Theory and History

Chapter 9. The Concept of Historical Individuality1. The Ultimate Given of HistoryT H E HUMAN SEARCH for knowledge cannot go on end-lessly. Inevitably, sooner or later, it will reach a pointbeyond which it cannot proceed. It will then be facedwith an ultimate given, a datum that man's reason can-not trace back to other data. In the course of the evolu-tion of knowledge science has succeeded in tracingback to other data some things and events which pre-viously had been viewed as ultimate. We may expectthat this will also occur in the future. But there will al-ways remain something that is for the human mind anultimate given, unanalyzable and irreducible. Humanreason cannot even conceive a kind of knowledge thatwould not encounter such an insurmountable obstacle.There is for man no such thing as omniscience. In dealing with such ultimate data history refers toindividuality. The characteristics of individual men,their ideas and judgments of value as well as the actionsguided by those ideas and judgments, cannot be tracedback to something of which they would be the deriva-tives. There is no answer to the question why FrederickII invaded Silesia except: because he was Frederick II.It is customary, although not very expedient, to call themental process by means of which a datum is tracedback to other data rational. Then an ultimate datum is 183

184 EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF HISTORYcalled irrational. No historical research can be thoughtof that would not ultimately meet such irrational facts. Philosophies of history claim to avoid referring to in-dividuality and irrationality. They pretend to provide athorough-going interpretation of all historical events.What they really do is relegate the ultimate given totwo points of their scheme, to its supposed beginningand its supposed end. They assume that there is at thestart of history an unanalyzable and irreducible agency,for example Geist in the system of Hegel or the materialproductive forces in that of Marx. And they furtherassume that this prime mover of history aims at adefinite end, also unanalyzable and irreducible, for in-stance the Prussian state of about 1825 or socialism.Whatever one may think about the various systems ofphilosophy of history, it is obvious that they do noteliminate reference to individuality and irrationality.They merely shift it to another point of their interpreta-tion. Materialism wants to throw history overboard en-tirely. All ideas and actions should be explained as thenecessary outcome of definite physiological processes.But this would not make it possible to reject any ref-erence to irrationality. Like history, the natural sciencesare ultimately faced with some data defying any furtherreduction to other data, that is, with something ulti-mately given.2. The Role of the Individual in History In the context of a philosophy of history there is noroom left for any reference to individuality other than

CONCEPT OF HISTORICAL INDIVIDUALITY 185that of the prime mover and his plan determining theway events must go. All individual men are merely toolsin the hand of ineluctable destiny. Whatever they maydo, the outcome of their actions must necessarily fit intothe preordained plan of Providence. What would have happened if Lieutenant NapoleonBonaparte had been killed in action at Toulon? FriedrichEngels knew the answer: \"Another would have filled theplace/' For \"the man has always been found as soon as hebecame necessary/'* Necessary for whom and for whatpurpose? Obviously for the material productive forces tobring about, at a later date, socialism. It seems that thematerial productive forces always have a substitute athand, just as a cautious opera manager has an understudyready to sing the tenor's part in case the star shouldcatch a cold. If Shakespeare had died in infancy, an-other man would have written Hamlet and the Sonnets.But, some people ask, how did this surrogate whileaway his time since Shakespeare's good health relievedhim from this chore? The issue has been purposely obfuscated by thechampions of historical necessity, who confused it withother problems. Looking backward upon the past, the historian mustsay that, all conditions having been as they were, every-thing that happened was inevitable. At any instant thestate of affairs was the necessary consequence of theimmediately preceding state. But among the elementsdetermining any given state of historical affairs there 1. Letter to Starkenburg, Jan. 25, 1894, Karl Marx and FriedrichEngels, Correspondence 1846-1895 (London, M. Lawrence, Ltd.,1934), p. 518.

186 EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF HISTORYare factors that cannot be traced back further than tothe point at which the historian is faced with the ideasand actions of individuals. When the historian says that the French Revolutionof 1789 would not have happened if some things hadbeen different, he is merely trying to establish the forcesthat brought about the event and the influence of eachof these forces. Taine did not indulge in idle specula-tions as to what would have happened if the doctrinesthat he called Tesprit revolutionnaire and I'esprit das-sique had not been developed. He wanted to assign toeach of them its relevance in the chain of events thatresulted in the outbreak and the course of the Revolu-tion.2 A second confusion concerns the limits drawn uponthe influence of great men. Simplified accounts of his-tory, adapted to the capacity of people slow of compre-hension, have presented history as a product of the featsof great men. The older Hohenzollern made Prussia,Bismarck made the Second Reich, William II ruined it,Hitler made and ruined the Third Reich. No serioushistorian ever shared in such nonsense. It has neverbeen contested that the part played even by the greatestfigures of history was much more moderate. Every man,whether great or small, lives and acts within the frameof his age's historical circumstances. These circum-stances are determined by all the ideas and events ofthe preceding ages as well as by those of his own age.The Titan may outweigh each of his contemporaries; 2. Taine, Les Origines de la France contemporaine, 1, Bk. Ill(16th ed. Paris, 1887), 221-328.

CONCEPT OF HISTORICAL INDIVIDUALITY 187he is no match for the united forces of the dwarfs. Astatesman can succeed only insofar as his plans are ad-justed to the climate of opinion of his time, that is tothe ideas that have got hold of his fellows' minds. Hecan become a leader only if he is prepared to guidepeople along the paths they want to walk and towardthe goal they want to attain. A statesman who antago-nizes public opinion is doomed to failure. No matterwhether he is an autocrat or an officer of a democracy,the politician must give the people what they wish toget, very much as a businessmanraust supply the cus-tomers with the things they wish to acquire. It is different with the pioneers of new ways of think-ing and new modes of art and literature. The path-breaker who disdains the applause he may get from thecrowd of his contemporaries does not depend on hisown age's ideas. He is free to say with Schiller's MarquisPosa: \"This century is not ripe for my ideas; I live as acitizen of centuries to come.\" The genius' work too isembedded in the sequence of historical events, is condi-tioned by the achievements of preceding generations,and is merely a chapter in the evolution of ideas. But itadds something new and unheard of to the treasureof thoughts and may in this sense be called creative.The genuine history of mankind is the history of ideas.It is ideas that distinguish man from all other beings.Ideas engender social institutions, political changes,technological methods of production, and all that iscalled economic conditions. And in searching for theirorigin we inevitably come to a point at which all thatcan be asserted is that a man had an idea. Whether the

188 EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF HISTORYname of this man is known or not is of secondary im-portance. This is the meaning that history attaches to the notionof individuality. Ideas are the ultimate given of histor-ical inquiry. All that can be said about ideas is thatthey came to pass. The historian may point out how anew idea fitted into the ideas developed by earlier gen-erations and how it may be considered a continuationof these ideas and their logical sequel. New ideas donot originate in an ideological vacuum. They are calledforth by the previously existing ideological structure;they are the response offered by a mans mind to theideas developed by his predecessors. But it is an arbi-trary surmise to assume that they were bound to comeand that if A had not generated them a certain B or Cwould have performed the job. In this sense what the limitations of our knowledgeinduce us to call chance plays a part in history. If Aris-totle had died in childhood, intellectual history wouldhave been affected. If Bismarck had died in 1860, worldaffairs would have taken a different course. To what ex-tent and with what consequences nobody can know.3. The Chimera of the Group Mind In their eagerness to eliminate from history any ref-erence to individuals and individual events, collectivistauthors resorted to a chimerical construction, the groupmind or social mind. At the end of the eighteenth and beginning ofthe nineteenth centuries German philologists began to

CONCEPT OF HISTORICAL INDIVIDUALITY 189study German medieval poetry, which had long sincefallen into oblivion. Most of the epics they edited fromold manuscripts were imitations of French works. Thenames of their authors—most of them knightly warriorsin the service of dukes or counts—were known. Theseepics were not much to boast of. But there were twoepics of a quite different character, genuinely originalworks of high literary value, far surpassing the conven-tional products of the courtiers: the Nibelungenlied andthe Gudrun. The former is one of the great books ofworld literature and undoubtedly the outstanding poemGermany produced before the days of Goethe andSchiller. The names of the authors of these master-pieces were not handed down to posterity. Perhapsthe poets belonged to the class of professional enter-tainers (Spielleute), who not only were snubbed by thenobility but had to endure mortifying legal disabilities.Perhaps they were heretical or Jewish, and the clergywas eager to make people forget them. At any rate thephilologists called these two works \"people's epics\"(Volksepen). This term suggested to naive minds theidea that they were written not by individual authorsbut by the \"people.\" The same mythical authorship wasattributed to popular songs (Volkslieder) whose au-thors were unknown. Again in Germany, in the years following the Napo-leonic wars, the problem of comprehensive legislativecodification was brought up for discussion. In this con-troversy the historical school of jurisprudence, led bySavigny, denied the competence of any age and anypersons to write legislation. Like the Volksepen and the

190 EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF HISTORYVolkslieder, a nation's laws, they declared, are a spon-taneous emanation of the Volksgeist, the nation's spiritand peculiar character. Genuine laws are not arbitrarilywritten by legislators; they spring up and thrive organ-ically from the Volksgeist. This Volksgeist doctrine was devised in Germanyas a conscious reaction against the ideas of natural lawand the \"un-German\" spirit of the French Revolution.But it was further developed and elevated to the dig-nity of a comprehensive social doctrine by the Frenchpositivists, many of whom not only were committed tothe principles of the most radical among the revolu-tionary leaders but aimed at completing the \"unfin-ished revolution\" by a violent overthrow of the capital-istic mode of production. Emile Durkheim and hisschool deal with the group mind as if it were a real phe-nomenon, a distinct agency, thinking and acting. Asthey see it, not individuals but the group is the subjectof history. As a corrective of these fancies the truism must bestressed that only individuals think and act. In dealingwith the thoughts and actions of individuals the histo-rian establishes the fact that some individuals influenceone another in their thinking and acting more stronglythan they influence and are influenced by other indi-viduals. He observes that cooperation and division oflabor exist among some, while existing to a lesser extentor not at all among others. He employs the term \"group\"to signify an aggregation of individuals who cooperatetogether more closely. However, the distinction ofgroups is optional. The group is not an ontological en-

CONCEPT OF HISTORICAL INDIVIDUALITY 191tity like the biological species. The various group con-cepts intersect one another. The historian chooses, ac-cording to the special plan of his studies, the featuresand attributes that determine the classification of indi-viduals into various groups. The grouping may integratepeople speaking the same language or professing thesame religion or practicing the same vocation or occu-pation or descended from the same ancestry. The groupconcept of Gobineau was different from that of Marx.In short, the group concept is an ideal type and as suchis derived from the historian's understanding of thehistorical forces and events. Only individuals think and act. Each individual'sthinking and acting is influenced by his fellows' think-ing and acting. These influences are variegated. Theindividual American's thoughts and conduct cannot beinterpreted if one assigns him to a single group. He isnot only an American but a member of a definite reli-gious group or an agnostic or an atheist; he has a job,he belongs to a political party, he is affected by tradi-tions inherited from his ancestors and conveyed to himby his upbringing, by the family, the school, the neigh-borhood, by the ideas prevailing in his town, state, andcountry. It is an enormous simplification to speak ofthe American mind. Every American has his own mind.It is absurd to ascribe any achievements and virtues orany misdeeds and vices of individual Americans toAmerica as such. Most people are common men. They do not havethoughts of their own; they are only receptive. Theydo not create new ideas; they repeat what they have

192 EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF HISTORYheard and imitate what they have seen. If the worldwere peopled only by such as these, there would notbe any change and any history. What produces changeis new ideas and actions guided by them. What distin-guishes one group from another is the effect of such in-novations. These innovations are not accomplished bya group mind; they are always the achievements of in-dividuals. What makes the American people differentfrom any other people is the joint effect produced bythe thoughts and actions of innumerable uncommonAmericans. We know the names of the men who invented andstep by step perfected the motorcar. A historian canwrite a detailed history of the evolution of the automo-bile. We do not know the names of the men who, in thebeginnings of civilization, made the greatest inventions—for example lighting a fire. But this ignorance doesnot permit us to ascribe this fundamental invention toa group mind. It is always an individual who starts anew method of doing things, and then other people imi-tate his example. Customs and fashions have alwaysbeen inaugurated by individuals and spread throughimitation by other people. While the group-mind school tried to eliminate theindividual by ascribing activity to the mythical Volks-geist, the Marxians were intent on the one hand upondepreciating the individual's contribution and on theother hand upon crediting innovations to common men.Thus Marx observed that a critical history of technologywould demonstrate that none of the eighteenth cen-tury's inventions was the achievement of a single indi-

CONCEPT OF HISTORICAL INDIVIDUALITY 193vidual.1 What does this prove? Nobody denies that tech-nological progress is a gradual process, a chain of suc-cessive steps performed by long lines of men each ofwhom adds something to the accomplishments of hispredecessors. The history of every technological con-trivance, when completely told, leads back to the mostprimitive inventions made by cave dwellers in the ear-liest ages of mankind. To choose any later starting pointis an arbitrary restriction of the whole tale. One maybegin a history of wireless telegraphy with Maxwelland Hertz, but one may as well go back to the first ex-periments with electricity or to any previous techno-logical feats that had necessarily to precede the con-struction of a radio network. All this does not in theleast affect the truth that each step forward was madeby an individual and not by some mythical impersonalagency. It does not detract from the contributions ofMaxwell, Hertz, and Marconi to admit that they couldbe made only because others had previously made othercontributions.To illustrate the difference between the innovatorand the dull crowd of routinists who cannot even im-agine that any improvement is possible, we need onlyrefer to a passage in Engels* most famous book.2 Here,in 1878, Engels apodictically announced that militaryweapons are \"now so perfected that no further progressof any revolutionizing influence is any longer possible.\"Henceforth \"all further [technological] progress is by 1. Das Kapital, 1, 335, n. 89. 2. Herrn Eugen Diihrings Umwalzung der Wissenschaft, 7th ed.Stuttgart, 1910.

194 EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF HISTORYand large indifferent for land warfare. The age of evo-lution is in this regard essentially closed/'8 This com-placent conclusion shows in what the achievement ofthe innovator consists: he accomplishes what other peo-ple believe to be unthinkable and unfeasible. Engels, who considered himself an expert in the artof warfare, liked to exemplify his doctrines by referringto strategy and tactics. Changes in military tactics, hedeclared, are not brought about by ingenious armyleaders. They are achievements of privates who areusually cleverer than their officers. The privates inventthem by dint of their instincts (instinktmdssig) and putthem into operation in spite of the reluctance of theircommanders.4 Every doctrine denying to the \"single paltry individ-ual*' 5 any role in history must finally ascribe changesand improvements to the operation of instincts. As thoseupholding such doctrines see it, man is an animal thathas the instinct to produce poems, cathedrals, and air-planes. Civilization is the result of an unconscious andunpremeditated reaction of man to external stimuli.Each achievement is the automatic creation of an in-stinct with which man has been endowed especially forthis purpose. There are as many instincts as there arehuman achievements. It is needless to enter into acritical examination of this fable invented by impotentpeople for slighting the achievements of better men 3. Ibid., pp. 17&-7. 4. Ibid., pp. 172-6. 5. Engels, Der Ursprung der Familie, des Privateigentums und desStaates (6th ed. Stuttgart, 1894), p. 186.

CONCEPT OF HISTORICAL INDIVIDUALITY 195and appealing to the resentment of the dull. Even onthe basis of this makeshift doctrine one cannot negatethe distinction between the man who had the instinctto write the book On the Origin of Species and thosewho lacked this instinct.4. Planning History Individuals act in order to bring about definite re-sults. Whether they succeed or not depends on the suit-ability of the means applied and the response their ac-tions encounter on the part of fellow individuals. Veryoften the outcome of an action differs considerably fromwhat the actor was eager to achieve. The margin withinwhich a man, however great, can act successfully isnarrow. No man can through his actions direct thecourse of affairs for more than a comparatively shortperiod of the future, still less for all time to come. Yet every action adds something to history, affectsthe course of future events, and is in this sense a his-torical fact. The most trivial performance of daily rou-tine by dull people is no less a historical datum than isthe most startling innovation of the genius. The aggre-gate of the unvarying repetition of traditional modes ofacting determines, as habits, customs and mores, thecourse of events. The common man's historical role con-sists in contributing a particle to the structure of thetremendous power of consuetude. History is made by men. The conscious intentionalactions of individuals, great and small, determine thecourse of events insofar as it is the result of the inter-

196 EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF HISTORYaction of all men. But the historical process is not de-signed by individuals. It is the composite outcome ofthe intentional actions of all individuals. No man canplan history. All he can plan and try to put into effectis his own actions which, jointly with the actions ofother men, constitute the historical process. The PilgrimFathers did not plan to found the United States. Of course, there have always been men who plannedfor eternity. For the most part the failure of their de-signs appeared very soon. Sometimes their construc-tions lasted quite a while, but their effect was not whatthe builders had planned. The monumental tombs ofthe Egyptian kings still exist, but it was not the inten-tion of their builders to make modern Egypt attractivefor tourists and to supply present-day museums withmummies. Nothing demonstrates more emphatically thetemporal limitations on human planning than the ven-erable ruins scattered about the surface of the earth. Ideas live longer than walls and other material arti-facts. We still enjoy the masterpieces of the poetry andphilosophy of ancient India and Greece. But they donot mean for us what they meant to their authors. Wemay wonder whether Plato and Aristotle would haveapproved of the use later ages have made of theirthoughts. Planning for eternity, to substitute an everlastingstate of stability, rigidity, and changelessness for histor-ical evolution, is the theme of a special class of litera-ture. The Utopian author wants to arrange future condi-tions according to his own ideas and to deprive the restof mankind once and for all of the faculty to chooseand to act. One plan alone, viz., the author's plan,

CONCEPT OF HISTORICAL INDIVIDUALITY 197should be executed and all other people be silenced.The author, and after his death his successor, willhenceforth alone determine the course of events. Therewill no longer be any history, as history is the compositeeffect of the interaction of all men. The superhumandictator will rule the universe and reduce all other peo-ple to pawns in his plans. He will deal with them asthe engineer deals with the raw materials out of whichhe builds, a method pertinently called social engi-neering. Such projects are very popular nowadays. They en-rapture the intellectuals. A few skeptics observe thattheir execution is contrary to human nature. But theirsupporters are confident that by suppressing all dis-senters they can alter human nature. Then people willbe as happy as the ants are supposed to be in their hills. The essential question is: Will all men be preparedto yield to the dictator? Will nobody have the ambitionto contest his supremacy? Will nobody develop ideas atvariance with those underlying the dictator's plan? Willall men, after thousands of years of \"anarchy\" in think-ing and acting, tacitly submit to the tyranny of one or afew despots? It is possible that in a few years all nations will haveadopted the system of all-round planning and totali-tarian regimentation. The number of opponents is verysmall, and their direct political influence almost nil.But even a victory of planning will not mean the endof history. Atrocious wars among the candidates for thesupreme office will break out. Totalitarianism may wipeout civilization, even the whole of the human race.Then, of course, history will have come to its end too.

Chapter 10. Historicism1. The Meaning of HistoricismHISTORICISM developed from the end of the eight-eenth century on as a reaction against the social phi-losophy of rationalism. To the reforms and policies ad-vocated by various authors of the Enlightenment itopposed a program of preservation of existing institu-tions and, sometimes, even of a return to extinct insti-tutions. Against the postulates of reason it appealed tothe authority of tradition and the wisdom of ages goneby. The main target of its critique was the ideas thathad inspired the American and the French Revolutionsand kindred movements in other countries. Its cham-pions proudly called themselves antirevolutionary andemphasized their rigid conservatism. But in later yearsthe political orientation of historicism changed. It be-gan to regard capitalism and free trade—both domesticand international—as the foremost evil, and joinedhands with the \"radical\" or \"leftist\" foes of the marketeconomy, aggressive nationalism on the one hand andrevolutionary socialism on the other. As far as histori-cism still has actual political importance, it is ancillaryto socialism and to nationalism. Its conservatism hasalmost withered away. It survives only in the doctrinesof some religious groups. People have again and again stressed the congenial-ity of historicism and artistic and literary romanticism. 198

HISTORICISM 199The analogy is rather superficial. Both movements hadin common a taste for the conditions of ages gone byand an extravagant overestimation of old customs andinstitutions. But this enthusiasm for the past is not theessential feature of historicism. Historicism is first of allan epistemological doctrine and must be viewed assuch. The fundamental thesis of historicism is the proposi-tion that, apart from the natural sciences, mathematics,and logic, there is no knowledge but that provided byhistory. There is no regularity in the concatenation andsequence of phenomena and events in the sphere ofhuman action. Consequently the attempts to developa science of economics and to discover economic lawsare vain. The only sensible method of dealing with hu-man action, exploits, and institutions is the historicalmethod. The historian traces every phenomenon backto its origins. He depicts the changes going on in humanaffairs. He approaches his material, the records of thepast, without any prepossessions and preconceivedideas. The historian utilizes sometimes, in preliminary,merely technical, and ancillary examination of thesesources, the results of the natural sciences, as for in-stance in determining the age of the material on whicha document of disputed authenticity is written. But inhis proper field, the exposition of past events, he doesnot rely upon any other branch of knowledge. Thestandards and general rules to which he resorts in deal-ing with the historical material are to be abstractedfrom this very material. They must not be borrowedfrom any other source.

200 EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF HISTORY The extravagance of these claims was later reducedto a more modest measure when Dilthey stressed therole psychology plays in the work of the historian.1 Thechampions of historicism accepted this restriction anddid not insist on their extreme description of the histor-ical method. They were merely interested in the con-demnation of economics and had no quarrel with psy-chology. If the historicists had been consistent, they wouldhave substituted economic history for the—in theiropinion counterfeit—science of economics. (We maypass over the question how economic history could betreated without economic theory.) But this would nothave served their political plans. What they wantedwas to propagandize for their interventionist or socialistprograms. The wholesale rejection of economics wasonly one item in their strategy. It relieved them fromthe embarrassment created by their inability to explodethe economists' devastating critique of socialism andinterventionism. But it did not in itself demonstratethe soundness of a prosocialist or interventionist policy.In order to justify their \"unorthodox\" leanings, the his-toricists developed a rather self-contradictory disciplineto which various names were given such as realisticor institutional or ethical economics, or the economicaspects of political science (wirtschaftliche Staatsutis-senschaften) .2 1. See below, p. 312. 2. For various other names suggested see Arthur Spiethoff in thePreface to the English edition of his treatise on \"Business Cycles,\"International Economic Papers, No. 3 (New York, 1953), p. 75.

HISTORICISM 201 Most champions of these schools of thought did notbother about an epistemological explanation of theirprocedures. Only a few tried to justify their method.We may call their doctrine periodalism and their sup-porters periodalists. The main idea underlying all these attempts to con-struct a quasi-economic doctrine that could be em-ployed to justify policies fighting the market economywas borrowed from positivism. As historicists the peri-odalists talked indefatigably about something theycalled the historical method, and claimed to be histor-ians. But they adopted the essential tenets of positiv-ism, which rejected history as useless and meaninglesschatter, and wanted to inaugurate in its place a newscience to be modeled after the pattern of Newtonianmechanics. The periodalists accepted the thesis that itis possible to derive from historical experience a pos-teriori laws which, once they are discovered, will forma new—not yet existing—science of social physics orsociology or institutional economics. Only in one regard did the periodalists' version ofthis thesis differ from that of the positivists. The posi-tivists had laws in mind that would be valid universally.The periodalists believed that every period of historyhas its own economic laws different from those of otherperiods of economic history. The periodalists distinguish various periods in thecourse of historical events. Obviously the criterion ac-cording to which this distinction is made is the charac-teristics of the economic laws determining economicbecoming in each period. Thus the periodalists' argu-

202 EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF HISTORYment moves in a circle. The periodization of economichistory presupposes knowledge of the economic lawspeculiar to each period, while these laws can only bediscovered by examining each period without any ref-erence to the events that happened in other periods. The periodalists' image of the course of history isthis: There are various periods or stages of economicevolution succeeding one another according to a defi-nite order; throughout each of these periods the eco-nomic laws remain unchanged. Nothing is said aboutthe transition from one period to the next one. If weassume that it is not brought about at one blow, wemust assume that between two periods there is an in-terval of transition, a transition period as it were. Whathappens in this interval? What kind of economic lawsare operative in it? Is it a time of lawlessness or has itits own laws? Besides, if one assumes that the laws ofeconomic becoming are historical facts and thereforechanging in the flux of historical events, it is manifestlycontradictory to assert that there are periods in whichthere is no change, i.e., periods in which there is no his-tory, and that between two such periods of rest thereis a period of transition. The same fallacy is also implied in the concept of apresent age as resorted to by contemporary pseudoeconomics. Studies dealing with the economic historyof the recent past are mislabeled as dealing with pres-ent economic conditions. If we refer to a definite lengthof time as the present, we mean that in regard to aspecial issue conditions remain unchanged throughoutthis period. The concept of the present is therefore dif-

HISTORICISM 203ferent for various fields of action.8 Besides, it is nevercertain how long this absence of change will last andconsequently how much of the future has to be in-cluded. What a man can say about the future is alwaysmerely speculative anticipation. Dealing with someconditions of the recent past under the heading \"presentconditions\" is a misnomer. The most that can be saidis: Such were the conditions yesterday; we expect theywill remain unchanged for some time to come.Economics deals with a regularity in the concatena-tion and sequence of phenomena that is valid in thewhole field of human action. It can therefore contributeto the elucidation of future events; it can predict withinthe limits drawn to praxeological prediction.4 If onerejects the idea of an economic law necessarily valid forall ages, one no longer has the possibility of discoveringany regularity that remains unchanged in the flux ofevents. Then one can say no more than: If conditionsremain unchanged for some time, they will remain un-changed. But whether or not they really remain un-changed can only be known afterward.The honest historicist would have to say: Nothingcan be asserted about the future. Nobody can knowhow a definite policy will work in the future. All webelieve to know is how similar policies worked in thepast. Provided all relevant conditions remain un-changed, we may expect that the future effects will notwidely differ from those of the past. But we do notknow whether or not these relevant conditions will re-3. Mises, Human Action, p. 101.4. Ibid., pp. 117-18. See below, p. 309.

204 EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF HISTORYmain unchanged. Hence we cannot make any prognosti-cation about the—necessarily future—effects of anymeasure considered. We are dealing with the history ofthe past, not with the history of the future. A dogma supported by many historicists asserts thattendencies of social and economic evolution as mani-fested in the past, and especially in the recent past, willprevail in the future too. Study of the past, they con-clude, discloses therefore the shape of things to come. Leaving aside all the metaphysical ideas with whichthis trend-philosophy has been loaded, we have only torealize that trends can change, have changed in thepast, and will change in the future too.6 The historicistdoes not know when the next change will occur. Whathe can announce about trends refers only to the past,never to the future. Some of the German historicists liked to comparetheir periodization of economic history with the periodi-zation of the history of art. As the history of art dealswith the succession of various styles of artistic activities,economic history deals with the succession of variousstyles of economic activities (Wirtschaftsstile). Thismetaphor is neither better nor worse than other meta-phors. But what the historicists who resorted to it failedto say was that the historians of art talk only about thestyles of the past and do not develop doctrines aboutthe art styles of the future. However, the historicists arewriting and lecturing about the economic conditions ofthe past only in order to derive from them conclusions 5. Mises, Planning for Freedom (South Holland, 111., 1952), pp. 38

HISTORICISM 205about economic policies that necessarily are directedtoward the economic conditions of the future.2. The Rejection of Economics As historicism sees it, the essential error of economicsconsists in its assumption that man is invariably egoisticand aims exclusively at material well-being. According to Gunnar Myrdal economics asserts thathuman actions are \"solely motivated by economic in-terests\" and considers as economic interests \"the desirefor higher incomes and lower prices and, in addition,perhaps stability of earnings and employment, reason-able time for leisure and an environment conducive toits satisfactory use, good working conditions, etc.\" This,he says, is an error. One does not completely accountfor human motivations by simply registering economicinterests. What really determines human conduct is notinterests alone but attitudes. \"Attitude means the emo-tive disposition of an individual or a group to respondin certain ways to actual or potential situations.\" Thereare \"fortunately many people whose attitudes are notidentical with their interests.\" * Now, the assertion that economics ever maintainedthat men are solely motivated by the striving afterhigher incomes and lower prices is false. Because oftheir failure to disentangle the apparent paradox of theuse-value concept, the Classical economists and their 1. Gunnar Myrdal, The Political Element in the Development ofEconomic Theory, trans, by P. Streeten (Cambridge, Harvard Uni-versity Press, 1954), pp. 199-200.

206 EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF HISTORYepigones were prevented from providing a satisfactoryinterpretation of the conduct of the consumers. Theyvirtually dealt only with the conduct of the business-men who serve the consumers and for whom the valua-tions of their customers are the ultimate standard.When they referred to the principle of buying on thecheapest market and selling on the dearest market, theywere trying to interpret the actions of the businessmanin his capacity as a purveyor of the buyers, not in hiscapacity as a consumer and spender of his own income.They did not enter into an anJiysis of the motivesprompting the individual consumers to buy and to con-sume. So they did not investigate whether individualstry only to fill their bellies or whether they also spendfor other purposes, e.g., to perform what they considerto be their ethical and religious duties. When they dis-tinguished between purely economic motives and othermotives, the classical economists referred only to theacquisitive side of human behavior. They never thoughtof denying that men are also driven by other motives. The approach of Classical economics appears highlyunsatisfactory from the point of view of modern subjec-tive economics. Modern economics rejects as entirelyfallacious also the argument advanced for the epistemo-logical justification of the Classical methods by theirlast followers, especially John Stuart Mill. According tothis lame apology, pure economics deals only with the\"economic\" aspect of the operations of mankind, onlywith the phenomena of the production of wealth \"as faras those phenomena are not modified by the pursuitof any other object.\" But, says Mill, in order to deal ade-

HISTORICISM 207quately with reality \"the didactic writer on the subjectwill naturally combine in his exposition, with the truthof pure science, as many of the practical modificationsas will, in his estimation, be most conducive to the use-fulness of his work.\" 2 This certainly explodes Mr. Myr-dal's assertion, so far as Classical economics is con-cerned. Modern economics traces all human actions back tothe value judgments of individuals. It never was sofoolish, as Myrdal charges, as to believe that all thatpeople are after is higher incomes and lower prices.Against this unjustified criticism which has been re-peated a hundred times, Bohm-Bawerk already in hisfirst contribution to the theory of value, and then lateragain and again, explicitly emphasized that the term\"well-being\" (Wohlfahrtszwecke) as he uses it in theexposition of the theory of value does not refer onlyto concerns commonly called egoistic but comprehendseverything that appears to an individual as desirableand worthy of being aimed at (erstrebenswert) .8 In acting man prefers some things to other things,and chooses between various modes of conduct. Theresult of the mental process that makes a man preferone thing to another thing is called a judgment of value.In speaking of value and valuations economics refers tosuch judgments of value, whatever their content may 2. John Stuart Mill, Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of Politi-cal Economy (3d ed. London, 1877), pp. 140-1. 3. Bohm-Bawerk, \"Grundziige der Theorie des wirtschaftlichenGiiterwerts,\" Jahrbiicher fur Nationalokonomie und Statistic, N.F.,13 (1886), 479, n. 1; Kapital und Kapitalzins (3d ed. Innsbruck,1909), 2, 316-17, n. 1.

208 EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF HISTORYbe. It is irrelevant for economics, up to now the bestdeveloped part of praxeology, whether an individualaims like a member of a labor union at higher wages orlike a saint at the best performance of religious duties.The \"institutional\" fact that most people are eager toget more tangible good is a datum of economic history,not a theorem of economics. All brands of historicism—the German and the Brit-ish historical schools of the social sciences, Americaninstitutionalism, the adepts of Sismondi, Le Play, andVeblen, and many kindred \"unorthodox\" sects—em-phatically reject economics. But their writings are fullof inferences drawn from general propositions aboutthe effects of various modes of acting. It is, of course,impossible to deal with any \"institutional\" or historicalproblem without referring to such general propositions.Every historical report, no matter whether its theme isthe conditions and events of a remote past or those ofyesterday, is inevitably based on a definite kind of eco-nomic theory. The historicists do not eliminate eco-nomic reasoning from their treatises. While rejectingan economic doctrine they do not like, they resort indealing with events to fallacious doctrines long sincerefuted by the economists. The theorems of economics, say the historicists, arevoid because they are the product of a priori reasoning.Only historical experience can lead to realistic econom-ics. They fail to see that historical experience is alwaysthe experience of complex phenomena, of the jointeffects brought about by the operation of a multiplicityof elements. Such historical experience does not give

HISTORICISM 209the observer facts in the sense in which the natural sci-ences apply this term to the results obtained in labora-tory experiments. (People who call their offices, studies,and libraries \"laboratories\" for research in economics,statistics, or the social sciences are hopelessly muddle-headed. ) Historical facts need to be interpreted on theground of previously available theorems. They do notcomment upon themselves. The antagonism between economics and historicismdoes not concern the historical facts. It concerns theinterpretation of the facts. In investigating and narrat-ing facts a scholar may provide a valuable contributionto history, but he does not contribute to the increaseand perfection of economic knowledge. Let us once more refer to the often repeated proposi-tion that what the economists call economic laws aremerely principles governing conditions under capital-ism and of no avail for a differently organized society,especially not for the coming socialist management ofaffairs. As these critics see it, it is only the capitalistswith their acquisitiveness who bother about costs andabout profit. Once production for use has been substi-tuted for production for profit, the categories of costand profit will become meaningless. The primary errorof economics consists in considering these and othercategories as eternal principles determining action un-der any kind of institutional conditions. However, cost is an element in any kind of humanaction, whatever the particular features of the individ-ual case may be. Cost is the value of those things theactor renounces in order to attain what he wants to

210 EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF HISTORYattain; it is the value he attaches to the most urgentlydesired satisfaction among those satisfactions which hecannot have because he preferred another to it. It isthe price paid for a thing. If a young man says: \"Thisexamination cost me a week end with friends in thecountry,\" he means: \"If I had not chosen to prepare formy examination, I would have spent this week end withfriends in the country.\" Things it costs no sacrifice toattain are not economic goods but free goods and assuch no objects of any action. Economics does not dealwith them. Man does not have to choose between themand other satisfactions. Profit is the difference between the higher value ofthe good obtained and the lower value of the goodsacrificed for its obtainment. If the action, due to bun-gling, error, an unanticipated change in conditions, orto other circumstances, results in obtaining somethingto which the actor attaches a lower value than to theprice paid, the action generates a loss. Since actioninvariably aims to substitute a state of affairs which theactor considers as more satisfactory for a state which heconsiders less satisfactory, action always aims at profitand never at loss. This is valid not only for the actionsof individuals in a market economy but no less for theactions of the economic director of a socialist society.3. The Quest for Laws of Historical Change A widespread error confuses historicism and history.Yet the two have nothing in common. History is thepresentation of the course of past events and conditions,

HISTORICISM 211a statement of facts and of their effects. Historicism isan epistemological doctrine. Some schools of historicism have declared that his-tory is the only way to deal with human action andhave denied the adequacy, possibility, and meaning-fulness of a general theoretical science of human action.Other schools have condemned history as unscientificand, paradoxically enough, have developed a sympa-thetic attitude toward the negative part of the doctrinesof the positivists, who asked for a new science which,modeled on the pattern of Newtonian physics, shouldderive from historical experience laws of historical ev-olution and of \"dynamic\" change. The natural sciences have developed, on the basis ofCarnot's second law of thermodynamics, a doctrineabout the course of the history of the universe. Freeenergy capable of work depends on thermodynamic in-stability. The process producing such energy is irrever-sible. Once all free energy produced by unstable systemsis exhausted, life and civilization will cease. In the lightof this cognition the universe as we know it appears asan evanescent episode in the flux of eternity. It movestoward its own extinction. But the law from which this inference is drawn, Car-not's second law, is in itself not a historical or dynamiclaw. Like all other laws of the natural sciences, it is de-rived from the observation of phenomena and verifiedby experiments. We call it a law because it describes aprocess that repeats itself whenever the conditions forits operation are present. The process is irreversible,and from this fact scientists infer that the conditions

212 EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF HISTORYfor its operation will no longer be given once all thermo-dynamic instability has disappeared. The notion of a law of historical change is self-contradictory. History is a sequence of phenomena thatare characterized by their singularity. Those featureswhich an event has in common with other events arenot historical. What murder cases have in common re-fers to penal law, to psychology, to the technique ofkilling. As historical events the assassination of JuliusCaesar and that of Henri IV of France are entirely dif-ferent. The importance of an event for the productionof further events is what counts for history. This effectof an event is unique and unrepeatable. Seen from thepoint of view of American constitutional law, the presi-dential elections of 1860 and of 1956 belong to the sameclass. For history they are two distinct events in theflux of affairs. If a historian compares them, he does soin order to elucidate the differences between them, notin order to discover laws that govern any instance of anAmerican presidential election. Sometimes people for-mulate certain rules of thumb concerning such elec-tions, as for instance: the party in power wins if businessis booming. These rules are an attempt to understandthe conduct of the voters. Nobody ascribes to them thenecessity and apodictic validity which is the essentiallogical feature of a law of the natural sciences. Every-body is fully aware that the voters might proceed in adifferent way. Carnot's second law is not the result of a study ofthe history of the universe. It is a proposition about phe-nomena that are repeated daily and hourly in precisely

HISTORICISM 213the way the law describes. From this law science de-duces certain consequences concerning the future of theuniverse. This deduced knowledge is in itself not a law.It is the application of a law. It is a prognosticationof future events made on the basis of a law that de-scribes what is believed to be an inexorable necessityin the sequence of repeatable and repeated events. Neither is Darwin's principle of natural selection alaw of historical evolution. It tries to explain biologicalchange as the outcome of the operation of a biologicallaw. It interprets the past, it does not prognosticatethings to come. Although the operation of the principleof natural selection may be considered as perennial, it isnot permissible to infer that man must inevitably de-velop into a sort of superman. A line of evolutionarychange may lead into a dead end beyond which thereis no further change at all or a retrogression to previousstates. As it is impossible to deduce any general laws fromthe observation of historical change, the program of\"dynamic\" historicism could only be realized by dis-covering that the operation of one or several praxeolog-ical laws must inevitably result in the emergence ofdefinite conditions of the future. Praxeology and itsuntil now best-developed branch, economics, neverclaimed to know anything about such matters. Histori-cism, on account of its rejection of praxeology, wasfrom the outset prevented from embarking upon such astudy. Everything that has been said about future historicalevents, inevitably bound to come, stems from prophe-

214 EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF HISTORYcies elaborated by the metaphysical methods of thephilosophy of history. By dint of intuition the authorguesses the plans of the prime mover, and all uncer-tainty about the future disappears. The author of theApocalypse, Hegel and, above all, Marx held them-selves to be perfectly familiar with the laws of historicalevolution. But the source of their knowledge was notscience; it was the revelation of an inner voice.4. Historicist Relativism The ideas of historicism can be understood only ifone takes into account that they sought exclusivelyone end: to negate everything that rationalist socialphilosophy and economics had established. In this pur-suit many historicists did not shrink from any absurdity.Thus to the statement of the economists that there isan inevitable scarcity of nature-given factors upon whichhuman well-being depends they opposed the fantasticassertion that there is abundance and plenty. Whatbrings about poverty and want, they say, is the inade-quacy of social institutions. When the economists referred to progress, they lookedupon conditions from the point of view of the endssought by acting men. There was nothing metaphysicalin their concept of progress. Most men want to live andto prolong their lives; they want to be healthy and toavoid sickness; they want to live comfortably and not toexist on the verge of starvation. In the eyes of actingmen advance toward these goals means improvement,the reverse means impairment. This is the meaning of

HISTORICISM 215the terms \"progress\" and \"retrogression\" as applied byeconomists. In this sense they call a drop in infant mor-tality or success in fighting contagious diseases progress. The question is not whether such progress makes peo-ple happy. It makes them happier than they wouldotherwise have been. Most mothers feel happier if theirchildren survive, and most people feel happier withouttuberculosis than with it. Looking upon conditions fromhis personal point of view, Nietzsche expressed mis-givings about the \"much too many/' But the objects ofhis contempt thought differently. In dealing with the means to which men resorted intheir actions history as well as economics distinguishesbetween means which were fit to attain the ends soughtand those which were not. In this sense progress is thesubstitution of more suitable methods of action for lesssuitable. Historicism takes offense at this terminology.All things are relative and must be viewed from thepoint of view of their age. Yet no champion of histori-cism has the boldness to contend that exorcism everwas a suitable means to cure sick cows. But the histori-cists are less cautious in dealing with economics. Forinstance, they declare that what economics teachesabout the effects of price control is inapplicable to theconditions of the Middle Ages. The historical works ofauthors imbued with the ideas of historicism are mud-dled precisely on account of their rejection of eco-nomics. While emphasizing that they do not want to judgethe past by any preconceived standard, the historicistsin fact try to justify the policies of the \"good old days.\"

216 EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF HISTORYInstead of approaching the theme of their studies withthe best mental equipment available, they rely uponthe fables of pseudo economics. They cling to the super-stition that decreeing and enforcing maximum pricesbelow the height of the potential prices which the un-hampered market would fix is a suitable means to im-prove the conditions of the buyers. They omit to men-tion the documentary evidence of the failure of the justprice policy and of its effects which, from the point ofview of the rulers who resorted to it, were more un-desirable than the previous state of affairs which theywere designed to alter. One of the vain reproaches heaped by historicists onthe economists is their alleged lack of historical sense.Economists, they say, believe that it would have beenpossible to improve the material conditions of earlierages if only people had been familiar with the theoriesof modern economics. Now, there can be no doubt thatthe conditions of the Roman Empire would have beenconsiderably affected if the emperors had not resortedto currency debasement and had not adopted a policyof price ceilings. It is no less obvious that the masspenury in Asia was caused by the fact that the despoticgovernments nipped in the bud all endeavors to accum-ulate capital. The Asiatics, unlike the Western Euro-peans, did not develop a legal and constitutional systemwhich would have provided the opportunity for large-scale capital accumulation. And the public, actuated bythe old fallacy that a businessman's wealth is the causeof other people's poverty, applauded whenever rulersconfiscated the holdings of successful merchants.

HISTORICISM 217 The economists have always been aware that the ev-olution of ideas is a slow, time-consuming process. Thehistory of knowledge is the account of a series of suc-cessive steps made by men each of whom adds some-thing to the thoughts of his predecessors. It is not sur-prising that Democritus of Abdera did not develop thequantum theory or that the geometry of Pythagoras andEuclid is different from that of Hilbert. Nobody everthought that a contemporary of Pericles could have cre-ated the free-trade philosophy of Hume, Adam Smith,and Ricardo and converted Athens into an emporium ofcapitalism. There is no need to analyze the opinion of many his-toricists that to the soul of some nations the practicesof capitalism appear so repulsive that they will neveradopt them. If there are such peoples, they will foreverremain poor. There is but one road that leads towardprosperity and freedom. Can any historicist on theground of historical experience contest this truth? No general rules about the effects of various modesof action and of definite social institutions can be de-rived from historical experience. In this sense the fa-mous dictum is true that the study of history can teachonly one thing: viz., that nothing can be learned fromhistory. We could therefore agree with the historicistsin not paying much attention to the indisputable factthat no people ever raised itself to a somewhat satis-factory state of welfare and civilization without the in-stitution of private ownership of the means of produc-tion. It is not history but economics that clarifies ourthoughts about the effects of property rights. But we

218 EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF HISTORYmust entirely reject the reasoning, very popular withmany nineteenth-century writers, that the alleged factthat the institution of private property was unknownto peoples in primitive stages of civilization is a validargument in favor of socialism. Having started as theharbingers of a future society which will wipe out allthat is unsatisfactory and will transform the earth intoa paradise, many socialists, for instance Engels, virtu-ally became advocates of a return to the supposedlyblissful conditions of a fabulous golden age of the re-mote past. It never occurred to the historicists that man mustpay a price for every achievement. People pay the priceif they believe that the benefits derived from the thingto be acquired outweigh the disadvantages resultingfrom the sacrifice of something else. In dealing withthis issue historicism adopts the illusions of romanticpoetry. It sheds tears about the defacement of natureby civilization. How beautiful were the untouched vir-gin forests, the waterfalls, the solitary shores before thegreed of acquisitive people spoiled their beauty! Theromantic historicists pass over in silence the fact thatthe forests were cut down in order to win arable landand the falls were utilized to produce power and light.There is no doubt that Coney Island was more idyllicin the days of the Indians than it is today. But in itspresent state it gives millions of New Yorkers an oppor-tunity to refresh themselves which they cannot get else-where. Talk about the magnificence of untouched natureis idle if it does not take into account what man has gotby \"desecrating\" nature. The earth's marvels were cer-

HISTORICISM 219tainly splendid when visitors seldom set foot upon them.Commercially organized tourist traffic made them ac-cessible to the many. The man who thinks \"What a pitynot to be alone on this peak! Intruders spoil my pleas-ure,\" fails to remember that he himself probably wouldnot be on the spot if business had not provided all thefacilities required. The technique of the historicists' indictment of cap-italism is simple indeed. They take all its achievementsfor granted, but blame it for the disappearance of someenjoyments that are incompatible with it and for someimperfections which still may disfigure its products.They forget that mankind has had to pay a price for itsachievements—a price paid willingly because peoplebelieve that the gain derived, e.g., the prolongation ofthe average length of life, is more to be desired.5. Dissolving History History is a sequence of changes. Every historical sit-uation has its individuality, its own characteristics thatdistinguish it from any other situation. The stream ofhistory never returns to a previously occupied point.History is not repetitious. Stating this fact is not to express any opinion aboutthe biological and anthropological problem of whethermankind is descended from a common human ancestry.There is no need to raise the question here whether thetransformation of subhuman primates into the speciesHomo sapiens occurred only once at a definite time andin a definite part of the earth's surface or came to pass

220 EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF HISTORYseveral times and resulted in the emergence of variousoriginal races. Neither does the establishment of thisfact mean that there is such a thing as unity of civiliza-tion. Even if we assume that all men are scions of acommon human ancestry, there remains the fact thatthe scarcity of the means of sustenance brought abouta dispersal of people over the globe. This dispersal re-sulted in the segregation of various groups. Each ofthese groups had to solve for itself man's specific prob-lem of life: how to pursue the conscious striving afterimprovement of conditions warranting survival. Thusvarious civilizations emerged. It will probably never beknown to what extent definite civilizations were iso-lated and independent of one another. But it is certainthat for thousands of years instances of such culturalisolation existed. It was only the explorations of Euro-pean navigators and travelers that finally put an endto it. Many civilizations came to an impasse. They eitherwere destroyed by foreign conquerors or disintegratedfrom within. Next to the ruins of marvelous structuresthe progeny of their builders live in poverty and ig-norance. The cultural achievements of their forefathers,their philosophy, technology, and often even their lan-guage have fallen into oblivion, and the people haverelapsed into barbarism. In some cases the literature ofthe extinct civilization has been preserved and, redis-covered by scholars, has influenced later generationsand civilizations. Other civilizations developed to a certain point andthen came to a standstill. They were arrested, as Bage-

HISTORICISM 221hot said.1 The people tried to preserve the achievementsof the past but they no longer planned to add anythingnew to them. A firm tenet of eighteenth-century social philosophywas meliorism. Once the superstitions, prejudices, anderrors that caused the downfall of older civilizationshave given way to the supremacy of reason, there willbe a steady improvement of human conditions. Theworld will become better every day. Mankind willnever return to the dark ages. Progress toward higherstages of well-being and knowledge is irresistible. Allreactionary movements are doomed to failure. Present-day philosophy no longer indulges in such optimisticviews. We realize that our civilization too is vulnerable.True, it is safe against external attacks on the part offoreign barbarians. But it could be destroyed fromwithin by domestic barbarians. Civilization is the product of human effort, theachievement of men eager to fight the forces adverse totheir well-being. This achievement is dependent onmen's using suitable means. If the means chosen are notfit to produce the ends sought, disaster results. Bad pol-icies can disintegrate our civilization as they have de-stroyed many other civilizations. But neither reasonnor experience warrants the assumption that we cannotavoid choosing bad policies and thereby wrecking ourcivilization. There are doctrines hypostatizing the notion of civ-ilization. In their view a civilization is a sort of livingbeing. It comes into existence, thrives for some time,1. Walter Bagehot, Physics and Politics (London, 1872), p. 212.

222 EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF HISTORYand finally dies. All civilizations, however differentthey may appear to the superficial observer, have thesame structure. They must necessarily pass through thesame sequence of successive stages. There is no history.What is mistakenly called history is in fact the repe-tition of events belonging to the same class; is, asNietzsche put it, eternal recurrence. The idea is very old and can be traced back to an-cient philosophy. It was adumbrated by Giovanni Bat-tista Vico. It played some role in the attempts of severaleconomists to develop schemes of parallelisms of theeconomic history of various nations. It owes its presentpopularity to Oswald Spengler's Decline of the WestSoftened to some extent and thereby rendered incon-sistent, it is the main idea of the voluminous Study ofHistory on which Arnold J. Toynbee is still working.There is no doubt that both Spengler and Toynbee wereprompted by the widespread disparagement of capital-ism. Spengler's motive clearly was to prognosticate theinevitable breakdown of our civilization. Although un-affected by the chiliastic prophecies of the Marxians, hewas himself a socialist and entirely under the sway ofthe socialists' vilification of the market economy. Hewas judicious enough to see the disastrous implicationsof the policies of the German Marxians. But, lackingany economic knowledge and even full of contempt foreconomics, he came to the conclusion that our civiliza-tion has to choose between two evils each of which isbound to destroy it. The doctrines of both Spengler andToynbee show clearly the poor results engendered byneglect of economics in any treatment of human con-

HISTORICISM 223cerns. True, Western civilization is decadent. But its de-cadence consists precisely in the endorsement of theanticapitalistic creed. What we may call the Spengler doctrine dissolveshistory into the record of the life span of individualentities, the various civilizations. We are not told inprecise terms what marks characterize an individualcivilization as such and distinguish it from another civ-ilization. All that we learn about this essential matteris metaphorical. A civilization is like a biological being;it is born, grows, matures, decays, and dies. Such anal-ogies are no substitute for unambiguous clarificationand definition. Historical research cannot deal with all things to-gether; it must divide and subdivide the totality ofevents. Out of the whole body of history it carves sep-arate chapters. The principles applied in so doing aredetermined by the way the historian understands thingsand events, value judgments and the actions promptedby them and the relation of actions to the further courseof affairs. Almost all historians agree in dealing sepa-rately with the history of various more or less isolatedpeoples and civilizations. Differences of opinion aboutthe application of this procedure to definite problemsmust be decided by careful examination of each indi-vidual case. No epistemological objection can be raisedto the idea of distinguishing various civilizations withinthe totality of history. But what the Spengler doctrine means is somethingentirely different. In its context a civilization is a Gestalt,a whole, an individuality of a distinct nature. What de-

224 EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF HISTORYtermines its origin, changes, and extinction stems fromits own nature. It is not the ideas and actions of theindividuals that constitute the historical process. Thereis in fact no historical process. On the earth civilizationscome into being, live for some time, and then die justas various specimens of every plant species are born,live, and wither away. Whatever men may do is irrele-vant to the final outcome. Every civilization must decayand die. There is no harm in comparing different historicalevents and different events that occurred in the historyof various civilizations. But there is no justificationwhatever for the assertion that every civilization mustpass through a sequence of inevitable stages. Mr. Toynbee is inconsistent enough not to deprive usentirely of any hope for the survival of our civilization.While the whole and only content of his study is topoint out that the process of civilization consists of pe-riodic repetitive movements, he adds that this \"does notimply that the process itself is of the same cyclical orderas they are.\" Having taken pains to show that sixteencivilizations have perished already and nine others areat the point of death, he expresses a vague optimismconcerning the future of the twenty-sixth civilization.2 History is the record of human action. Human actionis the conscious effort of man to substitute more satis-factory conditions for less satisfactory ones. Ideas de-determine what are to be considered more and lesssatisfactory conditions and what means are to be re- 2. A. J. Toynbee, A Study of History, Abridgment of VolumesI-VI by D. C. Somervell (Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 254.

HISTORICISM 225sorted to to alter them. Thus ideas are the main theme ofthe study of history. Ideas are not an invariable stockthat existed from the very beginning of things and thatdoes not change. Every idea originated at a definitepoint of time and space in the head of an individual.(Of course, it has happened again and again that thesame idea originated independently in the heads of var-ious individuals at various points of time and space.)The genesis of every new idea is an innovation; it addssomething new and unheard of before to the course ofworld affairs. The reason history does not repeat itselfis that every historical state is the consummation of theoperation of ideas different from those that operated inother historical states. Civilization differs from the mere biological and phys-iological aspects of life in being an offshoot of ideas.The essence of civilization is ideas. If we try to distin-guish different civilizations, the differentia specified canbe found only in the different meanings of the ideasthat determined them. Civilizations differ from one an-other precisely in the quality of the substance that char-acterizes them as civilizations. In their essential struc-ture they are unique individuals, not members of a class.This forbids us to compare their vicissitudes with thephysiological process going on in an individual man's oranimal's life. In every animal body the same physiolog-ical changes come to pass. A child ripens in the mother'swomb, it is delivered, grows, matures, decays, and diesin the consummation of the same cycle of life. It isquite another thing with civilizations. In being civiliza-tions they are disparate and incommensurable because

226 EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF HISTORYthey are actuated by different ideas and therefore de-velop in different ways. Ideas must not be classified without regard to thesoundness of their content. Men have had differentideas concerning the cure of cancer. Up to now noneof these ideas has produced fully satisfactory results.But this would not justify the inference that thereforefuture attempts to cure cancer will also be futile. Thehistorian of past civilizations may declare: There wassomething wrong with the ideas upon which those civ-ilizations that decayed from within were built. But hemust not derive from this fact the conclusion that othercivilizations, built on different ideas, are also doomed.Within the body of animals and plants forces are op-erating that are bound to disintegrate it eventually. Nosuch forces could be discovered in the \"body\" of a civ-ilization which would not be the outcome of its partic-ular ideologies. No less vain are efforts to search in the history ofvarious civilizations for parallelisms or identical stagesin their life span. We may compare the history of vari-ous peoples and civilizations. But such comparisonsmust deal not only with similarities but also with differ-ences. The eagerness to discover similarities inducesauthors to neglect or even to conjure away discrepan-cies. The first task of the historian is to deal with his-torical events. Comparisons made afterward on thebasis of a knowledge of events as perfect as possiblemay be harmless or sometimes even instructive. Com-parisons that accompany or even precede study of thesources create confusion if not outright fables.

HISTORICISM 2276. Undoing History There have always been people who exalted the goodold days and advocated a return to the happy past. Theresistance offered to legal and constitutional innova-tions by those whom they hurt has frequently crystal-lized in programs that requested a reconstruction ofold institutions or presumably old institutions. In somecases reforms that aimed at something essentially newhave been recommended as a restoration of ancient law.An eminent example was provided by the role MagnaCharta played in the ideologies of England's seven-teenth-century anti-Stuart parties. But it was historicism which for the first time franklysuggested unmaking historical changes and returning toextinct conditions of a remote past. We need not dealwith the lunatic fringe of this movement, such as Ger-man attempts to revive the cult of Wodan. Neither dothe sartorial aspects of these tendencies deserve morethan ironical comments. (A magazine picture showingmembers of the Hanover-Coburg family parading inthe garb of the Scottish clansmen who fought at Cullo-den would have startled the \"Butcher\" Cumberland.)Only the linguistic and economic issues involved re-quire attention. In the course of history many languages have beensubmerged. Some disappeared completely without leav-ing any trace. Others are preserved in old documents,books, and inscriptions and can be studied by scholars.Several of these \"dead\" languages—Sanskrit, Hebrew,

228 EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF HISTORYGreek, and Latin—influence contemporary thoughtthrough the philosophical and poetical value of theideas expressed in their literature. Others are merelyobjects of philological research. The process that resulted in the extinction of a lan-guage was in many cases merely linguistic growth andtransformation of the spoken word. A long successionof slight changes altered the phonetic forms, the vocab-ulary, and the syntax so thoroughly that later genera-tions could no longer read the documents bequeathedby their ancestors. The vernacular developed into a newdistinct language. The old tongue could only be under-stood by those with special training. The death of theold language and the birth of the new one were theoutcome of a slow, peaceful evolution. But in many cases linguistic change was the outcomeof political and military events. People speaking a for-eign language acquired political and economic hegem-ony either by military conquest or by the superiorityof their civilization. Those speaking the native tonguewere relegated to a subordinate position. On accountof their social and political disabilities it did not mattervery much what they had to say and how they said it.Important business was transacted exclusively in thelanguage of their masters. Rulers, courts, church, andschools employed only this language; it was the lan-guage of the laws and the literature. The old nativetongue was used only by the uneducated populace.Whenever one of these underlings wanted to rise to abetter position, he had first to learn the language of

HISTORICISM 229the masters. The vernacular was reserved to the dullestand the least ambitious; it fell into contempt and finallyinto oblivion. A foreign language superseded the nativeidiom. The political and military events that actuated thislinguistic process were in many cases characterized bytyrannical cruelty and pitiless persecution of all oppo-nents. Such methods met with the approval of somephilosophers and moralists of precapitalistic ages, asthey have sometimes won the praise of contemporary\"idealists\" when the socialists resort to them. But to the\"spurious rationalistic dogmatism of the orthodox lib-eral doctrinaires\" they appear shocking. The historicalwritings of the latter lacked that lofty relativism whichinduced self-styled \"realistic\" historians to explain andto justify all that had happened in the past and to vin-dicate surviving oppressive institutions. (As one criticreproachfully observed, in the utilitarians \"old institu-tions awake no thrill; they are simply embodiments ofprejudice.\") * It does not need any further explanationwhy the descendants of the victims of those persecu-tions and oppressions judged in a different way the ex-perience of their ancestors, still less why they were in-tent upon abolishing those effects of past despotismwhich still hurt them. In some cases, not content witheliminating still existing oppression, they planned toundo also such changes as did not harm them anylonger, however detrimental and malignant the proc- 1. Leslie Stephens, The English Utilitarians (London, 1900), 3,70 (on J. Stuart Mill).

230 EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF HISTORYess that had brought them about had been in a distantpast. It is precisely this that the attempts to undo lin-guistic changes aim at. The best example is provided by Ireland. Aliens hadinvaded and conquered the country, expropriated thelandowners, destroyed its civilization, organized a des-potic regime, and tried to convert the people by forceof arms to a religious creed which they despised. Theestablishment of an alien church did not succeed inmaking the Irish abandon Roman Catholicism. But theEnglish language superseded the native Gaelic idiom.When later the Irish succeeded step by step in curbingtheir foreign oppressors and finally acquiring politicalindependence, most of them were no longer linguis-tically different from the English. They spoke Englishand their eminent writers wrote English books some ofwhich are among the outstanding works of modernworld literature. This state of affairs hurts the feelings of many Irish.They want to induce their fellow citizens to return tothe idiom their ancestors spoke in ages gone by. Thereis little open opposition to these pursuits. Few peoplehave the courage to fight a popular movement openly,and radical nationalism is today, next to socialism, themost popular ideology. Nobody wants to risk beingbranded an enemy of his nation. But powerful forcesare silently resisting the linguistic reform. People clingto the tongue they speak no matter whether those whowant to suppress it are foreign despots or domesticzealots. The modern Irish are fully aware of the ad-vantages they derive from the fact that English is the

HISTORICISM 231foremost language of contemporary civilization, whicheveryone has to learn in order to read many importantbooks or to play a role in international trade, in worldaffairs, and in great ideological movements. Preciselybecause the Irish are a civilized nation whose authorswrite not for a limited audience but for all educatedpeople, the chances of a substitution of Gaelic for Eng-lish are slim. No nostalgic sentimentality can alter thesecircumstances. It must be mentioned that the linguistic pursuits ofIrish nationalism were prompted by one of the mostwidely adopted political doctrines of the nineteenthcentury. The principle of nationality as accepted by allthe peoples of Europe postulates that every linguisticgroup must form an independent state and that thisstate must embrace all people speaking the same lan-guage.2 From the point of view of this principle anEnglish-speaking Ireland should belong to the UnitedKingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the mereexistence of an independent Irish Free State appearsirregular. The prestige which the principle of national-ity enjoyed in Europe was so enormous that variouspeoples who desired to form a state of their own the in-dependence of which was at variance with it tried tochange their language in order to justify their aspira-tions in its light. This explains the attitude of the Irishnationalists, but it does not affect what has been saidabout the implications of their linguistic plans. A language is not simply a collection of phonetic 2. Mises, Omnipotent Government (New Haven, Yale UniversityPress, 1944), pp. 84-9.

232 EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF HISTORYsigns. It is an instrument of thinking and acting. Its vo-cabulary and grammar are adjusted to the mentality ofthe individuals whom it serves. A living language-spoken, written, and read by living men—changes con-tinually in conformity with changes occurring in theminds of those who use it. A language fallen into desue-tude is dead because it no longer changes. It mirrorsthe mentality of people long since passed away. It isuseless to the people of another age no matter whetherthese people are biologically the scions of those whoonce used it or merely believe themselves to be theirdescendants. The trouble is not with the terms signify-ing tangible things. Such terms could be supplementedby neologisms. It is the abstract terms that provide in-soluble problems. The precipitate of a people's ideolog-ical controversies, of their ideas concerning issues ofpure knowledge and religion, legal institutions, politicalorganization, and economic activities, these terms re-flect all the vicissitudes of their history. In learning then-meaning the rising generation are initiated into themental environment in which they have to live and towork. This meaning of the various words is in continualflux in response to changes in ideas and conditions. Those who want to revive a dead language must infact create out of its phonetic elements a new languagewhose vocabulary and syntax are adjusted to the con-ditions of the present age, entirely different from thoseof the old age. The tongue of their ancestors is of nouse to the modern Irish. The laws of present-day Ire-land could not be written in the old vocabulary; Shaw,Joyce, and Yeats could not have employed it in their