Nodia 2020 The Uncertain State of Georgia Democracy

Understanding the EU’s Association Agreements and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia The Uncertain State of Georgia’s Democracy Ghia Nodia 3 June 2020 Abstract Georgia has had several democratic breakthroughs but keeps failing to consolidate its democratic achievements. The 2012 electoral change of power gave rise to hopes for a new momentum of democratization and Europeanization. However, creation of the system of informal rule around billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, and politically selective persecution of the opponents of the regime led to extreme polarization of the political scene and an unfair playing ground for the political competition. Effective government control over the judiciary enabling the former to use it against political opponents has emerged as a major concern. The opposition, while divided on many issues, has united around the agenda of electoral reform and unacceptability of politically motivated persecution. The international democratic community remains a genuinely influential force respected by all political players. It facilitated a process of political dialogue between the government and the opposition that led to an agreement on 8 March 2020 regarding electoral reform and stopping politically motivated persecution. This was supposed to pave the way for more democratic conditions for pivotal parliamentary elections due in the fall. However, the opposition and the international community believe that ruling Georgian Dream party has failed to implement the second part of the agreement. Political tensions may ensue. Ghia Nodia is Professor of Politics at Ilia State University, Tbilisi. Available for free downloading at http://www.3dcftas.eu/ This publication is prepared within the framework of the CEPS-led '3DCFTAs' project, enabled by financial support from Sweden. Views expressed in this publication are attributable only to the author, and may not be attributed to either the partner organisations of the project or the institutions to which they may be attached, or the Government of Sweden.

Contents 1. The general profile of the Georgian political system .......................................................... 1 2. Excessive concentration of power and informal governance.............................................. 2 3. The Issues of the Independence of the Judiciary and politically motivated persecution.... 5 4. The weakness of political parties and the problem of political polarization ....................... 8 5. Civil society and new protest movements......................................................................... 10 6. The rise of anti-liberal nativist groups............................................................................... 11 7. The role of the international democratic community ....................................................... 13 8. The effect of COVID-19 pandemics ................................................................................... 14

The Uncertain State of Georgia’s Democracy Ghia Nodia 3 June 2020 1. The general profile of the Georgian political system Since its independence, Georgia has never been considered a full democracy but its political system has genuine democratic features. It has a competitive political environment, vibrant civil society, diverse and critical independent media. It has gone through several changes of power from government to the opposition, although only in 2012 this happened according to existing constitutional rules. It has been widely recognized as the most democratic nation in its immediate neighborhood. Despite this, however, Georgia still keeps failing to meet minimal standards of electoral democracy. The most conspicuous defect of its political system is a propensity to concentrate all levers of power within a ruling group dominated by a single powerful leader. Typically, the ruling party controls a constitutional majority in Parliament, takes advantage of the so-called “administrative resources\"1 to gain an unfair advantage during elections, exercises effective influence over the court system, fully dominates local government bodies, exerts pressure against business and independent media. The playing field between the government and the opposition is extremely uneven. Georgia’s political developments are notable for their cyclical character. Every change of government was broadly hailed as a democratic breakthrough and gave rise to hopes of eventual consolidation of democracy. New governments, such as those of the United National Movement (UNM) under Mikheil Saakashvili (2003-12) or Georgian Dream (GD), led by Bidzina Ivanishvili (since October 2012) initially enjoyed broad popularity and had strong international support. At this stage, they were more likely to carry out progressive reforms. However, initial enthusiasm tends to gradually be replaced by disappointment and apathy. As the government loses popularity and its position gets shakier, it is more likely to resort to less than democratic methods to maintain power. Deficiencies of Georgian democracy are often compared with the latest negative trends in established western democracies. This includes strong polarization within the political elites, the public, and the media, instrumentalization of the social and identitarian populism, weakness of political parties, etc. In Georgia’s nascent democracy, however, these have been stable features throughout the last three decades. Therefore, it might be misleading to look for 1 This term is used in post-Soviet countries to describe unfair advantage that government candidates draw from access to public financing for electioneering purposes, pressuring employees of public organizations, influencing decisions of election administrations, distributing benefits to voters before elections at public expense, etc. |1

2 | GHIA NODIA strong linkages between Georgia’s democratic deficiencies and the latest negative trends in developed western democracies. We started to work on this paper when the political life of the country was defined by preparations for very important parliamentary elections expected in October 2020. As the popularity of the ruling GD party had decreased and the prospect of losing power became stronger, signs of democratic backsliding became more conspicuous. This drew a new wave of criticism from the international democratic community.2 However, the COVID-19 pandemics and the state of emergency that was declared on March 23 for a month and later was extended until May 21st. changed a lot. Georgia’s fairly successful policy to contain the pandemic appears to have increased trust towards government while space for opposition activities shrunk. However, it is too early to assess any long-term influence of the pandemics on Georgia’s political developments. Below, we will discuss key challenges to Georgia’s democratic development in greater detail. 2. Excessive concentration of power and informal governance Excessive concentration of power has been a salient feature of the Georgian political system since it stabilized after 1995. Typically, the ruling party controls a strong (often constitutional) majority in Parliament and all or almost all municipalities (even though since 2005, municipal government is constitutionally independent of national authorities). It also has a strong effective influence on the courts' system and levers of pressure on the business community and independent media. This undermines the system of checks and balances in the system and leads to an uneven playing field during elections. The tenure of government under GD fully fits into this picture. When it came to power as a result of 2012 parliamentary elections, it got 61.3 percent of the vote in the proportional part of elections and 85 out of 150 mandates;3 later, as a result of defections from the UNM, its majority further increased, coming close to but not reaching a constitutional majority (101 MPS). In 2016, however, it got 115 mandates,4 above the constitutional majority. This happened because GD carried all the single-mandate districts save for two. In the 2014 and 2017 elections, GD also won majorities in all municipal councils in Georgia.5 Dominant parties, in their turn, exist around strong leaders, such as Zviad Gamsakhurdia (1990- 91), Eduard Shevardnadze (1992-2005), Mikheil Saakashvili (2004-12), and Bidzina Ivanishvili 2 Civil Georgia, 05.03.2020, “26 MEPs Express Worry over Georgia’s Democratic Backsliding”, https://civil.ge/archives/341052. 3 OSCE/ODIHR, “Georgia Parliamentary Elections 1 October. 2012 OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report”. Warsaw, 21 December 2012. 4 OSCE/ODIHR, “Georgia Parliamentary Elections 8 and 30 October 2016. OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report”. Warsaw, 3 February 2017. 5 In 2018, the Borjomi municipality was the single exception, where initially a coalition of opposition parties created a majority coalition in the local council.

THE UNCERTAIN STATE OF GEORGIA’S DEMOCRACY | 3 (since 2012). The excessive power of these individuals did not necessarily contradict formal constitutional requirements of democracy but ran against their spirit. Personalistic parties cannot possibly have internal democracy. When they come to power, their authoritarian structures influence practices of governance. Constitutional structures of governance are also being distorted: Having access to the leader may be more important than a formal position in government. The GD period in power, however, brought about an important additional feature usually described as “informal governance”. This coincided with a constitutional change. Until 2012, vast personal power exercised presidents were generally commensurate with those of the institution of presidency as defined by the Constitution. Following Constitutional changes adopted in 2010 and enacted in 2013, Georgia moved to a mixed system with strongly abridged presidential powers. Further changes adopted in 2017 made it a fully parliamentary republic with only ceremonial powers for the presidency. These changes were expected to make the system less dominated by powerful personalities and leave a greater role for Parliament. In practice, however, the personalistic structure remained in place but became much less transparent. Bidzina Ivanishvili, a founder and uncontested leader of the GD, served as the prime minister (the highest position of power in the new constitutional system) for one year from October 2012 to November 2013. After his resignation, he announced that he was becoming a private citizen and would quit politics. However, numerous indirect indicators suggested that he continued to exercise effective control over the overall direction of the GD policies. Prime ministers that succeeded Ivanishvili were largely seen as technical managers rather than political leaders and were replaced several times, presumably based on Ivanishvili’s decisions.6 In April 2018, he took the position of the chairman of the GD party, though this did not change the overall character of the “informal governance.” In an expert poll conducted by Georgian Institute of Politics in December 2019, Georgian and international experts considered informal governance to be one of the two most severe problems the Georgian democracy faces (alongside lack of judiciary independence).7 Moreover, Ivanishvili’s personal power is largely based not on his charisma or political record, but on the size of his wealth that is considered enormous by Georgian standards. In April 2020, Forbes estimated his fortune at 4.8 billion8 – no other Georgian even came close to making it to the Forbes’ billionaire list. This makes it more difficult for any opposition group to effectively compete with a party in power that has access to both “administrative resources” and can take advantage of Ivanishvili’s personal fortune. In October 2018, following a relatively weak showing of Salome Zurabishvili, a government-supported candidate, in the first round of 6 Irakli Garibashvili served between November 2013 and December 2015 and was succeeded by Giorgi Kvirikashvili (December 2015 – June 2017), Mamuka Bakhtadze (June 2017 – September 2019), and Giorgi Gakharia (since September 2019). 7 Georgian Institute of Politics, 23.12.2019, “Observers Warn Georgia’s Democracy is Deteriorating”. http://gip.ge/observers-warn-georgias-democracy-is-deteriorating/#more-13559. 8 Forbes, „#349 Bidzina Ivanishvili”, https://www.forbes.com/profile/bidzina-ivanishvili/#86cfedc45989.

4 | GHIA NODIA presidential elections, the Georgian government announced a plan to cancel debts of about 600 thousand Georgians (about a quarter of the Georgian electorate) at the expense of contribution from Cartu Bank owned by Ivanishvili.9 The linkage between money and power raises the stakes in the struggle for political power. As Georgia’s recent history suggests, turnover of power often leads to persecution of former leaders. After GD came to power in 2012, legal cases were opened against most prominent leaders of the previous UNM government: some of them were imprisoned, others chose to leave the country. To compare, following the 2019 elections Vladimir Plahotniuc, the informal ruler of Moldova, had to flee the country. Such an option would be extremely painful for a leader with great holdings in Georgia, such as Mr Ivanishvili. What can be done to address the problem of excessive concentration of power? Institutional solutions are often discussed. For years, many democracy supporters blamed the presidential system. However, it is now obvious that a switch to the parliamentary system did not help solve the problem. Moreover, it created better opportunities for leaders controlling ruling parties in a shadow, informal ways (as examples of Poland and Moldova until 2019, and Georgia have shown). An electoral system is another institutional factor in favor of the concentration of power. Since 1995, Georgia has had different versions of a mixed electoral system, whereby part of the mandates are distributed through party lists and another half – through single-mandate constituencies. In the last several elections, the ratio has been 77 mandates for party lists and 73 – for the so-called “majoritarians”. With rare exceptions, incumbent party candidates carry all or almost all single-mandate seats. For instance, in 2016 elections the incumbent GD party won in 71 districts, while the remaining two were taken by formally independent candidates supported by GD. This allowed GD to control 115 seats out of 150, even though the proportional system only gave it 48.7 percent of the vote. Many democracy supporters in Georgia believe that changing to a fully-proportional system might solve the problem of the excessive concentration of power. Before the 2012 elections, GD pledged to make this change if it came to power but dragged its feet afterward. In 2017, as a part of a general overhaul of the Constitution, the fully proportional system was introduced, but its implementation was postponed until 2024. However, the prospect of holding elections in 2020 according to the old system caused discontent of the opposition and civil society. In June 2019, facing large scale street protests, the GD pledged to amend the Constitution again to introduce the fully proportional system for 2020 elections, but reneged on the promise in November, referring to internal opposition from its majoritarian MPs.10 This led to another round of street protests and the opposition boycotting the Parliament sessions. On March 8, following a lengthy process of negotiations facilitated by the international diplomatic corps, the 9 Civil Georgia, 19.11.2018, “Government Announces Deal to Write off Bad Debts”, https://civil.ge/archives/266476. 10 Civil.ge, 14.11.2019, “MPs Vote down Constitutional Amendment on Transition to Proportional Electoral System”, https://civil.ge/archives/326316.

THE UNCERTAIN STATE OF GEORGIA’S DEMOCRACY | 5 government and the opposition came to a compromise agreement: the ratio between party list/majoritarian MPs would change to 120/30, and no party that got under 40 percent of the vote would be allowed to create a majority independently. This has been hailed inside and outside the country as an important step forward.11 The agreement, however, requires adopting changes in the Constitution. 3. The Issues of the Independence of the Judiciary and politically motivated persecution Fairness and independence of the judiciary, and the justice sector in general, is a major area of concern in Georgia. This has been the case under different governments, but during the last two to three years the problem has moved to the center of attention of civil society, the expert community, and the political opposition. In a poll conducted by Transparency International Georgia in February-March 2019, only 18 percent of respondents said they \"trusted\" or \"rather trusted than distrusted\" courts (only Parliament had a lower level of trust). 53 percent believed courts were under the influence of the ruling party (18 percent disagreed).12 In a November 2019 poll, 45 percent of those polled assessed the performance of the Georgian Courts as \"bad\" or \"very bad\" against 38 percent who considered it \"good\" or \"very good\".13 The prosecution office and the police are even less expected to be politically impartial. The capacity of the ruling party to influence court decisions is considered the main challenge. Allegations of selective justice against the opposition and the media are frequent and they come not only from the opposition representatives but, increasingly, from the civil society and the international democratic community.14 On a positive side, corruption in the court system is a lesser concern, and allegations of corruption are relatively rare. Reduction in the rates of corruption in the public service, including in the justice sector, has been the most conspicuous and widely acclaimed achievement of the Mikheil Saakashvili government, which has proven resilient in the later years. In the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International, Georgia continues to be the clear leader in the eastern European region.15 11 Civil.ge, 18.03.2020, “PACE Co-rapporteurs: March 8 Agreement Offers “Window of Opportunity” for Georgia”, https://civil.ge/archives/342957. 12 Transparency International Georgia, 08.04.2019, \"The Majority of respondents say that judges with a history of succumbing to political pressure should leave the judiciary”, www.transparency.ge/en/post/majority- respondents-say-judges-history-succumbing-political-pressure-should-leave-judiciary. 13 Laura Thornton, Koba Turmanidze, Public Attitudes in Georgia: Results of December 2019 Survey, https://www.ndi.org/publications/results-december-2019-public-opinion-polls-georgia-0. 14 Ghia Nodia, “The international democratic community, watching Georgia, aghast at Bidzina Ivanishvili's behavior”, 3 DCFTAs Op-ed No 5/2020, February 2020, https://3dcftas.eu/op-eds/the-international-democratic- community-watching-georgia-aghast-at-bidzina-ivanishvilis-behaviour. 15 Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index 2019, https://www.transparency.org/cpi2019. Georgia had its historically best score of 58 (41st place in rankings) in CPI 2018. This slid somewhat to 56 (44th place in rankings) in 2019.

6 | GHIA NODIA Starting from adopting an Organic Law on Courts in 1997, there had been several waves of reforms in the judiciary. Their general direction followed the advice of the international community, with European institutions (EU, Council of Europe, Venice Commission) being rather active in this regard. In particular, Georgian judges can only be appointed only after graduating from the High School of Justice and passing impartial examinations – this is supposed to ensure their high professional standards; their remunerations are relatively high by Georgian standards, so they have fewer incentives to seek income through corruption; the High Council of Justice (HCJ), rather than the political authorities, is in charge of selection, appointment and dismissal of judges and other governing functions within the judicial system, thus supposedly ensuring autonomy of the judiciary corps from the incumbent government; many judges are now appointed for life, which is supposed to guarantee the independence of individual judges. Steps in this direction were taken by different governments. Since 2012, the GD government carried out four additional waves of reforms; most of them followed recommendations of the Georgian civil society and international democratic community, though some important details became subject to criticism. Admittedly, the general institutional framework of the Georgian judicial system complies with international best practice.16 The Prosecutor’s Office also underwent institutional reforms. In 2008, it was brought under the ministry of justice (broadly following the US and French models). This, according to critics, made it too dependent on the government. In 2015, further legislative changes were made aimed at increasing the independence of the office. A prosecutorial board was created; the general prosecutor is selected by Parliament upon the nomination of the prosecutorial board.17 However, the reforms failed to achieve a breakthrough concerning the independence of the judiciary. As civil society watchdogs allege, leaders of the ruling party have maintained effective informal control over the judicial body that allows them to ensure desirable court verdicts in politically sensitive cases. Allegedly, the ruling party works through the so-called “clan”, or a group of informally influential judges that exercises effective control over the HCJ.18 It is widely presumed that the general prosecutor follows instructions from the leadership of the ruling party. The process of selection and appointment of the Supreme Court judges for life that started in December 2018 and was completed a year later proved especially controversial. Supreme Court nominations are the most important remaining leverage of Parliament to influence the court 16 Steven Blockmans, Nadejda Hriptievschi, Viacheslav Panasiuk, and Ekaterine Zguladze, “Integrity on Trial: Judicial reform in Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova”, CEPS Working Document No 2018/04, June 2018; Coalition for an Independent and Transparent Judiciary, The Judicial System: Past Reforms and Future Perspectives, Tbilisi 2017. 17 The Venice Commission recommended the general prosecutor to be elected by qualified rather than by a simple majority of Parliament, but this recommendation was not followed. – See European Commission For Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), “Georgia Opinion On the Draft Revised Constitution as Adopted by the Parliament of Georgia at the Second Reading on 23 June 2017”, p. 11, https://www.venice.coe.int/ webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2017)023-e. 18 Civil Georgia, 16.02.2019, “CSOs, Citizens Start Petition ‘to Save the Judiciary’”, https://civil.ge/archives/276891.

THE UNCERTAIN STATE OF GEORGIA’S DEMOCRACY | 7 system: it elects judges for life based on nominations by the HCJ. The government critics alleged the process was aimed at consolidating the GD control over the judicial system, with the list of the nominees presented by the HCJ being put together by the “clan” in coordination with the ruling party.19 A group of the ruling party MPs led by Eka Beselia, the Vice-Speaker of Parliament, joined the criticism and eventually left the GD faction in protest.20 Under pressure, Parliament postponed the appointment of the Supreme Court judges and developed a new, more elaborate and transparent procedure for selecting and appointing the candidates both in the HCJ and Parliament. While this did increase the level of transparency on both stages of nomination and appointment process, the outcome was under full control of the ruling party and its friends within the HCJ. OSCE ODIHR observers \"raised serious questions about the integrity of the process” in HCJ.21 In December 2019, the final vote in Parliament took place with the opposition boycotting the process due to protests over the failure of the ruling party to carry out the electoral reform. In March 2020, Nino Kadagidze was elected a new Chair of the Supreme Court.22 She is believed to represent the same “clan” informally ruling the court system. Using the court system for the persecution of political opponents is the most salient feature of government control over the court system. The ruling party was criticized for the application of selective justice against its political opponents from the very start of its tenure.23 The most recent last case, imprisonment of Gigi Ugulava, one of the leaders of the European Georgia Party (who had already been in prison in 2014-17), caused an especially high level of criticism both internationally and domestically.24 19 Interpressnews, 17.01.2019, “Eka Gigauri: ‘Murusidze-Chinchaladze clan’ gives instructions to the Parliament”, https://www.interpressnews.ge/en/article/100190-eka-gigauri-murusidze-chinchaladze-clan-gives-instructions- to-the-parliament. 20 Civil Georgia, 22.02.2019, “MP Beselia Quits Georgian Dream, Announces ‘New Political Platform’”, https://civil.ge/archives/277530. 21 OSCE/ODIHR, Second Report on the Nomination and Appointment of Supreme Court Judges in Georgia, June- December 2019, p. 4. 22 Civil Georgia, 17.03.2020, “Georgian Parliament Confirms New Supreme Court Chair”, https://civil.ge/ archives/342756. 23 Civil Georgia, 23.05.2013, “OSCE PA Special Envoy's Statement on Merabishvili's Arrest”, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=26103&search=; Civil Georgia, 27.05.2013, “Several U.S. Senators Express Concern over Ex-PM's Arrest”, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=26115&search=; Civil Georgia, 23.10.2013, “Polish, Swedish FMs Hail Georgia's Progress, Warn Against Selective Justice”, http://www.civil.ge/ eng/article.php?id=26594&search=; 24 Civil Georgia, 22.01.2020, “In Quotes: MEPs on Recent Developments in Georgia”, https://civil.ge/archives/335407; Civil Georgia, 31.01.2020 “Georgia in PACE Resolution”, https://civil.ge/archives/336826; Civil Georgia, 12.02.2020, “European Parliament Members Slam Georgian Gov’t over Ugulava Verdict”, https://civil.ge/archives/338488; Civil Georgia, 12.02.2020, “Estonia, Sweden ‘Concerned’ about Gigi Ugulava’s Imprisonment”, https://civil.ge/archives/338441; Civil Georgia, 12.02.2020, “EU-Georgia Parliamentary Association Committee Fails to Adopt Joint Statement“, https://civil.ge/archives/338750; Interpressnews, 11.02.2020, “Giorgi Margvelashvili: Gigi Ugulava is a political prisoner, who was jailed due to political reasons”, https://www.interpressnews.ge/en/article/105775-giorgi-margvelashvili-gigi-ugulava-is-a- political-prisoner-who-was-jailed-due-to-political-reasons.

8 | GHIA NODIA On March 13th, about twenty opposition parties (including all major ones) signed a joint memorandum on the main directions of the judicial reform in case of coming to power. This included measures such as terminating powers for all current members of HCJ, repealing all acts of appointment of judges from 2017, and appointing of foreign judges to the Supreme Court and Courts of Appeal. Whatever the merits of these proposals, the agreement constitutes recognition of especial concern over the condition of the Georgian judiciary and readiness to apply unconventional and controversial approaches to address the problem. 4. The weakness of political parties and the problem of political polarization Low credibility of mainstream political parties, high levels of political polarization, and the rise of illiberal populist movements are broadly discussed as indicators of backtracking or even crisis of democracy in many countries. Similar challenges also exist in Georgia, though the way they are expressed may be different. The weakness of political parties is a stable structural deficiency of Georgia’s political system. Relatively strong parties have been political organizations created around strong leaders. These personalities rather than policy agendas or ideologies define their identities. Political parties – at least those that have played leading role in the political process – never had distinct ideologies and played the “catch-all” game. Dividing lines between them was mainly related to the support for specific political leaders. Even if a party had a relatively distinct policy agenda, there was a gap between this policy and the issues it campaigned on. For instance, when in power, UNM was often considered a champion of neoliberal economics, but it usually campaigned as the best provider of social support and infrastructure. Political parties are weekly institutionalized: if their leaders exit the political scene, they tend to disappear or dramatically decline in support and influence. Political parties also have a low level of trust.25 Low support for the political class also expresses itself in the fact that in polls taken in periods between elections, an especially high number of respondents cannot or does not define a party they support. In recent years, mistrust of parties is often linked to the topic of “polarization” or “bi-polarity”. In the Georgian context, this refers to the political scene being dominated by two political parties, GD and UNM, associated with, respectively, Bidzina Ivanishvili and Mikheil Saakashvili. Both parties and their supporters refuse to consider each other as legitimate political actors. It is part of the persistent discourse of the ruling party that UNM should not be just defeated in elections, but it should disappear as a political force as it has no moral legitimacy to take part in the political process. This rhetoric is used to justify political persecution against UNM leaders and activists, including Mikheil Saakashvili. On the other hand, Saakashvili and UNM supporters 25 According to the February 2020 poll carried out by Edison Research for Formula TV, 35 percent of respondents trusted political parties and 36 percent trusted Parliament. This is lower than for other public institutions - https://formulanews.ge/News/https://formulanews.ge/News/მოსახლეობის_73_პროცენტი_მიიჩნევს%2C_რ ომ_ქვეყანა_არასწორად_ვითარდება_-_Edison-ის_სრული_კვლევა/22835?fbclid=IwAR32LpmEBDQ5IADS _62hOgoZp0TJEi_SYzMbCQawY60V4w2TbXEvFWXna30.

THE UNCERTAIN STATE OF GEORGIA’S DEMOCRACY | 9 habitually portray Ivanishvili and GD leaders as stooges of Putin’s Russia and promise persecution against them if they come to power.26 Many Georgian and foreign analysts consider such polarization to impede democratization.27 While this may be true, there is nothing new about the trend towards polarization and mutual demonization between the government and the opposition. The first president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, was often portrayed by his opponents as hidden collaborator of Soviet security services and was violently deposed in January 1992; the 2003 Rose Revolution was bloodless but resulted from an extreme political confrontation. This mindset leads to readiness for non- constitutional methods in the political struggle, not accepting election results, as well as abuse and persecution of the political opponents. The trend of political polarization in the media also contributes to the radicalization of party supporters.28 The record of the elections shows that generally, the voters tend to support opposition parties they see as more radically opposed to the incumbent. This being said, the perception of the bi-polarity of the Georgian political scene is often exaggerated. Government rhetoric contributes to it when it falsely presents all of its critics (including opposition parties, the civil society, independent media, and even the international community) as parts of a UNM-coordinated effort. In reality, many opponents of the government are also strongly critical of Saakashvili and the UNM. While the latter continues to be the most powerful opposition party, there is a growing understanding that it has no chances to defeat GD on its own. Cooperation between the opposition parties, however, makes the prospect of the change of power in the next parliamentary elections more realistic.29 A switch to the fully proportional electoral system is often seen as a way to both make an electoral change of power more realistic and overcome the extreme polarization syndrome. While promoting that change, the opposition parties have displayed a high level of cooperation. 26 Silagadze, Givi, Nino Gozalishvili, Extreme Political Polarisation as a Threat to Democratisation. The Georgian Case. Democracy Reporting International, Aug 29 2019. https://medium.com/strengthening-political-pluralism-in- georgia/extreme-political-polarisation-as-a-threat-to-democratisation-d331d7f6592b. 27 European Commission. “Georgia: EU report highlights the importance of maintaining reform momentum and depolarising the political environment”. 7 February 2020. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/ news_corner/news/georgia-eu-report-highlights-importance-maintaining-reform-momentum-and_en; Civil Georgia, 18.02.2019, “Behrendt: Georgian Politics Trapped between Saakashvili and Ivanishvili”, https://civil.ge/archives/276028. 28 Nino Robakidze, Political Polarization and Media: Threats to the Democratic Process in Georgia, Georgian Institute of Politics Policy Brief #19, March 2019. http://gip.ge/political-polarization-and-media-threats-to-the- democratic-process-in-georgia/. 29 According to the March 2020 Formula TV poll, almost 40 percent of respondents who had made up their minds were ready to vote for GD and 53 percent – for a hypothetical bloc of all opposition parties (not counting openly anti-western ones like Alliance of Patriots). Only 23 percent were ready to vote for the UNM. https://formulanews.ge/News/მოსახლეობის_73_პროცენტი_მიიჩნევს%2C_რომ_ქვეყანა_არასწორად_ვი თარდება_-_Edison-ის_სრული_კვლევა/22835?fbclid=IwAR32LpmEBDQ5IADS_62hOgoZp0TJEi_ SYzMbCQawY60V4w2TbXEvFWXna30

10 | GHIA NODIA They do not plan to create a unified opposition bloc but discuss a possibility of unifying around single candidates in the first round of the “majoritarian” component of the elections. 5. Civil society and new protest movements Non-partisan civil society is an important and growing social and political actor in Georgia. Mistrust towards organized political parties may be an additional factor explaining the increased relative influence of civil society organizations. Three main types of organizations should be mentioned here. One is an organized civil society sector or NGOs. There is a long tradition of a vibrant and active NGO community in Georgia. It positions itself as an impartial actor committed to promoting democratic and liberal values and institutions, as well as the cause of European integration. Overdependence on the donor community and weak roots in broader society limits its impact (this is typical for the East European countries), but the NGO sector compensates this through being active and focused and creating coalitions around specific issues. After coming to power in 2012, GD demonstrated readiness to cooperate with civil society, also to stress its difference from the UNM government. For instance, its so-called “first wave” of reforms in the judiciary largely followed recommendations of the civil society and was welcomed by most organizations. However, later, as NGOs started to be increasingly critical of government practices, relations started to deteriorate. It has become typical for the GD leaders to allege that civil society organizations follow the UNM lead, even though most of them were strongly critical of the UNM government as well. However, despite the hostile rhetoric of the government, the NGO community is quite free and unrestricted in its activities and influences the public agenda, even if its impact on the actual government policy is rather limited. The rise of much less structured but more influential social movements, mostly comprising young people, is among the most important new features of the last years. The White Noise movement that mobilized young people around the demands to liberalize drug policies induced the government to make some limited steps to meet the protesters’ demands.30 However, the focus of this movement was rather narrow. The Sirtskhvilia (Shame) movement proved much more consequential. It sprang out of spontaneous protests triggered by Sergey Gavrilov, a Russian MP, leading the session of the Interparliamentary Orthodox Assembly from the chair of the speaker of the Georgian Parliament. The initial protests targeted the Georgian government’s allegedly unprincipled position towards Russia as the occupying power, or even its alleged hidden pro-Russian agenda; however, the demands quickly extended to broader democracy and human rights issues, such as that of moving to fully proportional system of elections. The government reaction was swift: the speaker of Parliament took responsibility for the Gavrilov incident and resigned, and Bidzina Ivanishvili personally issued a pledge to amend 30 Civil Georgia, 14.05.2018, “Interior Minister Meets Members of White Noise Movement”, https://civil.ge/ archives/241674.

THE UNCERTAIN STATE OF GEORGIA’S DEMOCRACY | 11 the Constitution to change the electoral system. This showed that such movements may be more effective than the opposition in pushing the government to make concessions. Attitudes towards the opposition parties constitute a divisive issue within such groups: some activists consider the parties too discredited to cooperate with, others think the aims of the movement cannot be achieved without such cooperation. In the summer and fall of 2019, other youth protest groups emerged that were closer to specific political parties such as Gabede (Dare) and Shetsvale (Change). Still, for a large part of the potential constituency of youth protest movements, association with specific opposition parties (especially with the UNM) continues to be unacceptable, which weakens their mobilizing capacity. This may partly explain why did the protest actions gradually lose their steam after it peaked at the end of June 2019. 6. The rise of anti-liberal nativist groups Public activism does not only attract supporters of liberal and democratic causes. There is an increasing number of anti-liberal nativist groups (ALNG), including media organizations. These groups are numerous and rather different in their age, social background, priorities, level of organization, and methods of actions. However, there are several dominant themes most salient in their discourse: (1) European and generally western influence is pernicious for the country, it undermines traditional Georgian culture and promotes immorality, especially by supporting rights of LGBTQ community; (2) Georgia’s liberal elites, including pro-western political parties, NGOs, etc. are sell-outs to global interests; (3) Tourists and especially entrepreneurs that come from Muslim countries (Turkey, Iran, and the Arab world) are dangerous as they have a hidden agenda of Islamizing Georgia; (4) The course towards NATO and EU integration is counterproductive to the country while finding accommodation with Russia should take priority. A majority of ALNG position themselves as strong supporters of the Georgian Orthodox Church; conversely, a large part of the clergy express support to activities of such groups and may take part in their activities.31 There are different opinions among analysts regarding the reasons for the increase of activism and the influence of ALNG. Obviously, this is a global phenomenon and Georgia is part of it, but it still should be explained from changes in the Georgian society. One reason may be a backlash against radical reforms carried out by the UNM government. These reforms were carried out under a banner of westernization and they did bring Georgia’s institutions and practices closer to the European models, but were carried out in a top-down manner and were resented by some segments of the society. This explains why all ALNG are especially hostile towards UNM more than to any other political party. 31 Adriana Stephan, Defining the Far-Right in Georgia: From Neo-Fascists to Populist Parties, Georgian Institute for Politics Policy Paper #5, Tbilisi October 2018, http://gip.ge/defining-the-far-right-in-georgia-from-neo-fascists-to- populist-parties/; Ghia Nodia, “Nativists Versus Global Liberalism in Georgia”, in Richard Youngs (Ed), The Mobilization of Conservative Civil Society (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2018), pp. 45-50, https://carnegieeurope.eu/2018/10/04/mobilization-of-conservative-civil-society-pub-77366

12 | GHIA NODIA The Russian support for the ALNG is another popular explanation. It is widely recognized that Russia supports such groups in many countries; while specific expressions of such support are not always easy to trace, most analysts agree that the Russian government finds ways to financially support such groups in Georgia. Only a few of them are openly pro-Russian, as such stance would be especially unpopular in Georgia. Many of them deny any links or sympathy to Russia and highlight that their agenda is close to that of the right-wing populist movements in the West, so that being anti-liberal does not make them necessarily anti-European and anti- western. However, there is an obvious coincidence of messages between those promoted by the Russian propaganda and disinformation machine, and those of the Georgian ALNG. For this reason, most of their critics presume them to be Russia-linked.32 The most important issue is not their presence as such but their influence on public opinion and political life. The Alliance of Georgias’ Patriots is the strongest political party that represents this segment of opinion. In 2016 elections, it barely got five percent of the vote thus meeting then minimal requirement necessary to make it to Parliament. This is much less than right-wing populist parties get in many European countries. It is a greater problem that the ruling GD contains many sympathizers for the illiberal nativist agenda. While they frequently exercise violent tactics or threats of violence, they are rarely and only mildly punished for this.33 Moreover, it appears to consider such groups as useful allies against the political opposition and critical social movements. Both the ruling party and ALNG demonize the UNM as well as other pro-western opposition and civil society groups and media organizations whom they consider UNM allies. On several occasions when anti-government youth protests were being mobilized, ALNG organized counter-demonstrations, threatening violence against youth groups whom they typically accuse of immorality. In such cases, the government did not make any distinction between peaceful protesters and those openly threatening violence, and positioned itself as a force ensuring peace between social groups that happen to conflict with each other. In such cases, while there was no evidence suggesting that counter-demonstrations were inspired by the government, in effect, the government instrumentalized counter- demonstrations organized by ALNG against its critics.34 Another challenge is the government’s failure to protect vulnerable groups against violence or threats of violence that come from ALNG groups. The LGBTQ community is the most obvious case at point. ALNG groups have pledged to violently disrupt any public event, however small, that expresses support to LGBTQ rights. They demonstrated this on May 17, 2013, when a mob led by priests violently attacked a small public event in support of LGBTQ. Police physically 32 Lasha Tughushi et al., “Threats of Russian Hard and Soft Power in Georgia”, European Initiative-Liberal Academy Tbilisi, 2016, http://www.ei-lat.ge/images/doc/threats%20of%20russian%20soft%20and%20hard%20power.pdf; David Sichinava, “Georgia's far-right are anti-Russian but share Russian narratives”, OC Media 2 April 2019, https://oc-media.org/analysis-georgia-s-far-right-are-anti-russian-but-share-russian-narratives/; 33 Sasha Delemenchuk and Agit Mirzoev, “Georgia’s government is failing to take on right-wing extremism”, OC Media 7 August 2019, https://oc-media.org/opinions/opinion-georgia-s-government-is-failing-to-take-on-right- wing-extremism/. 34 Civil Georgia, 14.05.2018, “Protesters Clear Rustaveli Avenue after Talks with Interior Minister”, https://civil.ge/archives/241524.

THE UNCERTAIN STATE OF GEORGIA’S DEMOCRACY | 13 saved participants of the event but failed to protect their right for self-expression, and perpetrators of violence were not punished. This set a trend. In 2019, the LGBTQ community was prevented from carrying out any public events because the government would not guarantee their physical safety, at the same time refusing to restrain their violent opponents. 7. The role of the international democratic community The relative openness of the Georgian political system correlates with the general political consensus around the double goal of European and Euro-Atlantic integration: According to numerous polls, around 70-75 percent support Georgia’s professed course to join EU and NATO (support for EU integration tends to be somewhat higher).35 All Georgian governments, indeed all major political parties avow firm commitment to this course. It is well understood by political elites and the general public that Georgia’s recognition as a European nation largely (though not exclusively) depends on the progress in building democratic institutions. This gives EU and other western powers fairly strong leverage with regards to any Georgian government when it comes to pushing for democratic reforms. This leverage is not necessarily linked to specific benefits that the EU can propose at any given period. It is often said that after Association Agreement with Europe as well as Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements came fully into force in 2016, and in 2017 Georgian citizens were granted a visa-free status in Schengen zone countries of the EU, there are no obvious tangible benefits that EU could use as a strong \"carrot\" for Georgia.36 Georgia considers it to be a logical next step from the EU side to send some signal that it would recognize Georgia’s European vocation and considers at least a general possibility of providing it a membership perspective at some point, but the EU is not prepared to make this step. Despite this, however, the general prestige of the EU in Georgia remains fairly high and general commitment to the idea of European, as well as Euro-Atlantic integration, stay unwavering. It is also notable that while current US administration demonstrates less support for democratic causes worldwide and transatlantic relations appear to be going through another difficult phase, in Georgia, US and EU are still largely seen as two coordinated powers, especially when it comes to supporting democratic reforms. In effect, such coordination between diplomatic representatives of the EU, EU states, and the US takes place and influences local political processes. The Georgian government continues to demonstrate deference to western advice and criticism, even though it does not always follow their recommendations. 35 In a relatively recent such poll of November 2019, 82 percent of respondents approved of Georgia's stated goal to join the EU and only 10 percent disapproved. The ratio was 74 vs 14 percent for NATO membership. Since 2012, in similar polls, support for EU and NATO membership never went below 61 percent. – Laura Thornton, Koba Turmanidze, Public Attitudes in Georgia: Results of December 2020 Survey, https://www.ndi.org/ sites/default/files/NDI%20Georgia_December%202019_Public%20Presentation_ENG_VF.pdf. 36 Licinia Simao, “The challenge of moving EU-Georgia relations forward”, EDCN Blog 24 November 2017, https://eurasiademocraticsecuritynetwork.wordpress.com/2017/11/24/the-challenge-of-moving-eu-georgia- relations-forward/.

14 | GHIA NODIA A number of the above-mentioned controversial cases that lead to stand-offs between the government and the opposition (Constitutional debates of 2017, the appointment of Supreme Court judges in 2019, negotiations over the electoral system) illustrate this point. While the government tends to be openly dismissive towards the demands of the opposition and, increasingly, civil society, the influence of the democratic international community may induce it to at least come to the negotiating table. The issue of the electoral system was especially telling in this regard. After GD reneged on its promise of amending the Constitution in November 2019, it largely ignored the protests of the opposition and civil society and pronounced the issue closed. However, an especially strong wave of criticism from both sides of the Atlantic prompted it to change its position. There existed widely shared understanding that GD decision to reject the electoral reform was motivated by the fear of losing 2020 elections. Moreover, the rising political polarization could reach a point whereby the electoral process could lose its legitimacy and the country faced both threats of destabilization and democratic backsliding. Both international and Georgian observers urged EU and international democratic community in general to take more active role in facilitating a way out of the crisis.37 European political figures openly expressed solidarity with Georgian activists calling for electoral reform.38 In December, 2019 a dialogue process between the government and the opposition took place under the facilitation of the western diplomats, led by EU and US representatives.39 On March 8, the final compromise was signed in the residence of the US Ambassador. It is widely understood that pressure of the international democratic community was the main reason why the government agreed to make some concessions, and the West remains to be the chief guarantor of the implementation of the agreement after the state of emergency is lifted. 8. The effect of COVID-19 pandemics The COVID-19 pandemics created new challenges not only for public healthcare and the economy, but also for democracy worldwide.40 China and Russia propaganda machines actively use the crisis to demonstrate that they are more effective in handling it than western democracies. Some parts of the Georgian public may be receptive to this propaganda. On the other hand, the objective necessity to take emergency measures and concentrate power in the 37 Kornely Kakachia and Bidzina Lebanidze, “Does EU have role in stopping backsliding in Georgia?”, EUObserver, 5 December 2019, https://euobserver.com/opinion/146784. 38 https://twitter.com/hansvanbaalen/status/1201846442681421824. 39 Civil Georgia, 09.12.2019, “Georgian Dream, Opposition Mull over Reforming Majoritarian Electoral System”, https://civil.ge/archives/330815. 40 Rachel Kleinfeld, Do Authoritarian or Democratic Countries Handle Pandemics Better? Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 31, 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/03/31/do-authoritarian-or- democratic-countries-handle-pandemics-better-pub-81404?utm_source=carnegieemail&utm_medium= email&utm_campaign=announcement&mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiWmpSallqTmxPRGc1TWpNNCIsInQiOiJwMjhhZ29QOTh 1NTM0UGplV0ZuUlpYZlVNQ2FqVHNoVjg3OUt3UXYyY2pZXC9Ldm5XWTUzc25nY2tUdVQ0eGk3cHdibWtvaisrQ09 RUytrVlZpK2RBanV6elhocFRIOGFBeU9cL3Axd2FqdXJGR1A1UW1PYVhaSkpJWkwreUozcDVBIn0%3D

THE UNCERTAIN STATE OF GEORGIA’S DEMOCRACY | 15 executive order to fight the pandemic creates new challenges for fragile democratic institutions in countries like Georgia. The measures taken in response to pandemics changed the dynamics of political life dramatically. At this point, it is impossible to assess its short- or long-term impact on democratic institutions, though one can presume that there will be such an impact. On March 21, the Georgian president declared a state of emergency for one month.41 Opposition parties announced they were supporting this decision. Later, it was extended for another month, until May 22, though this time the opposition refused to support the decision referring to the government’s failure to present any anti-crisis program.42 No restrictions on activities of the opposition and independent media were instituted. The government also pledged that the state of emergency would not be used by the ruling party to avoid the implementation of the 8 March agreement to amend the Constitution to change the electoral system. According to Irakli Kobakhidze, former Parliament speaker, there is an agreement between the government and the opposition that constitutional changes will be adopted in two weeks after the state of emergency ends.43 It is too early to say whether the outbreak disrupts the electoral cycle. According to the Constitution, elections cannot take place earlier than in forty five days after the state of emergency ends. As of time of this writing, Georgia has proven to be a relatively successful case of response to the outbreak. The Georgian government was rather fast to enforce strict measures of international isolation and social distancing that many democratic countries were initially reluctant to embark on. While there have been no recent public opinion polls to confirm this, most observers assume that since pandemic started, the popularity of the government has increased. Popular interest towards political or any other topics not related to the pandemic sharply declined. The opposition continues to be critical of the government but the intensity of criticism has declined. It is only natural that in times of crisis, people rally around the government, especially if it is considered to be generally successful in addressing the issue at hand. However, in semi- democratic systems, like that of Georgia, this may further strengthen a pre-existent trend towards full concentration of power within the ruling group. One cannot be sure that the presumed surge in popularity of the government greatly outlives the end of the pandemics, whenever this happens. Success in containing the spread of COVID- 19 involves huge economic costs that will become more acutely felt when life starts coming back to normal. There is a chance that existing contradictions within the Georgian political system may become even sharper. 41 Civil Georgia, 21.03.2020, “Georgia Declares State of Emergency to Halt Coronavirus Spread”, https://civil.ge/ archives/343503. 42 Civil Georgia, 21.04.2020, “COVID-19: Georgia Extends State of Emergency until May 22”, https://civil.ge/ archives/347858. 43 Tabula, 02.04.2020, “Kobakhidze: opozitsiastan shevjerdit, rom sagangebos dasrulebidan 2 kvirashi mivighebt tsvlilebebs [Kobakhidze: We Agreed with the Opposition that the amendments will be adopted within two weeks after the and of the State of Emergency], http://www.tabula.ge/ge/story/168338-kobaxidze-opoziciastan- shevjerdit-rom-sagangebos-dasrulebidan-2-kvirashi-mivighebt.