that self- According to various theories of self- discrepancies influence emotion, but specific awareness (Carver & Scheier, 1981; Duval discrepancies do not always predict distinct & Wicklund, 1972), being self-aware emotions precisely as self-d iscrepancy theory induces an evaluative process in which peo- predicts (Phillips & Silvia, 2010; Tangney, ple compare themselves to whatever stan- Niedenthal, Covert, & Barlow, 1998). For dards are salient at that particular moment. example, Phillips and Silvia (2010) found For example, becoming self-aware while that although actual–ought discrepancies taking a test may lead people to evaluate uniquely predicted anxiety, both actual– themselves with regard to standards involv- ideal and actual–ought discrepancies pre- ing intellectual ability, whereas being self- dicted depressed affect. When people think aware while trying on new clothes may lead that they are close to becoming their feared people to compare themselves to standards selves, these actual–feared discrepancies pre- of physical attractiveness. Self-awareness is dict agitation-related emotions better than not necessary for goal pursuit (Bargh, Goll- do actual–ought discrepancies (i.e., how people think they ought to be), which more strongly predict emotions when people think they are far from assuming a feared identity (Carver, Lawrence, & Scheier, 1999).
378 PERSONALITY PROCESSES AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES In any case, discrepancies between how 1991). Although some of these tactics can be people think they are and how they want problematic (e.g., frequent substance abuse), (and do not want) to be evoke negative others (e.g., mindfulness and meditation emotions and lower subjective well-being practices) can help people respond to nega- (Brown & McConnell, 2011; Philips, Silvia, tive events with greater equanimity. & Paradise, 2007; Tangney et al., 1998). When people make internal attributions One common way that people attenu- for these discrepancies, they are especially ate self-Âa
Self-AÂ
380 PERSONALITY PROCESSES AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES imagining how they will feel in the future about the past and future only as needed to often helps people behave in ways that lead deal with practical issues. People can also to desired emotional outcomes (e.g., “I will regulate their emotional reactions to future regret it later if I don’t do something now”). events by managing their expectations. Peo- Moreover, people’s expectations about how ple’s emotional reactions to events depend they will feel when an event occurs can in part on what they expect to happen. For influence their emotional reactions to the instance, expected negative outcomes tend event when it actually transpires (Wilson & to evoke less distress than unexpected ones, Gilbert, 2003). and events that fail to occur as anticipated may evoke stronger reactions than if they How people feel when an event occurs also had not been expected. Self-awareness is depends on how they think about the alter- not necessary for animals to develop expec- natives. Concocting imaginary scenarios tations or to react emotionally to fulfilled about how events might have turned out dif- and unfulfilled expectancies (e.g., the fam- ferently can make people feel better or worse ily pet may become distressed when daily about their lot depending on whether the routines are disrupted). However, the ability alternatives they imagine are worse or bet- to self-reflect allows people to manage their ter than what actually happened. Medvec, feelings about upcoming events by exerting Madey, and Gilovich’s (1995) finding that deliberate “predictive control” (Rothbaum, Olympic bronze medal winners (i.e., third- Weisz, & Snyder, 1982) in which they tell place finishers) appeared happier than silver themselves what to expect. medal winners (i.e., second-place finishers) is a good example of this effect. Presumably, For example, people can use positive bronze medalists compare finishing third self-talk to allay their anxiety about future to not getting a medal at all, whereas silver outcomes. By telling themselves that things medalists compare their second-place finish will turn out OK, people can sometimes to the imagined alternative of winning the positively influence how they feel. Such opti- gold. Similarly, people may become discon- mism is sometimes costly, though. Sweeny tent even when current circumstances are and Shepperd (2010) found that after con- good if they think that being somewhere else trolling for actual exam performance, stu- would be even better. Therefore, people can dents who expected higher exam scores did regulate their emotional responses to events not feel any better before receiving feedback by managing the ways in which they con- and actually felt worse after learning their strue alternative outcomes. scores. In addition, cognitive representations of At other times, people manage their desired future states can motivate and guide expectations to avoid being disappointed. people’s behaviors (Emmons, 1986; Markus For example, people try to soften the blow & Nurius, 1986). The capacity for self- of failures, bad news, disappointments, thought again enters the picture, because and other aversive events by lowering their thinking about progress toward one’s goals expectations and telling themselves that bad evokes positive emotions, while lack of prog- outcomes are likely to occur. This may not ress (and particularly movement away from be an optimal tactic for maximizing positive those goals) evokes negative emotions (Hig- affect, however, because the costs of nega- gins, 1987; Markus & Nurius, 1986). Thus, tive expectations can outweigh the benefits emotions are experienced not only because for many people (Golub, Gilbert, & Wilson, the current state of affairs is favorable or 2009). On average, participants felt worse unfavorable to one’s well-being but also when they expected a negative rather than because events reflect movement toward or a positive outcome; moreover, their pessi- away from one’s goals. mistic expectations did not serve as a buf- fer against negative emotions once the event Predictive Control occurred. However, anticipating negative As noted, some tactics for improving peo- outcomes appears to lower anxiety among ple’s emotion regulation involve teaching dispositionally anxious people who use this them to remain focused on the present situa- strategy regularly (i.e., defensive pessimists; tion as much as possible, turning to thoughts Norem & Illingworth, 1993). In fact, pre- venting defensive pessimists from thinking
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