Chang (2011). The method applied in this research study for data collection is quantitative contentanalysis which can be made reference from the previously mentioned research studies. In terms ofmeasuring the media frames, the five generic frames formulated by Semetko & Valkenburg (2000) areapplied in this study. These frames are: a) Responsibility Frame: This frame highlights the government’s (or an individual’s or a group’s) responsibility and ability in solving the particular problem. b) Conflict Frame: As its name suggests, this frame pays close attention to the conflict elements of the particular issue, for instance, the argument between two parties. c) Morality Frame: Within this frame, issues are examined through the morality lens by relating it to moral values or religious teachings. d) Economic Consequences Frame: This frame reports an event, problem, or issue in terms of the consequences it will have economically on an individual, group, institution, region, or country. e) Human Interest Frame: This frame focuses on elements that could trigger an emotional impact on its readers. To measure the visibility of frames contained in a unit of analysis, 18 attribute statements fromSemetko and Valkenburg (2000) and, Valkenburg, Semetko, and de Vreese (1999) corresponding to thefive generic frames are adopted. Coders are instructed to mark ‘yes’ if they find the attribute statement onthe whole applied to the unit of analysis under study. Otherwise, ‘no’ is marked. Each ‘yes’ carries onescore, while ‘no’ contributes nothing to the score board. The accumulated score for a particular frame isthen averaged according to the number of attribute statements it has. The final score ranging from ‘0’to ‘1’will indicate the level of visibility of the frame, with ‘0’ pointing towards non-visibility while ‘1’indicating full visibility.CONTENT ANALYSIS STUDY ON FRAMING ‘BERSIH 3.0’The units of analysis in a content-analysis study are regarded as the data element. In this study, the unit ofanalysis is the gathering of news articles on the issue of ‘Bersih 3.0’ that appeared in Utusan Malaysiaand Malaysiakini for a period of one month from 4 April to 4 May 2012. The selection of news articlesfocused on the coverage of the reporting of the assembly of ‘Bersih 3.0’, covering before and after theevent. Based on the period under review, 256 news articles were identified. A total of 143 units wereidentified in Utusan Malaysia, while a total of 113 units in Malaysiakini. The results of the contentanalysis shown in Figure 4.1 and Table 4.1 facilitate the comparison of the news from the perspective ofthe data studied during the period of this study.
Figure 4.1: Life Cycle of News on the Coverage of ‘Bersih 3.0’. Table 4.1 shows the study period and number of news articles taken from the media studied. Thisstudy is divided into two periods in terms of the pre-event or before the ‘Bersih 3.0’ rally, and post-eventor after the rally. For the pre-event period of Utusan Malaysia starting from 4 April to 28 April 2012, thetotal number of articles is 29 units. This is in contrast to Malaysiakini with a shorter duration from 4April to 27 April 2012; the number of articles amounting to 60 units for the pre-event was higher than thatfor Utusan Malaysia. It is worth noting that, the rally took place on 28 April 2012 and the print mediacould only cover the story on the following day, which was in contrast with the online media that wereable to report the event instantly. After examining the shorter post-event period for Utusan Malaysia,starting from 29 April to 4 May 2012, we found that, this newspaper displayed more articles, with 114units. While Malaysiakini from the date of 28 April to 4 May 2012, had only 53 units, which is muchlower than Utusan Malaysia. Table 4.1: Cross-Tabulation between Media and Event.MEDIA Pre-event UTUSAN MALAYSIA MALAYSIAKINI (MK) Rally Post-event (UM) 60 (53.1%)Overall 29 (20.3%) 53 (46.9%) 114 (79.7%) 113 (100%) 143 (100%) Table 4.2 below displays the mean differences for the five dependent variables across the twoindependent variables which were media and event, and also the interaction between them. From thetable, it can be seen that the responsibility frame was the most prominent frame projected by UtusanMalaysia with the value M=.762 (S.D.=.032). The second highest frame was the conflict frame with themean score M=.591 (S.D.=.035) followed by human interest frame M=.248(S.D.=.019). Meanwhile themorality frame shows a mean score of M =.217 (S.D. =.028) and lastly, the economic consequences frame
was the least prominent frame in Utusan Malaysia newspaper with the value M=.066 (S.D.=.022).On theother hand, the Malaysiakini news portal had the conflict frame being the most prominent with a meanscore of M = .633 (S.D. = .032). The responsibility frame was the second most prominent frame inMalaysiakini with the score M = .591 (S.D.= .029). This was followed by the human interest frame (M =.291, S.D. = .017), morality frame (M = .057, S.D. = .025), and finally, the economic consequences frame(M = .008, S.D. = .020). Table 4.2: Mean Scores of Main and Interaction Effects RESPONSIBILITY HUMAN CONFLICT MORALITY ECONOMIC INTEREST CONSEQUENCES .762 (.032)** .591 (.035) Media .591 (.029)** .248 (.019) .633 (.032) .217 (.028)** .066 (.022) UM .291 (.017) .057 (.025)** .008 (.020) MK .719 (.035) .547 (.038)** .634 (.026) .228 (.021)** .677 (.028)** .180 (.030)* .014 (.024) Event .311 (.015)** .095 (.022)* .060 (.017) Pre- .816 (.058) .494 (.063) Post- .708 (.029) .207 (.034) .687 (.032) .276 (.050) .011 (.039)*Interaction .622 (.040) .289 (.017) .600 (.044) .158 (.025) .120 (.020)* UM*Pre .560 (.043) .250 (.024) .667 (.047) .083 (.035) .017 (.027)* UM*Post .332 (.025) .031 (.037) .000 (.000)* MK*Pre MK*Post Values in parentheses represent standard deviations; *p< .05, **p< .01 In an overall comparison between the two media vehicles, the findings show that Utusan Malaysiawas higher than Malaysiakini in terms of the prominence of the responsibility frame (MUM = .762, MMK= .591), morality frame (MUM = .217, MMK = .057), and economic consequences frame (MUM = .066,MMK = .008). On the other hand, the Malaysiakini news portal projected greater prominence of thehumanity frame (MMK = .291, MUM = .248), and conflict frame (MMK = .633, MUM = .591). Bycomparing the pre- and post-event of the ‘Bersih 3.0’ rally, the pre-event was found higher than the post-event in two out of five frames which were the responsibility frame (MPre = .719, MPost= .634), andmorality frame (MPre = .180, MPost= .095). On the other hand, the post-event coverage was higher interms of the human interest frame (MPost= .311, MPre= .228), conflict frame (MPost= .677, MPre= .547),and economic consequences frame (MPost= .060, MPre= .014). Looking at the interaction effect of media* event, the four lowest rows in Table 4.2 refer to the meanscores of the five frames across the variables of the Utusan Malaysia newspaper and Malaysiakini newsportal for the pre-event and post-event of “Bersih 3.0” rally. It was found that Utusan Malaysia in thestudy highlighted two frames over the period of pre- compared to post-event. These frames were theresponsibility frame (MUM.Pre = .816, MUM.Post = .708) and morality frame (MUM.Pre = .276,MUM.Post = .158). For the responsibility frame, news coverage before the rally showed that thegovernment, especially the Ministry of Home Affairs, suggested many recommendations in order to avoid
the ‘Bersih 3.0’ rally to be held at Dataran Merdeka, which is the central area of the capital city. As forexample, the article entitled ‘The rally should be conditional – Hishamuddin’ shows that the Minister inthe Ministry of Home Affairs was responsible in handling this issue, by giving guidance to the ‘Bersih3.0’ rally organizers so that the rally was held in peace. While through the morality frame, in the newsarticle entitled ‘Muslims remember not to be exploited’ that appeared during the pre-event of ‘Bersih 3.0’rally reminded Muslims not to be influenced and used by certain parties for their political interests. While in the post-event of the ‘Bersih 3.0’ rally, the conflict frame is most prominent in UtusanMalaysia (MUM.Post = .687, MUM.Pre = .494), followed by the human interest frame (MUM.Post =.289, MUM. Pre = .207), and, economic consequences frame (MUM.Post = .120, MUM.Pre = .011). Forthe conflict frame, most of the news coverage after the ‘Bersih 3.0’ rally in Utusan Malaysia blamed the‘Bersih 3.0’ organizers, especially the opposition party, for the chaos that occured. As the article ‘Theleader of the opposition incites, participants paid’, dated 29 April 2012, shows that the governmentblamed the opposition parties who organized the ‘Bersih 3.0’ rally for inciting the participants in creatingchaos and violence. For the human interest frame, found in an article entitled ‘Injured policemen were visited’ shows thecaring and sympathetic attitude of the government, especially when the Prime Minister visited thepolicemen who were injured during the ‘Bersih 3.0’ rally. Besides this, the article entitled ‘Ambiga,Anwar suspected’ during the post-event, depicted the person that was blamed by the government fororganizing the rally that led to chaos. While for the economic consequences frame found in the articlesentitled ‘Sale of business in the capital city fall dramatically’ and ‘Bersih 3.0 rally cause taxi driversincome to be affected’. The news articles reveal the costs and financial loss as a result of the ‘Bersih 3.0’rally. On the other hand, the Malaysiakini news portal shows that the pre-event is more prominent than post-event for the responsibility frame (MMK.Pre = .622, MMK.Post = .560), morality frame (MMK.Pre =.083, MMK.Post = .031) and economic consequences frame (MMK. Pre = .017, MMK.Post = .000). Forthe responsibility frame, the article entitled ‘Bersih 3.0: Clean first, then make a new election’ shows that‘Bersih 3.0’ organizers demonstrated their care and responsibility in ensuring transparency in the GeneralElection. While the morality frame is found in the article entitled, ‘Bersih 3.0: Zahid said Ministers areignorant and arrogant’ that provides a social prescription of how the people in power should behave.While the economic consequences frame as shown in the article entitled, ‘The taxi driver willing to bring‘Bersih 3.0’ participants’ tells the opinion of a taxi driver who said that he was willing to takeparticipants who want to join the ‘Bersih 3.0’ rally if the rally were to be held at Stadium Merdeka. But inthe post-event, there was no prominence of the economic consequences frame because it was highlightedin Utusan Malaysia, that there were losses as a result of the ‘Bersih 3.0’ rally. On the other hand, during the post-event of the ‘Bersih 3.0’ rally, Malaysiakini highlighted more on theconflict frame (MMK. Post = .667, MMK.Pre = .600), and, human interest frame (MMK. Post = .332,MMK.Pre = .250). For the conflict frame during the post-event, as in the article entitled, ‘PAS youth haveevidence that police battered participant’ and ‘PKR wants Najib be responsible to the attack allegations’,these articles show that news in Malaysiakini exhibited disagreement between the opposition and thegovernment. In addition, the opposition blamed the government after the happening of the ‘Bersih 3.0’rally. Besides the human interest frame displayed as in the article entitled, “A journalists has suffered fora broken rib when he covered ‘Bersih 3.0’ rally” indicates the vivid information given to generate
feelings of sympathy and compassion. A comparison between the Utusan Malaysia newspaper and the Malaysiakini news portal shows that,Utusan Malaysia promotes heavily on the responsibility frame during the pre-event with the mean score(MUM.Pre = .816), which is higher than Malaysiakini (MMK. Pre= .622). While the conflict frame ishighlighted during the post-event with the mean score (MUM.Post= .687) for Utusan Malaysia and(MMK.Post = .667) for Malaysiakini. The human interest frame is highlighted after the event with a higherscore for Malaysiakini (MMK. Post = .322) as compared to Utusan Malaysia (MUM.Post = .289). Whilethe morality frame is highlighted before the event by Utusan Malaysia (MUM.Pre= .276) as compared toMalaysiakini (MMK.Pre = .083). The economic consequences frame is highlighted during the post-eventwith a significant higher score for Utusan Malaysia (MUM.Post = .120) as compared to the pre-event(MUM.Pre = .011). Meanwhile, Malaysiakini shows a low score for this frame before the event(MMK.Pre = .017) and without its presence after the rally (MMK.Post = .000). Table 4.3: Tests of Significant Differences of Mean Scores. FRAME Media SS df MS F PResponsibility Event 1.482 1 1.482 15.42 .000** Interaction .371 1 .371 3.86 .051Human Interest Error .027 1 .027 .597 Media 24.215 252 .096 .28 Conflict Event .093 1 .093 Interaction .344 1 .344 2.79 .096 Morality Error .000 1 .000 10.31 .001** Economic Media 8.411 252 .033 .992Consequences Event .092 1 .092 .00 Interaction .855 1 .855 Error .202 1 .202 .08 .372 Media 29.046 252 .115 7.42 .007** Event 1.291 1 1.291 1.75 .187 Interaction .366 1 .366 Error .055 1 .055 17.82 .000** Media 18.260 252 .072 5.05 .025* Event .167 1 .167 .77 .383 Interaction .107 1 .107 Error .198 1 .198 3.79 .053 11.119 252 .044 2.42 .121 4.50 .035**p< .05, **p<.01In addition to the above descriptive analyses, the Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) test
was conducted to ascertain significant differences of frame portrayal within and between the variables ofmedia and event. MANOVA test results in Table 4.3 shows that, there are main effects of the media ontwo out of the five dependent variables in this study which are the responsibility frame [F (1,252) =15.42, p<.01] and morality frame [F (1,252) = 17.82, p< .01]. This means that, Utusan Malaysia projectsa higher responsibility frame and a morality frame than Malaysiakini. The results show that there were nosignificant differences in the human interest frame, conflict frame, and economic consequences frame forboth print and online media. While the results of the MANOVA test on the independent variable of event revealed that there weremain effects on three out of five frames which are the human interest frame [F (1,252) = 31.10, p<.01],conflict frame [F (1,252) = 7.42, p<. 01], and, morality frame [F (1,252) = 5.05, p<.05]. Both the humaninterest frame and conflict frame are found to be significantly more salient after the ‘Bersih 3.0’ rally vis-à-vis before the event. On the other hand, morality becomes significantly less prominent after the rally.Attention could have been diverted to the two former frames; the human interest frame and conflict frame.The results also show that, there were no significant differences in terms of the responsibility frame andeconomic consequences frame in the comparison of the pre-event and post-event. Finally, the results ofthe analysis on the interaction effects of the two independent variables media* event indicate that, onlyone frame which is the economic consequences frame exhibits significant differences [F (1,252) = 4.50,p<.05]. As described in the above section, the economic consequences frame is highlighted by UtusanMalaysia after the event as compared to before the rally. Although Malaysiakini shows a low scorebefore the event it eliminates this frame totally after the rally.NEWS FRAMING PATTERN AND CONCLUSIONGenerally, the news on the ‘Bersih 3.0’ rally had received widespread coverage by the media inMalaysia, be it by mainstream newspapers or news portals. However, the news framing pattern differedby print and online media. It was clear that, both the media under study had projected different framingdimensions in their news coverage of the events before and after the ‘Bersih 3.0’ rally. In UtusanMalaysia, the words that were often used in news articles were not in favor to ‘Bersih 3.0’ organizerssuch as riot, incitement, chaos, illegal, insubordinate, tense, mishap, chaos, outrageous and extremebehaviors, harmony destroyer, threaten public safety, property damage, waste time, attacking police,demanding the police authority, threaten peace, compromise the security and public order, caused a stir,causing problems, act wild, violent, reckless, criminal acts, muddy conditions, troublesome of all, theentire nation, people are exploited, anti government, overthrow the government, block traffic, and impactto business. On top of that, the police force, which included the Federal Reserve Unit that used watercanons, was reported as intending to calm the situation and avoid the riots becoming more violent. On the contrary, the Internet media especially the news portal like Malaysiakini also providedextensive coverage on the issue but slanted towards a different direction. “Bersih 3.0” was reported as agathering and a lively carnival that was well-received by the people, both in Malaysia and abroad. Theincidents during and after the rally that was revealed by Malaysiakini were significantly different fromUtusan Malaysia. The stories about the demonstration coupled with the pictures of the riots were mainlyon the brutal behaviors of the police force. An even picture of the reporter who was beaten by police washighlighted as the evidence of misconduct by the authority.
When comparing the prominence of frames in both media, the responsibility frame was mostcommonly used in highlighting the issue of ‘Bersih 3.0’by Utusan Malaysia prior to the rally. Theresponsibility frame is apparent in this Malay print media vehicle owing to the massive coverage ongovernment measures, especially the Home Affairs Ministry, in addressing or providing recommendationsto the organizers of ‘Bersih 3.0’ for not holding the event at Dataran Merdeka. This is in contrast to thenews portal Malaysiakini, which promoted more on the conflict frame, especially after the rally had takenplace. This is exemplified by the articles in the Malay online media vehicle entitled, ‘PAS youth claimedthere was evidence that participants were beaten by police’ and ‘PKR said Najib should be liable forthose attacks’ which showed the strong disagreement between the opposition and the government. When reporting the news about the ‘Bersih 3.0’ rally, Utusan Malaysia communciated greatly on thegovernment’s efforts to address and resolve the issues, and in combating accusations for causing the riot.In addition, this mainstream newspaper also showed the disagreement between political parties andindividuals who were associated with organizing the rally. For instance, there were individuals likeTunku Abdul Aziz from the opposition and Khairy Jamaluddin from the ruling political party, whorejected the proposal for holding the rally; but there was a lawyer, Ambiga Sreenevasan, who was urgingpeople to protest. Meanwhile, Malaysiakini had given ample space for the opposition to criticize thegovernment; for poorly managing the 22 recommendations to the PSC which was passed by the Housewithout debate. Besides that, the news portal also put forward the arguments about the action taken by theHome Affairs Ministry and Kuala Lumpur City Hall for not issuing a permit for some people to gather inthe Dataran. It can be seen that, the coverage of news on ‘Bersih 3.0’ by Malaysiakini differs from that reported byUtusan Malaysia. Each media organization has its own editorial policy. Both Malaysiakini and UtusanMalaysia see reality from different perspectives. Both of these media have different perspectives inviewing and reporting on ‘Bersih 3.0.’ Overall, this study finds that, there is a relationship betweenpolitics and communication where the government and political elites use the media to disseminateinformation and influence the people on what and how to think about an issue.REFERENCESChang Peng Kee, Faridah Ibrahim, & Normah Mustaffa. (2010). Framing a Pandemic: Analysis of Malaysian Mainstream Newspapers in the H1N1 Coverage. Journal of Media and Information Warfa`re, 3: 105-122.Chang Peng Kee, Faridah Ibrahim, Fuziah Kartini Hassan Basri, & Kho Suet Nie. (2011). Framing the Relationship between Government and NGOs in Selected Malaysian Chinese Daily Newspapers. The Innovation Journal, 16(3): Art.3:1-18.Chang Peng Kee, Faridah Ibrahim, Fauziah Ahmad, & Chew Chee Khiang. (2012). Frame Contention Between News Sources And News Media: Framing The Dispute Of Teaching Mathematics And Science In English. Asian Social Science, 8(5): 16-28.Chang Peng Kee, Fauziah Ahmad, & Wan Amizah Wan Mahmud. (2010). Indigenising Framing Knowledge From Content-Analysing The Weblog Frames Built On Chedet.Com. Malaysian Journal of Communication, 26: 47-61.Chang Peng Kee, Musa Abu Hassan, & Fauziah Ahmad. (2012). Framing the Contemporary Education
Issue: Analysis of News Stories From Selected Malaysian Daily Newspapers. Pertanika Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities, 20(2): 455-474.Chew Chee Khiang, Fauziah Ahmad, Faridah Ibrahim, & Chang Peng Kee. (2012). Investigating News Framing: A Comparative Study of Media Coverage on Contemporary Education Issues In Malaysia. Malaysian Journal of Communication, 28(1): 17-31Entman, R. M. (1993). Framing: Toward Clarification of A Fractured Paradigm. Journal of Communication, 43(4): 51-58.Gibson, P. D., Lacy, D. P., & Dougherty, M. J. 2005. Improving Performance and Accountability in Local Government with Citizen Participation. The Innovation Journal: The Public Sector Innovation Journal, 10(1). Article 5.Kho Suet Nie, Chew Chee Khiang, Tan Joon Ling, & Chang Peng Kee. (2011). Pembingkaian Isu Pendidikan di Malaysia oleh Sumber Berita dan Akhbar Cina.Malaysian Journal of Communication, 27(2): 221-238.Semetko, H. A., & Valkenburg, P. M. 2000. Framing European Politics: A Content Analysis of Press And Television News. Journal of Communication, 50(2): 93-109.Syed Arabi Idid. 2011. Peranan Media Massa Dalam Pilihan Raya Umum. Gombak: International Islamic University Malaysia.Tremayne, M. (2007). Blogging, Citizenship, and the Future Media. New York: Routledge.Valkenburg, P. M., Semetko, H. A., & de Vreese, C. H. 1999. The Effects of News Frames On Readers’ Thoughts And Recall. Communication Research, 26(5): 550-569.Zhou, Y., & Moy, P. 2007. Parsing Framing Processes: The Interplay between Online Public Opinion and Media Coverage. Journal of Communication, 57: 79-98.
SOCIAL MEDIA, POLITICS AND 5 YOUTHS SOCIAL MEDIA, POLITICS AND YOUTHS Mohd Sobhi Ishak Norsiah Abdul Hamid Mansor Mohd Noor Azizah SarkowiIn Malaysia, youths are generally defined as people of ages between 13 and 40 years old. However, whenthis term is brought to the political scene, this group commonly refers to people of ages from 21 to 40years old. Malaysian youths are often said to be familiar with and sustained users of informationtechnology and communications (Mohd Safar Hasim & Ali Salman, 2010). Therefore, in a politicalcontext, they always prefer to access political information, discuss on political issues and show thepolitical leanings through the medium of technology. This phenomenon is evident after the existence ofsocial media that has fueled the Malaysian political arena. What is social media? What is so interestingabout social media that makes politicians ‘worried’ about it? How and why do people use it as one of thetools in political activities? Are there any implications of social media on politics and youths inMalaysia? These are some questions that arise with the emergence of the new Internet application calledsocial media. Social media plays an increasing role in today’s modern living. It is such a common scenario today tosee people browsing or updating their statuses on social networking sites, reading blogs or chatting byusing laptops, smart phones, tablets or other sophisticated devices anywhere and at any time. Somepeople are even addicted to certain applications. Undoubtedly, social media is one of the fastest growingsegments on the web (Jansen, Sobel & Cook, 2011). Among the most popular applications of social mediaare weblogs or blogs (Blogger and WordPress), social networking sites (Facebook, Twitter andMyspace), photos and videos (Flickr and YouTube), online encyclopedia (Wikipedia), onlinebookmarking (Delicious), virtual social worlds (Second Life) and virtual game worlds (World of Craft).The social media platforms nowadays support User-Generated Content (UGC) in which users are able tocreate, share, search, collaborate and organize contents amongst them, while at the same time allowingvirtual self-presentation and self-disclosure of oneself. The main objective of this paper is to share the empirical findings from two studies conducted inMalaysia. Hence, this paper discusses the link between social media, politics and youths from twoaspects. First, the discussion is based on the findings from a political sensitivity study among youths inMalaysia. Second, this paper discusses the exploration of social media usage in relation to politicalleaders in Malaysia.
A PANEL SURVEYIn May 2012, the Institute of Ethnic Studies (KITA), Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, conducted apolitical sensitivity study utilizing a first round panel method to a group of respondents. This study wasconducted throughout Malaysia with the cooperation of several teams of researchers from otheruniversities in Malaysia. There were 745 respondents from 13 states and three federal territories,including a minority group and a political group. They were of ages between 21 and 65 years old. Thereliability of each construct in the study was more than 0.7 and the margin of error in the sample size wasbetween 3% and 4 %. From this study, a resampling approach is conducted to obtain samples of youth groups bycategorizing them based on two criteria. First, age is set to be between 21-40 years old, and second, theyobtained information from social media such as blogs, Facebook, and Twitter. As a result, a total of 100respondents were obtained to represent these two categories. Further, analysis was then carried out todetermine their sensitivity to the national politics. Among the focal issues discussed in this paper are theirperception on mainstream media and alternative media, sources and people that influence their politicalviews, their perception on economic prospects and the government’s performance, issues faced by thevoters, their views on selected political leaders in Malaysia, and the leadership of two leading politicalparties in Malaysia, namely Dato’Seri Najib Tun Abdul Razak (DS Najib) and Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim(DS Anwar).OUTCOMESSource of Political InformationA majority of the respondents were aware of the availability of political information on SocialNetworking Sites (SNS) such as Facebook and Twitter, blogs and news portals. Indirectly, thewidespread use of social networking sites especially Facebook and Twitter provides some informationabout politics. This occurs because the individual social networking site could be linked to other socialnetworking sites including those belonging to the partners of political allies. The use of blogs and newsportals in turn is a direct manifestation of the searching of information about politics. This is caused bythe respondents usually browsing blogs and news related to politics portal to get political informationthey need and fulfill their desires and curiosity. In comparison between the three sources of onlineinformation disclosed, youths do not put political information seeking as very important when carrying outtheir online activities (see Table 5.1). Table 5.1: Sources of Political Information (n=137). ONLINE SOURCES FREQUENCY PERCENTAGESocial Networking Sites (Facebook, Twitter) 57 41.6 43 31.4 Blogs 37 27.0 News Portals
Despite the fact that youths are exposed to electronic media and online media extensively, the politicalinformation obtained from printed newspapers is still a preferred choice. Reading information aboutpolitical tendencies is done on mainstream newspapers, tabloid newspapers, and newspapers by politicalparties for their members. Among the top newspapers of their choice are Harian Metro, The Star, BeritaHarian, Harakah (a newspaper for PAS members) and Utusan Malaysia. In addition to the printednewspaper, Malaysiakini (the online news portal) is preferred by the majority of respondents followed byHarakah daily, Tukar Tiub (blog), and The Star Online as sources of information about politics (see Table5.2).Table 5.2: Printed Newspapers and Online News Portals (n=137).PRINTED NEWSPAPERS AND ONLINE NEWS FREQUENCY PERCENTAGEPrinted Newspapers 18 13.1 Harian Metro 17 12.4 The Star 16 11.7 Berita Harian 16 11.7 Harakah 13 9.5 6 4.4 Utusan Malaysia 6 4.4 Kosmo 4 2.9 5 3.7 Sinar Harian New Straits Times 34 24.8 7 5.1 Others 6 4.4Online News Portals 3 2.2 87 63.5 Malaysiakini Harakah daily Tukar Tiub The Star Online OthersMainstream Media versus Alternative MediaAccording to the respondents, the mainstream media have the advantage of portraying national issues (asshown in Table 5.3). These media are easily available, accessible, and are conduits of information for thecommunity. Alternative media are considered to give more accurate information, are transparent, free, andeasy to obtain. Nevertheless, it requires a good mastery of the Internet because not all members of thecommunity know how to look for information on the Internet specifically about politics. Although there is the tendency to believe in information in alternative media, this group of youths stilldoubt the authenticity of the facts and the information provided. Information related to politics inalternative media is limited to people who really look into it and want it. Information in alternative mediais also said to have more propaganda than mainstream media. Furthermore, the alternative media alsotends to be biased towards the opponent. In comparison between the two forms of media mentioned
previously, the most preferred is the alternative media as it is easily available and has a variety ofinformation. The sentiment that the mainstream media is biased and controlled by the government remainsa stigma in the society.Table 5.3: Advantages and Disadvantages of Media (n=137). ADVANTAGES/DISADVANTAGES MAINSTREAM MEDIA ALTERNATIVE MEDIA Advantages FREQUENCY (%) FREQUENCY (%) National Issue Easily Obtained 50 (36.5) 12 (8.8) Easily Accessible 33 (24.1) 20 (14.6) Main Information Channel 13 (9.5) Real Issues/Sensational/Updated 12 (8.8) 6 (4.4) 9 (6.6) Fast 8 (5.8) 19 (3.9) Facts More Accurate 7 (5.1) 15 (10.9) No Restrictions/Free Speech 6 (4.4) 20 (14.6) Open / Transparent 2 (1.5) 16 (11.7) 2 (1.5) 19 (13.9) Others 4 (2.9) 1 (0.7) Disadvantages 54 (39.4) 16 (11.7) Bias 45 (32.8) 13 (9.5) Controlled By The Government 12 (8.8) 11 (8.0) 15 (10.9) Not Exhaustive 7 (5.1) 2 (1.5) Propaganda 6 (4.4) 36 (26.3) 6 (4.4) 31 (22.6) Not Transparent 3 (2.2) 8 (5.8)Accuracy/Validity Of Source Discredited 2 (1.5) 5 (3.6) 2 (1.5) Limited Circulation False Information Others The political environment often involves discussions about politics. It also involves influencingsomeone to choose a political party. As shown in Table 5.4, the majority of youths discuss political issueswith family members, colleagues at work, and a friend in the same religion. The majority of respondentsalso decide on political choices based on their own desires. However, there is also encouragement fromfamily members, community leaders, the electronic media, religious leaders, and colleagues at work whenmaking political choices. Among the factors that may be the reason for the selections by this group is due to the close and longlasting relationships. This relationship builds a high level of trust between them that makes them want todiscuss matters related to politics in the country openly. In addition, the compatibility factors between theviews of the respondents who try to influence the political views also form the basis of respondents’
political leanings. Table 5.4: Political Discussion and Influence. PERSONS INVOLVED POLITICAL POLITICAL CHOICE DISCUSSION Yourself FREQUENCY (%) FREQUENCY (%) Family Members 116 (84.7)Colleague in Workplace N.R (38.0)Friends in Same Religion 74 (54.0) 18 (13.1) 33 (24.1) 10 (7.3) Neighbour 20 (14.6) 5 (3.6) Community Leaders 48 (35.0) Religious Leaders 1 (0.7) 30 (21.9) N.R 38 (27.7) Electronic Media N.R 17 (12.4) Mainstream Media N.R N.RNote: N.R=Not Related.Perceptions on Economic MattersThe perceptions on economic performance were presented to respondents. Overall, they expect that thenational economy will be at a moderate level this year with a marginal increase in the following year(Table 5.5). However, the distribution of views on the economic outlook for the following year was quitedifferent among respondents. They also have a better outlook on the economic development of their regionthan the national economy with a slight increase in the following year. Nevertheless, the view of thefamily is most important to them. They perceive that their family’s economic development will continue toincrease in the following year. This view is consistent among the respondents. It can be said that theserespondents also thought about the economy in the context of micro-economics. They will characterize thenational economy, and the economy of their region based on the achievement of the economies of theirown families. Table 5.5: Perception on Economic Matters (n=137).ECONOMIC THIS YEAR NEXT YEAR VB B M G VG MATTERS MEAN (S.D) MEAN (S.D) PERCENTAGE THIS YEAR (NEXT YEAR) National 3.14 3.16 2.2 32.1 19.7 41.6 4.4 Economic (.994) (1.11) (10.9) (15.3) (25.5) (41.6) (5.8) Prospect 3.24 3.26 2.2 22.6 29.2 39.4 5.8 District (.947) (1.05) (6.6) (18.2) (23.4) (44.5) (6.6) EconomicDevelopment
Family 3.55 3.60 2.2 11.7 21.9 56.2 7.3 Economic (.876) (.992) (5.8) (7.3) (19.7) (54.7) (11.7)DevelopmentNote: Agreement Scale 1-5 (VB=Very Bad, B=Bad, M=Moderate, G=Good, VB=Very Good).Performance of Malaysian Federal GovernmentAs shown in Table 5.6, this group has a good perception on the federal government, particularly in someaspects. First, the government appears to be concerned with the welfare of students in schools, collegesand universities by providing the RM100 school aid to primary and secondary school students whileuniversity students were given a book voucher worth RM200. The federal government’s action is seen asan important effort to improve students’ achievements. Second, the federal government is also said to beworking on increasing the rural housing infrastructure and on providing better public transport. Thesebenefits are very important because most people still need comfortable homes and do not own vehicles ingood condition especially for long-distance travel. Third, the idea of the Prime Minister addressing the 1Malaysia People’s Shop (KR1M) and the1Malaysia People’s Aid (BR1M) is much appreciated by these groups as they could help low-incomeearners. The ‘1Malaysia’ concept introduced by the Prime Minister is also said to be able to reduce thegap between ethnic and religious ties. The noble efforts taken by the federal government show thegovernment’s seriousness in addressing the problems of the people. However, the federal government issaid to have been less successful in reducing crime, whitening immigrants, controlling product prices,increasing trust in the police, and reducing corruption. These are the real issues which have not beencompletely solved.Table 5.6: Perception on the Performance of Malaysian Federal Government (n=137).FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S MEAN FREQUENCY (%) OF AGREEMENT PERFORMANCE MEAN (S.D) SD D M A SA 3.34 (1.21) Concerned about the welfare 13 24 26 52 22of students (RM100 & voucher 3.31 (1.17) (9.5) (17.5) (19.0 (38.0) (16.1) 3.26 (1.04) book) 3.20 (1.04) 13 19 37 48 20 3.14 (1.33) (9.5) (13.9) (27.0) (35.0) (14.6) KR1M eases the burden of 3.10 (1.11) low-income consumers 3.01 (1.13) 12 16 41 59 9 (8.8) (11.7) (29.9) (43.1) (6.6)School academic achievement improved 10 23 42 53 9 (7.3) (16.8) (30.7 (38.7) (6.6) Increased rural housing infrastructure 21 26 24 43 23 (15.3) (19.0) (17.5) (31.4) (16.8) BR1M reduces the cost of living of the lower income. 15 25 36 53 8 (10.9) (18.2) (26.3) (38.7) (5.8) Increased quality of public transport 19 22 42 47 7 1Malaysia bridges racial and
religious relations 2.88 (.955) (13.9) (16.1) (30.7) (34.3) (5.1) 2.79 (1.20) Reduced crime rate 2.70 (1.07) 11 35 53 35 3 (8.0) (25.5) (38.7) (25.5) (2.2)Whitening Programme (6P) reduce foreign Immigrants 28 23 44 34 8 (20.4) (16.8) (32.1 (24.8) (5.8)Control the increase in price 22 35 44 32 4Increased trust on police 2.65 (1.10) (16.1) (25.5) (32.1) (23.4) (2.9)Reduced corruption rate 2.38 (1.17) 24 38 42 28 5 (17.5) (27.7) (30.7 (20.4) (3.6) 42 32 36 23 4 (30.7) (23.4) (26.3) (16.8) (2.9)Note: Agreement Scale 1-5 (SD=Strongly Disagree, D=Disagree, M=Moderate, A=Agree, SA=StronglyAgree).Relationship between National Issues and Political PartiesMore than half of the respondents felt that the national party line to control the administration of thecountry is now able to continue to provide subsidies to the people, to make public policy that meets theneeds of the people, and increase the income level (refer to Table 5.7). However, due to their views onBarisan Nasional’s underperformance regarding the issues that were played by Pakatan Rakyat (PR), therespondents in this study gave the option to PR in solving most of the issues related to ethnic relations, thewelfare of the people, the electoral system, the legal system, financial management, the LYNAS issue, andPTPTN. The wide dissemination of some information on the Internet by PR turns out to have an impact byinfluencing respondents’ thoughts.Table 5.7: Relationship between National Issues and Political Parties (n=137). ISSUES SURROUNDING VOTERS BARISAN PAKATAN RAKYAT NOT SURE NASIONAL Continuation of subsidies Improving the quality of education FREQUENCY (%) FREQUENCY (%) FREQUENCY (%)Public policy based on the needs of the 70 (51.1) 48 (35.0) 19 (13.9) people Rising income levels 58 (42.3) 60 (43.8) 19 (13.9) Managing ethnic relations Welfare of the people 57 (41.6) 56 (40.9) 24 (17.5) Improvement of the electoral system Integrity of the legal system 56 (40.9) 53 (38.7) 28 (20.4) Country's financial management 52 (38.0) 60 (43.8) 23 (16.8) 51 (37.2) 67 (48.9) 18 (13.1) LYNAS issue 41 (29.9) 70 (51.1) 26 (19.0) 41 (29.9) 69 (50.4) 27 (19.7) 30 (21.9) 70 (51.1) 37 (27.0) 29 (21.2) 79 (57.7) 29 (21.2)
Repeal PTPTN repayment 20 (14.6) 84 (61.3) 32 (23.4)Relationship between Social Issues and Political PartiesThe results show that, respondents did not believe that Barisan Nasional can solve social issues prevalentin society compared to Pakatan Rakyat (refer to Table 5.8). With regards to the problems of divorce,suicide and mental health, both parties are perceived to have no solution. However, expectations wereplaced on Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) to resolve issues related to poverty, immigrants, street gangs,drug addiction and Lesbian, Bisexual, Gay and Transgender (LBGT). Meanwhile, Parti Islam Semalaysia(PAS) is expected to solve the problem of divorce, prostitution, loan sharks, suicide, and most importantare the growing number of people with mental problems. Thus, in addressing social issues, politicalparties are not seen to have played their roles effectively. In many cases political parties are seen to usesocial issues for political gain.Table 5.8: Relationship between Political Issues and Political Parties (n=137).SOCIAL ISSUES BARISAN PAKATAN RAKYAT NOT SURE NASIONAL Poverty Illegal immigrants FREQUENCY (%) FREQUENCY (%) FREQUENCY (%) Road thugs 55 (40.1) 65 (47.4) 17 (12.4) Drug addiction 50 (36.5) 54 (39.4) 33 (24.1) LGBTAbandoned babies 47 (34.3) 48 (35.0) 42 (30.7) Divorce 44 (32.1) 49 (35.8) 43 (31.4) Prostitution Loan Sharks 40 (29.2) 49 (35.8) 48 (35.0) Suicide 39 (28.5) 53 (38.7) 45 (32.8) Mental problems 39 (28.5) 42 (30.7) 56 (40.9) 37 (27.0) 55 (40.1) 45 (32.8) 37 (27.0) 51 (37.2) 48 (35.0) 36 (26.3) 43 (31.4) 58 (42.3) 38 (27.7) 42 (30.7) 56 (40.9)Education IssuesThe results show that, the majority of respondents wanted the government to re-allocate funds to privatereligious schools (refer to Table 5.9). They also believed that, additional provisions should be madeavailable to the government-assisted religious school. Respondents also felt that the shortage of teachersin SJKC should be resolved immediately and that all types of schools should receive the same treatment.They also believed that, all Chinese primary school teachers need to master Mandarin and get at leastcredit at the Sijil Pelajaran Malaysia (SPM) level. Based on their views on the educational issuesmentioned previously, it can be said that, education is an important aspect for all races. The authoritiesshould take into account whether the education in our country is of equal standard.
Table 5.9: Education Issues (n=137). EDUCATION ISSUES MEAN FREQUENCY (%) OF AGREEMENT The government should re-allocate (S.D) SD D M A SA provisions to Private Religious School.Additional provisions should be given to 4.31 5 1 16 39 76 (.968) (3.6) (0.7) (11.7) (28.5) (55.5) the Government Religious School.Shortage of teachers in SJKC should be 4.26 4 3 16 45 69 (.955) (2.9) (2.2) (11.7) (32.8) (50.4) settled immediately. 4.02 3 2 16 84 32 Equal treatment to all types of school. (.781) (2.2) (1.5) (11.7) (61.3) (23.4)All teachers in SJKC should get credit for 3.87 5 7 25 64 36 Mandarin language at SPM level. (.984) (3.6) (5.1) (19.0 (46.7) (26.3) 3.86 4 7 26 67 33 (.941) (2.9) (5.1) (19.0) (48.9) (24.1)Images of LeadershipA total of eight leaders were listed to determine the level of respondents’ favorite for national leaders.The majority of respondents put Dato’ Nik Abdul Aziz as the most preferred leader, followed by Dato’Seri Hadi. The two leaders are from PAS. The selection was likely due to factors of religion or religiousimages displayed by the two leaders. Dato’ Seri Najib was in the third most preferred (BN), followed byDato’ Seri Anwar (PKR), and Tan Sri Muhyiddin (BN). Lim Guan Eng (DAP) and Datuk K.G. Palanivel(MIC) were placed in the sixth and seventh spots. Datuk Seri Dr. Chua Soi Lek (MCA) was placed last.Table 5.10: Images of Leadership (n=137). LEADERS MEAN S.D Dato’ Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat 6.54 3.28 Dato’ Sri Abd. Hadi Awang 5.75 3.27Dato’ Sri Mohd Najib Tun Abdul Razak 4.79 3.43 4.74 3.21 Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim 4.43 3.11 Tan Sri Muhyiddin Mohd. Yasin 4.27 3.11 3.16 2.58 Lim Guan Eng 2.76 2.78 Datuk Seri K.G. Palanivel Datuk Seri Dr Chua Soi LekNote: Agreement Scale 1-5 (SD=Strongly Disagree, D=Disagree, M=Moderate, A=Agree, SA=StronglyAgree). Overall, of the eleven characteristics of leaders that were listed, respondents linked sevencharacteristics to Dato’ Seri Anwar (DS Anwar) and four characteristics to Dato’ Seri Najib (DS Najib).DS Anwar was seen as not arrogant, having competency, having principles, caring/responsive, decisive
and tough, practising religious values, and is trustworthy/having integrity, while DS Najib is said to be avisionary leader, good at teamwork, accountable, and keeps promises. Although many of the features weregiven to DS Anwar, but all these features are more individualized characteristics. The four criteria givento DS Najib are very important and appropriate for a national leader.Table 5.11: Leadership of DS Najib and DS Anwar (n=137).LEADERSHIP CHARACTERISTICS DATO’ SERI NAJIB DATO’ SERI ANWAR MEAN (S.D) MEAN (S.D) Visionary 3.55 (1.32) 3.37 (1.36) Not Arrogant 3.47 (1.32) 3.51 (1.38) Competency 3.39 (1.34) 3.47 (1.42) 3.39 (1.32) 3.31 (1.37) Teamwork 3.38 (1.37) 3.30 (1.37) Accountability 3.35 (1.36) 3.11 (1.29) Keep promises 3.31 (1.39) 3.47 (1.32) Have principles 3.29 (1.45) 3.33 (1.36) Caring / Responsiveness 3.23 (1.28) 3.31 (1.32) Decisive and tough 3.10 (1.37) 3.30 (1.41) Practice Religious Value 3.01 (1.46) 3.13 (1.32) Trustworthy / IntegrityMEASURING SOCIAL MEDIA PRESENCE OF DS NAJIB AND DSANWARThe political scenario is changing due to the use of social media platforms such as Facebook, Myspace,YouTube and Flickr (Shirky, 2011; Campbell & Kwak, 2011). Some researchers go as far as claiming thatthese new platforms are indispensable campaign tools that have the power to influence the success andfailure of numerous political campaigns and causes (Abbey, 2010; Peter & Peter, 2010; Vergeer,Hermans, & Sams, 2011). This may be in response to Barack Obama’s successful campaign in the 2008presidential elections that has been widely attributed to the use of social media to engage previouslyhard-to-reach populations in political activity (Derrick & Fatima, 2011). This study was conducted to illustrate the trends of political information searching activities on DSNajib and DS Anwar, the perception of social media users on DS Najib and DS Anwar, and the socialmedia applications that DS Najib and DS Anwar have utilized for their political mileage. To achieve thispurpose, a number of measurement tools available on the Internet were used to measure the informationbeing transmitted through social media. Among them are Google Trends, Social Mention, HowSociable,and Tweet Cloud. All these tools can reveal patterns of social media use by youths by focusing on theiractivities on social media sites provided by the two leaders, DS Najib (leader of the federal government)and DS Anwar (leader of the opposition in the Parliament of Malaysia).
Google TrendsGoogle Trends (google.com/trends) data provide weekly reports on the number of search queries made bypeople in a geographical area and by category. As over three-quarters of those who access the Internetregularly are looking for information on goods and services – this information may be a useful indicatorof political related activity. Google Trends provides a time series index of the volume of queries userswho enter into Google in a given geographic area. The query index is based on query share: the totalquery volume for the search term in question within a particular geographic region divided by the totalnumber of queries in that region during the time period being examined. The maximum query share in thetime period specified is normalized at 100 and the query share at the initial date being examined isnormalized at zero.Figure 5.1 depicts the output from Google Trends for the query (Najib Razak, Anwar Ibrahim, and Bersih3.0) in Malaysia. The scale is based on the average traffic of Bersih 3.0 from Malaysia in all years. Thesearch share for this query has exhibited significant peaks during the upsurge of certain issues especiallypertaining to a particular person. As mentioned by Choi and Varian (2009), Google Trends data is usefulin predicting the present in a form of ‘contemporaneous forecasting’ or ‘nowcasting’. Google Trendsshows that, the most extensive search was on DS Anwar as compared to DS Najib. The search activityincreased during the arrest of Anwar Ibrahim on sodomy. This trend gives the impression that alternativemedia are often used to obtain information on current issues and sensational news. Information aboutBersih 3.0 in Google also increased during the assembly. This indicates that alternative media is widelyused to obtain political information, especially by young people who tend to use technology. However,information searching about DS Najib is likely to be very low. This situation may be because more newsand updates on DS Najib were displayed through mainstream media rather than social media. Figure 5.1: The output from Google Trends for the query (Najib Razak, Anwar Ibrahim, and Bersih 3.0).HOW DATO’ SERI NAJIB AND DATO’ SERI ANWAR AREPERCEIVED ON SOCIAL MEDIA?To measure perception, a free browser based on a social monitoring tool was used. Social Mention
(www.socialmention.com) is a social media search and analysis platform that aggregates User-GeneratedContent from a number of different social media platforms including Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, andothers, into a single stream of information. It allows users to track and measure what and how muchpeople are saying about any topic across the web’s social media landscape in real-time. Many social media users frequently use the keyword DS Anwar (Strength =15%) in their discussionthan the keyword DS Najib (Strength =6%). This suggests either because they were interested in talkingabout DS Anwar or felt freer without worrying about him taking legal action on people who wrongly uselanguage, words or images. The DS Najib keyword is often referred to by the same person over and overagain (Passion =62%) as compared with the DS Anwar keyword (Passion =29%). This is perhaps likelybecause the circulation of information on DS Najib is only done by one person acting as the manager ofinformation about DS Najib. It can also be caused by the circulation of information on DS Najib by smallgroups of people. The keyword DS Anwar (Reach =35%) reached out to more social media userscompared to the DS Najib keyword (Reach =16%). It shows that, information about DS Anwar waswidely distributed through social media. Most of the politicians in search of information on the Internetoften touch on the information about DS Anwar. DS Anwar often used social media to strengthen hispolitical career. The DS Anwar keyword was used by Unique Authors more frequently (Unique Authors=205) than theDS Najib keyword (Unique Authors=77). This is a sign that many people in social media were talkingabout DS Anwar than DS Najib. With the amount of people talking about DS Anwar, almost three timesmore than DS Najib, the social media seemed to be completely controlled by DS Anwar. Therefore, it ispossible that DS Anwar does not need the mainstream media for his political career. It is sufficient tostrengthen the acceptance of young people through Social Media. Social Mention reports a number ofmetrics; those utilized in this study are reported in Table 12. Table 5.12: Metrics of Social Mention. METRIC DEFINITION NAJIB RAZAK ANWAR IBRAHIM Strength 6% 15% Passion Strength measures the 62% 29% Reach likeliness of the keyword being 16% 35%Unique Authors 77 205 mentioned socially Passion indicates how likely it is that an individual will repeatedly mention a keyword Reach is the number of unique authors referencing your keyword divided by total mentions An indicator or the number of authors messaging about a keyword (in Frequency)SOCIAL MEDIA APPLICATIONS DATO’ SERI NAJIB AND
ANWAR IBRAHIM USEHowSociable is the simplest way to measure the impact of a particular keyword on the social web.HowSociable’s magnitude score provides an indication of the level of activity around a keyword during agiven week. The range is between zero and ten. A score of zero means there is zero or near zero activityfor the keyword. A score of ten means the brand has practically saturated the social web and will likely isrecognized by everyone that uses it. Besides the magnitude, a further analysis was also conducted onFacebook via the Likes attribute, Twitter via tweetstats.com, and a manual analysis of YouTube. Theresults revealed that Twitter and YouTube activities were higher for DS Anwar than DS Najibrespectively (Table 5.12). DS Najib dominated the proximity with Facebook users. It is likely due to theactivity of DS Najib to meet and mingle with bloggers and have cozy chats through Facebook. In addition,it could be due to the fact that DS Najib is a Prime Minister who allowed people to be his Facebookfriend. In contrast, DS Anwar dominated the use of Twitter and YouTube. The total number of activities byDS Anwar in Twitter was higher than DS Najib. The total number of tweets by DS Anwar with hisTwitter friends was three times higher than DS Najib every day and every month. DS Anwar was alsovery active in using the mobile gadgets interface to engage with educated people through political touchvia Social Media. In addition, information about DS Anwar was readily available via YouTube. Almostevery political information search including search on DS Najib will include information about DSAnwar. Among the most commonly included in the YouTube video was of DS Anwar talking aboutvarious issues in the country. Therefore, Social Media users, in particular Internet users, who search forinformation related to politics will always, be displayed with information about DS Anwar. Repetitivedisplay will inscribe thoughts on everything from him. These findings suggest that, DS Anwar really leveraged social media for his political interests. Theway he reaches out to consumers through the Internet and social media ‘personal touch’ to make the onlineenvironment users feel close to him helped build close political relationships between DS Anwar withhis supporters. The approach used by DS Anwar through social media allows him to build support manytimes over just by using a little effort (see Table 5.12).Table 5.13: Social Media Applications Usage. MEASURE NAJIB RAZAK ANWAR IBRAHIM Facebook Magnitude 2.9 2.8 People Talking About 10,552 3,697 Total Likes 1,043,813 376,233Most Popular Age Group 18-24 18-24 Twitter 3.9 4.9 Magnitude 2.9 13.4 Tweets Per Day 56 320 Tweets Per Month
Mobile Interface (e.g. Blackberry, iPad) (in 49% 86% percentage) 1.9 3.3 YouTube 173 276 Magnitude 19Video Upload by keyword search (July 2012) 7 Positive (Top 20) 13 0 Negative (Top 20) 0 1 Not relevant (Top 20)Tweet CloudTweet Cloud is a service that lets people generate a cool looking cloud of the words being tweeted aboutthe most. The larger the word displayed in the Tweet Cloud, the more frequently the word is repeated inthe person’s Twitter. This application is used to determine the word that is often used in DS Najib’s andDS Anwar’s Twitter. The results show that the most often used word by DS Najib describes his activitiesas the Prime Minister. Some of the words often displayed in DS Najib Twitter are ‘Malaysia’, ‘saya’,‘new’, ‘thank’, and ‘1Malaysia’. This design symbolizes the tendency of his speeches or discussions onhis activities as prime minister. He often uses the approach to reinforce the ‘1Malaysia’ concept whichbrought him and his efforts to attract people to join him in developing countries. Figures 5.2 and 5.3 showthe Tweet Clouds of each leader. Figure 5.2: Tweet Cloud for ‘Najibrazak’. DS Anwar used many words to link his Twitter to other social media for more information (especiallyblogs). Some of the words often displayed in DS Anwar’s Twitter are ‘blog’, ‘anwar’, ‘dan’, ‘dari’,‘malaysia’, ‘malaysiakini’, ‘malaysian’, ‘media’, ‘rakyat’, ‘umno’, ‘najib’, ‘saya’, dan ‘keadilan’. Thesewords show the topics of conversation in DS Anwar ’s Twitter. Patterns of word use appeared more tocriticize the situation than in providing suggestions for developing the country. Word patterns illustrated in
DS Anwar’s Twitter show a method often used by DS Anwar to create discussion and arouse the desire inhis Twitter readers to continue reading and link to other social media such as Facebook and his blog. Figure 5.3: Tweet clouds for ‘Anwaribrahim’.CONCLUSIONIn conclusion, today’s youths include social media such as Facebook, Twitter, Blog, and YouTube in theirsocial communication network for various purposes, including politics. In the first study, that measuredthe perceptions of youths, who used social media for their preferred political information, on a number ofissues such as the economy, the federal government, education, social issues and leaders showed that theystill thinking similarly to other communities. Research studies on social media owned by the two leadersalso indicated that social media users want a ‘personal touch’ in the form of national leaders whoentertain any questions, concerns and clarify political confusion. Sometimes, they also wanted to be recognized by the leaders of this country through their expressionof feelings through social media. This befits the concept of social media itself that is shared values, tastes,and activities, personally. Thus, the widespread use of social media by the youths of today needs to berecognized and be given serious attention. Using old methods of thinking to capture the political field isno longer appropriate in the current proliferation of the Internet today. It turns out; social media is nowbecoming a new mooring in shaping the current governance and political agenda in this country. Thus,social media should be examined seriously as an important tool in the world of Malaysian politics.REFERENCESAbbey, L. (2010). Online Relationship Management In A Presidential Campaign: A Case Study of the Obama Campaign’s Management Of Its Internet-Integrated Grass Roots Effort. Journal of Public
Relations Research, 22(3).Campbell, S. C. & Kwak, N. (2011). Political Involvement in ‘Mobilized’ Society: The Interactive Relationships among Mobile Communication, Network Characteristics, and Political Participation. Journal of Communication, 61(6), 1005-1024.Choi, H. & Varian, H. (2009). Predicting the Present with Google Trends. Technical Report, Google 2012.Derrick, L. C. & Fatima, K. E. (2011). From Networked Nominee to Networked Nation: Examining the Impact of Web 2.0 and Social Media on Political Participation and Civic Engagement in The 2008 Obama Campaign. Journal of Political Marketing, 10(1-2).Institute of Ethnic Studies (KITA). (2012). Report on Political Sensitivity Survey. Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia. A Technical Report.Jansen, B. J., Sobel, K., & Cook, G. (2011).Classifying E-Commerce Information Sharing Behavior by Youth on Social Networking Sites. Journal of Information Science, 37(2).120-136.Mohd Safar Hasim & Ali Salman. (2010). Factors Affecting Sustainability of Internet Usage among Youth. The Electronic Library. 28(2). 300 – 313.Peter, J. C. & Peter, J. S. (2010). Adoption And Use Of Digital Media In Election Campaigns: Australia, Canada And New Zealand Compared. Public Communication Review, 1(1).Shirky, C. (2011). The Political Power of Social Media. Foreign Affairs, 90(1), 28-41.Vergeer, M., Hermans, L. & Sams, S. (2011). Online Social Networks and Micro-Blogging in Political Campaigning: The Exploration of aNew Campaign Tool and a New Campaign Style. Party Politics.
SOCIAL MEDIA AND MALAYSIAN YOUTH’S PARTICIPATION ON 6FACEBOOK: AN EXPLORATORYCASE SOCIAL MEDIA AND MALAYSIAN YOUTH’S PARTICIPATION ON FACEBOOK: AN EXPLORATORY CASE Mohamad MD Yusoff Omar M. ThabitSocial media, such as Facebook, YouTube and Twitter, have drastically transformed social activities bybridging the gap between the public and politics. Numerous studies have been focusing on how socialmedia such as Facebook, YouTube and Twitter influence modern day politics, with emphasis given to therelationship and level of interaction that have been enabled and restricted by such social mediainfluences. In a study by Lenhart (2009), generally, 93% of teens aged 12-17 go online and 63% of onlineteens go online daily. In today’s modern politics, candidates cannot dispute the role of social media as one of the mostimportant and influential elements of a successful political campaign, particularly when it comes togauging popular support, for example, the 2008 US Election, during which both Democrats andRepublicans used a wide arsenal of different social media strategies in order to broadcast their politicalmessages to an increasingly bigger Internet audience, was probably the best example of the until thenunderrated power of social media. Social media has proven to be a democratic tool in advocating changeparticularly with the change in heads of government, as witnessed recently across several nations in NorthAfrica, where anti-Government groups have used blogs and especially social media outlets like Facebookand Twitter as their most effective weapons against dictatorial regimes. According to Eickelman and Anderson (2003), the emerging new media, in terms of their comparativediversity, flexibility, and lower barriers to entry, is channels for diverse, flexible, and more accessibleparticipation. This evolving public sphere is not only one of talking back to power, but also one of awider range of actors who talk to each other, sometimes about power, and often about the power of thenew media in their communication.THE IMPORTANCE OF SOCIAL MEDIAAccording to Abd Jalil, Abd Jalil, and Abdul Latiff (2010), the increasing importance of social media is
undeniable. Wikipedia, launched in 2001, today contains more than 13 million articles in 200 differentlanguages. Facebook, founded in 2004, helps more than 300 million members all over the world to stay intouch. If Facebook were a country, it would be ranked 4th based on its size. Among the youngest memberin the family of social media, Twitter has only been created in 2006 and currently shows a monthlygrowth rate of around 1,400 % (Qualman 2009). Scholars have acknowledged the power of social media in shaping today’s society as they haveargued that its impact on the political arena of countries around the world is undeniable. According toAbd Jalil, Abd Jalil, and Abdul Latiff (2010) and Ahmad Nazri et al. (2004), blogs have given a bigimpact to the political situation in a developing country like Malaysia. Horton (2009) emphasized sixcharacteristics that appear in the definitions of social media: a) Internet-based but not in totality as the Internet is the organizing agent but communication is personal. Meetup. com, for example, uses the Internet to set up local face-toface meetings. b) User-generated and published information. User generation is loosely defined as users that often republish information they discovered elsewhere. c) Community sharing – posts and comments, file sharing and community of interest which varies by individual and group as well as being active or passive. d) Multimedia – Social media make use of all media forms (audio visual and print media) even haptic communication (mechanical simulation of touch). e) Collapsed geographically i.e. there is no distance in social media. f) Incorporate old and new Internet technologies – Social media incorporate all of the technologies developed over the time spanning from e-mail to forums, instant messaging, file sharing, video transmission and more.SOCIAL MEDIA INFLUENCE IN MALAYSIAIn Malaysia, the exponential growth of social media and its usage had sparked interest in the implicationof social media especially blogs in the democratic process of this country. Blogs are amongst the mostfocused upon social media that had caught academic attention as well as the attention of the Malaysiangovernment (Mcintyre 2006). A book (Tan and Ibrahim 2008) and conference papers (Muhamad Nazriand Suhaimee, 2008; Nur Azween and Nidzam, 2008; Mohd Shamsul, Marlia and Jasmin, 2008; Zanariah,Siti Rohana and Norun, 2008; Nursuria and Serub, 2008) discussed the role of blogs in the electionprocess, its potential in democratizing political discourse in Malaysia and how it is affecting theMalaysian public sphere.SOCIAL MEDIA INFLUENCE ON THE YOUTHS IN MALAYSIA
Noting that, youths today grow up with the Internet, it could be argued that social media is amongst theireveryday communication tools, be it for friendship, relationship, information, education, entertainmentand so forth. Research objectives: a) To understand the adoption, and usage of social media among the Malaysian youth. b) To examine the roles and impact of social media in the life of the Malaysian youth.CURRENT RESEARCH STUDYAccording to Abd Jalil et al. (2010), the target population of this study was undergraduate students inhigher learning institutions in Malaysia. In the effort to gauge the adoption and usage of social mediaamongst Malaysian youths, a survey method was chosen as it enabled the researchers to gatherconfidential information from a large group in a cost-effective and efficient manner. This study utilized theself-administered survey to selected Malaysian students. The preassessment was conducted in February2010 prior to the data collection period which was conducted in March 2010. Convenience sampling wasimplemented. The questions measured demographic variables, usage of social media and traditional massmedia, media influence, trustworthiness of the media and privacy of users. The data were analyzed usingSPSS.OUTCOMES OF THE STUDYThe respondents of the study were described based on their demographic characteristics, their media use(social media and mass media) and impacts of social media use, particularly the privacy of users.Demographic Characteristics of RespondentsThe respondents of this study were undergraduate students in a private higher learning institution inMalaysia. The selected demographic variables that were analyzed include gender, age, education level(highest education obtained) and race. There were more male respondents (62%) compared to femalerespondents (37%) with one missing data. The distribution of age is as illustrated in Figure 6.1. As thetarget population was youths, the range of age started from 18 years old up to 24 years old and older.Most respondents were in the age group of 21-23 years (36%) followed by 18-20 years old (33%).Pertaining to the race of the respondents, Malays were the majority (97%) and the rest were non-Bumiputeras (3%).
Figure 6.1: Age of the Respondents.
Figure 6.2: The distribution of education level (highest education obtained) of the respondents. A majority of the respondents (60%) were diploma holders with nearly a quarter (24%) having had obtained their high school certificate (SPM).Usage of Social MediaAbout half of the respondents (52%) indicated that they used the Internet or World Wide Web every singleday. The usage of social media was separated into 10 categories ranging from: a) Social Networking. b) Blogs. c) Photo Sharing. d) Video Sharing. e) Audio/Music Sharing. f) Micro-Blogs. g) Live Casting. h) Social Bookmarking. i) Wikis. j) Others. Most of the respondents (88%) used Facebook with nearly half (47%) using it every day. The secondtype of social media that was used most by the respondents was video sharing (62%) with nearly a
quarter (22%) having used it for four days and above in a week. The least used social media was microblogs (12%). Comparatively social networking sites especially Facebook was used more than other typesof social media. 14 activities or reasons people used the social media were listed for rating on a fourpoint scale from never to always. The activities were divided between social network sites (such asFacebook and Myspace) and other social media (Wiki, YouTube, blogs). Table 6.1 features the activitiesassociated with the usage of social media. The main activities or reasons the respondents used socialnetwork sites were: to socialize with friends (64% agreed that they always used the social network forthis reason) and, to seek information (45%). While the main reason the respondents used other forms ofsocial media was to look for information (38%). Table 6.1: Reasons Respondents Used the Social Media.
Media Use, Influence and TrustworthinessA comparison was made among the various types of media (mass and social media) to find out thefrequencies of using the selected media by the young people. Figure 6.3 shows the frequencies of using themedia by the youths in a week.
Figure 6.3: High Usage of Media amongst Respondents. While the Internet, handphone and social media hold higher percentages of high usage, the data showsthat, the usage of other media especially the newspaper was quite high with percentages above 50%. Themedium that had the most influence on the respondents was the Internet (60%) followed by the handphone(55%) and then both television and social media (34%). In terms of trustworthiness, respondents statedthat, they always trusted the information delivered through television (31%) and the newspaper (30%)while information delivered through social media was only sometimes trusted by the respondents (49%).The respondents also indicated that, they sometimes trusted the information given by radio (49%),handphone (47%), magazine (46%) and the Internet (45%). Media influence on family communicationwas also measured with the respondents indicating that the media that always influenced their familycommunication was the Internet (28%) followed by television (24%) and newspaper (22%).PrivacyOne of the risks involved in using social media is the invasion of privacy. Six statements measuring thelevel of privacy protection taken by the respondents were rated on a four-point scale from stronglydisagree to strongly agree. More than half stated that they only shared their personal information withfriends (68%) and disagreed that their personal information (67%) and personal pictures (57%) wereopen to the public. A majority of the respondents also indicated that their personal updates were meant fortheir friends only (66%). However, they were more open in sharing their pictures with friends of friendsand sharing personal information with acquaintances (63% and 53% respectively). Figure 6.4 shows therespondents agreement and disagreement to the statements pertaining to individuals’ privacy among social
media users. Figure 6.4: Agreement to Statements on Individual Privacy.OVERALL DISCUSSIONThe pattern of media use of 98 undergraduate students who were mostly Malay males in the age group of18 to 23 years old was analyzed in this paper. Most of the respondents were diploma holders and werepursuing their degrees in a private higher learning institution in Malaysia. Half of the respondents used theInternet or World Wide Web every day. A majority of the respondents used Facebook with nearly halfhaving used it every day. They also used a video sharing application nearly every day. The least usedsocial media was micro blogs. The other types of social media had more or less the same percentagebetween users and nonusers. Blogs for example had an equivalent total number of users and non-users.Comparatively, social networking sites, especially Facebook were used more than the other types ofsocial media. The main activities or reasons the respondents constantly used social network sites are to socializewith friends and to look for information. The respondents also showed that, social media influenced themthe most in the areas of communication, entertainment, language and learning. In the analysis of media use,
the Internet, hand phone and social media hold higher percentages of high usage. However, the high usageof other media especially the newspaper is quite high with percentages above 50%. The Internet,handphone, television and social media had the most influence on the respondents. The Internet also hadthe most influence on respondents’ family communication followed by television and newspaper.Respondents showed that, they practiced certain measures of privacy protection by limiting access to theirpersonal information and personal pictures. The findings also illustrated the pattern of media use, media influence and trustworthiness of theselected sample and generally, it showed that, both the mass media and social media were equally usedby youths. It could be argued that social media complemented the mass media and they were part andparcel of the youths’ daily communication and life.THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL MEDIA ON MALAYSIANYOUTHS AND POLITICSAccording to Abdullah (2012), for the 13th General Election (GE13), there was one group that wasgetting the most attention which was the group of young voters, who are below 35 years old. They formedhalf of the voting public. Hence, every political party was rushing for their support. In previous GeneralElections, a number of political parties took Malaysian youths for granted. While politicians are nowtaking them more seriously, they should not limit their interests in them only for the intention of the ballotbox, but rather, for their full and active participation in politics in the real sense of the word. In order forthis to occur, they have to broaden the understanding on the issues pertaining to youth politicalcontribution. In contrast, there is the crucial need for us to understand youth political participation. They have tobuild up other appropriate and effective ways and means of capturing and motivating its nature and extent.They should begin by looking at three areas. Firstly, politicians should look at the current social andpolitical conditions as well as the youths’ own accounts of politics. Beyond the factors which shape thepolitical system and the relationship between politics and citizens, which we understand, there are alsoyouth specific factors that influence their perception to politics, which we may not understand. Thesespecific factors are related to their status as citizens, members of society and position in their life course.The youth have a complex and differentiated picture of ideals and expectations. If they are apolitical, thisoutlook may not only point to their own deficits, but also highlight some shortcomings of our democracyand the failures of our society in integrating them. Secondly, politicians should ask which ways the youth actually get politically active and how theythemselves evaluate various forms of political participation. Their answers reflect their image of politicsand actual experiences with political participation. The youths may view some political parties aslimiting rather than opening up spaces for the sharing and shaping of ideas and ideals. Some youths mayprefer individual forms of participation, such as political communication and protest, which are moreappropriate in their eyes because it allows loyalty to one’s own values despite being subjected toorganizational aims and methods. To others, self-expression becomes the most essential way of politicalparticipation. The arrival of social media makes this achievable today.
Thirdly, it is about political socialization. It is about the differing effects of parents and peers on theirlikelihood and preference of political engagement. Even though parents’ political orientation could figuretheir political orientation, it is the peers that have a greater impact on their political behavior. Theeducation system plays the most important role in increasing awareness among youths by impartingpolitical education and opportunities for involvement in democratic processes and experiences. Anotherplatform that is becoming more impactful in fostering young political activists is the civil societyorganizations. These are issues that merit to be taken ahead for our society to better appreciate andmotivate full and active political participation among our youths. The young voters know whichcandidates and political parties who are genuinely passionate and real in addressing youth voices, rolesand concerns, and which ones are not. They have given their answers during GE13.HOW THE MALAYSIAN GOVERNMENT IS USING SOCIALMEDIA TO COMMUNICATE WITH YOUTHSAccording to Weiss (2012), the Malaysian government has taken two different strategies in coping withthe augment of new media. The first is to make better use of these tools itself; the second is to crack downon online troublemakers. As the opposition candidates and parties made far enhanced use of cyberspacein the 2008 General Election than they, BN leaders have taken on social media and developed a moreexciting web presence in earnest, by developing ‘e-government’ portals for citizen action and input aswell as the delivery of government services and using Twitter and other communications tools moreaggressively. According to Behnke (2010), the recent figures for Facebook users, suggest there are now more thaneight million users in Malaysia, an increase of 181% within one year which means nearly one in threeMalaysians and more than half of them are with Internet access. Behnke (2010) mentioned that the PrimeMinister, Najib Razak, is an active blogger, while UMNO has several Facebook groups, as do many of itsmembers of parliament. Weiss (2012) added, to persuade the youth vote more aggressively, UMNO Youthchief Khairy Jamaluddin hosted a ‘tweetup’ at a local restaurant in 2010, engaging in a frank, in-persondiscussion with some of his online followers. Besides that, PM Najib himself followed up with tea withhis ‘online friends’ in early 2011, noting the launch of a new ‘1Malaysia’ mobile site to accommodate tocellphone-toting youth, and promising similar gatherings elsewhere in the country. According to Abdullah Sani (2011), PM Najib said, “as a leader I cannot afford not to be part ofcyberspace because this is a new medium of communication which a large number of Malaysians areusing and the numbers are growing day by day. If we want to engage with them, we have to utilizecyberspace to communicate with the rakyat. That is why I started my new Facebook and Twitteraccounts.” Social networking tools such as Facebook and Twitter, both used extensively in Malaysia, take theinteractive, real-time nature of blogs a step further. Twitter can extend and enhance in-person interactionsand encourage a sense of interpersonal commitment and authentic community. Such effects are particularlylikely when the online community has at its core a group of individuals who know (or at least, know of)each other and interact regularly through various communication technologies as well as in person (Weiss2012). In Malaysia, BN now makes effective the use of these tools as opposition politicians and
supporters. For example, one million people have ‘liked’ PM Najib’s primary Facebook page and he hasover 716,000 Twitter followers, compared to Anwar’s 171,000 followers. (Tellingly, Anwar himselffollows nearly 15,000 others, and has issued nearly 19,000 tweets; Najib follows a mere 81 and hasissued 2,600 tweets.) While these numbers firmly prove the depth of support, Najib has the most followers of anyMalaysian politician, some of whom express over enthusiastic admiration. With the GE13 approaching,he had begun to respond directly to tweets and, for instance, to poll followers for reactions to currentpopulist policies, rather than just posting more official updates, in early 2011. Social media should notthus be presumed ‘oppositional’ in leanings or likely to distress the current regime - yet by theirpersonality, these tools force a level of responsiveness and transparency that could shift the character ofBN governance.Crackdowns, E-Government, RegulationsAccording to Weiss (2012), even the Malaysian government acknowledged after the 2008 elections thatblogs had influenced many voters. Former Prime Minister, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi admitted that by nottaking seriously the fact that “the young people were looking at SMS and blogs” rather than print mediaand television, the BN “lost the Internet war, the cyber-war.” His successor Najib, as well as otherleading BN figures, echoed these sentiments (Mohd Sani 2009). Still, despite BN leaders’ persistentcriticism of bloggers (which left BN candidates constrained in trying to make use of blogs themselves),pro-UMNO site mykmu experienced a surge from 20,000 to 80,000 unique visitors per day during the2008 campaign. One common reading is that opposition parties in the Rakyat remained largely‘complacent’ about new media in 2008, having little rational media strategy; what helped in mobilizingsupport was merely that a numerous number of its ‘political newbie’ candidates were bloggers and thatonline media space was then ‘largely critical of the government.’ Since then, both sides have worked to build up their online strategies. For instance, Najib, thenAnwar, recently launched their Chinese-language Facebook fan pages, specifically to court the ethnic-Chinese votes (though in the process, reaffirming the salience of communal divisions online). The powerof new media to spread messages, generate leaders, and rally votes should not be overstated. Theenormous majority of Malaysians seem still to have relied on traditional media in 2008, not with standingthe disjuncture between those sources reporting and the election outcome (Weiss 2012). While there seems to be little proof thus far that increasingly reachable and wide ranging new mediahave essentially changed patterns of polarization in Malaysia, they have gone some way to “level theplaying field” for challengers to existing authorities and spurred increased politicization broadly, andespecially among the young - who form a formidable portion of the voting public. The easiest way todismiss the political potential of new media is to note the boundaries of netizenship: it isdisproportionately the young and urban who are online. In Malaysia, however, it was that demographicthat really tipped the scales toward the opposition in 2008. Nearly three-fourths of Malaysians today are under 40 years old, and the BN’s own data show that,over 60 % of those under 35 are undecided as voters. Both sides are likely to target these ‘digital natives’relying heavily on an online toolbox (Weiss, M. 2012). If those young (or future) voters have a partisan
preference, chances are better now than previously that they will exercise that preference, not just at theballot box, but also in finding and engaging with information on issues of importance to them. Finally, the‘broader offline strategy’ (Weiss 2012) remains critical: the Internet is a medium and a sort of shorthandfor a cluster of tools; it is a stage for, rather than sufficient for, mobilization. What makes new mediaactivism particularly effective is when the virtual and real worlds mesh: when citizens mobilized onFacebook, for instance, are moved to take concrete political action, whether demonstrating, voting in acertain way, or lobbying for a policy change. Online engagement that is too thoughtless or shallow totranslate into behavior change is ineffective as a form of sociopolitical activism, apart from perhapsincremental shifts in general consciousness-raising. Importantly too, even online engagement does entail a level of risk in Malaysia - yet concrete criticalengagement sustains the same (greater) dangers and uncertain benefits as before. If online discussionseems to present a safe alternative, rather than spurring on-the-ground mobilization or engagement withcitizens not similarly politically-inclined, new media could merely augment existing patterns ofpolarization and substantive depoliticization in the long run. Perhaps the most subtle and yet mostpervasive effects of media activism are in the domain of political culture. Social movements may aim notjust at policy change, but at shifts in the culture undergirding politics. Breaking the information blockadein Malaysia, for instance, has obliged the government to recalibrate its approaches, and citizens, theirassessments, amid likely secular impacts on the culture of formal politics. Meanwhile, the proliferation ofnovel channels for at least symbolic activism will likely have similar effects on the culture of informalpolitics and approaches to political engagement.Politicians Prefer Mobilization through the InternetThe Internet constitutes a new space for political mobilization. Mobilizing via the Internet can betremendously low-cost in contrast with other methods such as face-to-face or telephone contact, given thatthe marginal cost of sending one or more e-mails or subscribing an additional person to a bulletindistribution list is practically zero. It also allows for a decentralized kind of mobilization because anyonewith access to the Internet can send emails or write comments on online forums and websites to motivatepeople to vote for a certain candidate or to organize an action or activity. Thus, it is possible that theexposure to appeals to participate in a political activity increases in number – quantitative change – orvary in the type of sender or activity proposed – qualitative change – simply by having access to theInternet and, in particular, by being an e-mail user.Inequality in Participation and the InternetMany authors have shown that, access to the Internet is not equal among the population, but isconcentrated among young people and more privileged groups – what is known as the digital divide.Some have argued that this leads to an increase in inequality, a concentration of tools in the same pairs ofhands (Weiss 2012). Those who already tend to be active not only have new channels of influence, butalso enjoy the benefits from it. Firstly, young people are one of the least participative sectors for manytraditional activities. At least in relation to this sector of the population, the expected consequence couldbe a decline in inequalities if the Internet really does encourage their political involvement as someresearch studies have indicated. Even though young people do not participate actively in conventional activities, the distinction
explained by their age may disappear if they find other ways of making their opinions, problems anddemands heard in the public sphere and the political system through online participation. However, thereis no agreement on this point. Other authors argue that it is mainly by young people who use the Internetfor non-political purposes, and this does not lead to more political involvement (Weiss 2012).Consequently, it is unlikely that Internet used disproportionately encourages the participation of this groupand thus reduces inequality due to age. Secondly, it is necessary to ask whether, once access to the virtual world has been established, thesame factors of inequality described in classical studies are customized or whether they remain. Onceagain, it is practical to differentiate between inequalities in online and offline participation. In terms ofelectronic participation it would seem reasonable to assume that, inequalities in online activities aredifferent from those in traditional modes, given that the cost structure for these activities is different: inorder to participate online, technical skills, motivation and reasonable conditions of physical admissionare required (Weiss, M. 2012). On the other hand, the evidence available until now would show toindicate that factors such as education, money and other traditional resources do not carry the sameimportance for online participation (Weiss 2012), although they do influence the ownership of new kindsof assets such as technological skills. In other words, traditional resources condition access to the Internet, but once the obstruction ofaccess has been defeated, they lose importance. In terms of the impact of the use of the Internet in offlineparticipation, besides the statement that it could increase the activity of young people, there is littleevidence in this respect and it is a field which remains to be explored. As long as there is no universalaccess to the Internet, the argument of the digital divide remains relevant. According to Skoric and Kwan(2011), in recent years, the rise of social media has been accompanied by renewed calls for increasedparticipation, especially among young citizens who are frequently disengaged from traditional politics.For instance, Jenkins (2009) emphasizes the need of educating the young on how to use new mediaeffectively in order to ensure equal participation. Coleman (2008) argues that picking up skills requiredfor civic participation is necessary and that this ‘civic apprenticeship’ is ‘required to exerciseresponsible judgment in a risky and complex world’. Others argue that, the Internet, with its networkstructure, is particularly suited for decentralized networked communications and informal modes ofbelonging that characterize many youth movements of today (Norris 2007; Olsson 2008). Thus, the searchis not only for new means of reinvigorating traditional civic and political participation, but also for newways of understanding what authentic participation means for young citizens. In recent years, news reports have frequently portrayed social media such as Facebook and Twitter asplaying a key role in social upheavals and political protests in countries such as Iran and Egypt(Grossman 2009; Shane 2011). Still, some commentators have criticized this new wave of techno-optimism, suggesting that social media are neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for transitioning topolitical democracy (Gladwell 2010; Morozov 2011). Given that, a more theoretically-driven approachis certainly needed, focusing on specific technological affordances of social media platforms andanalyzing their socio-political implications. For example, social network sites like Facebook arecharacterized by low cost, high speed and precise targeting of recipients, which are all features that fosterfast dissemination of political information and efficient mobilization of citizens. Furthermore, various other features of Facebook facilitate the provision of identifying information andreputational information which are all important for reducing uncertainty when engaging in online
interactions, thereby fostering the development of the norms of trust (Berger and Calabrese 1975). Astrust, is necessary in promoting civic engagement and participation in collective action (Putnam 2002),Facebook seems well-suited for promoting civic and political engagement. Recent studies conducted inthe United States report a positive relationship between Facebook use and civic and political engagement(Pasek, More, and Romer, 2009; Valenzuela, Park, and Kee 2009). More specifically, Facebook featuressuch as ‘groups’ and ‘events’ were found to promote political discussion and mobilization (Valenzuela,Park, and Kee, 2009). Still, it is important to note that Facebook is primarily used for the maintenance andextension of existing offline networks (Joinson 2008) rather than for initiating completely newrelationships. Thus, its role among young citizens interested and engaged in political life may be quite significant,but it is likely to be much weaker among those who belong to the cyber-enclaves of citizens not interestedand/or disengaged from politics. The findings of Skoric and Kwan (2011) indicate that the intensity ofFacebook use was related to both online (marginally) and traditional political participation; however,Facebook use accounted for a relatively small portion of variance in political participation. In addition,we found that being a member of a civic/ political Facebook group was associated with an increasedlikelihood of engaging in other forms of online participation such as signing online petitions and readingpolitical blogs. Our findings are quite similar to those of Valenzuela, Park, and Kee (2009) indicating thatboth the general intensity of Facebook use as well as membership in politically-oriented Facebook groupsis predictors of political participation among youths.CONCLUSIONThe Malaysian youth are highly active in social media, it is a tool for them to be able to express theiridentity and voice out their opinions and stay in touch with their friends and family members, and toincrease their social circles based on the findings of a study by Abd Jalil, Abd Jalil and Abdul Latiff(2010) that showed the pattern of media use, media influence and trustworthiness of the selected sample.The study showed both mass media and social media were equally used by the youth and they are a part oftheir daily communication in life. The respondents also indicated that social media influence them themost in the areas of communication, entertainment language and learning. Even the Malaysian governmentacknowledged after the 2008 General Election, the importance of social media and that they did not payattention to the effects of social media on young voters.Since then many political parties have developed online and social media strategies to reach youngvoters, for example Najib and Anwar have created Facebook pages to communicate with Malaysiancitizens generally and the youth specially, they even created a fan page in the Chinese language to targetethnic Chinese votes. Facebook features such as groups and events were found to promote political discussion andmobilization, therefore it is important to take note that Facebook was mainly used for the maintenance andexpanding of existing network rather than creating completely new relationships. Social media can beused as a constructive tool to create value to the youth, at the same it is used too as an identity platform.On the other hand, it could be destructive politically if political parties did not take seriously theimportance of communicating with the youth or responding to them.
REFERENCESAbd Jalil, S., Abd Jalil, K. and Abdul Latiff, A. (2010). Social Media and Our Youths Today: Exploring the Impact of Social Media on Malaysian Youths. International Conference on Communications and Media, 1(1), pp. 2-13.Abdullah, S. (2012). Understanding Youth Participation in Politics. The Malay Mail.Abdullah Sani, A. (2011) Najib Hosts Tweetup, Eyes Youth Vote. The Malaysian Insider.Anduiza, E., Cantijoch, M. and Gallego, A. (2009). Political Participation and the Internet: A Field Essay. Information, Communication & Society, 12(6), pp. 860-878.Behnke, P. (2010). Social Media and Politics Online Social Networking And Political Communication In Asia.Berger, C. and Calabrese, R. (1975). Some Explorations in Initial Interaction and Beyond: Toward A Developmental Theory of Interpersonal Communication. Human Communication Research, 1(2), pp. 99-112.Coleman, S. (2008). Doing IT for Themselves: Management versus Autonomy in Youth E-Citizenship. Civic Life Online: Learning How Digital Media Can Engage Youth.Eickelman, D. and Anderson, J. (2003). New Media in the Muslim World. Bloomington, IN: I ndiana University Press.Gladwell, M. (2010). Small Change: Why The Revolution Will Not Be Tweeted. The New Yorker.Grossman, L. (2009). Iran Protests: Twitter, the Medium of the Movement. Time.Horton, J. (2009). PR and Social Media. [online] Available at: http://www.online- pr.com/Holding/PR_and_Social_media.pdf [Accessed: 20 June 2012].Jenkins, H. (2009). Confronting the Challenges of Participatory Culture: Media Education for the 21st Century. The MacArthur Foundation, pp. 3-61.Joinson, A. (2008). Looking At, Looking Up Or Keeping Up With People? Motives And Use Of Facebook. CHI 2008 Proceedings.Lenhart, A. (2009). Teens and Social Media: An Overview.Mcintyre, I. (2006). Bloggers Beware. The Star, 2nd Aug, p. 1.Mohd Sani, M. (2009). The Emergence of New Politics in Malaysia from Consociational to Deliberative Democracy. Taiwan Journal of Democracy.Morozov, E. (2011). The Net Delusion. New York, NY: PublicAffairs.Muhamad Nazri Mohamed Noor and Suhaimee Saahar @ Saabar. (2008). Blogsphere: Ruang Kontra Hegemoni? Analisis terhadap Blog Politik Malaysia Terpilih dalam PRU 2008. In Worran Hj Kabul, Shiren Haron, Mat Zin Mat Kib and Abdul Kadir Rosline (eds.) Prosiding Seminar Politik Malaysia, pp. 59-68. Shah Alam: UPENA UiTM.Norris, P. (2007). Political Activism: New Challenges, New Opportunities. The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics, Pp. 628-652. Available at: http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Acrobat/Boix&stokes-chap26.pdf [Accessed 20 June 2012].Nur Azween Zakaria and Nidzam Sulaiman. (2008). Media Alternatif sebagai Agen Perluasan Ruang Bersuara: Kajian Kes Pilihan Raya Umum Ke-12. In Worran Hj Kabul, Shiren Haron, Mat Zin Mat Kib and Abdul Kadir Rosline (eds.) Prosiding Seminar Politik Malaysia, Pp. 249-260. Shah Alam: UPENA UiTM.Nursuria Mahrif and Sharon Pearl Henry Serub. (2008). Roles of Money, Media and Political Machinery Reconsidered: The Malaysian 12th General Election 2008. In Worran Hj Kabul, Shiren Haron, Mat
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ONLINE AND SOCIAL MEDIA FOR POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 7 AMONG YOUNG ADULTS ONLINE AND SOCIAL MEDIA FOR POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AMONG YOUNG ADULTS Ezhar Tamam Md. Salleh HassanThe online media landscape has experienced tremendous growth in the country since the inception of theInternet. The growth trend will continue given the favorable policy, the establishment of the MalaysianCommunications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC), and the government commitment in furtherimproving the Internet and broadband infrastructure and in implementing programs aimed at intensifyingthe usage of Internet technology. According to the International Telecommunication Union, the Internetpenetration rate in the country has increased from 56.5% in 2007 to 58.8% in 2009, to 61.9% in 2011, andthe rate is estimated to reach 77% by 2015 (ITU 2011). As of March 2011, MCMC estimated 17.5 millionInternet users, a penetration rate of 60.1%. With broadband becoming more widely available andaffordable, a growing number of Malaysians are accessing the Internet via notebooks and smartphones. The MCMC also reports that, 85% of Malaysian Internet users are urban, 95% have completed highschool, and over 75% are 21 years old and older (MCMC 2011). Estimation in a Digital Media inMalaysia report have shown that Malaysians averaged 20 hours in terms of going online each week. MostInternet users were between the ages of 15-24 (38%), followed by 25-34 (26%), 35-44 (23%), and above45 (14%), with 45.8% being male compared to 54.2% female (Digital Media in Malaysia, 2012). Thehighest usage of online and social media was among Malaysians aged between 18-34 years. Socialnetworking, instant messaging, and reading local news were among the top three online activities in 2010(Goi 2011; Mustafa & Hamzah 2011). There were a mere handful of blog sites in 2001, but thousands ofsites by Malaysians exist today. There are far more non socio-political blogs. Ulicny, Matheus and Kokar(2010) in their study found that, Malaysian socio-political bloggers were older, on average, than arandom sample of Malaysian bloggers. Socio-political bloggers are twice more likely to be male thanfemale; the reverse is true for random Malaysian bloggers. And, socio-political bloggers were much lesslikely to be students. Facebook currently tops the list of seven top social media sites in the country andthose in the age range of 18 to 24 year old were most engaged to Facebook. As reported in Digitalbuzz Blog (2011), the top five social media channels are: Facebook (75.5%reach), BlogSpot (42.4% reach), Twitter (7.65% reach) and Metacafe (5.6% reach). In 2010, accordingto Javis (2011), 90.2% of Malaysians use Facebook, 5.2% use YouTube, 2% use Twitter, and less thanone percent use StumbleUpon, Digg, Myspace or Reddit. Facebook and Twitter have become standard
features on government and non-governmental organization websites. In sum, with the ever growingInternet technology, Malaysians practically are living in a much richer online media environment today ascompared to a decade ago. Malaysians now have wider options and alternatives to get access to theirinformation requirement, to disseminate information, and to express and influence opinions within thehighly controlled media environment.PREVIOUS LOCAL STUDIES ON ONLINE AND SOCIAL MEDIAIt is beyond the scope of this paper to review and discuss all Internet studies in the country. While localstudies on the Internet are numerous and cutting across disciplines such as education, business, commerce,journalism, health and politics to mention a few, our focus is on online and social media use in politicalcontexts. In a sense, our review and synthesis is selective and definitely not exhaustive. There are quite a number of studies examining Internet use among Malaysians, some used studentsamples, conducted when the Internet was at its formative stage (Abu Hassan 2002; Abu Hassan & Ismail2001; Hasim & Yusooff 2000; Pawanteh & Rahim 2000). Pawanteh and Rahim (2000) for instance,reported a higher percentage of young people very frequently surfing entertainment websites (54%)compared to those who were frequently surfing sports websites (27%), educational websites (22%) orscience and technology websites (22%). Abu Hassan and Ismail (2001) reported that the most commonInternet activities among Malaysian students were chatting, e-mailing, information search, and playinggames. Findings of these studies and others seem to suggest that many young adults regard the Internetmore as an entertainment medium rather than as a source of information to enhance their knowledge.While these findings add to the growing Internet literature, studies that specifically examine onlinepolitical and democratic discourse among young Malaysians are scarce. Studies on Internet use in politics and political communication in Malaysia can be traced back asearly as in the late 1990s particularly during the 1998 general election. The growing interest in online andsocial media research is understandable given the continuous growth in the number of Malaysiansaccessing Internet technology daily and the anticipated democratizing effects of Internet technology.Proponents of the democratizing effect of Internet technology argue that the Internet provides a platformfor greater and deeper political discourses and participation (Soon 2010). As posited in the theories ofmobilization and equalization, the Internet levels the political playing field by enabling people toovercome barriers such as costs and the state controlled mass media (Shah, et al. 2005; Soon 2010). Previous studies focused on Internet usage patterns (Abbott 2004; Hasim & Yusooff 2004 ; Tan &Zawawi 2008) and the effects of the Internet on election outcomes (Brown 2004; Gong 2011; Hung, &Chen 2009; Lim 2009; Mustafa & Hamzah, 2011; Pandi 2011; Rajaratnam 2009; Steele 2009). Much ofthese studies were about blogs and their role in the 2008 General Election. This includes descriptivestudies on blogs and blogger characteristics (Ho-Abdulah & Hashim 2009; Jano, Omar, & Ahmat 2008;Lim 2009; Ulicny, Matheus & Kokar 2010) and inferential analyses on the effects of blogs on electionoutcomes (Gong 2011; Pandi 2011; Rajaratnam 2009; Mohd Sani & Zengeni 2010). Research interests onnews websites and blogs are expected because news websites and blogs were more prominent forms ofsocial media than other forms of social media in the late 1900s and early 2000. Hence, this explains forthe much local literature on websites and blogs.
Previous studies have shown that, active bloggers and blog readers are young people between 20 to45 years old. Socio-political and personal diaries are the two types of blogs most visited by blogsreaders. Tan & Zawawi’s study (2008) found personal diaries as the most visited blogs, while Pandi’s(2011) study found socio-political as the most visited blogs. A majority of the respondents in Pandi’s(2011) survey who identified blogs as their main source of news and commentaries were older maleswho were interested in socio political issues. This echoes Ulicny, Matheus & Kokar’s (2010) finding that,Malaysian sopo bloggers were older, on average, than a random sample of Malaysian bloggers, wereabout twice as likely to be male as female, and were much less likely to be students. As for the motivationfor blogging, most bloggers claimed that, their motivation to blog was to voice out their opinion andthoughts, and to share information and knowledge (George 2006; Pandi 2011). Gong’s (2011) study onelectoral candidates in the 2008 General Election showed that, opposition candidates benefit significantlymore from having a blog than do non-opposition candidates, as blogging provides opportunities denied tothem by Malaysia’s state-controlled media. In addition to being an alternative avenue of informationdistribution, blogs hold a great potential for building interpersonal relationships and as mobilization toolsin media-controlling states. These findings taken from research studies imply that people are turning to ormaking use of blogs to meet their information and communication needs. Previous studies are consistent in the findings asserting the role of Internet technology such as blogs,online news media, and text messaging in shaping the results of the 2008 General Election. Thesealternative media have become important sources of information and news for most Malaysiansparticularly for those who were disillusioned with the shameless biases of the government-controlledmainstream media. Voters turned to alternative media, particularly independent online news sites andblogs for the latest information and development; the oppositions capitalized the Internet technology todisseminate information, set political agenda, networks, and mobilize resources (e.g., Hung & Chen 2009;Muhamad 2011; Mohd Sani & Zengeni 2010; Rajaratnam 2009; Salman & Hashim 2011). As argued byproponents of the democratization effect of Internet technology, these Internet technologies serve as aplatform for disseminating information and setting the agenda, networking and mobilizing, and self-expression. According to Lim (2009), George (2006), Pandi (2011), Smeltzer (2008), and Uimonen(2003), the significance of this function is more apparent in countries with strict media control. In addition to news websites and blogs, Smeltzer and Keddy (2010) have underscored the potential ofFacebook as a tool for political change within restricted media environments. Facebook’s integratedprivacy controls can connect and facilitate political discourse among likeminded individuals and politicaldissents and they can turn to this social media for political discourse that challenges the status quo of theruling political party. Thus, Facebook functions as a platform for disseminating information and setting theagenda, networking and mobilizing, just as blogs and news websites. Given the growing popularity ofFacebook and YouTube among Malaysians, the democratization process of information andcommunication in the country will further intensify.CULTURAL, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTA discussion on online and social media use and political participation must be contextualized within thecountry’s cultural, social and political environment. With regards to political development, it must benoted that Barisan National (BN) has held power since Malaysia’s independence in 1957, and this has
resulted in the hegemony of the ruling party. The political dominance of UMNO and its coalition parties inBN is maintained by political and cultural factors (Lee 2007; Singh 1998). Many political analysts havepointed out that the BN government created a number of laws and regulations to ensure continuity ofpower. The restrictive campaign rules and existing security-related laws and regulations hinder theopposition parties. Elections are generally regarded as ‘peaceful and free but not fair.’ Politicallycontentious communication and journalism that challenge or undermine the BN status quo, legitimacy, andhegemony are contained. From the government’s perspective the news media should be pro-governmentand catalysts for national development and political stability by practising responsible journalism andself-censorship. Government intervention and political party ownership of Malaysian mass media havelimited the concept of free, fair, and fearless journalism. There has been no significant improvement in theranking of the country in terms of press freedom. Malaysia was ranked at 122 in the 2011/2012 index(Reporters without Borders 2011). To continually remain in power, the BN government has nurtured the culture of fear for instability inthe country and the culture of dependency on the BN ruling coalition. The premise is that Malaysians needto maintain the BN government to ensure that there is continuous stability and prosperity in the country.The political tag line is that BN has a proven track record in sustaining economic growth, politicalstability and racial harmony in Malaysia. The support for opposition parties or regime change isassociated with the support for political instability. Politically contentious journalism that undermines theBN government is suppressed not only through the existing legal mechanisms but also through the politicaltradition manufactured by UMNO and its allied parties. The coalition party assumes the role of protectorand thus consolidates a particular form of political culture in which each party in the coalition expectsloyalty from the groups it represents. The present BN government has been under pressure since the March 2008 General Election. BN lostits long held two-thirds parliamentary majority in 2008 marking a new political chapter in the country.Recent demonstrations and protests such as Bersih (Coalition of Clean and Fair Election), Hindraf (HinduRights for Action Force), and Freedom Walk attest to the growing dissatisfaction among many urban andmiddle class Malaysians. The emergence of pro-democratic segments within a multi-ethnic and multi-religious middle class, has intensified interaction between political parties and civil society forces, anderoded the legitimacy of the BN party, and, has facilitated and enhanced the opposition political reformdrive. The government and BN are increasingly in a defensive mode and are strengthened by the alreadyrestrictive communication and media environment, and political democracy. Although the Internet wasexempted from censorship, the government did become more sophisticated in its attempt to minimize theimpact of the Internet (Abbott 2004; Smeltzer 2008). Given the rising aspiration for greater democracy in a highly partisan mainstream news media,Malaysians are turning and making use of online and social media to get and disseminate information, andto discuss on national affairs that affect them and other Malaysians. As Gong (2011) argues, online andsocial media provide platforms for and encourage critical communication which in turn promotes civicparticipation. The assumed democratizing power of Internet technology and a positive relationshipbetween online and social media use is based on the theory of mobilization. The democratizing effect,however, must be tempered. The Malaysian predisposition for being less willing to support the freedom of the press and freedomof speech and expression could also affect how and for what reasons Malaysians use Internet technology.
From a socio-cultural perspective, Malaysians are more likely to behave to suit the context, practice high-context communication and avoid disrupting harmony in relationships. This is because Malaysians arecollectivistic people. Collectivistic people define self as interdependent self. Interdependent self wouldseek to form obligation and become part of various interpersonal relationships. Furthermore,collectivistic people subscribe to values such as obedience, respect for order, more controlled,conservative, gratitude, and respect for elders, seniority and authority (Tan & Goh 2006). As such,confrontations, outspokenness, aggressiveness are not the societal communication norms and values ofMalaysians. On the one hand, while the online and social media facilitate the open sharing of ideas, information,opinion and perspective, on the other hand, it should not be used to openly and critically discuss sensitiveissues that challenge the country’s sociopolitical and economic status quo as this would disrupt socio-political stability and racial harmony in the country. In a survey on political attitudes of 1994 amongMalaysians, Welsh (1996) found that, Malaysians were not adopting democratic attitudes and werewilling to limit democracy particularly under conditions that threatened social order although they had abroad understanding of democracy. Ensuring political stability, racial harmony, and economic stability arethe reasons offered for less support on freedom of speech and freedom of strike or protest. Welsh alsonoted that, Malaysians were less accepting of political participation than rights. They were willing torestrict involvement in politics for those groups perceived to threaten social order, who were lacking inqualifications to participate or holding deviant views. In a 2008 nationwide opinion by Merdeka Center,it was found that, Malaysian youths between ages 20 to 35 years old, although in general were wellinformed on current issues, remained politically disconnected and uninterested. Malaysian youths ingeneral do not see themselves as being able to make a difference (Merdeka Center, 2009). Additionally, young people participation in democracy is hampered by a regulation limiting theparticipation of university students in politics. Students were barred from being involved in partisanpolitics, expressing in support of, or opposing any political party. This is particularly true before Section15(a) of the Universities and University Colleges Act (UUCA) was amended as the Court of Appealconcluded that Section 15(a) of UUCA is unconstitutional.THE STUDYThe Malaysian current socio-political environment is characterized by increasingly partisan pro-government mainstream media in an already highly regulated media environment. Additionally, calls forpolitical reform and deeper democracy are growing particularly from the opposition parties and its NGOsupporters. Given this scenario and assuming that the Internet has a democratization effect on informationand communication flow on politics and the ensuing political discourse, this study was designed toanalyze traditional, online and social media use and its relationships with political participation amongyoung Malaysians. Previous local politics and media use studies have focused on the media role and effects, electioncampaign, voting behavior, and election processes and outcomes. Studies examining offline and onlinepolitical participation and its relationships to online and social media are lacking. This survey is to fillthis gap. We defined political participation in terms of engagement in political activity excluding voting.
Specifically, it addressed the following questions: What are the patterns of traditional, online and socialmedia use among young adults? How actively are young adults discussing on politics and current eventsthrough online media? How actively are young adults involved in politics online and offline? And, aretraditional, online and social media use significantly correlated with political participation onlineoffline? Three hypotheses were formulated and tested:H1: Regular users of traditional, online, and social media will exhibit higher levels of politicalparticipation than those who use these media less regularly.H2: Regular users of social media will exhibit higher levels of political participation than the regularuser of traditional and online media.H3: Regular users of social media will be more likely to participate in politics online rather thanoffline.Current StudyThe data were part of a larger data set of the Social Media Political Participation of Young PeopleSurvey conducted between October 1 and November 30, 2011. The study used a cross-sectional surveyresearch design based on a standardized paper questionnaire and a convenient sample. Self-administeredquestionnaires were distributed in-person to 314 students in three public universities in Selangor. Thequestionnaires were group administered. A trained research assistant, with the consent of a classinstructor, distributed the questionnaires to students at the end of the class period in nine classes of 20 to35 students. The students who volunteered to take part in the survey independently worked on thequestionnaire after receiving instruction and explanation. The questionnaire used was developed by theproject leader of a cross national Social Media Political Participation in Asia study from IndianaUniversity. The questionnaire originally was in English. It was translated into Bahasa Malaysia by alanguage instructor, a native speaker who is proficient in Bahasa Malaysia and English. The translatedversion was checked by two other translators independently to ensure accuracy in the translation. Allefforts were made to get about even numbers of males and females and to match the sample to thedistribution of three main race groups (Malay, Chinese, and Indian) in Malaysia’s overall population. The sample consisted of 160 male and 154 female university students. The respondents’ age rangedfrom 20 to 40 years old with a median of 26 (M= 26.82, SD= 4.12), matching the median age for theMalaysian population (26.8 years). The respondents were mostly nonworking and working graduatestudents (83.2%) and the remaining respondents (16.8%) were final year undergraduate students. Theyhad been studying in their respective universities ranging from one to 15 semesters. All the three mainracial groups are represented, approximating the national race ratio 6:3:1 of Malay to Chinese to Indian.Reflecting the race distribution in this sample, most respondents said their religion was Islam (68.3%),followed by Buddhism (16.2%), Christianity (5.7%) and, Hinduism (8.6%). Overall, the sample wasfrom the millennial generation and was well-represented in terms of gender and race.OUTCOMES AND IMPLICATIONSInternet and Social Media Use
Table 7.1 summarizes responses to the question on daily Internet use. Respondents spend a considerableamount of time on the Internet for work, leisure and social networking. As shown in Table 7.1, almost allrespondents use the Internet daily. Close to half (47.1%) spend at least three hours online for work-related matters; about one-third (35.7%) spend at least three hours for leisure related activities, and alsoabout one-third (31.7%) spend at least three hours for social networking. It appears that respondentsspend slightly more online time on work-related than leisure-related activities. The pattern of responses on social media use seems similar to that of leisure-related online activities,suggesting the respondents use social media more for leisure activities. In sum, the findings corroboratethe findings of previous studies reporting young Malaysian adults spending a considerable amount of timeonline daily; they actively use the Internet for work, leisure and networking. Table 7.1: Daily Internet Use (hours per day). ACTIVITY NONE < 1 H 1 - <2 2 - <3 3 - <4 4 - <5 5 - <6 >6 Work-Related 1.0 6.1 20.7 25.2 19.7 10.8 6.4 10.2Leisure-Related 1.3 11.2 27.2 24.6 18.8 5.1 3.5 8.3 Social Media 1.6 16.1 25.4 25.1 12.5 6.4 5.1 7.7Figures are in percentages. (N= 341).Exposure to Traditional and Online NewsAlthough young Malaysian adults use the Internet quite extensively on a daily basis, how much of theonline time is spent on news? Table 7.2 presents the results. Most of the respondents spend no more thanhalf an hour per day on traditional or online news. A comparison across media shows that respondentsspend relatively more time on online news. Two in ten respondents (18.0%) spend time online for news,while one in ten (14.0%) spend at least half an hour a day on television for news. Radio seems the leastpreferred news medium as evidenced in the results that only 7.1% spend at least half an hour a day onradio for news. The pattern of findings concurs with the literature indicating that online media is increasinglypreferred among the millennium generation. The availability and easy access to the Internet and the needfor diverse or alternative information about the government and national affairs probably explain thisdevelopment. The findings concur with the findings of studies showing the significant role played by newswebsites during the 2008 General Election (Gong, 2011; Smeltzer 2008; Suffian 2008; Rajaratnam 2009). Table 7.2: Exposure to Media (minutes per day). MEDIA NONE 1-15 16-30 31-60 61-90 MORENewspaper 9.6 51.1 31.2 7.4 .3 .3Television 17.6 35.7 32.7 11.2 2.2 .6 19.0 52.3 21.6 4.5 1.3 1.3 Radio
Online 6.3 43.1 32.4 11.4 2.5 4.1Figures are in percentages. (N= 314).News from Other Media PlatformsIn addition to the traditional and online news media, Table 7.3 presents the distribution of respondents byfrequency of getting news from other media platforms. As shown in Table 7.3, the cell phone and emailare not common sources of news. Almost four in ten (38.6%) never get news from cell phones and aboutone-third (27.7%) never get news via email. On the contrary, there is a striking difference with regards tothe use of social media for news. But, social media is increasingly acknowledged as an important sourceof news. Slightly, more than half (57.5%) use social media very often or often to get news, whilesignificantly fewer respondents (13.4% and 22.3%) use the cell phone and email, respectively very oftenor often to get news. The findings clearly suggest that young people use social media not only fornetworking activities but to some extent, for news. Table 7.3: Frequency of Getting News from Other Media Platforms.OTHER MEDIA VERY OFTEN OFTEN SOMETIMES NEVER PLATFORMS 2.9 10.5 48.0 38.6 News On Cell 5.2 17.1 50.0 27.7 Phones 25.2 32.3 39.6 2.9News By EmailNews Through Social MediaATTENTION TO POLITICS AND DISCUSSION OF POLITICSOFFLINE AND ONLINEHow actively do respondents discuss on politics and events online and offline? Table 7.4 presents thedistribution of respondents by frequency of talking about politics and current events offline and online. Asshown in Table 7.4, respondents were not actively discussing politics or current events. Three in tennever talk about politics or current events on social networking sites (31.6%) and never visit chatroomsthat discuss on politics or current events (31.9%); about half never post comments on blogs aboutpolitics/current events (51.3%). Most of the respondents are in the ‘sometime’ category with regards to the frequency of talking aboutpolitics and current events online. Much of the political discourse is offline (38.4% reported talking aboutpolitics and current events with friends/family very often or often).Table 7.4: Frequency of Talking about Politics and Current Events Offline and Online.ACTIVITY VERY OFTEN OFTEN SOMETIMES NEVER
Talk about politics or 6.7 31.7 59.0 2.6 current events with friends/familyRead blogs about 4.5 19.5 53.7 22.4politics or current eventsVisit chatrooms that 2.0 15.6 50.5 31.9discuss on politics or current eventsTalk about politics or 2.3 15.0 51.2 31.6 current events on social networking sites sitesPost comments on .6 9.7 38.4 51.3 blogs about politics/current eventsFigures are in percentages. (N= 314). The pattern of findings suggests that, young people lack interest in politics and are passive consumersof online news. The finding is not that different from the findings of the Merdeka Center 2007 opinion pollindicating apathy towards politics among Malaysians aged 20-35 years old (Merdeka Center 2007,2009). It is also important to note that, the samples are students and student participation in politics isaffected by Section 15(a) of the UUCA. This explains the lack of interest or indifferent attitude towardspolitics amongst students.Offline and Online Political ParticipationTo answer the research question on the levels of political participation among young Malaysian adults,respondents were asked to indicate ‘yes’ if they have done any of the listed offline and online politicalparticipation activities during the past six months. As Table 7.5 indicates about five in ten respondentsdid volunteer work (45.2%), three in ten donated money to a charitable cause or organization (34.7%),three in ten had worked on a community project (29.3%) and had attended a public discussion forum(25.5%), two in ten had raised money for a charitable cause (19.4%), one in ten had contacted apolitician or government official (14.3%), had worked for a political organization or association(12.7%), had attended a public rally or demonstration (12.7%), had signed a hardcopy petition on politicsor public affairs (7.3%) and, had written a letter to the editor of a newspaper (7.3%). Political participation online is also fairly limited, with about four in ten respondents having watchedpolitical videos online (42.0%), visited web site of a party or political organization (39.5%), andcommunicated with friends, family or colleagues online about politics (38.2%). Significantly fewerrespondents had forwarded the link to a political video or news article (20.1%), had posted comments onnews websites or political blogs (19.1%), had submitted a political video to YouTube or similar onlinesites (16.6%), had posted comments, questions, or information about politics on websites (15.6%), haddonated money online to a charitable cause or organization (9.6%), had sent an email to a politician or
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