300 Chapter IX Therapy great need for admiration). Some studies have found that the TAT is successful in differentiating among personality disorders and that TAT scores are consistent with scores on the MMPI (Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory), a widely used and fairly well-validated objective personality assess- ment tool (Ackerman et al., 1999). It is important to acknowledge that people’s interpretation of ambigu- ous pictures is almost certain to vary across cultures. A study demonstrating this analyzed TAT responses of adolescents in Zambia and compared them to responses from a similar group of participants in Germany (Hofer & Chasiotis, 2004). These two groups, as you may imagine, are very diverse in terms of overall culture, beliefs, education, and life experiences. The authors found that the complexity of imagery and the interpretations given for the five TAT picture cards used in this study varied significantly between the two groups—so much so, in fact, that the authors suggested that using the TAT method for comparing diverse cultures on important psychological variables may be invalid. conclusion One of the most remarkable aspects of projective tests such as the TAT and the Rorschach inkblot (previous reading) test is that, in spite of a massive body of evidence condemning them as invalid, unreliable, and possibly based on faulty assumptions, they are among the most frequently used psychological tests by therapists. The fact that clinicians continue to be enthusiastic about these tools while experimental psychologists grow increasingly wary is a key point of contention between those two groups (see Lilienfeld, Wood, & Garb, 2000, for a review of this issue). How can we reconcile this contradiction? The most common answer to this question is that the TAT and the Rorschach tests are often employed in psychotherapy not as formal diagnostic tools but rather as extensions of the early give-and-take between clinicians and their patients. It follows, then, that therapists apply these projective devices in very individ- ual ways to open up channels of communication with clients and enter psychological domains that might have been avoided or hidden without the prompting by the stories on the TAT (see Cramer, 2006). As one practicing psychotherapist explains, “I don’t score my clients’ responses on the TAT or use them for diagnosis, but the drawings are a wonderful and valuable vehi- cle for bringing to light troubled areas in a client’s life. The identification and awareness of these issues that flow from the TAT allow for more focused and effective therapy” (author’s files). Ackerman, S., Clemence, A., Weatherill, R., & Hilsenroth, M. (1999). Use of the TAT in the assessment of DSM-IV Cluster B personality disorders. Journal of Personality Assessment, 73(3), 422–442. Anastasi, A., & Urbina, S. (1996). Psychological testing, 7th ed. New York: Macmillan. Cramer, P. (2006). Storytelling, narrative, and the Thematic Apperception Test. New York: Guilford Press. Eron, L. (1950). A normative study of the Thematic Apperception Test. Psychological Monographs, 64 (9, Whole No. 315).
Reading 36 Picture This! 301 Hofer, J., & Chasiotis, A. (2004). Methodological considerations of applying a TAT-type picture-story test in cross-cultural research: A comparison of German and Zambian adolescents. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 35(2), 224–241. Lilienfeld, S., Wood, J., & Garb, H. (2000). The scientific status of projective techniques. Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 1, 27–66. Pica, M., Beere, D., Lovinger, S., & Dush, D. (2001). The responses of dissociative patients on the TAT. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 57, 847–864.
Chapter X Human InteractIon and SocIal BeHavIor Reading 37 A PRison by Any otheR nAme . . . Reading 38 the PoweR of ConfoRmity Reading 39 to helP oR not to helP Reading 40 obey At Any Cost? S ocial psychology is the branch of psychology that looks at how your behavior is influenced by that of others and how their behavior is influenced by yours. It is the study of human interaction. This branch of psychology is vast and covers a wide array of topics, from romantic relationships to group behav- ior to prejudice, discrimination, and aggression. This is probably the area in psychology many nonpsychologists will find the most relevant to their personal lives. As humans, we spend most of our waking hours interacting with other humans in one way or another, so we naturally seek to learn more about the psychological processes involved in our social relationships. Social psychology may also be the research domain that contains the greatest number of land- mark studies. The four studies chosen for this section clearly changed the field of psychology by (a) providing new insights into some extreme human social behavior; (b) sparking new waves of research to either confirm, refine, or contest theories and discoveries; and (c) creating heated controversy about research ethics that ultimately led to the ethical principles discussed in the preface of this book. The first discussion reviews one of the most well-known studies in the history of psychology: Philip Zimbardo’s “Stanford Prison Study,” which produced some startling revelations about the psychology of imprisonment. Second is a recounting of a crucial study that demonstrated the power of conformity in determining behavior. The third study revealed a surprising phenomenon called the bystander effect, which states that the more people who witness an emergency, the less likely anyone is to help. Fourth, we arrive at another famous and surprising milestone in our understanding of the extremes people may resort to in powerful situations: Stanley Milgram’s study of blind obedience to authority. 302
Reading 37 A Prison by Any Other Name . . . 303 reading 37: a PrISon By any otHer name . . . Zimbardo, P. G. (1972). The pathology of imprisonment. Society, 9(6), 4–8. Haney, C., Banks, W. C., & Zimbardo, P. G. (1973). Interpersonal dynamics in a simulated prison. International Journal of Criminology & Penology, 1, 69–97. Have you ever been imprisoned? Let’s assume your answer (and mine) is “no.” Do you know anyone who has spent time incarcerated? Maybe. Regardless, most of us know very little about the psychological effects of spending time in prison. You may have read articles, stories, or novels about prisons, and almost certainly you’ve seen prison life portrayed in movies and on TV. From this exposure, most people’s only certainty is that prison is not a place we ever want to wind up! We know it is a horrific experience and it surely must produce strong reactions and even pathological behaviors among inmates. Most of us also believe that those who choose to be prison employees, such as guards and wardens, probably possess certain unique, personal characteristics. But how can behavioral scientists study systematically the psychological and emotional effects of the prison experience, for either the inmates or the employees? As for most complex real-life situations, studying the psychology of prison life is at best a difficult challenge for researchers because the methods used must be correlational—that is, we can observe the prison environment, interview inmates and guards, gather information about prisoners after they are released, and then try to make assumptions based on these accounts. But we cannot scientifically control the prison environment to draw clear, valid conclusions about the real causes of the behaviors that we observe. Does prison change people, or were the people in the prison system already “differ- ent” going in? One way around this research dilemma might be to create a simulated “research prison” and place people into it either as “prisoners” or “guards.” Sound impossible? Perhaps this would be a difficult study to do today, but one famous psychologist, Philip Zimbardo, and his associates Craig Haney, Curtis Banks, and Dave Jaffe did just that over 30 years ago at Stanford University (the two articles listed at the beginning of this reading are the earli- est discussions of their study). They wanted to create a simulated prison with randomly assigned, typical college students in the roles of “guards” and “prisoners.” Their “prison” (which will be described in greater detail) was con- structed in the basement of the psychology building on the Stanford campus. TheoreTical ProPosiTions Zimbardo was testing his belief that the environment around you, the situa- tion, often determines how you behave more strongly than who you are—that is, your internal, dispositional nature. He contends that, although we may have certain inherent or internal behavioral tendencies, powerful situations can overcome those tendencies and lead us to engage in behaviors that are very different from our usual selves. Zimbardo and his associates set out to discover
304 Chapter X Human Interaction and Social Behavior what happens to normal people who are placed into a situation that exerts great power over individuals: prison. Except for their initial belief that the situation exerts strong effects over our behavior, the researchers did not formulate any specific hypotheses. To test the impact of situational forces, they randomly assigned each participant to be either a “guard” or a “prisoner.” They believed that random assignment to either the role of guard or prisoner would result in significantly different reactions in the mock prison environment on behavioral measures of interaction, emotional measures of mood and pathology, attitudes toward self, as well as other indices of coping and adaptation to this novel situation (Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, 1973). MeThod Setting Zimbardo’s goal was to create a situation that would resemble a prison or jail as closely as possible; he brought in a consultant: an ex-convict who had been incarcerated for 17 years. Although for this study the prison would not be real and participants in the study would know this, Zimbardo wanted to be sure to simulate a real prison experience. Using space in the basement of the psychology building at Stanford University, Zimbardo supervised a crew as it transformed various rooms and hallways into a “prison.” The prison had to be well built because the study was planned to last for 2 weeks. Each end of a corridor was boarded up and the laboratory rooms became prison cells. To enhance realism, special cell doors were constructed with vertical bars for door windows and individual jail-cell numbers (see Figure 37-1). The enclosed hallway that ran along the cell rooms was the “prison yard” where prisoner-participants would be allowed out of their cells to eat and move around. At the end of the hall was a small closet that would eventually be designated as solitary confinement for prisoners who were troublemakers, rebellious, disrespectful to the guards, or otherwise Figure 37-1 A typical “cell” at the “Stanford Prison.” (Philip G. Zimbardo, Inc.)
Reading 37 A Prison by Any Other Name . . . 305 uncooperative. The bathroom was down the hall, but the guards would lead prisoners there blindfolded so they would not become aware of their location (Zimbardo, 2007b). The “prison” was equipped with a hidden observation camera and an intercom system that allowed the experimenters to maintain supervision of the guards’ and prisoners’ behavior. Participants If you are not already familiar with this famous study, what you are about to read may surprise or even shock you. As you read on, try to put yourself into the mind-set of the participants. First, the researchers placed ads in local papers near Stanford University in Palo Alto, California, offering $15 per day (that would be about $75 today) for individuals to volunteer to participate in a research study about prison life. To ensure participants gave informed consent, volunteers were told about the general nature of the study and that during the study they might experience some violations of their personal privacy and civil rights and that the food they would receive might be minimal, although it would meet their basic nutritional needs. They all agreed to these provisions. After extensive testing to screen out anyone with psychological problems or criminal backgrounds, 24 normal college-age men were selected from a group of nearly a hundred volunteers. Then, at random (by the flip of a coin), the men were divided into two groups of “prisoners” and “guards.” Remember, Zimbardo’s goal here was to separate internal, personality factors from the influ- ence of the situation in determining behavior. Therefore, it was imperative for each group of participants, at the outset, to be as identical, on average, as possi- ble (Zimbardo, 2005). Then all the participants went home, having received no instructions, no training, and no preparation at all for what lay ahead. Procedure The goal of the study was to observe, record, and analyze the behavior of the prisoners and the guards. As mentioned, Zimbardo and his associates were looking for signs that the situations and roles into which these young men were placed would be strong enough to overcome their personal characteris- tics and behavioral tendencies as individuals. The “Prisoners” Several days after the initial screening and selection, the participants assigned to the prisoner group were surprised at their homes on a Sunday morning by a knock on their door from an officer from the (real) Palo Alto Police Department. Each participant was “arrested” for armed rob- bery, searched, handcuffed, and whisked off to the station—sirens, lights, and all. Each prisoner was booked, fingerprinted, and thrown blindfolded into a holding cell. Later, they were told that they were to be transported, still blind- folded, to the “Stanford County Jail” (this was the mock prison built in the psychology building basement). When the prisoners arrived at the jail, the participants who were assigned to be guards proceeded to search (see Figure 37-2), strip, delouse (using an aerosol spray), and give each “inmate” a prison uniform consisting of a dress- like smock, each with a different four-digit number (these numbers would
306 Chapter X Human Interaction and Social Behavior Figure 37-2 Stanford Prison “guard” frisking new “prisoner.” (Philip G. Zimbardo, Inc.) become the prisoners’ names for the duration of the study), rubber sandals, a nylon stocking to wear over his hair at all times (to simulate head shaving, which occurs in most real prisons), and a chain wrapped around his ankle and padlocked (this was not attached to anything but was intended to serve as a reminder of prisoner status). Zimbardo pointed out that although these pro- cedures varied from actual, real-life prison procedures, the idea behind them was to simulate the humiliation, repression, and entrapment inmates experi- ence routinely in real prisons. The prisoners were assigned three to each small cell; each inmate had a cot with a thin mattress and one blanket. The three cots filled the space and there was virtually no extra room in the small cells. The “Guards” Unlike the prisoners, who were required to be in the prison 24/7 (they were incarcerated, after all), the guards worked 8-hour shifts— three men to a shift—and lived their normal lives when not on duty. They were given identical prison guard-style uniforms, nightsticks (although they were not allowed to strike prisoners), and reflective sunglasses designed to give them a menacing and anonymous appearance. Zimbardo explained that his idea for the mirrored sunglasses came from the 1967 film Cool Hand Luke, starring Paul Newman (Zimbardo, 2007). The guards received no specific training for their roles, and were merely charged with the responsibility of keeping the prisoners in line and maintaining order in the prison. resulTs This is one of the most researched, discussed, and analyzed studies in the his- tory of psychology. The personality and behavioral changes that occurred in the guards and the prisoners were profound and alarming. To summarize the
Reading 37 A Prison by Any Other Name . . . 307 Table 37-1 “Prisoner” and “guard” behaviors and reactions During the “Stanford Prison” Study the “GuARds” the “PRisoneRs” used demeaning, degrading language with Quickly became docile, subservient, and prisoners; harassed and intimidated them conformed to the rules set by the guards showed clear and early signs of trauma and made humiliating comments to prisoners depression, including crying and profound (e.g., “Prisoner 2354, go over and tell depression prisoner 2578 that you love him.”) begged to be paroled Raucously awakened all prisoners in the mid- Agreed to forfeit all payment in exchange for dle of the night (every night) for “inmate counts” release frequently used push-ups as punishment experienced uncontrollable crying and rage for minor offenses (one guard stepped on and disorganized thinking a prisoner’s back as he was attempting to Planned and staged a “rebellion” that involved carry out the push-up punishment.) removing stocking caps, tearing off uniform Appeared to enjoy their sadistic control numbers, barricading the cells with beds, and over the prisoners cursing and taunting the guards shot a fire extinguisher (ice-cold Co2) at designed an elaborate escape plan that prisoners to quell a rebellion never materialized Placed prisoners in solitary confinement for eventually gave up all attempts at rebellion entire nights and solidarity made visiting the bathroom a privilege, at times denying visits and placing a waste Assumed an every-man-for-himself attitude, bucket in their cell abandoning solidarity with other prisoners Positioned an informant (a confederate of the docilely accepted with increasing hopeless- experimenters) in the cells to spy on prisoners ness the guards’ degrading and sadistic treat- for signs of escape or rebellion plans ment of them as the study progressed stripped prisoners naked to achieve order After 6 days, all became completely passive following exposed escape plan; removed and dehumanized, robotlike prisoners’ beds and forced prisoners to give up blankets Allowed “privileges” (better food, teeth brush- ing, washing, etc.) to prisoners at random in an effort to divide and conquer and to break prisoner camaraderie, trust, and solidarity forced prisoners to clean toilets with their bare hands, extended “night counts” to several hours long, increased number of push-ups: all as punishment for the attempted escape were creative and inventive in finding ways of breaking the prisoners’ spirit (haney et al., 1973; Zimbardo, 1972; Zimbardo, 2005; Zimbardo, 2007b.) complex findings in the limited space available here, specific, representative behaviors of the participants are condensed in Table 37-1. More generally, how- ever, here is what happened over the next several days in the “Stanford Prison.” Faster than anyone would have predicted, the true identities and per- sonalities of the prisoners and guards seemed to vanish, and the roles they were being asked to play took over. Within a day the line between “play” and
308 Chapter X Human Interaction and Social Behavior real life became disturbingly blurred. As Zimbardo wrote of the participants in his original study (1972), The majority had indeed become “prisoners” and “guards,” no longer able to clearly differentiate between role playing and self. . . . In less than a week, the experience of imprisonment undid (temporarily) a lifetime of learning; human values were suspended, self-concepts were challenged and the ugliest, most base, pathological side of human nature surfaced. We were horrified because we saw some boys (guards) treat others as if they were despicable animals, taking pleas- ure in cruelty, while other boys (prisoners) became servile, dehumanized robots who thought only of escape, of their own individual survival and of their mount- ing hatred for the guards. (p. 4) Remember, this was a scientific study conducted by highly qualified, professional researchers, and it was rapidly taking on a life of its own. The participants, especially those given the role of prisoners, seemed to forget that they were college students with free will; they could have simply quit the study at any time, but they did not. After several days, many were pleading to be paroled, to be released, but when release was denied, they simply returned to their cells, dejected but obedient. The emotional breakdown and stress reac- tions of five of the prisoner-participants were so extreme that they became depressed, were unable to think clearly, and stopped eating. They had to be released from the study (or perhaps, more appropriately, from the prison) within the study’s first several days. Some of the guards took to tormenting the prisoners, apparently enjoy- ing the power of their positions. Some of the guards were less strict and tried to be fair, but they never interfered with the more tyrannical guards and, more importantly, never went to the experimenters to suggest that the other guards might be “over the top” in their roles. Even Zimbardo himself forgot, at times, that he was in charge of a scientific study and found himself slipping into the role of “prison superintendent.” recenT aPPlicaTions As is true of Milgram’s study of obedience (see Reading 40), Zimbardo’s prison study has generated sweeping social and political effects over the 30-plus intervening years. It is difficult if not impossible to discuss Zimbardo’s findings without acknowledging the political nature of the research. One of the most controversial and heated issues facing the United States, and most countries worldwide, is prison reform. Throughout history, the systematic abuse of prisoners has been well documented and continues to this day. The headline history in the United States of prison riots, uprisings, rebellions, kidnappings, and murders from the time of Zimbardo’s study to the present is filled with parallels, on a larger scale, to the events in that basement at Stanford. To aggravate further the potential for prisoner abuse, the number of inmates in U.S. prisons and jails grew from approximately 500,000 in 1980 to over 2.2 million in 2006 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2007). This is the highest prisoner population of any country in the world. Moreover, since the
Reading 37 A Prison by Any Other Name . . . 309 mid-1970s the goal of rehabilitation in prisons has been generally abandoned (although the phrase correctional facilities is still in wide use) and replaced with the goals of punishment and removing offenders from the public (referred to as incapacitation). In 1998, Zimbardo and Haney analyzed how the prison system had changed since their study at Stanford. Here, in Zimbardo’s words, was their conclusion at that time: Prisons continue to be failed social experiments using a dispositional [internal] model of punishment, and isolation of offenders rather than any basic rehabili- tation practices that might reduce persistently high rates of recidivism. What our analysis revealed was that prison conditions had significantly worsened in the decades since our study as a consequence of the politicization of prisons, with politicians, prosecutors, DAs, and other officials taking a hard line on crime as a means of currying favor of an electorate made fearful of crime by media exag- gerations. (Zimbardo, 2005) As you have been reading this, you may have been thinking about the possible links between Zimbardo’s prison study and some of the events that have occurred, over the last 15 years during the U.S. involvement in the Middle East wars. Several highly publicized reports, especially the prisoner abuse scan- dals at Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq and the reports of detainee abuse at the Guantanamo detention camp in Cuba (see Hooks & Mosher, 2005; Keller, 200), have brought the “Stanford Prison Study” back into the spotlight. Zimbardo, in his recent book The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil (2007a), has revisited the prison study and expanded his research and commentary on prisoner abuse beyond prisons to the larger concept of human evil. We are disbelieving that events such as Abu Ghraib could ever truly happen—that anyone, especially citizens of a free, democratic society, could have engaged in such sadistic treatment of other humans. How could this be? Psychologists, such as Zimbardo, and other social scientists have tried to help us understand; as the authors of one study about these abuses stated, Journalists have looked to social scientific research to understand the abuse in Iraq, Afghanistan and around the world. These accounts move away from an emphasis on a few “bad apples” and call into question an emphasis on punishing the lowest ranking soldiers. Zimbardo’s (1972) research figures prominently in these accounts. He rejects out of hand the “bad apple” thesis, suggesting instead that the barrel is bad. Zimbardo faulted the Bush administration with a “failure of leadership” and emphasized that the abusive interrogation techniques and harsh treatment of prisoners were “authorized from the top down” by military commanders and by the highest-ranking officials in the Bush administration. (Hooks & Mosher, 2005, pp. 1632–1633) In report after report from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo, we have heard about and seen in graphic detail the horrendous abuses and torture of prisoners carried out by guards and interrogators, who, like Zimbardo’s prison participants, are not, by all accounts, sadistic, brutal people. They are essen- tially normal people, perhaps not so different from you and me, who are dras- tically transformed by what may ultimately be the most powerful situational force of all for evil: war.
310 Chapter X Human Interaction and Social Behavior conclusion As mentioned, Zimbardo had planned for a 2-week study, yet he decided to call it off after only 6 days because the mock prison situation was so powerful that it had morphed, in alarming ways, into reality. These were no longer ran- domly assigned university students and experimenters; they had become their roles, had transformed into prisoners, guards, and wardens. These roles were so powerful that individual identities dissolved to the point that the partici- pants, and even the experimenters, had difficulty realizing just how danger- ous the behaviors in the “Stanford Prison” had become. Zimbardo wrote about his decision to halt the study as follows: I terminated the experiment not only because of the escalating level of violence and degradation by the “guards” against the “prisoners” . . . but also because I was made aware of the personal transformation that I was undergoing personally. . . . I had become a Prison Superintendent, the second role I played in addition to that of Principal Investigator. I began to talk, walk and act like a rigid institutional authority figure more concerned about the security of “my prison” than the needs of the young men entrusted to my care as a psychological researcher. In a sense, I consider that the most profound measure of the power of this situation was the extent to which it transformed me. (Zimbardo, 2005, p. 40; see also, Zimbardo, Maslach, & Haney, 1999) Bureau of Justice Statistics. (2007). Number of persons under correctional supervision. Retrieved February 4, 2008, from http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/glance/tables/corr2tab.htm. Haney, C., Banks, W. C., & Zimbardo, P. G. (1973). Interpersonal dynamics in a simulated prison. International Journal of Criminology & Penology, 1, 69–97. Hooks, G., & Mosher, C. (2005). Outrages against personal dignity: Rationalizing abuse and torture in the war on terror. Social Forces, 83(4), 1627–1645. Keller, A. S. (2006). Torture in Abu Ghraib (Iraq prisoner abuse scandal, 2004). Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, 49(4), 553–569. Zimbardo, P. (2005). A situationist perspective on the psychology of evil: Understanding how good people are transformed into perpetrators. In A. Miller (Ed.), The social psychology of good and evil: Understanding our capacity for kindness and cruelty (pp. 21–50). New York: Guilford. Zimbardo, P. (2007a). The Lucifer Effect: Understanding how good people turn evil. New York: Random House. Zimbardo, P. (2007b). The Stanford Prison Experiment: A simulation study of the psychology of imprisonment conducted at Stanford University. Retrieved June 2, 2007, from http://www.prisonexp.org. Zimbardo, P. G., Maslach, C., & Haney, C. (1999). Reflections on the Stanford Prison Experiment: Genesis, transformation, consequences. In T. Blass (Ed.), Obedience to authority: Current perspectives on the Milgram paradigm (pp. 193–237). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. reading 38: tHe Power of conformIty Asch, S. E. (1955). Opinions and social pressure. Scientific American, 193(5), 31–35. Do you consider yourself to be a conformist, or are you more of a rebel? Most of us probably like to think that we are conformist enough not to be consid- ered terribly strange or frightening, yet nonconformist enough to demonstrate that we are individuals and capable of independent thinking. Psychologists have been interested in the concept of conformity for decades. You can see why when you remember that psychological research focuses not only on
Reading 38 The Power of Conformity 311 explaining human behavior but also, and perhaps more importantly, on revealing the causes of it. The effect of people’s willingness to conform to oth- ers can help us a great deal in understanding the sources of people’s behavior. When psychologists talk about conformity, they refer to individual behav- ior that adheres to the behavior patterns of a particular group of which that individual is a member. The usually unspoken rules or guidelines for behavior in a group are called social norms. If you think about it, you can probably remember a time in your life when you behaved in ways that were out of sync or in disagreement with your attitudes, beliefs, or morals. Chances are, when- ever this occurred, you were part of a group in which everyone was behaving that way, so you went along with them. Conformity is a powerful force on our behavior and can, at times, cause us to behave in ways that, left to our own devices, we would never do. Therefore, conformity is clearly worthy of interest and study by behavioral scientists. However, no one undertook to study con- formity scientifically until the early 1950s. Enter Solomon Asch. His experi- ments on conformity offered us a great deal of new information about conforming behavior and opened many doors for future research. TheoreTical ProPosiTions Suppose you are with a group of people you see often, such as friends or coworkers. The group is discussing some controversial issue or political candi- date. It quickly becomes clear to you that everyone in the group shares one view, which is the opposite of your own. At one point the others turn to you and ask for your opinion. What are you going to do? The choices you are faced with are to state your true views and risk the consequences of being treated as an outcast, to agree with the group consensus even though it differs from your opinion, or—if possible—to sidestep the issue entirely. Asch wanted to find out just how powerful the need to conform is in influ- encing our behavior. Although conformity often involves general and vague concepts, such as agreeing with others’ attitudes, ethics, morals, and belief systems, Asch chose to focus on a much more obvious type: perceptual conformity— that is, the extent to which humans tend to conform with one another’s percep- tions of the world (what we see, hear, taste, smell, and touch). Asch chose to study conforming behavior on a simple visual comparison task so that he could examine this phenomenon in a controlled laboratory environment. If conformity is as powerful a force as Asch and many others believed, then researchers should be able to manipulate a person’s behavior by apply- ing group pressure to conform. This is what Asch set about testing in a very elegantly designed series of experiments, all incorporating a similar method. MeThod The visual materials consisted simply of pairs of cards with three different lengths of vertical lines (called comparison lines) on one card and a single standard line the same length as one of three comparison lines on the other (see Figure 38-1). Here is how the experimental process worked. Imagine you
312 Chapter X Human Interaction and Social Behavior X AB C Standard line Comparison lines Figure 38-1 An example similar to Asch’s line judging task card. (Adapted from p. 32.) are a participant who has volunteered to participate in a “visual perception study.” You arrive at the experiment room and find seven other participants already seated in a row. You sit in the one empty chair at the end of the row. The experimenter then reveals a pair of cards and asks you to determine which of the three comparison lines is the same length as the standard line. You look at the lines and immediately decide on the correct response. Starting at the far end of the row away from you, each participant is asked individually for his or her answer. Everyone gives the correct answer, and when your turn comes you give the same obviously correct answer. The card is changed, the same process happens, and—once again, no problem—you give the correct answer along with the rest of the group. On the next trial, however, something odd happens. The card is revealed and you immediately choose in your mind the correct response (this all seems quite easy!), but when the other participants give their answers this time, they all choose the wrong line! And they all choose the same wrong line. Now, when it is your turn to respond again, you pause. You can’t believe what is happening. Are all these other people blind? The correct answer is obvious. Isn’t it? Have you gone blind? Or crazy? You now must make a decision. Do you maintain your opinion (after all, the lines are right in front of your nose), or do you conform and agree with the rest of the group? As you have probably figured out by now, the other seven “participants” in the room were not participants at all but, rather, confederates of the experi- menter. They were in on the experiment from the beginning, and the answers they gave were, of course, the key to this study of conformity. So, how did the real participants in the study answer? resulTs Each participant took part in the experimental situation several times. Approximately 75% went along with the group’s incorrect consensus at least once. For all trials combined, participants agreed with the group on the incorrect responses about one-third of the time. Just to be sure that the line lengths could be judged accurately, individuals in a control group of partici- pants were asked simply to write down their answers to the line comparison questions. Participants in this group were correct 98% of the time.
Reading 38 The Power of Conformity 313 discussion and relaTed research The powerful effects of group pressures to conform were clearly demonstrated in Asch’s study. If individuals are willing to conform to a group of people they hardly know about a clearly incorrect judgment, how strong must this influ- ence be in real life, where groups exert even stronger forces and issues are more ambiguous? Conformity as a major factor in human behavior, the subject of widespread speculation for years, had now been scientifically established. Asch’s results were important to the field of psychology in two crucial ways. First, as discussed, the real power of social pressure to conform was dem- onstrated clearly and scientifically for the first time. Second, and perhaps even more important, this early research sparked a huge wave of additional studies that continue right up to the present. The body of research that has accumu- lated since Asch’s early studies has greatly elaborated our knowledge of the specific factors that determine the effects conformity has on our behavior. Some of these findings follow: 1. Social support. Asch conducted his same experiment with a slight varia- tion. He altered the answers of the confederates so that in the test condi- tion one confederate of the seven gave the correct answer. When this occurred, only 5% of the participants agreed with the group consensus. Apparently, a single ally is all you need to “stick to your guns” and resist the pressure to conform. This finding has been supported by several later studies (e.g., Morris & Miller, 1975). 2. Attraction and commitment to the group. Later research demonstrated that the more attracted and committed you are to a particular group, the more likely you are to conform to the behavior and attitudes of that group (see Forsyth, 1983). If you like the group and feel that you belong with its members (they are called your reference group), your tendency to conform to that group will be very strong. 3. Size of the group. At first, research by Asch and others demonstrated that the tendency to conform increases as the size of the group increases. However, upon further examination, it was found that this connection is not so simple. While it is true that conformity increases as the size of the group increases, this only holds for groups up to six or seven members. As the group size increases beyond this number, conformity levels off, and even decreases somewhat. This is shown graphically in Figure 38-2. Asch has suggested this happens because as the group becomes large, people may begin to suspect the other members of working together purposefully to affect their behavior and, in response, they become resistant to this obvious pressure. 4. Sex. Do you think men and women differ in their tendency or willingness to conform? Early studies that followed Asch’s work indicated that women seemed to be much more willing to conform than men. This was such a strong and frequently repeated finding that it entered the psychological literature as an accepted difference between the sexes. However, later
314 Chapter X Human Interaction and Social Behavior High Amount of conforming behavior Low Figure 38-2 The relationship 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 between group size and conformity. Number of group members (Based on data from p. 35.) research drew this notion into question. It appears that many of the early studies (all conducted by men) inadvertently created testing conditions that were more familiar and comfortable for men in those days than for women. Psychologists know that people will tend to conform more when placed in a situation where standards for appropriate behavior are unclear. Therefore, the finding of greater conformity among women may have simply been a systematic error caused by subtle (and unintentional) biases in the methods used. Research under better controlled conditions has failed to find this sex difference in conformity behavior (see Sistrunk & McDavid, 1971, for a discussion of these gender-related issues). Numerous additional areas related to the issue of conformity also have been studied. These include cultural influences, the amount of information available when making decisions about conforming, personal privacy, and many others. criTicisMs Asch’s work on conformity has received widespread support and acceptance. It has been replicated in many studies, under a wide variety of conditions. One criticism concerns whether Asch’s findings can be generalized outside of the lab and to the real world. In other words, does a participant’s answer in a laboratory about the length of some lines really have very much to do with conforming behavior in life? This is a valid criticism for all research about human behavior that is carried out in a controlled laboratory setting. What this criticism says is “Maybe the subjects were willing to go along with the group on something so trivial and unimportant as the length of a line, but in real life, and on important matters, they would not conform so readily.” However, although real-life matters of conformity can certainly be more mean- ingful, it is equally likely that the pressures for conformity from groups in the real world are also proportionately stronger. recenT aPPlicaTions An article examining why young adults continue to engage in unsafe sexual practices demonstrates how Asch’s work continues to influence research on important social issues (Cerwonka, Isbell, & Hansen, 2000). The researchers
Reading 39 To Help or Not to Help 315 assessed nearly 400 students between the ages of 18 and 29 on various measures of their knowledge of HIV/AIDS risk behaviors (such as failure to use condoms, multiple sex partners, alcohol and other drug use, and sexual his- tory). Numerous factors were shown to predict high-risk sexual behaviors, including conformity to peer group pressures. You can see how an understanding of conformity pressures on people’s choices about their sexual behaviors might be a valuable tool in fighting the continuing spread of HIV. Another fascinating study incorporated Asch’s 1955 article to examine why men are less likely than women to seek help, even when they are in dire need of it (Mansfield et al., 2003). This article begins with the following (old) joke: “Why did Moses spend 40 years wandering in the desert? Because he wouldn’t ask for directions” (p. 93). This joke is (sort of) funny because it taps into a stereotype about men and help-seeking behavior. Of course, failure to ask for directions usually does not cause serious problems, but men also tend to resist seeking medical and mental health care, and that can be dangerous or even fatal. The authors suggest that one of the primary forces preventing men from seeking help is conformity: “In the context of help seeking, men may be disinclined to seek help if they believe they will be stigmatized for doing so. . . . If a man greatly admires the people in his life who discourage or speak badly of seeking help, he will be less likely to seek help himself” (p. 101). On a final note, culture appears to play an especially important role in conformity (Bond & Smith, 1996). Research in collectivist countries, such as Japan or India, has consistently found higher levels of conformity than in indi- vidualistic countries, such as the United States (see Triandis’s research on collectivist and individualistic cultures in Reading 28). Such findings add to the ever-growing body of evidence that psychological research must never overlook the impact of culture on virtually all human behaviors. Bond, R., & Smith, P. (1996). Culture and conformity: A meta-analysis of studies using Asch’s line- judgment task. Psychological Bulletin, 119(1), 111–137. Cerwonka, E., Isbell, T., & Hansen, C. (2000). Psychosocial factors as predictors of unsafe sexual practices among young adults. AIDS Education and Prevention, 12(2), 141–153. Forsyth, D. (1983). An introduction to group dynamics. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole. Mansfield, A., Addis, M., & Mahalik, J., (2003). Why won’t he go to the doctor? The psychology of men’s help-seeking. International Journal of Men’s Health, 2, 93–109. Morris, W., & Miller, R. (1975). The effects of consensus-breaking and consensus-preempting partners on reduction in conformity. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 11, 215–223. Sistrunk, F., & McDavid, J. (1971). Sex variable in conforming behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 17, 200–207. reading 39: to HelP or not to HelP Darley, J. M., & Latané, B. (1968). Bystander intervention in emergencies: Diffusion of responsibility. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 8, 377–383. One of the most influential events in the history of psychological research was not a study at all but a violent and tragic event in New York City that was picked up by media news services across the United States. In 1964, a young
316 Chapter X Human Interaction and Social Behavior woman, Kitty Genovese, was returning to her apartment in a quiet, middle-class neighborhood in Queens after closing the Manhattan bar that she managed. As she left her car and walked toward her building, she was viciously attacked by a man with a knife. As the man stabbed her several times, she screamed for help. One neighbor yelled out of his window for the man to “leave that girl alone,” at which time the attacker began to run away. But then he turned, knocked Genovese to the ground, and began stabbing her again. The attack continued, and her screaming continued until finally someone telephoned the police. The police arrived 2 minutes after they were called, but Genovese was already dead and her attacker had disappeared. The attack had lasted 35 minutes. During their investigations, police found that 38 people in the sur- rounding apartments had witnessed the attack, but only 1 had eventually called the police. One couple (who said they assumed someone else had called the police) had moved two chairs next to their window to watch the violence. Genovese’s killer, Winston Moseley, now in his 70s, remains incarcer- ated at a maximum-security prison in upstate New York. He has been denied parole 14 times during his 47 years in prison. In his most recent hearing in 2011, he was once again denied parole and he will not be eligible for parole again until 2013. If someone had acted sooner to help Genovese, she probably would have survived. New York City and the nation were appalled by the seeming indifference on the part of so many neighbors who had failed to try to stop this violent act. People attempted to find a reason for this inaction. They blamed the alienation caused by living in a large city; they blamed the neighborhood of Queens; they blamed basic human nature. The Genovese tragedy sparked the interest of psychologists, who, as scientists, rather than looking to place blame, set out to try to understand what psychological forces might have been at work that prevented all those people from helping the victim. The concept of helping others falls into a research area of psychology that behavioral scientists call prosocial behavior, or behavior that produces positive social consequences. Topics falling into this research area include altruism, cooperation, resisting temptation, and helping. If you witness an emergency situation in which someone may be in need of help, many factors affect your decision to step in and offer assistance. John Darley at New York University and Bibb Latané at Columbia University, both social psychologists, were among those who began to examine these factors. They termed the behavior of helping others in emergencies bystander intervention (or in the Genovese case, nonintervention). Have you ever been faced with a true emergency? Contrary to what you may think from watching television and reading newspapers, emergencies are not very common. Darley and Latané estimated that the average person will encounter fewer than six emergencies in a lifetime. This is good and bad: good for obvious reasons, but bad because if and when you find yourself fac- ing an emergency, you will have to decide what to do, without the benefit of very much experience. Society dictates that we should take action to help in
Reading 39 To Help or Not to Help 317 emergencies, but often, as in the Genovese case, we do not. Could that be because we have so little experience that we simply do not know what to do? Is it because of the alienation caused by urban living? Or are humans, by nature, basically uncaring? Following the Genovese murder, Darley and Latané analyzed the bystanders’ reactions. They theorized that the large number of people who witnessed the violent event decreased the willingness of any one individual to step in and help. They decided to test their theory experimentally. TheoreTical ProPosiTions Your common sense might tell you that the higher the number of bystanders present during an emergency, the more likely it is someone will intervene. Darley and Latané hypothesized just the opposite: They believed that the rea- son no one took steps to help Kitty Genovese was a phenomenon they called diffusion of responsibility—that is, as the number of bystanders in an emergency increases, the greater is the belief that “Someone else will help, so I don’t need to.” Have you ever witnessed an accident on a busy street or arrived at the scene of one soon after it has happened? Chances are that as you drove by you made the assumption that someone surely has called the police or ambulance by now, and therefore you did not feel a personal responsibility to do so. But imagine discovering the same accident on a deserted country road with no one else around. Would your response be different? The answer for most of us is “yes.” The concept of diffusion of responsibility formed the theoretical basis for this chapter’s study. The challenge was to re-create a Genovese-like situa- tion in a controlled, laboratory-type situation so that it could be manipulated and examined scientifically. Darley and Latané were ingenious in designing experiments to do this. MeThod For obvious reasons, the actual events of the Kitty Genovese murder could never be re-created for experimental purposes. Therefore, the researchers needed to devise a situation that would approximate or simulate a true emer- gency so that the intervention behavior of bystanders could be observed. In this experiment, Darley and Latané told students in an introductory psychol- ogy class at New York University that they were interested in studying how students adjust to university life in a highly competitive, urban environment, as well as what kinds of personal problems they were experiencing. The students were asked to discuss their problems honestly with other students, but to avoid any discomfort or embarrassment they would be in separate rooms and would speak with each other over an intercom system. This intercom, they were told, would only allow one student to speak at a time. Each student would be given 2 minutes, after which the microphone for the next student would be activated for 2 minutes, and so on.
318 Chapter X Human Interaction and Social Behavior All this was a cover story designed to obtain natural behavior from the participants and to hide the true purpose of the experiment. The most impor- tant part of this cover story was the way the students were divided into three different experimental conditions. The participants in group 1 believed that they would be talking with only one other person; those in group 2 believed there would be two other people on the intercom; and the group 3 partici- pants were told that five other people were on the line. In reality, each participant was alone, and all the other voices they heard through the “inter- com” were recorded. Now that the size of the groups was varied, some sort of emergency had to be created. The researchers decided that a very realistically acted epileptic seizure would be interpreted by most people as an emergency. As the discussions over the intercom system between the participants and the other “students” began, participants heard the first student, a male, tell about his difficulties con- centrating on his studies and problems adjusting to life in New York City. He then added, with some embarrassment, that he sometimes had severe seizures, especially when under a lot of stress. Then the conversation switched to the next student. In group 1, the actual participant’s turn came next, whereas in the other two conditions, the participant heard one or more other students speak before his or her turn. After the participant spoke, it was the first student’s turn again. This is when the emergency occurred. The first student spoke normally as before but then began to have a seizure (remember, this was all on tape). Latané and Darley quote the seizure in detail in a later report as follows: I-er-um-I think I-I need-er-if-if could-er-er somebody er-er-er-er-er-er give me a little-er-give me a little help here because-er-I-er-I’m-er-h-h-having a-a-a real problem-er right now and I-er-if somebody could help me out it would-it would- er-er s-s-sure be good . . . because-er-there-er-ag cause I er-I-uh-I’ve got one of the-er-sei—er-er-things coming on and-and-and I could really use some help so if somebody would-er give me a little h-help-uh-er-er-er-er c-ould somebody-er er-help-er-uh-uh-uh [choking sounds] . . . I’m gonna die-er-er . . . help-er-er- seizure [chokes, then quiet]. (pp. 95–96) To the participants, this was clearly an emergency. They felt sure that the “student” was in trouble and needed help immediately. To analyze the responses of the participants, Darley and Latané measured the percentage of participants in each condition who helped the student in trouble (helping was defined as leaving the cubicle and notifying the experimenter of the prob- lem). They also measured the amount of time participants waited to respond to the emergency and to try to help. Participants were given 4 minutes to respond, after which the experiment was halted and participants debriefed. resulTs The findings from this study offered strong support for the researchers’ hypothesis. As the number of others that participants believed were part of the study increased, the percentage who reported the seizure quickly—that is, as the attack was occurring—decreased dramatically (see Figure 39-1). Among
Reading 39 To Help or Not to Help 319 100 Percentage of subjects who helped 80 60 40 20 Figure 39-1 Number of participants in each condition who helped quickly 0 Group 2 Group 3 during seizure. Group 1 (six in group) (Based on data from p. 380.) (two in group) (three in group) those who eventually helped, the amount of delay in helping was greater when more bystanders were present. For group 1, the average delay in responding was less than 1 minute, whereas for group 3 it was over 3 minutes. The total number of participants who reported the seizure at all, either during or after it occurred, varied among the groups in a similar way. All the participants in group 1 reported the emergency, but only 85% of group 2 and 60% of group 3 did so at any time during the 4-minute period. discussion As many did in the real-life case of Kitty Genovese, you might think that the participants in this study were simply uncaring toward the victim having the seizure. However, Darley and Latané are quick to point out that this was not true for the participants in groups 2 and 3 (or of Genovese’s neighbors). All the participants reported experiencing a great deal of anxiety and discom- fort during the attack and showed physical signs of nervousness (trembling hands, sweaty palms). The researchers concluded that the reason for their results must lie in the difference in the number of other people the partici- pants believed were present. Whenever your behavior changes because of the presence of others, a psychological principle known as social influence is at work. Obviously, social influence played a significant role in this study, but we are still left wondering why. What was it about the presence of others that was so influential? Darley and Latané claimed to have demonstrated and supported their theory of diffusion of responsibility. As the number of people in the group increased, the participants felt less personal or individual responsi- bility to take action. It was “easier” in groups 2 and 3 for the participants to assume that someone else would handle the problem. Moreover, people not only feel a shared responsibility for helping when others are present, but they also sense less potential guilt or blame if they do not help. Because
320 Chapter X Human Interaction and Social Behavior we consider helping others to be a positive action in our culture, refusing or failing to help carries shameful connotations. If you are the only person present in an emergency, the negative consequences of not helping will be much greater than if others are there to bear some of the burden for nonintervention. Another possible explanation for this type of social influence is some- thing that psychologists have termed evaluation apprehension. Darley and Latané contended that part of the reason we fail to help when others are present is that we are afraid of being embarrassed or ridiculed. Imagine how foolish you would feel if you were to spring into action to help someone who did not need or want your help. I remember a time when, as a teenager, I was swimming with a large group of friends at a neighbor’s pool. As I was about to dive from the board I saw the neighbor’s 13-year-old daughter lying facedown on the bottom of the pool. I looked around, and no one else seemed to be aware of, or concerned about, this apparent emergency. Was she drowning? Was she joking? I wasn’t sure. Just as I was about to yell for help and dive in for the rescue, she swam lazily to the surface. I had hesitated a full 30 seconds out of the fear of being wrong and feeling embarrassed for overreacting. Many of us have had experiences such as this. The problem is that they teach us the wrong thing: Helping others carries with it the possibility of looking foolish. significance of The findings From this and other studies, Darley and Latané became the leading research- ers in the field of helping behavior and bystander intervention. Much of their early work was included in their book The Unresponsive Bystander: Why Doesn’t He Help? (Latané & Darley, 1970). In this work, they outlined a model for helping behavior that has become widely accepted in the psychological litera- ture on helping. They proposed five steps you and most people typically pass through before intervening in an emergency: 1. You, the potential helper, must first notice that an emergency event is occurring. In the study this reading examines, there was no question that something was wrong, but in the real world you may be in a hurry or your attention may be focused elsewhere, and you might completely fail to notice the event. 2. You must interpret the situation as one in which help is needed. This is a point at which fear of embarrassment exerts its influence. Again, in the present study, the situation was not ambiguous and the need for help was quite clear. In reality, however, most potential emergencies contain some degree of doubt or ambiguity, such as in my swimming pool exam- ple. Or, imagine you see a man stagger and pass out on a busy city side- walk. Is he sick, having a heart attack, or just drunk? How you interpret the situation will influence your decision to intervene. Many of those who failed to help in the Genovese case claimed that they thought it was a lover’s quarrel and did not want to get involved.
Reading 39 To Help or Not to Help 321 3. You have to assume personal responsibility. You will usually do this if you are the only bystander. If others are present, however, you may instead place the responsibility onto them. This step was the focus of this chap- ter’s experiment. The more people present in an emergency, the more diffused the responsibility and the less likely it is that help will occur. 4. If you assume responsibility, you then must decide what action to take. If you do not know what to do or you do not feel competent to take the appropriate action, you will be less likely to help. In Darley and Latané’s study, this issue of competence did not play a part because all the partici- pant had to do was report the seizure to the experimenter. But if a crowd were to witness a pedestrian being run over by a car, a member of the group who was a doctor, a nurse, or a paramedic would be more likely than others to intervene because he or she would feel more competent to know how to help. 5. After you’ve decided what action to take, you have to take it. Just because you know what to do doesn’t guarantee that you will do it. Now, you will weigh the costs and benefits of helping. Are you willing to personally intervene in a fight in which one or both of the participants has a knife? What about victims of accidents—can you help them, or will you make things worse by trying to help (the competence issue again)? If you get involved, can you be sued? What if you try to help and end up looking like a fool? Many such questions, depending on the situation, may run through your mind before you actually take action. Figure 39-2 illustrates how helping behavior may be short-circuited or prevented at any one of these stages. Step One: No Does the person notice the event? No Yes No Step Two: Does the person No interpret the event as needing help? No Yes No help is given Figure 39-2 Latané and Darley’s Model of Helping. Step Three: Does the person assume personal responsibility? Yes Step Four: Does the person decide what to do? Yes Step Five: Does the person actually do it? Yes Help is given
322 Chapter X Human Interaction and Social Behavior subsequenT findings and recenT aPPlicaTions Both the Kitty Genovese murder and the experiment discussed in this reading involved groups of onlookers who were cut off from each other. What do you suppose would happen if the bystanders could see and talk to each other? Would they be more likely to intervene when they could be judged by others? Darley and Latané believed that, in some cases, even groups in close contact would be less likely than individuals to help. This would be especially true, they theorized, when the emergency is somewhat ambiguous. For example, imagine you are sitting in a waiting room and smoke begins to stream in through a vent. You become concerned and look around at the others in the room. But everyone else appears quite calm and uncon- cerned. You think your reaction to the smoke must be exaggerated, and you decide against taking any action because if you take action and are wrong (maybe it wasn’t smoke, just steam or something from the next room) you would feel sheepish and embarrassed. However, you don’t realize that every- one in the room is feeling the same as you and hiding it, just as you are, to avoid embarrassment! Meanwhile, no one is doing anything about the smoke. Sound unbelievable? It’s not. Latané and Darley (1968) tested this idea by creating the situation just described. Psychology students volunteered to participate in interviews alleg- edly to “discuss some of the problems involved in life at an urban university.” When they arrived for the interview, they were seated in a room and asked to fill out a preliminary questionnaire. After a few minutes, smoke began to seep into the room through a vent. For this study, the smoke was a special mixture of chemicals that would not be dangerous to the participants. After several minutes, the smoke became so thick that vision in the room was obscured. The researchers timed the participants to see how long they would wait to report the smoke. Some of the participants were in the room alone; others were with either two or three confederates, believed by the participant to be other participants, who behaved very passively when the smoke appeared. Once again, Latané and Darley’s results supported their theory. Of the partici- pants in the alone condition, 55% reported the smoke within the first 2 minutes; only 12% of the participants in the other two groups did so. Moreover, after 4 minutes, 75% of the alone participants had acted, but no additional participants in the other groups ever reported the smoke. Further evidence of the fear of embarrassment in people’s hesitation to help others comes from a study that combined personality measures of shy- ness and fear of negative evaluation (FNE) with participants’ willingness to help another (Karakashian et al., 2006). In this study, participants filled out scales to measure shyness and fear of negative evaluation. They were then given the opportunity to help a female confederate either alone or with two additional confederates in the room. In accordance with Darley and Latané’s findings, participants’ helping behavior decreased significantly with two other bystand- ers present, compared to the no-bystander condition, regardless of their scores on the personality tests. Beyond this, however, those who scored high
Reading 39 To Help or Not to Help 323 on FNE and shyness were less likely to help in the no-bystander condition, but they were equally likely (or unlikely) to help when the two additional bystand- ers were present. This may seem counterintuitive to you—that is, someone who dreads being judged negatively or who is shy should be less likely to help in the presence of others—right? Not exactly. Think of it this way: If others are present, a shy person feels less pressure to help (due to diffusion of responsi- bility), so he or she, in essence, has an “excuse” to avoid helping just as the other bystanders do. On the other hand, if no other bystanders are present, that fear of (the potential for) negative evaluation kicks in and the shy person will be less likely to help than a non-shy person. The authors of the study stated it like this: Because of the diffusion of responsibility in the social condition [with others present], the participant faces little decision of whether to help or not. Here, FNE does not become an issue, as there is little to no thought of helping, and in turn, no apprehension of being evaluated poorly. In the non-social condition [no other bystanders] the participant is left alone and has all the responsibility to help, and therefore must make a decision to act or not (Karakashian et al., 2006, p. 30). Another study demonstrated the power of the bystander effect and diffu- sion of responsibility, not in real life, but in our imaginations. A study entitled Crowded Minds: The Implicit Bystander Effect, carried out by a team of researchers that included Darley, found that merely imagining being in a group changed helping behavior (Garcia et al., 2002). In this study, participants were asked to imagine that they were either part of a group of people or with only one other person. Then, all participants were asked to donate to a charity. The partici- pants who imagined themselves in the presence of others donated signifi- cantly less money, and felt less personal accountability, than did those who imagined being with one other person. These findings imply that our brains immediately “leap” at the chance to assume less individual responsibility when we are part of a group. conclusion The results of this body of research may seem rather pessimistic about our inclination to help others in need, but you should recognize that these studies deal with extremely specific situations in which people fail to help. Frequent examples may be found every day of people helping other people, of altruistic behaviors, and heroic acts. Darley and Latané’s research is important, how- ever, not only to explain a perplexing human behavior but also to help change it. Perhaps, as more people become aware of the bystander effect, they will make the extra effort to intervene in an emergency, even if others are present. In fact, research has demonstrated that those who have learned about the bystander effect (as you now have) are more likely to help in emergencies (Beaman et al., 1978). The bottom line is this: Never assume that others have intervened or will intervene in an emergency. Always act as if you are the only bystander there.
324 Chapter X Human Interaction and Social Behavior Beaman, A., Barnes, P., Klentz, B., & Mcquirk, B. (1978). Increasing helping rates through information dissemination: Teaching pays. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 4, 406–411. Garcia, S., Weaver, K., Darley, J., & Moskowitz, G. (2002). Crowded minds: The implicit bystander effect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 843–853. Karakashian, L., Walter, M., Christopher, A., & Lucas, T. (2006). Fear of negative evaluation affects helping behavior: The bystander effect revisited. North American Journal of Psychology, 8(1), 13–32. Latané, B., & Darley, J. M. (1968). Group inhibition of bystander intervention in emergencies. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 10, 215–221. Latané, B., & Darley, J. M. (1970). The unresponsive bystander: Why doesn’t he help? New York: Appleton Century Crofts. reading 40: oBey at any coSt? Milgram, S. (1963). Behavioral study of obedience. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 67, 371–378. If someone in a position of authority over you ordered you to deliver an elec- trical shock of 350 volts to another person, simply because the other person answered a multiple-choice question incorrectly, would you obey? Neither would I. If you met someone who was willing to do such a thing, you would probably think of him or her as cruel and sadistic. This study by Stanley Milgram of Yale University set out to examine the idea of obedience to author- ity and produced some disturbing findings. Milgram’s research on obedience joins Zimbardo’s prison study (see Reading 37) as one of the most famous in all psychology’s history. It is included in every general psychology text and every social psychology text. If you talk to students of psychology, more of them are familiar with these studies than any others. Out of this study came a book by Milgram (1974) on the psychology of obedience, as well as a film about the research itself that is widely shown in college and university classes. Not only is this experiment referred to in discussions of obedience, but it has also influenced the entire debate about the ethics of involving human participants in psychological research. Milgram’s idea for this project grew out of his desire to investigate scien- tifically how people could be capable of carrying out great harm to others simply because they were ordered to do so. Milgram was referring specifically to the hideous atrocities committed during World War II and also, more gener- ally, to the inhumanity that has been and is perpetrated by people following the orders of others. Milgram believed that in some situations, the human tendency to obey is so deeply ingrained and powerful that it cancels out a person’s ability to behave morally, ethically, or even sympathetically. When behavioral scientists decide to study some complex aspect of human behavior, their first step is to find a way to gain control over the behav- ioral situation so that they can approach it scientifically. This can often be the greatest challenge to a researcher, because many events in the real world are difficult to re-create in a laboratory setting. Milgram’s problem was how to create a controlled situation in which one person would order another person
Reading 40 Obey at Any Cost? 325 to injure a third person physically, without anyone actually getting hurt. Now there’s a researcher’s challenge! TheoreTical ProPosiTions Milgram’s primary theoretical basis for this study was that humans have a tendency to obey other people who are in a position of authority over them even if, in obeying, they violate their personal codes of moral and ethical behavior. He believed that, for example, many individuals who would never intentionally cause someone physical harm would inflict pain on a victim if ordered to do so by a person whom they perceived to be a powerful authority figure. MeThod The most ingenious portion of this study was the technique Milgram devel- oped to test the power of obedience in the laboratory. Milgram designed a rather scary-looking shock generator: an electronic device with 30 toggle switches labeled with voltage levels starting at 30 volts and increasing by 15-volt intervals up to 450 volts (see Figure 40-1). These switches were labeled in groups such as slight shock, moderate shock, and danger: severe shock. The idea was that a participant could be ordered to administer electric shocks at increasing levels to another person. Before you conclude that Milgram was truly sadistic Figure 40-1 Milgram’s experimental “shock” generator. (Alexandra Milgram)
326 Chapter X Human Interaction and Social Behavior himself, this was a very realistic-looking simulated shock generator, but no one ever actually received any painful shocks. The participants for this study were 40 males between the ages of 20 and 50. They consisted of 15 skilled or unskilled workers, 16 white-collar sales- or businessmen, and 9 professional men. They were recruited through newspaper ads and direct-mail solicitation asking for volunteers to be paid participants in a study about memory and learning at Yale University. Each man participated in the study individually. To obtain an adequate number of participants, each man was paid $4.50 (remember, these were 1963 dollars, worth about $30 today). All participants were clearly told that this payment was simply for com- ing to the laboratory, and it was theirs to keep no matter what happened after they arrived. This was to ensure that participants knew they could withdraw at any time and did not feel coerced to behave in certain ways because they were worried about not being paid. In addition to the participants, two other key participants were part of the study: a confederate (a 47-year-old accountant) posing as another partici- pant and an actor (dressed in a gray lab coat, looking very official) playing the part of the experimenter. As participants arrived at the social interaction laboratory at Yale, each was seated next to another “participant” (the confederate). Obviously, the true purpose of the experiment could not be revealed to participants because this would completely alter their behavior. Therefore, the experimenter told each participant a cover story explaining that this was a study on the effect of “punishment on learning.” The participants then drew pieces of paper out of a hat to determine who would be the teacher and who would be the learner. This drawing was rigged so that the true participant always became the teacher and the accomplice was always the learner. Keep in mind that the “learner” was a confederate in the experiment, as was the person playing the part of the experimenter. The learner was then taken into the room next door and was, with the participant watching, strapped to a chair and wired up with electrodes (com- plete with electrode paste to “avoid any blisters or burns”) connected to the shock generator in the adjoining room. The learner, although his arms were strapped down, was able to reach four buttons marked a, b, c, and d to answer questions posed by the teacher from the next room. The learning task was thoroughly explained to the teacher and the learner. Briefly, it involved the learner memorizing connections between vari- ous pairs of words. It was a rather lengthy list and not an easy memory task. The teacher-participant would read the list of word pairs and then test the learner’s memory of them. The teacher was instructed by the experimenter to administer an electric shock each time the learner responded incorrectly. Most important, for each incorrect response, the teacher was instructed to move up one level of shock voltage on the generator. All this was simulated so realistically that no participant suspected that the shocks were not really being delivered.
Reading 40 Obey at Any Cost? 327 The learner-confederate’s responses were preprogrammed to be correct or incorrect in the same sequence for all the participants. Furthermore, as the amount of voltage increased with incorrect responses, the learner began to shout his discomfort from the other room (in prearranged, prerecorded phrases, including the fact that his heart was bothering him), and at the 300-volt level, he pounded on the wall and demanded to be let out. After 300 volts he became completely silent and refused to answer any more ques- tions. The teacher was instructed to treat this lack of a response as an incor- rect response and to continue the procedure. Most of the participants would turn to the experimenter at some point for guidance on whether to continue the shocks. When this happened, the experimenter ordered the participant to continue, in a series of commands increasing in severity: Command 1: Please continue. Command 2: The experiment requires that you continue. Command 3: It is absolutely essential that you continue. Command 4: You have no other choice: You must go on. A measure of obedience was obtained simply by recording the level of shock at which each participant refused to continue to deliver shocks. Because 30 switches were on the generator, each participant could receive a score of 0 to 30. Participants who went all the way to the top of the scale were referred to as obedient subjects, and those who broke off at any lower point were termed defiant subjects. resulTs Would the participants obey the commands of this experimenter? How high on the voltage scale did they go? What would you predict? Think of yourself, your friends, and people in general. What percentage do you think would deliver shocks all the way through the 30 levels? All the way up to “450 volts— danger: severe shock”? Before discussing the actual results of the study, Milgram asked a group of Yale University senior psychology majors, as well as various colleagues, to make such a prediction. The estimates ranged from 0% to 3%, with an average estimate of 1.2%. That is, no more than three people out of 100 were predicted to deliver the maximum shock. Table 40-1 summarizes the “shocking” results. Upon command of the experimenter, every participant continued at least to the 300-volt level, which was when the confederate banged on the wall to be let out and stopped answering. Most surprising is the number of participants who obeyed orders to continue all the way to the top of the scale. Although 14 participants defied orders and broke off before reaching the maximum voltage, 26 of the 40 participants, or 65%, followed the experi- menter’s orders and proceeded to the top of the shock scale. This is not to say
328 Chapter X Human Interaction and Social Behavior Table 40-1 level of Shock Delivered by Participants numbeR of Volts numbeR who Refused to to be deliVeRed Continue At this VoltAGe leVel slight shock 0 15 0 30 0 45 0 60 0 moderate shock 0 75 0 90 0 105 0 120 0 strong shock 0 135 0 150 165 0 180 0 Very strong shock 0 195 0 210 225 0 240 0 intense shock 0 255 5 270 285 4 300 2 extreme intensity shock 1 315 1 330 345 1 360 0 danger: severe shock 0 375 0 390 405 0 420 26 XXX——— 435 450 (source: Adapted from milgram, 1963, p. 376.) that the participants were calm or happy about what they were doing. Many exhibited signs of extreme stress and concern for the man receiving the shocks and even became angry at the experimenter. Yet they obeyed. The researchers were concerned that some of the participants might suffer psychological distress from the ordeal of shocking another person, especially when the learner had ceased to respond for the last third of the
Reading 40 Obey at Any Cost? 329 experiment. To help alleviate this anxiety, after the participants finished the experiment, they received a full explanation (called a “debriefing”) of the true purpose of the study and of all the procedures, including the deception that had been employed. In addition, the participants were interviewed as to their feelings and thoughts during the procedure and the confederate “learner” was brought in for a friendly reconciliation with each participant. discussion Milgram’s discussion of his findings focused on two main points. The first was the surprising strength of the participants’ tendency to obey. These were aver- age, normal people—not sadistic, cruel individuals in any way—who agreed to participate in an experiment about learning. Milgram points out that from childhood these participants had learned that it is immoral to hurt others against their will. So why did they behave this way? The experimenter was a person in a position of authority, but if you think about it, how much author- ity did he really have? He had no power to enforce his orders, and participants would lose nothing by refusing to follow orders. Clearly it was the situation that carried a force of its own that somehow created an atmosphere of obedience. The second key observation made during the course of this study was the extreme tension and anxiety manifested by the participants as they obeyed the experimenter’s commands. Again, it might be expected that such discom- fort could be relieved simply by refusing to go on, and yet this is not what hap- pened. Milgram quotes one observer (who watched a participant through a two-way mirror): I observed a mature and initially poised businessman enter the laboratory smil- ing and confident. Within 20 minutes he was reduced to a twitching, stuttering wreck who was rapidly approaching a point of nervous collapse . . . . At one point he pushed his fist into his forehead and muttered, “Oh, God! Let’s stop it.” And yet he continued to respond to every word of the experimenter and obeyed to the end. (p. 377) Milgram listed several points at the end of the article to attempt to explain why this particular situation produced such a high degree of obedi- ence. In summary, from the point of view of the participant, his main points were that (a) if it is being sponsored by Yale, I must be in good hands, and who am I to question such a great institution; (b) the goals of the experiment appear to be important, and therefore, because I volunteered, I’ll do my part to assist in the realization of those goals; (c) the learner, after all, also volun- tarily came here and he has an obligation to the project, too; (d) hey, it was just by chance that I’m the teacher and he’s the learner—we drew lots and it could have just as easily been the other way around; (e) they’re paying me for this, I’d better do my job; (f) I don’t know all that much about the rights of a psychologist and his participants, so I will yield to his discretion on this; and (g) they told us both that the shocks are painful but not dangerous.
330 Chapter X Human Interaction and Social Behavior significance of The findings Milgram’s findings have held up quite well in the 40-plus years since this article was published. Milgram himself repeated the procedure on similar participants outside of the Yale setting, on unpaid college student volunteers, and on women participants, and he found similar results each time. In addition, he expanded further on his findings in this study by con- ducting a series of related experiments designed to reveal the conditions that promote or limit obedience (see Milgram, 1974). He found that the physical, and therefore emotional, distance of the victim from the teacher altered the amount of obedience. The highest level of obedience (93% going to the top of the voltage scale) occurred when the learner was in another room and could not be seen or heard. When the learner was in the same room with the participant and the participant was required to force the learner’s hand onto a shock plate, the rate of obedience dropped to 30%. Milgram also discovered that the physical distance of the authority figure to the participant also influenced obedience. The closer the experimenter, the greater the obedience. In one condition, the experimenter was out of the room and telephoned his commands to the participant. In this case, obedi- ence fell to only 21%. On a more positive note, when participants were allowed to punish the learner by using any level of shock they wished, no one ever pressed any switch higher than 45 volts. criTicisMs Although Milgram’s research has been extremely influential in our under- standing of obedience, it has also had far-reaching effects in the area of the ethical treatment of human participants. Even though no one ever received any shocks, how do you suppose you would feel if you knew that you had been willing to shock someone (possibly to death) simply because a person in a lab coat told you to do so? Critics of Milgram’s methods (e.g., Baumrind, 1964; Miller, 1986) claimed that unacceptable levels of stress were created in the participants during the experiment. Furthermore, it has been argued that the potential for lasting negative effects existed. When the deception was revealed to participants at the end of their ordeal, they may have felt used, embar- rassed, and possibly distrustful of psychologists or legitimate authority figures in the future. Another line of criticism focused on the validity of Milgram’s findings (e.g., Brief et al., 1995; Orne & Holland, 1968). One commonly cited basis for this criticism was that because the participants had a trusting and rather dependent relationship with the experimenter, and the laboratory was an unfamiliar setting, obedience found there did not represent obedience in real life. Therefore, critics claim, the results of Milgram’s studies were not only invalid, but because of this poor validity the treatment his participants were exposed to could not be justified.
Reading 40 Obey at Any Cost? 331 Milgram responded to criticisms by surveying participants after they had participated. He found that 84% of his participants were glad to have partici- pated, and only 1% regretted the experience. In addition, a psychiatrist inter- viewed 40 of the participants who were judged to have been the most uncomfortable in the laboratory and concluded that none had suffered any long-term effects. As to the criticism that his laboratory findings did not reflect real life, Milgram said, “A person who comes to the laboratory is an active, choosing adult, capable of accepting or rejecting the prescriptions for action addressed to him” (Milgram, 1964, p. 852). The Milgram studies reported here have been a focal point in the ongo- ing debate over experimental ethics involving human participants. It is, in fact, arguable whether this research has been more influential in the area of the psychology of obedience or in policy formation on the ethical treatment of humans in psychological research (as summarized in this book’s preface). recenT aPPlicaTions The breadth of influence that Milgram’s obedience project continues to exert on current research can best be appreciated through a brief annotated selec- tion of recent studies that have been primarily motivated by Milgram’s early methods and findings. As has been the case every year since the early 1960s when Milgram carried out his studies, these studies are divided between attempts to refine and elaborate on people’s tendency to obey authority figures and the omnipresent debate about the ethics of using deception in research involving human participants. Thomas Blass—a leading authority on the work and career of Stanley Milgram, and author of a biography of Milgram, The Man Who Shocked the World (Blass, 2004)—has reviewed all the research and social implications stemming from Milgram’s obedience studies (Blass, 1999; 2002). In general, Blass has found universal support for Milgram’s original findings, but, more importantly, he suggests that obedience rates have not changed significantly during the 40-plus years since Milgram first published his findings. This is contrary to many people’s intuitive judgments that Americans in general have become less respectful of authority and more willing to rebel and fight back when ordered to perform behaviors with which they disagree. Another question that often arises about Milgram’s early studies con- cerns gender and the fact that all his original participants were male. Do you think, overall, that men or women would be more likely to obey an authority figure? Blass’s review of later studies by Milgram and numerous others found no difference in obedience rates for males versus females. (For more details about the history and influences of Milgram’s work, see Blass’s Web site at http://www.stanleymilgram.com.) A very pertinent application of Milgram’s findings examined the psycho- logical experience of “execution teams” charged with carrying out the death sentence in Louisiana State prisons (Osofsky & Osofsky, 2002). The researchers
332 Chapter X Human Interaction and Social Behavior interviewed 50 correctional officers who were directly involved with executions. They found that, although exposed far more than most people to trauma and death, the participants were not found to be clinically depressed. They reported relying on religious beliefs, identification with their peer group, and their ability to diffuse responsibility to deal with painful emotions: “Nevertheless, the officers experience conflicted feelings and frequently report having a hard time carrying out society’s ‘ultimate punishment’” (p. 358). On the ethics side, a study employed Milgram’s research in examining potentially thorny ethical issues for social science research conducted on the Internet (Pittenger, 2003). Today, a great deal of research is conducted via the World Wide Web, and the number of such studies is likely to increase signifi- cantly in the future. Pittenger contends that researchers must be alert to potential ethical violations relating to invasion of privacy, obtaining informed consent, and using deceptive tactics online. “The Internet offers unique chal- lenges to researchers,” Pittenger writes. “Among these are the need to define the distinction between private and public behavior performed on the Internet, ensure mechanisms for obtaining valid informed consent from par- ticipants, performing debriefing exercises, and verifying the validity of data collected” (p. 45). An important question is this: What should be done to protect partici- pants from irresponsible, deceptive practices in psychological research, while at the same time allowing for some deception when absolutely necessary for scientific advancement? A study by Wendler (1996) suggested that partici- pants in studies involving deception be given an increased level of “informed consent.” (See the discussion of this concept in the preface to this book.) This enhanced informed consent would inform you of the study’s intention to use deception before you agree to be a participant in the experiment, although you would not be aware of the exact nature of the deception. “This ‘second order consent’ approach to acceptable deception,” claims Wendler, “represents our best chance for reconciling respect for participants with the occasional scientific need for deceptive research” (p. 87). conclusion Milgram historian Thomas Blass’s (2002) remarks in a biographical review of Milgram’s life and work provide a fitting conclusion to this reading: We didn’t need Milgram to tell us we have a tendency to obey orders. What we didn’t know before Milgram’s experiments is just how powerful this tendency is. And having been enlightened about our extreme readiness to obey authorities, we can try to take steps to guard ourselves against unwelcome or reprehensible commands. (p. 73) Baumrind, D. (1964). Some thoughts on the ethics of research: After reading Milgram’s “Behav- ioral Study of Obedience.” American Psychologist, 19, 421–423. Blass, T. (1999). The Milgram paradigm after 35 years: Some things we now know about obedi- ence to authority. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 29(5), 955–978.
Reading 40 Obey at Any Cost? 333 Blass, T. (2002). The man who shocked the world. Psychology Today, 35, 68–74. Blass, T. (2004). The man who shocked the world. New York: Basic Books. Brief, E., Collins, B., & Miller, A. (1995). Perspectives on obedience to authority: The legacy of the Milgram experiments. The Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, 51, 1–19. Milgram, S. (1964). Issues in the study of obedience: A reply to Baumrind. American Psychologist, 19, 448–452. Milgram, S. (1974). Obedience to authority. New York: Harper & Row. Miller, A. G. (1986). The obedience studies: A case study of controversy in social science. New York: Praeger. Orne, M. T., & Holland, C. H. (1968). On the ecological validity of laboratory deceptions. International Journal of Psychiatry, 6, 282–293. Osofsky, M., & Osofsky, H. (2002). The psychological experience of security officers who work with executions. Psychiatry: Interpersonal and Biological Processes, 65, 358–370. Pittenger, D. (2003). Internet research: An opportunity to revisit classic ethical problems in behavioral research. Ethics and Behavior, 13, 45–60. Wendler, D. (1996). Deception in medical and behavioral research: Is it ever acceptable? Milbank Quarterly, 74(1), 87.
Author Index A B Blass, T., 331, 332 Boissy, A., 192 Aase, H., 102 Baillargeon, R., 159 Bolte, S., 191–192 Able, K., 134 Baker, R., 82 Bond, R., 315 Abraham, L., 43 Baldwin, D., 232 Bontempo, R., 233–242 Abramson, L., 265 Baluch, B., 126–127 Bottoms, B., 167 Ackerman, S., 300 Bancroft, J., 184 Bouchard, T., 37–45 Adams, H., 257 Bandura, A., 103–110 Braiker, H., 264 Addis, M., 315 Banks, W., 303–310, 307 Brief, E., 330 Ader, R., 88 Barde, B., 231 Brond, R., 231 Adeyemo, A., 197 Barnes, P., 323 Broughton, N., 250 Adkins, A., 214 Baumann, D., 213 Brown, R., 279 Adolph, K., 51 Baumrind, D., 330 Bruner, A., 101 Aeschleman, S., 101–102 Baynhama, K., 197 Bureau of Justice Agar, N., 45 Beaman, A., 323 Aguilar, A., 159 Beckwith, J., 44 Statistics, 308 Alarcón, A., 81 Beere, D., 299 Burnette, M., 184 Albert, M., 59–60 Bell, S., 134–135 Alferink, L., 28 Bellinger, D. C., 35–36 C Alper, J., 44 Bem, S., 127, 216–225 Amir, T., 160 Benn, A., 293 Cabaños, F., 81 Anastasi, A., 292, 299 Bennett, E., 30–36 Cacioppo, J., 151 Andrasik, F., 279 Benson, E., 118 Calhoun, J., 265–273 Andrews, T., 117–118 Berger, D., 102 Campos, J., 50, 50–51 Annas, P., 88 Berger, S., 51 Capafons, A., 81 Arenella, J., 293 Berscheid, E., 151 Carlsmith, J., 199–206 Arvey, R., 43 Bhana, K., 59 Centers for Disease Asai, M., 233–242 Bhatt, S., 197 Asch, S., 211, 310–315 Billard, C., 28 Control, 264 Aserinsky, E., 60–61, 66 Billings, P., 44 Cerwonka, E., 314 Avis, J., 142 Bingman, V., 134 Chaiken, A., 116 Ayman, R., 225 Blandon-Gitlin, I., 141 Chasiotis, A., 300 Chaves, J., 81 Checkley, K., 125 334
Author Index 335 Chesterman, P., 250 Ellsworth, P., 141 Glass, G., 274–279 Childress, R., 195–196 Emde, R., 50–51 Gleitman, H., 291 Christopher, A., 322–323 Erdberg, P., 293 Goodman, G., 167 Clemence, A., 300 Eron, L., 110, 298 Goodwin, G., 168 Coelho, C., 51 Espejo, B., 81 Greenberg, J., 249 Cohen, D., 241 Evans, G., 271 Greenberg, R., 65, 257 Cohen, N., 88 Exner, J., 293 Gremy, I., 205 Cohen, S., 89 Exposido, F., 241 Grossman, L., 293 Coleman, M., 223 Gur, R., 195–196 Collins, B., 330 F Gustafson, C., 88 Collins, J., 126 Gyoerkoe, K., 293 Constantinople, A., Fantz, R., 54–60 Farmer-Dougan, V., 28 H 216–217 Fazio, R., 204 Cooper, J., 204, 205 Fehr, B., 74 Hailu, A., 197 Cox, V., 271 Festinger, L., 199–206 Halfen, S., 205 Craig, G., 160 Finkelstein, N., 263 Hall, J., 223 Cramer, P., 257, 258, 300 Fisher, S., 257 Haney, C., 303–310, 307 Fode, K., 112–113 Hanratty, M., 109 D Forsyth, D., 313 Hansen, C., 191, 314 Fredrickson, B., 286 Hansen, R., 191 Darley, J., 168, 315–323 Fredrikson, M., 88 Harlow, H., 144–152 Darwin, C., 191 Freedman, J., 271 Harris, B., 94 Dauvermanna, M., 197 French, C., 141 Harris, C., 224–225 Davis, W., 213 Freud, A., 251–258 Hautzinger, M., 174 Dawes, R., 278 Freud, S., 252, 256 Hawkins, W., 88 DeAngelis, T., 95 Friedman, M., 226–233 Hawkley, L., 151 Dement, W., 60–66 Friesen, W., 186–193 Heath, A., 44 Dempster, C., 81 Frith, C., 74 Henderson, C., 50 Denollet, J., 232 Furnham, A., 126–127 Heshka, S., 271 Derlega, V., 116 Hiatt, S., 50 DeRoma, V., 264 G Hilgard, E., 75 Desire, L., 192 Hilsenroth, M., 300 Diamond, M., 30–36 Ganong, L., 223 Hine, T., 51 Dixon, W., 214 Garb, H., 293, 300 Hittner, J., 264 Dovidio, J., 73 Garcia, J., 88 Hobson, J., 66 Dumont, F., 272 Garcia, S., 323 Hock, R., 184 Dunn, W., 160 Gardner, H., 118–127 Hodkinson, C., 134 Dush, D., 299 Garry, M., 142 Hofer, J., 300 D’yakonova, N., 214 Gazzaniga, M., 19–29 Hoffman, M., 167 George, I., 233 Hogg, M., 205 E Gibson, E., 45–52 Holland, C., 330 Giles, C., 141 Holt, C., 224 Eaves, L., 44 Gilligan, C., 166–167 Hommet, C., 28 Ehrenreich, H., 174 Ginzburg, H., 153, 158 Hooks, G., 309 Ekman, P., 186–193 Glass, C., 169 Ellis, J., 224
336 Author Index Krampe, H., 174 McDonald, S., 195–196 Kroner-Herwig, B., 174 McGue, M., 37–45 Hopson, J., 35 Kumaraiah, V., 233 Mcquirk, B., 323 Horn, R., 263 Kurtines, W., 166 Mahalik, J., 315 Horowitz, F., 59 Maier, S., 258–265 Huesmann, L., 110 L Maldjian, J., 195–196 Mansfield, A., 315 I Landman, J., 278 Mansfield, P., 194 Langer, E., 168–175 Markus, H., 241 Ingle, S., 214 Langleben, D., 195–196 Marsden, H., 271 Inhelder, B., 158 Latané, B., 315–323 Masters, W., 176–186 Isbell, T., 314 LaTorre, M., 151–152 Matthews, K., 231 Iyengar, S., 175, 214 Lauterbur, P., 194, 198 Mattson, S., 167 Lawrie, S., 197 Mbwana, J., 197 J Lazar, B., 81 Mendoza, E., 81 LeDoux, J., 27 Mervis, C., 73 Jacobson, L., 111–118 Leotti, L., 175, 214 Metcalf, J., 169 Jarudi, I., 192 Lester, H., 250–251 Milgram, S., 324–332 Johnson, S., 59–60 Levensen, R., 192 Miller, A., 330 Johnson, V., 176–186 Levy, A., 27–28, 271 Miller, G., 89 Jones, S., 36 Lewis, M., 95 Miller, I., 279 Jordan, J., 231 Libby, L., 197 Miller, R., 313 Joseph, J., 44 Lilienfeld, S., 82, 293, 300 Miller, T., 278 Joslyn, S., 142 Lock, T., 82 Mineka, S., 89 Loehlin, J., 44 Moise, J., 110 K Loftus, E., 82, 135–143 Monin, B., 205 Loftus, J., 184 Monje, A., 81 Kaplan, H., 183 Lohr, B., 257 Morgan, H., 126 Karakashian, L., 322–323 Long, J., 184 Morris, E., 97 Karkowski, L., 96 Loving, J., 293 Morris, W., 313 Kebbell, M., 141 Lovinger, S., 299 Morton, B., 29 Keller, A., 309 Lucas, T., 322–323 Mosher, C., 309 Kendler, K., 44, 96 Lucca, N., 233–242 Moskowitz, G., 323 Kennell, J., 150 Lykken, D., 37–45 Moya, M., 241 Kessler, R., 44 Lynch, K., 133–134 Mulick, J., 117–118 Ketcham, K., 142–143 Lynn, S., 82 Munakata, Y., 159 Kiel, G., 134 Murray, H., 294–300 Kihlstrom, J., 75 M Mystkowski, J., 89 Kinsey, A., 177 Kitayama, S., 241 McAnulty, R., 184 N Klaus, M., 150 McCain, G., 271 Klein, P., 126 McCall, B., 43 Neale, M., 44 Kleitman, N., 60–61 McColl-Kennedy, J., 134 Nezworski, M., 293 Klentz, B., 323 McConkey, K., 82 Norton, M., 205 Klinnert, M., 50–51 McDavid, J., 314 Nowak-Drabik, K., 279 Kohlberg, L., 161–168 McDermut, W., 279 Konrad, A., 224–225 Korabik, K., 225
Author Index 337 O Rammstedt, B., 127 Segal, N., 37–45 Ramsay, D., 50 Self, P., 59 O’Brien, C., 195–196 Rayner, R., 90–96 Seligman, M., 258–265 Ochsner, K., 175, 214 Regoeczi, W., 272 Shahidi, S., 126–127 O’Neil, E., 109 Revuski, S., 101 Shea, C., 205–206 Opper, S., 153, 158 Ricciardelli, L., 223 Sheehan, P., 82 Ornduff, S., 293 Riley, E., 167 Shinskey, J., 159 Orne, M., 330 Rivera, S., 160 Sholtz, R., 231 Orzeck, T., 241 Rodin, J., 168–175 Shuwairi, S., 59–60 Osofsky, H., 331–332 Roepstorff, A., 74 Sigler, E., 116 Osofsky, M., 331–332 Rogers, C., 101 Simpson, J., 197 Rokach, A., 241 Sims, J., 213 P Rorschach, H., 287–293 Singer, J., 169 Rosch, E., 67–74 Sinha, P., 192 Paden, L., 59 Rosen, C., 101–102 Sistrunk, F., 314 Pajares, F., 109 Rosenblum, L., 151 Skinner, B., 96–103 Paulus, B., 271 Rosenhan, D., 243–251 Smith, M., 274–279 Pavlov, I., 83–89 Rosenman, R., 226–233 Smith, P., 315 Penzien, D., 279 Rosenthal, R., 111–118 Smith, V., 141 Peretti-Watel, P., 205 Rosenzweig, M., 30–36 Snarey, J., 166 Perlman, C., 65 Ross, D., 103–110 Snibbe, A., 241 Perry, A., 232 Ross, P., 193–198 Solomon, S., 169 Pezdek, K., 141 Ross, S., 103–110 Sorce, J., 50–51 Pfungst, O., 112 Rossi, E., 65 Spanos, N., 75–82 Phares, E., 213 Rotter, J., 208–215 Spector, T., 45 Philipa, R., 197 Rusiniak, K., 88 Spek, V., 232 Piaget, J., 152–160, 161 Russell, J., 74 Sperry, R. W., 20–29 Pica, M., 299 Russell, W., 293 Spitzer, B., 142 Picard, R., 263 Spitzer, R., 249 Pittenger, D., 332 S Stam, H., 79 Podolski, C., 110 Standfield, A., 197 Polage, D., 142 Sadr, J., 192 Steinberg, M., 142 Poustka, F., 191–192 Sagvolden, T., 102 Sternberg, R., 118, 151 Prainsack, B., 45 Samelson, F., 94 Stewart, S., 214–215 Prasadaro, P., 233 Samuels, C., 223 Strickland, B., 212 Prescott, C., 96 Saucier, D., 134–135 Stroufe, A., 150 Price, E., 272 Sawyer, A., 197 Sullivan, M., 95 Prout, H., 279 Saylor, C., 264 Sulzer, J., 109 Pual, G., 285, 286 Scher, A., 160 Sun, L., 214–215 Puente, A., 20 Schiffer, A., 232 Suzuki, H., 66 Schiffer, F., 29 Suzuki, T., 241 R Schneider, S., 97 Svejda, M., 50 Schonfeld, A., 167 Swickert, R., 264 Ragland, J., 195–196, 197 Schroeder, L., 195–196 Szasz, T., 250 Rains, J., 279 Schulz, R., 174 Ramey, C., 263 Schwartz-Kenney, B., 167 Rammsayer, T., 127
338 Author Index Veissier, I., 192 Wolpe, J., 88, 280–287 Vernon, L., 89 Wood, J., 275, 293, 300 T Villareal, M., 233–242 Woodhill, B., 223 Wright, L., 257 Tagaya, H., 66 W Talbot, M., 59 Y Taubman, P., 43 Wahl, O., 250 Taylor, M., 223 Walk, R., 45–52 Yavagal, S., 233 Taylor, S., 263 Wallentin, M., 74 Young, M., 134 Teasdale, J., 265 Wallis, G., 51 Yurtaikin, V., 214 Tellegan, A., 37–45 Walter, M., 322–323 Thomas, S., 167 Wasyliw, O., 293 Z Tiefer, L., 185 Waters, A., 51 Tirosh, E., 160 Watson, J., 88, 90–96 Zaviacic, M., 184 Tolman, E., 128–135 Weatherill, R., 300 Zawaydeh, A., 160 Torbit, G., 272 Weaver, K., 323 Zeiher, A., 231 Triandis, H., 233–242 Weed, E., 74 Zeiner, P., 102 Tritter, J., 250–251 Weiss, B., 35–36 Zettle, R., 286–287 Tylen, E., 74 Welton, G., 214 Zigler, E., 36 Wendler, D., 332 Zimbardo, P., 303–310 U Whalleya, H., 197 Zinbarg, R., 89 Whitley, B., 223 Uchiyama, M., 66 Wik, G., 88 Unyk, A., 73 Williams, M., 101–102 Urbina, S., 292, 299 Williams, R., 223 Wisniewski, J., 117–118 V Vandello, J., 241 VanMeter, J., 197
Subject Index Note: Page numbers in italics indicate figures or tables. A chickens, 49, 54, 55 arcus senilis, 228, 229, 230 chimpanzees, 55–56 Arden House, 170 abnormal psychology, 243 coyotes, 88 attachment, 144–152, 148 abnormality, defined, dogs, 84–89, 258–265, attention deficit/ 243–245 261 hyperactivity disorder absorption in tasks, 78 goats, 49 (ADHD), 102 acetylcholinesterase, 32 kittens, 49 auditory abilities, split brain achievement motivation, lambs, 49 research and, 25 mice, 88–89 autism, 191–192, 197 211 monkeys, 144–152, 148 avoidant personality, 299 acrophobia, 51, 281 pigeons, 99–103 awareness. see consciousness ADHD (attention deficit/ rats, 30–31, 49, 112–113, B hyperactivity disorder), 129–135, 130, 131, 132, 102 266–273, 267 babies. see infants adult attachment love, 151 turtles, 50 Baillargeon, Renee, 59 aged people, control and, wolves, 88 behavior 168–175, 172 animals, domestication aggression, 103–110, 107 of, 272 abnormal, diagnosis of, agoraphobia, 281 A-not-B effect, 157 244–245 alcohol use, 65, 167 anterior cingulate gyrus, Alfred Binet Laboratory, 196, 196 genetics versus environ- 153 anticipatory anxiety, 264 ment, 37–45, 40 analgesia effects, 79 antisocial personality, 299 androgyny, 216–225, 217, anxiety, 254. see also phobias morality and, 166 219, 222 anxiety disorders, 280 behavioral sinks, 269 angry face, picking out anxiety hierarchies, 283, 283 behavioral superclass, 277 from crowd, 191 anxiety justifying, 200 behaviorism theory, 37–38, animal research subjects apperceptions, 294 applicability to humans, 90–91, 96–97 34–35, 271 Bem Sex-Role Inventory (BSRI), 217–222, 219, 222, 224–225 339
340 Subject Index “The Best Hand Test,” 29 sub-cortexes, 33 cognitive dissociation, 81 biases synapses, 33 cognitive dissonance, twin studies, 26 double-blind method, 113 Brother’s Dilemma, 162 199–206, 203 experimenter expectancy BSRI (Bem Sex-Role cognitive maps, 111, effects, 32, 112 Inventory), 217–222, 128–135, 130, 131, 132 of gender conformity, 314 219, 222, 224–225 cognitive psychology, 111, in IQ tests, 119 bystander intervention, of participants, 200–201 315–323, 319, 321 133 preference bias, 70 cognitive-behaviorism, 128 racial or cultural, 117 C cold pressor test, 79 biological psychology, 19 collectivist cultures biology. see also brains; cannibalism, 269 cardiopsychology, 231 characteristics of, 236 nature–nurture care orientation, 167 conformity and, 315 controversy categorization, 67–74, 71 defined, 234–235 twin studies, 39–45, 40, 96 Caucasians, 212 moral development visual cliff studies, 46–52, cerebral cortexes, enriched 47, 48 and, 166 blindness, 35, 45–46 environments and, personality and, 233–242, Bobo doll study, 104–110 32–33, 33 bodily-kinesthetic intelli- CHD, 226–233, 229, 240 236, 239 gence, 121, 124 chickens, 49, 54, 55 colors, categorization of, bonding, 144–152, 148 child abuse, attachment borderline personality, 299 and, 150–151 68–74, 71 “Born to Choose: The chimpanzees, 55–56 communication, split brain Origins and Value of choice the Need for Control,” as control, 168–175, 172 studies, 20–29 174–175 learned helplessness, companionate love, 151 brains 258–265, 261 compassionate love, 151 corpus callosum, 20, locus of control and, 214 concepts, 67, 72 21, 28 cholesterol, 229, 230 concrete operational experiences, effects on, classical conditioning, 30–36, 31, 33 83–89 stage of cognitive fMRI to see activity in, claustrophobia, 281 development, 154 195–198, 196 Clever Hans, 112 conditioned reflexes, 83–89 hydrocephalus, 95 clinical psychology. conditioned response neurons, 32 see psychotherapy (CR), 85 protein synthesis during cloning, 44–45 conditioned stimulus REM sleep by, 65 cognition. see intelligence; (CS), 85 specialization in, 119– memories conditioning. see learning 120, 196–197, 196 cognitive development, ob- conditioning chambers, split brain studies, 19–29, ject permanence and, 98–99 21, 22, 26 152–160, 154 condom use, 205 conformity, 211, 310–315, 312, 314 conscience, 253 conscientiousness, 44 consciousness overview, 53
Subject Index 341 hypnosis, 75–82, 80 Thematic Apperception diffusion of responsibility, REM sleep and, Test and, 300 315–323, 319, 321 60–66, 63 D dishabituation, 59 consequences, behavior as dissociative disorders, Dani people, 68–74 influencing, 208 debriefing, 329 29, 299 contact comfort, 146–152, deception dissonance, 199. see also 148 facial expressions cognitive dissonance control and, 192 districts, 134 dizygotic twins, 39 benefits of, 168–175, 172 functional MRI for lie dogs, 84–89, 92, 258–265, cognitive dissonance, detection, 193–198, 196, 198 261 199–206, 203 dorsolateral prefrontal learned helplessness, informed consent and, 332 cortex, 196, 196 258–265, 261 double-blind method, 113 control, locus of, defense mechanisms, dreaming, 60–66 251–258 driving, 232 208–215, 210 drug use, REM sleep control recovery, 63 delirium tremens conventional morality, (DTs), 65 and, 65 DTs (delirium tremens), 65 163–164, 164 density, 266 core operations, 120, 121 depression E coronary heart disease control and, 174 eclectic approach to (CHD), 226–233, learned helplessness, therapy, 278 229, 240 corpus callosum, 20, 258–265, 261 edges, 134 21, 28 psychotherapy efficacy ego, 253 correctional officers. see The Ego and the prisons and, 279 correlations, in twin depth perception Mechanisms of Defense studies, 41 (Freud), 252 coyotes, 88 by formerly blind man, ego defense mechanisms, CR (conditioned 45–46 251–258 response), 85 ejaculation, multiple, 184 Crowded Minds: The Implicit visual cliff studies, 46–52, elderly people, control Bystander Effect study, 47, 48 and, 168–175, 172 323 emotions crowding, 265–273, 267 desensitization, 89, 283–284 angry face, picking out CS (conditioned desire, sexual, 183 from crowd, 191 stimulus), 85 determinism, 38 cognitive dissonance, culture. see also collectivist detumescence, 183 199–206, 203 cultures; individualistic diagnosis of mental health conditioning of fear, cultures 90–96, 93 facial expressions and, in mental hospital facial expressions and, 186–193, 188, 189 patients, 243–251, 246 186–193, 188, 189 Rorschach ink blot testing and, 287–293, 290, 291 Thematic Apperception Test and, 294–300, 296
342 Subject Index fear, distinguishing from excitement stage, 181, 181 filler items, 209, 210 surprise, 189–190, 189 execution teams, 331–332 fMRI, 195–198, 196, 214 existential intelligence, 121, FNE (fear of negative functional MRI for lie detection, 193–198, 125–126 evaluation), 322–323 196, 198 expectancies focal colors, 69 forced compliance, Emotions Revealed: Recogniz- behavior and, 208 ing Faces and Feelings to intelligence and, 199–206, 203 Improve Communication Fore people, 187–193, and Emotional Life 111–118, 114, 115 (Ekman), 192–193 for psychotherapy and 188, 189 form, perception of, 55–60 empiricist position, 46–47 success of, 278 form interpretation test. enriched environments, experiences, effects on see Rorschach ink 32, 34 brain of, 30–36, 31, 33 blot test environment, behavior, experimenter expectancy formal operations stage of cognitive genetics compared, effects, 112 development, 154 37–45, 40 The Expression of Emotion Frames of Mind environmental (Gardner), 119 cognition, 133 in Man and Animals fraternal twins, 39 environmental (Darwin), 191 free-association tests, 297 psychology, 133 external locus of control, free-floating anxiety, 254 environmental toxins, 208–215, 210 Freud, Sigmund, 90, 145, 35–36 extinction, 95, 97, 100 251–252 epilepsy, 21 extraversion–introversion, functional MRI, 195–198, equal environment 44 196, 214 assumption, 44 eyebrows, 192 ethics eyewitness reports, 135–143, G of crowding people, 266 139, 140, 167–168 Internet use in gambler’s fallacy, 210 research, 332 F gambling, 210–211 in Little Albert study, 94 gender of monkeys subject to facial expressions, 186–193, harmful conditions, 150 188, 189 aggression and, 107–108, moral development and, 107 161–168, 164, 165 Facial Figure Test, 57–58, in obedience study, 57, 58 androgyny, 216–225, 217, 330–331 219, 222 of severing corpus fantastic memories, 141 callosum, 21 fear. see also phobias cognitive maps and, of shocking dogs, 260, 134–135 264–265 anxiety, 254 evaluation distinguishing from conformity and, 313–314 apprehension, 320 defined, 216 surprise, 189–190, 189 intelligence and identity learning of, 90–96, 93 fear of negative evaluation with, 127 moral development and, (FNE), 322–323 feminity and androgyny, 166–167 216–225, 217, 219, 222 fields, visual, 22
Subject Index 343 obedience, 331 healthy behaviors Hypnosis: The Cognitive- one- or two-dimensional locus of control and, Behavioral Perspective 212–213 (Spanos), 82 view of, 216–217, 217 sexuality, 205, 315 sexual response and, Type A personality I theory, 226–233, 229 179–186, 179, 181 id, 252–253 teacher expectancies heart disease, 226–233, identical twins, 39–45, 229, 240 and, 118 40, 96 gender identity, 216 Heinz Dilemma, 162–163 I-E Scale, 209–210, 210 general mental ability hemispheres of the brain, illusions, optical, 59–60, 59 immunity conditioning, (g-score), 119 20–29 generalization, 92 hemisphericity, 29 88–89 genetics. see also nature– homophobia, 257 impoverished environ- horses, 112 nurture controversy human cloning, 44–45 ments, 32, 36 behavior, environment human development. imprisonment compared, 37–45 see also infants crowding and, 271 as changing attachment, 144–152, 148 effects of, 303–310, 304, control and, environment, 43 306, 307 coronary heart disease 168–175, 172 individualistic cultures morality, 161–168, 164, and, 230 characteristics of, 236 phobias as, 96 165 conformity and, 315 genomes, 41 object permanence, defined, 235 Genovese, Kitty, 315–316 personality and, 233–242, Germany, 300 152–160, 154 goats, 49 Human Sexual Inadequacy 236, 239 God control, 214 infants golden rule thinking, 164 (Masters and group size, 313, 314 Johnson), 186 depth perception by, guards, prison. see prisons Human Sexual Response 46–52, 47, 48 (Masters and H Johnson), 185–186 learned helplessness, 263 human sexual response object permanence, habituation, 59 cycle, 181, 181 hallucinations, REM sleep humanistic school of 152–160, 154 psychology, 101 preference looking, and, 65 humans, application of happy face, picking out animal research to, 54–60, 56, 57 34–35, 271 social referencing by, 51 from crowd, 191 hydrocephalus, 95 informed consent, 332 head circumference, 30 Hypnos, 75 ingroups, 234–235 head injuries, split brain hypnosis, 75–82, 80, ink blot testing and, 282–283 studies application 287–293, 290, 291 to, 27 inmates headaches, 279 health psychology, 231 crowding and, 271 effects from being, 303–310, 304, 306, 307
344 Subject Index insanity, 245 K lying institutionalized detection of, 193–198, Kinsey Reports, 177 196, 198 children, 150 kittens, 49 facial expressions and, 192 intelligence informed consent and, L 332 overview, 111 expectations and, labeling, dangers of, M 248–249 111–118, 114, 115 magnetic imbalances, 75 genetic factors lambs, 49 magnetic resonance landmarks, 134 for, 42 language, concepts and, imaging (MRI), 193 Multiple Intelligence Malacarne, Vincenzo, 30 67–68, 72 malnutrition, 35 (MI) Theory, 118–127, latent learning experiment, The Man Who Shocked the 121, 122 intelligence quotient 129–130, 130 World (Blass), 331 (IQ), 119 leading questions, 135–143, masculinity and androgyny, intelligence testing, racial or cultural biases in, 139, 140 216–225, 217, 219, 222 117, 119 learned helplessness, Masters, W., 185 internal locus of control, math phobia, 286–287 208–215, 210 258–265, 261 measuring devices, reliabil- Internet, 134, 332 learning interpersonal intelligence, ity and validity of, 221 121, 124 overview, 83 media, violence and, interpretation of accidental of aggression, 103–110, forms. see Rorschach 109–110 ink blot test 107 memories intrapersonal intelligence, conditioned reflexes, 121, 124 eyewitness reports, introversion–extraversion, 83–89 135–143, 139, 140 44 of fear, 90–96, 93 Inuit, 68 superstitions, 96–103 repressed, 82, 141–142 invisible displacements, The Lenses of Gender mental hospital patients, 157–158 IQ (intelligence (Bem), 224 243–251, 246 quotient), 119 linguistic intelligence, 121, mental representation. see J 122–123 cognitive maps Little Albert study, 90–96, 93 mental retardation, 279 jail. see prisons locus of control, 208–215, mental rotation task, 121, Japan, collectivist culture 210 122 of, 237–238, 239, 241 logical-mathematical intel- Merritte, Arvilla, 95 job selection, 29, 43 Merritte, Douglas, 95 Johnson, V., 185 ligence, 121, 123 Mesmer, Franz Anton, 75 loneliness, 241 meta-analysis, 275 looking chambers, 55 Mexican Americans, 212 love, 146–152, 148 mice, immunity condition- The Lucifer Effect: ing of, 88–89 Understanding How Good People Turn Evil (Zimbardo), 309
Subject Index 345 migraines, 279 The Myth of Repressed NS (neutral stimulus), mili, 69 Memories: False Memories 86, 91 Minnesota Multiphasic and Allegations of Sexual Abuse (Loftus & nursing, human develop- Personality Inventory Ketcham), 142 ment and, 145–149 (MMPI), 293, 300 Minnesota twin studies, N nursing home residents, 39–45, 40 168–175, 172 minorities, teacher expec- narcissistic personality, tancies and, 117–118 299–300 O modeling, 104 mola, 69 nativist position, 46 obedience, 324–332, monkeys, 144–152, 148 natural categories, 72 325, 328 monozygotic twins, 39–45, naturalist intelligence, 40, 96 object permanence, moral development, 121, 125 152–160, 154 161–168, 164, 165 nature–nurture controversy morals, defined, 161 old age, 169–175, 172 Moseley, Winston, 316 facial expressions and, 190 open field tests, 147 motivation, sexual, human nature and, 37–45 operant conditioning, 97 176–186, 179, 181 phobias, 96 opinion shifts, 199–206, 203 motivation for achieve- Type A personality optical illusions, 59–60, 59 ment, 211 orgasm stage, 181, 181 “Mozart Effect,” 36 and, 232 orgasms, multiple, 183 MRI (magnetic resonance visual cliff studies, 46–52, outcome studies, imaging), 193 multiple ejaculation, 184 47, 48 274–279, 277 Multiple Identities & negative reinforcement, 102 overcrowding, 265–273, 267 False Memories: A nesting behaviors, 270 Sociocognitive Perspective neurons, 32 P (Spanos), 82 neuroses, 255, 256, 280. Multiple Intelligence (MI) pain, sensitivity to, 79–80, Theory, 111, 118–127, see also phobias 80 121, 122 neuroticism, 44 multiple orgasms, 183 neurotoxins, 35–36 pansexuals, 270 multiple personality neutral stimulus (NS), 86, 91 parenting styles, 212, 213, disorder, split brain New Guinea studies and, 29 240–241 muscle relaxation, 282 Dani categorization, partial reinforcement, 100 music, brain development, 68–74 passive expectation, effects of, 36 musical intelligence, Fore people, 187–193, 155–156 121, 123 188, 189 paths, 134 pattern A, 226–233, 229 nodes, 134 pattern B, 226–233, 229 nonbehavioral Pavlovian conditioning, superclass, 277 83–89 noncontingent peer pressure, 310–315, reinforcement, 98 312, 314 non-rapid-eye-movement penis size, 182 percentiles, 276 sleep (NON-REM), 61–66
346 Subject Index perception types of, 281 problem-solving abilities, overview, 53 vicarious conditioning crowding and, 271 categorization, 67–74, 71 defined, 53 of, 88 prodigies, 120 preference looking, Phobos, 280 profession selection, 29, 43 54–60, 56, 57 physical intelligence, 121, progressive muscle Rorschach ink blot testing and, 287–293, 124 relaxation, 282 290, 291 pigeons, 99–103 projection, 255, 287–293, visual fields, 22 plateau stage, 181, 181, 182 pleasure principle, 290, 291 perceptual conformity, projective tests 310–315, 312, 314 252–253 polygraphs, 195, 197 defined, 288 personal intelligences, population density, Rorschach ink blot test, 121, 124 265–273, 267 287–293, 290, 291 personality positive reinforcement, Thematic Apperception overview, 207–208 androgyny and, 216–225, 101–102 Test, 294–300, 296 217, 219, 222 posttraumatic growth, 264 validity of, 299 culture and, 233–242, potato prints, 105 The Promise of Sleep: A Pioneer 236, 239 preconscious, 254 disorders of, 299–300 preference bias, 70 in Sleep Medicine experience or genetics preference looking Explores the Vital and, 40, 41–44 Connection Between locus of control and, defined, 53, 55 Health, Happiness and a 208–215, 210 of form by infants, 54–60, Good Night’s Sleep Rorschach ink blot test (Dement), 66 and, 287–293, 290, 291 56, 57 prosocial behaviors, 316 structure of, Freudian, object permanence protoconscious, 66 252–254 prototypes, 68 Thematic Apperception and, 159 proximal causes, 43 Test and, 294–300, 296 pregnancy, alcohol use pseudopatients, 243–251, Type A personality 246 theory, 226–233, 229 during, 167 psychoanalytic theory, premoral level, 163, 164 90, 281 persuasion, 211 preoperational stage of psychobiology, 19 pessimists, 232 psychological handicaps, phallic fallacies, 182 cognitive develop- 244 phobias ment, 154, 158 psychoneuroimmunology, prepotent stage, 162 89 as conditioned, 95–96 presuppositions, 136–137 psychopathology defined, 274, 280–281 primary circular overview, 243 desensitization of, 89, reactions, 155 crowding, 265–273, 267 prisons defense mechanisms, 280–287, 283, 286 crowding and, 271 251–258 as genetic, 96 effects on people of, 303– learned helplessness, 310, 304, 306, 307 258–265, 261 execution teams, 331–332 probers, 269
Subject Index 347 mental hospital patients reaction formation, 256, 257 111–118, 114, 115 and, 243–251, 246 reality principle, 253 sensori-motor stage of reciprocal inhibition, 282 Rorschach ink blot test reconditioning, 93 cognitive develop- and, 287–293, 290, 291 reconstruction, 136, 140 ment, 154, 155–158 recovered memories, 82, September 29, 2001, 264 Thematic Apperception sex offenders, 293 Test, 294–300, 296 141–142 sexual abuse, false memo- recovery phases, 62 ries of, 82, 141–142 psychotherapists, specializa- reference groups, 313 Sexual Behavior in the Human tion of, 272–273 reflexes, 83–89 Female (Kinsey), 177 refractory period, 183, 184 Sexual Behavior in the Human psychotherapy regression, 255 Male (Kinsey), 177 overview, 274 reinforcement, 97, 208 sexual response, 176–186, defined, 274 reinforcers, 97 179, 181 outcomes from, reliability, 221, 298 sexual response cycle, 274–279, 277 religious faith, 214 181, 181 Rorschach ink blot REM sleep, 60–66, 63 sexual revolution, 177–178 testing and, 287–293, REM-rebound effect, 64 sexuality 290, 291 repressed memories, 82, condom use and cogni- systematic desensitiza- tive dissonance, 205 tion, 280–287, 283, 286 141–142 conformity and risk Thematic Apperception repression, 254–255 behaviors, 315 Test and, 294–300, 296 resolution stage, 181, 181 crowding and, 269–270 rhesus monkeys, homophobia, 257 Puerto Rico, culture and, sexual revolution, 237–239, 239 144–152, 148 177–178 RNA to DNA ratio, 32–33, 33 sibs, 70 punishers, 97 romantic love, 151 sight. see blindness; punishment, 97 Rorschach ink blot test, perception Pygmalion effect, 113 signal stimuli, 85 287–293, 290, 291 simple phobias, 281 R Skinner Boxes, 98–99 S sleep, 60–66 rabbits, 92 smoking, 205, 211, 229, 230 radical behaviorism, 96–97 sanity, 245 social deviance, 244 rats savants, 120 social influence, 319 S.B., 45–46 social learning theory, 104 advantages of using, schizophrenics, fMRI social norms, 311 30–31 social phobias, 281 and, 197 social psychology cognitive maps, 129–135, secondary circular conformity, 310–315, 130, 131, 132 312, 314 reactions, 156 crowding and, secrecy and eyewitness 266–273, 267 reports, 167–168 depth perception, 49 self-accepted moral experimenter expectancy principles, 164 effects, 112–113 self-fulfilling prophesies, in Little Albert study, 91–92 reactance, 169
348 Subject Index defined, 302 subjective distress, 244 Type B personality, diffusion of responsibil- sublimation, 256 226–233, 229 superclasses of therapy, 277 ity, 315–323, 319, 321 superego, 253 Type D personality, 232 imprisonment effects, superstitions, 96–103 surprise, distinguishing from U 303–310, 304, 306, 307 obedience, 324–332, fear, 189–190, 189 unconditioned reflexes, 85 survival mechanisms, 175 unconditioned response 325, 328 synapses, 33 social referencing, 51 systematic desensitization, (UCR), 85 socioeconomic levels, locus unconditioned stimulus 280–287, 283, 286 of control and, 212 (UCS), 85, 91 South Fore people, T An Unconventional Family 187–193, 188, 189 tactile abilities, split brain (Bem), 224 spatial intelligence, 121, studies, 22, 22, 24–25 United States 122, 123–124 task specialization, 119–120, individualistic culture of, spatial orientation, 196–197, 196 237–238, 239, 241 130–132, 131, 132 technological visual cliffs, 51 multiple intelligence spatial relationships, 25, 26 tension headaches, 279 theory and, 126 specific phobias, 281 terrorism, 264 Spelke, Elizabeth, 59 Tests of General Ability prison population split brain studies, 19–29, in, 308 (TOGA), 113 21, 22, 26 Thematic Apperception sexual revolution in, stages of development of 177–178 Test (TAT), 294–300, morality, 162 296 universal ethical principles, stages of sleep, 61 therapy. see psychotherapy 164, 164 Standford County Jail tornadoes, deaths from, 213 touch, split brain studies, The Unresponsive Bystander: experiment, 303–310, 22, 22, 24–25 Why Doesn’t He Help? 304, 306, 307 touch therapies, 151–152 (Latané & Darley), state of awareness. toxic substances, 35–36 320–321, 321 see consciousness traits theory, 226 stimulus-response theory, trances, 81 unstructured evaluation 129 transfer tasks, 70 methods, 155 stress traumatic events, benefits control and, 169, 175 of, 264 Ute Indians, 212 crowding, 265–273, 267 Triarchic Abilities Test, 118 isolation as, 34 truth, 195–198, 196 V lying, 193–198, 196, 198 turtles, 50 Type A personality twin studies, 39–45, 40, 96 validity, 221, 292–293, theory, 226–233, 229 Type A personality, 298–299 strip maps, 132 226–233, 229 strokes, split brain studies verbal abilities, split brain application to, 27 studies, 23–25 sub-cortexes, 33 vicarious conditioning, 88 vicarious dissonance, 205 video games, violence and, 110 violence, 103–110, 107
Subject Index 349 visible displacements, W Z 156–157 weight gain, dream Zambia, 300 vision. see blindness; deprivation and, 65 zygotes, 39 perception wolves, 88 visual abilities, split brain World Wide Web, 134, 332 research and, 23–25 Y visual cliff studies, 46–52, 47, 48 yoking, 260 visual fields, 22 vocation, 29, 43
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