The 19th Son

As time progressed Grivas' pursuit of Enosis through guerrilla tactics with the use of the EOKA-B's paramilitary organisation failed to force Makarios to follow the policy of self- determination followed by union with Greece and led to a period of fighting between the Greek Cypriots. By the end of 1973 Makarios’ forces, primarily the Presidential Guard known as ‘Efedriko’ had won the civil struggle and Grivas was in a desperate position. In November 1973, Demetrios Ioannidis, the hardliner nationalist brigadier, overthrew Georgios Papadopoulos (Greece’s junta President since 1967) and established the Second Junta, with himself as the \"invisible dictator\". Grivas tried to contact the new regime in Greece in the end of 1973, but Ioannides refused to give any immediate indication as to what his intentions in Cyprus were. On 27 January 1974, Grivas died of a heart attack, uncertain to the end of Ioannides' plans for Cyprus. Meanwhile Makarios took advantage of Grivas' demise by granting an amnesty to the dead leader's followers. He hoped and believed that with Grivas gone, EOKA-B would disappear as a guerrilla force and could be politically tamed. Numerous EOKA-B members did actually accept the amnesty's terms, but this merely increased the hardliners' influence within the remainder of the movement. Ioannides finally disclosed his aims: he imposed on the organisation a secret memorandum, by which EOKA-B would be committed to deposing Makarios. On 3 May 1974, Makarios sent the Greek government a letter that identified certain Greek military officers stationed in Cyprus as undermining the Cypriot government. The Greek regime responded that it would withdraw the officers in question. In the second half of June 1974, Makarios decided to take the initiative and challenge Athens directly. He believed that he could eliminate the junta's control of Cyprus by forcing the Cypriot National Guard to remain loyal to himself. On 2 July 1974 he wrote to the Athens colonels a letter which demanded that all Greek officers depart from the island within 19 days. Greek Foreign Minister Spyridon Tetenes suggested, as a compromise, that Makarios personally select the substitute officers from a roster of Greek officers; but this was something that Makarios refused to countenance. On 11 July, Glafkos Klerides (by this stage the speaker of the Cypriot parliament) visited Makarios in an unsuccessful attempt to promote a solution. Four days later, on 15 July 1974, Ioannides took Makarios by surprise by organizing a coup d’état in Nicosia at 8.15 am, when Makarios' forces were off guard. Makarios, who was in Paphos, was rescued by a British helicopter and fled to London. At first there were false reports that he had been slain. Nikos Samson, a Nicosia-based newspaper editor and parliamentarian with a long-standing commitment to Enosis, was installed as president in Makarios' stead. On 20 July 1974, five days after the coup, Turkey invaded Cyprus. As of 2020 Northern Cyprus remains occupied by the Turkish Army, despite the constitution and presidency Page 351 of 371

having been restored. To Turks and Turkish Cypriots, the invasion is still known as a \"peace operation\", designed to protect the Turkish Cypriot community. Sampson's presidency was short-lived, because the regime of Ioannides in Athens collapsed only a few days after the Turkish invasion. It was noted at the time that Turkey threatened to invade Greece, and that the colonels suddenly had to concentrate on trying to defend the country, rather than staying in power. The regime's failure to predict, let alone to thwart, Turkish intervention had destroyed its power at home. Unsupported, Sampson resigned on 23 July and the presidency passed to Glafkos Klerides. Makarios remained in London for five months; then, having succeeded in securing international recognition that his administration was the rightful government of the whole island, he returned to Cyprus and focused solely on restoring Cypriot territorial integrity. He was not successful, and Turkey has remained as an occupying power ever since. Makarios III died of a heart attack on 3 August 1977. He had been experiencing issues with his heart earlier that year. This was no doubt influenced by his many years of heavy smoking. He is buried in a tomb on the mountain of Throni, a site he personally chose. The tomb is near Kykkos monastery, where he served as a novice in the 1920s and 1930s. At his funeral, held at St. John's Cathedral outside the Archbishopric in Nicosia, 182 dignitaries from 52 countries attended while an estimated 250,000 mourners—about half the Greek Cypriot population of the island—filed past the coffin. To commemorate his life, an imposing bronze statue of Makarios was erected outside the Archbishop's palace in Nicosia. The huge size of the statue was considered bad taste by many Greek Cypriots and as a compromise, in 2008 it was moved to Kykkos monastery and replaced by a life-size marble statue of Makarios. Page 352 of 371

The Events at Kophinou in 1967 Between the first inter-communal fighting of 1963, which my father describes in his book and I personally remember and the Turkish invasion of 1974, there was further inter- communal fighting, the most notable being that of 1967. The incident at the village of Kophinou in 1967, is significant because it caused Turkey to send an ultimatum, which led to the recall of Grivas and his Greek battalion, back to Greece. Pre-1974, the village was inhabited by Turkish Cypriots only, the few original Greek Cypriot inhabitants having abandoned the village in the late 1950s. The population of the village also increased substantially after 1964, as some 60 Turkish Cypriot families from Pano Lefkara abandoned their Greek Cypriot dominated village in the aftermath of the December 1963 events. The village became infamous on 15 November 1967, when some thousands of National Guard troops overran the TMT (a Turkish-Cypriot paramilitary group) fighters located at the village, including the neighbouring mixed village of Agios Theodoros. Turkish-Cypriot TMT members stationed at the area were controlling the area and blocking the main road from Nicosia to Limassol, making it impossible for Greek-Cypriots civilians to pass through the area without UN escort. On 15 November 1967, General Grivas and his large battalion of mainly mainland Greece originating conscripts, caused enough concerns for the lightly armed Turkish Cypriots to return fire when they intruded too closely to the Turkish Cypriot owned land. The fighting escalated and some 24 Turkish Cypriots, including unarmed civilians lost their lives in the overnight events. Turkey's ultimatum the following day resulted in the withdrawal of the National Guard from the two villages. This event in particular saw the recall of Grivas and his battalion back to Greece. In addition, this event also culminated in the removal of all roadblocks upon which Turkish Cypriot buses entering Nicosia were being stopped and by which means the passengers were subjected to a humiliating body search. After the Turkish Invasion of Cyprus in 1974, the original Turkish Cypriot population of Kophinou were allocated the village of Lefkoniko – the new Geçitkale – in the north by the Cypriot Turkish administration, to this day where many of them reside, whereas the original Turkish Cypriot population of Pano Lefkara are now residing in Agios Theodoros in the north of the island (a different Agios Theodoros to the one near Kophinou). Page 353 of 371

THE 1967 CRISIS Note: this history section is an online version of the chapter about UNFICYP in \"The Blue Helmets - A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping,\" a United Nations publication. It covers the period from the establishment of UNFICYP in 1964 until 1996. In January 1967, General George Grivas, the Greek commander of the Cyprus National Guard, deployed a battalion of troops in the Kophinou area. These remained in place despite an understanding reached by UNFICYP with the local Turkish Cypriot commander to avoid incidents. As the National Guard unit was reinforced on 28 February, Turkish Cypriot fighters moved forward at nearby Agios Theodhoros, where they also manhandled senior UNFICYP officers. There was severe friction between UNFICYP and Turkish Cypriot fighters in Kophinou, and the situation also deteriorated in the Paphos and Lefka districts. In September 1967, the government announced a normalization programme that included the unmanning of armed posts and fortifications and complete freedom of movement, initially in the Paphos and Limassol districts. The Turkish Cypriot side assured UNFICYP that it would not seek to occupy the vacated positions. In November 1967, the Cyprus police sought to resume the practice of patrolling Agios Theodhoros, passing through the Turkish Cypriot quarter, and informed UNFICYP that the National Guard would, if necessary, escort the policemen. On 15 November, heavy fighting broke out, and the National Guard overran most of Agios Theodhoros and part of Kophinou. The Turkish government protested to the Secretary-General, who requested the Cyprus and Greek governments to bring about a withdrawal of the National Guard from the areas it had occupied. The withdrawal was carried out on 16 November. On 18 and 19 November, there were several Turkish over flights of Cyprus, and armed clashes spread to the Kokkina and Kyrenia areas. These events set off a severe political crisis. The Secretary-General appealed to the president of Cyprus and to the prime ministers of Greece and Turkey, on 22 and 24 November 1967, to avoid an outbreak of hostilities, and sent a personal representative to the three capitals. In the second appeal, the Secretary-General urged the three parties to agree upon a staged reduction and ultimate withdrawal of non-Cypriot armed forces, other than those of the United Nations, and he offered the assistance of UNFICYP in working out a programme of phased withdrawals and helping to maintain calm. The Security Council met on 24 November and, after consultations with the representatives of the parties, unanimously approved a consensus statement noting with satisfaction the efforts of the Secretary-General and calling upon all the parties to assist and cooperate in keeping the peace. Page 354 of 371

On 3 December 1967, the Secretary-General addressed a third appeal to the president of Cyprus and to the prime ministers of Greece and Turkey, in which he called for Greece and Turkey to carry out an expeditious withdrawal of their forces in excess of their contingents in Cyprus. He added: With regard to any further role that it might be considered desirable for UNFICYP to undertake, I gather that this could involve, subject to the necessary action by the Security Council, enlarging the mandate of the force so as to give it broader functions in regard to the realization of quiet and peace in Cyprus, including supervision of disarmament and the devising of practical arrangements to safeguard internal security, embracing the safety of all the people of Cyprus. My good offices in connection with such matters would, of course, be available to the parties on request. All three governments welcomed the Secretary-General's appeal, and Turkey supported the enlargement of the UNFICYP mandate to include supervision of the disarmament in Cyprus of forces constituted after 1963. The Security Council, at a meeting on 22 December 1967, adopted resolution 244 (1967), by which, among other things, it noted the Secretary- General's three appeals and the replies of the three governments. In response to the Secretary-General's appeals, Greece and Turkey reached an agreement under which Greek national troops were withdrawn from Cyprus between 8 December 1967 and 16 January 1968. However, as Greece and Turkey reached no agreement on the issue of reciprocity, UNFICYP did not take on the task of checking that no Greek or Turkish forces in excess of their respective contingents remained in Cyprus. At the same time, a formula was devised for informal meetings between Mr. Glafkos Klerides and Mr. Rauf R Denktash, representing the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, respectively. After an initial meeting in Beirut, Lebanon on 2 June, they held meetings in Nicosia. The intercommunal security situation in Cyprus improved during 1968, and in January 1969, President Makarios confirmed that he intended to extend normalization measures, including freedom of movement for the Turkish Cypriots, throughout the island. The Secretary-General suggested that the Turkish Cypriot leadership should respond by allowing the free movement of Greek Cypriots through Turkish Cypriot areas, but this was not accepted. Arms imports: From the beginning of the Cyprus operation, the Secretary-General reported that the influx of arms and military equipment was a cause of concern for UNFICYP with regard to the discharge of its mandate. UNFICYP kept a careful watch on all imports of such arms and equipment, but the question whether it could take any additional action in this regard under resolution 186 (1964) remained a controversial one. An agreement was concluded on 10 September 1964 to have UNFICYP present at the unloading of military equipment at Page 355 of 371

Famagusta and Limassol. Additional material was, however, being imported at Boghaz at that time, unobserved by UNFICYP. The issue came to a head when it became known in December 1966 that the Cyprus government had imported a quantity of arms for distribution to the Cyprus police. On 12 January 1967, the Cyprus government indicated to the Secretary-General that the imported arms would not be distributed for the time being, that the Secretary-General would be advised in due time if their distribution should become necessary, and that, in the meantime, the Force Commander could make periodic inspections. In March 1970, increasing tension within the Greek Cypriot community culminated in an attempt on the life of President Makarios and the subsequent killing of a former minister of the interior, Mr. Polycarpos Georghadjis. Clandestine activity by pro-Enosis (union with Greece) elements continued in 1971, and in view of that, the government of Cyprus in January 1972 imported a large quantity of arms and ammunition. To minimize the resultant increase in tension, UNFICYP negotiated a provisional agreement on 10 March, whereby the Cyprus government undertook to place the imported arms in safekeeping and open to inspection by the Force Commander. On 21 April, the Secretary-General reported that an improved arrangement had been agreed upon, under which the weapons and munitions, except for the high explosives, would be stored in a fenced area within the perimeter of an UNFICYP camp. The fenced area would be in the charge of unarmed Cyprus police personnel, but control of the camp perimeter and access to it would be the responsibility of UNFICYP. The high explosive munitions were stored at Cyprus police headquarters, but the fuses were removed and stored at the UNFICYP camp. A system of double locks and keys was devised for both storage areas. [In the summer of 1999, the ammunition was handed over to the Cyprus government for destruction] UNFICYP continued to carry out its functions under both these agreements until 1974. Subsequently, the responsibility for their security rested with UNFICYP alone and the Cyprus police had no involvement with them other than periodic verification carried out jointly with UNFICYP. UNFICYP reductions: The consolidation of the security situation that was achieved by the beginning of 1965, however limited and tenuous, made possible a gradual reduction of the strength of UNFICYP. From a total (military personnel and police) of 6,275 in December 1964, the force was reduced one year later to 5,764, and to 4,610 by the end of 1966. The strength of the force in December 1967 was 4,737. The general lessening of tension throughout the island in 1968, in addition to creating a favourable atmosphere for the Klerides/Denktash intercommunal talks, also led to a further Page 356 of 371

significant reduction in the strength of the force. Steps were taken, in cooperation with the government of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, to ensure that the effectiveness of the force would not be adversely affected. Between April and December 1968, its strength was brought down to 3,708. Further reductions took place gradually over the next two years; thereafter, the strength of UNFICYP from 1970 to 1972 remained stable at approximately 3,150. The strength of the Irish battalion was reduced from 420 to 150 during this period. In this connection, Austria, at the request of the Secretary-General, agreed in 1972 to augment its contingent, which had consisted of the UNFICYP field hospital and an UNCIVPOL unit, by providing also a battalion of 276 ground troops. In October and November 1973, personnel of the Austrian, Finnish, Irish and Swedish contingents of UNFICYP were transferred to the Middle East to form the advance elements of the United Nations Emergency Force. Replacements for the Austrian, Finnish and Swedish personnel were promptly sent to Cyprus by the governments concerned; however, at the request of the Secretary-General, Ireland agreed to dispatch additional troops only to the Middle East, and the Irish contingent in Cyprus was reduced to a token detachment at UNFICYP headquarters. A further reduction of 381 troops was made in the spring of 1974. However, this was soon overtaken by the events of July 1974, which made it necessary to increase the strength of the force once again Page 357 of 371

Footnote no: 81 on page 195 – Internment Camps The British internment camps in Cyprus were referred to as concentration camps by the members of EOKA, because they were established on Nazi lines. They took their first prisoners in July 1955 and closed down on 22nd February 1959, after the struggle came to an end. In total about 3,000 EOKA freedom fighters were held in the camps during the four-year struggle for independence. Some were released after a few months, but others were held for up to four years. At first, the freedom fighters were held at Nicosia Central Prison (where the members of Α.Κ.Ε.Λ. were also held) and Kyrenia Castle. Subsequently, the British colonial powers set up the Kokkinotrimithia Camp and then those of Pyla and Polemi. Further camps were later built at Pergamos, Mammari, Pyroi, Ayios Loucas, Limni and Agyrta. Although the internment camps were intended primarily for members of EOKA, they were also used to hold the members of AKEL including my father. All prisoners, whether considered members of EOKA, or members of AKEL, were held without trial. It is probably fair to say that the members of EOKA were treated more harshly than the members of AKEL, but nevertheless, their living conditions were similar. The British had no evidence with which to drag them to the special courts and impose prison sentences, so they kept them locked up in the camps, hostages to the harsh whims of the British commanders, prison guards and army officers. From the moment of his transfer from the interrogation centres to the Detention Centre, the freedom fighter became a mere number. Political prisoners were forced to live in barracks of corrugated metal with 30 other prisoners, in which they froze in the bitter cold of winter and baked in the intolerable summer heat. Before sunset, checks were carried out on the prisoners and then followed the long, dramatic night in the barracks. The doors were closed until morning. No one was allowed out during the hours of darkness, which was broken up by the strong beams of light emanating from the searchlights. These were trained on the prisoners by the guards who stood on their towers ready to shoot and kill anyone who might be out in the courtyard or the buffer zones. Most of the barracks had no lavatory. During the day the prisoners were able to move around in the small yard of a sector containing 2 or 4 barracks. The sector was fenced in with barbed wire and surrounded by buffer zones in which only the guards and tracker dogs circulated. Prisoners passed the time reading, exercising with primitive means and occupying themselves with joinery and drew spiritual strength by studying the Scriptures. In the Camps there was an invisible authority regulating the freedom fighters’ action. This was a three-member secret council set up by EOKA leader George Grivas. This council Page 358 of 371

executed the organisation’s orders, approved or rejected escape plans, decided on uprisings, mass protests and other action undertaken by the prisoners. Uprisings resulted in the loss of privileges. Prisoners were no longer allowed to send or receive letters, which, in any case were always censored, and weekly visits were banned. During the periods of punishment, attempts at destroying human dignity were cruder and harsher than usual and included methods such as the stripping naked of prisoners in public, isolation in disciplinary cells and survival on bread and water. Grivas described EOKA prisoners as: \"The flower of Cypriot youth and the pride of Cyprus” Page 359 of 371

Footnote no: 85 on page 209 – EOKA-B and The Turkish Invasion For several years, following independence in 1960, Makarios had been trying to find a solution, which would allow the Greek Cypriots to live in harmony with the Turkish Cypriots in an independent and non-aligned Cyprus. Grivas was recalled to Greece following the intercommunal fighting of 1967. Makarios' deviation from the policy of Enosis in 1959 and the reaffirmation of this position during his re-election in 1968, was supported by the majority of the Greek Cypriots, who together with Makarios, had abandoned their life-long dream of uniting Cyprus with Greece. However, Grivas and an ultra-right group of his supporters, had not given up on Enosis and they considered Makarios to be a traitor to the National Cause. Grivas returned to Cyprus, under cover, in 1971 and formed a secret para-military organisation, which he called EOKA-B. Whereas the original EOKA (1955–59) were considered by the Greek Cypriots as anti-colonialist freedom fighters, EOKA-B did not have the support of the Greek Cypriot population. During its short history, the organisation's chief aim was to block any attempt to enforce upon the Cyprus people what the organisation considered to be an unacceptable settlement to the Cyprus issue. In addition, the organisation drafted various plans to overthrow President Makarios. The organisation continued its activities until it officially declared its dissolution and disbanded on February 11, 1978, well after the Turkish invasion of 1974. Due to its attacks on civilians, it was considered a terrorist organization and was outlawed by the Republic of Cyprus. This terminology was used by President Makarios in his speech at the United Nations following the coup in 1974. EOKA-B members were also arrested for the kidnapping of the son of President Spyros Kyprianou and for being involved in the assassination of US ambassador Rodger Paul Davies. Homicide charges were dropped on June 4, 1977 by a Cypriot court against the two men accused of killing the ambassador. According to the Washington Post's renowned 1970s Cyprus correspondent, Joseph W Fitchett, EOKA-B members were motivated by a mixture of patriotism, money and macho. The only armed, organized resistance to EOKA-B came from the \"Efedriko\" a special police force set up by Makarios and the members of the Socialist Party EDEK, as well as armed supporters of Makarios in towns and villages. The Communist Party AKEL, despite its verbal opposition to EOKA-B, had not organized any form of resistance against it. When Grivas died from heart failure on 27 January 1974, the post-Grivas EOKA-B increasingly came under the direct control and influence of the military junta in Athens. EOKA-B was on the verge of dissolution by July 1974. Yet on July 15, 1974 the Greek dictator Demetrios Ioannides, used the Cypriot National Guard, which was led by Greek Page 360 of 371

officers and consisted of Greek-Cypriot conscripts, and EOKA-B to launch a military coup. EOKA-B attempted to assassinate President Makarios but failed, and he fled to London. Nikos Samson was installed by the junta as the new President of Cyprus, basically because no one else was willing to accept the position. He was a Nicosia newspaper editor, a member of both EOKA and EOKA-B and a long term supported of Enosis. Samson was accused of personally leading raids of EOKA-B members into Turkish Cypriot villages to commit atrocities, in the preceding years. The coup d’état provided the excuse Turkey had been waiting for, to intervene. A Turkish invasion of Cyprus began on Saturday, July 20, 1974. Ankara said that it was “invoking its right under the Treaty of Guarantee, to protect the Turkish Cypriots and guarantee the independence of Cyprus”. The invasion led to the de facto division of the island. The subsequent toppling of the Greek Junta led to Sampson's resignation on 23 July 1974. He had been the president for eight days! On 14 August 1974, Turkey mounted a second invasion into Cyprus. By the end of hostilities, about 180,000 Greek Cypriots (almost one third of the population), were forcibly uprooted from their homes and properties, while 80,000 Turkish Cypriots moved to the north. Thousands more were killed or listed as missing. The three nations which guaranteed the integrity of the Independent Republic of Cyprus, under the Zurich-London agreement of 1959, were Greece, Turkey and Britain. Given that Turkey mounted a military invasion of Cyprus, taken a third of the island by force and still keeps it under military occupation, it is difficult to see how Turkey was “protecting the Independence of Cyprus”. Greece, which was under military junta at the time, failed to act, either as a guarantor, or as the nation considered by the Greek Cypriots as ‘Mother Greece’. Britain did nothing! Britain’s then foreign secretary (later prime minister) James Callaghan later disclosed that US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, “vetoed” at least one British military action to pre-empt the Turkish landing (you may find the article in the National Herald below, interesting). I don’t think anyone doubts that, if Turkey wanted to, it could have overrun the whole of the island within a few days. Clearly, Turkish troops reached pre-determined positions and stopped. Many international journalists and commentators reported that this was done with the agreement of Henry Kissinger, who approved the entire plan, known as the ‘Attila’ plan, in advance. Thus, the Turkish dream of ‘Taksim’ (partition), first mentioned by Fazil Kucuk in 1957, was achieved by force. Atrocities were committed by both sides. On the Greek side, I believe it is fair to say that most, of the atrocities were committed by members of EOKA-B. For example, on 14 August 1974, members of EOKA-B entered the villages of Maratha, Santalaris and Aloda and massacred 89 people in Maratha and Santalaris and a further 37 people in Aloda. There are many examples of atrocities committed by the Turkish militia and the invading Turkish army. Although there is no need to list the atrocities, it is important to note that the Page 361 of 371

Turkish troops, who were part of a disciplined modern army and who should have been prevented from committing atrocities, were allowed, perhaps even encouraged by their superiors, to be brutal against the Greeks. For many years after the invasion, international teams of experts searched for mass graves, without anyone in authority admitting their existence. On 29 July 2012, in a controversial interview with my cousin Stavros Sideras, in his television programme ‘Persona and Persona Non Grata’, the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community and one of the founders of the right-wing para-military Turkish Cypriot organisation TMT, acknowledged that a number of Greek Cypriots taken prisoner during the Turkish invasion, were massacred in cold blood by the Turkish invading army. Clips from this shocking interview were broadcasted worldwide by CNN, BBC, EURONEWS and other international TV networks. The full interview is still available on ‘YouTube’. Over the years, some mass graves have been located and through the use of DNA identification, closure has been provided to some of the families whose loved ones were missing. In 1983, the 1974 Turkish controlled area, declared itself the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’, but has been recognised only by Turkey. All efforts made in the last 46 years to find a solution to the ‘Cyprus Problem’ have failed. One of the main reasons for the failure, is that many Turkish and Turkish Cypriot leaders, consider that the ‘Cyprus Problem’ has already been solved by the Turkish army in 1974 and there is no need to solve it again. The island remains divided. The Republic of Cyprus occupies the southern two-thirds of the island (59.74%). The so- called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus occupies the northern third (34.85%), and the United Nations-controlled Green Line provides a buffer zone that separates the two and covers 2.67% of the island. Page 362 of 371

Article in The National Herald (USA) The following is the full article from the website of the ‘The National Herald’ which is an English-language weekly newspaper, based in New York City, focusing on the Greek American community. It was founded in 1997 and added a website in 2004. Its headquarters are in the Long Island neighbourhood of the borough of Queens. White House 1974 Cyprus Meeting: Kissinger Backed Turkey Over Greece 4/9/2018 TNH Staff A day before a second invasion wave of Turkish forces in Cyprus in 1974, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger told President Gerald Ford - in office only four days after Richard Nixon resigned, facing impeachment over Watergate - that if Greece went to war with Turkey that America should back the Turks and that they were entitled to seize part of the island. A file exempt from declassification, from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, shown on the Hellenic American Leadership Council (HALC) blog revealed Kissinger’s bias and favouritism toward Turkey, backing up long-held assertions he had implicitly supported Turkey’s invasion although the US was supporting a Greek military dictatorship that collapsed over Cyprus. Minutes of the meeting showed that Kissinger was becoming anxious during a brief period of internationally brokered peace talks in Geneva, Switzerland and that the Greeks were playing for time as Turkey was getting antsy. Ford asked Kissinger, “What we do if the Turks moved?” and was told the US would have to vote against them in the United Nations Security Council. “We would have our hands full to keep the Greeks from going to war. The Turks right now are extremely nationalistic. For a few years ago, the Turkish tactics are right - grab what they want and then negotiate on the basis of possession,” he said. Then, he added ominously: “But if the Turks run loose on Cyprus, the Greeks could come unglued. We certainly do not want a war between the two, but if it came to that, Turkey is more important to us and they have a political structure which could produce a Qadhafi,” referring to Libya’s military dictator. BRITISH BREAKDOWN Kissinger said as the Cyprus issue was set to spin out of control that, “We have been trying to bail the Cyprus situation out after it got out of control. The British have made a mess of it,” referring to the island’s former Colonial ruler. “If the Turks move to take what they want, they will be condemned in the Security Council and the Soviet Union will beat them Page 363 of 371

over the head with it. Some of my colleagues want to cut off assistance to Turkey' - that would be a disaster,” he said. Despite Greece having been an ally of the United States in every war, Kissinger said that, “There is no American reason why the Turks should not have one-third of Cyprus”. We will make a statement today that will get the New York Times off our back, but we should not twist their arm,” the record showed. Also present for much the meeting, which also discussed other foreign policy issues including Egypt, Israel, Jordan, the Sinai, West Bank and Soviet Union was Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Kissinger also raised what he called the “poppy issue,” with the US wanting to eradicate planting of poppies used to make opium, drawing anger from Turkish growers, with the Secretary of State apparently trying to carry more favour with Turkey. “The whole poppy situation is a loser. Do you want to have a brawl with the Turks, or should I? Kissinger asked Ford. The US seemed unprepared for what happened the next day on August 14th after Turkey had taken 3 percent of the northern third of the island before a ceasefire was declared and talks began. Turkey had invaded Cyprus on July 20, 1974 in response to a Cypriot coup five days earlier. Under Operation Attila heavily armed troops landed shortly before dawn at Kyrenia on the northern coast meeting resistance from Greek and Greek-Cypriot forces. Turkey said it was invoking its right as a guarantor of security on the island to protect Turkish-Cypriots. When the Greek junta fell apart on July 23, Greek political leaders in exile started returning and on July 24, Constantine Karamanlis returned from Paris and was sworn in as Prime Minister. He kept Greece from entering the war. KISSINGER CATALYST As a second Geneva conference was meeting on August 14th international sympathy that had seemed to be on the side of Turkey swung back to Greece as it was trying to restore democracy. Turkey demanded the Cypriot government accept its plan for a Federal state, and population transfer but when Acting President Glafkos Klerides asked for 36 to 48 hours to consult with Athens and Greek-Cypriot leaders, the Turkish Foreign Minister rejected it. Only 90 minutes after the Geneva talks broke up, Turkey launched its second invasion. Britain's then Foreign Secretary James Callaghan, who took part in the talks with the United Kingdom and Greece also guarantors of security - and who later became Prime Minister - reportedly said that Kissinger vetoed at least one British military action to pre-empt the Turkish landing and was favouring Turkey over Greece although the ruling junta that had wanted to annex the island was gone. Kissinger’s bias in favour of Turkey was apparently even stronger, according to RAW STORY, which in 2007 wrote that Kissinger had abetted illegal financial aid and arms Page 364 of 371

support to Turkey for its 1974 Cyprus invasion. Some Greek Cypriots believed that the invasion was a deliberate plot on the part of Britain and the US to maintain their influence on the island, which was particularly important as a listening post in the Eastern Mediterranean in the wake of the October 1973 War between Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Syria, the news site said. The late noted columnist Christopher Hitchens, author of the book The Trial of Henry Kissinger, wrote that, \"At the time, many Greeks believed that the significant thing was that (Prime Minister Bulent) Ecevit had been a pupil of Kissinger's at Harvard.\" Several intelligence sources who were not named, told RAW STORY that Kissinger both pushed for the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and allowed arms to be moved to Ankara. The transition between the two Presidencies was nearly simultaneous with the Cyprus invasion and aftermath. In his 2004 book on NATO, Lawrence S. Kaplan, who was a professor at State and Georgetown, wrote that, “Kissinger personified in Greek eyes a conspiracy that had been behind the coup on Cyprus and behind the bellicose Turkish response. An articulate and influential Greek lobby in Washington worked to focus American attention on the betrayal of its ally.” Despite Greece having been a long-time ally, the United States “placed a higher value on the military strength and the seemingly consistent anti-Soviet cast of Turkey,” he said, suggesting other reasons why the US would go against Greece in case of war. “It was Turkey’s military potential and the strategic location straddling the Dardanelles that made the Turkish partnership more valuable than its Greek rival,” Kaplan wrote. {The Raw Story (also stylized as RawStory) is an American online tabloid founded in 2004 by John K. Byrne. It covers current national and international political events and publishes its own editorials which tend to advocate for centre-left positions. The Raw Story is a news site bringing attention to stories that it sees as downplayed or ignored by other media outlets. It is owned by Raw Story Media, Inc}. Page 365 of 371

Footnote no: 88 on page 228 – Kolokotronis and the Inn of Gravia Kolokotronis Theodoros Kolokotronis (Greek: Θεόδωρος Κολοκοτρώνης; 3 April 1770 – 4 February 1843) was a Greek general and the pre-eminent leader of the Greek War of Independence of 1821 – 1829 against the Ottoman Empire. Kolokotronis's greatest success was the defeat of the Ottoman army under Mahmud Dramali Pasha at the Battle of Dervenakia in 1822. In 1825, he was appointed commander-in-chief of the Greek forces in Peloponnese. Today, Kolokotronis ranks among the most prominent figures in Greece's War of Independence. Theodoros Kolokotronis was born at Ramavouni (Ραμαβούνι) in Messenia, in South/West Peloponnese into a family of ‘Klephts’ and grew up in Arcadia, in central Peloponnese where his family originated. The ‘Kolokotroneoi’ were a powerful and respected clan in Arcadia in the 18th century. Their legendary pride and insubordination is commemorated in a well-known folk song of that time: On a horse they go to church, On a horse they kiss the icons, On a horse they receive communion From the priest's hand. Prior to the Greek Revolution, Theodoros Kolokotronis operated as a Klepht (a warrior- bandit), an ‘armatolos’ (a Christian irregular of the Ottoman military), and as a Kápos (a militiaman employed by Greek notables of the Peloponnese). As a Kapos, Kolokotronis worked for the Deligiannis family. He acquired wealth by stealing sheep and marrying the daughter of a wealthy Peloponnesian notable. In 1806 Ottoman attacks against the Klephts forced Kolokotronis to flee to the island of Zakynthos (or Zante). When Zakynthos was occupied by the British, he obtained useful military experience while serving under the command of Richard Church, a philhellene (pro-Greek), in the 1st Regiment Greek Light Infantry. In 1810, he was promoted to the rank of major. From his service in the British Army, he adopted his characteristic red helmet. While in the Heptanese (seven islands – as the Ionian islands are known) which was a French protectorate from 1807 to 1814, he came in contact with the revolutionary ideas of the era (the French Revolution 5 May 1789 – 9 November 1799) and was influenced by them. Kolokotronis returned to the mainland just prior to the outbreak of the war (officially, 25 March 1821) and formed a confederation of irregular Moreot Klepht bands (men from ‘Morea’ or ‘Moria’, which was another name for the Peloponnese). These he tried to train and organize into something resembling a modern army. Page 366 of 371

In May, he was named Archistratigos or commander-in-chief. He was already 50 years old by this time, a fact which contributed to his sobriquet ‘O Geros tou Moria’ or ‘The Elder of Morea’. Kolokotronis’s first action was the defence of Valtetsi (Greek: Βαλτέτσι), the village near Tripolitsa where his army was mustering. Later, he was also the Commander of the Greek forces during the Siege of Tripolitsa, which is the modern-day city of Tripoli. It was the administrative hub of the Ottoman Empire in Morea and home to probably half of the Turkish population of the district. After the capture of Tripolitsa, he entered the town, where he was shown a plane tree in the marketplace where the Turks used to hang the Greeks and he ordered that it be cut down. As well as his most notable achievement in the Battle of Dervenakia and his capture of Tripolitsa, he took part in several other battles, including the Siege of Nafplio. When the fortress of Nafplio fell, Kolokotronis is said to have ridden his horse up the steep slopes of the fortress of Palamidi to celebrate his victory there. A statue in the town square commemorates the event. He is attired in the pseudo-classical uniform of the Greek Light Infantry, which he was fond of wearing. From December 1823 to February 1825, he took part in the civil wars among the various Greek factions; when his party was finally defeated, he was jailed in Hydra with some of his followers in March 1825 and was released only when an Egyptian army under the command of Ibrahim Pasha invaded the Morea. His eldest son, Panos Kolokotronis, was killed during the second civil war. Ibrahim Pasha was fresh from fighting the Wahhabi rebels in Arabia, and so was used to fighting guerrillas. His troops were armed with the most modern equipment and trained by European experts. The sultan had promised Ibrahim a big prize if he succeeded in Morea. Some say that he promised him Morea itself. Others say that he promised Ibrahim’s father the island of Crete as an appanage for young Ibrahim if he could crush the rebels. With his eye on the prize, he burned his way through the Peloponnese, gaining much territory but arousing much hostility in Western European public opinion, which in the long run, proved disastrous for the Ottomans. The Great Western powers of Britain, France and Russia intervened and defeated the Ottomans in the decisive Sea Battle of Navarino in 1827. Kolokotronis decided to not confront Ibrahim in an open field battle and used guerrilla tactics and scorched earth policy against him; but given his limited resources, was unable to prevent the widespread destruction that Ibrahim left in his wake. Still, in 1825, in recognition of his military acumen and many services to the Greek cause, he was appointed commander-in-chief of Greek forces in the Peloponnese. After the war, Kolokotronis became a supporter of Count Ioannis Capodistrias and a proponent of an alliance with Russia. When the count was assassinated on 8 October 1831, Kolokotronis created his own administration in support of Prince Otto of Bavaria as King of Greece. However, later he opposed the Bavarian dominated regency during his rule. Page 367 of 371

On 7 June 1834, he was accused, with Demetrios Plapoutas for conspiracy against the regency, charged with treason and sentenced to death, though they were ultimately pardoned in 1835. Theodoros Kolokotronis died in 1843 in Athens one day after his son Konstantinos's (Kollinos) wedding and after a feast at the Royal Palace, in the presence of King Otto. In the twilight of his life, Kolokotronis had learned to write in order to complete his memoirs, which have been a perennial favourite in Greece, and have been translated several times in English and other languages. Kolokotronis's famed helmet, along with the rest of his arms and armour, may today be seen in the National Historical Museum of Greece in Athens. In addition to the Nafplio statue mentioned earlier, there is another to be seen in Athens, in the forecourt of the Old Parliament building on Stadiou Street near Syntagma Square. This was one of the sights my father wanted to see during his visit to Athens in 1963. The Inn of Gravia Another sight my father wanted to visit, was ‘The Inn of Gravia’, (Greek: Χάνι της Γραβιάς), which is an old inn about 200 kilometres North/West of Athens. In order to put the Battle of the Inn of Gravia into context, we need to mention the events immediately before the battle. After the fall of Livadia on 1 April 1821, to a contingent of Greek fighters under the command of Athanasios Diakos and Vasilis Bousqos, Hursid Pasha sent two of his most competent commanders from Thessaly, Omer Vrioni and Kose Mehmet at the head of 8,000 men, with orders to put down the revolt in Roumeli and then proceed to the Peloponnese to lift the siege at Tripolitsa by Theodoros Kolokotronis. In May 1821, Omer Vrioni crushed the Greek resistance at the Battle of Alamana and put Athanasios Diakos to death. It is said that Athanasios Diakos was brought before Omer Vrioni, who offered to make him an officer in his army. Diakos immediately refused and replied: “I was born a Greek and I will die a Greek\". Vrioni then ordered that Diakos be impaled, a particularly cruel method of execution. The Ottomans tried to make Diakos carry the sharpened pole, but he threw it down with contempt. As he was led off to be impaled, it was said that onlookers heard him sing: “Για δες καιρό που διάλεξε ο χάρος να με πάρει τώρα π΄ ανθίζουν τα κλαδιά και βγάζ΄ η γη χορτάρι”. (Look at the time death chose to take me, now that branches are flowering, now that the earth sends forth grass). Page 368 of 371

Diakos’s song was in reference to the Greeks' uprising against the Ottoman Empire. One popular version mentions that Diakos was also roasted over a fire, however, this is questionable because of another local, oral tradition that has him being killed by a Greek rebel the next day out of mercy, as he was found to be in a near-death state from the impalement. Omer Vrioni headed south towards the Peloponnese, with his army of 8,000 men. However, his army was met by a Greek group numbering 120 men, under the command of Odysseas Androutsos, who had barricaded themselves inside an old inn called the Inn of Gravia. In the Battle of Gravia Inn, Androutsos and his men repulsed the Ottoman army inflicting heavy losses with minimal losses to the Greeks. As soon as Vrioni ordered the attack, a detachment of Albanian soldiers charged the building. As they entered the building they were met by a barrage of gunfire. The Albanians were forced to retreat under heavy fire and suffered many casualties from the concealed Greeks. Androutsos had trained his men to fire with a European method. A group of his soldiers was firing in unison, while another group was filling their own guns to fire in their place and so forth. This method was the best way of facing any kind of massive attack, so the following Ottoman assaults also met a barrage of fire and were forced to retreat. Ironically, Odysseas Androutsos had learned his war methods in the court of Ali Pasha, where he had grown up. The casualties suffered by Vrioni were heavy, with 300 soldiers dead and 600 wounded in a couple of hours of fighting, while the Greeks had only six countrymen dead. This battle shocked him into uncertainty and he decided to retreat to the island of Euboea, just off the coast of Attica, where he would later combine forces with Köse Mehmed. However, the final outcome of the battle is considered to be ambiguous. Both Androutsos and Omer Vrioni finally retreated, so the outcome is quite equivocal. Nevertheless, the Battle of Gravia was considered to be an important event in the Greek War of Independence. By forcing Vrioni to retreat, Androutsos allowed the Greeks in the Peloponnese, under Theodoros Kolokotronis, to have more time to consolidate their gains as well as to capture the Ottoman capital of the Peloponnese, Tripolitsa (Tripoli). Page 369 of 371

Footnote no: 89 on page 230 The author’s bad experience in Greece in 1963 My father’s bad experience in Athens in 1963, was partly caused by a typical bureaucrat, who wanted to exercise his minimal power to its full extent. However, this on its own, does not explain the degree of animosity he directed towards my father. To fully understand it, we need to consider the following: Between 1946 and 1949, following World War II, a bitter Civil War was fought between the Greek Government army, supported by Britain and the United States and the Democratic Army of Greece, (Greek: Ελληνικός Λαϊκός Απελευθερωτικός Στρατός - ΕΛΑΣ) the military branch of the Communist Party of Greece, supported by Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria (the Soviet Union avoided sending aid). The fighting resulted in the defeat of the communists, by the Government Army. The Civil War left Greece in ruins and in even greater economic distress than it had been following the end of German occupation. Additionally, it divided the Greek people for decades, with both sides vilifying their opponents. Thousands of communists or left- sympathisers languished in prison for many years or were sent into exile on the so called ‘dry islands’ of Gyaros and Makronisos. Many others sought refuge in communist countries or emigrated to Australia, Germany, the US, the UK, Canada and elsewhere. The country remained politically divided between the left and the right, with very little tolerance of each other. Constantinos Karamanlis, was in power in 1963, during the first period he served as prime minister and he led the party of the right. He was replaced at the elections of 3 November 1963 by The Centre Union (Greek: Ένωσις Κέντρου, Enosis Kentrou ΕΚ) created and led by Georgios Papandreou in 1961. I don’t know the exact dates of my father’s visit to Greece in 1963, but either just before or shortly after his visit, the murder in public of the left-wing politician Gregoris Lambrakis took place. Lambrakis was the inspiration for the Costas Gavras political thriller, ‘Z’, which some of you may remember. Only four years after my father’s visit, on April 21, 1967, a group of rightist and anti- communist army officers led by George Papadopoulos, executed a coup d’état and seized power from the government, using the political instability and tension of the time as a pretext. The subsequent military regime (later referred to as the ‘Regime of the Colonels’) lasted until 1974. The Communist Party of Greece (Greek: Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδας, Kommounistikó Kómma Elládas, KKE) was still illegal in 1963. It was not legalised until after the restoration of parliamentary democracy in 1974, by Constantinos Karamanlis, when he returned to Greece. Page 370 of 371

The freedom in general and freedom of speech in particular the Greeks enjoy today, did not exist in the years following World War II and the Civil War and did not return until 1974. The Cypriot calamity of 1974, when Turkey invaded Cyprus following the coup d’état, caused the fall of the junta and the restoration of democracy in Greece. In 1963, the bureaucrat would not have held his civil service position, unless he was anti- communist. It is even possible, that he fought in the civil war against the communists. A Greek Cypriot visiting Romania, a communist country, would have raised suspicion and the bureaucrat would have regarded my father either as a communist or at the very least a communist sympathiser. In this climate of hate and suspicion towards communists, my father had just visited Romania, a communist country and was standing up to the bureaucrat. Taking the above into consideration, I think he was lucky not to simply disappear and never be seen or heard of again! Page 371 of 371