ECH3602 Major Disaster Assignment1 Group 1

THE LARGEST MARINE OIL SPILL IN THE WORLD DEEPWATER HORIZON APRIL 20, 2010 ECH3602 SAFETY AND RISK ASSESSMENT ASSIGNMENT 1 : MAJOR DISASTER LECTURER: DR MUS'AB BIN ABD. RAZAK MEMBERS: 198743 197337 NUR ARIENA HANIS BINTI MOHD NOR 198692 NIZAR BIN JALALUDEEN RAJAGOBAR 199078 NURAFIFAH DILLA BINTI DIWI MUHAMMAD IKMAL HAZIQ BIN KHAIRUL ANUAR

TABLE OF 3 BACKGROUND 4 DEEPWATER HORIZON CONTENTS DESIGN 5 CAUSES 7 ACTION TAKEN 10 PUBLIC PERCEPTION 14 PRECAUTIONS 15 HAZARD AND PROCESS SAFETY 16 CONCLUSION 17 REFERENCES

BACKGROUND The Gulf of Mexico is one of The search for oil and gas During the 4th era of the the Atlantic Ocean smaller offshore for United States of petroleum industry in region and 9th largest body America (USA) in the gulf is America especially Gulf of of water in the world. The gulf one of the most important Mexico appears as the majorly bounded by the North source which also relates the Deepwater gushers as there American continent and of USA history of the were an impressive growth in Cuban islands. Gulf Coast of petroleum industry. The gulf oil production since the mid the United States bounds on offshore production from of 1990. The application of the northeast, north and negligible in 1945, but it is a the technologies also creates northwest, Mexico bounds on vital source where about 34 a technology bloom that the southwest and south and percent of the world’s crude oil conjured up by the modern Cuba on the southeast. The and about 25 percent of the petroleum industry. ocean basin is oval shape world’s natural gas is able to Deepwater fields are likely to approximately where wide discover. These percentages have relatively short life- about 810 maritime miles are favorable to shoot up by cycles, as high rates of (1,500 km). It is noticeable end of this decade. The Gulf production drain them faster that half of the basin is of Mexico is the most than production from equal- shallow intertidal waters explored, drilled, and size fields on the continental roughly. The gulf is about developed in this era. Today, shelf. As the Gulf of Mexico 615,000 miles (1.6 million km) in the continental shelf waters offshore industry matures, the covered with sedimentary off Louisiana and Texas, there limits on its potential become rocks and debris coverage. At are nearly 4,000 active more apparent, even with the the Sigsbee Deep, the deepest platforms servicing 35,000 revival of activity in point which is 14,383 ft (4,384 wells, and 29,000 miles of Deepwater. The fact that the m). Tidal range are very pipelines. The Gulf provides industry must keep searching minute and negligible due to close to one-third of U.S. oil in ever deeper, more remote the narrow connection with and gas supply and waters, with increasingly the ocean. production which exceeds expensive and sophisticated Texas’s onshore output and technology implies growing will soon surpass Alaska’s. scarcity, not abundance. 3

DEEPWATER HORIZON DESIGN Deepwater Horizon was a fifth- monitoring system and its technical generation Deepwater rig which was personnel is based in Houston, Texas. designed using RBS-8D model and This system ensures to receive a real-time dynamically positioned capability with drilling data from the rig itself and also column-stabilization. It is a semi- transmitting maintenance and submersible mobile offshore drilling unit troubleshooting information. specifically designed to drill deep subsea wells for oil exploration and production. Deepwater Horizon specialty was its With the aid of 15,000 psi (100,000 kPa) advancement in the rig's operation blowout preventer, and a 21 in (530 mm) varying from pressure and drill outside diameter marine riser the drilling monitoring technology until automated process was on full precaution with the shutoff systems as well as modelling hazards. systems for cementing. The OptiCem Deepwater Horizon was the second semi- cement modelling system used which was submersible rig which is an updated one of the investigation criteria in the version of its predecessor, Deepwater explosion accident. This model played a Nautilus which is incapable of dynamic vital part in cement slurry mix. positioning. In 2010 it was classified as one of the 200 Deepwater offshore rigs Deepwater Horizon was built for which are capable of drilling in waters Transocean company by Hyundai Heavy deep up to 5,000 ft (1,500 m). According Industries in Ulsan, South Korea. In the to American Bureau of Shipping (ABS), it end of 1998, the Construction took place is known as a class of a Column and the keel was laid on 21 March 2000. Stabilized Drilling Unit. By 23 February 2001 the rig was The major upgrade was executed in year delivered and the rig was registered in 2002 with \"e-drill\" which is a drill the Republic of Panama until 29 December 2004. 4

02.CAUSES Improper cementing job According to Bly in Deepwater Horizon investigation report, to prevent hydrocarbons from reservoir from entering wellbore, cement had been pumped down the production casing and up into the wellbore the day before the accident. The annulus cement that was placed at the bottom of the borehole did not seal well. Hydrocarbons began to leak through it into the wellbore annulus leading towards the surface. The seal was weak to withstand the pressure because they were composed of a concrete mixture that used nitrogen gas to accelerate curing. Gas from the reservoir may cause the viscosity of the cement was diluted. The shoe track failure To confirm the situation, the negative pressure test was run again but this time The shoe track failed to prevent hydrocarbons on the kill line. The result misinterpreted enter hydrocarbons into production casing. This as successful because the pressure held is because the cement used was insufficient as at 0 psi .On the other hand, the drill only 50 barrels of cement were used to seal pipeline pressure was on 1400 psi. A between the 7-inch production casing and the good result should be the kill line and previously cemented 9 7/8-inch protection casing drill pipeline were the same. (Arthur E. Berman, 2010). Misinterpretation of the negative pressure test Negative pressure test was to confirm the integrity of the entire wall. At first run, annular was closed. During the run, the pressure was high as the team decided open the upper annular to bleed the pressure. The result test was bad because the pressure end was not 0 psi. The well site insisted that there was something off with the drill pipe called bladder effect since there was pressure but no mud flowing out from the pipe. 5

Influx was not spotted soon by Emergency alarm failure the rig crew As the mud overflows, the crew diverting After 20 hours, as part of the normal the mud to the mud gas separator, but the operations to temporarily abandon the well, drill pipe pressure keeps increasing cause the crew began to displace the remaining mud and hydrocarbons discharged from the drilling fluid with seawater to start this rig. operation. The annular preventer was open and heavy mud displacement occurred. The BOP failure mud displacement was to removes pressure stabilizing mud from the well prior to The pressure drop above the pipe ram but disconnection unfortunately the mud from at the same time, the pressure in the drill shot up. 40 minutes before the rig crew pipe climbed substantially the drill pipe take actions, mud overflow onto the rig was closed at the top but the oil and gas floor as the hydrocarbons flow up through continued to flow in from the reservoir production casing and passed BOP (Bly, below. The large difference in pressure 2011). Later, the rig crew appeared to close caused the drill pipe to buckle and the pipe an annular preventer. bending off-center inside the blowout preventer. The buckling pushed sections of Well control failure the drill pipe outside of the reach of the blind shear ram. The annular preventer was closed but the The blind sheer ram is closed by AMF and mud was overflow and shot up. Activation the drill pipe is removed. This emergency of the annular preventer failed to seal the system is intended to be triggered when annulus. electrical hydraulics and plant communications are lost. Two redundant Overwhelmed separator control systems known as the yellow pod and the blue pod were run by this system in As the mud overflows, the crew diverting the BOP. An inspection of the BOP control the mud to the mud gas separator, but the pods after the accident showed that there drill pipe pressure keeps increasing cause was a flaw in the yellow control pod in a mud and hydrocarbons discharged from the vital solenoid valve and that there was rig. insufficient charge for the blue pod AMF batteries. These faults likely existed ay the time of the accident. One system seems to have had a flat battery and the other a defective switch. Therefore, the blowout preventer did not close. Timeline Initiation Propagation Termination Improper Misinterpretation Well control Emergency alarm Massive oil cementing of negative failure failure spill job pressure test Shoe track Influx was not Overwhelmed BOP failure spotted soon by separator failure the rig crew 6

03.ACTION TAKEN After the oil spillage have been spread through Gulf of Mexico, US government are haven taken four main actions to cope with this disaster ;- 01. Shoreline Protection Actions Response Actions designed for shoreline protection included placement of boom and construction of berms. Since boom was identified as a critical limited resource, planning strategies were used to prioritize available boom for areas identified as environmentally sensitive (USCG 2011). Boom was placed and anchored with the intention of protecting shoreline or corralling oil on the water surface. Sorbent boom was used to soak up oil and needed to be removed once saturated (NOAA 2010a). By the end of August 2010, some 3.7 million feet (over 700 miles) of hard boom and over 9 million feet (1,700 miles) of sorbent boom had been deployed (USCG 2011). The total length of deployed boom (over 12.7 million feet) is approximately the distance from New York City to Los Angeles. Next, The State of Louisiana requested that BP fund the construction of over 100 miles of sand berms, which were intended to prevent oil from entering estuaries and marshes. Dredging and construction began in mid-June 2010, though little progress had been made by July 15, 2010, when the well was capped. Personnel at the Bon Secour National Wildlife Refuge constructed a smaller berm to protect Little Lagoon, an environmentally sensitive estuary at the refuge, from oil intrusion. Personnel also constructed berms in front of storm blowout areas to protect the dune ecosystem on the refuge (USCG 2011). 02. Shoreline Response Activities The Shoreline Cleanup and Assessment • Stage I/II (May to September 2010). Technique (SCAT) program directed Focus on removal of floating oil adjacent to shoreline treatments across the northern Gulf the shoreline and bulk oil removal from the of Mexico for beaches and marshes. The shoreline. program was already in place by the time oil first made landfall during the second week of • Stage III (September 2010 to March 2011). May 2010. The SCAT program was conducted Ongoing cleanup activities on beaches, in four stages (Michel et al. 2015). marshes, and humanmade shoreline structures. • Stage IV (March to November 2011). Resurvey of affected areas; determination of “No Further Treatment” status. 7

Following Stage IV, the Shoreline Cleanup Completion Plan was implemented from November 2011 to April 2014 to complete the removal actions to the point where they were no longer part of active response. Cleanup crews engaged in a wide variety of activities that varied by location. On beaches, crews used manual and mechanical removal methods, including both onsite treatment and sediment relocation (Owens et al. 2011). One measure of the level of the cleanup effort is the total amount of oil waste material generated during response activities. EPA reported that, as of June 19, 2011, over 626 million pounds of oiled waste material had been collected and transported to disposal facilities, and shoreline cleanup continued well after that date. Through February 2014, that total had increased to over 642 million pounds of oiled waste material (Michel et al. 2015). As detailed in Section 4.6, Nearshore Marine Ecosystem, over 12,500 acres of sand beach habitat were affected by response activities undertaken to clean up the oil. These response activities on oiled sand beaches resulted in approximately 100 million pounds of oil waste materials removed from sand beaches (Michel et al. 2015). 03. Wildlife Response Activities (Figure 2.3-9, Figure 2.3-10, and Figure 2.3-11) (USCG 2011). The management of wildlife response operations was led by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS). Agencies initially deployed their own personnel and resources to address wildlife response, and followed existing oil spill response protocols. Wildlife response and rehabilitation were operating within the incident command structure of the spill. As response to the spill progressed, wildlife teams were positioned across the northern Gulf of Mexico to assist with various wildlife response-related activities. These activities included responding to mammal and sea turtle strandings and reports of oiled birds; documenting, inventorying, and storing dead animals; serving as wildlife observers; identifying sensitive and fragile habitats; providing guidance; and taking measures to reduce impacts to wildlife from cleanup activities. Rehabilitation teams worked with many nonprofit organizations, wildlife care centers, and aquariums across the country on capturing, transporting, and caring for animals during these recovery efforts. A wildlife hotline was also created to process and respond to reports of dead or oiled wildlife from responders and members of the public (USCG 2011). These tremendous response actions were necessitated because of the large number of animals that were directly exposed to Deepwater Horizon oil. Some animals were not only exposed to oil, but also handled by humans, and kept in captivity during recovery efforts, which added to the stress caused by the spill. Some animals were captured and relocated, which prevented exposure to oil but disrupted their natural habitat. Any animals that needed to be handled because of the oil spill may have been adversely affected regardless of the extent of oil exposure. 8•

03. Lost Human Use: Closures During the oil spill response, agencies • Louisiana: Louisiana issued its first fishery closed beaches and fisheries and restricted closure in state waters on April 30, 2010. vessel traffic around the BP Macondo well Closure areas expanded during the spill in area to protect human health and enable response to reports of oil. Louisiana response activities to proceed safely. The announced a reopening of some areas to closures resulted in lost use of recreational commercial fishing on May 10, 2010. areas and fisheries. Beaches Authorities closed beaches in 2010 and 2011 in Alabama, • Mississippi: Mississippi issued its first fishery Florida, Louisiana, and Mississippi, affecting closure in state waters on June 1, 2010. tourism and recreation. Beach closings can Mississippi announced a reopening of some be quantified in units of “oil spill advisory areas of commercial and recreational fishing days,” where one beach closed for 1 day starting on July 19, 2010. All Mississippi equals one “oil spill advisory day.” Through territorial waters were reopened completely June 15, 2011, the numbers of oil spill for commercial and recreational fishing advisory days in each state were as follows activities on August 21, 2010 (Jewell 2015). (NRDC 2011): • Alabama: Alabama issued its first closure in • Alabama: 1,661 oil spill advisory days at 30 state waters for commercial and recreational beaches from June 1 to July 30, 2010. fishing on June 1, 2010. Closures of different • Florida: 2,245 oil spill advisory days at 30 areas were in place until September 6, 2010, beaches from June 8, 2010 to June 15, 2011. when all waters were reopened to all valid • Louisiana: 3,420 oil spill closure days at 11 fisheries (Outdoor Alabama 2015). beaches from May 7, 2010 to June 15, 2011. • Mississippi: 2,148 oil spill advisory days at • Florida: Florida issued its first fishery 17 beaches from June 28 to November 30, closure for a portion of its state waters on 2010. June 14, 2010. All Florida fishery closures were lifted on August 17, 2010 (FWC 2010a, 2010b). Other than beaches are closed, authorities By September 2010, commercial and also closed fisheries for public-safety recreational fishing reopened to the harvest reasons, to protect fishermen from injuries, of fish, crabs, and shrimp in all state waters and to protect the public from potentially east of the Mississippi River and north of the eating contaminated seafood. These closures northern shore of Pass a Loutre (USCG 2011). resulted in substantial lost use of recreational fisheries during the spill. NOAA Fisheries first issued an emergency rule to close a portion of the Gulf of Mexico exclusive economic zone to all fishing in response to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill on May 2, 2010. This action closed off 6,817 square miles from fishing for public safety reasons (NOAA 2010a). Closures reached a peak of 88,522 square miles (nearly 37 percent of federal waters in the Gulf of Mexico) on June 2, 2010 (NOAA 2010b). NOAA Fisheries reopened the last remaining closed area in federal waters on April 19, 2011 (NOAA 2011). The following closures occurred across the different states: 9

04.PUBLIC PERCEPTION Deepwater horizon oil rig explosion causes a major oil spill which eventually leads to numerous amounts of problems in different areas of the society rose. Countless inquiry regarding the science and policy remain perplexed even after six years since the disaster occurred (Lichtveld et al., 2016). Below are several aspects that were taken into consideration in investigating the public perception towards this oil-spill disaster Social Aspect: Public health concern Diving into one of the majorly discussed aspect of the environment is the impacts of this oil spill disaster towards the public health concern. Lichtveld et al. (2016) listed the key air pollutants released due to the oil spill consist of hydrocarbons, particulate matter (PM), or aerosol particles, ozone, carbon monoxide, sulfur oxides and nitrogen oxides. The biggest source of primary air emissions was pinpointed as the hydrocarbons released due to the oil slick while byproducts of the reaction consisting ozone and secondary organic aerosols were detected in the atmosphere as well. Beyer et al. (2016) disclosed that pollutants containing hydrocarbons were more widely spread than what was believed formerly and dissolved benzene at a potentially deleterious concentration was detected outside of the areas previously known to contain hydrocarbons. An enormous amount of oil trapped in the deep waters forming a plume due to the depth of the gulf was also suspected. According to a study conducted by Diercks et al. (2010), polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon (PAH) concentrations of up to 189 μg / L (ppb) was discovered in the plume and the PAH pollution that has broadened to no less than 13 km from the wellhead existed In an article written by Goldstein, Osofsky and Lichtveld (2011), benzene is mentioned as a substance that contains hematotoxin and carcinogen that can cause diseases such as leukemia and anemia if a person is exposed to it excessively. Goldstein, Osofsky and Lichtveld (2011) claimed that PAHs can bio accumulate and have the potential to cause skin and lung cancer other than posing negative effects to the reproductive and developmental toxic towards the human body. Despite the claims made, the same article has affirmed that all of these organic components appear unlikely to be found in an amount that correlated to long-term health problems. Based on the countless air samples collected by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), none of the results display any alarming level of concentrations of benzene or other volatile organic hydrocarbons that may pose threats to humans. Meanwhile, up till October 2020, a negative result for benzene and PAHs in the water was obtained by the EPA, and no volatile components of crude oil were detected. February 25, 2013 - A protest was held in front of the Federal Building during the trial over the Deepwater Horizon oil rig spill in New Orleans, Louisiana. 10

Environment Aspect: Impacts June 4, 2010 – A photo of a brown pelican on wildlife coated in oil in Louisiana. Sea turtles’ habitat was contaminated PHOTOGRAPH BY WINMCNAMEE, GETTY IMAGES due to the oil from the Deepwater Horizon. The oil-covered turtles are May 5, 2010 – An image showing a loggerhead easily exhausted due to the movement sea turtle swimming in the oil-contaminated restrictions exposing them to predators. water of Mexico Gulf. National Marine Fisheries Service Fisheries (2020) unveiled that around PHOTOGRAPH BY CAROL GUZY, THE WASHINGTON 4,900 to 7.600 adult sea turtles and an estimated 56,000 to 166,000 juvenile sea turtles were killed. 35,000 hatchlings or more were also lost. 21 species of cetaceans reported to inhabit the Gulf Coast were found to be exposed to oil when they continue inhaling contaminated air, swam in or consume sediment, water or prey full of contaminants. At least 15 species of the 22 stocks found has suffered from injuries including mortality, elevated productive failure and unfortunate health impacts. The stocks consist of bay, sound and estuarine bottlenose dolphin stocks, coastal and shelf dolphin stocks and oceanic whales. The marine species such as shrimp, crabs, grouper and snapper utilize corals as their habitats. Therefore, the preservation of corals is really important to ensure the ecosystem is well-balanced. Peter Etnoyer, a marine biologist at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) Hollings Lab, however has reported that some corals were wounded to some degree specifically the colonies that were thriving near the wellhead of the Deepwater Horizon. Additionally, around 100,000 to a million numbers of birds were deeply affected including 32 percent of laughing gulls and a quarter of brown pelicans. 11

June 5, 2010 – A sign was put up on the Economical Aspect: How the side of the road in Grand Isle, Louisiana, Deepwater Horizon oil spill ruin industry related to the expressing the community’s frustration communities with British Petroleum over the oil spill. In 2010, as a result of post-spill fishing PHOTOGRAPH BY CHERYL GERBER, closures, shrimp landings decreased by GETTY IMAGES 32% in Louisiana, 60% in Mississippi, 56% in Alabama. Estimated lost tourism 2011 - The number of persons employed dollars were projected to cost the Gulf mainly ranged from 0 – 2,500 across the coastal economy up to $22.7 billion through 2013. Mississippi was one of the Gulf of Mexico. cities that suffered the greatest economic PHOTOGRAPH BY CHERYL GERBER, loss due to the oil spill as the tourism industry mainly focused on the common GETTY IMAGES boating attractions and countless seafood restaurants around its cities. Another state involved in receiving a fund from BP was Alabama and Florida. Although Florida was also affected by the oil spill and suffered from a large number of hotel and home rental cancelation, its tourism industry still managed to generate $64 billion in 2016 (Norman, C. 2017). Jonny Beyer et al. explained that Louisiana earned to $151.6 million dollars from their fishing industries before the oil spill and their losses accumulated to 77% of their production post-spill. This matter is important to be handle as quickly as possible as the state have the most productive fisheries among the many states along the Gulf Coast. Due to the oil spills, the usual buyers of the seafood fresh stock avoided buying from restaurants or suppliers from the gulf as they believed the marine products obtained from the ocean are not safe to be consumed. Due to the decrease in demand of fresh seafood and other marine services, businesses slowed down causing many workers were forced to be laid-off. A report prepared by the company responsible for this disaster, British Petroleum, stated that financial support was provided to restore the economy throughout the Gulf Coast, focusing on the tourism and seafood industry. A total of $117 million was spent on helping the four states affected which are Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Florida to boost their tourism industry and to reduce the impact of the oil spill towards respective communities. Meanwhile, $31 million was used to fund the seafood and fisheries industry. 12

Ethical Aspect: British Petroleum’s negligence and the Political View of the disaster A series of ethical issues arose after the explosion of Deepwater Horizon oil rig connected to the company British Petroleum. In an article titled ‘Bad Company: BP, human rights and corporate crimes’ written by an organization called cultureunstained.org revealed one of the underlying causes of this disaster, BP’s records in human rights issues. BP pleaded guilty to 14 criminal charges and was found guilty for neglecting and misconducting the whole operation voluntarily after the disaster. The company has also acknowledged to manipulate independent research relating to the spill internally and also lied to the US House of Representatives by providing false information about the amount of oil flowing into the gulf. Lustgarten, A. (2010) stated that workers have reported to numerous safety problems in the oil rig system but were always dismissed so that the company could cut down their expenditures. Untrained and unqualified employees were given important tasks out of their area of specialty causing inaccuracy. Other negligence found upon investigation were numerous accounts of faulty equipment and corroded pipelines reoccurring due to not using corrosion inhibitors. Barack Obama, the US President during the period this disaster is happening has clearly expressed his disappointment with the Minerals Management Service (MMS), the Interior Department agency that regulates offshore drilling. An executive order, Executive Order 13457, to promote environmental stewardship of the ocean, coasts, and the Great Lakes in light of the oil spill was signed by the President. Some of the content of the order is that all executive departments and related parties to participate in the process for coastal and marine spatial planning and comply with Council certified coastal and marine spatial plans, as described in the Final Recommendations and subsequent guidance from the Council (Executive Order 13547 --Stewardship of the Ocean, Our Coasts, and the Great Lakes, 2010). 13

01 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL: PRECAUTIONS A) Provide proper training B) Regular site inspection Proper training for the employees The company must conduct a should be conducted before they are regular site inspection and allowed to perform key processes. improve their communication with Employees should also be briefed and the workers on the oil rig. Days trained to handle emergency situations before the disaster, it has been and possible accidents that may reported that the rig’s blowout emerge. preventer might not be C) Precautionary principle should be functioning well, the alarm system implemented (ALARP) was reported to be switched off Precautionary principles describe about and the computer system which is the actions that need to be taken in responsible to monitor key safety case of a project possibly posing harm equipment keeps crashing. and risky for the society and Despite all the issues reported, environment. Action taken shall be none of the people from the main proven that it will help reducing the office responded and proceed to uncertainty and possible harm to as low neglect the worsening condition as reasonably practicable. Failure to do of the rig as the main goal is to so, a project shall never receive the only keep the oil rig running permission to be continued. Murphy’s (Pilkington, 2010). Law shall be taken into consideration during system design process. 02 ENGINEERING CONTROL: A) Remote shutoff capability B) Computer systems update Additional backup systems that are Ensure that the systems needed to able to allow all operations to halt monitor the key processes for all remotely should be developed. equipment run smoothly without errors that may affect the reading of some C) Blowout preventer maintenance vital processes. and design safety of well The blowout preventer which is a D) Tradeoffs between design and mechanical valve that is important to control be able to function well to avoid The tradeoffs between the cost and the uncontrolled release of crude oil materials used to build supporting should be well maintained. The design structure and all the key equipment safety of the well needs to be should be revised as ensuring the reviewed as it failed to be sealed with durability and the performances of the cement causing the effort to stop the materials are more important and more overflow of oil to fail. cost-effective in the long-term. 03 PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT: All workers should be provided with anti-flammable protective equipment. 14

A process hazard can be generally defined as presence of a stored or connected material or energy with inherent characteristics having the potential for causing loss or harm. In this Deepwater Horizon accident case, process hazard defined as a planning failure step of the oil rig seal and misinterpretations which lead to massive high pressurized release of highly flammable and reactive oil and gas which caused mechanical failure in a sequence. Finally, whole rig was on fire and sunk as well as oil leakage to the environment, not forgetting 11 fatalities. Table below shows the errors, loss event and impact of the incident. HAZARD AND PROCESS SAFETY Errors Loss Event Impact Sealing cement leakage to environment Causing pollution and Pressure Test Error Over pressure pipes burst environmental issues Fatality and rig on fire Valve Failure Flammable gas and oil A mixture of mud and continued release gas began pouring onto Blowout preventer (BOP) Flammable gas and oil the floor of the rig. continued release and Main safety failure lead pollution to fatality, property Overwhelmed Separator Flammable vapour damage, business losses ignition and penalties Gas Alarm Flammable vapour Mud-gas separator was ignition quickly overwhelmed and flammable gas began to BOP backup failure Emergency mechanical failure engulf the rig. Human error Over pressure pipes burst The closure of ventilation fans was failed to prevent the gas reaching potential causes of ignition Main safety failure lead to fatality, property damage, business losses and penalties Fatality, business loss, pollution and fines. 15

Basically, there are 3 process hazard which are Material, Energy and Chemical Interaction. In this Deepwater Horizon few process hazards were able to identified which are: Energy hazards Mechanical, kinetic and Hydraulic and pneumatic Chemical – (Health, positional 1) Oil under pressure inside Flammables, Combustibles, 1) Oil rig drill pipe Reactive) 2) Mud and gas separator ·2) Gas under high 1) Oil and gas from sea 3) Crane pressure inside pipe bed 4) Other heavy machines ·3) BOP 2) Oil and gas in the pipes Material hazards Chemical Interactions Mechanical, kinetic and positional Chemical – (Health, Flammables, 1) Oil rig drill Combustibles, Reactive) 2) Mud and gas separator 1) Oil and gas towards oxygen and fire 3) Crane 2) Oil and gas towards environment (sea, 4) Other heavy machines microorganisms and animals Hydraulic and pneumatic CONCLUSION Deepwater Horizon is a disaster that shall never be forgotten. This event shows how negligence can eventually affect a situation to become worse. Regular routine must always be followed and in this context, a regular inspection on site should be mandatory. The society has become more aware of the environment and how important it is to not only protect the wildlife but also preserve the natural habitats of these animals as protecting their habitats equals to reducing the concern over environmental issues such as global warming. Politically, establishing a law and enforcing it is vital in today’s society as event like this will keep on reoccurring if no strict measure is taken because to these companies, generating the highest possible income is the most important although it means having to sacrifice and putting lives in danger. Even till today, there are still many environmental issues that have surfaced due to the irresponsibility of companies that refuses to obey the law as they will always get away with whatever wrongdoings that they did. Deepwater Horizon spill has also taught us to always stand up and fight for your rights as a human. The economics, specifically the tourism and fisheries industry suffered a huge loss after the spill and it took British Petroleum several years to finally plead guilty to all the charges and compensate the people affected by this disaster. This situation would not have possibly happened if the people are not standing together through this and pressure the company to be responsible for the inhumane act that they have done. The same community has also helped ensure that BP is implementing controls to protect their workers from any future accidents, and this shall apply to all companies too. 16

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