_WondrLab_0220

["51 relates to me in one way or the other. Or me and As we see from the two observations \u201csomething\u201d occur \u201cit\u201d .... When I for instance sit with this here [she in the event of wonder both in groups of several persons slowly sweeps her fingers over the stone table in and within individuals, which seems tO transcend our front of her) then it is my fingers who wonder, or normal understanding of psychological group dynamics then it is the whole of me, which is in wonder and and cognitive learning patterns in educational processes. not so much my brain. But in the moment when Their professional competences and knowledge as I get curious [she knocks on the table] about it, psychologists do not seem to have any significance I think: \u201cHey! How can it be that this surface is for the event of wonder (\u201cAnd I am clear about that it so smooth?\u201d In that moment I step out of this has nothing to do \u2018with us\u2019). And the participants do .... [pause) ... I don\u2019t know [again she sweeps her not seem to be in need of any special training to be hand examining the table), whether one can talk able to participate in a dialogue based on wonder. The about a \u2018sensuous wonder\u2019? Anyway, it is not just psychologist is astonished as well as in wonder about happening in my brain. And this is for sure also what on earth is going on in these wondrous reflective what I observe with my students -that there are processes. \u201cSomething\u201d, she repeatedly say, happens in different phases, where they are having different these moments of wonder, which makes people become attitudes in their design projects. The curiosity more trustful, uplifted, enthusiastic, joyful and attentive. always comes first, I think. And it can have many \u201cHow can it be\u201d, she asks, \u201c that \u201cjust\u201d by making room directions. And in that moment where we kind of for these reflective wondrous processes \u2018the best in us\u2019 choose something out and we start to get deeper seems to appear in us?\u201d and she continues: \u201cHow come into the design process, then we can get into this that such a wondrous process can effect how we get the state of wonder where we sit with ... [long pause). courage to be more authentic together?\u201d .. yes, it can both happen when we sit with the materials [for instance some yarn], but it can \t The Design professor is especially occupied with the also happen when you sit with thoughts and in relation between the attitude of curiosity, inquiry and dialogues with other people. But at some point wonder. Curiosity is connected to an uneasiness and [she smiles) one will kind of run into something constant desire for news and answers pointing in all sorts where you again are drawn out [ of the state of of directions. The attitude of inquiry is connected to a wonder], because there also has to be a sort of more schematic attempt to acquire more systematic enterprise. And, I think that these moments of knowledge. Wonder on the other hand is slower in its wonder are periods of stillness, and it can also tempo, and more directly linked to the experience of happen when you are about to fall asleep, or \u201cthe whole\u201d and the relation to the person herself as take a bath or do the dishes where you are not such rather than to particularities and the reasoning going any where. One is then not in ones project, brain. She points to the mysterious link or union there one might be really tired or just want to finish seems to be between the person and the subject matter this wash and suddenly, out of the blue, you are (\u201cme and \u2018it\u2019\u201d), when the event of wonder happens. She nevertheless in it [wonder]. And I think, actually, even describes it reluctantly, in lack of other terms, as a that this is as important as to sit for instance \u201cspiritual experience\u201d. And also as an event that cannot with the material. This is also a kind of wonder be controlled but happens spontaneously in unforeseen you are\u2019in .... On the other hand when I examine situations. In the moments of wonder \u201csomething\u201d something, I do it with the purpose of gaining greater than the person or human being as such seems specific knowledge, which then can make me do to take over. As the psychologist busts out: \u201cWhat on something else. If I do something motivated by earth is going on?!\u201d wonder -it is a bit the same but nevertheless of another character. It is not so schematic, but it is maybe at this point where the experiment starts? !.. . .In wonder I step out of reason in a way ... , well, I don\u2019t want to sound like a Hippie [she smiles], I have a scientific background, I am rational, etc., etc., but anyway in wonder it is like one is ... hmm ... one is united with the project ... and it is nearly like a spiritual experience. I, of course, don\u2019t mean Spiritual Experience in a religious or New Age sense! But something happens which is more than the human being who sits here. It is like the design project, together with me, takes over. And this is what happens in wonder and which doesn\u2019t occur in curiosity.\u201d From interview with design professor at the Danish School of Design, 16. October 2009.","52 \u201cThe creative force of wonder\u201d \t So, wonder is fundamentally a personal experience of \u201cnot-knowing\u201d, and at the same time \u201chearing\u201d some- The German phenomenologist Eugen Fink (1981) thing which seems to be impossible to catch -or only in- writes about wonder in his article \u201cThe problem of the directly pointed to -by our written or spoken words. Only phenomenology of Edmund Husserl\u201d.2 Here he dwells when we authentically are moved by \u201csomething\u201d, which upon the question of how one can really understand we experience as very important and meaningful and or grasp the fundamental problem or philosophy of at the same time experience the limitation and finitude another philosopher. How can we be sure that we of the written and spoken word, and when we openly know the essential ideas, problems and questions of a expose our vulnerability, struggle and longing, then first philosopher (in casu Edmund Husserl)? The problem of at this point there are signs of wonder in our faces and a philosophy, he points out, need not be identical with thoughts. particular questions with which its literatures begins, or the method, that the philosophers seems to follow, or \t Eugen Fink claims that the original meaning of the- to the specific situation or history of the philosopher or ory [theoria] is closely connected to the experience of even to the explicit motivating questions which remain wonder. Any theory, any knowing relation between man with a philosophy throughout its development. The and the existent is, according to him, not original if what fundamental problem, that motivated the philosopher the existent as such is and nature of truth is are already to create his or her philosophy, might better be decided. \u201cAstonishment [should we read wonder?3] is understood as \u201csomething\u201d that belongs to the space original theory because man suffers the experience of between the lines in a written philosophical text. a breakdown of his traditional knowledge, a breakdown What one has to listen for, or have a musicality to hear, of his preacquaintance with the world and things, and is what Fink calls \u201cthe inner beginning of a philosophy\u201d that as a result a new confronting of the existent and (ibid., p. 22). The real problem of a philosophy is based a new projection of the senses of \u201cbeing\u201d and \u201ctruth\u201d on the philosopher\u2019s personal experience of wonder. become necessary. In turning towards the existent with Wonder is, he says, the opposite of an \u2018expecting-to- astonishment, man is as it were primevally open to the know\u2019\u00adknowledge, which science, scientific progress and world once again, he finds himself in the dawn of a new higher education teaching normally is guided by. As he day of the world in which he himself and everything that writes: \u201c ... philosophy is an \u201cexperience\u201d that man has is begins to appear in a new light. The whole of the exis- of himself and the existent. The origin of philosophical tent dawns upon him anew\u201d (ibid., p. 24). Thus by surren- problems is wonder. Wonder descends upon man; it is dering to wonder (or astonishment?) man gets the possi- essentially something that befalls him [ein Widerfahmis]. bility, as Fink expresses it, \u201cto visit the ground of things\u201d ( ... ) In wonder, the unsettling idea of a genuine mode of and to experience the \u201ccreative force of wonder\u201d (ibid., knowing the existent suddenly emerges from beneath p. 25). But we -as individuals and as cultures -will always the ordered, familiar world in which we are at home and arrive at this ground in different and inadequate ways. about which we have fixed meanings concerning things, man and God, meanings which make certainty in life 3 In a personal correspondence with Dr. Mahe Brinkmann from The possible\u201d (ibid., p. 23). Wonder, in other words, dislodges University of Education in Freiburg he made it clear to me that in man from the prejudice of everyday familiarity and dis\u00ad \u201cDie Entwicklung der Phanomenologie Husserls\u201d Fink uses for place him from his traditional and habitant relation to wonder the German words Verwunderung and Staunen. Brinkmann the world. \u201cThe valid, the certain and existent become writes: \u201cStaunen is closely related to the Greek word thaumazein. invalid, uncertain and nothing in an alien and alienating Verwunderung means more than wonder as Prefix (Ver-) em\u00ad way\u201d (ibid.). Through wonder, Fink claims, a dis-placing phasizes the role of that which the wonder comes from: the world structure happens \u201c ... that bring man home in the and the \u201cFragwurdigkeit\u201d of Sein. Fragwurdigkeit means that there depth of his essence. It (wonder] refers to its proximity to exists something, which is worth to be asked for (dignity). In his early dread, fear, horror and displacement as well as to that writings Fink calls the cosmological framing of his way of world- great self-movement of man which Nietzsche entitled thinking ( especially in the 6th Cartesianischen Meditation) Meontik. \u201cthe great longing\u201d (ibid., p. 24). In it happens the play of Selbstverbiiltnis (relation to one self) and Weltverbiiltnis (relation to the world), Selbsto\/fenbeit (openness to \t2 Tnnslated by Robert M. Harlan (in Harlan, McKenna and oneself) and Weltoffenbeit (openness to the world) in a Nietzschean Winters, eds. (1981, p. 21-55) from: Das Problem der Phanomenologie way. In this context Fink explains the aspects of Staun\u00ad en\/wonder\/ Edmund Husserls. In: Studien zur Phanomenologie. Den Haag 1966. Verwunderung: Verkebrung (reversal, perversion: Philosophy as S. 179-233; original published in Revue internationale de philosophie, an inverted, reverted, perverted world), Ent-setzen (Explexis) and 2 (1939), p. 236-70. Selbstverwandlung (Widerfabms), transformation of the self). ( ... )I don\u2019t think there is a relation to joy there ... \u201c(email, 9. March 2010) I am very grateful for these insightful comments.","53 It is, according to Fink, impossible to visit this fundamen- The Transcendence and Joy of Wonder tal ground in the same way, that is, to repeat the con- stant, self-radicalizing movement of the problem\u2019s de- Notice that Fink describes the moment of wonder as velopment, which originally motivated the philosopher being connected to \u201cthe depth of his [man\u2019s] essence\u201d (in casu Husserl) to these questions and phenomeno- and that this fundamental experience is followed by logical approaches. We should instead try to attune to dread, fear, horror and displacement as well as a the wonder that originally motivated or better - inspired Nietzschean \u2018great selfm\u00ad ovement and longing\u2019. Here - the philosopher, that is, what was it (die Sache), that there seems to be a difference in understanding the made him wonder? In other words, to philosophize, to phenomenology of wonder between Fink, and for be in wonder, is also a question of always starting anew instance the late Heidegger and Hannah Arendt. In and getting the \u2018beginner\u2019s mind\u201d. So - in contrast to Heidegger\u2019s later thinking (and critique of Nietzsche\u2019s Aristotle and Hegel who believed that true philosophy Will-philosophy) it is not \u201cangst\u201d, fear, horror or alienation is seen as putting an end to wonder by gaining more that is the leading \u201cStimmung\u201d which follows authentic and more true knowledge in a systematic way (see Sallis thinking and being. It is rather admiration, thankfulness 1995) - wonder is not only a prelude for philosophizing, (\u201cDenken ist Danken\u201d\/\u201dThinking is Thanking\u201d), reverence, it is and should be the leading force from the beginning awe and joy - and even cheerfulness, which follow to the end of the philosophizing! When we are lead by the experience of wonderment. To think in this way (in intellectual curiosity our eyes are suddenly caught by Gelassenheit) is to dwell upon a wholeness, which the something peculiar in the far horizon of our acquired thinking person is part of, and carried by, and to see and stabile knowledge-continent. We become \u2018interest- this wholeness as a wonder (a Wunder\/a miracle - see ed\u2019 and want to know more. We, so to speak, as scien- also Wittgenstein (1965) in his description of wonder). tists, put on our professional clothes and full marching One could ask: Why are we experiencing thankfulness equipment and start our systematic inquiry. And over and maybe fundamental joy in life, when we are in time we will also reclaim knowledge of these so-called wonder? Arendt and Heidegger both seem to say, anomalities. But, when we are in wonder, our whole and that in wonder you experience a stepping out of you stabile knowledge-continent suddenly and without any own Ego and Will-oriented existence and at the same warning seems to experience an \u2018epistemological earth- time a stepping into a \u201cStimmung\u201d of \u201chomecoming\u201d quake\u2019. That is because in wonder, the fundamental on- - or ontological familiarity. There is, in the moment of tological relation to our being-in-the-world is put in play wonder, a thankfulness and joy, because there are or at risk. We then see, or arrive at, the world as if for valuable things in life which do not depend on, whether the first time, and the more we reflect and wonder - the you have chosen it to be of value or not, meaningful or deeper the wonder seems to grow and the more enig- not. In wonder you can experience even the most usual matic the world and life seem to be. and familiar daily elements of life as extraordinary - but now gloving with value and meaningfulness, which you maybe never experience in ordinary life. Or as Heidegger writes: \u2018\u2019Wonder now opens up what alone is wondrous in it: namely, the whole as a whole, the whole as beings, beings as a whole, that they are and what they are as being ( ... ) the open[ing] of a free space .... in which beings come into play as such, namely as the beings they are, in the play of their be-ing\u201d (Heidegger 1994, p.146). So, in wonder man\u2019s thinking and action become authentic, that is, in wonder man\u2019s actions and insights are more of Being than of himself. From monological wonder to dialogical wonder Now, both Arendt and especially Gadamer (and Martin Buber of course) emphasise one element in this descrip- tion of thinking and wonder, which is not particularly highlighted in Heidegger\u2019s thinking. This is the dialogical nature of thinking and wonder. My experience is that philosophical writing and reading might create or pre- pare moments of wonder for the individual in his soli- tude. But, in a living face-to-face conversation between two or more persons a magical wondrous room often emerges as if out of the blue, which indeed can move and transform the participants on a more existential level. Or as Martin Buber writes: \u201cWhere the dialogue is fulfilled ... there is brought into being a memorable com- mon fruitfulness which is to be found nowhere else ... The","54 world arises in a substantial way between men [sic] who on \u201cempty silence\u201d. Here we sense that \u201csomething\u201d have been seized in their depths and opened out by the is lacking. When Bollnow (and Van Manen 1990) talks dynamic of an elemental togetherness. The interhuman about an ontological silence it is a silence, which is opens out what otherwise remains unopened\u201d (Buber experienced as a \u2018filled silence\u2019. We are - in the moment 1965, p. 86). In other words, the \u2018voice of being\u2019 can, is of wonder - filled with an experience of \u2018being in the my experience after ten years of working with Socrat- presence of truth\u2019, or as Fink would say, an experience ic dialogue groups and philosophical counselling ses- of \u2018visiting the ground of things\u2019. Even when we try to sions at my university, more easily be called upon and articulate our wondrous questions we seem not quiet heard in these \u2018Communities of Wonder\u2019. As mentioned to be in wonder any longer. Every question always lays above, I think there is a close relationship between the out only certain tracks to follow and answers to find experience of transcendence and wonder. Other phe- (Verhoeven 1972). So, wonder is something, which comes nomenologists such as Steen Halling (2007) have like- to us before our questions turn up. Wonder is connected wise shown, that there is a need for talking about a \u201cdi- to \u201c ... those moments\u201d, as Rilke so beautifully writes in alogical phenomenology\u201d as something different and the epigraph of this essay, \u201c ... when something new more than empirical phenomenology, transcendental has entered us, something unknown; our feelings grow phenomenology, hermeneutic phenomenology and the mute in shy embarrassment, everything in us withdraws, writing-oriented practice phenomenology of Van Ma- a silence arises, and the new experience, which no one nen. But as I said in the introduction, Halling only men- knows, stands in the midst of it all and says nothing.\u201d To tions shortly wonder as primordial for the experience of be receptive to these wonderful moments is the overall transcendence and human relations. hope in the Socratic dialogue groups, where silence is a very important virtue to call upon in the dialogue (as a My question and future interest is therefore how we can \u201cthird partner\u201d), and it is also a virtue that I emphasise describe and develop in theory and especially practice in training young phenomenological researchers. Not a dialogical phenomenology, which is first and foremost only silence but also humility, courage (to show integrity based on the experience of wonder. and vulnerability), humour (playfulness), friendship (the trustful generous exchange of thoughts, life experiences Socratic virtues and the \u2018sounding of wonder\u2019 and communication), discipline (to keep working and - a conclusion be in the struggle and longing in a respectful dialogue with the tradition of great thinkers and artists of human Working as a university teacher and phenomenological history) and last but not least - passion or love. We researcher in higher education I am of course daily will never be able to tune in on wonder if we are not confronted with the question: How then do we teach connecting to and mindful about that which really our students and young researchers to become matters to us the most. These are - what I call - the 7 more wondrous in their thinking? As I have indicated, Socratic virtues in a Community of Wonder. Of course, wonder is not something we can control or \u201ccreate\u201d as there might be others as well, and what these virtues we wish. Wonder is not like clear didactic objectives really are and mean, well, I don\u2019t know - but I would love or competences that we can manage our teaching being in a community of wonder about them. according to. Nevertheless, it seems that wonder - \u201cth,e creative force of wonder\u201d - constitutes the very solar plexus of deeper and more self-transforming learning (Bildung). I hope that this article have at least indicated that there is in higher education research as well as in phenomenological research a need to look more thoroughly into the phenomenology of wonder. And also, that wonder first of all must be seen and understood as an ontological event that happens to us if we are receptive, daring and open enough to it. An enigmatic part of the phenomenological view of wonderment is its fundamental silence. When we are struck by wonder we become silent and still. And then we begin to listen. Listen for \u201csomething\u201d which transcends our words and thoughts but nevertheless has made a deep impression on us. The existential educationalist Otto F. Bollnow (1982) talks about an important difference between the \u2018epistemological silence\u2019 and the \u2018ontological silence\u2019. In contemporary Mode-2 research (Gibbons et al. 1994; Nowotny et al. 2001) one is focused on the tacit embodied and practical knowledge. How can we bring these forms of knowledge to the surface and reflect upon it and from it? But this tacit knowledge has only to do with the \u2018epistemological silence\u2019. This is, so to speak,","55 References Hansen, F.T. (2007): Philosophical Counselling. A hermeneutical- \t dialogical approach to Career Counselling. In (P. Plant ed.): Achenbach, G. 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Albany, NY. \t P-Trow, M. (1994): The new production of knowledge: Schmitt, F.\/Lahroodi, R. (2008): The Epistemic Value of Curiosity. \t The dynamics of science and research in contemporary \t In: Educational Theory, Vol. 58, No. 2, p. 125-148. \t societies. London. Schon, D. (1983): The Reflective Practitioner. New York. Hadot, P. (1995): Philosophy as a Way of Life. Spiritual Exercises Van Manen, M. (1990): Researching Lived Experience. Human Science \t from Socrates to Foucault. Malden. \t for an Action Sensitive Pedagogy. Ontario, NY. Van Manen. Halling, S. (2007): Intimacy, Transcendence, and Psychology. \t M. (1991): The Tact of Teaching. The Meaning of Pedagogical \t Closeness and openness in everyday life. New York. \t Thoughtfulness. Alberta. Hansen, F.T. \u00b7(2000): Den sokratiske dialoggruppe - et v.erkt0j for Van Manen, M. (2002): \u201cThe heuristic reduction: Wonder\u201d, see \t vrerdiafklaring [The Socratic Dialogue Group - A Tool for Value \t www.phenomenologyonline.com\/inquiry\/11.html) \t Clarification]. Copenhagen. Verhoeven, C. (1972): The Philosophy of Wonder. New York. Hansen, F.T. (2002): Det filosofiske !iv - et dannelsesideal for Wittgenstein, L. (1965): A lecture on ethics. In: Philosophical Review, \t eksistensp.edagogikken \t[The Philosophical Life - the Edifying \t Vol. 74. No. 1, p. 3-12. \t Ideal of existential pedagogic]. Published Ph.D. dissertation. \tCopenhagen.","56 Rikke Toft N\u00f8rg\u00e5rd & S\u00f8ren S.E. Bengtsen The Worldhood University: Design Signatures & Guild Thinking","Introduction sibility of higher education institutions (Marginson 2016; Macfarlane 2007). Universities and higher education today are sites for entanglement of multiple forms of agency and lifeworlds. As Ronald Barnett (2004), Finn T. Hansen (2010), and Enhanced focus is given to higher education strategies others have argued we have left the mode 1 university and frameworks that integrate more traditional forms behind, where the institution steadfastly manages and of higher education curriculum with moral and political imposes the right forms of knowledge, ideas and values awareness, social agency, and economic consciousness. on the world for it to follow. Also, we are now moving beyond the mode 2 university, where the univer- sity is \u2018for An example of such initiatives within teaching and sale\u2019 (Shumar 1997) and where higher education curricula learning is the \u2018Connected Curriculum\u2019 at University Col- are being defined and shaped by the needs and current lege London (UCL) (Fung 2017). The Connected Curric- drivers of the job market and the shift- ing neoliberalist ulum strives to merge different disciplinary, professional, company strategies. As Ronald Barnett underlines \u201cthe social, political and economic realities and contexts. contemporary vocabulary of the university [is] terribly Closer to our own national context, Aarhus University thin relying as it does on the terminology of performance (AU) is in the middle of a process where it is trying to de- indicators, worldclass-ness, knowledge transfer, \u2018third fine and rede- sign the physical campus through a pur- space professionals\u2019, \u2018the student experience\u2019, students- chase of an old hospital ground for 800 mill. DKK cre- as-consumers, league tables, outcomes, impact, [and] ating a 110.00 square meters new campus area. One of internationalisation\u201d (Barnett 2013, p.43\u201344). the aims here is to create a future campus where living labs, sustainability, student-staff partnerships and en- Currently, we are now in the process of approaching gagements with the public are interconnected as can be the mode 3 university, which is a university for, in, and of seen when looking at the \u201cTen principles for the university the world. This notion has recently been described by campus of tomorrow\u201d (http:\/\/newsroom.au.dk\/en\/news\/ Barnett (2017) as an \u2018eco-philosophy for the university\u2019, show\/artikel\/ti-principper-for-fremtidens-universitets- and Barnett argues for the need for \u201cEarth philosophies, campus\/). Related trends are visible within research as conveying a sense of the embeddedness, of humanity in well, where new centres emerge that are estab- lished the world in its fullest sense and its inter-connectedness, and funded based on enhancing relations between poli- and urging an orienta- tion towards the world.\u201d cy making, societal engagement, intellectual leadership, (Barnett 2017, forthcoming). business cooperation, and HE practice. Examples of such centres are the newly established centres Centre for Glob- R.T. N\u00f8rg\u00e5rd (*) \u00b7 S.S.E. Bengtsen al Higher Education (UCL) and Centre for Higher Educa- Centre for Teaching Development and Digital Media, tion Futures (AU). Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] Such initiatives and socio-political forms of institutional agency are highlighted in current research on the \u00a9Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018 ecological university and higher education ecologies S.S.E. Bengtsen, R. Barnett (eds.), The Thinking University, Debating (Barnett 2017; Wright 2016), the global education industry Higher Education: Philosophical Perspectives 1, and professionalisation of higher education (Verger https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/978-3-319-77667-5_12 et al. 2016; Andres et al. 2015), and the social respon-","58 This chapter is one such example of trying to materialise the university from its entrapment within dominant such an \u2018earth philoso- phy\u2019 through the notion of the discourses and working towards social emancipation.\u201d \u2018worldhood university\u2019 as a way for a university to be (Barnett 2013, p.45). Such an imaginative university, integrated in the world in distinctive ways and to be a we shall argue in the following, is dependent on being distinctive world for the people living there. Whay we an integrative worldhood university by establishing call \u2018designed signatures\u2019 and \u2018guild thinking.\u2019 Through dialogues between the \u2018thought crafters\u2019 of the university the concept of \u2018worldhood\u2019 we intend, on the one hand, guilds and the broader range of social, cultural and to focus on the ways the different designs of university political lifeworlds. structures and systems create specific signa- tures for being, doing and knowing at the university. Something Conceptual Framework for the universities can work with intentionally to shape thinking Worldhood University in certain ways and create unique world- hood signatures for themselves. On the other hand, we also wish to draw In the following section we present a conceptual attention to how particular ways of thinking conjures framework for the worldhood uni- versity resting on four different worlds. Here, thinking becomes a guild\u2019s craft core philosophical pillars, namely embedded in and emanating from the sinews of the university. However, new difficulties and challenges become 1.\t the philosophy of things (Harman 2002, 2005; visible, if universities as higher education institutions Lingis 1998, 2011), are to be for, in, and of the world. As we have argued else- where (N\u00f8rg\u00e5rd and Bengtsen 2016) making 2.\t the philosophy of place (Casey 1997; Tuan 1997\/1977; the university belong to the world, and vice-versa, Bachelard 1958, Malpas 1999), is a challenge politically, socially, ethically, and philosophically. It requires new conceptions of academic 3.\t the philosophy of design (Nelson and Stolerman citizenship, belonging in higher education, and what 2012; Flusser 1999; Verbeek 2011), and we have called \u2018placeful universities\u2019 where \u201cacademic citizenship emerges through dialogical integration and 4.\t the philosophy of thinking (Heidegger 2000, 2001, \u2018Mitsein\u2019 in the critically open bond between university 2011; Bhaskar 2008, 2011). and society as they are in and for each other [\u2026] That entails designing universities that allows for openness, Below we present the framework and the core concepts dialogue, mutual integration, joint responsibility and derived from the pillars. The framework demonstrates care\u201d (N\u00f8rg\u00e5rd and Bengtsen 2016, p. 14). how the worldhood university is concurrently emerg- ing from the world through the things and places that Paul Temple (2014) has likewise argued for the constitute it and creating the world through the designs university as a potential place as \u201c[t]he creation of a and thinking it constitutes (Fig. 12.1). community and its culture turns, I suggest, the university space into a place. As a result, locational capital becomes UNIVERSITIES AS THINGS Made of world: UNIVERSITIES AS PLACES transformed, through the media- tion of an institutional university being culture, into social capital.\u201d (Temple 2014, p.11). If this -\tbeing a certain thing in and -\thaving arcitectural composition transformation from locational to social and educational <=> capital does not occur suc- cessfully, the university is at \t of itself Worldhood \t & experential structure risk of becoming a monologic world design of exclu- sion universities and power (Waite 2014). -\tbeing something for someone -\thaving geographical layout -\tthings being things for <=> As Peter Scott (2015) has argued the dialogue between Maker of world: \t & ecological envionment institution and society risks breaking down, when the \t themselves through taking university doing purpose of the university world is no longer clear to the \t a stance -\tthinking and worlds as placed public. Nixon further this point by calling attention to how this might make the university a secluded disconnected -\tthings as signatures \t and placing world as \u201c[t]he loss of all values other than the values of the marketplace further erodes public trust in the \t and charms -\teach other universities by restricting the notion of public concern to -\tplaces constrain or incite narrow self-interests of the commercial sector.\u201d (Nixon -\tthings as educational 2008, p.22). Following Nixon (2008) and Macfarlane \tmovement (2007), the fusion of the university and the public into \timperatives a shared world is mandatory to ensure the contin- ued -\tplaces mold mood and dialogue between university and society. As Barnett -\tthings as worlds in motion argues, the university itself needs to be imaginative and \t mode of thinking to promote imaginative thinking, being, and doing in \t & setting worlds in motion the higher education curriculum. Only the imaginative THINKING UNIVIERSITIES university \u201ccan offer trans- port to a new world, freeing DESIGNING UNIVERSITIES -\tbecoming worldly through -\tthrough materializing \tthinking \tmorality -\tbeing enables thinking & thinking -\tas persuasive systems \t enables being \t with intent -\tthinking in and through world -\tis (im)moral thinking in action -\tworld architects and \tdialogue \tfuture-makers -\tdwelling as thinking from & -\tthrough inviting\/stifling \t for worlds \t particular knowing, being -\tthinking as an act of \t and doing \temancipation -\tas shaping the experience -\tthinking through caring and \t and action of people and \t worlds \t caring through thinking Fig. 12.1 Conceptual framework for the worldhood university","59 The Universty as World-Made: and a specific autonomous power at work in the world. Things & Places Worldhood Places Worldhood Things Seeing universities not only as things in themselves, but also as places for someone opens them up to being If we apply the object-oriented philosophies of Graham inhabited. We can, following Lingis, comprehend how Harman (2002, 2005) and Alphonso Lingis (1998, 2011), uni- versities \u201cmake us move as patterns in the world the university can be seen as a thing in its own right, with (...) [and] take possession of us and choreograph our its own particular ontology and an internally coherent movements\u201d. (Lingis 2011, p.67). Here, an ontological and consistent reality. Instead of seeing universities dialogue creates place, between the university as a as a uniform globalized or mass university for anyone, particular thing and its inhabitants enter- ing that thing. object-oriented philosophy argues that universities are in Through thinking universities as places, things and principle open to everyone but for someone. As Harman people necessar- ily becomes located and as such the describes, things are \u201cnot ultimate materials but auton- concept of place becomes a pathway for humanity into omous forms, forms somehow coiled up or folded in the the university. It is through following this pathway that crevices of the world and exerting their power on all that the thinking university emerges as \u2018a world for someone\u2019: approaches them.\u201d (Harman 2005, p.19). As Harman \u201cA world of other persons as well as a world in which we continues, with his \u201cdefinition of substance (...): an object find ourselves, so it is this world, and the place in which it or substance is a real thing considered apart from any unfolds, that our philosophical explorations must always of its relations with other such things.\u201d (ibid.). Transferred be addressed and to which they must always return\u201d to this context, worldhood universities, on an ontological (Malpas 1999, p. 196). By becoming something for some- level, become things that \u201ctake a stance within the world one, universities become places of felt value, they have and command our attention, lure us into taking them a certain atmosphere and impart certain moods and seriously even if only to ridicule them.\u201d (Harman 2002, modes of being. p.241). In line with Harman we argue that universities must be dealt with as worlds through an effort of \u201contological But they also have a more concrete spatial and alchemy\u201d (Harman 2002, p.237), where they respond to geographical being - places are architectural rooms not only socio-political imperatives, but indeed that they for thinking that can be spacious or crowded, and can respond to an ontological imperative within themselves constrain or incite movement in body as well as mind. as well. They are their own worlds. As Tuan writes: \u201cSpaciousness is closely associated with the sense of being free. Freedom implies space; it However, in our object-oriented approach to world- means having the power and enough room in which to hood universities as things we shall need to underline act\u201d (Tuan 1997, p. 52). But con- versely, \u201cEnclosed and that the specific university as a world \u201cis not only hard at humanized space is [also] place. Compared to space, work in being what it is, but is equally effective at draw- place is a calm centre of established values. Human ing [others] into its orbit as an individual thing.\u201d (Harman beings require both space and place. Human lives [and 2002, p.242). If the university as such a worldhood being thinking] are a dialectical movement between shelter succeeds in making itself manifest as a particular power and venture, attachment and freedom\u201d (Tuan 1997, p. in the world, the effect will be that it will, powerfully and 54). This dialectical movement between fredoom and through the signature of its being, try to draw us in or re- control can be established in numerous ways and as pell us. To describe this power Harman can \u201cthink of no thus invite and prohibit ways of being and thinking at better tech- nical term than charm.\u201d However, this word the university. \u201cshould be heard with overtones of witchcraft rather than those of social skills. (...) The charm of objects is their This potential humanising quality of placefulness inno- cent absorption in being just what they are, which in is also accentuated by Bachelard who in the chapter each case is something that we ourselves can never be.\u201d \u201cNests\u201d argues that belonging and dwelling in places (Harman 2005, p.137). is intimately connected to feeling at home. (Bachelard 1958, p. 91). Following Bachelard, the university holds the To recognise each university as a thing or a particular possibility of being a worldhood nest for us to dwell and worldhood in and of itself is to recognise that it is not dare to think in. But for a university to become a nest for only us that infuses educational imperatives into univer- daring thinking in the world it needs to ensure that it instils sities through sculpting them as things, but that they enough confidence for anyone to lodge there (Bachelard also, as Lingis argues, exert their powers and \u201cshape 1958, p. 103). That is, universities are environments of our bodies, [and] imprint their forms on [us].\u201d Indeed, we affect and experience. They are lifeworld signatures, \u201cfind ourselves caught up in their images, their shadows, functioning as a particular localisation and placing of their reflections, halos, the harmonics of their colors, the thinking (our term) that has the power to define, refine rhythms of their forms.\u201d (Lingis 1998, p.101), and through and thwart what thinking is and could be. Universities are such an ontological imperative, \u201c[w]e find ourselves thinking guilds that can sharpen and extend thinking, or among them and car- ried on by them into a time of fate.\u201d dull and restrict it. (ibid.). As such, the university, and, more importantly, each individual university is a thing in itself \u2013 a field of forces, That is, thinking as a particular world signature is inte- grated and identifiable in the very sinews of a university.","60 As such, the university environment serves an edu- cat- locking doors. On a very fundamental level, the university ional purpose through which it can communicate its guild is a world that through its design dynamically act upon thinking: \u201cArchitectural space reveals and instructs\u201d (Tuan its inhabitants by letting them know who and where they 1997, p. 114). The university place is the spatial- ity that should be and how they should act and think. shapes, mutates, and grows thinking into a certain kind of university being. As such, intimate connections exist A design is never a neutral existential terrain \u2013 it has between the places we inhabit and the thinking we do. particular intents. What philosophy of design unearths, is Our thinking becomes architecture and architecture be- the morality and intentionality designed into the things comes thinking. and places of the university (Verbeek 2011). Following Peter-Paul Verbeek, a university is a moralizing design, Being a certain place is, then, also an annexation of and, hence, we need to think carefully and criti- cally thinking - as thinking is an annexation of place. Thinking about how universities are designed, and subsequently becomes an affectionate relation with the place in which are designing us. As Verbeek accentuates: \u201cEven when one thinks \u2013 thinking emerges through topophilia, \u2018the designers do not explicitly reflect morally on their work, love of place,\u2019 where thinking emerges through constant the artefacts they design will inevitably play mediating dialogue with its worldly surroundings: \u201cThus one does role in people\u2019s actions and experience, helping to shape not first have a subject that apprehends certain features moral actions and decisions and the quality of people\u2019s of the world in terms of the idea of place; instead the lives\u201d (Verbeek 2011, p. 90). structure of subjectivity is given in and through the structure of place\u201d (Malpas 1999, p. 35). Consequently, worldhood universities are enacters of certain ethics and call upon us as institution makers Consequently, the signature of the university place and working inhabitants to take part in the responsibility also becomes the signature of that university\u2019s thinking. arising from the circumstance that \u201cdesigning is The university, as a placeful being, \u201cstands as an environ- materializing morality\u201d (Verbeek 2011, p. 90). Wether we ment capable of affecting the people who live in it [...] come to care about thinking or each other, wether we architecture \u2018teaches.\u2019 A planned city, a monument, or are truthful or feel authentic in our being is to large extent even a simple dwelling can be as symbol of the cos- mos\u201d dependent upon what we hear when we listen to the (Tuan 1997, p. 102). Accordingly, the worldhood university world we inhabit. How it design us. Here, the term \u2018culture\u2019 intentionally teaches people to be, think, and act in the is important, as higher education and critical thinking do world in a certain way. not happen in a social and cultural vacuum, but very much are influenced by the education environment they emerge from. The University as World-Maker: However, we suggest an ontological approach to Design and Thinking culture, which means that higher education culture is not merely related to the social norms and codes of con- duct, Worldhood Design and Designing but is being co-constitued by the brick and mortar of the buildings and the design of the campus experience. A university is not still life - it is a world brimming with This entails, that the experience, ethics, engage- ments, lifeforms. But it is not a neutral or natural ecosystem. It and action of the university and its inhabitants fall back is an world designed by humans and a world design- ing on the designers that, as a consequence hereof need to humans. As Nelson & Stolterman states in the design way be in constant critical dialogue and thoughtful inquiry \u2013 intentional change in an unpredictable world: \u201cGenesis with their design and its entanglement with people is ongoing. As human beings, we continuously create and worlds. At the core, higher education culture is things that help reshape the reality and essence of the what Verbeek calls persuasive design, that is, design world as we know it. that through its constitution convinces people to think, act and be in certain ways (Verbeek 2011, p. 122). Seen through the lens of design, the moral responsibility of the university is inescapable. When we create new things \u2013 technologies, organiza- To offer and sustain enduring thinking and habitable tions, processes, environments, ways of thinking, or sys- existential terrains, univer- sities need to critically reflect tems \u2013 we engage in design\u201d (Nelson & Stolterman, 2012, on their worldhood and take on themselves to be moral p.1). A university is not just a thing and a place, it is also a leaders through embodying ethics in both thinking and design actively fashion- ing the being, doing and know- design: \u201cThis is a task that calls for good judgment \u2013 not ing that goes on there. problem solving. It calls for compelling composi- tions and effective creations \u2013 not true solutions [\u2026] leaders As a design, universities invite for certain forms of and designers are often one and the same, and that interaction and experience while it stifles or prohibits it is important for leaders to recognize that their chal- other kinds. This can be seen in the ways university lenge is that of a designer \u2013 to determine direction buildings and interiors are designing for or against and destination via the design tradition\u201d (Nelson & informal gatherings, social events or weekend visits Stolterman, 2012, p. 5). through offering places to hang, managing rooms, and","61 Through the lens of design, to become a world, insofar as thinking, belonging to Being, listens to Being. universities need to take charge and be the intentional (...) Being enables thinking.\u201d (Heidegger 2011, p.149). By architects of their own worldhood, rather than followers foregrounding this point from Heidegger, we again and opportunists in the world. From this also follows wish to stress the point that thinking is being opened up a moral obligation to take action and be proactive through its grounded nature. This \u2018placefulness\u2019 (N\u00f8rg\u00e5rd through ethically imagining that-which-do-not-yet-exist. and Bengtsen 2016) of higher education learning and This entails that the worldhood university is not only a thinking creates abundance in the very act of thinking spatial and social arena, but con- nects to past, present, itself \u2013 a surplus that makes criticality possible. and future time also. An ability that demands strong moral and great human capacity as: A kindred perspective is found in Roy Bhaskar\u2019s scientific realism, where he argues that the world is not Possessing the ability to engage so powerfully in the world is the opened up through science, but, the other way around, essence of human poten- tial. But it is also true that humans are that science is opened up because of the open nature of fallible. Design activities can do, and have done, great service the world. As Bhaskar writes, \u201ca closed world entails either to humanity. But design has done great harm as well. [\u2026] At the a completed science or no science (...), so a closed world most basic level, we as human beings are compelled to design entails the impossibility of science.\u201d (Bhaskar 2008, p.116). \u2013 it is our calling as agents of free will, who through design Bhasker goes on to conclude that \u201cas science occurs the intelligence, can act with design will. As humans with design will, world must be open.\u201d (ibid.) Science, here understood we are impelled to create new meaning, new forms, and new as thinking at universities in the broadest sense of the realities. (Nelson & Stolterman, 2012, p. 12-13) term, is not the reason why the world is open. Rather it is \u201cbecause the world is open that sci- ence, whether or not This presuppose that universities know themselves as (and for how long) it actually occurs, is possible.\u201d (ibid.). designed and designing world and act upon people with Thinking, in this perspective, is a thinking submerged in ethical design will that take responsibility, when- ever it the world, a thinking from an open world. is clear that their worldhood has unethical consequences for the people living there (Verbeek 2011). And this is a Thinking from the world is possible because thinking moral obligation that override any utilitarian, statutory or is a way of taking place in the world, it is, as Heidegger pragmatic purpose or task that the university might have writes, \u2018dwelling\u2019 in the world. With Heidegger we argue (Verbeek 2011; Flusser 1999). Otherwise the university is that students and teachers at the worldhood university risking its own worldhood and are in danger of becoming must be invited as worldhood \u201cdwellers.\u201d (Heidegger an inhabitable place for thinking. 2001, p.146) where we \u201cthink for the sake of dwelling [wohnen]\u201d (Heidegger 2001, p.159). Here, to dwell Worldhood Thinking contains the meaning of \u201cto cherish and protect, to preserve and care for (\u2026).\u201d (Heidegger 2001, p.145), We find Heidegger\u2019s understanding of thinking central and as Heidegger underlines by the use of italics: \u201cThe here, as it becomes a link of academic being and en- fundamental character of dwelling is the sparring and gagement to the very place of this thinking. The university preserving.\u201d (2001, p.147). In this way, Heidegger con- as a world, argued by way of Heidegger, \u201cdesignates the nects dwelling to giving thanks, to preserve, and to care ontologico-existential con- cept of worldhood.\u201d (Heide- for someone or something, and a certain kind of alien gger 2000, p.93). Heidegger importantly points out \u201c[n]oble-mindedness would be the nature of thinking and that thinking and world are closely linked, and that stu- thereby of thanking.\u201d (Heidegger, 2010, p. 97). dents and teachers at the universi- ties become \u2018worldly\u2019 through their thinking. Here, to become worldly means As Gloria Dall\u2019Alba points out in her work on that higher education thinking and learning thinks from Heidegger\u2019s notion of care in higher education contexts, a certain social, cultural, and political context towards a \u201contology is integrated with epistemology through devel- critical openness in that context. oping the capacity to care\u201d, and that the \u201ccapacity to care promotes an interweaving of what students know Therefore, worldhood thinking is not a certain form and can do with how they are learning to be.\u201d (Dall\u2019Alba, of closing down the horison meaning, but a certain 2011, p.115). Understood as care, thinking links dimensions way of opening it up. Thinking is here a response to the of personal meaning, social and cultural importance worldhood nature of the university, and the university as and relevance, disciplinary depth and academic rigour \u201c\u2018world\u2019 does not in any way imply earthly as opposed in the worldhood university. Also here, we find important to heavenly being, nor the \u2018worldly\u2019 as opposed to the overlaps with Bhaskar\u2019s realist philosophy of science. \u2018spiritual\u2019. For us \u2018world\u2019 does not at all signify beings Bhaskar argues that the object of thinking, here called or any realm of beings but the openness of Being.\u201d depth-investigation, isto locate and access emancipatory (Heidegger 2011, p.172). This way we argue that thinking powers that are embedded within the world. Bhaskar has roots, which means that it emerges from a specific writes that \u201c[t]he object of the depth- investigation is institutional, regional, and national context, which are emancipation. (\u2026) Now if the emancipation is to be of often overlooked when discussing critical thinking in the human species, then the powers of the emancipated higher education. As Heidegger writes, thinking belongs human being and community must already exist (\u2026) in an to being, and \u201c[a]t the same time thinking is of Being unactualized state.\u201d (Bhaskar 2011, p.112).","62 Design Signatures and Guild Thinking Worldhood Guilds Like the workshop is the craftsman\u2019s home (Sennett 2008) the university contains in it the possibility to be a home for thinking. Through the lens of guilds and crafts- manship we argue that thinking at the university is also something generated by our hands, our being, our movements, and our ability to dwell and build in the world. Here, the university materialises by way of what Adamson calls thinking through craft (Adamson 2007). Fig. 12.2 The four pillars of the worldhood university Like craft, the university is not a fixed thing, but perpetually emerging from a particular guild\u2019s engaged Thus, we wish to underline that thinking in the world- craftsmanship practice. Through craftsmanship practice hood university is an aca- demic dwelling where a par- university thinking is simulatenously forged as way of ticular university as a thing, place and design in itself thinking, acting and being (Adamson 2007, p. 3\u20134). together with its capacity to be ethical, rooted and hab- Considering universities as craft and thinking as crafts- itable constitutes an institu- tionally grounded and criti- manship enables a break both with understandings of cally open higher education world. the university as an institution separate from the lifeworld of its inhabitants, and with academic work as abstract In the above, we have invoked the idea of the world- or immaterial. Firstly, we argue, by way of Sennett hood university and estab- lished it as a certain engage- (2008), that the worldhood univer- sity is a guild where ment with the four pillars of philosophy of things, place, a certain thinking craft finds a \u2018home\u2019 in the sense that design, and thinking (Fig. 12.2). \u201c[t]he workshop is the craftman\u2019s home.\u201d (Sennett 2008, p.53). The worldhood university as guild emphasises its In the last part of the chapter we will describe two collective endeavour and rooted dwelling of thought as central characteristics of the worldhood university, when a homefulness. these four domains intersect in productive ways. Firstly, this will be done be explicating how worldhood universities Secondly, academic work in the guild materialises emerge as guilds, and secondly what forms of signatures as a socio-material practice - a \u201cknowing how to make such guilds leave on higher education practice. something\u201d through integrating ways of thinking, doing and being (Adamson 2007, p. 69). In the guild, Around the forge of a particular guild, craftsman come the craft of thinking emerges through critical-creative into being by way of \u2018Thinking through craft\u2019 (Adamson, forging of materials wherein \u201cthe quality of the result 2007) and the guild perseveres and prosper though is not prede- termined, but depends on the judgment, carrying its craftsmanship in its sinews. Powerful guilds care and dexterity which the maker exer- cises as he are those that are able to perform their craftsmanship works\u201d (Adamson 2007, p. 73). Following from this, the as and through being intentional thinking, design, place, worldhood university as a guild is a geographically and and things (Sennett 2008). This comes forth as an socio-materially embodied and ethical university, a place embodiment and exhibition of a distinguishing signature where the \u201csuccessful workshop will establish legitimate that set it apart from other guilds. The crafts- men of the author- ity in the flesh, not in rights or duties set down on guild, living and thinking around the forge materialises paper. \u201c(Sennett 2008, p.54). that signature in their hands, heads, and hearts \u2013 what Lee Shulman and others have called a \u2018signa- ture Looking at the worldhood university as a guild make pedagogy\u2019 (Shulman 2005; Gurung et al. 2009). thinking emerge, as Heidegger describes, \u201cby taking Following theories of crafts- manship and signature to mind and heart\u201d, and \u201c[t]he heart is the wardship pedagogies, as well as thinking through the concepts of guarding what lies before us\u201d (Heidegger 2004, p.207). guilds and signatures \u2013 the remaining part of the article Here, the thinking univer- sity materialises as ethical present a framework for thinking about the worlds of wardship of the guild-members where having a univer- worldhood universities as constituting distinctive homes sity home means to participate in the craft practice of for thinking crafters to dwell. the worldhood university itself. Seen through the lens of Heidegger, the thinking within the guild becomes a \u201cHomecoming\u201d (ibid.), and the university as guild becomes the \u201chomeland\u201d (ibid.) of thinking. As Barnett and Bengtsen (2017) write, \u201cthe ecological university is characterised by an ecological epistemology.","63 Its work, its efforts to understand the world and to Designing Worldhood Signatures advance understandings in the world, are guided by a will to advance the ecosys- tems of the world.\u201d (Barnett and The worldhood university as a practicing guild engraves Bengtsen 2017, p.10). So, the \u2018homeland\u2019 or \u2018exis- tential its thinking into the world as a recognisable mark. A terrain\u2019 of the worldhood university is not expressed as a worldhood university that practices its craft intentionally guarded and secret university that primarily nourishes its gain a distinct signature that can be found in the way its own \u2018family\u2019 of students and teachers. On the contrary, inhabitants expresses their knowing, being and doing the university as guild \u201cgives itself to the world, and in the world. By creating a \u2018worldhood signature\u2019 \u2013 has concerns for the world, and these concerns inflect through excerting intentional design will on things, places its knowing efforts.\u201d (Barnett and Bengtsen 2017, p.10). and think- ing \u2013 the university becomes something that However enriching the intersections between the different sets its thinking apart from other uni- versities. A guild ecological domains may be, it is still important that the that distinguishes itself from other guilds through the notion of embodied dwelling, and the ontologi- cal way thinking is forged and wielded in the world by its \u2018being-there\u2019, is anchored in a physical place. That craftsmen. One such example could be the \u2018worldhood thinking has things to work with and that the craftsmen signature\u2019 of UCL\u2019s Connected Curriculum described in has a forge to gather around. As Ossa-Richardson under- the beginning and put forward in A connected curriculum lines, the university campus must congeal \u201cas a place for Higher Education (Fung 2017). in its own right, with its own history and meanings, [for the students and teachers to] have the opportunity of Drawing on Shulman\u2019s (2005), Gurung et al. (2009), finding their own part in a community and in a tradition and Horn\u2019s (2013) works on signature pedagogies, we - of participating in the idea of the university.\u201d (Ossa- argue that a defining feature of the worldhood university Richardson 2014, p.154). is its signature. As Shulman writes, signature pedagogies \u201cdefine how knowledge is analysed, criticised, accepted, Craftsmanship thinking in the guild is the ability to take or discarded. They define the functions of expertise in and manage risks as the process of thinking materialise a field, the locus of authority, and the privileges of rank in the guild in the form of a craftsmanship conversa- tion and standing. [.. .] these pedagogies even determine the between things for thinking at hand and crafting design architectural design of educational institutions, which in will around the univer- sity forge. Craftsmanship practice turn serves to perpetuate these approaches.\u201d (Shulman is to not only know how to craft something (a thought\/ 2005: 54). As this quote underlines, the worldhood thing), but ratherto know howto make something just right signature works as a higher education nexus, a point of both in the ethi- cal and critical-creative understanding gathering in the Heideggerian sense, where \u201chabits of the of those words (Adamson 2007, p. 78). head, heart, hand\u201d (Shulman 2005, p. 59) are united in the things, place, design and inhabitants of the university Furthermore, every worldhood university has its own and its environment. guilds with its particular craftsmen embodying certain ways of \u2018thinking through craft\u2019 and making things and We find attempts to gather university signatures in thinking \u2018just right.\u2019 The worldhood university highlights Barnett\u2019s comprehensive list of sightings of different the circumstance that thinking is always done in a place, universities in the literature (Barnett 2013, p.67\u201370), and surrounded by things and is carried out as a moral and in Staley\u2019s own inventions of university tyoes (Staley 2015). intentional design practice. It is, as Adamson writes, a However, such sightings and inventions need to be craft dialogue between process and material where further developed into real signatures with a clear \u201cepis- the worldhood university is a \u2018tectonic\u2019 guild (Adamson temological footprint\u201d (Barnett 2015, p.163). To develop 2007, p. 97) - a place bound to thinking through craft a worldhood university with a distinctive signature that and a play of forces in the world calling forth a particular sets it apart entails an ability to make it manifest as thing, university which, as a guild, expresses and forges specific place, design, and thinking. And to make it come alive worlds through thinking. The guild is a place for the in the world through its inhabitants ability to unfold and craftsman to think through building and dwelling - but express the signature and its qualities within the world. also a place that through its design impact and shape Here, \u201cuniversities have to decide how they are to be in our dealings with the world. Our thinking is crafted in the world. This is an existential moment for universities.\u201d the guild as we are crafting our thinking there, and so, (Barnett 2011, p.16) as the particular institu- tion needs to we cannot walk away from the forge untouched. The critically reflect and choose how it shall carry on, oppose, worldhood university as guild, therefore, is not a stagnant or rethink its social, cultural, and political rootedness form of higher education that reproduces and reruns an in the world. Just because the particular institution has overstretched and backward looking craft or curriculum. been \u2018grown\u2019 out of a certain culture, it is not determined The university as guild sees into the many possible by that culture, and so it needs to find a proper and futures and cre- ates thinking as craftsmanship practice determinate voice and worldhood of its own. from these futures, and \u201c[a]s the future is dawning, our response through thinking dawns as well.\u201d (Barnett and Following from this, worldhood as a university Bengtsen 2017, p.7). Preparing craftsmen for the world signature is a way of conceiving individual universities ahead is an enduring ethical endeav- our of the guild, as having authenticity and distinctiveness. The authentic and in this way the image of the guild suits the worldhood uni- versity enacts its voice and worldhood from the four- university well. fold described above, and it emerges from the world as","64 a distinctive signature. Here, authenticity as a signature from it and return to it\u201d (Lingis 1998, p.87). Signatures qualia, includes a continued ethical questioning of manifest themselves as indwelling powers of the search for its place in the world and as part of that world. university, as \u201cpractical fields that extend about [them]\u201d As Barnett underlines \u201c[t]he authentic university is not (Lingis 1998, p.87), and as \u201csites that take form when we withdrawn from the world but is immersed in the world. come upon the reality [of them]\u201d (ibid.) as places for living The issue [of worldhood] concerns the grounds of that in research, teaching, and learning. immersion.\u201d (Barnett 2011, p.136). Inspired by Bhaksar\u2019s concept of the powers of things, Barnett describes Conclusion the range of powers that constitute the being of the university in the world. The worldhood university can be Based on our exploration and conceptualisation of said to be \u2018signatured\u2019 into the world: the idea of the worldhood univer- sity and its design signatures and guild thinking, we foreground three Practical powers are those powers internal to universities concluding points: Firstly, the worldhood university could as organisations. (...) Pedagogical powers are self-evidently be seen as a moving away from the discourse about the those that derive from the teaching role of a university. uniform or globalised university that is nowhere rather (...) Epistemic powers are those powers that derive from a than now-here and for no-body rather than some-one. university\u2019s engagement with fields of knowledge. (...) Powers of Contrary, the worldhood university is a re-guildification engagement are those powers through which a university con- and re-grounding of the university into time and, here nects itself to the wider society. (...) Discursive powers refer to the more importantly, place. This is not a nostalgic argument registers, the languages, and the narratives that a university for a return to pre-modern times and the walled gardens employs both in relation to itself and in its relationships with the of university knowledge. On the contrary, the worldhood wider world. (...) Imaginative powers are those that universities university thinks and acts not only in the world, but from possess to see the world and themselves in ways that depart the world. It becomes an inhabited lifeworld and a place from conventional images. (Barnett 2015, p.163) for thinking and things to dwell. This point brings back the meaning of \u2018home\u2019 to universities. Not home in the Seen through the lens of the worldhood university, meaning of the private sphere or egoistic thinking, but higher education becomes visible as an ontological home as a submersion into society and the greater good. imperative, a powerful signature, laid down by the specific university. Not to say that universities across the Secondly, the chapter has provided an analytical world cannot be comparatively discussed and reflected, model for worldhood thinking by way of the philosophies but they each hold within them the footprint of their of thing, place, design, and thinking. This model has own institutional forms of being and becoming. Such been applied on understandings of the university and \u201cimperatives that extend a space [for higher education] the life taking place there. This \u2018worldhood model\u2019 should of our own are vitalizing forces that do not have the form not be seen as a normative ideal, but rather as both an of law but of portentous events.\u201d (Lingis 1998, p.167). The analytical tool for further analysis and discussion of the university signature extends into thinking as well. Thinking role of universities within contemporary societies and as worldhood. Thoughts as emergences from the cultures, and as a prospective framework for imagining university as a particular world with its own thing, places and designing future universities. The worldhood model, and designs. Seen this way thinking in higher education we argue, has a wider potential than this chapter and unfolds as a footprint within the world, visible to other may be used outside the university context even, worlds beyond the university, and other university-worlds. when analysing or designing institutions for all levels of Again, the notion of embodiment can be helpful here. educations. A university world has its own visage (emblem, coat of arms), its own voice (motto or saying, even its own songs), Thirdly, and finally, the concepts of guild and signature its corpus (the buildings and campus environment), and reaches beyond these concepts\u2019 own point of origin and its heart and soul (its curriculum and aca- demic values contribute with more far-reaching understandings of the and visions). university and its societal environment. This has wider philosophical implica- tions too. It opens up a pluralistic A similar point is noted by Temple (2017 - forthcoming) ontology of the university, captured in the con- cepts in his description of the difficulty in separating a place of worldhood, design signatures and guild thinking. from the habitus and modes of being of the people living This contribution to the philosophy of the university and there. Temple writes that it is notoriously difficult to \u201csaying higher education ontology asks for further research and just what a place is - we have to rely on those in it, those thinking into the ways that worlds grow out of, and into, creating it, to tell us\u201d (Temple 2017 - forth- coming, p.8). the university as world- maker and world-hood. With the words of Lingis the \u201c[r]eality of [the worldhood university] weighs on us; we cannot be indifferent to it.\u201d (Lingis 1998, p.119). 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