The Pearson Series in Economics - 8th Edition

626 PART 4 • Information, Market Failure, and the Role of Government may prevent some markets from ever developing. It may, for example, be impos- sible to purchase certain kinds of insurance because suppliers of insurance lack adequate information about consumers likely to be at risk. Each of these informational problems can lead to competitive market ineffi- ciency. We will describe informational inefficiencies in detail in Chapter 17 and see whether government intervention might help to reduce them. Externalities The price system works efficiently because market prices convey information to both producers and consumers. Sometimes, however, market prices do not reflect the activities of either producers or consumers. There is an externality when a consumption or production activity has an indirect effect on other con- sumption or production activities that is not reflected directly in market prices. As we explained in Section 9.2 (page 323), the word externality is used because the effects on others (whether benefits or costs) are external to the market. Suppose, for example, that a steel plant dumps effluent in a river, thus mak- ing a recreation site downstream unsuitable for swimming or fishing. There is an externality because the steel producer does not bear the true cost of wastewater and so uses too much wastewater to produce its steel. This externality causes an input inefficiency. If this externality prevails throughout the industry, the price of steel (which is equal to the marginal cost of production) will be lower than if the cost of production reflected the effluent cost. As a result, too much steel will be produced, and there will be an output inefficiency. We will discuss externalities and ways to deal with them in Chapter 18. • public good Nonexclusive, Public Goods nonrival good that can be made available cheaply but which, The last source of market failure arises when the market fails to supply goods that once available, is difficult to many consumers value. A public good can be made available cheaply to many prevent others from consuming. consumers, but once it is provided to some consumers, it is very difficult to prevent others from consuming it. For example, suppose a firm is considering whether to undertake research on a new technology for which it cannot obtain a patent. Once the invention is made public, others can duplicate it. As long as it is difficult to exclude other firms from selling the product, the research will be unprofitable. Markets therefore undersupply public goods. We will see in Chapter 18 that government can sometimes resolve this problem either by supplying a good itself or by altering the incentives for private firms to produce it. E X A M P L E 1 6 . 5 INEFFICIENCY IN THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM The United States spends a larger fraction of its efficient in production, in the sense of utilizing the GDP on health care than do most other countries. best combination of such inputs as hospital beds, Does this mean that the U.S. health care system is physicians, nurses, and drugs to obtain better health less “efficient” than other health care systems? This outcomes? Second, is the United States output is an important public policy question that we can efficient in the provision of health care; that is, are clarify by taking advantage of the analysis presented the health benefits from the marginal dollar spent on in this chapter. There are two distinct efficiency issues health care greater than the opportunity cost of other here. First, is the U.S. health care system technically goods and services that might be provided instead?

CHAPTER 16 • General Equilibrium and Economic Efficiency 627 We discussed the question of technical under-prescribed in the United States. Beta block- efficiency in Chapter 6. As we saw in Example 6.1, ers, for example, cost just a few cents per dose as more and more health care is produced, there and are believed to reduce heart attack mortality are diminishing returns, so that even if we are on by 25%, yet in some parts of the country they are the production frontier, it will take more and more rarely prescribed. resources to eke out small gains in health out- comes (e.g., increases in life expectancy). But we What about output efficiency? It has been sug- saw that there is reason to believe that the health gested that the increasing fraction of income being care industry is operating below the frontier, so devoted to health expenditures in the United States that if inputs were used more efficiently, better is evidence of inefficiency. But, as we saw in Example health outcomes could be achieved with little or 3.4, this could simply reflect a strong preference for no increase in resources. For example, for every health care on the part of the U.S. population, whose office-based physician in the United States there incomes have generally been increasing. The study are 2.2 administrative workers. This is 25 percent underlying that example calculated the marginal higher than the equivalent number in the United rate of substitution between health related and non- Kingdom, 165 percent more than the Netherlands, health related goods and found that as consump- and 215 percent more than Germany. It appears tion increases, the marginal utility of consumption that substantially more time and expense is for non-health related goods falls quickly. As we devoted to navigating the complex credentialing, explained, this should not be surprising; as individu- claim reporting, verification, and billing require- als age and their incomes increase, an extra year of ments of various insurers in the U.S. relative to life expectancy becomes much more valuable than other developed countries. In addition, a number a new car or a second home. Thus an increasing of low cost, highly effective treatments seem to be share of income devoted to health is entirely consis- tent with output efficiency. SUMMARY 5. Because a competitive equilibrium need not be equi- table, the government may wish to help redistribute 1. Partial equilibrium analyses of markets assume that wealth from rich to poor. Because such redistribution related markets are unaffected. General equilibrium is costly, there is some conflict between equity and analyses examine all markets simultaneously, taking efficiency. into account feedback effects of other markets on the market being studied. 6. An allocation of production inputs is technically effi- cient if the output of one good cannot be increased 2. An allocation is efficient when no consumer can be without decreasing the output of another. made better off by trade without making someone else worse off. When consumers make all mutually advan- 7. A competitive equilibrium in input markets occurs tageous trades, the outcome is Pareto efficient and lies when the marginal rate of technical substitution on the contract curve. between pairs of inputs is equal to the ratio of the prices of the inputs. 3. A competitive equilibrium describes a set of prices and quantities. When each consumer chooses her most pre- 8. The production possibilities frontier measures all ferred allocation, the quantity demanded is equal to efficient allocations in terms of the levels of output the quantity supplied in every market. All competitive that can be produced with a given combination of equilibrium allocations lie on the exchange contract inputs. The marginal rate of transformation of good curve and are Pareto efficient. 1 for good 2 increases as more of good 1 and less of good 2 are produced. The marginal rate of transfor- 4. The utility possibilities frontier measures all efficient mation is equal to the ratio of the marginal cost of allocations in terms of the levels of utility that each of producing good 1 to the marginal cost of producing two people achieves. Although both individuals pre- good 2. fer some allocations to an inefficient allocation, not every efficient allocation must be so preferred. Thus 9. Efficiency in the allocation of goods to consumers is an inefficient allocation can be more equitable than an achieved only when the marginal rate of substitution efficient one.

628 PART 4 • Information, Market Failure, and the Role of Government of one good for another in consumption (which is 11. Free international trade expands a country’s produc- the same for all consumers) is equal to the marginal tion possibilities frontier. As a result, consumers are rate of transformation of one good for another in better off. production. 10. When input and output markets are perfectly com- 12. Competitive markets may be inefficient for four rea- petitive, the marginal rate of substitution (which sons. First, firms or consumers may have market power equals the ratio of the prices of the goods) will equal in input or output markets. Second, consumers or pro- the marginal rate of transformation (which equals ducers may have incomplete information and may the ratio of the marginal costs of producing the therefore err in their consumption and production deci- goods). sions. Third, externalities may be present. Fourth, some socially desirable public goods may not be produced. QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW 10. Why can free trade between two countries make con- sumers of both countries better off? 1. Why can feedback effects make a general equilibrium analysis substantially different from a partial equilib- 11. If Country A has an absolute advantage in the produc- rium analysis? tion of two goods compared to Country B, then it is not in Country A’s best interest to trade with Country B. 2. In the Edgeworth box diagram, explain how one point True or false? Explain. can simultaneously represent the market baskets owned by two consumers. 12. Do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? Explain. 3. In the analysis of exchange using the Edgeworth box a. If it is possible to exchange 3 pounds of cheese for diagram, explain why both consumers’ marginal rates 2 bottles of wine, then the price of cheese is 2/3 the of substitution are equal at every point on the contract price of wine. curve. b. A country can only gain from trade if it can pro- duce a good at a lower absolute cost than its trading 4. “Because all points on a contract curve are efficient, partner. they are all equally desirable from a social point of c. If there are constant marginal and average costs of view.” Do you agree with this statement? Explain. production, then it is in a country’s best interest to specialize completely in the production of some 5. How does the utility possibilities frontier relate to the goods but to import others. contract curve? d. Assuming that labor is the only input, if the opportunity cost of producing a yard of cloth is 6. In the Edgeworth production box diagram, what 3 bushels of wheat per yard, then wheat must conditions must hold for an allocation to be on the require 3 times as much labor per unit produced production contract curve? Why is a competitive equi- as cloth. librium on the contract curve? 13. What are the four major sources of market failure? 7. How is the production possibilities frontier related to Explain briefly why each prevents the competitive the production contract curve? market from operating efficiently. 8. What is the marginal rate of transformation (MRT)? Explain why the MRT of one good for another is equal to the ratio of the marginal costs of producing the two goods. 9. Explain why goods will not be distributed efficiently among consumers if the MRT is not equal to the con- sumers’ marginal rate of substitution. EXERCISES b. What if a new discovery of gold doubles the quan- tity supplied to 150? How will this discovery affect 1. Suppose gold (G) and silver (S) are substitutes for the prices of both gold and silver? each other because both serve as hedges against infla- tion. Suppose also that the supplies of both are fixed 2. Using general equilibrium analysis, and taking into in the short run (QG = 75 and QS = 300) and that the account feedback effects, analyze the following: demands for gold and silver are given by the follow- a. The likely effects of outbreaks of disease on chicken ing equations: farms on the markets for chicken and pork. b. The effects of increased taxes on airline tickets on PG = 975 - QG + 0.5PS and PS = 600 - QS + 0.5PG. travel to major tourist destinations such as Florida a. What are the equilibrium prices of gold and silver?

CHAPTER 16 • General Equilibrium and Economic Efficiency 629 and California and on the hotel rooms in those change if the monopsonist in the labor market were destinations. also a monopolist in the output market? 3. Jane has 3 liters of soft drinks and 9 sandwiches. Bob, 9. The Acme Corporation produces x and y units of on the other hand, has 8 liters of soft drinks and 4 goods Alpha and Beta, respectively. sandwiches. With these endowments, Jane’s mar- a. Use a production possibility frontier to explain ginal rate of substitution (MRS) of soft drinks for sandwiches is 4 and Bob’s MRS is equal to 2. Draw an how the willingness to produce more or less Alpha Edgeworth box diagram to show whether this alloca- depends on the marginal rate of transformation of tion of resources is efficient. If it is, explain why. If it is Alpha or Beta. not, what exchanges will make both parties better off? b. Consider two cases of production extremes: 4. Jennifer and Drew consume orange juice and coffee. (i) Acme produces zero units of Alpha initially, or Jennifer’s MRS of orange juice for coffee is 1 and (ii) Acme produces zero units of Beta initially. If Drew’s MRS of orange juice for coffee is 3. If the price Acme always tries to stay on its production possi- of orange juice is $2 and the price of coffee is $3, which bility frontier, describe the initial positions of cases market is in excess demand? What do you expect to (i) and (ii). What happens as the Acme Corporation happen to the prices of the two goods? begins to produce both goods? 5. Fill in the missing information in the following tables. 10. In the context of our analysis of the Edgeworth pro- For each table, use the information provided to iden- duction box, suppose that a new invention changes a tify a possible trade. Then identify the final allocation constant-returns-to-scale food production process into and a possible value for the MRS at the efficient solu- one that exhibits sharply increasing returns. How does tion. (Note: There is more than one correct answer.) this change affect the production contract curve? Illustrate your results using Edgeworth box diagrams. 11. Suppose that country A and country B both produce a. Norman’s MRS of food for clothing is 1 and Gina’s wine and cheese. Country A has 800 units of available MRS of food for clothing is 4: labor, while country B has 600 units. Prior to trade, country A consumes 40 pounds of cheese and 8 bottles INDIVIDUAL INITIAL TRADE FINAL of wine, and country B consumes 30 pounds of cheese ALLOCATION ALLOCATION and 10 bottles of wine. Norman Gina 6F, 2C COUNTRY A COUNTRY B 1F, 8C Labor per pound cheese 10 10 Labor per bottle wine 50 30 b. Michael’s MRS of food for clothing is 1/2 and a. Which country has a comparative advantage in the Kelly’s MRS of food for clothing is 3. production of each good? Explain. INDIVIDUAL INITIAL TRADE FINAL b. Determine the production possibilities curve for ALLOCATION ALLOCATION each country, both graphically and algebraically. Michael (Label the pretrade production point PT and the Kelly 10F, 3C post-trade point P.) 5F, 15C c. Given that 36 pounds of cheese and 9 bottles of 6. In the analysis of an exchange between two people, wine are traded, label the post-trade consumption suppose both people have identical preferences. Will point C. the contract curve be a straight line? Explain. Can you think of a counterexample? d. Prove that both countries have gained from trade. e. What is the slope of the price line at which trade 7. Give an example of conditions when the production possibilities frontier might not be concave. occurs? 12. Suppose a bakery has 16 employees to be desig- 8. A monopsonist buys labor for less than the competi- tive wage. What type of inefficiency will this use of nated as bread bakers (B) and cake bakers (C), so that monopsony power cause? How would your answer B + C = 16. Draw the production possibilities fron- tier for bread (y) and cakes (x) for the following pro- duction functions: a. y = 2B.5 and x = C.5 b. y = B and x = 2C.5

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C H A P T E R 17 Markets with Asymmetric Information CHAPTER OUTLINE For most of this book, we have assumed that consumers and 17.1 Quality Uncertainty and the producers have complete information about the economic vari- 17.2 Market for Lemons ables that are relevant for the choices they face. Now we will see 17.3 632 what happens when some parties know more than others—i.e., when 17.4 there is asymmetric information. *17.5 Market Signaling 17.6 638 Asymmetric information is quite common. Frequently, a seller of a product knows more about its quality than the buyer does. Workers Moral Hazard usually know their own skills and abilities better than employers. And 643 business managers know more about their firms’ costs, competitive positions, and investment opportunities than do the firms’ owners. The Principal–Agent Problem Asymmetric information also explains many institutional arrange- 645 ments in our society. It is one reason why automobile companies offer warranties on parts and service for new cars; why firms and employ- Managerial Incentives ees sign contracts that include incentives and rewards; and why the in an Integrated Firm shareholders of corporations must monitor the behavior of managers. 651 We begin by examining a situation in which the sellers of a product Asymmetric Information in have better information about its quality than buyers have. We will Labor Markets: Efficiency see how this kind of asymmetric information can lead to market fail- Wage Theory ure. In the second section, we see how sellers can avoid some of the 654 problems associated with asymmetric information by giving potential buyers signals about the quality of their product. Product warranties LIST OF EXAMPLES provide a type of insurance that can be helpful when buyers have less information than sellers. But as the third section shows, the purchase 17.1 Medicare of insurance entails difficulties of its own when buyers have better 17.2 636 information than sellers. 17.3 Lemons in Major League In the fourth section, we show that managers may pursue goals 17.4 Baseball other than profit maximization when it is costly for owners of pri- 637 vate corporations to monitor their behavior. In other words, manag- 17.5 ers have better information than owners. We also show how firms can 17.6 Working into the Night give managers an incentive to maximize profits even when monitoring 642 their behavior is costly. Finally, we show that labor markets may oper- 17.7 ate inefficiently when employees have better information about their Reducing Moral Hazard: productivity than employers have. Warranties of Animal Health 645 CEO Salaries 647 Managers of Nonprofit Hospitals as Agents 649 Efficiency Wages at Ford Motor Company 656 631

632 PART 4 • Information, Market Failure, and the Role of Government • asymmetric 17.1 Quality Uncertainty and the Market information Situation in which a buyer and a seller possess for Lemons different information about a transaction. Suppose you bought a new car for $20,000, drove it 100 miles, and then decided you really didn’t want it. There was nothing wrong with the car—it performed beautifully and met all your expectations. You simply felt that you could do just as well without it and would be better off saving the money for other things. So you decide to sell the car. How much should you expect to get for it? Probably not more than $16,000—even though the car is brand new, has been driven only 100 miles, and has a warranty that is transferable to a new owner. And if you were a prospective buyer, you probably wouldn’t pay much more than $16,000 yourself. Why does the mere fact that the car is second-hand reduce its value so much? To answer this question, think about your own concerns as a prospective buyer. Why, you would wonder, is this car for sale? Did the owner really change his or her mind about the car just like that, or is there something wrong with it? Is this car a “lemon”? Used cars sell for much less than new cars because there is asymmetric infor- mation about their quality: The seller of a used car knows much more about the car than the prospective buyer does. The buyer can hire a mechanic to check the car, but the seller has had experience with it and will know more about it. Furthermore, the very fact that the car is for sale indicates that it may be a “lemon”—why sell a reliable car? As a result, the prospective buyer of a used car will always be suspicious of its quality—and with good reason. The implications of asymmetric information about product quality were first analyzed by George Akerlof and go far beyond the market for used cars.1 The markets for insurance, financial credit, and even employment are also charac- terized by asymmetric information about product quality. To understand the implications of asymmetric information, we will start with the market for used cars and then see how the same principles apply to other markets. The Market for Used Cars Suppose two kinds of used cars are available—high-quality cars and low-qual- ity cars. Also suppose that both sellers and buyers can tell which kind of car is which. There will then be two markets, as illustrated in Figure 17.1. In part (a), SH is the supply curve for high-quality cars, and DH is the demand curve. Similarly, SL and DL in part (b) are the supply and demand curves for low-quality cars. For any given price, SH lies to the left of SL because owners of high-quality cars are more reluctant to part with them and must receive a higher price to do so. Similarly, DH is higher than DL because buyers are willing to pay more to get a high-quality car. As the figure shows, the market price for high-quality cars is $10,000, for low-quality cars $5000, and 50,000 cars of each type are sold. In reality, the seller of a used car knows much more about its quality than a buyer does. (Buyers discover the quality only after they buy a car and drive it for a while.) Consider what happens, then, if sellers know the quality of cars, but buyers do not. Initially, buyers might think that the odds are 50-50 that a car will be high quality. Why? Because when both sellers and buyers know 1George A. Akerlof, “The Market for ’Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,” Quarterly Journal of Economics (August 1970): 488–500.

CHAPTER 17 • Markets with Asymmetric Information 633 PH SH PL SL $10,000 $10,000 DH DM $7500 $7500 DLM $5000 DM $5000 DL DLM DL 25,000 50,000 50,000 75,000 (a) High-Quality Cars (b) Low-Quality Cars FIGURE 17.1 THE MARKET FOR USED CARS When sellers of products have better information about product quality than buyers, a “lemons problem” may arise in which low-quality goods drive out high-quality goods. In (a) the demand curve for high-quality cars is DH. However, as buyers lower their expectations about the average quality of cars on the market, their perceived demand shifts to DM. Likewise, in (b) the perceived demand curve for low-quality cars shifts from DL to DM. As a result, the quantity of high-quality cars sold falls from 50,000 to 25,000, and the quantity of low-quality cars sold increases from 50,000 to 75,000. Eventually, only low-quality cars are sold. the quality, 50,000 cars of each type are sold. When making a purchase, buyers therefore view all cars as “medium quality,” in the sense that there is an equal chance of getting a high-quality or a low-quality car. (Of course, after buying the car and driving it for a while, they will learn its true quality.) The demand for cars perceived to be medium quality, denoted by DM in Figure 17.1, is below DH but above DL. As the figure shows, these medium-quality cars will sell for about $7500 each. However, fewer high-quality cars (25,000) and more low-quality cars (75,000) will now be sold. As consumers begin to realize that most cars sold (about three-fourths of the total) are low quality, their perceived demand shifts. As Figure 17.1 shows, the new perceived demand curve might be DLM, which means that, on average, cars are thought to be of low to medium quality. However, the mix of cars then shifts even more heavily to low quality. As a result, the perceived demand curve shifts further to the left, pushing the mix of cars even further toward low quality. This shifting continues until only low-quality cars are sold. At that point, the market price would be too low to bring forth any high-quality cars for sale, so consumers correctly assume that any car they buy will be low quality. As a result, the only relevant demand curve will be DL. The situation in Figure 17.1 is extreme. The market may come into equilib- rium at a price that brings forth at least some high-quality cars. But the frac- tion of high-quality cars will be smaller than it would be if consumers could identify

634 PART 4 • Information, Market Failure, and the Role of Government quality before making the purchase. That is why you should expect to sell your brand new car, which you know is in perfect condition, for much less than you paid for it. Because of asymmetric information, low-quality goods drive high-quality goods out of the market. This phenomenon, which is sometimes referred to as the lemons problem, is an important source of market failure. It is worth emphasizing: The lemons problem: With asymmetric information, low-quality goods can drive high-quality goods out of the market. Implications of Asymmetric Information Our used cars example shows how asymmetric information can result in market failure. In an ideal world of fully functioning markets, consumers would be able to choose between low-quality and high-quality cars. While some will choose low-quality cars because they cost less, others will prefer to pay more for high- quality cars. Unfortunately, consumers cannot in fact easily determine the qual- ity of a used car until after they purchase it. As a result, the price of used cars falls, and high-quality cars are driven out of the market. Market failure arises, therefore, because there are owners of high-quality cars who value their cars less than potential buyers of high-quality cars. Both parties could enjoy gains from trade, but, unfortunately, buyers’ lack of information prevents this mutually beneficial trade from occurring. • adverse selection Form of ADVERSE SELECTION Our used car scenario is a simplified illustration of an market failure resulting when important problem that affects many markets—the problem of adverse selec- products of different qualities are tion. Adverse selection arises when products of different qualities are sold at a sold at a single price because single price because buyers or sellers are not sufficiently informed to determine of asymmetric information, so the true quality at the time of purchase. As a result, too much of the low-quality that too much of the low-quality product and too little of the high-quality product are sold in the marketplace. product and too little of the Let’s look at some other examples of asymmetric information and adverse selec- high-quality product are sold. tion. In doing so, we will also see how the government or private firms might respond to the problem. THE MARKET FOR INSURANCE Why do people over age 65 have difficulty buying medical insurance at almost any price? Older people do have a much higher risk of serious illness, but why doesn’t the price of insurance rise to reflect that higher risk? Again, the reason is asymmetric information. People who buy insurance know much more about their general health than any insur- ance company can hope to know, even if it insists on a medical examination. As a result, adverse selection arises, much as it does in the market for used cars. Because unhealthy people are more likely to want insurance, the proportion of unhealthy people in the pool of insured people increases. This forces the price of insurance to rise, so that more healthy people, aware of their low risks, elect not to be insured. This further increases the proportion of unhealthy people among the insured, thus forcing the price of insurance up more. The process contin- ues until most people who want to buy insurance are unhealthy. At that point, insurance becomes very expensive, or—in the extreme—insurance companies stop selling the insurance. Adverse selection can make the operation of insurance markets problem- atic in other ways. Suppose an insurance company wants to offer a policy for

CHAPTER 17 • Markets with Asymmetric Information 635 a particular event, such as an auto accident that results in property damage. It selects a target population—say, men under age 25—to whom it plans to market this policy, and it estimates that the probability of an accident for people in this group is .01. However, for some of these people, the probability of having an accident is much less than .01; for others, it is much higher than .01. If the insurance company cannot distinguish between high- and low-risk men, it will base the premium on the average accident probability of .01. What will hap- pen? Those people with low probabilities of having an accident will choose not to insure, while those with high probabilities of an accident will purchase the insurance. This in turn raises the accident probability among those who choose to be insured above .01, forcing the insurance company to raise its premium. In the extreme, only those who are likely to be in an accident will choose to insure, making it impractical to sell insurance. One solution to the problem of adverse selection is to pool risks. For health insurance, the government might take on this role, as it does with the Medicare program. By providing insurance for all people over age 65, the government eliminates the problem of adverse selection. Likewise, insurance companies will try to avoid or at least reduce the adverse selection problem by offering group health insurance policies at places of employment. By covering all workers in a firm, whether healthy or sick, the insurance company spreads risks and thereby reduces the likelihood that large numbers of high-risk individuals will purchase insurance.2 THE MARKET FOR CREDIT By using a credit card, many of us borrow money without providing any collateral. Most credit cards allow the holder to run a debt of several thousand dollars, and many people hold several credit cards. Credit card companies earn money by charging interest on the debit balance. But how can a credit card company or bank distinguish high-quality borrowers (who pay their debts) from low-quality borrowers (who don’t)? Clearly, borrowers have better information—i.e., they know more about whether they will pay than the lender does. Again, the lemons problem arises. Low-quality borrowers are more likely than high-quality borrowers to want credit, which forces the interest rate up, which increases the number of low-quality borrowers, which forces the interest rate up fur- ther, and so on. In fact, credit card companies and banks can, to some extent, use computer- ized credit histories, which they often share with one another, to distinguish low-quality from high-quality borrowers. Many people, however, think that computerized credit histories invade their privacy. Should companies be allowed to keep these credit histories and share them with other lenders? We can’t answer this question for you, but we can point out that credit histories perform an important function: They eliminate, or at least greatly reduce, the problem of asymmetric information and adverse selection—a problem that might otherwise prevent credit markets from operating. Without these histories, even the creditworthy would find it extremely costly to borrow money. 2Some people argue that pooling risks is not the main justification for Medicare, because most peo- ple’s medical histories are well established by age 65, making it feasible for insurance companies to distinguish among high-risk and low-risk individuals. Another justification for Medicare is a distributional one. After age 65, even relatively healthy people are likely to need more medical care, making insurance expensive even without asymmetric information, and many older people would not have sufficient income to purchase the insurance.

636 PART 4 • Information, Market Failure, and the Role of Government The Importance of Reputation and Standardization Asymmetric information is also present in many other markets. Here are just a few examples: • Retail stores: Will the store repair or allow you to return a defective product? The store knows more about its policy than you do. • Dealers of rare stamps, coins, books, and paintings: Are the items real or counterfeit? The dealer knows much more about their authenticity than you do. • Roofers, plumbers, and electricians: When a roofer repairs or renovates the roof of your house, do you climb up to check the quality of the work? • Restaurants: How often do you go into the kitchen to check if the chef is using fresh ingredients and obeying health laws? In all these cases, the seller knows much more about the quality of the prod- uct than the buyer does. Unless sellers can provide information about quality to buyers, low-quality goods and services will drive out high-quality ones, and there will be market failure. Sellers of high-quality goods and services, there- fore, have a big incentive to convince consumers that their quality is indeed high. In the examples cited above, this task is performed largely by reputation. You shop at a particular store because it has a reputation for servicing its prod- ucts; you hire particular roofers or plumbers because they have reputations for doing good work; you go to a particular restaurant because it has a reputation for using fresh ingredients and nobody you know has become sick after eating there. Amazon and other online vendors use another model to maintain their reputation. They allow customers to rate and comment on products. The rating and commenting feature reduces the lemons problem by giving customers more information and motivating vendors to uphold their end of the bargain. Sometimes, however, it is impossible for a business to develop a reputation. For example, because most of the customers of highway diners or motels go there only once or infrequently, the businesses have no opportunity to develop reputations. How, then, can they deal with the lemons problem? One way is standardization. In your hometown, you may not prefer to eat regularly at McDonald’s. But a McDonald’s may look more attractive when you are driv- ing along a highway and want to stop for lunch. Why? Because McDonald’s provides a standardized product: The same ingredients are used and the same food is served in every McDonald’s anywhere in the country. Who knows? Joe’s Diner might serve better food, but at least you know exactly what you will be buying at McDonald’s. EXAMPLE 17.1 MEDICARE Health care reform has been at the forefront of pol- the argument for mandatory participation, just look icy debates in the United States and worldwide for at Medicare. years. A core issue in the United States is whether everyone should have health insurance, and whether Medicare was created in 1965 as a public pro- participation in some kind of public or private insur- gram that provides health insurance to all indi- ance program should be mandatory. To understand viduals over age 65 and those under age 65 with certain disabilities. Medicare has been financed by

CHAPTER 17 • Markets with Asymmetric Information 637 payroll taxes, paid in part by workers and in part a stable outcome, since only those people with by employers. (In 2011, 1.45% was withheld from relatively poor health who expect healthcare costs workers’ paychecks and a matching 1.45% was paid above $7,000 will buy coverage, and once again by the employers; those rates are scheduled to the insurance company will be in the red. Each increase in 2013.) The central feature of Medicare time the insurance company raises its price, some is that participation is mandatory—essentially all of the healthier remaining customers will drop out, workers are part of the program. Indeed, manda- until finally only very sick people will want to buy tory participation is what makes Medicare work, and insurance. (This was essentially the situation prior what distinguishes it from other public and private to 1965.) And what happens when some of the health care programs. uninsured people get sick? Some may be wealthy enough to pay for their medical costs out of pocket. To see why mandatory participation is essential, But most people are not so wealthy, and they will imagine an alternative in which private insurers offer end up in the emergency room of their local hos- insurance policies to the elderly at a cost of $5,000 pital, which is required by law to treat them. As a per year. Remember that there is asymmetric infor- result, the cost of health care for most seniors will mation: people know much more about their health, be borne by society as a whole, in part through the their lifestyles, and their likely health care needs in subsidization of emergency room visits. the future than insurance companies can possibly know. Now think about who will choose to buy the Medicare solves this adverse selection problem. insurance and who will choose to forgo the $5,000 All people over 65 participate in Medicare—those annual expense. Those seniors who have chronic expecting low health care costs along with those diseases or for other reasons expect their health who expect high costs. Of course, the low-cost par- care costs to exceed $5,000 are much more likely ticipants are subsidizing those with high costs. But to buy the insurance than those who are in excel- because adverse selection is not a problem with a lent health and thus expect lower costs. This creates mandatory program, the overall cost of Medicare is an adverse selection problem: mostly sick people lower than the cost of most private insurance sys- will buy the insurance, which means the insurance tems. Indeed, Medicare has earned a reputation as company will be lose money and will need to raise one of the most successful and efficient public pro- the price of coverage, say to $7,000. But this is not grams in the United States. EXAMPLE 17.2 LEMONS IN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL How can we test for the presence Before 1976, major league of a lemons market? One way is baseball teams had the exclu- to compare the performance of sive right to renew a player’s products that are resold with simi- contract. After a 1976 ruling lar products that are seldom put declared this system illegal, a up for resale. In a lemons market, new contracting arrangement because purchasers of second- was created. After six years of hand products will have limited major league service, players information, resold products can now sign new contracts with should be lower in quality than products that rarely their original teams or become free agents and appear on the market. One such “second-hand” mar- sign with new teams. The availability of many free ket was created some time ago by a change in the agents creates a second-hand market in baseball rules governing contracts in major league baseball.3 players. 3This example is based on Kenneth Lehn’s study of the free-agent market. See “Information Asymmetries in Baseball’s Free-Agent Market,” Economic Inquiry (1984): 37–44.

638 PART 4 • Information, Market Failure, and the Role of Government Asymmetric information is prominent in the desirable candidates for contract renewal. Because free-agent market. One potential purchaser, the more such players would become free agents, free player’s original team, has better information about agents would experience higher disability rates for the player’s abilities than other teams have. If we health reasons. were looking at used cars, we could test for the existence of asymmetric information by comparing Table 17.1, which lists the post-contract perfor- their repair records. In baseball, we can compare mance of all players who have signed multiyear con- player disability records. If players are working hard tracts, makes two points. First, both free agents and and following rigorous conditioning programs, renewed players have increased disability rates after we would expect a low probability of injury and a signing new contracts. The disabled days per sea- high probability that they will be able to perform son increase from an average of 4.73 to an average if injured. In other words, more motivated players of 12.55. Second, the postcontract disability rates of will spend less time on the bench owing to disabil- renewed and non-renewed players are significantly ities. If a lemons market exists, we would expect different. On average, renewed players are disabled free agents to have higher disability rates than for 9.68 days, free agents for 17.23 days. players who are renewed. Players may also have preexisting physical conditions which their origi- These two findings suggest that there is a lemons nal teams know about and which make them less market in free agents that exists because baseball teams know their own players better than the teams with which they compete. TABLE 17.1 PLAYER DISABILITY DAYS SPENT ON DISABLED LIST PER SEASON All players PRECONTRACT POSTCONTRACT PERCENTAGE CHANGE Renewed players Free agents 4.73 12.55 165.4 4.76 9.68 103.4 4.67 268.9 17.23 • market signaling Process 17.2 Market Signaling by which sellers send signals to buyers conveying information We have seen that asymmetric information can sometimes lead to a lemons prob- about product quality. lem: Because sellers know more about the quality of a good than buyers do, buy- ers may assume that quality is low, causing price to fall and only low-quality goods to be sold. We also saw how government intervention (in the market for health insurance, for example) or the development of a reputation (in service industries, for example) can alleviate this problem. Now we will examine another important mechanism through which sellers and buyers deal with the problem of asymmetric information: market signaling. The concept of market signaling was first developed by Michael Spence, who showed that in some markets, sell- ers send buyers signals that convey information about a product’s quality.4 To see how market signaling works, let’s look at a labor market, which is a good example of a market with asymmetric information. Suppose a firm is thinking about hiring some new people. The new workers (the “sellers” of labor) know 4Michael Spence, Market Signaling (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974).

CHAPTER 17 • Markets with Asymmetric Information 639 much more about the quality of the labor they can provide than does the firm (the buyer of labor). For example, they know how hard they tend to work, how responsible they are, what their skills are, and so forth. The firm will learn these things only after workers have been hired and have been working for some time. Why don’t firms simply hire workers, see how well they work, and then fire those with low productivity? Because this policy is often very costly. In many countries, and in many firms in the United States, it is difficult to fire someone who has been working more than a few months. (The firm may have to show just cause or provide severance pay.) Moreover, in many jobs, workers do not become fully productive for at least six months. Before that time, considerable on-the-job training may be required, for which the firm must invest substantial resources. Thus the firm might not learn how good workers are for six months to a year. Clearly, firms would be much better off if they knew how productive potential employees were before they hired them. What characteristics can a firm examine to obtain information about people’s productivity before it hires them? Can potential employees convey information about their productivity? Dressing well for the job interview might convey some information, but even unproductive people can dress well. Dressing well is thus a weak signal—it doesn’t do much to distinguish high-productivity from low- productivity people. To be strong, a signal must be easier for high-productivity people to give than for low-productivity people to give, so that high-productivity people are more likely to give it. For example, education is a strong signal in labor markets. A person’s educational level can be measured by several things—the number of years of schooling, degrees obtained, the reputation of the university or college that granted the degrees, the person’s grade-point average, and so on. Of course, education can directly and indirectly improve a person’s productivity by providing information, skills, and general knowledge that are helpful in work. But even if education did not improve productivity, it would still be a useful signal of productivity because more produc- tive people find it easier to attain high levels of education. Not surprisingly, pro- ductive people tend to be more intelligent, more motivated, more disciplined, and more energetic and hard-working—characteristics that are also helpful in school. More productive people are therefore more likely to attain high levels of education in order to signal their productivity to firms and thereby obtain better-paying jobs. Thus, firms are correct in considering education a signal of productivity. A Simple Model of Job Market Signaling To understand how signaling works, we will discuss a simple model.5 Let’s assume that there are only low-productivity workers (Group I), whose average and marginal product is 1, and high-productivity workers (Group II), whose average and marginal product is 2. Workers will be employed by competitive firms whose products sell for $10,000, and who expect an average of 10 years’ work from each employee. We also assume that half the workers in the popula- tion are in Group I and the other half in Group II, so that the average productivity of all workers is 1.5. Note that the revenue expected to be generated from Group I workers is $100,000 ($10,000/year * 10 years) and from Group II workers is $200,000 ($20,000/year * 10 years). If firms could identify people by their productivity, they would offer them a wage equal to their marginal revenue product. Group I people would be paid $10,000 per year, Group II people $20,000. On the other hand, if firms could not 5This is essentially the model developed in Spence, Market Signaling.

640 PART 4 • Information, Market Failure, and the Role of Government identify productivity before they hired people, they would pay all workers an annual wage equal to the average productivity—$15,000. Group I people would then earn more ($15,000 instead of $10,000), at the expense of Group II people (who would earn $15,000 instead of $20,000). Now let’s consider what can happen with signaling via education. Suppose all the attributes of an education (degrees earned, grade-point average, etc.) can be summarized by a single index y that represents years of higher education. All education involves a cost, and the higher the educational level y, the higher the cost. This cost includes tuition and books, the opportunity cost of foregone wages, and the psychic cost of having to work hard to obtain high grades. What is impor- tant is that the cost of education is greater for the low-productivity group than for the high-productivity group. We might expect this to be the case for two reasons. First, low-productivity workers may simply be less studious. Second, low-productivity workers may progress more slowly through degree programs. In particular, sup- pose that for Group I people, the cost of attaining educational level y is given by CI(y) = $40,000y and the cost for Group II people is CII(y) = $20,000y Now suppose (to keep things simple and to dramatize the importance of sig- naling) that education does nothing to increase one’s productivity; its only value is as a signal. Let’s see if we can find a market equilibrium in which different people obtain different levels of education, and in which firms look at education as a signal of productivity. EQUILIBRIUM Consider the following possible equilibrium. Suppose firms use this decision rule: Anyone with an education level of y* or more is a Group II person and is offered a wage of $20,000, while anyone with an education level below y* is a Group I person and is offered a wage of $10,000. The particular level y* that the firms choose is arbi- trary, but for this decision rule to be part of an equilibrium, firms must have identi- fied people correctly. Otherwise, the firms will want to change the rule. Will it work? To answer this question, we must determine how much education the people in each group will obtain, given that firms are using this decision rule. To do this, remember that education allows one to get a better-paying job. The benefit of education B(y) is the increase in the wage associated with each level of education, as shown in Figure 17.2. Observe that B(y) is 0 initially, which represents the $100,000 base 10-year earnings that are earned without any college education. For an education level less than y*, B(y) remains 0, because 10-year earnings remain at the $100,000 base level. But when the education level reaches y* or greater, 10-year earnings increase to $200,000, increasing B(y) to $100,000. How much education should a person obtain? Clearly the choice is between no education (i.e., y = 0) and an education level of y*. Why? Any level of educa- tion less than y* results in the same base earnings of $100,000. Thus there is no benefit from obtaining an education at a level above 0 but below y*. Similarly, there is no benefit from obtaining an educational level above y* because y* is sufficient to allow one to enjoy the higher total earnings of $200,000. COST–BENEFIT COMPARISON In deciding how much education to obtain, people compare the benefit of education with the cost. People in each group make the following cost-benefit calculation: Obtain the education level y* if the

CHAPTER 17 • Markets with Asymmetric Information 641 Value of (a) Group I Value of (b) Group II college CI (y) = $40,000 y college education education $200,000 $200,000 $100,000 $100,000 CII (y) = $20,000 y B(y) B(y) 0 12 3 456 0 12 3 4 5 6 Optimal choice of y* Years of Optimal choice of y* Years of y for group I college y for group II college FIGURE 17.2 SIGNALING Education can be a useful signal of the high productivity of a group of workers if education is easier to obtain for this group than for a low-productivity group. In (a), the low-productivity group will choose an education level of y = 0 because the cost of education is greater than the increased earnings resulting from education. However, in (b), the high-productivity group will choose an education level of y * = 4 because the gain in earnings is greater than the cost. benefit (i.e., the increase in earnings) is at least as large as the cost of this education. For both groups, the benefit (the increase in earnings) is $100,000. The costs, how- ever, differ. For Group I, the cost is $40,000y, but for Group II it is only $20,000y. Therefore, Group I will obtain no education as long as $100,000 6 $40,000y* or y* 7 2.5 and Group II will obtain an education level y* as long as $100,000 7 $20,000y* or y* 6 5 These results give us an equilibrium as long as y* is between 2.5 and 5. Suppose, for example, that y* is 4.0, as in Figure 17.2. In that case, people in Group I will find that education does not pay and will not obtain any, whereas people in Group II will find that education does pay and will obtain the level y = 4.0. Now, when a firm interviews job candidates who have no college education, it correctly assumes they have low productivity and offers them a wage of $10,000. Similarly, when the firm interviews people who have four years of college, it correctly assumes their productivity is high, warranting a wage of $20,000. We therefore have an equilibrium. High-productivity people will obtain a college education to signal their productivity; firms will read this signal and offer them a high wage.

642 PART 4 • Information, Market Failure, and the Role of Government This is a highly simplified model, but it illustrates a significant point: Education can be an important signal that allows firms to sort workers accord- ing to productivity. Some workers (those with high productivity) will want to obtain a college education even if that education does nothing to increase their pro- ductivity. These workers simply want to identify themselves as highly produc- tive, so they obtain the education needed to send a signal. In the real world, of course, education does provide useful knowledge and does increase one’s ultimate productivity. (We wouldn’t have written this book if we didn’t believe that.) But education also serves a signaling function. For example, many firms insist that a prospective manager have an MBA. One rea- son is that MBAs learn economics, finance, and other useful subjects. But there is a second reason: To complete an MBA program takes intelligence, discipline, and hard work, and people with those qualities tend to be very productive. Guarantees and Warranties We have stressed the role of signaling in labor markets, but it can also play an important role in many other markets in which there is asymmetric information. Consider the markets for such durable goods as televisions, stereos, cameras, and refrigerators. Many firms produce these items, but some brands are more dependable than others. If consumers could not tell which brands tend to be more dependable, the better brands could not be sold for higher prices. Firms that produce a higher-quality, more dependable product must therefore make consumers aware of this difference. But how can they do it in a convincing way? The answer is guarantees and warranties. Guarantees and warranties effectively signal product quality because an extensive warranty is more costly for the producer of a low-quality item than for the producer of a high-quality item. The low-quality item is more likely to require servicing under the warranty, for which the producer will have to pay. In their own self-interest, therefore, producers of low-quality items will not offer extensive warranties. Thus consumers can correctly view extensive warranties as signals of high quality and will pay more for products that offer them. EXAMPLE 17.3 WORKING INTO THE NIGHT this talent. Given this asymmet- ric information, what policy should Job market signaling does not end employers use to determine pro- when one is hired. Even after a few motions and salary increases? Can years of employment, a worker will workers who are unusually talented still know more about his abilities and productive signal this fact and than will the employer. This is espe- thereby receive earlier promotions cially true for workers in knowledge- and larger salary increases? based fields such as engineering, computer programming, finance, Workers can often signal talent law, management, and consulting. and productivity by working harder Although an unusually talented com- and longer hours. Because more tal- puter programmer, for example, will ented and productive workers tend be more skilled than his co-workers to get more enjoyment and satisfac- at writing programs that are efficient tion from their jobs, it is less costly for and bug-free, it may take several them to send this signal than it is for years before the firm fully recognizes

CHAPTER 17 • Markets with Asymmetric Information 643 other workers. The signal is therefore strong: It con- Employers rely increasingly on the signaling value veys information. As a result, employers can—and of long hours as rapid technological change makes do—rely on this signal when making promotion and it harder for them to find other ways of assessing salary decisions. workers’ skills and productivity. A study of software engineers at the Xerox Corporation, for example, This signalling process has affected the way found that many people work into the night because many people work. Rather than an hourly wage, they fear that otherwise their bosses will conclude knowledge-based workers are typically paid a fixed that they are shirkers who choose the easiest assign- salary for a 35- or 40-hour week and do not receive ments. As the bosses make clear, this fear is war- overtime pay if they work additional hours. Yet such ranted: “We don’t know how to assess the value of a workers increasingly work well beyond their weekly knowledge worker in these new technologies,” says schedules. Surveys by the U.S. Labor Department, one Xerox manager, “so we value those who work for example, found that the percentage of all work- into the night.” ers who toil 49 hours or more a week rose from 13 percent in 1976 to over 16 percent in 2011.6 Many As corporations become more reluctant to young lawyers, accountants, consultants, investment offer lifetime job security, and as competition for bankers, and computer programmers regularly work promotion intensifies, salaried workers feel more into the night and on weekends, putting in 60- or and more pressure to work long hours. If you find 70-hour weeks. Is it surprising that these people are yourself working 60- or 70-hour weeks, look at working so hard? Not at all. They are trying to send the bright side—the signal you’re sending is a signals that can greatly affect their careers. strong one.7 17.3 Moral Hazard When one party is fully insured and cannot be accurately monitored by an • moral hazard When a party insurance company with limited information, the insured party may take an whose actions are unobserved action that increases the likelihood that an accident or an injury will occur. For can affect the probability example, if my home is fully insured against theft, I may be less diligent about or magnitude of a payment locking doors when I leave, and I may choose not to install an alarm system. The associated with an event. possibility that an individual’s behavior may change because she has insurance is an example of a problem known as moral hazard. The concept of moral hazard applies not only to problems of insur- ance, but also to problems of workers who perform below their capabilities when employers cannot monitor their behavior (“job shirking”). In general, moral hazard occurs when a party whose actions are unobserved affects the probability or magnitude of a payment. For example, if I have complete medical insurance coverage, I may visit the doctor more often than I would if my cover- age were limited. If the insurance provider can monitor its insurees’ behavior, it can charge higher fees for those who make more claims. But if the company can- not monitor behavior, it may find its payments to be larger than expected. Under conditions of moral hazard, insurance companies may be forced to increase pre- miums for everyone or even to refuse to sell insurance at all. 6“At the Desk, Off the Clock and Below Statistical Radar,” New York Times, July 18, 1999. Data on hours worked are available from the Current Population Survey (CPS), Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), at http://www.bls.gov/cps/#charemp; Persons at Work in Agriculture and Nonagricultural Industries by Hours of Work. 7For an interesting study of “time stress,” see Daniel Hamermesh and Jungmin Lee, “Stressed Out on Four Continents: Time Crunch or Yuppie Kvetch?” Review of Econ. and Stat., May 2007, 89, 374–383.

644 PART 4 • Information, Market Failure, and the Role of Government Consider, for example, the decisions faced by the owners of a warehouse val- ued at $100,000 by their insurance company. Suppose that if they run a $50 fire- prevention program for their employees, the probability of a fire is .005. Without this program, the probability increases to .01. Knowing this, the insurance com- pany faces a dilemma if it cannot monitor the company’s decision to conduct a fire-prevention program. The policy that the insurance company offers cannot include a clause stating that payments will be made only if there is a fire-pre- vention program. If the program were in place, the company could insure the warehouse for a premium equal to the expected loss from a fire—an expected loss equal to .005 * $100,000 = $500. Once the insurance policy is purchased, however, the owners no longer have an incentive to run the program. If there is a fire, they will be fully compensated for their financial loss. Thus, if the insur- ance company sells a policy for $500, it will incur losses because the expected loss from the fire will be $1000 (.01 * $100,000). Moral hazard is a problem not only for insurance companies. It also alters the ability of markets to allocate resources efficiently. In Figure 17.3, for example, D gives the demand for automobile driving in miles per week. The demand curve, which measures the marginal benefits of driving, is downward sloping because some people switch to alternative transportation as the cost of driving increases. Suppose that initially, the cost of driving includes the insurance cost and that insurance companies can accurately measure miles driven. In this case, there is no moral hazard and the marginal cost of driving is given by MC. Drivers know that more driving will increase their insurance premiums and so increase their total cost of driving (the cost per mile is assumed to be constant). For example, if the cost of driving is $1.50 per mile (50 cents of which is insurance cost), drivers will go 100 miles per week. A moral hazard problem arises when insurance companies cannot monitor individual driving habits, so that insurance premiums do not depend on miles driven. In that case, drivers assume that any additional accident costs that they incur will be spread over a large group, with only a negligible portion accruing to each of them individually. Because their insurance premiums do not vary with the number of miles that they drive, an additional mile of transportation will cost $1.00, as shown by the marginal cost curve MC’, rather than $1.50. The number of miles driven will increase from 100 to the socially inefficient level of 140. FIGURE 17.3 Cost MC per MCЈ THE EFFECTS OF MORAL HAZARD mile D = MB Moral hazard alters the ability of markets to allocate resources $2.00 50 100 140 Miles per week efficiently. D gives the demand for automobile driving. With no $1.50 moral hazard, the marginal cost of transportation MC is $1.50 per $1.00 mile; the driver drives 100 miles, which is the efficient amount. $0.50 With moral hazard, the driver perceives the cost per mile to be MC = $1.00 and drives 140 miles. 0

CHAPTER 17 • Markets with Asymmetric Information 645 Moral hazard not only alters behavior; it also creates economic inefficiency. The inefficiency arises because the insured individual perceives either the cost or the benefit of the activity differently from the true social cost or benefit. In the driving example of Figure 17.3, the efficient level of driving is given by the intersection of the marginal benefit (MB) and marginal cost (MC) curves. With moral hazard, however, the individual’s perceived marginal cost (MC’) is less than actual cost, and the number of miles driven per week (140) is higher than the efficient level at which marginal benefit is equal to marginal cost (100). E X A M P L E 1 7 . 4 REDUCING MORAL HAZARD: WARRANTIES OF ANIMAL HEALTH For buyers of livestock, informa- buyers avoid paying for early tion about the animals’ health diagnoses of diseased livestock, is very important.8 Unhealthy and losses increase. animals gain weight more slowly and are less likely to reproduce. In response to the moral Because of asymmetric infor- hazard problem, many states mation in the livestock market have modified their animal war- (sellers know the health of an ranty laws by requiring sellers animal better than buyers do), to tell buyers whether livestock most states require warranties on are diseased at the time of sale. the sale of livestock. Under these laws, sellers not Some states also require sell- only promise (warrant) that animals are free from ers to comply with state and federal animal health hidden diseases, but are responsible for all costs regulations, thereby reducing disease. Beyond arising from any diseased animals. these measures, however, warranties that ani- mals are free from hidden disease must be in the Although warranties solve the problem of the form of explicit written or oral guarantees to buy- seller having better information than the buyer, they ers. Following an outbreak of Mad Cow Disease also create a form of moral hazard. Guaranteeing in 2003, the U.S. Department of Agriculture intro- reimbursement to the buyer for all costs associ- duced the National Animal Identification System ated with diseased animals means that insurance (NAIS) as a means to further reduce moral hazard. rates are not tied to the level of care that buyers or NAIS is designed to make the entire supply chain their agents take to protect their livestock against more transparent so that disease outbreaks can be disease. As a result of these warranties, livestock traced to the responsible party. 17.4 The Principal–Agent Problem If monitoring the productivity of workers were costless, the owners of a busi- • principal–agent problem ness would ensure that their managers and workers were working effectively. Problem arising when agents In most firms, however, owners can’t monitor everything that employees (e.g., a firm’s managers) pursue do—employees are better informed than owners. This information asymmetry their own goals rather than the creates a principal–agent problem. goals of principals (e.g., the firm’s owners). 8This example is based on Terence J. Centner and Michael E. Wetzstein, “Reducing Moral Hazard Associated with Implied Warranties of Animal Health,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 69 (1987): 143–50.

646 PART 4 • Information, Market Failure, and the Role of Government • agent Individual employed An agency relationship exists whenever there is an arrangement in which one by a principal to achieve the person’s welfare depends on what another person does. The agent is the person principal’s objective. who acts, and the principal is the party whom the action affects. A principal– agent problem arises when agents pursue their own goals rather than the goals of the • principal Individual who principal. In our example, the manager and the workers are the agents, and the employs one or more agents to owners of the firm are the principals. In this case, the principal-agent problem achieve an objective. results from the fact that managers may pursue their own goals, even at the cost of lower profits for the owners. Agency relationships are widespread in our society. For example, doctors serve as agents for hospitals and, as such, may select patients and do procedures which, though consistent with their personal preferences, are not necessarily consistent with the objectives of the hospital. Similarly, managers of housing properties may not maintain the property the way that the owners would like. And sometimes insured parties may be seen as agents and insurance companies as principals. How does incomplete information and costly monitoring affect the way agents act? And what mechanisms can give managers the incentives to oper- ate in the owner’s interest? These questions are central to any principal–agent analysis. In this section, we study the principal–agent problem from several perspectives. First, we look at the owner–manager problem within private and public enterprises. Second, we discuss ways in which owners can use contrac- tual relationships with their employees to deal with principal–agent problems. The Principal–Agent Problem in Private Enterprises Most large companies are controlled by management. Individual stockholders, who are not part of management, typically own only a small percentage of the equity of these companies, and thus they have little or no power to fire managers who are performing poorly. Indeed, it is difficult or impossible for stockhold- ers to even learn much about what the managers are doing and how well they are performing. Monitoring managers is costly, and information can be expen- sive to gather. The result is that managers can often pursue their own objectives, rather than focusing on the objective of the stockholders, which is to maximize the value of the firm.9 But, what are objectives of managers? One view is that managers are more concerned with growth than with profit per se: More rapid growth and larger market share provide more cash flow, which in turn allows managers to enjoy more perks. Another view emphasizes the utility that managers get from their jobs, not only from profit but also from the respect of their peers, the power to control the corporation, the fringe benefits and other perks, and long job tenure. However, there are limitations to managers’ ability to deviate from the objectives of owners. First, stockholders can complain loudly when they feel that managers are behaving improperly. In exceptional cases, they can oust the current management (perhaps with the help of the board of directors, whose job it is to monitor managerial behavior). Second, a vigorous market for corpo- rate control can develop. If a takeover bid becomes more likely when the firm is poorly managed, managers will have a strong incentive to pursue the goal of profit maximization. Third, there can be a highly developed market for manag- ers. If managers who maximize profit are in great demand, they will earn high wages and so give other managers an incentive to pursue the same goal. 9See Merritt B. Fox, Finance and Industrial Performance in a Dynamic Economy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987).

CHAPTER 17 • Markets with Asymmetric Information 647 Unfortunately, the means by which stockholders control managers’ behavior are limited and imperfect. Corporate takeovers may be motivated by personal and economic power, for example, instead of economic efficiency. The manage- rial labor market may also work imperfectly because top managers are frequently near retirement and have long-term contracts. The problem of limited stockholder control shows up most dramatically in executive compensation, which has grown very rapidly over the past several decades. In 2002, a Business Week survey of the 365 largest U.S. companies showed that the average CEO earned $13.1 million in 2000, and executive pay has continued to increase at a double-digit rate. Even more disturbing is the fact that for the 10 public companies led by the highest-paid CEOs, there was a negative correlation between CEO pay and company performance. It is clear that shareholders have been unable to adequately control managers’ behavior. What can be done to address this problem? In theory, the answer is simple: One must find mechanisms that more closely align the interests of man- agers and shareholders. In practice, however, this is likely to prove difficult. Among those suggestions put into effect recently by the Securities and Exchange Commission, which regulates public companies, are reforms that grant more authority to independent outside directors. Other possible reforms would tie executive pay more closely to the long-term performance of the company. EXAMPLE 17.5 CEO SALARIES Washington Mutual, an upstart savings and loan Killinger and Fishman were not the only bankers, company, saw incredible growth throughout the or even the only CEOs, to receive large compensa- 1990s and early 2000s. A housing boom was in full tion packages, regardless of their performance and swing, and the bank, led by CEO Kerry Killinger, was the health of the companies they led. CEO com- aggressive in pursuing new mortgages. By 2007, pensation has increased sharply over the past few however, Washington Mutual was in trouble. As the decades. The average annual salary for production housing market slumped and home values fell, it workers in the U.S. went from $18,187 in 1990 to became clear that the bank had a dangerous number $32,093 in 2009. But in constant dollar terms, the of sub-prime mortgages on its books. By the fall of 2009 average salary was only $19,552 (in 1990 dol- 2008, Washington Mutual’s assets had been seized lars), which represents only a 7.5% increase. At the by the FDIC and sold to competitor JP Morgan same time, the average annual compensation for Chase at the fire sale price of $1.9 billion to avert CEOs has grown from $2.9 million to $8.5 million, or what at the time would have been the largest bank about $5.2 million in 1990 dollars.12 In other words, failure in U.S. history. Less than three weeks before while production workers have seen a 7.5% increase this sale, Washington Mutual’s board of directors fired in their real wages over the past two decades, real Killinger. Still, he received a severance package total- CEO compensation has risen nearly 80%. Why? ing over $15.3 million.10 Killinger’s successor, Alan Have top managers become more productive, or are Fishman, led the bank for just 17 days, but received CEOs simply becoming more effective at extracting $11.6 million in severance pay, in addition to a $7.5 economic rents from their companies? The answer million signing bonus.11 Washington Mutual’s share- lies in the principal–agent problem, which is at the holders were wiped out in the sale. heart of CEO salary determination. 10http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/businesstechnology/2011590001_wamuside13.html 11http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/26/business/26wamu.html 12Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Institute for Policy Studies—United for a Fair Economy (2006). Average CEO pay peaked at $11 million in 2005, only to decrease during the 2007–2009 recession. After 2009, it began to increase again.

648 PART 4 • Information, Market Failure, and the Role of Government For years, many economists believed that in order to be re-nominated to the board or other- executive compensation reflected an appropriate wise rewarded. reward for talent. Recent evidence, however, sug- gests that managers have been able to increase Research has shown that high levels of CEO pay their power over boards of directors and have are negatively correlated with a firm’s accounting used that power to extract compensation pack- value and profitability.14 In other words, the higher ages that are far out of line with their performance the CEO’s pay, the lower the firm’s profitability is and contributions to the growth of their firms. In likely to be. In addition, CEOs with unusually high essence, managers have steadily increased their pay were more likely to stay at a company despite ability to extract economic rents. How has this poor economic results. These effects are intensified happened? at companies where the board is entrenched and shareholder rights are limited. First, most boards of directors do not have the necessary information or independence to nego- “Golden parachutes,” generous severance pack- tiate effectively with managers. Directors often ages that CEOs can negotiate with their boards, cannot monitor executives’ activities and therefore have also come under fire recently. Some argue that cannot negotiate compensation packages that are such guarantees free CEOs from board and share- tightly linked to their performance. Furthermore, holder pressure to focus on short-term growth and boards consist of a mix of inside members, who enable them to focus instead on their firms’ long- either are or represent top executives, and outside term growth. However, it has been shown that CEOs members, who are chosen by and are often on with golden parachutes are less likely to worry about close terms with top executives.13 Therefore, direc- long-term growth, and—when negotiating the sale tors have a strong incentive to support executives of their firm to another company—are more likely to agree to acquisition terms that hurt shareholders.15 Reward structures that focus on profitability over a 5- to 10-year period are more likely to generate efficient incentives than more shortsighted reward structures. We will consider some additional solutions to this important principal–agent problem in the next section. The Principal–Agent Problem in Public Enterprises The principal–agent framework can also help us understand the behavior of the managers of public organizations. These managers may also be interested in power and perks, both of which can be obtained by expanding their orga- nization beyond its “efficient” level. Because it is also costly to monitor the behavior of public managers, there are no guarantees that they will produce the efficient output. Legislative checks on a government agency are not likely to be effective as long as the agency has better information about its costs than the legislature has. Although the public sector lacks some of the market forces that keep pri- vate managers in line, government agencies can still be effectively monitored. 13Killinger was the chairman of Washington Mutual’s board until he was forced out two months before the bank failed. 14In 2007, Killinger, who was also chairman of Washington Mutual’s board of directors, was paid $18.1 million, making him the highest paid CEO of any publicly traded company (http://www. equilar.com/NewsArticles/062407_pay.pdf). This was especially true when the CEO took home the largest portion of the pay going to the firm’s top-five executives. For more detailed discussion and analysis, see Lucian A. Bebchuk, Martjin Cremers, and Urs Peyer, “The CEO Pay Slice,” Journal of Financial Economics (Spring 2012). 15Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Charles C. Y. Wang, \"Golden Parachutes and the Wealth of Shareholders,” Harvard Law School Olin Discussion Paper No. 683, December 2010.

CHAPTER 17 • Markets with Asymmetric Information 649 First, managers of government agencies care about more than just the size of their agencies. Indeed, many choose lower-paying public jobs because they are concerned about the “public interest.” Second, much like private manag- ers, public managers are subject to the rigors of the managerial job market. If public managers are perceived to be pursuing improper objectives, their abil- ity to obtain high salaries in the future might be impaired. Third, legislatures and other government agencies perform an oversight function. For example, the Government Accounting Office and the Office of Management and Budget spend much of their energy monitoring other agencies. At the local rather than the federal level, public managers are subject to even more checks. Suppose, for example, that a city transit agency has expanded bus service beyond the efficient level. Citizens can vote the transit managers out of office, or, if all else fails, use alternative transportation (or even move). Competition among agencies can be as effective as competition among private firms in constraining the behavior of managers. E X A M P L E 1 7 . 6 MANAGERS OF NONPROFIT HOSPITALS AS AGENTS Do the managers of nonprofit only 5 percent of the for-profits. organizations have the same In addition, while 43 percent of goals as those of for-profit orga- nonprofits have premature infant nizations? Are nonprofit organiza- units, only 29 percent of the for- tions more or less efficient than profits have equivalent units. for-profit firms? We can get some insight into these issues by look- Using a statistical regres- ing at the provision of health care. sion analysis, which controls In a study of 725 hospitals, from for differences in the services 14 major hospital chains, researchers compared the performed, one can determine return on investment and average costs of nonprofit whether differences in services account for the and for-profit hospitals to determine if they per- higher costs. The study found that after adjust- formed differently.16 ing for services performed, the average cost of a patient day in nonprofit hospitals was 8 percent The study found that the rates of return did higher than in for-profit hospitals. This difference indeed differ. In one year, for-profits earned an implies that the profit status of the hospital affects 11.6-percent return, while nonprofits earned 8.8 its performance in the way principal–agent theory percent. Four years later, for-profits earned 12.7 predicts: Without the competitive forces faced percent and nonprofits only 7.4 percent. A straight by for-profit hospitals, nonprofit hospitals may comparison of returns and costs is not appropriate, be less cost-conscious and therefore less likely to however, because the hospitals perform different serve appropriately as agents for their principals— functions. For example, 24 percent of the nonprofit namely, society at large. hospitals provide medical residency programs, Of course, nonprofit hospitals provide services as compared with only 6 percent of the for-profit that society may well wish to subsidize. But the hospitals. Similar differences can be found in the added cost of running a nonprofit hospital should provision of specialty care, with 10 percent of the be considered when determining whether it should nonprofits having open-heart units, as compared to be granted tax-exempt status. 16Regina E. Herzlinger and William S. Krasker, “Who Profits from Nonprofits?” Harvard Business Review 65 (January–February 1987): 93–106.

650 PART 4 • Information, Market Failure, and the Role of Government Incentives in the Principal–Agent Framework We have seen why managers’ and owners’ objectives are likely to differ within the principal-agent framework. How, therefore, can owners design reward systems so that managers and workers come as close as possible to meeting owners’ goals? To answer this question, let’s study a specific problem. A small manufacturer uses labor and machinery to produce watches. The owners want to maximize profit. They must rely on a machine repairperson whose effort will influence the likelihood that machines break down and thus affect the firm’s profit level. Revenue also depends on other random factors, such as the quality of parts and the reliability of other labor. As a result of high monitoring costs, the owners can neither measure the effort of the repairperson directly nor be sure that the same effort will always generate the same profit level. Table 17.2 describes these circumstances. The table shows that the repairperson can work with either a low or high amount of effort. Low effort (a = 0) generates either $10,000 or $20,000 in revenue (with equal probability), depending on the random factors that we mentioned. We’ve labeled the lower of the two revenue levels “bad luck” and the higher level “good luck.” When the repairperson makes a high effort (a = 1), revenue will be either $20,000 (bad luck) or $40,000 (good luck). These numbers highlight the problem of incomplete information: When the firm’s revenue is $20,000, the own- ers cannot know whether the repairperson has made a low or high effort. Suppose the repairperson’s goal is to maximize his wage payment less the cost (in terms of lost leisure and unpleasant work time) of the effort that he makes. To simplify, we’ll suppose that the cost of effort is 0 for low effort and $10,000 for high effort. (Formally, c = $10,000a.) Now we can state the principal–agent problem from the owners’ perspective. The owners’ goal is to maximize expected profit, given the uncertainty of outcomes and given the fact that the repairperson’s behavior cannot be monitored. The own- ers can contract to pay the repairperson for his work, but the payment scheme must be based entirely on the measurable output of the manufacturing process, not on the repairperson’s effort. To signify this link, we describe the payment scheme as w(R), stressing that payments can depend only on measured revenue. What is the best payment scheme? And can that scheme be as effective as one based on effort rather than output? The best payment scheme depends on the nature of production, the degree of uncertainty, and the objectives of both owners and managers. The arrangement will not always be as effective as an ideal scheme directly tied to effort. A lack of information can lower economic efficiency because both the owners’ revenue and the repairperson’s payment may fall at the same time. Let’s see how to design a payment scheme when the repairperson wishes to maximize his payment received net of the cost of effort made.17 Suppose first TABLE 17.2 REVENUE FROM MAKING WATCHES Low effort (a = 0) BAD LUCK GOOD LUCK High effort (a = 1) $10,000 $20,000 $20,000 $40,000 17We assume that because the repairperson is risk neutral, no efficiency is lost. If, however, the repairperson were risk averse, there would be an efficiency loss.

CHAPTER 17 • Markets with Asymmetric Information 651 that the owners offer a fixed wage payment. Any wage will do, but we can see things most clearly if we assume that the wage is 0. (Here, 0 could represent a wage equal to the wage paid in other comparable jobs.) Facing a wage of 0, the repairperson has no incentive to make a high level of effort. The reason is that the repairperson does not share in any of the gains that the owners enjoy from the increased effort. It follows, therefore, that a fixed payment will lead to an inefficient outcome. When a = 0 and w = 0, the owner will earn an expected revenue of $15,000 and the repairperson a net wage of 0. Both the owners and the repairperson will be better off if the repairperson is rewarded for his productive effort. Suppose, for example, that the owners offer the repairperson the following payment scheme: If R = $10,000 or $20,000, w = 0 (17.1) If R = $40,000, w = $24,000 Under this bonus arrangement, a low effort generates no payment. A high effort, however, generates an expected payment of $12,000, and an expected pay- ment less the cost of effort of $12,000 - $10,000 = $2000. Under this system, the repairperson will choose to make a high level of effort. This arrangement makes the owners better off than before because they get an expected revenue of $30,000 and an expected profit of $18,000. This is not the only payment scheme that will work for the owners, however. Suppose they contract to have the worker participate in the following revenue- sharing arrangement. When revenues are greater than $18,000, w = R - $18,000 (17.2) (Otherwise the wage is zero.) In this case, if the repairperson makes a low effort, he receives an expected payment of $1000. But if he makes a high level of effort, his expected payment is $12,000, and his expected payment less the $10,000 cost of effort is $2000. (The owners’ profit is $18,000, as before.) Thus, in our example, a revenue-sharing arrangement achieves the same out- come as a bonus-payment system. In more complex situations, the incentive effects of the two types of arrangements will differ. However, the basic idea illus- trated here applies to all principal–agent problems: When it is impossible to mea- sure effort directly, an incentive structure that rewards the outcome of high levels of effort can induce agents to aim for the goals that the owners set. *17.5 Managerial Incentives in an • horizontal integration Integrated Firm Organizational form in which several plants produce the same We have seen that owners and managers of firms can have asymmetric informa- or related products for a firm. tion about demand, cost, and other variables. We’ve also seen how owners can design reward structures to encourage managers to make appropriate efforts. • vertical integration Now we focus our attention on firms that are integrated—that consist of several Organizational form in which a divisions, each with its own managers. Some firms are horizontally integrated: firm contains several divisions, Several plants produce the same or related products. Others are also vertically with some producing parts and integrated: Upstream divisions produce materials, parts, and components that components that others use to downstream divisions use to produce final products. Integration creates orga- produce finished products. nizational problems. We addressed some of these problems in the appendix

652 PART 4 • Information, Market Failure, and the Role of Government to Chapter 11, where we discussed transfer pricing in the vertically integrated firm—that is, how the firm sets prices for parts and components that upstream divisions supply to downstream divisions. Here we will examine problems that stem from asymmetric information. Asymmetric Information and Incentive Design in the Integrated Firm In an integrated firm, division managers are likely to have better information about their different operating costs and production potential than central man- agement has. This asymmetric information causes two problems. 1. How can central management elicit accurate information about divisional operating costs and production potential from divisional managers? This information is important because the inputs into some divisions may be the outputs of other divisions, because deliveries must be scheduled to customers, and because prices cannot be set without knowing overall production capacity and costs. 2. What reward or incentive structure should central management use to encourage divisional managers to produce as efficiently as possible? Should they be given bonuses based on how much they produce? If so, how should they be structured? To understand these problems, consider a firm with several plants that all produce the same product. Each plant’s manager has much better information about its production capacity than central management has. In order to avoid bottlenecks and to schedule deliveries reliably, central management wants to learn more about how much each plant can produce. It also wants each plant to produce as much as possible. Let’s examine ways in which central management can obtain the information it wants while also encouraging plant managers to run the plants as efficiently as possible. One way is to give plant managers bonuses based on either the total out- put of their plant or its operating profit. Although this approach would encourage managers to maximize output, it would penalize managers whose plants have higher costs and lower capacity. Even if these plants produced efficiently, their output and operating profit—and thus their bonuses—would be lower than those of plants with lower costs and higher capacities. Plant managers would also have no incentive to obtain and reveal accurate infor- mation about cost and capacity. A second way is to ask managers about their costs and capacities and then base bonuses on how well they do relative to their answers. For example, each manager might be asked how much his or her plant can produce each year. Then at the end of the year, the manager receives a bonus based on how close the plant’s output was to this target. For example, if the manager’s estimate of the feasible production level is Qf, the annual bonus in dollars, B, might be B = 10,000 - .5(Qf - Q) (17.3) where Q is the plant’s actual output, 10,000 is the bonus when output is at capac- ity, and .5 is a factor chosen to reduce the bonus if Q is below Qf. Under this scheme, however, managers would have an incentive to underes- timate capacity. By claiming capacities below what they know to be true, they

CHAPTER 17 • Markets with Asymmetric Information 653 can more easily earn large bonuses even if they do not operate efficiently. For example, if a manager estimates capacity to be 18,000 rather than 20,000, and the plant actually produces only 16,000, her bonus increases from $8000 to $9000. Thus this scheme fails to elicit accurate information about capacity and does not ensure that plants will be run as efficiently as possible. Now let’s modify this scheme. We will still ask managers how much their plants can feasibly produce and tie their bonuses to this estimate. However, we will use a slightly more complicated formula than the one in (17.3) to calculate the bonus: If Q 7 Qf, B = .3Qf + .2(Q - Qf) (17.4) If Q … Qf, B = .3Qf - .5(Qf - Q) The parameters (.3, .2, and .5) have been chosen so that each manager has the incentive to reveal the true feasible production level and to make Q, the actual output of the plant, as large as possible. To see that this scheme does the job, look at Figure 17.4. Assume that the true production limit is Q* = 20,000 units per year. The bonus that the manager will receive if she states feasible capacity to be the true production limit is given by the line labeled Qf = 20,000. This line is continued for outputs beyond 20,000 to illustrate the bonus scheme but dashed to signify the infeasibility of such pro- duction. Note that the manager’s bonus is maximized when the firm produces at its limits of 20,000 units; the bonus is then $6000. Suppose, however, that the manager reports a feasible capacity of only 10,000. Then the bonus is given by the line labeled Qf = 10,000. The maximum bonus is now $5000, which is obtained by producing an output of 20,000. But note that this is less than the bonus that the manager would receive if she correctly stated the feasible capacity to be 20,000. The same line of argument applies when the manager exaggerates available capacity. If the manager states feasible capacity to be 30,000 units per year, the Bonus Qf = 30,000 FIGURE 17.4 (dollars Qf = 20,000 per year) Qf = 10,000 INCENTIVE DESIGN IN AN INTEGRATED FIRM 10,000 A bonus scheme can be 8000 designed that gives a man- ager the incentive to estimate 6000 accurately the size of the plant. If the manager reports a fea- 4000 sible capacity of 20,000 units per year, equal to the actual 2000 capacity, then the bonus will be maximized (at $6000). 0 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 Output (units per year)

654 PART 4 • Information, Market Failure, and the Role of Government bonus is given by the line Qf = 30,000. The maximum bonus of $4000, which is achieved at an output of 20,000, is less than the bonus that she could have received by reporting feasible capacity correctly.18 Applications Because the problem of asymmetric information and incentive design comes up often in managerial settings, incentive schemes like the one described above arise in many contexts. How, for example, can managers encourage salespeople to set and reveal realistic sales targets and then work as hard as possible to meet them? Most salespeople cover specific territories. A salesperson assigned to a densely populated urban territory can usually sell more product than a sales- person assigned to a sparsely populated area. The company, however, wants to reward all salespeople equitably. It also wants to give them the incentive to work as hard as possible and to report realistic sales targets, so that it can plan production and delivery schedules. Companies have always used bonuses and commissions to reward salespeople, but incentive schemes have often been poorly designed. Typically, salespeople’s commissions were proportional to their sales. This approach elicited neither accurate information about feasible sales targets nor maximum performance. Today, companies are learning that bonus schemes like the one given by equation (17.4) provide better results. The salesperson can be given an array of numbers showing the bonus as a function of both the sales target (chosen by the salesperson) and the actual level of sales. (The numbers would be calculated from equation (17.4) or some similar formula.) Salespeople will quickly figure out that they do best by reporting feasible sales targets and then working as hard as possible to meet them.19 Recall from §14.1 that in a 17.6 Asymmetric Information in Labor perfectly competitive labor market, firms hire labor to Markets: Efficiency Wage Theory the point at which the real wage (the wage divided by When the labor market is competitive, all who wish to work will find jobs for the price of the product) wages equal to their marginal products. Yet most countries have substantial is equal to the marginal unemployment even though many people are aggressively seeking work. Many product of labor. of the unemployed would presumably work for an even lower wage rate than that being received by employed people. Why don’t we see firms cutting wage • efficiency wage theory rates, increasing employment levels, and thereby increasing profit? Can our Explanation for the presence models of competitive equilibrium explain persistent unemployment? of unemployment and wage discrimination which recognizes In this section, we show how the efficiency wage theory can explain the that labor productivity may be presence of unemployment and wage discrimination.20 We have thus far affected by the wage rate. 18Any bonus of the form B = bQf + a(Q - Qf) for Q 7 Qf , and B = bQf - g(Qf - Q) for Q … Qf , with g 7 b 7 a 7 0 will work. See Martin L. Weitzman, “The New Soviet Incentive Model,” Bell Journal of Economics 7 (Spring 1976): 251–6. There is a dynamic problem with this scheme that we have ignored: Managers must weigh a large bonus for good performance this year against being assigned more ambitious targets in the future. This is discussed in Martin Weitzman, “The ’Ratchet Principle’ and Performance Incentives,” Bell Journal of Economics 11 (Spring 1980): 302–8. 19See Jacob Gonik, “Tie Salesmen’s Bonuses to Their Forecasts,” Harvard Business Review (May–June 1978): 116–23. 20See Janet L. Yellen, “Efficiency Wage Models of Unemployment,” American Economic Review 74 (May 1984): 200–5. The analysis relies on Joseph E. Stiglitz, “The Causes and Consequences of the Dependence of Quality on Price,” Journal of Economic Literature 25 (March 1987): 1–48.

CHAPTER 17 • Markets with Asymmetric Information 655 determined labor productivity according to workers’ abilities and firms’ • shirking model Principle investment in capital. Efficiency wage models recognize that labor produc- that workers still have an tivity also depends on the wage rate. There are various explanations for this incentive to shirk if a firm pays relationship. Economists have suggested that the productivity of workers them a market-clearing wage, in developing countries depends on the wage rate for nutritional reasons: because fired workers can be Better-paid workers can afford to buy more and better food and are therefore hired somewhere else for the healthier and can work more productively. same wage. A better explanation for the United States is found in the shirking model. • efficiency wage Wage that Because monitoring workers is costly or impossible, firms have imperfect a firm will pay to an employee as information about worker productivity, and there is a principal–agent prob- an incentive not to shirk. lem. In its simplest form, the shirking model assumes perfectly competitive markets in which all workers are equally productive and earn the same wage. In §14.2, we explain that the Once hired, workers can either work productively or slack off (shirk). But equilibrium wage is given because information about their performance is limited, workers may not get by the intersection of the fired for shirking. demand for labor curve and the supply of labor curve. The model works as follows. If a firm pays its workers the market-clearing wage w*, they have an incentive to shirk. Even if they get caught and are fired (and they might not be), they can immediately get hired somewhere else for the same wage. Because the threat of being fired does not impose a cost on work- ers, they have no incentive to be productive. As an incentive not to shirk, a firm must offer workers a higher wage. At this higher wage, workers who are fired for shirking will face a decrease in wages when hired by another firm at w*. If the difference in wages is large enough, workers will be induced to be productive, and the employer will not have a problem with shirking. The wage at which no shirking occurs is the efficiency wage. Up to this point, we have looked at only one firm. But all firms face the prob- lem of shirking. All firms, therefore, will offer wages greater than the market- clearing wage w*—say, we (efficiency wage). Does this remove the incentive for workers not to shirk because they will be hired at the higher wage by other firms if they get fired? No. Because all firms are offering wages greater than w*, the demand for labor is less than the market-clearing quantity, and there is unemployment. Consequently, workers fired for shirking will face spells of unemployment before earning we at another firm. Figure 17.5 shows shirking in the labor market. The demand for labor DL is downward-sloping for the traditional reasons. If there were no shirking, the intersection of DL with the supply of labor (SL) would set the market wage at w*, and full employment would result (L*). With shirking, however, individ- ual firms are unwilling to pay w*. Rather, for every level of unemployment in the labor market, firms must pay some wage greater than w* to induce work- ers to be productive. This wage is shown as the no-shirking constraint (NSC) curve. This curve shows the minimum wage, for each level of unemployment, that workers must earn in order not to shirk. Note that the greater the level of unemployment, the smaller the difference between the efficiency wage and w*. Why is this so? Because with high levels of unemployment, people who shirk risk long periods of unemployment and therefore don’t need much induce- ment to be productive. In Figure 17.5, the equilibrium wage will be at the intersection of the NSC curve and DL curves, with Le workers earning we. This equilibrium occurs because the NSC curve gives the lowest wage that firms can pay and still dis- courage shirking. Firms need not pay more than this wage to get the number of workers they need, and they will not pay less because a lower wage will encour- age shirking. Note that the NSC curve never crosses the labor supply curve. This means that there will always be some unemployment in equilibrium.

656 PART 4 • Information, Market Failure, and the Role of Government Wage SL FIGURE 17.5 we No-Shirking w* Constraint UNEMPLOYMENT IN A SHIRKING MODEL (NSC) Unemployment can arise in otherwise competitive labor markets Demand when employers cannot accurately monitor workers. Here, the “no shirking constraint” (NSC) gives the wage necessary to keep work- for Labor ers from shirking. The firm hires Le workers (at an efficiency wage we higher than the market-clearing wage w*), creating L* - Le of DL unemployment. Le L* Quantity of labor E X A M P L E 1 7 . 7 EFFICIENCY WAGES AT FORD MOTOR COMPANY One of the early examples of the efficiency, not generosity. The goal payment of efficiency wages can be was to attract better workers who found in the history of Ford Motor would stay with their jobs—and Company. Before 1913, automo- eventually to increase profits. bile production depended heavily on skilled workers. But the intro- Although Henry Ford was attacked duction of the assembly line drasti- for it, his policy succeeded. His work- cally changed the workplace. Now force did become more stable, and jobs demanded much less skill, the publicity helped Ford’s sales. In and production depended on maintaining assembly- addition, because Ford had his pick line equipment. But as automobile plants changed, of workers, he could hire a group that was on average workers became increasingly disenchanted. In 1913, more productive. Ford stated that the wage increase turnover at Ford was 380 percent. The following year, did in fact increase the loyalty and personal efficiency it rose to 1000 percent, and profit margins fell sharply. of his workers, and quantitative estimates support his statements. According to calculations by Ford’s Ford needed to maintain a stable workforce, chief of labor relations, productivity increased by 51 and Henry Ford (and his business partner James percent. Another study found that absenteeism had Couzens) provided it. In 1914, when the going been cut in half and discharges for cause had declined wage for a day’s work in industry averaged between sharply. Thus the productivity increase more than off- $2 and $3, Ford introduced a pay policy of $5 a set the increase in wages. As a result, Ford’s profitabil- day. The policy was prompted by improved labor ity rose from $30 million in 1914 to $60 million in 1916. SUMMARY market. Market failure can be eliminated if sellers offer standardized products, provide guarantees or warran- 1. The seller of a product often has better information ties, or find other ways to maintain good reputations about its quality than the buyer. Asymmetric infor- for their products. mation of this type creates a market failure in which bad products tend to drive good products out of the

CHAPTER 17 • Markets with Asymmetric Information 657 2. Insurance markets frequently involve asymmetric behavior of their managers (agents). Managers may information because the party buying insurance has seek higher fringe benefits for themselves or a goal of better information about the risk involved than the sales maximization, even though shareholders would insurance company. This can lead to adverse selection, prefer to maximize profit. in which poor risks choose to insure and good risks do 5. Owners can avoid some principal–agent problems by not. Another problem for insurance markets is moral designing contracts that give their agents the incentive hazard, in which the insured takes less care to avoid to perform productively. losses after being insured. 6. Asymmetric information can explain why labor markets have unemployment even though some 3. Sellers can deal with the problem of asymmetric infor- workers are actively seeking work. According to mation by sending buyers signals about the quality of efficiency wage theory, a wage higher than the com- their products. For example, workers can signal high petitive wage (the efficiency wage) increases worker productivity by obtaining high levels of education. productivity by discouraging workers from shirking on the job. 4. Asymmetric information may make it costly for the owners of firms (principals) to monitor accurately the QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW 6. Joe earned a high grade-point average during his four years of college. Is this achievement a strong signal to 1. Why can asymmetric information between buyers and Joe’s future employer that he will be a highly produc- sellers lead to market failure when a market is other- tive worker? Why or why not? wise perfectly competitive? 7. Why might managers be able to achieve objectives 2. If the used car market is a “lemons” market, how would other than profit maximization, which is the goal of you expect the repair record of used cars that are sold to the firm’s shareholders? compare with the repair record of those not sold? 8. How can the principal–agent model be used to explain 3. Explain the difference between adverse selection and why public enterprises, such as post offices, might moral hazard in insurance markets. Can one exist pursue goals other than profit maximization? without the other? 9. Why are bonus and profit-sharing payment schemes 4. Describe several ways in which sellers can convince buy- likely to resolve principal–agent problems, whereas a ers that their products are of high quality. Which meth- fixed-wage payment will not? ods apply to the following products: Maytag washing machines, Burger King hamburgers, large diamonds? 10. What is an efficiency wage? Why is it profitable for the firm to pay it when workers have better information 5. Why might a seller find it advantageous to signal the about their productivity than firms do? quality of a product? How are guarantees and warran- ties a form of market signaling? EXERCISES 3. A major university bans the assignment of D or F grades. It defends its action by claiming that students 1. Many consumers view a well-known brand name as a tend to perform above average when they are free signal of quality and will pay more for a brand-name from the pressures of flunking out. The university product (e.g., Bayer aspirin instead of generic aspirin, states that it wants all its students to get As and Bs. or Birds Eye frozen vegetables instead of the super- If the goal is to raise overall grades to the B level or market’s own brand). Can a brand name provide a above, is this a good policy? Discuss this policy with useful signal of quality? Why or why not? respect to the problem of moral hazard. 2. Gary is a recent college graduate. After six months at 4. Professor Jones has just been hired by the economics his new job, he has finally saved enough to buy his department at a major university. The president of the first car. board of regents has stated that the university is com- a. Gary knows very little about the difference between mitted to providing top-quality education for under- makes and models. How could he use market graduates. Two months into the semester, Jones fails to signals, reputation, or standardization to make show up for his classes. It seems he is devoting all his comparisons? time to research rather than to teaching. Jones argues b. You are a loan officer in a bank. After selecting a car, that his research will bring prestige to the department Gary comes to you seeking a loan. Because he has and the university. Should he be allowed to continue only recently graduated, he does not have a long exclusively with research? Discuss with reference to credit history. Nonetheless, the bank has a long his- the principal–agent problem. tory of financing cars for recent college graduates. Is this information useful in Gary’s case? If so, how?

658 PART 4 • Information, Market Failure, and the Role of Government 5. Faced with a reputation for producing automobiles a. Suppose Harry offers a one-year warranty on all of with poor repair records, a number of American com- the cars he sells. panies have offered extensive guarantees to car pur- i. What is Lew’s profit if he does not offer a one- chasers (e.g., a seven-year warranty on all parts and year warranty? If he does offer a one-year labor associated with mechanical problems). warranty? a. In light of your knowledge of the lemons market, ii. What is Harry’s profit if Lew does not offer a why is this a reasonable policy? one-year warranty? If he does offer a one-year b. Is the policy likely to create a moral hazard prob- warranty? lem? Explain. iii. Will Lew’s match Harry’s one-year warranty? iv. Is it a good idea for Harry to offer a one-year 6. To promote competition and consumer welfare, the warranty? Federal Trade Commission requires firms to adver- tise truthfully. How does truth in advertising promote b. What if Harry offers a two-year warranty? Will this competition? Why would a market be less competitive offer generate a credible signal of quality? What if firms advertised deceptively? about a three-year warranty? 7. An insurance company is considering issuing three c. If you were advising Harry, how long a warranty types of fire insurance policies: (i) complete insurance would you urge him to offer? Explain why. coverage, (ii) complete coverage above and beyond a $10,000 deductible, and (iii) 90 percent coverage of all *10. As chairman of the board of ASP Industries, you losses. Which policy is more likely to create moral haz- estimate that your annual profit is given by the table ard problems? below. Profit (⌸) is conditional upon market demand and the effort of your new CEO. The probabilities of 8. You have seen how asymmetric information can each demand condition occurring are also shown in reduce the average quality of products sold in a mar- the table. ket, as low-quality products drive out high-quality products. For those markets in which asymmetric MARKET LOW MEDIUM HIGH information is prevalent, would you agree or disagree DEMAND DEMAND DEMAND DEMAND with each of the following? Explain briefly: a. The government should subsidize Consumer Market .30 .40 .30 Reports. Probabilities b. The government should impose quality standards— e.g., firms should not be allowed to sell low-quality Low Effort ⌸ = $5 million ⌸ = $10 million ⌸ = $15 million items. c. The producer of a high-quality good will probably High Effort ⌸ = $10 million ⌸ = $15 million ⌸ = $17 million want to offer an extensive warranty. d. The government should require all firms to offer You must design a compensation package for the extensive warranties. CEO that will maximize the firm’s expected profit. While the firm is risk neutral, the CEO is risk averse. 9. Two used car dealerships compete side by side on a The CEO’s utility function is main road. The first, Harry’s Cars, always sells high- quality cars that it carefully inspects and, if neces- Utility = W.5 when making low effort sary, services. On average, it costs Harry’s $8000 to buy and service each car that it sells. The second Utility = W.5 - 100 when making high effort dealership, Lew’s Motors, always sells lower-quality cars. On average, it costs Lew’s only $5000 for each where W is the CEO’s income. (The -100 is the “utility car that it sells. If consumers knew the quality of the cost” to the CEO of making a high effort.) You know used cars they were buying, they would pay $10,000 the CEO’s utility function, and both you and the CEO on average for Harry’s cars and only $7000 on aver- know all of the information in the preceding table. You age for Lew’s cars. do not know the level of the CEO’s effort at time of Without more information, consumers do not compensation or the exact state of demand. You do see know the quality of each dealership’s cars. In this case, the firm’s profit, however. they would figure that they have a 50–50 chance of ending up with a high-quality car and are thus willing Of the three alternative compensation packages to pay $8500 for a car. below, which do you as chairman of ASP Industries Harry has an idea: He will offer a bumper-to- prefer? Why? bumper warranty for all cars that he sells. He knows that a warranty lasting Y years will cost $500Y on aver- Package 1: Pay the CEO a flat salary of $575,000 per age, and he also knows that if Lew tries to offer the year same warranty, it will cost Lew $1000Y on average. Package 2: Pay the CEO a fixed 6 percent of yearly firm profits

CHAPTER 17 • Markets with Asymmetric Information 659 Package 3: Pay the CEO a flat salary of $500,000 per with 4% interest. Risky loans have a 20% chance of year and then 50 percent of any firm profits above defaulting (paying back nothing) and an 80% chance $15 million of paying back in full with 30% interest. 11. A firm’s short-run revenue is given by R = 10e - e2, a. How much profit can the lending institution expect where e is the level of effort by a typical worker (all workers are assumed to be identical). A worker to earn? Show that the expected profits are the same chooses his level of effort to maximize wage less effort whether the lending institution makes risky or risk- w - e (the per-unit cost of effort is assumed to be 1). free loans. Determine the level of effort and the level of profit (rev- b. Now suppose that the lending institution knows enue less wage paid) for each of the following wage that the government will “bail out” UNIVERSAL if arrangements. Explain why these different principal– there is a default (paying back the original $1000). agent relationships generate different outcomes. What type of loans will the lending institution a. w = 2 for e Ú 1; otherwise w = 0. choose to make? What is the expected cost to the b. w = R/2. government? c. w = R - 12.5. c. Suppose that the lending institution doesn’t know 12. UNIVERSAL SAVINGS & LOAN has $1000 to lend. for sure that there will be a bail out, but one will Risk-free loans will be paid back in full next year occur with probability P. For what values of P will the lending institution make risky loans?

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C H A P T E R 18 Externalities and Public Goods CHAPTER OUTLINE In this chapter we study externalities—the effects of production and 18.1 Externalities consumption activities not directly reflected in the market—and 18.2 661 public goods—goods that benefit all consumers but that the market either undersupplies or does not supply at all. Externalities and public 18.3 Ways of Correcting Market goods are important sources of market failure and thus raise serious 18.4 Failure public policy questions. For example, how much waste, if any, should 667 firms be allowed to dump into rivers and streams? How strict should 18.5 automobile emission standards be? How much money should the Stock Externalities government spend on national defense? Education? Basic research? 18.6 678 Public television? 18.7 Externalities and Property When externalities are present, the price of a good need not reflect Rights its social value. As a result, firms may produce too much or too little, 684 so that the market outcome is inefficient. We begin by describing exter- nalities and showing exactly how they create market inefficiencies. We Common Property then evaluate remedies. While some remedies involve government Resources regulation, others rely primarily on bargaining among individuals or 687 on the legal right of those adversely affected to sue those who create an externality. Public Goods 690 Next, we analyze public goods. The marginal cost of providing a public good to an additional consumer is zero, and people cannot be Private Preferences for prevented from consuming it. We distinguish between those goods Public Goods that are difficult to provide privately and those that could have been 694 provided by the market. We conclude by describing the problem that policymakers face when trying to decide how much of a public good LIST OF EXAMPLES to provide. 18.1 The Costs and Benefits of 18.1 Externalities 18.2 Sulfur Dioxide Emissions 18.3 665 Externalities can arise between producers, between customers, or 18.4 between consumers and producers. They can be negative—when the 18.5 Reducing Sulfur Dioxide action of one party imposes costs on another party—or positive—when 18.6 Emissions in Beijing the action of one party benefits another party. 18.7 672 18.8 A negative externality occurs, for example, when a steel plant dumps Emissions Trading its waste in a river that fishermen downstream depend on for their and Clean Air 673 Regulating Municipal Solid Wastes 678 Global Warming 682 The Coase Theorem at Work 687 Crawfish Fishing in Louisiana 689 The Demand for Clean Air 693 661

662 PART 4 • Information, Market Failure, and the Role of Government • externality Action by either daily catch. The more waste the steel plant dumps in the river, the fewer fish a producer or a consumer which will be supported. The firm, however, has no incentive to account for the exter- affects other producers or nal costs that it imposes on fishermen when making its production decision. consumers, but is not accounted Furthermore, there is no market in which these external costs can be reflected in for in the market price. the price of steel. A positive externality occurs when a home owner repaints her house and plants an attractive garden. All the neighbors benefit from this activ- ity, even though the home owner’s decision to repaint and landscape probably did not take these benefits into account. In §6.3, we explain that with Negative Externalities and Inefficiency a fixed-proportions produc- tion function, it is impossible Because externalities are not reflected in market prices, they can be a source of to substitute among inputs economic inefficiency. When firms do not take into account the harms associ- because each level of output ated with negative externalities, the result is excess production and unnecessary requires a specific combina- social costs. To see why, let’s take our example of a steel plant dumping waste in tion of labor and capital. a river. Figure 18.1 (a) shows the production decision of a steel plant in a com- petitive market. Figure 18.1 (b) shows the market demand and supply curves, assuming that all steel plants generate similar externalities. We assume that because the firm has a fixed-proportions production function, it cannot alter its input combinations; waste and other effluent can be reduced only by lower- ing output. (Without this assumption, firms would be jointly choosing among a variety of combinations of output and pollution abatement.) We will analyze the nature of the externality under two circumstances: first when only one steel plant pollutes and, second, when all steel plants pollute in the same way. Price MSC Price MC MSCI S ϭ MCI P* P1 P1 MEC I MEC D q* q1 Firm output Q* Q1 Industry output (a) (b) FIGURE 18.1 EXTERNAL COST When there are negative externalities, the marginal social cost MSC is higher than the marginal cost MC. The difference is the marginal external cost MEC. In (a), a profit-maximizing firm produces at q1, where price is equal to MC. The efficient output is q*, at which price equals MSC. In (b), the industry’s competitive output is Q1, at the intersection of industry supply MCI and demand D. However, the efficient output Q* is lower, at the intersection of demand and marginal social cost MSCI.

CHAPTER 18 • Externalities and Public Goods 663 The price of steel is P1 at the intersection of the demand and supply curves In §8.3, we explain that in Figure 18.1 (b). The MC curve in (a) gives a typical steel firm’s marginal cost because a competitive firm of production. The firm maximizes profit by producing output q1, at which faces a horizontal demand marginal cost is equal to price (which equals marginal revenue because the firm curve, choosing its output so takes price as given). As the firm’s output changes, however, the external cost that marginal cost is equal to imposed on fishermen downstream also changes. This external cost is given price is profit-maximizing. by the marginal external cost (MEC) curve in Figure 18.1 (a). It is intuitively • marginal external cost clear why total external cost increases with output—there is more pollution. Increase in cost imposed However, our analysis focuses on the marginal external cost, which measures externally as one or more firms the added cost of the externality associated with each additional unit of output increase output by one unit. produced. In practice, the MEC curve is upward sloping for most forms of pol- lution: As the firm produces additional output and dumps additional effluent, • marginal social cost Sum of the incremental harm to the fishing industry increases. the marginal cost of production and the marginal external cost. From a social point of view, the firm produces too much output. The efficient level of output is the level at which the price of the product is equal to the mar- In §9.2, we explain that, ginal social cost (MSC) of production: the marginal cost of production plus the absent market failure, a marginal external cost of dumping effluent. In Figure 18.1 (a), the marginal social competitive market leads to cost curve is obtained by adding marginal cost and marginal external cost for each the economically efficient level of output (i.e., MSC = MC + MEC). The marginal social cost curve MSC output level. intersects the price line at output q*. Because only one plant is dumping effluent into the river, the market price of the product is unchanged. However, the firm is producing too much output (q1 instead of q*) and generating too much effluent. Now consider what happens when all steel plants dump their effluent into rivers. In Figure 18.1 (b), the MCI curve is the industry supply curve. The mar- ginal external cost associated with the industry output, MECI, is obtained by summing the marginal cost of every person harmed at each level of output. The MSCI curve represents the sum of the marginal cost of production and the mar- ginal external cost for all steel firms. As a result, MSCI = MCI + MECI. Is industry output efficient when there are externalities? As Figure 18.1 (b) shows, the efficient industry output level is the level at which the mar- ginal benefit of an additional unit of output is equal to the marginal social cost. Because the demand curve measures the marginal benefit to consumers, the efficient output is Q*, at the intersection of the marginal social cost MSCI and demand D curves. The competitive industry output, however, is at Q1, the intersection of the demand curve and the supply curve, MCI. Clearly, industry output is too high. In our example, each unit of output results in some effluent being dumped. Therefore, whether we are looking at one firm’s pollution or the entire indus- try’s, the economic inefficiency is the excess production that results in too much effluent being dumped in the river. The source of the inefficiency is the incor- rect pricing of the product. The market price P1 in Figure 18.1 (b) is too low— it reflects the firms’ marginal private cost of production, but not the marginal social cost. Only at the higher price P* will steel firms produce the efficient level of output. What is the cost to society of this inefficiency? For each unit produced above Q*, the social cost is given by the difference between the marginal social cost and the marginal benefit (the demand curve). As a result, the aggregate social cost is shown in Figure 18.1 (b) as the shaded triangle between MSCI, D, and output Q1. When we move from the profit-maximizing to the socially efficient output, firms are worse off because their profits are reduced, and purchasers of steel are worse off because the price of steel has increased. However, these losses are less than the gain to those who were harmed by the adverse effect of the dumping of effluent in the river.

664 PART 4 • Information, Market Failure, and the Role of Government Externalities generate both long-run and short-run inefficiencies. In Chapter 8, we saw that firms enter a competitive industry whenever the price of the product is above the average cost of production and exit whenever price is below average cost. In long-run equilibrium, price is equal to (long-run) average cost. When there are negative externalities, the average private cost of production is less than the average social cost. As a result, some firms remain in the industry even when it would be efficient for them to leave. Thus, negative externalities encourage too many firms to remain in the industry. • marginal external benefit Positive Externalities and Inefficiency Increased benefit that accrues to other parties as a firm increases Externalities can also result in too little production, as the example of home output by one unit. repair and landscaping shows. In Figure 18.2, the horizontal axis measures the home owner’s investment (in dollars) in repairs and landscaping. The marginal • marginal social benefit cost curve for home repair shows the cost of repairs as more work is done on the Sum of the marginal private house; it is horizontal because this cost is unaffected by the amount of repairs. benefit plus the marginal The demand curve D measures the marginal private benefit of the repairs to the external benefit. homeowner. The home owner will choose to invest q1 in repairs, at the intersec- tion of her demand and marginal cost curves. But repairs generate external ben- efits to the neighbors, as the marginal external benefit curve, MEB, shows. This curve is downward sloping in this example because the marginal benefit is large for a small amount of repair but falls as the repair work becomes extensive. The marginal social benefit curve, MSB, is calculated by adding the marginal private benefit and the marginal external benefit at every level of output. In short, MSB = D + MEB. The efficient level of output q*, at which the marginal social benefit of additional repairs is equal to the marginal cost of those repairs, Value MSB FIGURE 18.2 D MC Repair level EXTERNAL BENEFITS P1 P* When there are positive externalities, marginal social benefits MSB are higher than marginal ben- MEB efits D. The difference is the marginal external benefit MEB. A self-interested homeowner invests q1 in repairs, determined by the intersection of the marginal benefit curve D and the marginal cost curve MC. The efficient level of repair q* is higher and is given by the intersection of the marginal social benefit and marginal cost curves. q1 q*

CHAPTER 18 • Externalities and Public Goods 665 is found at the intersection of the MSB and MC curves. The inefficiency arises In §4.5, we explain that because the homeowner doesn’t receive all the benefits of her investment in when there is a network repairs and landscaping. As a result, the price P1 is too high to encourage her to externality, each individual’s invest in the socially desirable level of house repair. A lower price, P*, is required demand depends on to encourage the efficient level of supply, q*. the purchases of other individuals. Another example of a positive externality is the money that firms spend on research and development (R&D). Often the innovations resulting from research cannot be protected from other firms. Suppose, for example, that a firm designs a new product. If that design can be patented, the firm might earn a large profit by manufacturing and marketing the product. But if the new design can be closely imitated by other firms, those firms can appropriate some of the developing firm’s profit. Because there is then little reward for doing R&D, the market is likely to underfund it. The externality concept is not new: In discussing demand in Chapter 4, we explained that positive and negative network externalities can arise if the quan- tity of a good demanded by a consumer increases or decreases in response to an increase in purchases by other consumers. Network externalities can also lead to market failures. Suppose, for example, that some individuals enjoy socializing at busy ski resorts when many other skiers are present. The resulting conges- tion could make the skiing experience unpleasant for those skiers who preferred short lift lines to pleasant social occasions. EXAMPLE 18.1 THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF SULFUR DIOXIDE EMISSIONS Although sulfur dioxide gas can be produced natu- lung disorders such as asthma and bronchitis and rally by volcanoes, almost two-thirds of all sulfur has been linked to premature death in both adults dioxide emissions in the United States come from and children. According to one estimate, if sulfur electric power generation that depends on burn- dioxide emissions had been reduced by 50 per- ing fossil fuels such as coal and petroleum. The cent of 1980s levels—a time when emissions were effect of sulfur dioxide pollution on the environ- at a historic high in the United States—over 17,000 ment has concerned policymakers for years, but deaths per year would have been prevented. these concerns reached new heights in the 1990s (with a series of amendments to the Clean Air Act) In addition to human health, acid rain causes dam- because of the potential adverse effects of acid rain. age to water and forests as well as to man-made Acid rain—formed when sulfur dioxide and nitrogen structures. According to one study, a 50-percent oxides react with the atmosphere to form various reduction in sulfur dioxide levels in the 1980s would acidic compounds—threatens property and health have translated into a $24 million annual value in throughout the midwestern and northwestern improvements in recreational fishing, an $800 million United States.1 annual value to the commercial timber sector, and a $700 million annual value to grain crop producers.2 Acid rain can adversely affect human health Furthermore, sulfur dioxide emissions have been either directly, from the atmosphere, or indirectly, shown to cause damage to paint, steel, limestone, through the soil in which our food is grown. Acid and marble through increased surface erosion. While rain has been shown to increase risk of heart and the cost of acid rain to man-made materials is difficult 1Further information on sulfur dioxide and acid rain can be found at http://www.epa.gov. 2Spencer Banzhaf et al., “Valuation of Natural Resource Improvements in the Adirondacks,” (Washington: Resources for the Future, September 2004).

666 PART 4 • Information, Market Failure, and the Role of Government to quantify, automobile manufacturers are now offer- The marginal external cost curve reflects (again ing acid-resistant paint on new automobiles at an reading from right to left) the incremental reduc- average cost of $5 per car, or $61 million for all new tion in the harms caused by acid rain. For moder- cars and trucks sold in the United States. ate concentrations, studies of respiratory diseases, corrosion of materials, and lost visibility suggest What about the costs of achieving reductions in that marginal social costs are high and relatively sulfur dioxide emissions? To achieve these reduc- constant. However, for very low concentrations, tions, firms need to put emissions-control equip- the marginal external cost declines, and eventually ment into use. The incremental cost of achieving there are relatively few adverse health, material, or some emissions reduction is likely to be small, but aesthetic effects. that cost increases as greater and greater invest- ments in capital equipment are needed to achieve The efficient level of reduced sulfur dioxide further reductions. emissions is given by the number of ppm at which the marginal cost of reduced emissions is An example of the costs and benefits of reduc- equal to the marginal external cost. We can see ing sulfur dioxide emissions is given in Figure 18.3, from Figure 18.3 that this level is approximately which is based on a study of pollution abatement .0275 ppm. in Philadelphia.3 It is easiest to read the graph from right to left, since we are looking to see how much To sum up, there are clearly substantial ben- of a reduction in sulfur dioxide concentrations from efits to reducing sulfur dioxide emissions. What the existing level of .08 parts per million is socially if any policies are best utilized to achieve those desirable. The marginal abatement cost curve is reductions efficiently? We will return to these increasing (from right to left); it jumps whenever questions after we consider a variety of pol- new capital-intensive pollution-control equipment is icy options for the treatment of externalities in needed to improve fuel efficiency. Section 18.2. FIGURE 18.3 Dollars 60 Marginal External Cost per SULFUR DIOXIDE EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS unit of reduction The efficient sulfur dioxide concentration equates the marginal abatement cost to the 40 marginal external cost. Here the marginal abatement cost curve is a series of steps, 20 each representing the use of a different abatement technology. Marginal Abatement Cost 0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 Sulfur dioxide concentration (ppm) 3Thomas R. Irvin, “A Cost Benefit Analysis of Sulfur Dioxide Abatement Regulations in Philadelphia,” Business Economics, September 1977, pp. 12–20.

CHAPTER 18 • Externalities and Public Goods 667 18.2 Ways of Correcting Market Failure How can the inefficiency resulting from an externality be remedied? If the firm Recall from §7.3 that a firm that generates the externality has a fixed-proportions production technology, the can substitute among inputs externality can be reduced only by encouraging the firm to produce less. As we by changing technologies in saw in Chapter 8, this goal can be achieved through an output tax. Fortunately, response to an effluent fee. most firms can substitute among inputs in the production process by altering their choices of technology. For example, a manufacturer can add a scrubber to its smokestack to reduce emissions. Consider a firm that sells its output in a competitive market. The firm emits pollutants that damage air quality in a neighborhood. The firm can reduce its emissions, but only at a cost. Figure 18.4 illustrates this trade-off. The horizon- tal axis represents the level of factory emissions and the vertical axis the cost per unit of emissions. To simplify, we assume that the firm’s output decision and its emissions decision are independent and that the firm has already cho- sen its profit-maximizing output level. The firm is therefore ready to choose its preferred level of emissions. The curve labeled MEC represents the marginal external cost of emissions. This social cost curve represents the increased harm associated with the emissions. We will use the terms marginal external cost and marginal social cost interchangeably in the discussion that follows. (Recall that we have assumed that the firm’s output is fixed, so that the private costs of production—as opposed to pollution abatement—are unchanged.) The MEC curve slopes upward because the marginal cost of the externality gets higher as the externality becomes more extensive. (Evidence from studies of the effects of air and water pollution suggests that small levels of pollutants generate little harm. However, the harm increases substantially as the level of pollut- ants increases.) Because our emphasis will be on reducing emissions from existing levels, we will find it useful to read the MEC graph from right to left. From this perspec- tive, we see that the MEC associated with a small reduction in emissions from a level of 26 units, which reflects the incremental benefit of reduced emissions, is Dollars MEC per unit of emissions 6 4 FIGURE 18.4 2 THE EFFICIENT LEVEL OF EMISSIONS The efficient level of factory emissions is the level that equates the marginal external cost of emissions MEC to the benefit associated with lower abate- ment costs MCA. The efficient level of 12 units is E*. MCA 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 E0 E* E1 Level of emissions

668 PART 4 • Information, Market Failure, and the Role of Government greater than $6 per unit. However, as emissions are reduced further and further, the marginal social cost falls (eventually) to below $2 per unit. At some point, the incremental benefit of reducing emissions becomes less than $2. The curve labeled MCA is the marginal cost of abating emissions. It measures the additional cost to the firm of installing pollution-control equipment. The MCA curve is downward sloping because the marginal cost of reducing emissions is low when the reduction has been slight and high when it has been substantial. (A slight reduction is inexpensive—the firm can reschedule production to gener- ate the greatest emissions at night, when few people are outside. Large reduc- tions require costly changes in the production process.) As with the MEC curve, reading the MCA curve from right to left will help with our intuition. From this perspective, the marginal cost of abatement increases as we seek to achieve greater and greater reductions in emissions. With no effort at abatement, the firm’s profit-maximizing level of emissions is 26, the level at which the marginal cost of abatement is zero. The efficient level of emissions, 12 units, is at point E*, where the marginal external cost of emis- sions, $3, is equal to the marginal cost of abating emissions. Note that if emis- sions are lower than E*—say, E0—the marginal cost of abating emissions, $7, is greater than the marginal external cost of emissions, $2. Emissions, therefore, are too low relative to the social optimum. However, if the level of emissions is E1, the marginal external cost of emissions, $4, is greater than the marginal cost of abatement, $1. Emissions are then too high. We can encourage the firm to reduce emissions to E* in three ways: (1) emissions standards; (2) emissions fees; and (3) transferable emissions permits. We will begin by discussing standards and fees and comparing relative advantages and disadvantages. Then we will examine transferable emissions permits. • emissions standard Legal An Emissions Standard limit on the amount of pollutants that a firm can emit. An emissions standard is a legal limit on how much pollutant a firm can emit. If the firm exceeds the limit, it can face monetary and even criminal penalties. In Figure 18.5, the efficient emissions standard is 12 units, at point E*. The firm will be heavily penalized for emissions greater than this level. The standard ensures that the firm produces efficiently. The firm meets the standard by installing pollution-abatement equipment. The increased abate- ment expenditure will cause the firm’s average cost curve to rise (by the average cost of abatement). Firms will find it profitable to enter the industry only if the price of the product is greater than the average cost of production plus abate- ment—the efficient condition for the industry.4 • emissions fee Charge An Emissions Fee levied on each unit of a firm’s emissions. An emissions fee is a charge levied on each unit of a firm’s emissions.As Figure 18.5 shows, a $3 emissions fee will generate efficient behavior by our factory. Faced with this fee, the firm minimizes costs by reducing emissions from 26 to 12 units. To see why, note that the first unit of emissions can be reduced (from 26 to 25 units of emissions) at very little cost (the marginal cost of additional abatement is close to zero). For very little cost, therefore, the firm can avoid paying the $3 per-unit fee. In fact, for all levels of emissions above 12 units, the marginal cost 4This analysis assumes that the social costs of emissions do not change over time. If they do, the efficient standard will also change.

CHAPTER 18 • Externalities and Public Goods 669 Dollars MEC per unit of emissions Standard FIGURE 18.5 Fee STANDARDS AND FEES 3 The efficient level of emissions at E* can be achieved through either an emissions fee or an emissions standard. Facing a fee of $3 per unit of emissions, a firm reduces emissions to the point at which the fee is equal to the marginal cost of abatement. The same level of emissions reduction can be achieved with a standard that limits emissions to 12 units. MCA 12 26 E* Level of emissions of abatement is less than the emissions fee. Thus it pays to reduce emissions. Below 12 units, however, the marginal cost of abatement is greater than the fee. In that case, the firm will prefer to pay the fee rather than further reduce emis- sions. It will therefore pay a total fee given by the gray-shaded rectangle and incur a total abatement cost given by the blue-shaded triangle under the MCA curve to the right of E = 12. This cost is less than the fee that the firm would pay if it did not reduce emissions at all. Standards versus Fees The United States has historically relied on standards to regulate emissions. However, other countries, such as Germany, have used fees successfully. Which method is better? The relative advantages of standards and fees depend on the amount of information available to policymakers and on the actual cost of con- trolling emissions. To understand these differences, let’s suppose that because of administrative costs, the agency that regulates emissions must charge the same fee or set the same standard for all firms. THE CASE FOR FEES First, let’s examine the case for fees. Consider two firms that are located so that the marginal social cost of emissions is the same no mat- ter which reduces its emissions. Because they have different abatement costs, however, their marginal cost of abatement curves are not the same. Figure 18.6 shows why emissions fees are preferable to standards in this case. MCA1 and MCA2 represent the marginal cost of abatement curves for the two firms. Each firm initially generates 14 units of emissions. Suppose we want to reduce total emissions by 14 units. Figure 18.6 shows that the cheapest way to do this is to have Firm 1 reduce emissions by 6 units and Firm 2 by 8. With these reduc- tions, both firms have marginal costs of abatement of $3. But consider what hap- pens if the regulatory agency asks both firms to reduce emissions by 7 units. In that case Firm 1’s marginal cost of abatement increases from $3 to $3.75, while Firm 2’s marginal cost of abatement decreases from $3 to $2.50. This cannot be

670 PART 4 • Information, Market Failure, and the Role of Government Dollars per MCA2 MCA1 unit of FIGURE 18.6 emissions THE CASE FOR FEES 6 With limited information, a policymaker may be faced with the choice of either 5 Firm 1’s Increased a single emissions fee or a single emis- Abatement Costs sions standard for all firms. The fee of $3 4 achieves a total emissions level of 14 units 3.75 more cheaply than a 7-unit-per-firm emis- sions standard. With the fee, the firm with 3 a lower abatement cost curve (Firm 2) 2.50 reduces emissions more than the firm with a higher cost curve (Firm 1). 2 Firm 2’s Reduced Abatement 1 Costs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Level of emissions cost-minimizing because the second firm can reduce emissions more cheaply than the first. Only when the marginal cost of abatement is equal for both firms will emissions be reduced by 14 units at minimum cost. Now we can see why a fee ($3) might be preferable to a standard (7 units). Faced with a $3 fee, Firm 1 will reduce emissions by 6 units and Firm 2 by 8 units—the efficient outcome. By contrast, under an emissions standard, Firm 1 incurs addi- tional abatement costs given by the green-shaded area between 7 and 8 units of emissions. But Firm 2 enjoys reduced abatement costs given by the purple-shaded area between 6 and 7 units. Clearly, Firm 1’s added abatement costs are larger than Firm 2’s reduced costs. The emissions fee thus achieves the same level of emissions at a lower cost than the equal per-firm emissions standard. In general, fees can be preferable to standards for several reasons. First, when standards must be applied equally to all firms, fees achieve the same emissions reduction at a lower cost. Second, fees give a firm a strong incentive to install new equipment that would allow it to reduce emissions even further. Suppose the standard requires that each firm reduce its emission by 6 units, from 14 to 8. Firm 1 is considering installing new emissions devices that would lower its marginal cost of abatement from MCA1 to MCA2. If the equipment is relatively inexpensive, the firm will install it because it will lower the cost of meeting the standard. However, a $3 emissions fee would provide a greater incentive for the firm to reduce emissions. With the fee, not only will the firm’s cost of abatement be lower on the first 6 units of reduction, but it will also be cheaper to reduce emissions by 2 more units: The emissions fee is greater than the marginal abate- ment cost for emissions levels between 6 and 8. THE CASE FOR STANDARDS Now let’s examine the case for standards by looking at Figure 18.7. While the marginal external cost curve is very steep, the marginal cost of abatement is relatively flat. The efficient emissions fee is $8. But suppose that because of limited information, a lower fee of $7 is charged (this fee amounts to a 1/8 or 12.5 percent reduction). Because the MCA curve is flat, the firm’s emissions will be increased from 8 to 11 units. This increase lowers the

CHAPTER 18 • Externalities and Public Goods 671 Dollars per unit 16 C of emissions Marginal 14 External Cost FIGURE 18.7 12 THE CASE FOR STANDARDS E When the government has limited information about the 10 A B costs and benefits of pollution abatement, either a stan- 8 D dard or a fee may be preferable. The standard is prefer- 6 able when the marginal external cost curve is steep and the marginal abatement cost curve is relatively flat. Here 4 Marginal Cost a 12.5 percent error in setting the standard leads to extra 2 of Abatement social costs of triangle ADE. The same percentage error in setting a fee would result in excess costs of ABC. 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 Level of emissions firm’s abatement costs somewhat, but because the MEC curve is steep, there will be substantial additional social costs. The increase in social costs, less the savings in abatement costs, is given by the entire shaded (light and dark) triangle ABC. What happens if a comparable error is made in setting the standard? The efficient standard is 8 units of emissions. But suppose the standard is relaxed by 12.5 percent, from 8 to 9 units. As before, this change will lead to an increase in social costs and a decrease in abatement costs. But the net increase in social costs, given by the small triangle ADE, is much smaller than before. This example illustrates the difference between standards and fees. When the marginal external cost curve is relatively steep and the marginal cost of abate- ment curve relatively flat, the cost of not reducing emissions is high. In such cases, a standard is preferable to a fee. With incomplete information, standards offer more certainty about emissions levels but leave the costs of abatement uncertain. Fees, on the other hand, offer certainty about the costs of abatement but leave the reduction of emissions levels uncertain. The preferable policy depends, therefore, on the nature of uncertainty and on the shapes of the cost curves.5 Tradeable Emissions Permits If we knew the costs and benefits of abatement and if all firms’ costs were iden- tical, we could apply a standard. Alternatively, if the costs of abatement varied among firms, an emissions fee would work. However, when firms’ costs vary 5Our analysis presumes that the emissions fee is levied as a fixed fee per unit of emissions. If the fee is set too low because of limited information, the firm will generate a substantial amount of excess emissions. Suppose, however, that a fixed fee were replaced with a fee schedule designed so that the higher the level of emissions the higher the per-unit fee. In this case, if the fee schedule is set too low, the increasing fee will discourage the firm from generating substantial excess emissions. In general, a variable fee is preferable to a standard if the fee schedule can be designed to match the environmental harm caused by the emissions. In this case, firms know that the payment they make will be approximately equal to the harm that they cause and will internalize that harm in making their production decisions. See Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, “On the Superiority of Corrective Taxes to Quantity Regulation,” American Law and Economics Review 4 (Spring 2002): 1–17.

672 PART 4 • Information, Market Failure, and the Role of Government • tradeable emissions and we do not know the costs and benefits, neither a standard nor a fee will permits System of marketable generate an efficient outcome. permits, allocated among firms, specifying the maximum level of We can reach the goal of reducing emissions efficiently by using tradeable emissions that can be generated. emissions permits. Under this system, each firm must have permits to generate emissions. Each permit specifies the number of units of emissions that the firm is allowed to put out. Any firm that generates emissions not allowed by permit is subject to substantial monetary sanctions. Permits are allocated among firms, with the total number of permits chosen to achieve the desired maximum level of emissions. Permits are marketable: They can be bought and sold. Under the permit system, the firms least able to reduce emissions are those that purchase permits. Thus, suppose the two firms in Figure 18.6 (page 670) were given permits to emit up to 7 units. Firm 1, facing a relatively high mar- ginal cost of abatement, would pay up to $3.75 to buy a permit for one unit of emissions, but the value of that permit is only $2.50 to Firm 2. Firm 2 should therefore sell its permit to Firm 1 for a price between $2.50 and $3.75. If there are enough firms and permits, a competitive market for permits will develop. In market equilibrium, the price of a permit equals the marginal cost of abatement for all firms; otherwise, a firm will find it advantageous to buy more permits. The level of emissions chosen by the government will be achieved at min- imum cost. Those firms with relatively low marginal cost of abatement curves will be reducing emissions the most, and those with relatively high marginal cost of abatement curves will be buying more permits and reducing emissions the least. Marketable emissions permits create a market for externalities. This market approach is appealing because it combines some of the advantageous features of a system of standards with the cost advantages of a fee system. The agency that administers the system determines the total number of permits and, therefore, the total amount of emissions, just as a system of standards would do. But the market- ability of the permits allows pollution abatement to be achieved at minimum cost.6 EXAMPLE 18.2 REDUCING SULFUR DIOXIDE EMISSIONS IN BEIJING Taken together, sulfur dioxide not only in China, but in the world. In 1995, emissions produced through the for example, the level of sulfur dioxide in burning of coal for use in electric Beijing was 90 milligrams per cubic meter, power generation and the wide which compares unfavorably to Berlin (18 use of coal-based home furnaces mg/m3), Copenhagen (7), London (25), have caused a huge problem in New York (26), Tokyo (18), and Mexico City Beijing as well as other cities in (74). Of the major cities in the world, only China. Not only have emissions Moscow had higher sulfur dioxide levels created an acid rain problem, but (109 mg/m3). they have combined with emis- sions from the growing number Over the long term, the key to solving of automobiles to make Beijing Beijing’s problem is to replace coal with one of the most polluted cities cleaner fuels, to encourage the use of pub- lic transportation, and, when necessary, to 6With limited information and costly monitoring, a marketable permit system is not always ideal. For example, if the total number of permits is chosen incorrectly and the marginal cost of abatement rises sharply for some firms, a permit system could drive those firms out of business by imposing high abatement costs. (This would also be a problem for fees.)

CHAPTER 18 • Externalities and Public Goods 673 introduce fuel-efficient hybrid vehicles. But prior to Improved air quality led to better human health, less its hosting of the Olympics in 2008, Beijing had a damage to materials, and higher property values. problem. What could it do to reduce sulfur dioxide Example 18.1 shows that the imposed standards emissions so as to offer a cleaner environment to made sense on cost-benefit grounds. the Olympic athletes and to the visiting public? Would the imposition of a system of emissions Beijing’s choice was to shut down a large num- fees—or better yet a regime of tradeable emissions ber of coal-fired plants. The air quality in Beijing permits—do even better in Beijing? A study of improved 30 percent in 2008 for the Olympics, at a the regulation of electric-utility sulfur dioxide trade- cost of about $10 billion. But a year after the Games, able emissions shows that marketable permits in the when many of the environmental regulations were United States can cut in half the cost of complying no longer in effect, about 60 percent of the improve- with a regulatory-based standard.7 Can similar gains ment was lost. Was the shutdown of plants the most be achieved in Beijing? The answer lies in part on efficient policy choice? Our study of pollution- whether the market for tradeable emissions will itself abatement strategies suggests not. For one thing, work efficiently. But it also depends on the shape of we have experience with the use of standards for the marginal abatement cost and marginal exter- regulating sulfur dioxide emissions in Philadelphia nal cost curves. As our prior discussion has shown, (recall Example 18.1). In 1968, Philadelphia imposed the case for emissions fees (and for tradeable per- air-quality regulations that limited the maximum mits) is strongest (1) when firms vary substantially allowable sulfur content in fuel oil to 1.0 percent in their marginal abatement costs; and (2) or less. This regulation decreased sulfur dioxide when the marginal external cost of emissions curve levels in the air substantially—from 0.10 parts per is relatively steep and the marginal cost of abate- million (ppm) in 1968 to below 0.030 ppm in 1973. ment curve relatively flat. EXAMPLE 18.3 EMISSIONS TRADING AND CLEAN AIR Controlling emissions cost companies approxi- the firm can reduce its emissions, another part will mately $18 billion during the 1980s, and it cost even be allowed to emit more. Abatement cost savings more during the first half of the 1990s.8 An effec- associated with the EPA’s program of 42 bubbles tive emissions trading system could reduce those have been approximately $300 million per year costs substantially in the decades to come. The since 1979. Environmental Protection Agency’s “bubble” and “offset” programs were modest attempts to use a Under the offset program, new sources of emis- trading system to lower cleanup costs. sions may be located in geographic regions in which air-quality standards have not been met, but A bubble allows an individual firm to adjust its only if they offset their new emissions by reduc- pollution controls for individual sources of pollut- ing emissions from existing sources by at least as ants as long as a total pollutant limit for the firm is much. Offsets can be obtained by internal trading, not exceeded. In theory, a bubble could be used but external trading among firms is also allowed. to set pollutant limits for many firms or for an entire A total of more than 2000 offset transactions have geographic region; in practice, however, it has been occurred since 1976. applied to individual firms. As a result “permits” are, in effect, traded within the firm: If one part of Because of their limited natures, bubble and offset programs substantially understate the 7Don Fullerton, Shaun P. McDermott, and Jonathan P. Caulkins, “Sulfur Dioxide Compliance of a Regulated Utility,” NBER Working Paper No. 5542, April 1996. 8See Robert W. Hahn and Gordon L. Hester, “The Market for Bads: EPA’s Experience with Emissions Trading,” Regulation (1987): 48–53; Brian J. McKean, “Evolution of Marketable Permits: The U.S. Experience with Sulfur-Dioxide Allowance Trading,” Environmental Protection Agency, December, 1996.

674 PART 4 • Information, Market Failure, and the Role of Government potential gain from a broad-based emissions rain” in the 1990 Clean Air Act. Acid rain can be trading program. In one study, the cost of achiev- extremely harmful to people, animals, vegetation, ing an 85-percent reduction in hydrocarbon emis- and buildings. The government initially authorized sions in all U.S. DuPont plants was estimated a permit system to reduce annual sulfur dioxide under three alternative policies: (1) each source emissions by 10 million tons and nitrogen oxide at each plant must reduce emissions by 85 per- emissions by 2.5 million tons by the year 2000. cent; (2) each plant must reduce its overall emis- That program remains in place today. sions by 85 percent with only internal trading possible; and (3) total emissions at all plants must Under the plan, each tradeable permit allows a be reduced by 85 percent, with both internal maximum of one ton of sulfur dioxide to be released and external trading possible.9 When no trading into the air. Electric utilities and other polluting enti- was allowed, the cost of emissions reduction was ties are allocated permits in proportion to their cur- $105.7 million. Internal trading reduced the cost rent level of emissions. Companies can make the to $42.6 million. Allowing for both external and capital investments necessary to reduce emissions, internal trading reduced the cost even further, to perhaps by selling excess permits, or they can buy $14.6 million. permits and avoid having to make costly emissions- reducing investments. Clearly, the potential cost savings from an effec- tive tradeable emissions program can be substan- In the early 1990s, economists expected tial. This may explain why Congress focused on these permits to trade for around $300. In fact, transferable permits as a way of dealing with “acid as Figure 18.8 shows, between 1993 and 2003, prices fluctuated between $100 and $200. Why? It Price (dollars/ton) 1600 1400 1200 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 1000 Year 800 600 400 200 0 1993 FIGURE 18.8 PRICE OF TRADEABLE EMISSIONS PERMITS The price of tradeable permits for sulfur dioxide emissions fluctuated between $100 and $200 from 1993 to 2003, but then increased sharply in 2005 and 2006 in response to an increased demand for permits. The price fluctuated between $400 and $500 per ton for the next few years, before the market crashed in 2008, after the EPA was forced to revise the permit program. 9M. T. Maloney and Bruce Yandle, “Bubbles and Efficiency: Cleaner Air at Lower Cost,” Regulation (May/June 1980): 49–52.

CHAPTER 18 • Externalities and Public Goods 675 turned out that reducing sulfur dioxide emissions beyond its initial scope. The permit market could was less costly than anticipated (it had become be expanded, the court ruled, but the EPA must cheaper to mine low-sulfur coal), and many elec- rewrite its rules to comply with existing Clean Air tric utilities took advantage of this development Act regulations. Permit prices fell precipitously to reduce emissions. From 2005 to 2006, how- after the ruling, and the market finally bottomed ever, the price of permits rose sharply, hitting out in 2010, when the EPA issued new rules that a high of nearly $1600 in December 2005. This require most emissions reductions to come from was the result of an increase in the price of low- changes at individual plants and that limit the use sulfur coal and, more importantly, the increased of permit allowances. By 2011, you could buy a demand for permits that resulted as more electric permit (perhaps as a gift for a close friend) for as power plants were required to meet tight emis- little as $2 per ton. sions standards.10 Will the prices of emission permits remain so Starting in 2007, however, the market price of low that the entire program might be dismantled? emission permits began to decline, in part because The answer depends on the amount of sulfur diox- the EPA lost a lawsuit brought by a group of utili- ide emissions we are willing to allow in the United ties. The court ruled that the EPA had overstepped States. If emission limits are tightened, permit prices its authority by expanding the sulfur permit market could eventually rise. Recycling To the extent that the disposal of waste products involves little or no private cost to either consumers or producers, society will dispose of too much waste material. The overutilization of virgin materials and the underutilization of recycled materials will result in a market failure that may require government intervention. Fortunately, given the appropriate incentive to recycle products, this market failure can be corrected.11 To see how recycling incentives can work, consider a typical household’s decision with respect to the disposal of glass containers. In many communities, households are charged a fixed annual fee for trash disposal. As a result, these households can dispose of glass and other garbage at very low cost—only the time and effort to put the materials in a trash receptacle. The low cost of disposal creates a divergence between the private and the social cost of disposal. The marginal private cost, which is the cost to the household of throwing out the glass, is likely to be constant (indepen- dent of the amount of disposal) for low to moderate levels of disposal. It will then increase for large disposal levels involving additional shipping and dump charges. In contrast, the social cost of disposal includes the harm to the environment from littering, as well as the injuries caused by sharp glass objects. Marginal social cost is likely to increase, in part because the marginal private cost is increasing and in part because the environmental 10Our thanks to Elizabeth Bailey, Denny Ellerman, and Paul Joskow for providing the emissions permit price data and for helpful comments. For a more detailed explanation of permit prices, see A. D. Ellerman, P. L. Joskow, R. Schmalensee, J. P. Montero, and E. M. Bailey, Markets for Clean Air: The U.S. Acid Rain Program (Boston: MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research, 1999). For more information on tradeable permits generally, go to the EPA Web site at www.epa.gov. 11Even without market intervention, some recycling will occur if the price of virgin material is suf- ficiently high. For example, recall from Chapter 2 that when the price of copper is high, there is more recycling of scrap copper.