Fictionalism 383 The first of these may seem surprising, but, in speaking of fictional characters, itsfailure has some plausibility. There are characters who treat everyone badly does notappear to entail Everyone is treated badly by some character. We naturally read the formersentence as meaning that some characters treat every character in their fiction badly; thelatter, however, seems to speak of everyone in or outside a work of fiction. The secondand third formulas above in effect mix stories. In general, what Quine calls \"rules of passage\" are not valid. Also, note that despitethe symmetry of the quantificational truth clauses, the quantifiers are not duals of eachother, because of the intuitionistic understanding of negation.7.4 Settled ModelsSay that 4i is settled iff for all k, k' 2 k, if A is in the language of k, then k' It A 3 k It A.In settled models, that is, further stages of construction make no difference to truth values.It is easy to see that, in settled models, sentential connectives behave classically. Even in settled models, however, the quantifiers do not behave classically. The aboveformulas remain invalid. A sound and complete system for settled models has, in additionto the rulesMP: t-A, t- A+ B* x A tB y does not occur in A)UG: t- Ay lx (where + t- Va complete set of schemata for classical sentential logic, and schemata defining &, V, and3 in terms of the other connectives, the following quantificational axiom schemata: UI: VxA + Atlx, where t is a term free for x in A CBV. VxA -+ VyAylx, where y is a variable free for x in A DIS: Vx(A + B) + (VxA -+ VxB) AMAL: (VxA & VyB) + VxVy(A& B), where x does not occur free in B and y doesnot occur free in A BVQ: A + VxA, where A is a basic formula and x does not occur free in AThe proof proceeds by defining a tableau system analogous to those for intuitionisticlogic.7.5 Minewan ConstructionsThe logic of quantification that emerges from this conception is thus weaker than intu-itionistic logic and, even on the class of settled models, weaker than classical logic. Isthere a restricted class of models on which the quantifiers behave classically? If so, wemight see classical logic as stemming from a more general semantics plus ontologicalconsiderations. In fact, two rather different sets of ontological assumptions yield classicallogic. One is metaphysically especially well-suited to ordinary physical objects; the other,to mathematical objects. Assume throughout that we are within the class of settled mod-els. It is simplest to assume that we have replaced the intuitionistic clauses for sententialconnectives with their classical counterparts.
384 Daniel Bonevac We may think of the domain as constructed in two different senses. In the collectivesense, the domain may be constructed in stages if objects are added to it gradually, atdifferent stages of construction. In the distributive sense, the domain may consist ofobjects which themselves are constructed gradually, in stages. Call a construction (or theobjects issuing from it) minervan if it produces elements that are complete as soon asthey emerge, and marsupial if it produces elements that are fledgling at first and achievematurity gradually as the structure unfolds. Fictional objects are typically marsupial; theyare defined gradually throughout a work of fiction, and might develop in a variety of ways.Earlier stages of construction do not determine how later stages must go. Mathematicalobjects might be construed similarly. But they might also be construed according to theminervan conception. The properties of 2, K,or e appear to be determined as soon as theyare introduced -though it might of course take a very long time for those properties tobe known, articulated, and understood. Interestingly, under certain conditions, each conception leads to a classical logic ofquantification. Consider first the minervan conception. We might think of our ourselvesas constructing a well-defined domain of objects. The domain expands in stages. Everyobject introduced, however, is fully defined as soon as it is introduced, and retains its iden-tity across subsequent stages of construction. The domain, in other words, is constructedin the collective sense only; each object is fully characterized upon its introduction. Formally, we can capture this conception by restricting ourselves to Berkeley models,models R that are strong nets in the sense that, for all k, kr E K there is a k\" E K such thatk u k' k\". (The name is inspired by Bishop Berkeley's thought that our constructionsare approximations of ideas in the mind of God.) Nodes in a strong net are compatiblewith each other; they must agree about the objects they have in common. By induction on the complexity of formulas, we can show that, if R is a settled strongnet, then, for any sentence A of L and k, k' E K , if L(A) G L(k) and k 5 k', k It A o k' It-A. It follows that A holds in all settled strong nets iff A is classically valid. The real significance of this result lies not in its application to mathematical objects,which, if viewed as fictional, seem to be construed more naturally as marsupial, but in itsapplication to physical objects. If objects are minervan, then the constructive aspects ofthe semantics make little difference, and the logic that emerges is classical. That explainshow the criteria of existence in mathematical and nonmathematical contexts can appearquite different, even though exists has a univocal meaning in both. It explains, in short,how it is possible for the fictionalist to satisfy Benacerraf's semantic continuity require-ment, giving a uniform semantics for mathematical and nonmathematical language.7.6 Marsupial ConstructionsMarsupial constructions, too, under certain conditions yield classical logic. If we thinkof objects as constructed gradually in stages, we might naturally think of later stages ofdevelopment as to some extent undetermined by earlier stages. The construction mighttherefore develop one or more relational structures. Suppose that moreover we think of theobjects as \"thin\" from an ontological point of view -as described purely qualitatively,having no further hidden nature or essence [Azzouni, 1994; Yablo, 20011. We might,
Fictionalism 385for example, think of the names in our theory as mere pegs in a relational grid. As inBenacerraf [1965], for example, we might think of the numeral '2' not as standing for adeterminate object but as marking a place in a relational grid of order type w. I will callthe models that make this conception precise structuralist models. Such models seemsespecially well suited to mathematical theories, which at best characterize their objectsup to isomorphism. Let f be a function from objects to objects such that the domain o f f includes D ( k ) .Extend f to formulas by letting f (A) be the result of replacing each designator of x inA with a designator of f ( x ) . Node f ( K ) is such that, for every atomic sentence A of L,f ( k ) It- f ( A ) o k It A. I f f is a one-one function from D ( k l )onto D(k2),say that kl andk2 are equivalent modulo f (kl =f k2 a k2 = f ( k l ) ) . A has the universal understudy property iff the following holds for k l ,k2,k3 E K suchthat kl 2 k3 and kl =f k2 for some f : If C c D ( K ) is disjoint from D(k3) and g is anyone-one function from D(k3)- D ( k l ) onto C, then there is a k4 E K such that k3 =fvg k4and k2 Ik4. In models with this property, any group of objects not already in a node mayplay the roles of a group of that node's objects. In this sense, anything in the universe ofthe model but playing no role in a node may serve as \"understudy\" for anything that isplaying a role. The objects of such a model are extremely versatile; they can play any rolethe model provides. That reflects well the idea that the objects in such a model are merepegs, having no identity independent of the bundle of properties they instantiate. Say that A is inexhaustible iff for each k l ,k2 E K there is a subset C of D ( K ) suchthat C n D ( k l ) = 0 and ICI = ID(k2)l. Given the assumption that K f 0, this conditionimplies the weaker property that, for all k E K , there is a c E D ( K ) such that c 4 D(k).If k E K and n is a natural number, there is a set C C D ( K ) disjoint from D(k) which hascardinality n. If A is inexhaustible and has the universal understudy property, it also has the exis-tential understudy property: for all k l ,k2,k3 E K such that k l 2 k2 and kl 2 ks, there-,exist a set C' c D ( K ) such that C' n (D(k3)- D ( k l ) ) = 0, a one-one function f fromD(k3) - D ( k l )onto C', and a k4 E K such that k2 k4, where g is the union o f f and theidentity function on D ( k l ) .If a model has this property, each collection of objects playingroles in a node has a team of \"understudies\" not contained in the node who can take overthe roles played by members of the collection -and in fact do so on another node of themodel. Call any inexhaustible model with the understudy properties permutable. rA model A is a weak net iff, whenever k l ,k2 E K and kl ( D ( k l )n D(k2)) = k2( D ( k l )nD(k2),there is a k3 E K such that kl u k2 c_ k3. Any two nodes that agree on theircommon domain, that is, are together subsumed within some further node. In a weak net,nodes function as giving (partial) information about their objects; whenever they agreeon the objects appearing on both, the model combines the information to yield a morecomplete picture of the objects in question. But there is no requirement that nodes agreeon their common objects. The model may develop alternative and incompatible portraitsof the objects under construction. A structuralist model, then, is a permutable weak net. By induction on the complexityof formulas, we can show that, if A is a settled structuralist model, then, for any sentence
386 Daniel BonevacA of L and k,kt E K, if L(A) c L(k) and k 5 k', k It A @ k' It A. It follows thatA holds in all settled structuralist models iff A is classically valid. This explains how itis possible to maintain both that mathematical objects are constructed and that classicallogic is appropriate to mathematical reasoning. It also explains how a unified semanticsfor mathematical and nonmathematical language can apply successfully to both and yieldclassical logic when applied to both, even though the semantics itself is nonclassical.7.7 Open ModelsWe have so far developed two conceptions under which a symmetric, constructive seman-tics for quantification yields classical first-order logic. But our constructive fictionalismis not yet free-range. Neither conception reflects Cantor's idea that the essence of math-ematics is its freedom; neither reflects PoincarC's thought that existential assertions inmathematics require nothing more than consistency. To capture those notions, we needthe concept of an open model, an model, analogous to a canonical model in modal logic,in which all possibilities -or, at least, all possibilities consistent with certain constraints-are realized. Let W be a set of infinite cardinality K. The open model of cardinality K for W, Ow =(K, I, D, It), is generated from K = {k : 3 U C W(IUI < K & D(k) = U)), wherek 2 k' H D(k) C D(k'). It is straightforward to show that Ow is an inexhaustible weak netwith the understudy properties -in short, a structuralist model. It follows that Zb(Ow)is a first-order theory. Say that model fi for L is reductively complete iff for all k E K and every L' such thatL c L' c L(k), k /' L' E K. In reductively complete models, altering the quantifica-tional clauses to ones considering only nodes extending the current one by the additionof a single object would make no difference, provided that for any sentence A of Lk andkik'~K,kItAok'ItA. We can use this fact to show (somewhat tediously) that if L contains no individualconstants and 0 is an open model of cardinality K, Z b ( 0 ) is decidable. Moreover, Zb(0) isan V 3 theory, axiomatized by the set U(0) of axioms of the form Vxl ...x,3yl ...y, F(2',9,where n 2 0, m 2 1,F(x',9 is a consistent conjunction of basic formulas built frompredicates of L and variables from among xl ...x,,, yl ...y,, and in each conjunct there is atleast one occurrence of one of the ys. It is possible to generalize this result in two different directions. First, suppose that isa reductively complete structuralist model: a reductively complete permutable weak net.Then ZIJ(R)is a first-order theory axiomatized by %(a)), consisting of(i) all axioms of the form Vx'(G(2) -t 3yG1(2',y)), where for some 2, c, G ( 3 ,G'(2, c) are diagrams of some k, k' E K such that D(kt) extends D(k) by a single object, and(ii) all axioms of the form Vx', y(G(2) -, Vi Gi(x',y)), where for some such 2, c, G ( 3 , G'(2, c), G I(2,c), ..., G,,(c', c) are diagrams of all the kt E K extending k by a single object. If fiis not reductively complete, but has an analogous property with respect to finite extensions, then Zt)(.E) is similarly axiomatizable, and will in fact be decidable iff %(a)) is recursively enumerable.
Fictionalism 387 Second, and more immediately relevant to mathematics, suppose that P is a decidableset of purely universal sentences of L - sentences, from a metaphysical point of view,carrying no ontological commitment. Then we can characterize the P-open model ofcardinality K for W , OpVW= (K, 5 ,D, IF), generated from K = { k : 3 U c W(IUI <K & D(k) = U & the diagram of k is consistent with P)), where k 5 k' o D(k) c D(k').It is straightforward to show that OPSWis an inexhaustible weak net with the understudyproperties. It follows that Zb(Op,w)is a classical first-order theory. Suppose, for example, that L consists of a single nonlogical two-place predicate < char-acterized as a strict linear order by the purely universal axioms Vx,y(x < y + ~y < x),Vx,y,z((x < y & y < z) + x < z), and Vx,y(x < y V y < x V x = y). Among the the-orems of the theory of the <-open model of cardinality KOfor N would be Vx3y x < y,Vx3yy < x, and Vx, y(x < y + 3z(x < z & z < y)). We thus get a theory of a dense linearorder extending infinitely in both directions, even though every stage k in the structurehas a finite domain. If every mathematical theory could be analyzed as the theory of a P-open model ofsome cardinality, we could stop the account here, and have, perhaps, a version of modalstructuralism that would capture a variety of fictionalist insights. Whether it would de-serve to be called a version of fictionalism is unclear. Unlike other forms of structuralism,it does take seriously the thought that the structures in question are products of humancreative activity governed by no constraints other than those applying to fiction. Howmany mathematical theories might be analyzed as theories of P-open models remains anopen question. It appears, however, that some mathematical theories are fictionalist in a stronger sense.They appear not to be analyzable as theories of P-open models. Peano arithmetic, forexample, assumes the existence of zero as the sole natural number without a predeces-sor. Set theory assumes the existence of the null set and of an infinite set. Geometry,on Hilbert's axiomatization, assumes the existence of two points lying on a line, threepoints not lying on a line, and four points not lying in a plane. It is possible to accountfor some such theories in terms of Q-open models in which, among the axioms of Q,there are not only purely universal sentences but also (a) pure existentials (needed, forexample, in the case of geometry) and (b) definitions of one or more constants (needed,for example, in the case of arithmetic). Suppose, for example, we define 0 by means ofthe formula Vx(x = 0 ++ -3y Syx), where S is the successor relation, and stipulate thatVx, y, z((Sxy & Syz) + y = z) and Vx, y, z((Syz & S xz) + x = y). The theory of therelevant open model then includes Vx3ySxy and Vx(x # 0 + 3ySyx). The inductionschema corresponds to a pure universal in a second-order language, and so can perhapsin principle be included in the axiom set Q. For that reason, in fact, it is easier to analyzesecond-order arithmetic as the theory of a Q-open model than it is to analyze first-orderarithmetic in similar fashion. For the same reason, it is easier to attempt an analysis of second-order set theory.Whether set theory or geometry can be understood as the theory of a Q-open model is alarge question I cannot discuss here in detail. The general strategy for set theory would beto use arithmetic or the theory of dense linear order to define an infinite set, thus justifyingthe axiom of infinity; to use Q to define unions, pair sets, and power sets, and to express
388 Daniel Bonevaca second-order abstraction axiom; and then to view axioms of sum sets, pair sets, andpower sets as theorems. However the details of this might go, the philosophical moral appears to be that certainmathematical theories, especially existential mathematical theories such as Peano arith-metic and set theory, if capable of being given a fictional interpretation, are fictional intwo senses. They are fictional in the sense that they speak of objects constructible giventhe general criteria of construction governing fiction. They are also fictional in the sensethat they require the postulation of an object -zero, in the case of the theory of naturalnumbers, or the null set, in the case of set theory -that accords with those criteria butthe existence of which cannot be viewed as a logical truth. The semantic fictionalism I amoutlining is irresistably fictionalist; it does not collapse into deductivism or reductionism.7.8 Modal TranslationsThat both minervan and marsupial conceptions of objects -Berkeley models and struc-turalist models - yield classical first-order logic raises a number of questions. First,under what conditions does the semantics I have sketched yield first-order logic? Wehave seen two sets of sufficient conditions; what are necessary conditions? What effect dothe understudy properties and the weak net condition have on their own? Are there condi-tions that might be imposed on the semantics to yield intuitionistic logic? How do strongnets and structuralist models behave when not restricted to the class of settled models? I can only begin to address such question here. Some light is shed on them by consid-ering a modal translation of formulas. Kurt Godel [I9331 showed that intuitionistic logictranslates into modal logic in such a way that a formula is valid intuitionistically iff itstranslation is valid in S4. Almost exactly the same translation works for the logic I havedeveloped here. We may define the translation of a formula recursively as follows: A\" = OA, if A is atomic (,A)\" = O7A\" (A&B)\" =AK&B\" (A v B)\" = A\" v B\" (A -+ B)\" = O(AK+ B\") (VxA)\" = OVxA\" (3xA)\" = 03xA\"This is identical to the Godel translation except for its treatment of existential quantifi-cation. Let MS4 indicate quantified S4 with domains that may increase in accessibleworlds, and CS4 indicate quantified S4 with constant domains (and similarly for otherlogics). MS4 thus validates the converse Barcan formula, OVxA -+ VxOA, and CS4 val-idates in addition the Barcan formula, VxOA -+ OVxA. It is straightforward to establishthe following facts: A is valid on the class of all models iff A\" is valid in MS4. A is valid on the class of all settled models iff A\" is valid in MS5. A is valid on the class of all settled Berkeley models iff A\" is valid in CS5. A is valid on the class of all settled structuralist models iff A\" is valid in CS5.
Fictionalism 389 A is valid on the class of all weak nets iff A\" is valid in MS4.2.S4.2, with characteristic axiom OOA > OOA, characterizes the class of reflexive, transi-tive, and convergent models. (R is convergent iff Vx, y, z((xRy A xRz) 2 3w(yRw A zRw)).)It points the way to the schema 3xVyA -t Vy3xA, which holds in all weak nets. It is tempting to think that there might be a constraint that would yield intuitionisticlogic. Brouwer [1913; 19491 and Heyting [I9561 suggest such a possibility, contend-ing that intuitionistic logic is required specifically for infinite mathematical constructions.Dummett [1973], in contrast, denies that intuitionism can be given any such ontologicalfoundation, insisting that it rests solely on a semantical thesis about the nature of truth. Itis easy, in the context of the view I have developed, to confirm Dummett's perspective:There is no class C of models such that A is true in C iff A is intuitionistically valid. Anyconstraint on models that would permit the existential quantifier to behave intuitionisti-cally, so that k It- 3xA o 3cl E D(k) k Ik A(d), would force the universal quantifier tobehave classically. The asymmetry of intuitionistic logic's treatment of the quantifierscannot be removed by any ontological constraint on the class of models. Burgess and Rosen object to semantic views that overtly or covertly introduce modality,as mine arguably does, on the ground that they trade one obscurity for another. Indeed,a number of fictionalist views -perhaps all of them -can be seen as trading ontologyfor ideology. Fictionalists often add modal notions, and can legitimately stand accused ofeliminating commitments to abstracta and other troublesome entities at the expense of acommitment to possibilia. Some fictionalists see this as an advance, since possible objectsor states of affairs need to be invoked for other kinds of modals. Others see it as at bestan intermediate step, and argue for a modal fictionalism that employs the same strategy toeliminate commitment to possible worlds. Modal fictionalism has its own problems that Icannot discuss here. In any case, any philosopher of mathematics who takes seriously theneed to explain the necessity of mathematics (or, more neutrally, perhaps, its applicabilityto hypothetical and counterfactual situations) encounters the problem of accounting formodal operators. So, this raises issues that are not unique to fictionalism or even especiallyforceful with respect to it. It highlights, however, an issue that faces fictionalism in general. Metaphysical andepistemological problems arise when a discourse seems to commit us to empirically in-scrutable objects or facts. Fictionalism addresses those problems by construing the dis-course as fictional, as capable of succeeding despite the nonexistence of such objects orfacts. One can go on to ask why, in the absence of such constraints, that discourse, asopposed to other possible competitors, succeeds. Attempts to respond by citing a factthreaten to collapse the fictionalist project into reductive or modal accounts. Only ac-counts that allow all possible discourses to count as successful seem to promise a theorythat is stably fictional. BIBLIOGRAPHY[Adams, 19771 M. Adams. Ockham's Nominalism and Unreal Entities, Philosophical Review 87, 144-176, 1977.[Adams, 19871 M. Adams. Williarr~Ockharn. 2 vols., Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987 (2nd rev. ed., 1989.)
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392 Daniel Bonevac[Peirce, 18911 C. S. Peirce. The Architecture of Theories, Monist; reprinted in Buchler, 315-323, 18891.[Peirce, 1896a1 C. S. Peirce. Lessons from the History of Science, 1896. In C. Hartshorne and P. Weiss (ed.), Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Volume 1: Principles of Philosophy. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1960: 19-49.[Peirce, 1896b1 C. S. Peirce. The Regenerated Logic, Monisr 7, 19-40, 1896; reprinted in C. Hartshorne and P. Weiss (ed.), Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Volume 3: Exact Logic. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1933: 266-287.[Peirce, 18971 C. S. Peirce. The Logic of Relatives, Monist; reprinted in Buchler, 146-147; and in Hartshorne and Weiss, Volume 3,288-345, 1897.[Peirce, 18981 C. S. Peirce. The Logic of Mathematics in Relation to Education, Educational Review; 209-2 16, 1898; reprinted in Buchler, 135-139, and in Hartshorne and Weiss, Volume 3, 346-359.[Peirce, 19021 C. S. Peirce. Minute Logic, manuscript; reprinted in Buchler, 139-145, 1902.[Peirce, 1905al C. S. Peirce. Issues of Pragmaticism, Monist; reprinted in Buchler, 290-294, 300-301, 1905.[Peirce, 1905bl C. S. Peirce. What Pragmatism Is, Monist, 1905; reprinted in Buchler, 251-267.[Peirce, 19761 C. S. Peirce. The New Elements ofMathenzatics, Volume IV, Mathematical Philosophy, C. Eisele (ed.). The Hague: Mouton, 1976.[PoincarC, 19521 H. PoincarC. Science and IIypothesis. New York: Dover, 1952.[Priest, 19941 G. Priest. Is Arithmetic Consistent? Mind, 103, 337-49, 1994.[Priest, 19961 G. Priest. On Inconsistent Arithmetics: Reply to Denyer, Mind, 105, 649-59, 1996.[Priest, 19971 G. Priest. Inconsistent Models of Arithmetic; 1 Finite Models, Journal of Philosophical Logic. 26,223-35, 1997.[Priest, 20001 G. Priest. Inconsistent Models for Arithmetic: 11, The General Case, The Jountal of Symbolic Logic, 65, 1519-29,2000.[Putnam, 19671 H. Putnam. Mathematics without Foundations, Journal of Philosophy 64, 5-22, 1967; reprinted in P. Benacerraf and H. Putnam 1983,295-31I .[Quine, 19391 W. V. 0.Quine. A Logistical Approach to the Ontological Problem. The Ways ofparadox (Cam- bridge: Harvard University Press. 1976), 198, 1939.[Quine, 19511 W. V. 0.Quine. On What There Is, in From a Logical Point of View,New York: Harper & Row, 1-19, 1951.[Quine, 19601 W. V. 0.Quine. Wordattd Object. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1960.[Quine, 19691 W. V. 0. Quine. O~ttologicalRelativiry and Other Essays. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969.[Resnik, 19751 M. Resnik. Mathematical Knowledge and Pattern Cognition, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 5,25-39, 1975.[Resnik, 19851 M. Resnik. How Nominalist is Hartry Field's Nominalism? Philosophical Studies 47, 163-181, 1985.[Resnik, 19971 M. Resnik. Mathetnatics as a Science of Patterns. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.[Rosen, 19901 G. Rosen. Modal Fictionalism, Mind 99, 327-354, 1990.[Rosen, 19931 G. Rosen. The Refutation of Nominalism (?), Philosophical Topics 21, 149-186, 1993.[Rosen, 19951 G. Rosen. Modal Fictionalism Fixed, Analysis 55, 67-73, 1995.[Rosen, 20031 G. Rosen. A Problem for Fictionalism for Possible Worlds,Analysis 53,71-81,2003.[Rosen, 20051 G. Rosen. Problems in the History of Fictionalism. in Kaldcron 2005.[Routley and Routley, 19721 R. Routley and V. Routley. The Semantics of First Degree Entailment, Nous, 6, 335-359, 1972.[Russell, 19181 B. Russell. The Philosophy of Logical Atomism in Logic and Knowledge, ed. R.C. Marsh. London: Allen and Unwin, 1956, 177-281, 1918.[Schiffer,20031 S. Schiffer. The Things We Mean. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003.[Shapiro, 1983a1 S. Shapiro. Conservativeness and Incompleteness, Journal qf Philosophy 80, 521-53 1, 1983.[Shapiro, l983bl S. Shapiro. Mathematics and Reality, Philosophy o f Science 50,523-548, 1983. [Shapiro, 19971 S. Shapiro. Philosophy ofMathematics. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. [Shapiro, 20001 S. Shapiro. Thinking About Mathernatics. Oxford: Oxford University Press ,2000. [Sober, 19931 E. Sober. Mathematics and Indispensability, Philosophical Review 102, 35-57, 1993. [Spade, 19981 P. Spade. Three Versions of Ockham's Reductionist Program. Frarlciscarl Studies 56, pp. 335- 46, 1998. [Spade, 19991 I? Spade, ed. The Cambridge Contpanion to Ockhanl. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999. [Spade, 1999al P. Spade. Ockham's Nominalist Metaphysics: Some Main Themes. In Spade [1999], 100-117, 1999.
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SET THEORY FROM CANTOR TO COHEN Akihiro KanamoriSet theory is an autonomous and sophisticated field of mathematics, enormously success-ful not only at its continuing development of its historical heritage but also at analyzingmathematical propositions and gauging their consistency strength. But set theory is alsodistinguished by having begun intertwined with pronounced metaphysical attitudes, andthese have even been regarded as crucial by some of its great developers. This has encour-aged the exaggeration of crises in foundations and of metaphysical doctrines in general.However, set theory has proceeded in the opposite direction, from a web of intensions toa theory of extension par excellence, and like other fields of mathematics its vitality andprogress have depended on a steadily growing core of mathematical proofs and methods,problems and results. There is also the stronger contention that from the beginning settheory actually developed through a progression of mathematical moves, whatever andsometimes in spite of what has been claimed on its behalf. What follows is an account of the development of set theory from its beginningsthrough the creation of forcing based on these contentions, with an avowedly Whiggishemphasis on the heritage that has been retained and developed by the current theory. Thewhole transfinite landscape can be viewed as having been articulated by Cantor in sig-nificant part to solve the Continuum Problem. Zermelo's axioms can be construed asclarifying the set existence commitments of a single proof, of his Well-Ordering Theo-rem. Set theory is a particular case of a field of mathematics in which seminal proofs andpivotal problems actually shaped the basic concepts and forged axiomatizations, thesetransmuting the very notion of set. There were two main junctures, the first being whenZermelo through his axiomatization shifted the notion of set from Cantor's range of inher-ently structured sets to sets solely structured by membership and governed and generatedby axioms. The second juncture was when the Replacement and Foundation Axioms wereadjoined and a first-order setting was established; thus transfinite recursion was incorpo-rated and results about all sets could established through these means, including resultsabout definability and inner models. With the emergence of the cumulative hierarchy pic-ture, set theory can be regarded as becoming a theory of well-foundedness, later to expandto a study of consistency strength. Throughout, the subject has not only been sustainedby the axiomatic tradition through Godel and Cohen but also fueled by Cantor's two lega-cies, the extension of number into the transfinite as transmuted into the theory of largecardinals and the investigation of definable sets of reals as transmuted into descriptive settheory. All this can be regarded as having a historical and mathematical logic internal toset theory, one that is often misrepresented at critical junctures in textbooks (as will bepointed out). This view, from inside set theory and about itself, serves to shift the focus toHandbook of the Philosophy of Science. Philosophy of MathematicsVolume editor: Andrew D. Irvine. General editors: Dov M. Gabbay, Paul Thagard and John Woods.@ 2009 Elsevier B. V. All rights reserved.
396 Akihiro Kanamorithose tensions and strategies familiar to mathematicians as well as to those moves, oftenmade without much fanfare and sometimes merely linguistic, that have led to the crucialadvances. 1 CANTOR1.1 Real Numbers and CountabilitySet theory had its beginnings in the great 19th-Century transformation of mathematics,a transformation beginning in analysis. Since the creation of the calculus by Newtonand Leibniz the function concept had been steadily extended from analytic expressionstoward arbitrary correspondences. The first major expansion had been inspired by the ex-plorations of Euler in the 18th Century and featured the infusion of infinite series methodsand the analysis of physical phenomena, like the vibrating string. In the 19th-Century thestress brought on by the unbridled use of series of functions led first Cauchy and thenWeierstrass to articulate convergence and continuity. With infinitesimals replaced by thelimit concept and that cast in the E-6language, a level of deductive rigor was incorporatedinto mathematics that had been absent for two millenia. Sense for the new functions givenin terms of infinite series could only be developed through carefully specified deductiveprocedures, and proof reemerged as an extension of algebraic calculation and becamebasic to mathematics in general, promoting new abstractions and generalizations. Working out of this tradition Georg Cantor1(1845-1918) in 1870 established a basicuniqueness theorem for trigonometric series: If such a series converges to zero every-where, then all of its coefficients are zero. To generalize Cantor [I8721 started to allowpoints at which convergence fails, getting to the following formulation: For a collectionP of real numbers, let P' be the collection of limit points of P, and P(\") the result of niterations of this operation. I f a trigonometric series converges to zero everywhere excepton a P where P(\") is emptyfor some n, then all of its coeficients are zero.' It was in [I8721 that Cantor provided his formulation of the real numbers in terms offundamental sequences of rational numbers, and significantly, this was for the specificpurpose of articulating his proof. With the new results of analysis to be secured by proofand proof in turn to be based on prior principles the regress led in the early 1870s tothe appearance of several independent formulations of the real numbers in terms of therational numbers. It is at first quite striking that the real numbers came to be developedso late, but this can be viewed as part of the expansion of the function concept whichshifted the emphasis from the continuum taken as a whole to its extensional construal as acollection of objects. In mathematics objects have been traditionally introduced only withreluctance, but a more arithmetical rather than geometrical approach to the continuumbecame necessary for the articulation of proofs. The other well-known formulation of the real numbers is due to Richard Dedekind[1872], through his cuts. Cantor and Dedekind maintained a fruitful correspondence, 'Dauben [1979], Meschkowski [1983], and Purkert-llgauds [I9871 are mathematical biographies of Cantor. 'See Kechris-Louveau 119871 for recent developments in the Cantorian spirit about uniqueness for trigono- metric series converging on definable sets of reals.
Set Theory from Cantor to Cohen 397especially during the 1870s, in which Cantor aired many of his results and ~ ~ e c u l a t i o n s . ~The formulations of the real numbers advanced three important predispositions for settheory: the consideration of infinite collections, their construal as unitary objects, andthe encompassing of arbitrary such possibilities. Dedekind [I8711 had in fact made thesemoves in his creation of ideals, infinite collections of algebraic numbers: and there is anevident similarity between ideals and cuts in the creation of new numbers out of old.5 Thealgebraic numbers would soon be the focus of a major breakthrough by Cantor. Althoughboth Cantor and Dedekind carried out an arithmetical reduction of the continuum, theyeach accommodated its antecedent geometric sense by asserting that each of their realnumbers actually corresponds to a point on the line. Neither theft nor honest toil sufficed;Cantor [1872: 1281 and Dedekind [1872:1111 recognized the need for an axiom to thiseffect, a sort of Church's Thesis of adequacy for the new construal of the continuum as acollection of objects. Cantor recalled6 that around this time he was already considering infinite iterations ofhis P' operation using \"symbols of infinity\":In a crucial conceptual move he began to investigate infinite collections of real numbersand infinitary enumerations for their own sake, and this led first to a basic articulation ofsize for the continuum and then to a new, encompassing theory of counting. Set theorywas born on that December 1873 day when Cantor established that the real numbers areuncountable.' In the next decades the subject was to blossom through the prodigiousprogress made by him in the theory of transfinite and cardinal numbers. The uncountability of the reds was established, of course, via reductio ad absurdurnas with the irrationality of G.Both impossibility results epitomize how a reductio cancompel a larger mathematical context allowing for the deniability of hitherto implicitproperties. Be that as it may, Cantor the mathematician addressed a specific problem, em-bedded in the mathematics of the time, in his seminal [I8741 entitled \"On a property ofthe totality of all real algebraic numbers\". After first establishing this property, the count-ability of the algebraic numbers, Cantor then established: For any (countable) sequence 3 ~ h me ost complete edition of Cantor's correspondence is Meschkowski-Nilson [1991]. Excerpts fromthe Cantor-Dedekind correspondence from 1872 through 1882 were published in Noether-Cavaillks [1937], andexcerpts from the 1899 correspondence were published by Zermelo in the collected works of Cantor [1932]. En-glish translations of the Noether-Cavaill&sexcerpts were published in Ewald [1996: 843ff.l. An English transla-tion of a Zermelo excerpt (retaining his several errors of transcription) appeared in van Heijenoort 11967: 113ff.l.English translations of Cantor's 1899 correspondence with both Dedekind and Hilbert were published in Ewald[1996: 926ff.l. 4 ~ haelgebraic numbers are those real numbers that are the roots of polynomials with integer coefficients. '~edekind [I8721 dated his conception of cuts to 1858, and antecedents to ideals in his work were alsoentertained around then. For Dedekind and the foundation of mathematics see Dugac [I9761 and Ferreirbs[2007], who both accord him a crucial role in the development of the framework of set theory. 6 ~ eheis [1880: 3581. 'A set is courttable if there is a bijective correspondence between it and the natural numbers {0,1,2,...).The exact date of birth can be ascertained as December 7. Cantor first gave a proof of the uncountability of thereals in a letter to Dedekind of 7 December 1873 (Ewald [1996: 845ffI). professing that \". . . only today do Ibelieve myself to have finished with the thing . . .\".
398 Akihiro Kanamoriof reals, every interval contains a real not in the sequence. Cantor appealed to the ordercompleteness of the reals: Suppose that s is a sequence of reals and I an interval. Let a < b be the first two realsof s, if any, in I. Then let a' < b' be the first two reals of s, if any, in the open interval( a ,b); a\" < b\" the first two reals of s, if any, in (a',b'); and so forth. Then howeverlong this process continues, the (non-empty) intersection of these nested intervals cannotcontain any member of s . By this means Cantor provided a new proof of Joseph Liouville's result [1844,1851]that there are transcendental numbers (real non-algebraic numbers) and only afterward didCantor point out the uncountability of the reals altogether. This presentation is suggestiveof Cantor's natural caution in overstepping mathematical sense at the time.8 Accounts of Cantor's work have mostly reversed the order for deducing the existenceof transcendental numbers, establishing first the uncountability of the reals and only thendrawing the existence conclusion from the countability of the algebraic number^.^ Intextbooks the inversion may be inevitable, but this has promoted the misconception thatCantor's arguments are non-constru~tive.'I~t depends how one takes a proof, and Can-tor's arguments have been implemented as algorithms to generate the successive digits ofnew reaIs.llI .2 Continuum Hypothesis and Transjinite NumbersBy his next publication [I8781 Cantor had shifted the weight to getting bijective corre-spondences, stipulating that two sets have the same power [Machtigkeit] iff there is sucha correspondence between them, and established that the reals IR and the n-dimensionalspaces IRn all have the same power. Having made the initial breach in [I8741 with a neg-ative result about the lack of a bijective correspondence, Cantor secured the new ground ' ~ a u b e n[1979: 68ffl suggests that the title and presentation of Cantor [I8741 were deliberately chosen toavoid censure by Kronecker, one of the journal editors. 91ndeed, this is where Wingenstein [1956: 1,Appendix 11, 1-31 located what he took to be the problematicaspects of the talk of uncountability. 'A non-constructive proof typically deduces the existence of a mathematical object without providing ameans for specifying it. Kac-Ulam [1968: 131 wrote: \"The contrast between the methods of Liouville andCantor is striking, and these methods provide excellent illustrations of two vastly different approaches towardproving the existence of mathematical objects. Liouville's is purely cortstrurtive; Cantor's is purely existential.\"See also Moore 11982: 391. One exception to the misleading trend is Fraenkel [1930: 237][1953: 751, who fromthe beginning emphasized the constructive aspect of diagonalization. The first non-constructive proof widely acknowledged as such was Hilbert's [I8901 of his basis theorem.Earlier, Dedekind [188R: $1591 had established the equivalence of two notions of being finite with a non-constructive proof that made an implicit use of the Axiom of Choice. \"Gray [I9941 shows that Cantor's original [I8741 argument can be implemented by an algorithm that gener-ates the first n digits of a transcendental number with time complexity 0(2\"\"'), and his later diagonal argument,with a tractable algorithm of complexity 0(n2log2 rz log logn). The original Liouville argument depended on asimple observation about fast convergence, and the digits of the Liouville numbers can be generated much faster.In terms of 2.3 below, the later Baire Category Theorem can be viewed as a direct generalization of Cantor's[I8741 result, and the collection of Liouville numbers provides an explicit example of a co-meager yet measurezero set of reals (see Oxtoby [1971: 921). On the other hand, Gray [1994] shows that every transcendental realis the result of diagonalization applied to some enumeration of the algebraic reals.
Set Theory from Cantor to Cohen 399with a positive investigation of the possibilities for having such ~ o r r e s ~ o n d e n c e sW. ' ~ith\"sequence\" tied traditionally to countability through the indexing, Cantor used \"corre-spondence [Beziehung]\". Just as the discovery of the irrational numbers had led to one ofthe great achievements of Greek mathematics, Eudoxus's theory of geometrical propor-tions presented in Book V of Euclid's Elements and thematically antecedent to Dedekind's[I8721 cuts, Cantor began his move toward a full-blown mathematical theory of the infi-nite. Although holding the promise of a rewarding investigation Cantor did not come to anypowers for infinite sets other than the two as set out in his [I8741 proof. Cantor claimedat the end of [1878:2571: Every infinite set of reals either is countable or has the power of the continuum.This was the Continuum Hypothesis (CH) in the nascent context. The conjecture viewedas a primordial question would stimulate Cantor not only to approach the reals qua ex-tensionalized continuum in an increasingly arithmetical fashion but also to grapple withfundamental questions of set existence. His triumphs across a new mathematical contextwould be like a brilliant light to entice others into the study of the infinite, but his inabilityto establish CH would also cast a long shadow. Set theory had its beginnings not as someabstract foundation for mathematics but rather as a setting for the articulation and solu-tion of the Continuum Problem: to determine whether there are more than two powersembedded in the continuum. In his magisterial Grundlagen [I8831 Cantor developed the transfinite numbers [An-zahlen] and the key concept of well-ordering. A well-ordering of a set is a linear orderingof it according to which every non-empty subset has a least element. No longer wasthe infinitary indexing of his trigonometric series investigations mere contrivance. The\"symbols of infinity7' became autonomous and extended as the transfinite numbers, theemergence signified by the notational switch from the oo of potentiality to the w of com-pletion as the last letter of the Greek alphabet. With this the progression of transfinitenumbers could be depicted:A corresponding transition from subsets of IRn to a broader concept of set was signaled bythe shift in terminology from \"point-manifold [Punktmannigfaltigkeit]\" to \"set [Menge]\".In this new setting well-orderings conveyed the sense of sequential counting and transfi-nite numbers served as standards for gauging well-orderings. '*cantor developed a bijective correspondence between !R2 and R by essentially interweaving the decimalexpansions of a pair of reals to define the associated real, taking care of the countably many exceptional pointslike .100... = , 0 9 9 . .. by an ad hoc shuffling procedure. Such an argument now seems straightforward, butto have bijectivcly identified thc plane with the line was a stunning accomplishment at the time. In a letter toDedekind of 29 June 1877 Cantor (Ewald [1996: 8601) wrote, in French in the text, \"I see it, but I don't believeit.\" Cantor's work inspired a push to establish the \"invariance of dimension\", that there can be no contirluousbijection of any IR\" onto IRm for rn < rt, with Cantor [I8791 himself providing an argument. As topologydeveloped, the stress brought on by the lack of firm ground led Brouwer [I9111 to definitively establish theinvariance of dimension in a seminal paper for algebraic topology.
400 Akihiro Kanamori As Cantor pointed out, every linear ordering of a finite set is already a well-orderingand all such orderings are isomorphic, so that the general sense is only brought out byinfinite sets, for which there are non-isomorphic well-orderings. Cantor called the set ofnatural numbers the first number class (I) and the set of numbers whose predecessors arecountable the second number class (11). Cantor conceived of (11) as being bounded aboveaccording to a limitation principle and showed that (11) itself is not countable. Proceedingupward, Cantor called the set of numbers whose predecessors are in bijective correspon-dence with (11) the third number class (111), and so forth. Cantor took a set to be of ahigher power than another if they are not of the same power yet the latter is of the samepower as a subset of the former. Cantor thus conceived of ever higher powers as repre-sented by number classes and moreover took every power to be so represented. With this\"free creation\" of numbers, Cantor [1883: 5.501 propounded a basic principle that was todrive the analysis of sets: \"It is always possible to bring any well-dejined set into the form of a well- ordered set.\"He regarded this as a \"an especially remarkable law of thought which through its gen-eral validity is fundamental and rich in consequences.\" Sets are to be well-ordered, andthus they and their powers are to be gauged via the transfinite numbers of his structuredconception of the infinite. The well-ordering principle was consistent with Cantor's basic view in the Grundla-gen that the finite and the transfinite are all of a piece and uniformly comprehendable inmathematics,13 a view bolstered by his systematic development of the arithmetic of trans-finite numbers seamlessly encompassing the finite numbers. Cantor also devoted severalsections of the Grundlagen to a justificatory philosophy of the infinite, and while thismetaphysics can be separated from the mathematical development, one concept was tosuggest ultimate delimitations for set theory: Beyond the transfinite was the \"Absolute\",which Cantor eventually associated mathematically with the collection of all ordinal num-bers and metaphysically with the transcendence of God.14 The Continuum Problem was never far from this development and could in fact be seenas an underlying motivation. The transfinite numbers were to provide the framework forCantor's two approaches to the problem, the approach through power and the more di.rectapproach through definable sets of reals, these each to initiate vast research programs. As for the approach through power, Cantor in the Grundlagen established that thesecond number class (11) is uncountable, yet any infinite subset of (11) is either countableor has the same power as (11). Hence, (11) has exactly the property that Cantor sought forthe reals, and he had reduced CH to the positive assertion that the reals and (11) have thesame power. The following in brief is Cantor's argument that (11) is uncountable: Suppose that s is a (countable) sequence of members of (11), say with initial element a.Let a' be a member of s, if any, such that a < a'; let a\" be a member of s, if any, such thata' < a\"; and so forth. Then however long this process continues, the supremum of thesenumbers, or its successor, is not a member of s. 13This is emphasized by Hallett [I9841 as Cantor's \"finitism\". I4The \"absolute infinite\" is a varying but recurring explanatory concept in Cantor's work; see Jan6 [1995].
Set Theory from Cantor to Cohen 401 This argument was reminiscent of his [I8741 argument that the reals are uncountableand suggested a correlation of the reals through their fundamental sequence representationwith the members of (11) through associated cofinal sequences.15 However, despite severalannouncements Cantor could never develop a workable correlation, an emerging problemin retrospect being that he could not define a well-ordering of the reals. As for the approach through definable sets of reals, this evolved directly from Cantor'swork on trigonometric series, the \"symbols of infinity\" used in the analysis of the P'operation transmuting to the transfinite numbers of the second number class (11).16 Inthe Grundlagen Cantor studied P' for uncountable P and defined the key concept of aperfect set of reals (non-empty, closed, and containing no isolated points). Incorporatingan observation of Ivar Bendixson [1883], Cantor showed in the succeeding [I8841 thatany uncountable closed set of reals is the union of a perfect set and a countable set. For aset A of reals, A has the perfect set property 12A is countable or else has a perfect subset.Cantor had shown in particular that closed sets have the perfect set property. Since Cantor [1884; 1884al had been able to show that any perfect set has the powerof the continuum, he had established that \"CH holds for closed sets\": every closed seteither is countable or has the power of the continuum. Or from his new vantage point, hehad reduced the Continuum Problem to determining whether there is a closed set of realsof the power of the second number class. He was unable to do so, but he had initiated aprogram for attacking the Continuum Problem that was to be vigorously pursued (cf. 2.3and 2.5).1.3 Diagonalization and Cardinal NumbersIn the ensuing years, unable to resolve the Continuum Problem through direct correla-tions with transfinite numbers Cantor approached size and order from a broader perspec-tive that would incorporate the continuum. He identified power with cardinal number, anautonomous concept beyond being une faeon de parler about bijective correspondence,and he went beyond well-orderings to the study of linear order types. Cantor embraceda structured view of sets, when \"well-defined\", as being given together with a linear or-M.Mdering of their members. Order types and cardinal numbers resulted-from successiveabstraction, from a set M to its order type and then to its cardinality Almost two decades after his [I8741 result that the reals are uncountable, Cantor in ashort note [I8911 subsumed it via his celebrated diagonal argument. With it, he estab- \" ~ f t e rdescribing the similarity behveen w and d? as limits of sequences, Cantor [1887: 991 interestinglycorrelated the creation of the transfinite numbers to the creation of the irrational numbers, beyond merely break-ing new ground in different number contexts: \"The transfinite numbers are in a certain sense new irrationalities,and in my opinion the best method of defining the,fir~itierrational numbers [via Cantor's fundamental sequences]is wholly similar to, and I might even say in principle the same as, my method of introducing transfinite num-bers. One can say unconditionally: the transfinite numbers startd orfall with the finite irrational numbers: theyare like each other in their innermost being [Wesen]; for the former like the latter are definite delimited formsor modifications of the actual infinite.\" I6~erreir6s[I9951 suggests how the formulation of the second number class as a completed totality witha succeeding transfinite number emerged directly from Cantor's work on the operation P', drawing Cantor'stransfinite numbers even closer to his earlier work on trigonometric series.
402 Akihiro Kanamorilished: For any set L the collection offunctions from L into afixed two-element set has ahigher cardinality than that of L. This result indeed generalized the [I8741 result, sincethe collection of functions from the natural numbers into a fixed two-element set has thesame cardinality as the reals. Here is how Cantor gave the argument in general form:\" Let M be the totality of all functions from L taking only the values 0 and I. First, L isin bijective correspondence with a subset of M, through the assignment to each xo E L ofthe function on L that assigns 1 to xo and 0 to all other x E L. However, there cannot bea bijective correspondence between M itself and L. Otherwise, there would be a function@(x,z) of two variables such that for every member f of M there would be a z E L such that@(x,Z) = f(x) for every x E L. But then, the \"diagonalizing\" function g(x) = 1 - @(x,x)cannot be a member of M since for zo E L, g(zo) f @(zoz, o)! In retrospect the diagonal argument can be drawn out from the (18741proof.'s Cantorhad been shifting his notion of set to a level of abstraction beyond sets of reals and thelike, and the casualness of his [I8911 may reflect an underlying cohesion with his [1874].Whether the new proof is really \"different\" from the earlier one, through this abstractionCantor could now dispense with the recursively defined nested sets and limit construction,and he could apply his argument to any set. He had proved for the first time that there isa power higher than that of the continuum and moreover affirmed \"the general theorem,that the powers of well-defined sets have no m a x i m ~ m . \" 'T~he diagonal argument, evento its notation, would become method, flowing later into descriptive set theory, the GodelIncompleteness Theorem, and recursion theory. Today it goes without saying that a function from L into a two-element set correspondsto a subset of L, so that Cantor's Theorem is usually stated as: For any set L its power setP(L) = { X I X c L) has a higher cardinality than L. However, it would be an exaggerationto assert that Cantor was working on power sets; rather, he had expanded the 19th-Centuryconcept of function by ushering in arbitrary f~nctions.'~In any case, Cantor would now 1 7 ~ c t u a l l yC,antor took L to be the unit interval of reds presumably to invoke a standard context, but he wascleaorrleyoavwoavreero, fdtihaegogneanleizraaltiitoyn. as such had already occurred in Paul du Bois-Reymond's theory of growth asearly as in his [1869]. An argument is manifest in his [1875: 365m for showing that for any sequence of realfunctions fo, fl,f2,. .. there is a real function g such that for each n, f,(x) ig(x) for all sufficiently large realsX. Diagonalization can be drawn out from Cantor's [I8741 as follows: Starting with a sequence s of reals anda half-open interval lo, instead of successively choosing delimiting pairs of reds in the sequence, avoid themembers of s one at a time: Let 11be the left or right half-open subinterval of lodemarcated by its midpoint,whichever does not contain the first element of s. Then let 12 be the left or right half-open subinterval of 11demarcated by its midpoint, whichever does not contain the second element of s; and so forth. Again, the nestedintersection contains a real not in the sequence s. Abstracting the process in terms of reals in binary expansion,one is just generating the binary digits of the diagonalizing real. In that letter of Cantor's to Dedekind of 7 December 1873 (Ewald [1996: 845m) first establishing the un-countability of the r e a l ~t,here already appears, quite remarkably, a doubly indexed array of real numbers anda procedure for traversing the array downward and to the right, as in a now common picturing of the diagonalargument. 19~emarkablyC,antor had already conjectured in the Grurtdlagen [I 883: 5901 that the collection of continuousreal functions has the same power as the second number class (11), and that the collection of all real functionshas the same power as the third number class (111). These are consequences of the later Generalized Continuum Hypothesis and are indicative of the sweep of Cantor's conception. 2 0 ~ h \"epower\" in \"power set\" is from \"Potenz\" in the German for cardinal exponentiation, while Cantor's
Set Theory from Cantor to Cohen 403have had to confront, in his function context, a general difficulty starkly abstracted fromthe Continuum Problem: From a well-ordering of a set, a well-ordering of its power setis not necessarily dejinable. The diagonal argument called into question Cantor's verynotion of set: On the one hand, the argument, simple and elegant, should be part of settheory and lead to new sets of ever higher cardinality; on the other hand, these sets do notconform to Cantor's principle that every set comes with a (definable) well-~rdering.~' Cantor's Beitrage, published in two parts [I8951and [1897], presented his mature the-ory of the transfinite. In the first part he described his post-Grundlagen work on cardinalnumber and the continuum. He quickly posed Cardinal Comparability, whether for cardinal numbers a and 6, a = 6, a < 6, or b < a,as a property \"by no means self-evident\" and which will be established later \"when weshall have gained a survey over the ascending sequence of transfinite cardinal numbersand an insight into their connection.\" He went on to define the addition, multiplication,and exponentiation of cardinal numbers primordially in terms of set-theoretic operationsand functions. If a is the cardinal number of M and b is the cardinal number of N, thenab is the cardinal number of the collection of all functions :N -+ M, i.e. having domainN and taking values in M. The audacity of considering arbitrary functions from a set Ninto a set M was encased in a terminology that reflected both its novelty as well as the oldview of function as given by an explicit rule.\" As befits the introduction of new numbersCantor then introduced a new notation, one using the Hebrew letter aleph, K. With KOthecardinal number of the set of natural numbers Cantor observed that KO.No = No and that2% is the cardinal number of continuum. With this he observed that the [I8781 labor ofassociating the continuum with the plane and so forth could be reduced to a \"few strokes\"power\" is from \"Machtigkeit\". 2 1 ~ h iis emphasized in Lavine [1994: IV.21. Cantor did consider power sets in a letter of 20 September 1898to Hilbert. In it Cantor entertained a notion of \"completed set\", one of the guidelines being that \"the collectionof all subsezs of a completed set M is a completed set.\" Also, in a letter of 10 October 1898 to Hilbert, Cantorpointed out, in an argument focused on the continuum, that the power set P(S)is in bijective correspondencewith the collection of functions from S into (0, 1). But in a letter of 9 May 1899 to Hilbert, writing now \"set\" for\"completed set\", Cantor wrote: \". . .it is our common conviction that the 'arithmetic continuum' is a 'set' in thissense; the question is whether this truth is provable or whether it is an axiom. 1now incline more to the latteralternative, although I would gladly be convinced by you of the former.\" For the first and third letters in contextsee Moore 12002:451 and for the second, Ferreir6s [2007: epilogue]; the letters arc in Meschkowski-Nilson[1991]. 2 2 ~ a n t owr rote [ I 8 9 5 4861: \"...by a 'rovering [Belegung] of N with M,' we understand a law by whichwith every element ti of N a definite element of M is bound up, where one and the same element of M cancome repeatedly into application. The element of M bound up with n is, in a way, a one-valued function of11, and may be denoted by f ( n ) ; it is called a 'covering function [Belegungsfunktion] of n.' The correspondingcovering of N will be called f (N).\" A convoluted description! Arbitrary functions on arbitrary domains are nowof course commonplace in mathematics, but several authors at the time referred specifically to Cantor's conceptof covering, most notably Zermelo [1904]. Jourdain in his introduction to his English translation of the Beitragewrote (Cantor [ I 9 1 5 821): \"The introduction of the concept of 'covering' is the most striking advance in theprinciples of the theory of transfinite numbers from 1885 to 1895 . ...\" With Cantor initially focusing on bijective correspondence [Beziehung] and these not quite construed asfunctions, Dedekind was the first to entertain an arbitrary function on an arbitrary domain. He [1888: $921,361formulated q5: S + Z, \"a mapping [Abbildung] of a system S in Z\",in less convoluted terms, but did notconsider the totality of such. He quickly moved to the case Z = S for his theory of chains; see footnote 36.
Akihiro Kanamoriof the pen\" in his new arithmetic:Cantor only mentioned NO,N I ,N2,. ..,Ha,...,these to be the cardinal numbers of the successive number classes from the Grundlagenand thus to exhaust all the infinite cardinal numbers. Cantor went on to present his theory of order types, abstractions of linear orderings.He defined an arithmetic of order types and characterized the order type q of the rationalsas the countable dense linear order without endpoints, introducing the \"forth\" part of thenow familiar back-and-forth argument of model theory.23He also characterized the ordertype 8 of the reals as the perfect linear order with a countable dense set; whether a realistor not, Cantor the mathematician was able to provide a characterization of the continuum. The second Beitrage developed the Grundlagen ideas by focusing on well-orderingsand construing their order types as the ordinal numbers. Here at last was the generalproof via order comparison of well-ordered sets that ordinal numbers are comparable.Cantor went on to describe ordinal arithmetic as a special case of the arithmetic of ordertypes and after giving the basic properties of the second number class defined K1 as itscardinal number. The last sections were given over to a later preoccupation, the studyof ordinal exponentiation in the second number class. The operation was defined viaa transfinite recursion and used to establish a normal form, and the pivotal €-numberssatisfying 6 = wc were analyzed. The two parts of the Beitrage are not only distinct by subject matter, cardinal numberand the continuum vs. ordinal number and well-ordering, but between them there devel-oped a wide, irreconcilable breach. In the first part nowhere is the [I8911 result a < 2astated even in a special case; rather, it is made clear [1895:4951 that the procession oftransfinite cardinal numbers is to be secured through their construal as the alephs. How-ever, the second Beitrage does not mention any aleph beyond N1,nor does it mention CH,which could now have been stated as 2\" = N,.(Cantor did state this in an 1895 letter.24)Ordinal comparability was secured, but cardinalcomparability was not reduced to it. Every well-ordered set has an aleph as its cardinalnumber, but where is 2'0 in the aleph sequence? Cantor's initial [I8741 proof led to the Continuum Problem. That problem was embed-ded in the very interstices of the early development of set theory, and in fact the structuresthat Cantor built, while now of intrinsic interest, emerged in significant part out of effortsto articulate and solve the problem. Cantor's [I8911 diagonal argument, arguably a trans-mutation of his initial I18741 proof, exacerbated a growing tension between having well-orderings and admitting sets of arbitrary functions (or power sets). David Hilbert, when2 3 ~ ePelotkin [I9931 for an analysis of the emergence of the back-and-forth argument.2 4 ~ eMe oore [1989: 991.
Set Theory from Cantor to Cohen 405he presented his famous list of problems at the 1900 International Congress of Mathe-maticians at Paris, made the Continuum Problem the very first problem and intimatedCantor's difficulty by suggesting the desirability of \"actually giving\" a well-ordering ofthe reals. The next, 1904 International Congress of Mathematicians at Heidelberg was to be agenerational turning point for the development of set theory. Julius K6nig delivered alecture in which he provided a detailed argument that purportedly established that 2'0 isnot an aleph, i.e. that the continuum is not well-orderable. The argument combined thenow familiar inequality K, < K> for a of cofinality w with a result from Felix Bernstein'sGottingen dissertation [1901: 491 which alas does not universally hold.25 Cantor was un-derstandably upset with the prospect that the continuum would simply escape the numbercontext that he had devised for its analysis. Accounts differ on how the issue was resolved. Although one has Zermelo finding anerror within a day of the lecture, the weight of evidence is for Hausdorff having foundthe error.26 Whatever the resolution, the torch had passed from Cantor to the next gen-eration. Zermelo would go on to formulate his Well-Ordering Theorem and axiomatizeset theory, and Hausdorff, to develop the higher transfinite in his study of order types andcofinalities.'' 2 MATHEMATIZATION2.1 Axiom of Choice and Axiomatization~ r n s~t e r m e l (o18~7~1-1953), born when Cantor was establishing his trigonometric seriesresults, had begun to investigate Cantorian set theory at Gottingen under the influence ofHilbert. In just over a month after the Heidelberg congress, Zermelo [I9041 formulatedwhat he soon called the Axiom of Choice (AC) and with it, established his Well-OrderingTheorem:Every set can be well-orderedZermelo thereby shifted the notion of set away from the implicit assumption of Cantor'sprinciple that every well-defined set is well-ordered and replaced that principle by an 2 5 ~ hreojrtality of an ordinal number a is the least ordinal numberp such that there is a set of form (yg I[ < P )unbounded in a, i.e. for any < cr there is an [ < P such that rl 5 yg < a. cr is regular if its cofinality is itself,and otherwise a is sitzgular. There concepts were not clarified until the work of Hausdorff, brought together inhis [1908], discussed in 2.6.Kdnigapplied Bemstein's equality H? = H,.2*0 as follows: lf 20' were an aleph, say Xp, then by Bemstein'sH;:'equality = Xp+, .2\"0 = Kp+,, contradicting KBnig's inequality. However, Bemstein's equality fails whencr has cofinality w and 20' < H,. Kdnig's published account [I9051 acknowledged the gap. 2 6 ~ eGe rattan-Guinness [2000,334] and Purkert [2002]. \" ~ n das with many incorrect proofs, there would be positive residues: Zermelo soon generalized Kbnig'sinequality to the fundamental Zermelo-Kdnig inequality for cardinal exponentiation, which implies that theSF,cofinality of 2-' is larger than a, and Hausdorff [1904: 5711 published his recursion formula,;H; = Hp+l .in form like Bemstein's result. 28~bbinghau[s2007] is a substantive biography of Zermelo. See Kanamori [1997; 20041 for Zermelo's workin set theory.
406 Akihiro Kanamoriexplicit axiom about a wider notion of set, incipiently unstructured but soon to be givenform by axioms. In retrospect, Zermelo's argument for his Well-Ordering Theorem can be viewed aspivotal for the development of set theory. To summarize the argument, suppose that x is aset to be well-ordered, and through Zermelo's Axiom-of-Choice hypothesis assume thatthe power set P(x) = { y I y x) has a choice function, i.e. a function y such that forevery non-empty member y of P(x), y(y) E y. Call a subset y of x a y-set if there is awell-ordering R of y such that for each a E y, Y((ZIz Bf y or z R a fails)) = aThat is, each member of y is what y \"chooses\" from what does not already precede thatmember according to R. The main observation is that y-sets cohere in the following sense:If y is a y-set with well-ordering R and z is a y-set with well-ordering S, then y c z and Sis a prolongation of R, or vice versa. With this, let w be the union of all the y-sets, i.e. allthe y-sets put together. Then w too is a y-set, and by its maximality it must be all of x andhence x is well-ordered. The converse to this result is immediate in that if x is well-ordered, then the power setP(x) has a choice function.29 Not only did Zermelo's argument analyze the connectionbetween having well-orderings and having choice functions on power sets, it anticipatedin its defining of approximations and taking of a union the proof procedure for von Neu-mann's Transfinite Recursion Theorem (cf. 3.1).30 Zermelo [1904: 5161 noted without much ado that his result implies that every infinitecardinal number is an aleph and satisfies m2 = m, and that it secured Cardinal Compara-bility -so that the main issues raised by Cantor's Beitrage are at once resolved. Zermelomaintained that the Axiom of Choice, to the effect that every set has a choice function,is a \"logical principle\" which \"is applied without hesitation everywhere in mathematicaldeduction\", and this is reflected in the Well-Ordering Theorem being regarded as a theo-rem. The axiom is consistent with Cantor's view of the finite and transfinite as unitary, inthat it posits for infinite sets an unproblematic feature of finite sets. On the other hand, theWell-Ordering Theorem shifted the weight from Cantor's well-orderings with their resid-ually temporal aspect of numbering through successive choices to the use of a functionfor making simultaneous choices.31 Cantor's work had served to exacerbate a growingdiscord among mathematicians with respect to two related issues: whether infinite collec-tions can be mathematically investigated at all, and how far the function concept is to beextended. The positive use of an arbitrary function operating on arbitrary subsets of a sethaving been made explicit, there was open controversy after the appearance of Zermelo'sproof. This can be viewed as a turning point for mathematics, with the subsequent tilt- 2 9 ~ a m e l yw, ith < a well-ordering of x , for each non-empty member y of P(x),let y(y) be the the <-leastmember of y. 'Osee Kanamori [I9971 for more on the significance of Zermelo's argument, in particular as a fixed pointargument. 3 ' ~ e r m e l ohimself stressed the importance of simultaneous choices over successive choices in criticism of anargument of Cantor's for the Well-Ordering Theorem in 1899 correspondence with Dedekind, discussed in 2.2.See Cantor [1932: 4511 or van Heijenoort [1967: 1171.
Set Theory from Cantor to Cohen 407ing toward the acceptance of the Axiom of Choice symptomatic of a conceptual shift inmathematics. In response to his critics Zermelo published a second proof [I9081of his Well-OrderingTheorem, and with axiomatization assuming a general methodological role in mathemat-ics he also published the first full-fledged axiomatization [1908a] of set theory. But aswith Cantor's work this was no idle structure building but a response to pressure for anew mathematical context. In this case it was not for the formulation and solution ofa problem like the Continuum Problem, but rather to clarify a specific proof. In addi-tion to codifying generative set-theoretic principles, a substantial motive for Zermelo'saxiomatizing set theory was to buttress his Well-Ordering Theorem by making explicitits underlying set existence assumption^.^^ Initiating the first major transmutation of thenotion of set after Cantor, Zermelo thereby ushered in a new abstract, prescriptive view ofsets as structured solely by membership and governed and generated by axioms, a viewthat would soon come to dominate. Thus, proof played a crucial role by stimulating anaxiomatization of a field of study and a corresponding transmutation of its underlyingnotions. The objections raised against Zermelo's first proof [I9041 mainly played on the ambi-guities of a y-set's well-ordering being only implicit, as for Cantor's sets, and on the def-inition of the well-ordering being impredicative -defined as a y-set and so drawn froma collection of which it is already a member. Largely to preclude these objections Zer-melo in his second [I9081 proof resorted to a rendition of orderings in terms of segmentsand inclusion first used by Gerhard Hessenberg [1906: 674ffl and a closure approach withroots in Dedekind [1888]. Instead of extending initial segments toward the desired well-ordering, Zermelo got at the collection of its final segments by taking an intersection in alarger setting.33 With his [1908a] axiomatization, Zermelo \"started from set theory as it is historicallygiven\" to seek out principles sufficiently restrictive \"to exclude all contradictions\" andsufficiently wide \"to retain all that is valuable\". However, he would transform set theoryby making explicit new existence principles and promoting a generative point of view.Zermelo had begun working out an axiomatization as early as 1905, addressing issuesraised by his [I9041 proof.34 The mature presentation is a precipitation of seven axioms,and these do not just reflect \"set theory as it is historically given\", but explicitly buttresshis proof(s) of the Well-Ordering Theorem. Zermelo's seven set axioms, now formalized, constitute the familiar theory Z, Zermeloset theory: Extensionality, Elementary Sets (0, (a}, {a,b}), Separation, Power Set, Union,Choice, and Infinity. His setting allowed for urelements, objects without members yetdistinct from each other. But Zermelo focused on sets, and his Axiom of Extensional- 3 2 ~ o o r[e1982: 155ffl supports this contention using items from Zermelo's Nachlass. ;;TO well-order a set M using a choice function ip on P(M), Zermelo defined a O-chub, to be a collection OnZof subsets of M such that: (a) M E O; (b) if A E O, then A - (p(A))E 0; and (c) if Z C O , then E O. Hethen took the intersection I of all O-chains, and observed that I is again a O-chain. Finally, he showed that Iprovides a well-ordering of M given by: a < b iff there is an A E I such that a Z A and b E A. I thus consistsof the final segments of the same well-ordering as provided by the [I9041 proof. Note that this second proof isless parsimonious than the [I9041 proof, as it uses the power set of the power set of M. 34Thisis documented by Moore [1982: 155fflwith items from Zermelo's Nachlass.
408 Akihiro Kanamoriity announced the espousal of an extensional viewpoint. In line with this AC, a \"logicalprinciple\" in [1904] expressed in terms of an informal choice function, was framed lessinstrumentally: It posited for a set consisting of non-empty, pairwise disjoint sets the ex-istence of a set that meets each one in a unique element.35 However, Separation retainedan intensional aspect with its \"separating out\" of a new set from a given set using a def-inite property, where a property is \"dejinite [dejinit] if the fundamental relations of thedomain, by means of the axioms and the universally valid laws of logic, determine with-out arbitrariness whether it holds or not.\" But with no underlying logic formalized, theambiguity of definite property would become a major issue. With Infinity and Power SetZermelo provided for sufficiently rich settings for set-theoretic constructions. Temperingthe logicians' extravagant and problematic \"all\" the Power Set axiom provided the prove-nance for \"all\" for subsets of a given set, just as Separation served to capture \"all\" forelements of a given set satisfying a property. Finally, Union and Choice completed theencasing of Zermelo's proof(s) of his Well-Ordering Theorem in the necessary set exis-tence principles. Notably, Zermelo's recursive [I9041 argumentation also brought him inproximity of the Transfinite Recursion Theorem and thus of Replacement, the next axiomto be adjoined in the subsequent development of set theory (cf. 3.1). Fully two decades earlier Dedekind [I8881 had provided an incisive analysis of thenatural numbers and their arithmetic in terms of sets [Systeme], and several overlap-ping aspects can serve as points of departure for Zermelo's a x i o m a t i ~ a t i o n .T~h~e mostimmediate is how Dedekind's argumentation extends to Zermelo's [1908] proof of theWell-Ordering Theorem, which in the transfinite setting brings out the role of AC. BothDedekind and Zermelo set down rules for sets in large part to articulate arguments in-volving simple set operations like \"set of\", union, and intersection. In particular, bothhad to argue for the equality of sets resulting after involved manipulations, and exten-sionality became operationally necessary. However vague the initial descriptions of sets,sets are to be determined solely by their elements, and the membership question is to bedeterminate.37 The looseness of Dedekind's description of sets allowed him [1888: $661the latitude to \"prove\" the existence of infinite sets, but Zermelo just stated the Axiom ofInfinity as a set existence principle. The main point of departure has to do with the larger issue of the role of proof for ar-ticulating sets. By Dedekind's time proof had become basic for mathematics, and indeed3 5 ~ u s s e l[lI9061 had previously anived a1 this form, his Multiplicative Axiom. The elimination of the \"pair-wise disjoint\" by going to a choice function formulation can be established with the Union Axiom, and this isthe only use of that axiom in the second, [I9081 proof of the Well-Ordering Theorem.3 6 ~cnurrent terminology, Dedekind [I8881 considered arbitrary sets S and mappings 9: S + S and defined+aKch>aiAr1.[Kette] to be a K C S such that 9°K 2 K. For A C S, the chair1 of A is the intersection of all chainsA set N is simply irlfinite iff there is an injective 9: N N such that N - @'N 0. Letting 1 be a +distinguished element of N - @'N # 0 Dedekind considered the chain of ( I ) , the chain of {#(I)), and so forth.Having stated an inherent induction principle, he proceeded to show that these sets have all the ordering andarithmetical properties of the natural numbers (that are established nowadays in texts for the (von Neumann)finite ordinals).3 7 ~ e d e k i n d[1888: $21 begins a footnote to his statement about extensional determination with: \"ln whatmanner this determination is brought about, and whether we know a way of deciding upon it, is a matter ofindifference for all that follows; the general laws to be developed in no way depend upon it; they hold under allcircumstances.\"
Set Theory from Cantor to Cohen 409his work did a great deal to enshrine proof as the vehicle for algebraic abstraction andgeneralization.38 Like algebraic constructs, sets were new to mathematics and would beincorporated by setting down the rules for their proofs. Just as calculations are part of thesense of numbers, so proofs would be part of the sense of sets, as their \"calculations\".Just as Euclid's axioms for geometry had set out the permissible geometric constructions,the axioms of set theory would set out the specific rules for set generation and manipu-lation. But unlike the emergence of mathematics from marketplace arithmetic and Greekgeometry, sets and transfinite numbers were neither laden nor buttressed with substantialantecedents. Like strangers in a strange land stalwarts developed a familiarity with themguided hand in hand by their axiomatic framework. For Dedekind [I8881 it had sufficedto work with sets by merely giving a few definitions and properties, those foreshadowingExtensionality, Union, and Infinity. Zermelo [1908a] provided more rules: Separation,Power Set, and Choice. Zermelo [1908], with its rendition of orderings in terms of segments and inclusion,and Zermelo [1908a], which at the end cast Cantor's theory of cardinality in terms offunctions cast as set constructs, brought out Zermelo's set-theoretic reductionism. Zer-melo pioneered the reduction of mathematical concepts and arguments to set-theoreticconcepts and arguments from axioms, based on sets doing the work of mathematical ob-jects. Zermelo's analyses moreover served to draw out what would come to be generallyregarded as set-theoretic out of the presumptively logical. This would be particularlysalient for Infinity and Power Set and was strategically advanced by the relegation ofproperty considerations to Separation. Zermelo's axiomatization also shifted the focus away from the transfinite numbers toan abstract view of sets structured solely by E and simple operations. For Cantor thetransfinite numbers had become central to his investigation of definable sets of reals andthe Continuum Problem, and sets had emerged not only equipped with orderings but onlyas the developing context dictated, with the \"set of\" operation never iterated more thanthree or four times. For Zermelo his second, [I9081 proof of the Well-Ordering Theoremserved to eliminate any residual role that the transfinite numbers may have played in thefirst proof and highlighted the set-theoretic operations. This approach to (linear) orderingwas to preoccupy his followers for some time, and through this period the eliminationof the use of transfinite numbers where possible, like ideal numbers, was regarded assalutary.\" Hence, Zermelo rather than Cantor should be regarded as the creator of abstractset theory. 3 8 ~ fth.e first sentence of the preface to Dedekind [1888]: \"In science nothing capable of proof ought to beaccepted without proof.\" 3 9 ~ o mneotable examples: Lindelof [I9051 proved the Cantor-Bendixson result, that every uncountable closedset is the union of a perfect set and a countable set, without using transfinite numbers. Suslin's [1917], discussedin 2.5, had the unassuming title, \"On a definition of the Borel sets without transfinite numbers\", hardly indicativeof its results, so fundamental for descriptive set theory. And Kuratowski [I9221 showed, pursuing the approachof Zermelo [1908], that inclusion chains defined via transfinite recursion with intersections taken at limits canalso be defined without transfinite numbers. Kuratowski [I9221 essentially formulated Zom's Lemma, and thiswas the main success of the push away from explicit well-orderings. Especially after the appearance of Zom[I9351 this recasting of AC came to dominate in algebra and topology.
410 Akihiro Kanamori Outgrowing Zermelo's pragmatic purposes axiomatic set theory could not long fore-stall the Cantorian initiative, as even 2% = K1 could not be asserted directly, and inthe 1920s John von Neumann was to fully incorporate the transfinite using Replacement(cf. 3.1).~\"On the other hand, Zermelo's axioms had the advantages of schematic sim-plicity and open-endedness. The generative set formation axioms, especially Power Setand Union, were to lead to Zermelo's 119301cumulative hierarchy picture of sets, and thevagueness of the dejinit property in the Separation Axiom was to invite Thoralf Skolem's[I9231proposal to base it on first-order logic, enforcing extensionalization (cf. 3.2).2.2 Logic and ParadoxAt this point, the incursions of a looming tradition can no longer be ignored. Gottlob Fregeis regarded as the greatest philosopher of logic since Aristotle for developing quantifica-tional logic in his Begrlffsschrift 118791, establishing a logical foundation for arithmeticin his Grundlagen 118841, and generally stimulating the analytic tradition in philosophy.The architect of that tradition was Bertrand Russell who in his earlier years, influencedby Frege and Giuseppe Peano, wanted to found all of mathematics on the certainty oflogic. But from a logical point of view Russell [1903] became exercised with paradox.He had arrived at Russell's Paradox in late 1901by analyzing Cantor's diagonal argumentapplied to the class of all classes!' a version of which is now known as Cantor's Paradoxof the largest cardinal number. Russell 11903:$3011also refocused the Burali-Forti Para-dox of the largest ordinal number, after reading Cesare Burali-Forti's [1897].42Russell'sParadox famously led to the tottering of Frege's mature formal system, the Grundgesetze[1893,19031.43 Russell's own reaction was to build a complex logical structure, one used later to de-velop mathematics in Whitehead and Russell's 1910-3Principia Mathernatica. Russell'srarniJied theory of types is a scheme of logical definitions based on orders and typesindexed by the natural numbers. Russell proceeded \"intensionally\"; he conceived thisscheme as a classification of propositions based on the notion of propositional function, anotion not reducible to membership (extensionality). Proceeding in modern fashion, wemay say that the universe of the Principia consists of objects stratified into disjoint typesT,, where To consists of the individuals, Tn+l { Y I Y C T,), and the types Tn for n > 0are further ramified into orders 0: with Tn = U i 0:. An object in 0: is to be definedeither in terms of individuals or of objects in some fixed 0; for some j < i and rn 5 n , thedefinitions allowing for quantification only over 0;. This precludes Russell's Paradoxand other \"vicious circles\", as objects consist only of previous objects and are built up 40~extbooksusually establish the Well-Ordering Theorem by first introducing Replacement, formalizingtransfinite recursion, and only then defining the well-ordering using (von Neurnann) ordinals; this amountsto another historical misrepresentation, but one that resonates with how acceptance of Zermelo's proof brokethe ground for formal transfinite recursion. 41Grattan-Guinness [1974], Coffa [1979], Moore [1988], and Garciadiego [I9921 describe the evolution ofRussell's Paradox. J 2 ~ o o r e - ~ a r c i a d i e[gI9o811 and Garciadiego [I9921 describe the evolution of the Burali-Forti Paradox. 4 3 ~ etehe exchange of letters between Russell and Frege in van Heijenoort [1967: 124Cfl. Russell's Paradoxshowed that Frege's Basic Law V is inconsistent.
Set Theory from Cantor to Cohen 41 1through definitions referring only to previous stages. However, in this system it is impos-sible to quantify over all objects in a type T,,,and this makes the formulation of numerousmathematical propositions at best cumbersome and at worst impossible. Russell was ledto introduce his Axiom of Reducibility, which asserts that for each object there is a pred-icative object consisting of exactly the same objects, where an object is predicative if itsorder is the least greater than that of its constituents. This axiom reduced considerationto individuals, predicative objects consisting of individuals, predicative objects consistingof predicative objects consisting of individuals, and so on-the simple theory of types. Intraumatic reaction to his paradox Russell had built a complex system of orders and typesonly to collapse it with his Axiom of Reducibility, a fearful symmetry imposed by anartful dodger. The mathematicians did not imbue the paradoxes with such potency. Unlike Russellwho wanted to get at everything but found that he could not, they started with what couldbe got at and peered beyond. And as with the invention of the irrational numbers, theoutward push eventually led to the positive subsumption of the paradoxes. Cantor in 1899 correspondence with Dedekind considered the collection R of all ordi-nal numbers as in the Burali-Forti Paradox, but he used it positively to give mathematicalexpression to his A b ~ o l u t e . \"F~irst, he distinguished between two kinds of multiplicities(Vielheiten): There are multiplicities such that when taken as a unity (Einheit) lead toa contradiction; such multiplicities he called \"absolutely infinite or inconsistent multi-plicities\" and noted that the \"totality of everything thinkable\" is such a multiplicity. Amultiplicity that can be thought of without contradiction as \"being together\" he called a\"consistent multiplicity or a 'set [Menge]\"'. Cantor then used the Burali-Forti Paradox ar-gument to point out that the class Q of all ordinal numbers is an inconsistent multiplicity.He proceeded to argue that every set can be well-ordered through a presumably recursiveprocedure whereby a well-ordering is defined through successive choices. The set mustget well-ordered, else all of R would be injectible into it, so that the set would have beenan inconsistent multiplicity instead.45 Zermelo found Russell's Paradox independently and probably in 1902,46but like Can-tor, he did not regard the emergence of the paradoxes so much as a crisis as an overalldelimitation for sets. In the Zermelian generative view [1908: 1181, \". ..if in set theorywe confine ourselves to a number of established principles such as those that constitutethe basis of our proof - principles that enable us to form initial sets and to derive newsets from given ones - then all such contradictions can be avoided.\" For the first theoremof his axiomatic theory Zermelo [1908a] subsumed Russell's Paradox, putting it to use asis done now to establish that for any set x there is a y C x such that y @ x, and hence thatthere is no universal set.47 44Seefootnote 3 for more about the 1899 correspondence. Purkert [1989: 57ffl argues that Cantor had alreadyamved at the Burali-Forti Paradox around the time of the Grundlagen [1883]. On the interpretations supportedin the text all of the logical paradoxes grew out of Cantor's work -with Russell shifting the weight to paradox. 4 5 ~ .H~ard.y [I9031 and Philip Jourdain [1904,1905] also gave arguments involving the injection of R,butsuch an approach would only get codified at a later stage in the development of set theory in the work of vonNeurnann [I9251 (cf. 3.1). 4 6 ~ eKe anamori [2004:8 11. 471n2.6 Hartogs's Theorem is construed as a positive subsumption of that other, the Burali-Forti Paradox.
412 Akihiro KanamoriThe differing concerns of Frege-Russell logic and the emerging set theory are furtherbrought out by the analysis of the function concept as discussed below in 2.4, and thoseissues are here rehearsed with respect to the existence of the null class, or empty set.48Frege in his Grundlagen [ I8841 eschewed the terms \"set [Menge]\" and \"class [Klasse]\",but in any case the extension of the concept \"not identical with itself' was key to his def-inition of zero as a logical object. Ernst Schroder, in the first volume [I8901 of his majorwork on the algebra of logic, held a traditional view that a class is merely a collectionof objects, without the { ] so to speak. In his review [I8951 of Schroder's [1890], Fregeargued that Schroder cannot both maintain this view of classes and assert that there is anull class, since the null class contains no objects. For Frege, logic enters in giving unityto a class as the extension of a concept and thus makes the null class viable.It is among the set theorists that the null class, qua empty set, emerged to the fore asan elementary concept and a basic building block. Cantor himself did not dwell on theempty set. At one point he did write [1880: 3551 that \"the identity of two pointsets P andQ will be expressed by the formula P Q\"; defined disjoint sets as \"lacking intersection\"; absence of points ... weand then wrote [1880: 3561 \"for the single point.\" (So, \"= choose the letter 0;P 0indicates that the set P contains no 0 is arguably more like apredication for being empty at this stage.)Dedekind [1888: $21 deliberately excluded the empty set [Nullsystem] \"for certain rea-sons\", though he saw its possible usefulness in other contexts. Zermelo [1908a] wrote inhis Axiom 11: \"There exists a (improper [uneigentliche]) set, the null set [Nullmenge]0, that contains no element at all.\" Something of intension remained in the \"(improper[uneigentliche])\", though he did point out that because of his Axiom I, the Axiom of Ex-tensionality, there is a single empty set. Finally, Hausdorff [I9141 unequivocally optedfor the empty set [Nullmenge]. However, a hint of predication remained when he wrote[1914: 31: \". .. the equation A = 0 means that the set A has no element, vanishes [ver-schwindet], is empty.\" The use to which Hausdorff put \"0\" is much as \"0\" is used inmodern mathematics, particularly to indicate the extension of the conjunction of mutuallyexclusive properties.The set theorists, unencumbered by philosophical motivations or traditions, attributedlittle significance to the empty set beyond its usefulness. Although embracing both exten-sionality and the null class may engender philosophical difficulties for the logic of classes,the empty set became commonplace in mathematics simply through use, like its intimate,zero.2.3 Measure, Category, and Borel HierarchyDuring this period Cantor's two main legacies, the investigation of definable sets of realsand the extension of number into the transfinite, were further incorporated into mathemat-ics in direct initiatives. The axiomatic tradition would be complemented by another, onethat would draw its life more directly from mathematics. The French analysts Emile Borel, RenC Baire, and Henri Lebesgue took on the in-vestigation of definable sets of reals in what was to be a paradigmatically constructive 4 8 ~ omr ore on the empty set, see Kanamori [2003a].
Set Theory from Cantor to Cohen 413approach. Cantor [I8841 had established the perfect set property for closed sets and for-mulated the concept of content for a set of reals, but he did not pursue these matters. Withthese as antecedents the French work would lay the basis for measure theory as well asdescriptive set theory, the definability theory of the continuum.49 Soon after completing his thesis Borel [1898:46ffl considered for his theory of mea-sure those sets of reals obtainable by starting with the intervals and closing off undercomplementation and countable union. The formulation was axiomatic and in effect im-predicative, and seen in this light, bold and imaginative; the sets are now known as theBorel sets and quite well-understood. Baire in his thesis [I8991 took on a dictum of Lejeune Dirichlet's that a real functionis any arbitrary assignment of reals, and diverging from the 19th-Century preoccupationwith pathological examples, sought a constructive approach via pointwise limits. HisBaire class 0 consists of the continuous real functions, and for countable ordinal numbersa > 0, Baire class cu consists of those functions f not in any previous class yet obtainableas pointwise limits of sequences fo, fi, f2, ...of functions in previous classes, i.e. f ( x ) =lim,,, f,(x) for every real x. The functions in these classes are now known as the Bairefunctions, and this was the first stratification into a transfinite hierarchy after Cantor.50 Baire's thesis also introduced the now basic concept of category. A set of reals isnowhere dense iff its closure under limits includes no open set, and a set of reals is meager(or ofjirst category) z f f it is a countable union of nowhere dense sets -otherwise, it is ofsecond category. Baire established the Baire Category Theorem: Every non-empty openset of reals is of second category. His work also suggested a basic property: A set ofreals has the Baire property iff it has a meager symmetric difference with some open set.Straightforward arguments show that every Borel set has the Baire property. Lebesgue's thesis [I9021 is fundamental for modem integration theory as the sourceof his concept of measurability. Inspired in part by Borel's ideas but notably containingnon-constructive aspects, Lebesgue's concept of measurable set through its closure un-der countable unions subsumed the Borel sets, and his analytic definition of measurablefunction through its closure under pointwise limits subsumed the Baire functions. Cate-gory and measure are quite different; there is a co-meager (complement of a meager) setof reals that has Lebesgue measure zero.51 Lebesgue's first major work in a distinctivedirection would be the seminal paper in descriptive set theory: In the memoir [I9051 Lebesgue investigated the Baire functions, stressing that theyare exactly the functions definable via analytic expressions (in a sense made precise). Hefirst established a correlation with the Borel sets by showing that they are exactly the pre-images of open intervals via Baire functions. With this he introduced the first hierarchyfor the Borel sets, his open sets of class a not being in any previous class yet being pre-images of some open interval via some Baire class a function. After verifying various 4 9 ~ e Ke anamori [I9951 for more on the emergence of descriptive set theory. See Moschovakis [I9801 orKanamori [2003] for the mathematical development. 'OBaire mainly studied the finite levels, particularly the classes 1 and 2. He [I8981 pointed out that Dirichlet'sfunction that assigns 1 to rationals and 0 to irrationals is in class 2 and also observed with a non-constructiveappeal to Cantor's cardinality argument that there are real functions that are not Baire. 5 1 ~ efeootnote 11. See Hawkins [I9751 for more on the development of Lebesgue measurability. See Oxtoby[I9711 for an account of category and measure in juxtaposition.
414 Akihiro Kanamoriclosure properties and providing characterizations for these classes Lebesgue establishedtwo main results. The first demonstrated the necessity of exhausting the countable ordinalnumbers: The Baire hierarchy is propec i.e. for every countable a there is a Bairefinc-tion of class a; correspondingly the hierarchy for the Borel sets is analogously propel:The second established transcendence beyond countable closure for his concept of mea-surability: There is a Lebesgue measurable function which is not in any Baire class;correspondingly there is a Lebesgue measurable set which is not a Borel set. The first result was the first of all hierarchy results, and a precursor of fundamentalwork in mathematical logic in that it applied Cantor's enumeration and diagonalizationargument to achieve a transcendence to a next level. Lebesgue's second result was alsoremarkable in that he actually provided an explicitly defined set, one that was later seen tobe the first example of a non-Borel analytic set (cf. 2.5). For this purpose, the reals werefor the first time regarded as encoding something else, namely countable well-orderings,and this not only further embedded the transfinite into the investigation of sets of reals,but foreshadowed the later coding results of mathematical logic. Lebesgue's results, along with the later work in descriptive set theory, can be viewedas pushing the mathematical frontier of the actual infinite past KO,which arguably hadachieved a mathematical domesticity through increasing use in the late 19th-Century,through Cantor's second number class to XI. It is somewhat ironic but also revealing, then,that this grew out of work by analysts with a definite constructive bent. Baire 11899:361viewed the infinite ordinal numbers and hence his function hierarchy as merely unef a ~ o nde parler, and continued to view infinite concepts only in potentiality. Borel [I8981 tooka pragmatic approach and seemed to accept the countable ordinal numbers. Lebesgue wasmore equivocal but still accepting; recalling Cantor's early attitude Lebesgue regarded theordinal numbers as an indexing system, \"symbols\" for classes, but nonetheless he workedout their basic properties, even providing a formulation 11905: 1491 of proof by transfi-nite induction. All three analysts expressed misgivings about AC and its use in Zermelo'sproof.52 As descriptive set theory was to develop, a major concern became the extent of theregularity properties, those properties indicative of well-behaved sets of reals of whichLebesgue measurability, the Baire property, and the perfect set property are the prominentexamples. These properties seemed to get at basic features of the extensional construal ofthe continuum, yet resisted inductive approaches. Early explicit uses of AC through itsrole in providing a well-ordering of the reals showed how it allowed for new constructions:Giuseppe Vitali [I9051 established that there is a non-Lebesgue measurable set of reals,and Felix Bernstein [1908], that there is a set of reals without the perfect set property.Soon it was seen that neither of these examples have the Baire property. Thus, that thereals are well-orderable, an early contention of Cantor's, permitted constructions thatprecluded the universality of the regularity properties, in particular his own approach tothe Continuum Problem through the perfect set property. 5 2 ~ eMe oore [1982: 2.31.
Set Theory from Cantor to Cohen2.4 Hausdo@ and FunctionsFelix Hausdorff was the first developer of the transfinite after Cantor, the one whose workfirst suggested the rich possibilities for a mathematical investigation of the higher transfi-nite. A mathematician par excellence, HausdorfFtook that sort of mathematical approachto set theory and extensional, set-theoretic approach to mathematics that would dominatein the years to come. While the web of 19th-Century intension in Cantor's work, espe-cially his approach toward functions, now seems rather remote, Hausdorff's work seemsfamiliar as part of the modem language of mathematics. In [I9081 Hausdorff brought together his extensive work on uncountable order types.53Deploring all the fuss being made over foundations by his contemporaries (p.436) andwith Cantor having taken the Continuum Problem as far as seemed possible, HausdorfTproceeded to venture beyond the second number class with vigor. He provided an elegantanalysis of scattered linear order types (those having no dense subtype) in a transfinite hi-erarchy, and constructed the r;r, sets, prototypes for saturated model theory. He first statedthe Generalized Continuum Hypothesis (GCH), that 2\". = K,+, for every a, clarified thesignificance of cofinality, and first considered (p.443) the possibility of an uncountableregular limit cardinal, the first large cardinal. Large cardinal hypotheses posit cardinals with properties that entail their transcendenceover smaller cardinals, and as it has turned out, provide a superstructure of hypothesesfor the analysis of strong propositions in terms of consistency. Hausdorff observed thatuncountable regular limit cardinals, also known now as weakly inaccessible cardinals, area natural closure point for cardinal limit processes. In penetrating work of only a few yearslater Paul Mahlo [1911; 1912; 19131 investigated hierarchies of such cardinals based onhigher fixed-point phenomena, the Mahlo cardinals. The theory of large cardinals was tobecome a mainstream of set theory.54 Hausdorff's classic text, Gr~indziigdeer Mengenlehre [I9141dedicated to Cantor, brokethe ground for a generation of mathematicians in both set theory and topology. A com-pendium of a wealth of results, it emphasized mathematical approaches and proceduresthat would eventually take firm root.55 After giving a clear account of Zermelo's first,[I9041 proof of the Well-Ordering Theorem, Hausdorff (p.140fT) emphasized its max-imality aspect by giving synoptic versions of Zorn's Lemma two decades before Zorn[1935], one of them now known as Hausdorff's Maximality Principle.56 Also, Haus-dorff (p.304) provided the now standard account of the Bore1 hierarchy of sets, with thestill persistent F, and G6 notation. Of particular interest, Hausdorff (p.469ff, and also in[1914a]) used AC to provide what is now known as Hausdorff's Paradox, an implausibledecomposition of the sphere and the source of the better known Banach-Tarski Paradox \"See Plotkin [2005] for translations and careful analyses of Hausdorff's work on ordered sets. 5 4 ~ eKeanamori [2003]for more on large cardinals. 55~ausdorff'smathematical attitude is reflected in a remark following his explanation of cardinal number ina revised edition [1937:§5] of [1914]: \"This formal explanation says what the cardinal numbers are supposed todo, not what they are. More precise definitions have been attempted, hut they are unsatisfactory and unnecessary.Relations between cardinal numbers are merely a more convenient way of expressing relations between sets; wemust leave the determination of the 'essence' of the cardinal number to philosophy.\" 5 6 ~ a u s d o r f fM' ~aximality Principle states that if A is a partially ordered set and B is a linearly ordered subset,then there is a C-maximal linearly ordered subset of A including B.
416 Akihiro Kanamorifrom Stefan Banach and Alfred Tarski's [19241.~'Hausdorff's Paradox was the first, anda dramatic, synthesis of classical mathematics and the Zermelian abstract view. Hausdorff's reduction of functions through a defined ordered pair highlights the dif-fering concerns of the earlier Frege-Russell logic and the emerging set theory.58 Frege[I8911 had two fundamental categories, function and object, with a function being \"un-saturated\" and supplemented by objects as arguments. A concept is a function with twopossible values, the True and the False, and a relation is a concept that takes two argu-ments. The extension of a concept is its graph or course-of-values [Werthverlaufl, whichis an object, and Frege [1893: $361 devised an iterated or double course-of-values [Dop-pelwerthverlaufl for the extension of a relation. In these involved ways Frege assimilatedrelations to functions. As for the ordered pair, Frege in his Grundgesetze [1893: $1441provided the extravagant definition that the ordered pair of x and y is that class to whichall and only the extensions of relations to which x stands toy belong.59 On the other hand, Peirce [1883], Schroder [1895], and Peano [I8971 essentially re-garded a relation from the outset as just a collection of ordered pairs. Whereas Fregewas attempting an analysis of thought, Peano was mainly concerned with recasting on-going mathematics in economical and flexible symbolism and made many reductions,e.g. construing a sequence in analysis as a function on the natural numbers. Peano fromhis earliest logical writings had used \"(x, y)\" to indicate the ordered pair in formula andfunction substitutions and extensions. In [I8971 he explicitly formulated the ordered pairusing \"(x; y)\" and moreover raised the two main points about the ordered pair: First, equa-tion 18 of his Definitions stated the instrumental property which is all that is required ofthe ordered pair:(*) ( x , y ) = ( a , b ) iff x = a a n d y = b .Second, he broached the possibility of reducibility, writing: \"The idea of a pair is funda-mental, i.e. we do not know how to express it using the preceding symbols.\" In Whitehead and Russell's Principia Mathernatica [1910-31, relations distinguishedin intension and in extension were derived from \"propositional\" functions taken as fun-damental and other \"descriptive\" functions derived from relations. They [1910: *55] likeFrege defined an ordered pair derivatively, in their case in terms of classes and relations,and also for a specific purpose.60 Previously Russell [1903: $271had criticized Peirce and 57~ausdorff'sParadox states that a sphere can be decomposed into four pieces Q, A, B, C with Q countableand A, B, C, and B U C all pairwise congruent. Even more implausibly, the Banach-Tarski Paradox states thata ball can be decomposed into finitely many pieces that can be rearranged by rigid motions to form two ballsof the same size as the original ball. Raphael Robinson [I9471 later showed that there is such a decompositioninto just five pieces with one of them containing a single point, and moreover that five is the minimal number.See Wagon [I9851 for more on these and similar results; they stimulated interesting developments in measuretheory that, rather than casting doubt on AC, embedded it further into mathematical practice (cf. 2.6). 5 8 ~ omrore on the ordered pair, see Kanamori [2003a]. 5 9 ~ h idsefinition, which recalls the Whitehead-Russell definition of the cardinal number 2, depended onFrege's famously inconsistent Basic Law V. See Heck [I9951 for more on Frege's definition and use of hisordered pair. @whitehead and Russell had first defined a cartesian product by other means, and only then defined theirordered pair x l y as (xi x ( y ] ,a remarkable inversion from the current point of view. They [1910: *56] used their ordered pair initially to define the ordinal number 2.
Set Theory from Cantor to Cohen 417Schroder for regarding a relation \"essentially as a class of couples,\" although he did notmention this shortcoming in P e a n ~ . ~C'ommenting obliviously on Principia Peano [I911;19131 simply reaffirmed an ordered pair as basic, defined a relation as a class of orderedpairs, and a function extensionally as a kind of relation, referring to the final version ofhis Formulario Mathematico [1905-8: 73ff.l as the source. Capping this to and fro Norbert Wiener [19141provided a definition of the ordered pairin terms of unordered pairs of classes only, thereby reducing relations to classes. Workingin Russell's theory of types, Wiener defined the ordered pair (x, y) aswhen x and y are of the same type and A is the null class (of the next type), and pointedout that this definition satisfies the instrumental property (*) above. Wiener used this toeliminate from the system of Principia the Axiom of Reducibility for propositional func-tions of two variables; he had written a doctoral thesis comparing the logics of Schroderand Although Russell praised Sheffer's stroke, the logical connective not-both,he was not impressed by Wiener's reduction. Indeed, Russell would not have been ableto accept it as a genuine analysis. Unlike Russell, Willard V.O. Quine in a major philo-sophical work Word and Object [1960: $531 regarded the reduction of the ordered pair asa paradigm for philosophical analysis. Making no intensional distinctions Hausdorff [1914: 32ff,70ffl defined an ordered pairin terms of unordered pairs, formulated functions in terms of ordered pairs, and the or-dering relations as collections of ordered pairs.63 Hausdorff thus made both the Peano[I911; 19131 and Wiener [I9141 moves in mathematical practice, completing the reduc-tion of functions to sets.64 This may have been congenial to Peano, but not to Fregenor Russell, they having emphasized the primacy of functions. Following the pioneeringwork of Dedekind and Cantor Hausdorff was at the crest of a major shift in mathematicsof which the transition from an intensional, rule-governed conception of function to anextensional, arbitrary one was a large part, and of which the eventual acceptance of thePower Set Axiom and the Axiom of Choice was symptomatic. In his informal setting Hausdorff took the ordered pair of x and y to be 611na letter accepting Russell's [1901] on the logic of relations for publication in his journal Rivista, Peanohad pointedly written \"The classes of couples correspond to relations\" (see Kennedy [1975: 2141) so that rela-tions are extensionally assimilated to classes. Russell [1903: $981 argued that the ordered pair cannot be basicand would itself have to be given sense, which would be a circular or an inadequate exercise, and \"It seemstherefore more correct to take an intensional view of relations ...\". 6 2 ~ eGerattan-Guinness [I9751 for more on Wiener's work and his interaction with Russell. 6 3 ~deid not so define arbitrary relations, for which there was then no mathematical use, but he was the first toconsider general partial orderings, as in his rnaximality principle. Before Hausdorff and going beyond Cantor,Dedekind was first to consider non-linear orderings, e.g. in his remarkably early, axiomatic study [1900] oflattices. 6 4 ~ tso historical priority, Wiener's note was communicated to the Cambridge Philosophical Society, pre-sented on 23 February 1914, while the preface to Hausdorff's book is dated 15 March 1914. Given the pace ofbook publication then, it is arguable that Hausdorff came up with his reduction first.
418 Akihiro Kanamoriwhere 1 and 2 were intended to be distinct objects alien to the situation.65 In any case, thenow-standard definition is the more intrinsicdue to Kazimierz Kuratowski [1921: 1711. Notably, Kuratowski's definition is a by-product of his analysis of Zermelo's [I9081 proof of the Well-Ordering he or em.^^2.5 Analytic and Projective SetsA decade after Lebesgue's seminal paper [1905], descriptive set theory emerged as a dis-tinct discipline through the efforts of the Russian mathematician Nikolai Luzin. He hadbecome acquainted with the work of the French analysts while in Paris as a student andhad addressed Baire's functions with a intriguing use of CH. What is now known as aLuzin set is an uncountable set of reals whose intersection with any meager set is count-able, and Luzin established: CH implies that there is a Luzin set.67 This would becomea paradigmatic use of CH, in that a recursive construction was carried out in HIstepswhere at each state only countable many conditions have to be attended to, in this case byapplying the Baire Category Theorem. Luzin showed that the characteristic function ofhis set escaped Baire's function classification, and Luzin sets have since become pivotalexamples of \"special sets\" of reals. In Moscow Luzin began an important seminar, and from the beginning a major topicwas the \"descriptive theory of functions\". The young Pole Waclaw Sierpi~skiwas anearly participant while he was interned in Moscow in 1915, and undoubtedly this not onlykindled a decade-long collaboration between Luzin and Sierpinski but also encouragedthe latter's involvement in the development of a Polish school of mathematics and itsinterest in descriptive set theory. Of the three regularity properties, Lebesgue measurability, the Baire property, and theperfect set property (cf. 2.3), the first two were immediate for the Bore1 sets. However,nothing had been known about the perfect set property beyond Cantor's own result thatthe closed sets have it and Bernstein's that with a well-ordering of the reals there is aset not having the property. Luzin's student Pavel Aleksandrov [I9161 established the 6 5 ~sthould be pointed out that the definition works even when x or y is 1 or 2 to maintain the instrumentalproperty (*) of ordered pairs. 6 6 ~ h geeneral adoption of the Kuratowski pair proceeded through the major developments of matbemati-cal logic: Von Neumann initially took the ordered pair as primitive but later noted (von Neumann [1925:VI];[1928: 338];[1929: 2271) the reduction via the Kuratowski definition. Godel in his incompleteness paper11931: 1761 also pointed out the reduction. In his footnote 18, Godel blandly remarked: \"Every propositionabout relations that is provable in [Principia Mathernatica] is provable also when treated in this manner, asis readily seen.\" This stands in stark contrast to Russell's labors in Principia and his antipathy to Wiener'sreduction of the ordered pair. Tarski [1931: n.31 pointed out the reduction and acknowledged his compatriot Ku-ratowski. In his recasting of von Neumann's system, Bernays 11937: 681 also acknowledged Kuratowski [I9211and began with its definition for the ordered pair. It is remarkable that Nicolas Bourbaki in his treatise [I9541on set theory still took the ordered pair as primitive, only later providing the Kuratowski reduction in the [I9701edition. 6 7 ~ a h l[o1913a] also established this result.
Set Theory from Cantor to Cohen 419groundbreaking result that the Borel sets have the perfect set property, so that \"CH holdsfor the Borel sets\".68 In the work that really began descriptive set theory another student of Luzin's, MikhailSuslin, investigated the analytic sets following a mistake he had found in Lebesgue'spaper.69 Suslin [I9171 formulated these sets in terms of an explicit operation 5T70 andannounced two fundamental results: a set B of reals is Borel 13both B and IR - B areanalytic; and there is an analytic set which is not or el.^' This was to be his sole publi-cation, for he succumbed to typhus in a Moscow epidemic in 1919 at the age of 25. In anaccompanying note Luzin [I9171 announced the regularity properties: Every analytic setis Lebesgue measurable, has the Baire property, and has the pe$ect set property, the lastresult attributed to Suslin. Luzin and Sierpinski in their [1918] and [1923] provided proofs, and the latter paperwas instrumental in shifting the emphasis toward the co-analytic sets, i.e. sets of realsX such that lR - X is analytic. They used well-founded relations to provide a basic treerepresentation of co-analytic sets, one from which the main results of the period flowed,and it is here that well-founded relations entered mathematical practice.72 After the first wave in descriptive set theory brought about by Suslin [I9171 and Luzin(19171had crested, Luzin [1925a] and Sierpinski [I9251 extended the domain of study tothe projective sets. For Y c lRk+' and with ordered k-tuples defined from the ordered pair,the projection of Y isSuslin [1917] had essentially noted that a set of reals is analytic iff it is the projection of aBorel subset of lR2.73 Luzin and Sierpinski took the geometric operation of projection to 6 8 ~ f t egretting a partial result [1914: 465ff1, Hausdorff [I9161 also showed, in essence, that the Borel setshave the perfect set property. 69~ierpinsk[i1950: 28ff1describes Suslin's discovery of the mistake. 7 0 d~ejning system is a family (X,), of sets indexed by finite sequences s of natural numbers. The result ofthe Operation 3on such a system is that set 3({X,],) defined by: x E 3((X,JS)iff (3f: w + w)(Vrt E U)(X E Xnn)where f 111 denotes that sequence determined by the first 11 values of f . For a set X of reals, X is analytic iffX = R((X,),) for some defining system (X,), consisting of closed sets of reals. \" ~ u z i n [I9251 traced the term \"analytic\" back to Lebesgue [I9051 and pointed out how the original exampleof a non-Borel Lebesgue measurable set there was in fact the first example of a non-Bore1 analytic set. 72~uildinogn the penultimate footnote, suppose that Y is a co-analytic set of reals, i.e. Y = R - X withX = 3((X,),) for some closed sets X,, so that for reals x, x E Y iff x B X iff (Vf : w -t w)(3nE w)(x B Xfl,,).For finite sequences sl and s2 define: sl < s2 iff s2 is a proper initial segment of sl. For a real x define:T , = {s I x E X, for every initial segment t of sJ. Then: x E Y iff < on T , is a well-founded relation,i.e. there is no infinite descending sequence .. . < s2 < sl < so. T, is a tree (cf. 3.5). Well-founded relationswere explicitly defined much later in Zermelo [1935]. Constructions recognizable as via recursion along a well-founded relation had already occurred in the proofs that the Borel have the perfect set property in Aleksandrov[I9161 and Hausdorff [1916]. 7 3 ~ o r eslubsets of W~ are defined analogously to those of W.
420 Akihiro Kanamoribe basic and defined the projective sets as those sets obtainable from the Borel sets by theiterated applications of projection and complementation. The corresponding hierarchyof projective subsets of lRk is defined, in modern notation, as follows: For A c lRk, A is 12 A = pY for some Borel set Y C lRk+' ,i.e. A is analytic74and for integers n > 0, A is E:+, 12 A = pY for some llf,set Y c lRk+' ,and A is A; iff A is both E; and n: . Luzin [1925a] and Sierpinski [I9251 recast Lebesgue's use of the Cantor diagonal ar-gument to show that the projective hierarchy is proper, and soon its basic properties wereestablished. However, this investigation encountered basic obstacles from the beginning.Luzin [1925a] emphasized that whether the II; sets, the co-analytic sets at the bottomof the hierarchy, have the perfect set property was a major question. In a confident andremarkably prophetic passage he declared that his efforts towards its resolution led himto a conclusion \"totally unexpected\", that \"one does not know and one will never know\"of the family of projective sets, although it has cardinality 2'0 and consists of \"effectivesets\", whether every member has cardinality 2'0 if uncountable, has the Baire property,or is even Lebesgue measurable. Luzin [1925b] pointed out the specific problem of es-tablishing whether the Z; sets are Lebesgue measurable. Both these difficulties werealso pointed out by Sierpinski [1925]. This basic impasse in descriptive set theory wasto remain for over a decade, to be surprisingly resolved by penetrating work of Godelinvolving metamathematical methods (cf. 3.4).2.6 Equivalences and ConsequencesIn this period AC and CH began to be explored no longer as underlying axiom and primor-dial hypothesis but as part of mathematics. Consequences were drawn and even equiv-alences established, and this mathematization, like the development of non-Euclideangeometry, led eventually to a deflating of metaphysical attitudes and attendant concernsabout truth and existence. Friedrich Hartogs [19151established an equivalence result for AC, and this was the firstsubstantial use of Zermelo's axiomatization after its appearance. The axiomatization hadinitially drawn ambivalent response among commentator~,7e~specially those exercisedby the paradoxes, and its assimilation by structuring sets and clarifying arguments beganwith such uses. As noted in 1.3, Cardinal Comparability had become a concern for Cantor by the timeof his Beitrage [1895]; Hartogs showed in Zermelo's system sans AC that Cardinal Com-parability implies that every set can be well-ordered. Thus, an evident consequence of 7 4 ~ n a l y t iscubsets of lRk are defined as for the case k = 1 in terns of a defining system consisting of closedsubsets of R ~ . 7 5 ~ eMe oore [1982: 3.31.
Set Theory from Cantor to Cohen 42 1every set being well-orderable also implied that well-ordering principle, and this first\"reverse mathematics\" result established the equivalence of the well-ordering principle,Cardinal Comparability, and AC over the base theory. Hartogs actually established without AC what is now called Hartogs S Theorem: Forany set M ,there is a well-orderable set E not injectible into M. Cardinal Comparabilitywould then imply that M is injectible into E and hence is well-orderable. For the proofHartogs first worked out a theory of ordering relations in Zermelo's system in terms ofinclusion chains as in Zermelo's [1908] proof.76 He then used Power Set and Separationto get the set M w of well-orderable subsets of M and the set E of equivalence classespartitioning M w according to order-isomorphism. Finally, he showed that E itself hasan inherited well-ordering and is not injectible into M . R~emi~niscent of Zermelo's sub-sumption of Russell's Paradox in the denial of a universal set, Hartogs's Theorem can beviewed as a subsumption of the Burali-Forti Paradox into the Zermelian setting. The first explicit uses of AC mostly amounted to appeals to a well-ordering of the reals,Cantor's preoccupation. Those of Vitali [I9051 and Bernstein [I9081 were mentioned in2.3, and Hausdorff's Paradox [1914; 1914a1, in 2.4. Georg Hamel [I9051 constructedby transfinite recursion a basis for the reals as a vector space over the rationals; cited byZermelo [1908, 1141, this provided a useful basis for later work in analysis and algebra.These various results, jarring at first, broached how a well-ordering allows for a new kindof arithmetical approach to the continuum. The full exercise of AC in ongoing mathematics first occurred in the pioneering workof Ernst Steinitz [1910] on abstract fields. This was the first instance of an emerging phe-nomenon in algebra and topology: the study of axiomatically given structures with therange of possibilities implicitly including the transfinite. Steinitz studied algebraic clo-sures of fields and even had an explicit transfinite parameter in the transcendence degree,the number of indeterminates necessary for closure. Typical of the generality in the yearsto come was Hausdorff's [I9321 result using well-ordering that every vector space hasa basis. As algebra and topology developed however, such results as these came to bebased on the maximal principles that Hausdorff had first broached (cf. 2.4) and began todominate after the appearance of Zorn's Lemma [1935]. Explicit well-orderings seemedout of place at this level of organization, and Zorn's Lemma had the remarkable featurethat its hypothesis was easily checked in most applications. Poland since its reunification in 1918 featured an active school of mathematics estab-lishing foundational results in mathematical logic, topology, and analysis, and at WarsawTarski and Kuratowski together with Sierpiriski were making crucial contributions to settheory and the elucidation of its role in mathematics. The Polish school of mathemat-ics carried out a penetrating investigation of the role of AC in set theory and analysis.Sierpiliski's earliest publications, culminating in his survey [1918], not only dealt withspecific constructions but showed how deeply embedded AC was in the informal devel-opment of cardinality, measure, and the Borel hierarchy (cf. 2.3), supporting Zermelo's 1 6 ~ h iiss better done in Kuratowski [1921]. The Hausdorff [I9141 approach with an ordered pair could havebeen taken, but that only became standard later when more general relations were considered. 7 7 ~wsith Zermelo's Well-Ordering Theorem, textbooks usually establish Hartogs's Theorem after first intro-ducing Replacement and (von Neumann) ordinals, and this amounts to a historical misrepresentation.
422 Akihiro Kanamoricontention [1904: 5161 that the axiom is applied \"everywhere in mathematical deduc-tion\". Tarski [1924], explicitly building his work on Zermelo's system, provided severalpropositions of cardinal arithmetic equivalent to AC, most notably that m2 = m for everyinfinite cardinal m. Adolf Lindenbaum and Tarski in their [I9261 gave further cardinalequivalents, some related to the Hartogs [I9151 result, and announced that GCH, in theform that m < n < 2m holds for no infinite cardinals m and n, implies AC. This studyof consequences led to other choice principles, further implications and sometimes con-verses in a continuing cottage industry.78 The early mathematical study of AC extended to the issue of its independence. Abra-ham Fraenkel's first investigations [I9221 directly addressed Zermelo's axioms, pointingout the need for the Replacement Axiom and attempting an axiomatization of the definitproperty for the Separation Axiom (cf. 3.1). The latter was motivated in part by the needto better articulate independence proofs for the various axioms. Fraenkel [1922a] cameto the fecund idea of starting with urelements and some initial sets closing off underset-theoretic operations to get a model. For the independence of AC he started with urele-ments a,, a,for n E w and the set A = {{a,, I n E w ) of unordered pairs and argued thatfor any set M in the resulting model there is a co-finite AM A such that M is invariantif members of any {a,,a,) E AM are permuted. This immediately implies that there is nochoice function for A in the model. Finally, Fraenkel argued that the model satisfies theother Zermelo axioms, except Extensionality because of the urelements. Fraenkel's early model building emphasized the Zermelian generative framework, an-ticipated well-founded recursion, and foreshadowed the later play with models of set the-ory. That Extensionality was not to be had precluded settling the matter, but just as for theearly models of non-Euclidean or finite geometries Fraenkel's achievement lay in stimu-lating interest in mathematical constructions despite relaxing some basic tenet. Fraenkeltried to develop his approach from time to time, but it needed the articulation that wouldcome with the full espousal of the satisfaction relation. In the latter 1930s Lindenbaumand Andrzej Mostowski so cast and extended Fraenkel's work. Mostowski [1939] forgeda method according to post-Godelian sensibilities, bringing out the importance of groupsof permutations leaving various urelements fixed, and the resulting models as well as laterversions are now known as the Fraenkel-Mostowski models. Even more than AC, Sierpinski investigated CH, and summed up his researches in amonograph [1934]. He provided several notable equivalences to CH, e.g. (p.11) the planelR2 is the union of countably many curves, where a curve is a set of form {(x,y) Iy = f (x))or {(x,y) I x = f O ) with f a real function. Moreover, Sierpinski presented numerous consequences of CH from the literature, onein particular implying a host of others: Mahlo [1913a] and Luzin [I9141 had shown thatCH implies that tlzere is a Luzin set, an uncountable set of reals whose intersection withany meager set is countable (cf. 2.5). To state one consequence, say that a set X ofreals has strong measure zero iff for any sequence 60, el,c 2 , .. . of positive reals there is a sequence of intervals lo,I , , 12,... such that the length of In is less than c, for each n andX 2 U nIn. Bore1 [I9191 conjectured that such sets are countable. However, Sierpiliski [I9281 showed that a Luzin set has strong measure zero. Analogous to a Luzin set, a 7 8 ~ eMe oore (19821,especially its 5.1, for other choice principles.
Set Theory from Cantor to Cohen 423Sierpinski set is an uncountable set of reals whose intersection with any Lebesgue measurezero set is countable. Sierpinski [I9241 showed that CH implies that there is a Sierpiriskiset, and emphasized [I9341 an emerging duality between measure and category. The subsequent work of Fritz Rothberger would have formative implications for theContinuum Problem. He [I9381 observed that if both Luzin and Sierpinski sets exist,then they have cardinality K 1 , so that the joint existence of such sets of the cardinality ofthe continuum implies CH. Then in penetrating analyses of the work of Sierpinski andHausdorff on gaps (cf. 2.1) Rothberger [1939; 19481 considered other sets and implica-tions between cardinal properties of the continuum independent of whether CH holds. Itbecame newly clarified that absent CH one can still isolate uncountable cardinals I 2'0that gauge and delimit various recursive constructions, and this approach was to blossomhalf a century later in the study of cardinal characteristics (or invariants) of the contin-UU~.~~ These results cast CH in a new light, as a construction principle. Conclusions had beendrawn from having a well-ordering of the reals, but one given by CH allowed for recur-sive constructions where at any stage only countably many conditions corresponding toas many reals had to be handled. The construction of a Luzin set was a simple recur-sive application of the Baire Category Theorem, and later constructions took advantageof the possibility of diagonalization at each stage. However, whereas the new construc-tions using AC, though jarring at first, were eventually subsumed as concomitant with theacceptance of the axiom and as expressions of the richness of possibility, constructionsfrom CH clashed with that very sense of richness for the continuum. It was the mathe-matical investigation of CH that increasingly raised doubts about its truth and certainlyits provability (cf. end of 3.4). 3 CONSOLIDATION3.1 Ordinals and ReplacementIn the 1920s fresh initiatives structured the loose Zermelian framework with new featuresand corresponding developments in axiomatics: von Neumann's work with ordinals andReplacement; the focusing on well-founded sets and the cumulative hierarchy; and exten-sionalization in first-order logic. Von Neumann effected a counter-reformation of sorts:The transfinite numbers had been central for Cantor but peripheral to Zermelo; von Neu-mann reconstrued them as bona$de sets, now called simply the ordinals, and establishedtheir efficacy by formalizing transfinite recursion. Von Neumann [1923; 19281, and before him Dimitry Mirimanoff [1917; 1917al andZermelo in unpublished 1915 work,80 isolated the now familiar concept of ordinal, withthe basic idea of taking precedence in a well-ordering simply to be membership. Ap-pealing to forms of Replacement Mirimanoff and Von Neumann then established the key 7 9 ~ eMe iller [I9841 for more on special sets of reals and van Douwen I19841 as a trend setting paper forcardinal characteristics of the continuum. See Blass [2008] and Bartoszynski [2008] for recent work on cardinalcharacteristics. *Osee Hallctt [1984: 8.11.
424 Akihiro Kanamoriinstrumental property of Cantor's ordinal numbers for ordinals: Every well-ordered set isorder-isomorphic to exactly one ordinal with membership. Von Neumann in his own ax-iomatic presentation took the further step of ascribing to the ordinals the role of Cantor'sordinal numbers. Thus, like Kepler's laws by Newton's, Cantor's principles of generationfor his ordinal numbers would be subsumed by the Zerrnelian framework. For this recon-strual of ordinal numbers and already to define the arithmetic of ordinals von Neumannsaw the need to establish the Transfinite Recursion Theorem, the theorem that validatesdefinitions by transfinite recursion. The proof was anticipated by the Zermelo 1904 proof,but Replacement was necessary even for the very formulation, let alone the proof, of thetheorem. With the ordinals in place von Neumann completed the restoration of the Can-torian transfinite by defining the cardinals as the initial ordinals, those ordinals not inbijective correspondence with any of its predecessors. Now, the infinite initial ordinalsare denoted . . ...,W = W O ,W1, W 2 , . WU, ,so that w is to be the set of natural numbers in the ordinal construal, and the identificationof different intensions is signaled bywith the left being a von Neumann ordinal and the right being the Cantorian cardinalnumber. Replacement has been latterly regarded as somehow less necessary or crucial thanthe other axioms, the purported effect of the axiom being only on large-cardinality sets.Initially, Abraham Fraenkel [1921; 19221 and Thoralf Skolem [I9231 had independentlyproposed adjoining Replacement to ensure that E(a) = { a ,P ( a ) ,P ( P ( a ) ) ,...) be a setwhen a is the particular infinite set & = ( 0 ,{ a ) ,{ ( a ) ).,..) posited by Zermelo's Axiomof Infinity, since, as they pointed out, Zermelo's axioms cannot establish this. However,even E(8) cannot be proved to be a set from Zermelo's axioms;' and if his axiom ofInfinity were reformulated to accommodate E(0), there would still be many finite sets asuch that E(a)cannot be proved to be a set.82 Replacement serves to rectify the situationby admitting new infinite sets defined by \"replacing\" members of the one infinite set givenby the Axiom of Infinity. In any case, the full exercise of Replacement is part and parcelof transfinite recursion, which is now used everywhere in modern set theory, and it wasvon Neumann's formal incorporation of this method into set theory, as necessitated by hisproofs, that brought in Replacement. That Replacement became central for von Neumann was intertwined with his takingof function, in its full extensional sense, instead of set as primitive and his establish-ing of a context for handling classes, collections not necessarily sets. He [1925; 1928alformalized the idea that a class is proper, i.e. not a set, exactly when it is in bijectivecorrespondence with the entire universe, and this exactly when it is not an element ofany class. This thus brought in another move from Cantor's 1899 correspondence with he union of E(Zo), with membership restricted to it, models Zermelo's axioms yet does not have E(0) asa member. 8 2 ~ eMe athias [2001].
Set Theory from Cantor to Cohen 425Dedekind (cf. 2.2). However, von Neumann's axiomatization [1925; 19281 of functionwas complicated, and reverting to sets as primitive Paul Bernays (cf. his [1976]) recastand simplified von Neumann's system. Still, the formal incorporation of proper classes in-troduced a superstructure of objects and results distant from mathematical practice. Whatwas to be inherited was a predisposition to entertain proper classes in the mathematicaldevelopment of set theory, a willingness that would have crucial ramifications (cf. 3.6).3.2 Well-Foundednessand the Cumulative HierarchyWith ordinals and Replacement, set theory continued its shift away from pretensions ofa general foundation toward a theory of a more definite subject matter, a process fueledby the incorporation of well-foundedness. Mirimanoff [I9171 was the first to study thewell-founded sets, and the later hierarchical analysis is distinctly anticipated in his work.But interestingly enough well-founded relations next occurred in the direct definabilitytradition from Cantor, descriptive set theory (cf. 2.5). In the axiomatic tradition Fraenkel [1922], Skolem [I9231 and von Neumann [I9251considered the salutary effects of restricting the universe of sets to the well-founded sets.Von Neumann [1929: 231,236ffl formulated in his functional terms the Axiom of Foun-dation, that every set is well-f~unded,'a~nd defined the resulting hierarchy of sets in hissystem via transfinite recursion: In modern notation, the axiom, as is well-known, entailsthat the universe V of sets is stratified into cumulative ranks V, where Vo = 0; V,+, = P(V,); V, = U,<,V, for limit ordinals 6 ;and v = u,v,Von Neumann used this, the cumulative hierarchy, to establish the first relative consis-tency result in set theory via \"inner models\"; his argumentation in particular establishedthe consistency of Foundation relative to Zermelo's axioms plus Replacement. During this period mathematical logic gained new currency, and a tussle based on thedifferent approaches of first- and second-order logic to set theory would lead to a substan-tial axiomatic development.84 The prescient Skolem [I9231 made the proposal of usingfor Zermelo's definite properties for the Separation Axiom those properties expressiblein first-order logic with E as a binary relation symbol. After Leopold Lowenheim [I9151had broken the ground for model theory with his result about the satisfiability of a first-order sentence, Skolem [1920; 19231 had located the result solidly in first-order logicand generalized it to the Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem: I f a countable collection ofjrst-order sentences is satisjable, then it is satisjable in a countable domain. That Skolemintended for set theory to be a first-order system without a privileged interpretation for 8 3 ~ x (fx 0 + 3y E x(xrly = 0)). This is von Neumann's Axiom V14 in terms of sets. The term \"Foundation[Fundierung]\" itself comes from Zermelo [1930]. 84~irst-ordelrogic is the logic of formal languages consisting of formulas built up from specified functionand relation symbols using logical connectives and first-order quantifiers V and 3, quantifiers to be interpretedas ranging over the elemerris of a domain of discourse. Second-order logic has quantifiers to be interpreted asranging over arbitrary subsets of a domain.
426 Akihiro KanamoriE becomes evident in the initial application of the Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem to getSkolemS Paradox: In first-order logic Zermelo's axioms are countable, Separation hav-ing become a schema, a schematic collection of axioms, one for each first-order formula;the theorem then implies the existence of countable models of the axioms although theyentail the existence of uncountable sets. Skolem intended by this means to deflate thepossibility of set theory becoming a foundation for mathematics. Exercised by this rela-tivism and by the recent work of Fraenkel and von Neumann, Zermelo [I9291 in his firstpublication in set theory in two decades proposed an axiomatization of his de$nit propertyin second-order terms. In direct response Skolem [I9301 pointed out possible difficultieswith this approach and reaffirmed his first-order formulation, completing the backdrop fora new axiomatic synthesis. Zermelo in his remarkable [I9301 offered his final axiomatization of set theory as wellas a striking view of a procession of natural models that would have a modern resonance.While ostensibly a response to Skolem [1930], the dramatically new picture of sets inZermelo [I9301 reflects gained experience and the germination of ideas over a prolongedperiod. The main axiomatization incorporated Replacement but also the Axiom of Foun-dation. In contrast to Zermelo [1908a], while urelements continued to be allowed, Infinitywas eschewed and Choice was regarded as part of the underlying logic. Concerning Sepa-ration and Replacement it becomes evident from how Zermelo proceeded that he regardedtheir applicability in a fully second-order context. As described in above, Foundation in modern set theory ranks the universe of sets intothe cumulative hierarchy V = U, V,. Zermelo substantially advanced this schematicgenerative picture with his inclusion of Foundation in an axiomatization. Replacementand Foundation focused the notion of set, with the first making possible the means oftransfinite recursion and induction, and the second making possible the application ofthose means to get results about all sets. It is now almost banal that Foundation is the oneaxiom unnecessary for the recasting of mathematics in set-theoretic terms, but the axiomascribes to membership the salient feature that distinguishes investigations specific to settheory as an autonomous field of mathematics. Indeed, it can be fairly said that modernset theory is at base a study couched in well-foundedness, the Cantorian well-orderingdoctrines adapted to the Zermelian generative conception of sets. In [I9301 Zermelo described a range of models for set theory, each an initial segmentof a cumulative hierarchy built on an initial set of urelements. Zermelo then establisheda categoricity of sorts for his axioms, one made possible by his second-order context.He showed that his models are characterized up to isomorphism by two cardinals, thenumber of their urelements and the height of their ordinals. Moreover, he establishedthat if two models have the same number of urelements yet different heights, then oneis isomorphic to an initial segment of the other's cumulative hierarchy. Grappling withPower Set and Replacement he characterized the heights of his models (\"Grenzzahlen\")as KO or the (strongly)inaccessible cardinals, those uncountable regular cardinals K thatare strong limit, i.e. if R < K, then 2A< K. Zermelo posited an endless procession of models, each a set in a next, advocatinga dynamic view of sets that was a marked departure from Cantor's (and later, Godel's)realist presumption of a fixed universe of sets. In synthesizing the sense of progression
Set Theory from Cantor to Cohen 427inherent in the new cumulative hierarchy picture and the sense of completion in the limitnumbers, the inaccessible cardinals, he promoted the crucial idea of internal models ofset theory. The open-endedness of Zermelo's original [1908a] axiomatization had beenstructured by Replacement and Foundation, but he advanced a new open-endedness withan eternal return of models approaching Cantor's Absolute. In the process, inaccessible cardinals became structurally relevant. Sierpiriski-Tarski[I9301 had formulated these cardinals arithmetically as those uncountable cardinals thatare not the product of fewer cardinals each of smaller power and observed that theyare weakly inaccessible - the first large cardinal concept, from Hausdorff [1908: 4431(cf. 2.4). Be that as it may, in the early model-theoretic investigations of set theory theinaccessible cardinals provided the natural models as envisioned by Zerrnelo. Moreover,strong large cardinal hypotheses emerging in the 1960s were to be formulated in terms ofthese initial segments of the cumulative hierarchy.85 The journal volume containing Zermelo's paper also contained Stanislaw Ulam's sem-inal paper [1930] on measurable cardinals, the most important of all large cardinals. Fora set S, U is a (non-principal) ultraJlter over S ~ f Uf is a collection of subsets of S con-taining no singletons, closed under the taking of supersets and finite intersections, andnsuch that for any X S , either X E U or S - X E U. For a cardinal A, an ultrafilter U isA-complete ifffor any D C U of cardinality less than A, D E U. Finally, an uncountablecardinal K is measurable iff there is a K-complete ultrafilter over K. Thus, a measurablecardinal is a cardinal whose power set is structured with a two-valued measure havingstrong closure property. Measurability embodied the first large cardinal confluence of Cantor's two legacies,the investigation of definable sets of reals and the extension of number into the transfinite:Distilled from measure-theoretic considerations related to Lebesgue measure, the conceptalso entailed inaccessibility in the transfinite. Moreover, the initial airing generated aproblem that was to keep the spark of large cardinals alive for the next three decades:Can the least inaccessible cardinal be measurable? In the 1960s consequences of, and astructural characterization of, measurability were established that became fundamental inthe setting structured by the new Zermelian emphasis on well-foundedness (cf. 3.6).3.3 First-Order Logic and ExtensionalizationThe final structuring of set theory before it was to sail forth on its independent courseas a distinctive field of mathematics was its full extensionalization in first-orderHowever influential Zermelo's [I9301 and despite his subsequent advocacy [1931; 19351of infinitary logic, his efforts to forestall Skolem were not to succeed, as stronger currentswere at work in the direction of first-order formalization. Hilbert effected a basic shift in the development of mathematical logic when he tookWhitehead and Russell's Principia Mathematica, viewed it as an uninterpreted formalism,and made it an object of mathematical inquiry. The book [19281g7by Hilbert and Wilhelm 8 5 ~ eKeanamori [2003:chap.51. 8 6 ~ eGe oldfarb [I9791 and Moore [1988a] for more on the emergence of first-order logic. he historical development is clarified by the fact that while this book was published in light of the devel-
428 Akihiro KanamoriAckermann reads remarkably like a recent text. In marked contrast to the formidableworks of Frege and Russell with their forbidding notation and all-inclusive approach, itproceeded pragmatically and upward to probe the extent of structure, making those movesemphasizing forms and axiomatics typical of modem mathematics. After a completeanalysis of sentential logic it distinguished and focused on first-order logic (\"functionalcalculus\", and later \"(restricted) predicate calculus\") as already the source of significantproblems. Thus, while Frege and Russell never separated out first-order logic, Hilbertthrough his mathematical investigations established it as a subject in its own right. Hilbert in the 1920s developed proof theory, i.e. metamathematics, and proposed hisprogram of establishing the consistency of classical mathematics. The issues here gainedcurrency because of Hilbert's preeminence, just as mathematics in the large had beenexpanded in the earlier years of the century by his reliance on non-constructive proofsand transcendental methods and his advocacy of new contexts. Through this expansion thefull exercise of AC had become a mathematical necessity (cf. 2.6) and arbitrary functions,and so Power Set, had become implicitly accepted in the extensive investigation of higherfunction spaces. Hilbert-Ackermann [1928: 65ff,72ffl raised two crucial questions directed at the furtherpossibilities for first-order logic: the completeness of its axioms and the Decision Problem[Entscheidungsproblem]. These as well as Hilbert's program for securing consistencywere to be decisively informed by penetrating work that for set theory eventually led toits first sophisticated metamathematical result, the relative consistency of AC and GCH. Kurt Godel (1906-1978), born when Zermelo was devising his proofs of the Well-Ordering Theorem, virtually completed the mathematization of logic by submerging meta-mathematical methods into mathematics. The main vehicle was of course the direct cod-ing, \"the arithmetization of syntax\", in his celebrated Incompleteness Theorem [1931].Establishing a fundamental distinction between what is true about the natural numbersand what is provable, this theorem transformed Hilbert's consistency program and ledto the undecidability of the Decision Problem from Hilbert-Ackermann [I9281 and thedevelopment of recursion theory. Godel's work showed in particular that for a (schemat-ically definable) collection of axioms A, its consistency, that from A one cannot prove acontradiction, has a formal counterpart in an arithmetical formula Con(A) about naturalnumbers. Godel's \"second\" theorem asserts that if A is consistent and subsumes someelementary arithmetic of the natural numbers, then Con(A) cannot be proved from A. Butstarting an undercurrent, the earlier Completeness Theorem [I9301 from his thesis an-swered affirmatively a Hilbert-Ackermann [I9281 question about semantic completeness,clarified the distinction between the formal syntax and semantics of first-order logic, andsecured its key instrumental property with the Compactness Theorem. Tarski [1933; 19351 then completed the mathematization of logic by providing hisdefinition of truth, exercising philosophers to a surprising extent ever since. ThroughHilbert-Ackermann [I9281 and Godel [I9301 the satisfaction relation had been informal,and in that sense completeness could be said to have remained inadequately articulated.Tarski simply extensionalized truth in formal languages and provided a formal, recur-opments of the 1920s, it has a large overlap with unpublished lecture notes for a 1917-8 course given by Hilhertat Gottingen.
Set Theory from Cantor to Cohen 429sive definition of the satisfaction relation in set-theoretic terms. This new response to agrowing need for a mathematical framework became the basis for model theory, but thuscast into mathematics truth would leave behind any semantics in the real meaning of theword. Tarski's [I9331 was written around the same time as his [1931], a seminal paper thathighlights the thrust of his initiative. In [I9311 Tarski gave a precise mathematical (that is,set-theoretic) formulation of the informal concept of a (first-order) definable set of reals,thus infusing the intuitive notion of definability into ongoing mathematics. This math-ematization of intuitive or logical notions was accentuated by Kuratowski-Tarski [1931],where second-order quantification over the reals was correlated with the geometric op-eration of projection, beginning the process of explicitly wedding descriptive set theoryto mathematical logic. The eventual effect of Tarski's [I9331 mathematical formulationof (so-called) semantics would be not only to make mathematics out of the informal no-tion of satisfiability, but also to enrich ongoing mathematics with a systematic method forforming mathematical analogues of several intuitive semantic notions.88 In this process of extensionalization first-order logic came to be accepted as the canon-ical language because of its mathematical possibilities as epitomized by the CompactnessTheorem, and higher-order logics became downgraded as the workings of the power setoperation in disguise. Skolem's early suggestion for set theory was thus taken up gener-ally, and again the ways of paradox were positively subsumed, as the negative intent ofSkolem's Paradox gave way to the extensive, internal use of Skolem functions from theLowenheim-Skolem Theorem in set-theoretic constructions.3.4 Relative ConsistencySet theory was launched on an independent course as a distinctive field of mathematics byGodel's construction of L [1938; 19391 leading to the relative consistency of the Axiomof Choice and the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis. Synthesizing all that came before,Godel built on the von Neumann ordinals as sustained by Replacement to formulate arelative Zermelian universe of sets based on logical definability, a universe imbued with aCantorian sense of enumerative order. Godel's advances in set theory can be seen as part of a steady intellectual development.In a lecture [I9331 on the foundations of mathematics Godel propounded the axiomaticset theory \"as presented by Zermelo, Fraenkel and von Neumann\" as \"a natural gener-alization of [Russell's simple] theory of types, or rather, what becomes of the theory oftypes if certain superfluous restrictions are removed.\" First, the types can be taken to becumulative, and second, the process can be continued into the transfinite. As for howfar this cumulative hierarchy of sets is to continue, \"the first two or three [infinite] typesalready suffice to define very large [Cantorian ordinal numbers]\" which can then serve toindex the process, and so on. Implicitly referring to his incompleteness result Gadel notedthat for a formal system S based on the theory of types a number-theoretic propositioncan be constructed which is unprovable in S but becomes provable if to S is adjoined \"the 881ncidentally,Tarski [I9311 stated a result whose proof led to Tarski's well-known theorem [I9511 that theelementary theory of real closed fields is decidable via the elimination of quantifiers.
430 Akihiro Kanamorinext higher type and the axioms concerning it.\"89 Thus, although he never mentionedZermelo [1930], Godel was entertaining its cumulative hierarchies but as motivated bythe theory of types. It is to this initiative, separately fueled by Zermelo and Godel, that one can date howthe formation of sets out of sets iterated into the transfinite as embodied by the cumulativehierarchy can be regarded as a motivation for the subject matter of set theory. In a notableinversion, what has come to be regarded as the iterative conception became a heuristicfor motivating the axioms of set theory generally.g0 The iterative conception of sets, likeTarski's definition of truth, has exercised philosophers to a surprising extent with respectto extrinsic justifications. This has opened the door to a metaphysical appropriation in thefollowing sense: It is as if there is some notion of set that is \"there\", in terms of which theaxioms must find some further justification. But set theory has no particular obligationsto mirror some prior notion of set arrived at a posteriori. Replacement and Choice forexample do not quite \"fit\" the iterative conception?' but if need be, Replacement canbe \"justified in terms of achieving algebraic closure of the axioms, a strong motivationin the work of Fraenkel and the later Zermelo, and choice can be \"justified\" in terms ofCantorian well-ordering doctrines or as a logical principle as Zermelo did. In his first announcement [I9381 about L Godel described it as a hierarchy \"whichcan be obtained by Russell's ramified hierarchy of types, if extended to include transfiniteorders.\" Indeed, with L Godel had refined the cumulative hierarchy of sets to a cumulativehierarchy of definable sets which is analogous to the orders of Russell's ramiJied theory.Godel's further innovation was to continue the indexing of the hierarchy through all theordinals. Von Neumann's canonical well-orderings would be the spine for a thin hierarchyof sets, and this would be the key to both the AC and CH results. In a brief account [I9391 Godel informally presented L essentially as is done today:For any set x let def(x) denote the collection of subsets of x first-order definable over(x, E ) . T~he~n define: Lo = 8; La+' = def(L,), L6 = U{L, 1 a < 6) for limit ordinals 6;and the constructible universe L = U { L aI a is an ordinal). 8 9 ~ o d ewl as evidently referring to propositions like Con(S). In a prescient footnote, 48a, to his incomplete-ness paper [I9311 Godel had already written: \". ..the true reason for the incompleteness inherent in all formalsystems of mathematics is that the formation of ever higher types can be continued into the transfinite . . .whilein any formal system at most denumerably many of them are available. For it can be shown that the undecidablepropositions constructed here become decided whenever appropriate higher types are added (for example, thetype w to the system P [Peano Arithmetic]). An analogous situation prevails for the axiom system of set theory.\" ''~hocnfield [1967: 238ff1[1977], Wang [1974a], Boolos [1971], and Scott 119741motivate the axioms of settheory in terms of an iterative concept of set based on stages of construction. Parsons [I9771 raises issues aboutthis approach. \"See Boolos [I9711 for Replacement and Scott 11974: 2141 for Choice. 9 2 ~ oarfirst-order formula q(v1,. . .,v,) in E, qX(xl,... ,x,) is the restriction of the formula to x, i.e. each Vyis replaced by Vy E x and each 3 y is replaced by 3y E x (with these abbreviations having the expected formalarticulation). A set y C x isjrst-order definable over (x, E ) if there is a first-order formula (o(v0,vl, .. . ,v,) anda,, ... ,a, all in x such that y = ( z E x I qX(z,al,... ,an)).
Set Theory from Cantor to Cohen 43 1Godel pointed out that L \"can be defined and its theory developed in the formal systemsof set theory themselves.\" This is a remarkable understatement of arguably the centralfeature of the construction of L. L is a class definable in set theory via a transfinite recur-sion that could be based on the formalizability of def(x), the definability of definability,which was later reaffirmed by Tarski's systematic definition of the satisfaction relation inset-theoretic terms. With this, one can formalize the Axiom of Constructibility V = L,i.e. Vx(x E L). In modem parlance, an inner model is a transitive class93containing all theordinals such that, with membership and quantification restricted to it, the class satisfieseach axiom of ZF. In summary terms, what Godel did was to show in ZF that L is aninner model, and moreover that L satisfies AC and CH. He thus established the relativeconsistency Con(ZF) implies Con(ZFC + GCH). In the approach via def(x) it is necessary to show that def(x) remains unaltered whenapplied in L with quantifiers restricted to L. Godel himself would never establish thisabsoluteness ofjirst-order dejinability explicitly, preferring in his one rigorous publishedexposition of L to take an approach that avoids def(x) altogether. In his monograph [1940], based on 1938 lectures, Godel provided a specific, formalpresentation of L in a class-set theory emanating from that of Paul Bernays (cf. [1976]),a theory based in turn on a theory of von Neumann [1925]. Using eight binary operationsproducing new classes from old, Godel generated L set by set via transfinite recursion.This veritable \"Godel numbering\" with ordinals bypassed def(x) and made evident cer-tain aspects of L. Since there is a direct, definable well-ordering of L, choice functionsabound in L, and AC holds there. Of the other axioms the crux is where first-order logicimpinges, in Separation and Replacement. For this, \"algebraic\" closure under Godel'seight operations ensured \"logical\" Separation for bounded formulas:4 and then the fullexercise of Replacement (in V) secured all of the ZF axioms in L. Godel's proof that L satisfies GCH consisted of two separate parts. He established theimplication V = L + GCH, and, in order to apply this implication within L, that L asdefined within L with quantifiers restricted to L is again L itself. This latter follows fromthe aforementioned absoluteness of def(x), and in [I9401 Godel gave an alternate proofbased on the absoluteness of his eight binary operations. Godel's argument for V = L + GCH rests, as he himself wrote in [1939], on \"a gener-alization of Skolem's method for constructing enumerable models.\" This was the first sig-nificant use of Skolem functions since Skolem's own to establish the Lowenheim-Skolemtheorem, and with it, Skolem's Paradox. Ironically, though Skolem sought through hisparadox to discredit set theory based on first-order logic as a foundation for mathemat-ics, Godel turned paradox into method, one promoting first-order logic. Godel [I9391specifically established:(*) For infinite a, every constructible subset of L, belongs to some Lp for a p of the same cardinality as a.It is straightforward to show that for infinite a, La has the same cardinality as that of a. 9 3 cl~ass C is rrat~sitiveif members of members of C are themselves members of C, so that C is \"closedunder membership\". 9 4 ~ h aist, those first-order formulas in which all the quantifiers can be rendered as Vx E yand 3x E y.
432 Akihiro KanamoriIt follows from (*) that in the sense of L, the power set of LK,i,s included in LH,+lrand soGCH follows in L. To establish (*), Godel actually iterated the Skolem closure procedure,and made the first use of the now familiar Mostowski collapse (cf. 3.6). In an incisive 1939lecture Godel announced the version of (*) for countable a as the crux of the consistencyproof of CH and asserted that \"this fundamental theorem constitutes the corrected coreof the so-called Russellian axiom of reducibility.\"95 Thus, Godel established anotherconnection between L and Russell's ramified theory of types. But while Russell had topostulate his ill-fated Axiom of Reducibility for his finite orders, Godel was able to derive,with an important use of Replacement, an analogous form for his transfinite hierarchy thatasserts that the types are delimited in the hierarchy of orders. The synthesis at L extended to the resolution of difficulties in descriptive set theory(cf. end of 2.5). Godel [I9381 announced, in modem terms: If V = L, then ( a ) there is aA; set of reals that is not Lebesgue measurable, and ( b )there is a a ll: set of reals withoutthe perfect set property. Thus, the descriptive set theorists were confronting an obstacleinsurmountable in ZFC! Godel [I9381 listed each of these impossibility results on anequal footing with his AC and GCH results. Unexpected, they were the first instances ofmetamathematical methods resolving outstanding mathematical problems that exhibitedno prior connection to such methods. When eventually confirmed and refined, the resultswere seen to turn on a well-ordering of the reals in L defined via reals coding well-founded structures and thus connected to the well-founded tree representation of a I'I; set(cf. 2.5).96 Set theory had progressed to the point of establishing, in addition to a consistent reso-lution of CH, a consistent possibility for a definable well-ordering of the reals as Cantorhad wanted, one that synthesizes the two historical sources of well-foundedness. Put intoa broader historical context, formal definability was brought into descriptive set theoryby Tarski [1931], and by Kuratowski-Tarski [I9311 and Kuratowski [I9311 which pur-sued the basic connection between existential number quantifiers and countable unionsand between existential real quantifiers and projection and used these \"logical symbols\"to aid in the classification of sets in the Bore1 and projective hierarchies. Godel's results(a) and (b) constitute the first real synthesis of abstract and descriptive set theory, in thatthe axiomatic framework is brought to bear on the investigation of definable sets of reals. Godel brought into set theory a method of construction and argument which affirmedseveral features of its axiomatic presentation. Most prominently, Godel showed how first-order definability can be formalized and used in a transfinite recursive construction to \"see Godel [1939a: 1411. 9 6 ~ h c envery real is in L, this well-ordering is also A: and does not satisfy Fubini's Theorem for Lebesguemeasurable subsets of the plane, and this is one way to confirm (a). What may have been Godel's originalargument for (b) is given in Kanamori [2003: 1701. Texts establish (b) indirectly via the KondB Uniformization Theorem, and this leads to a historical pointabout Godel the working mathematician. As 1938 correspondence with von Neumann makes evident, Godelwas working on one-to-one continuous images of IT; sets, and his [I9381 actually states the results (a) and(b) in these terms. In a 1939 letter, von Neumann informed Godel of KondB [1939], the paper containing theuniformization result, from which it is immediate that the sets are exactly the one-to-one continuous imagesof Ili sets. In a replying letter to von Neumann of 20 March 1939 Godel wrote: \"The result of KondB is of great interest to me and will definitely allow an important simplification in the consistency proof of [(a)] and [(b)] of the attached offprint.\" See Godel [2003] for the Godel-von Neumann correspondence.
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