Companion to Sparta II

570 Thomas Figueira systematically cultivated in the Mycenaean period that barley fields continued to grow naturally. To infiltrating Dorian bands, provision of olive production and grain crops without human intervention would have seemed providential, the basis for a sacral contract with gods and ancestral heroes. The myth of an early allocation became central to the later history of property in Lakōnike.̄ The transition to a ‘special’ property regime occurred by stages. The distribution of the Peloponnese among Heraklid kings was relevant as an alloca- tion between aristocratic lineages and their armed bands (Luraghi (2008) 48–61). That it entailed equal division among Dorian tribesmen, which in the fourth century Isokrates (6.20; 12.179, 259) and Plato emphasize (Laws 3.684D–E; 5.736C–E), seems an anach- ronism that was formulated under the influence of the tradition of Spartan equality. While not indicative of tenth‐century reality, these references establish the classical association between Spartan land tenure and equality (Figueira (2004b) 52–3). Eighth‐ century Laconia probably experienced a Homeric‐style distribution, in which basileis (‘kings’) received a disproportionate share, approximating preferential shares of plunder, elite estates in conquered communities, and exactions made for cults at the disposition of priestly families. Under this regime the Spartans first seized territory in the Eurotas valley and began to raid Messenia, drawing income thence. Claiming heroic descent, their elite fashioned a mythological pedigree for exploitation of weaker populations by citing Herakles’ rights over the lineages of Neileus and Hippokoon.13 Tyrtaios (late seventh century) visualizes his audience as Herakleidai when he exults in helot subservi- ence and mourning over their masters’ deaths (fr. 2.12–13, 11.1–2W). In classical Sparta, the right to govern as Herakleidai and compulsory helot mourning are reserved for the royal dynasties (Hdt. 6.58.2–3). That narrowing of privilege is significant. Archaic Sparta saw an elevation both of the royal dynasties as the genuine embodiment of Heraklid legitimacy and of the common Spartiate as full participant in the allocation of the com- munal assets.14 Scale was an essential feature of classical helotage. The conquest of Messenia was a watershed in establishing its viability. This large territory could only be secured by driving off the resistant groups. The Spartans acted to disrupt existing Dark Age set- tlements, like Nichoria in lower Messenia.15 In Messenia, canonical helotage entailed successive depopulations (Figueira (2003b) 221–5). Remaining helot workers in any locale were remnant populations after protracted resistance played itself out (the so‐called Messenian Wars: traditionally c. 735–715, c.668–625 or 660–600). Although the Messeniaka, local histories of the region, are notoriously untrustworthy as factual documentation, they do offer traditions of resistance punctuated by the departure of various intractable groups.16 The Spartan conquest of the Messenians was contemporaneous with the Greek colonial movement – notably both Spartiate holdings, cultivated by helots, and the land granted to colonists were called klēroi (‘allotments’). The existence of colonies such as Zankle in Sicily (a known destina- tion17) as possible refuges for the most resistant Messenians spared Sparta from con- fronting die‐hards for whom no other options for survival existed. Sometimes scholars have envisaged these displacements as removal of the Messenian elite, whom some would imagine as Dorians ruling a pre‐Dorian or Achaean common people. Such a view, however, may require a more settled cultural matrix than is likely for late eighth‐ or seventh‐century Messenia.

Helotage and the Spartan Economy 571 22.3  The Helot Allotments and Rents The foundation of the Spartan social system lay in the klēroi ‘allotments’,18 that com- prised arable land and the helots to cultivate it. One assumes the klēroi were named on analogy with allotments made in apoikiai (‘colonies’) and in other occupations of con- quered land.19 Our evidence seems to vouch for a principle of equal shares among peer colonists.20 The same principle of equal division of the Spartan politikē khor̄ a (‘land of the polis’) is specified by Polybios,21 and Spartan equality is a well‐attested tradition (Figueira (2004b) 49–51). The ultimate origin of the klēroi may well have existed in lands given to Laconian aristocrats in eighth‐century raids in the lower Eurotas valley and Messenia. The size of the late archaic or early classical klēroi has been a matter for scholarly speculation, but c.14.4–17.2 ha. is a likely magnitude.22 Therefore, the huge territory of Lakōnikē permitted an agrarian regime in which klēroi exceeded the estates of average farmers elsewhere (c.3.6–5.4 ha.). Klēroi not only exceeded median Attic landholdings, but they also generated output surpassing that of Athenian Zeugitai (notional hoplites), or 200 agricultural measures, and approximating that of Hippeis (‘Knights’) at Athens (300 measures). All Spartiates possessed holdings comparable to the lower range of the affluent elite in other poleis. No other mechanisms are known from Greek evidence for sustaining this high mean in property distribution other than the sort of limitations on alienation (i.e., sale or conveyance to someone else) that our testimonia attribute to Sparta. Furthermore, the disincentives to productivity and inef- ficiencies of servile labor ensure that the klēros‐system can only have been implemented on unusually productive land. My reconstruction of the klēroi endeavors to account for the full range of evidence on the Spartan regime of subsistence and includes the indications that Sparta had an atypical property system for a Greek polis. This picture reflects the account of Polybios and the traces of a ‘constitutional’ tradition on Sparta that begins with Aristotle and his students and is preserved in Plutarch, not only in his Lykourgos, but also in his Agis, Instituta Lycurgi, and Dicta Lycurgi.23 Our sources speak of the creation of thousands of klēroi (3,000, 4,500, 6,000, 9,000) by Lykourgos and perhaps also by King Polydoros, and imply various divisions of klēroi between Laconia and Messenia (Plut. Lyk. 8.5–6; Agis 8.2). The number of 4,500 klēroi associated with the third‐century reforms of Agis IV suggests an equal split between Laconia and Messenia. That seems unlikely when one considers the extent of the two regions and their number of perioikic communities. That Polydoros created an additional 3,000 to a Lykourgan 6,000 might indicate the creation of a second 3,000 in Messenia to supplement an earlier 3,000/3,000 interregional divi- sion. Estimates of arable land put at least two‐thirds of the klēroi in Messenia (Figueira (1984a) 101–2; (2003b) 203–11). Nevertheless, all the ancient figures for the klēroi merely render as design or hold as canonical the number 9,000. The testimony of Aristotle and Herodotos (on the mobili- zation for the battle of Plataia, in 479) indicates a highest level for the Spartiates c.9,000– 10,000 (Aris. Pol. 1270a36; Hdt. 7.234.2, 9.10.1, 28.2). Consequently, the 9,000 klēroi represent an estimate of a maximum number of adult male Spartiates that was reached 479–466. At some point in archaic Spartan history, the primordial Dorian occupation of Laconia started to be considered a distribution of equal shares, probably under the influence of contemporary equal allocations in the colonies. Perhaps the archaic (late

572 Thomas Figueira seventh‐century?) agrarian reform tried to accommodate 2,000 Spartans as klēros holders, contending that this was the size of the Dorian host occupying Laconia. Isokrates reports this traditional figure.24 If this hypothesis is valid, the ascent of the Spartiates from c.2,000 to c.10,000 from perhaps 630 to 465 (at the extremes) would stand as a remark- able testimony to the vitality of Spartan social arrangements. In envisaging the klēros‐system, anachronistic categorization must be avoided. Klēros‐ land constituted the politikē khor̄ a (‘land of the polis’) of Sparta (Polyb. 6.45.3–4). Yet to describe it as public property is erroneous, because this could only invoke private property as its counterpart. The creation of the klēros‐system preceded the emergence of private property, as the individual as an economic actor had not fully separated himself from his lineage, nor had a market in land developed. The klēroi were collective property as the common acquisition of the community, but no public apparatus existed to exert control over or to manage them. Quite different are the collective farms of modern com- munism that adapt either the work regimen of nineteenth‐century European factories or of Asian village communes of subsistence farmers. Rather the klēroi were only ‘political’ for their falling within the authority of the community to establish the suitability of their holders and set the rules for their transfer. Similarly, Strabo (8.5.4 C365) describes the helots as dēmosioi (‘public [property]’), a revealing expression although it introduces again an anachronistic distinction between ownership of public and private property. Certain landholdings were excluded from this politicized regimen, and this exemption was realized within a conventional early archaic social structure.25 Sparta never became a completely egalitarian community; the distinction between aristocrats and damos continued. Tempted to denominate land held apart from reallocation as private property, we again recall that such a category was not yet viable. Original holdings, however, which were not perceived as conquests of the proto‐polis acting collectively, appear to have been excluded from the klēros‐system. This land was presumably concentrated in the core territory of the Spartan villages and Amyklai. This reservation much favored the traditional aristocracy because it perpetuated an early archaic agrarian regime. The failure of an early market in land to develop meant that reserved land was also inalienable. There may even have been helots working such estates, the descendants of people subjugated before Sparta’s great expansion (from the late ninth and early eighth centuries). Thus, features of the Spartan polity, such as the choice of the gerontes (‘senators’) from a few families, were natural outgrowths of the preservation of an early archaic aristocracy. Hence came Sparta’s international athletes, its dedicators at panhellenic sanctuaries, and the wealthy lineages with whom the kings intermarried. Yet remarkably at Sparta, the physical appurtenances of landed wealth and the manifestations of behavioral differentiation accorded the rich elsewhere were denied to descendants of the old landed elite. This homogenization created the Homoioi (‘peers’), full Spartan citizens or Spartiates, who were isodiaitoi (‘equal in lifestyle’) (Thuc. 1.6.4–5). Yet, notwithstanding its concessions in behavioral opportunities, the old elite survived. The success of the klēros‐system is demonstrated by the expansion of Sparta. Such suc- cess probably turned the old core territory into a mosaic of estates and tiny plots of non‐klēros‐land. By intermarriage and dowering, the elite would try to preserve its estates just as wealthy landholders did in Attike and elsewhere. Limits on elite display and con- sumption, by excluding many misadventures that befell the wealthy elsewhere, promoted stability. The stability for the privileges of the elite excluded the necessity for expensive

Helotage and the Spartan Economy 573 patronage that might otherwise have led aristocrats to squander their estates. In contrast, the archaic Spartan damos grew unrestrictedly because the state assured possession of kler̄ oi to all who completed the agoḡ e.̄ 26 Thus, ever smaller holdings of the damos in non‐kler̄ os land – plots too small to manage through family planning and marital status strategies – would have been created through partible inheritance, so that many ordinary Spartiates must have come to possess a kler̄ os as their only significant holding.27 As long as Lakōnikē was free from rebellion and external attack and helot numbers were rising, the heavy dependence of common Spartiates on their kler̄ oi was not problematic. The social order would later come under stress only when manpower shortages afflicted Lakōnike.̄ 28 Tradition reports two sorts of levy or rent from the helots – in kind, naturally, in the Spartan barter economy – a proportion of 50 percent (Tyrtaios fr. 6W; cf. Paus. 4.14.4–5; Ael. VH 6.1), and a fixed number of medimnoi (‘bushels’) of barley (Plut. Lyk. 8.4, 12.2; cf. Myron FGrH 106 F 2), 72 for the Spartiate and 12 for his wife,29 and scholars have generally chosen one of these alternatives. However, the 50 percent levy and a fixed rent were possibly aspects of a single system (Figueira (2003b) 199–203). The one‐half exac- tion embodies a Dark Age pattern of even division between a superior and an inferior group, as confirmed by test of battle (Figueira (2003b) 199; Link (2004) 2–4). The fixed amounts, however, ensured generous support for a Spartiate soldier. Enough grain to support about 4–8 people at subsistence was left after the Spartiate paid his mess dues. Spartan officials, perhaps even the ephors, allocated helots and land to Spartiates by observation of their productivity, with an eye toward estimating a kler̄ os in which 50 per- cent of the output of a particular group of helots on a certain extent of land approxi- mated the needed amount of the main crop of barley.30 The focus on the grain yield probably left some incentive for the helots to produce certain products (like livestock?) that may not have been subject to the 50 percent rule. That the relations between Spartiate and helot were not monetized until the Hellenistic period reveals the archaic and conservative character of Spartan exploitation. This absence of monetary exactions occurred within the framework of a barter economy. Perhaps the Spartans also had a rough formula by which to reckon the number of helot males appropriate for supporting a single Spartiate. In the mobilization for the Plataia campaign in 479, each mustered Spartiate brought along seven helots (Hdt. 9.10.1, 9.29.1). These 35,000 helots were a significant proportion of all male helots. The rationale behind this levy was the security of Lakōnike,̄ because a mass of untrained and potentially disloyal followers had little military value.31 The justification of the ratio of seven to one might lie in a preexisting rule of thumb about administering the kler̄ oi rather than in some strategic or demographic calculation. Once the Spartiate’s income from this main constituent of his diet was assured, prod- ucts other than grain were either subject to their own specific rents (unfortunately unknown) or left to the 50 percent rule. Allocating production of the grain crop was thus consequential for kler̄ os demarcation. Hence we appreciate the anecdote in which Lykourgos supposedly first viewed reordered Lakōnikē at harvest time, comparing it to an inheritance divided equitably between brothers (Plut. Lyk. 8.4; cf. Mor. 226B). Let us recall that the Spartans are never described as managing the helots or kler̄ oi. Such a commitment of time would have worked at cross‐purposes with their exclusion from ordinary economic involvements. It would have introduced status differentiation, as

574 Thomas Figueira their individual managerial skills would have varied considerably. The kler̄ os‐system was truly absentee ‘ownership’, initially without direct supervision. Supervision would have entangled the economic fortunes of single Spartiates with their own individual helots and transformed helotage into a congeries of dependent relationships, rather than the balanced confrontation of two economic castes as presented in our sources. Such an agrarian regime is reconcilable with the absence of a state administration for supervising the helots. Annual review during harvests sufficed. As the helot population rose through natural increase, the number of kler̄ oi could rise accordingly. An ample stock of fertile land, especially in Messenia, permitted the helots to increase numbers by allowing them to cultivate idle fields around their holdings and vacant tracts or to farm more intensively land already under cultivation.32 The evidence for holding possible kler̄ os‐land in reserve is provided by the Thyreatis after its seizure from Argos in c.546, because it was left sufficiently vacant to accommodate several settlements of the fugitive Aiginetans in 430 (Thuc. 2.27.2, 4.56.2). Most distributed kler̄ os‐land lay in the interior of Lakōnikē and was insulated by perioikic towns from the northern border and from some points of best access to the sea. Helot losses to war and flight were probably low. Thus, personal security from hostilities was another incentive toward helot compliance. As the kler̄ os‐system expanded, the Spartans possessed another powerful tool for main- taining helot cooperation. They could offer young helot males early and risk‐free oppor- tunities to marry and form their own oikoi without their waiting to inherit. As already noted, Spartan control of Messenia had only been solidified through successive depopu- lations that left behind the more tractable. Surplus production of the main products of the kler̄ oi was probably not left for appropriation by their helot producers, but was sub- ject to the 50 percent levy. Even if this rent could not be practically raised on all output, it served as an important buttress of the Spartan class system, since it minimized licit opportunities for helot upward mobility. An ambitious, successful helot could not amass resources openly and permanently.33 Unlike at Athens or elsewhere, land tenure with ‘private’ property and equal partition among heirs did not prevail on kler̄ os‐land, but a dispensation where a Spartiate’s connection with particular fields and with certain helots was more conditional and communally determined. Hypothetically, the simplest mecha- nism is that vacant kler̄ oi, intact and indivisible, passed to sons and nearest heirs without kler̄ oi. Any males not thus afforded kler̄ oi, like younger sons of kler̄ os‐holders and those with surviving antecessors, were given new kler̄ oi, created by demarcation. The record of military power and the human resources underwriting its success tend to corroborate this reconstruction, because they indicate that Sparta had a strikingly differ- ent social order from contemporary poleis. Nonetheless, this reconstruction depends admittedly on an indispensable postulate, namely that a redistribution of land and dependent laborers had occurred sometime in the archaic period. In this social reconfig- uration, there was no total restructuring, because core land holdings of the Spartiates were apparently preserved, and an early archaic wealth and status disparity between elite and damos was maintained. The accessions to the communal core, acquired by collective action of the politai, i.e. mainly territory in the lower Eurotas valley and in Messenia, were now equally divided in principle among all Spartiates as Homoioi. During the late‐seventh‐ century suppression of the Messenians, affording equal shares may have constituted a pledge tendered by the Spartiates to each other. With the gradual subjection of Messenia, this pledge was implemented in an emplacement of the kler̄ os‐system over several decades.

Helotage and the Spartan Economy 575 We should therefore seek the inauguration of the kler̄ os‐system in the so‐called Second Messenian War. Aristotle noted that the poems of Tyrtaios – remember that he had a more complete dossier than our survivals – reveal political pressure for land redistribu- tion (Pol. 1306b26–1307a2 with fr. 1W). Our reconstruction proposes that such an anadasmos (‘re‐division’) actually took place outside the field of view now offered by the Tyrtaian corpus. Tyrtaios seems to show a polis dependent on a hoplite army, but one with a more conventional aristocratic elite, self‐identifying as Heraklids, who interrelated in symposia and did not yet interact with the damos in syssitia. The helots already existed, the kler̄ os‐system may not have. Some citizen fighters were not hoplites, as gumnet̄ ai (‘light armed troops’) also fought in the Spartan army (POxy #3316). Tyrtaian exhorta- tions to young fighters in the forefront of the phalanx or even in its vanguard (sometimes perhaps as mounted infantry in a corps of Hippeis: (Figueira (2006) 67–70) reveal ten- sions between age groups that the educational system would later address (Tyr. 10.1, 21, 30; 11.4, 12; 12.16, 23W). If we accept the implication of Aristotle that Tyrtaian poetry resisted agitation toward redistribution, such poetic gestures would harmonize with the generally conservative and conciliatory thematic of the corpus. At the same time, Tyrtaios reveals a strong impetus toward a hoplite polity and a more austere regimen. The kler̄ os‐system was, then, a creation of the late seventh or early sixth century, not a vestige of a primordial Dorian order or the result of the legislation of a mythical Lykourgos before 750. Its prehistory represents fabrication of earlier history in order to consolidate a false collective memory. While the kler̄ os‐system was created in an interlocking group of changes, Spartan austerity was not legislated in a single program. Rather, the strong tendency toward egalitarianism and against elite ostentation inherent not only in the kler̄ os‐system but also in the messes suppressed conspicuous consumption by stages. Recourse to the practice of xenel̄ asia (‘expulsion of for- eigners’) and prohibition on residence abroad accentuated inhibitions against out- ward expression of different grades of material status. These manifestations of xenophobia decoupled the Spartans symbolically from elite mores prevalent elsewhere and practically from trade exchanges supporting conspicuous consumption (Figueira (2003a) 62–6). The existence of a barter economy, where open ownership of gold and silver had been prohibited (probably in the sixth century), protected the evolu- tion toward austerity (Figueira (2002a) 153–5). The Sparta of my reconstruction does not possess a tendency toward demographic decline unlike the Sparta which others have surmised. For instance, Hodkinson has imagined a large body of equal kler̄ os‐holders, the size and number of whose estates declined under the influence of differential procreation that was filtered through partible inheritance.34 That would entail an impossibly large hoplite army for c.600 (or whenever one supposes that the kler̄ oi were created). It is better to hypothesize a relatively small complement of initial kler̄ os‐holders that grew steadily into the fifth century until the Great Earthquake of c.465. Concomitant with our hypothesis is the existence of some mechanism that acted against the division of the kler̄ oi. Such a prohibition against divi- sion and alienation was a provision of the ‘communist’ system of land tenure in the Lipari islands c.560 (Diod. Sic. 5.9.3–5; see Figueira (1984b)) and was certainly a feature of fifth‐century Athenian kler̄ oi that were held by cleruchs (Figueira (1991) 176–85). In some form, it may have been a feature of much early colonization as well (cf. Aris. Pol. 1319a10–11).

576 Thomas Figueira The reconstruction of equivalent helot‐cultivated kler̄ oi that were not initially divisible greatly differs from the treatment of Spartan land tenure in the Politics of Aristotle (1264b6–1271b19). Viewed in terms of historiography, this confrontation embodies two forms of political inquiry among the Peripatetics, the school of Aristotle. One form can be called the ‘constitutional’ tradition as it was presented in the Politeiai (constitu- tional treatises on Sparta) of Aristotle and his pupil, Dikaiarchos (Figueira (2016, 15–17)). In contrast, the treatment in the Politics conveys observations on the social realities of mid‐fourth‐century Sparta. Both modes of interpretation imbibed the essen- tially achronicity of Spartan historiography, as the constitutional treatises presented a system legislated by Lykourgos while the Politics cite an anonymous lawgiver. The dimension of time needs to be added to both forms of Peripatetic investigation to create a coherent social evolution. Accordingly, we might synthesize these visions of Sparta by offering a de‐idealized form of the ‘constitutional’ picture as an archaic social order and by accepting the testimony of the Politics as reflecting an altered set of arrangements affecting Sparta’s agrarian regime in the classical period. As seen below, the period after the Great Earthquake of c.465 will be proposed as the tipping point for the revisions of the archaic economic dispensation. 22.4  Messes and Dues The other pole of the axis of production in Lakōnikē comprised the syssitia (‘messes’), which played a unique role in the Spartan economy.35 The messes existing at Tiryns and in Crete differed significantly, despite a common origin.36 At Tiryns, the meals were more elite gatherings than at Sparta. The scale of such transfers was limited by number of recipients or by the occasions for the transfers. On Crete messes did include the body of citizen families, but the messes were supported directly from public revenues (including income from dependent communities). At Sparta, however, a vast engine for the cycling of production was established. Tendering of the mess contributions and membership in a mess were prerequisites for the maintenance of full citizenship, so that commensality encompassed the entire civic body. Embodying egalitarianism, and bound with strict rules limiting displays of wealth‐based status differentiation, the messes inculcated a reg- imen of austerity. The messes were the focus of male life, and daily attendance was mandatory. The dues were set high, as seen from the enumerations of their components in Plutarch’s Lykourgos (12.3) and in Athenaeus (Athen. 4.141; cf. ΣPlato Laws 633A.), who cites Dikaiarchos’ Tripolitikos (fr. 72 [Wehrli]). These authorities may have used different sources, but clearly the dues were an element in the constitutional treatises of Aristotle and Dikaiarchos. The monthly amounts were 1.5 Attic medimnoi or 1 Laconian medimnos of alphita (‘barley groats’), eight Laconian or 11/12 Attic khoes (‘quarts’) of wine, five mnai (mna = c. 431 gr.) of cheese, two‐and‐a‐half mnai of figs, and opson̄ ion (‘side‐dishes’) worth 10 Aiginetan obols. The use of a monetarily‐denoted amount is incongruous because using coinage was forbidden to Spartiates. Therefore, this practice was probably first adopted as a military procedure on campaign, where Spartans dealt with merchants conducting business in Aiginetic standard currency. The quota of 10 obols in the messes at home was an act of ‘domestication’ of the military messes of the army on campaign.

Helotage and the Spartan Economy 577 Indeed the syssitia themselves institutionalized the sysken̄ ia (‘military messes’) by import- ing into life at home the simplicity and shared lives of infantrymen serving in the field (Hdt. 1.65.5; Polyain. 2.3.11). The late archaic and early classical Spartan army used the civic messes as basic units. Since mess membership was virtually limited to men who passed through the agoḡ ē and was a criterion of citizenship (Aris. Pol. 1271a26–37; 1272a13–16), the high dues threshold practically tied retention of citizenship to the possession of a kler̄ os and support by helot workers. The definition of kler̄ os rents and the enumeration of dues were thus conjoined acts of social design. Furthermore, mess dues far exceeded the foodstuffs necessary to sustain a well‐nourished man in his daily main meals (being five to six times minimum annual subsistence).37 This superfluity is especially striking in the surplus of dues in wine, since Spartiates were notoriously abstemious about wine consumption in their messes.38 Some recipients of this additional wine were helots, who were permitted to imbibe to intoxication and to embarrassment for their buffooneries, which indignities were staged before the Spartiate mess members.39 The messes were, then, a mechanism that acculturated Spartiates to superior sociopolitical roles and helots to their status of social and moral inferiority. I have wished to go further and theorize that this dispensation of wine was part of a broader usage of the messes as channels for redistribution, for giving back to the helots a portion of the helot rents they paid in kind.40 An exaction of 50 percent of production is at the upper limit of practical rents among near‐subsistence agriculturalists. Such rents diverted so much output of foodstuffs that they left the helots particularly susceptible to an incentive mechanism that offered food as a reward for displays of compliance.41 Wine as a foodstuff and an intoxicant is especially relevant in food recirculation, since it was universally in demand, readily consumable, and relatively portable (even for transferring large amounts of calories). Just as Appalachian farmers converted surplus grain into moonshine whiskey to transport agricultural output in mountainous terrain, wine recirculated in the messes avoided some costs of a redistributive system. Furthermore, another argument in favor of the hypothesis of considerable redistribu- tion to the helots is that some such mechanism is needed to reconstruct a viable demo- graphic and economic model for Lakōnikē (Figueira (1984a) 100–4; (2003b) 217–20). The exemption from gainful labor of the entire Spartiate population built into Spartan agriculture a shortage of manpower. Without redistribution, it is hard to posit appro- priate amounts of helot labor to man the klēros‐system and to provide the required mess dues. Also difficult is explaining how 35,000 male helots were available for the expeditionary force to Plataia in 479. At that time, Spartiate adult males (18+) exceeded 8,000 and total holders (or potential holders) of kler̄ oi approximated 10,000. Estimates of the arable land in Lakōnikē sharpen this dilemma as they imply that Laconia and Messenia were fully utilized to support 10,000 kler̄ oi. The lack of managerial or administrative structures for the system of kler̄ oi reveals why the syssitia were the context for food redistribution in the archaic Spartan economy. Spartiates may well have bartered with fellow Homoioi, perioikoi, and helots, but keeping recirculation in the quasi‐public setting of the mess discouraged individual Spartiates from developing multifaceted relationships with the helots supporting them, interactions in which the Spartiate might provide incentives for higher output of which the helot might receive a share. Rather, the communal setting of the mess linked material advantage

578 Thomas Figueira for the helot with acceptance of abuse. Thus the incentives toward cooperation did not serve the interests of the individual Spartiate, but engendered compliance with the whole civic body. Indeed, analysis of the helots as a class often fails us because Spartan practice acted to forestall the emergence of intra‐class integration not only through incentives (noted above), but also through threats. In conjunction, these means constitute a policy of ‘divide to rule’. Thus, beneficiaries of recirculation could not be numerous at any one time. Rather the few favored were well positioned to act as patrons of the other helots through allotting food to those cooperative toward the Spartiates and themselves. The shadowy mnoionomoi, described as arkhontes (‘leaders’) of the helots, may be relevant in this connection (Hesych. s.v.). The ‘carrot’ of recirculated food was balanced by the ‘stick’ of repressive measures. The ephors declared war on the helots annually (Aris. fr. 543 Gigon with Plut. Lyk. 28.4); the helots submitted to a regimen of arbitrary abuse with a quota of blows (Myron FGrH 106 F2); and the youths of the krypteia meted out extra‐legal violence toward the helots as though enemies (Plut. Lyk. 28.1–4 with Aris. fr. 543; Aris. apud Heracl. Lembos 373.10D; Myron FGrH 106 F2). Nevertheless, after the Spartiate population declined so that a smaller civic body had access to more land, it may well be that inhibitions against management of the kler̄ oi weakened. Increased opportunities for specific super- vision may have devolved upon Spartan women. 22.5  Population and Land Tenure The wealth and military power of Greek poleis are often a direct reflection of population growth.42 The analysis of the Spartan pattern of dependent labor outlined above indi- cates how Sparta emerged as one of the most powerful archaic poleis through demo- graphic vitality (Figueira (1986) 170–5). Spartan control over Messenia could only be achieved through a series of depopulations in which those most resistant to reduction to helotage were driven into exile, and a remnant population remained as helots. When the kler̄ oi‐system consolidated in the late seventh century, the kler̄ oi perhaps only numbered a few thousand. Then Spartan power was restricted by the limit of helot workers and not by shortages of fertile land. As late as the struggle with Tegea in the 570 s, it was labor and not land for which Sparta made war. The Spartans brought fetters for the Tegeans to symbolize reduction to servitude, although they doubtless expected to annex for kler̄ oi the best arable Tegean land (Hdt. 1.66.1–4). The resistance offered by the Arkadians, based on their linguistic, ethnic, and political solidarity, rendered vain this dream of a new stock of subject laborers. Hence the decision to bind the Spartans’ neighbors by a series of alliances had as its internal corollary opting for a policy of slow growth in the complement of Spartiates. Notably this shift can also be traced for the perioikoi, because no further groups of refugees from elsewhere in Greece were accom- modated before the Peloponnesian War. Sparta experienced steady growth over the sixth century. As noted above, the Spartans could offer young helot males an early, easy opportunity to form their own households, because there was still much good land available when the Spartiates numbered but a few thousand. Some helot flight may have occurred but fugitives had to run a gauntlet of perioikic towns and allied poleis (as suggested by the treaty with Tegea: SVA #112), as

Helotage and the Spartan Economy 579 well as to defy the vigilance of the kryptoi. Compared to the losses of young men for other poleis in war and invasion, reduction of helot laborers through flight was probably insignificant. If suppositions about the mixed origins of the helots are correct, the Spartans may even have supplemented their natural increase through importation of cap- tives and slaves. The Spartiates themselves had little motivation toward family limitation. A kler̄ os was guaranteed each male who completed the agoḡ e.̄ While partible inheritance probably pre- vailed over non‐kler̄ os land, possessing a little more or less of it had no practical effect on social standing when compared with success in the agoḡ ē and on campaign. The granting of dowries was probably forbidden (Plut. Mor. 227F), a provision which excluded a tool of social mobility used elsewhere, and the kings awarded heiresses on the basis of Spartiate aretē (Hdt. 6.57.4). Access to the aristocracy was barred by custom and lacked the cachet of exclusivity known elsewhere, since conspicuous expression of elite status was sup- pressed. The annual high office of the ephorate was open to the entire damos: this was a powerful compensation balancing the retained privileges of the old elite. It is inconceivable that an early Greek polis could have a population policy. Rather, the Spartans created conditions where the number of helots grew; thus there was a growing reservoir of helot workers to support a rising number of Spartiates. This buoyancy is illustrated by various events. Circa 546, the Spartans were willing to risk, and, in the event, sacrifice, their entire corps of elite troops, the Hippeis, in a duel with the Argives (Hdt. 1.82.1–8). As the sixth century advanced, Sparta became more aggressive, ranging farther afield militarily to the Isthmos and to its north, and even sallying into the Aegean to strike at Naxos and Samos. Dorieus, brother of Kleomenes, may have taken as many as 1,000 Spartans off as colonists c.514–512 (Hdt. 5.42.2). The Laconia Survey vouches for at least one new perioikic community being founded at Sellasia through deliberate occupation by internal settlers.43 In the small clusters of helots scattered on kler̄ os‐land, it would not have been feasible to match young men and women or to ensure that their most likely places for living were in the vicinity of kinsmen. Spartan ritual activities were exposing the helots to the dominant Spartiate culture, and helot rural cult practices were bringing them into contact with their fellows. Therefore, two kindred cultural processes were advancing: all inhabitants of Lakōnikē were converging in fundamental behavior, such as common dialect, religious practices, and high culture, and there was a churning of demographic components, as intermarriage and exogamy between families and among small communities, as well as internal colonization, affected both perioikoi and helots. In particular, the helots felt integrative and differential cultural forces, as illustrated by a later episode from the Theban invasion of Lakōnikē (370). Captured, or is that ‘liber- ated’?, helots refused to perform the poetry of archaic Spartan poets Terpandros, Alkman, and Spendon, on the grounds that their masters forbade it (Plut. Lyk. 28.5). However, it appears that they could have done so; they knew the poetry in question. As Sparta entered the fifth century, its population was reaching its apogee. The expe- ditionary corps that appeared at Marathon (490) looks like a picked force of the first ten age classes.44 Leonidas faced the loss of his expeditionary force of three hundred Spartiates at Thermopylai (480) with relative equanimity.45 The 5,000 Spartiates at Plataia (479) were perhaps the normal two‐thirds levy (men aged twenty to forty‐nine) out of a complement of men aged twenty to sixty exceeding 8,000. At that time, then, all male Spartiates totaled c.10,000. Yet it is in fact difficult to accommodate 10,000 kler̄ oi on the

580 Thomas Figueira arable land of Laconia and Messenia. With so many Spartiates, it is also hard to explain how the 35,000 helots conscripted for the Plataia campaign were fed. Indeed, if, on the basis of the arable land of Laconia and Messenia, we calculate the upper limits of the kler̄ os‐system to provide food, high estimates for helot numbers, common in earlier scholarship, become doubtful.46 The number of helots, male and female of every age, lay between 85,000 and 115,000. Even these numbers probably entail the existence of channels (in my view, through the messes) by which food was recirculated to the helots. Nonetheless, the servile population of Spartan territory was very large ([Plato] Alcib. 1.122d; Plut. Solon 22.2), as confirmed by its comparison with the Chian slave population by Thucydides (8.40.2). Circa 479, therefore, in its utilization of Laconia and Messenia, the kler̄ os‐system was reaching its practical limit, which was not only imposed by available land, but also by the challenge of mobilizing a sufficient labor force under a 50 percent rent. However, Sparta possessed additional land in the Thyreatis, later granted to Aiginetan refugees, but still available for creating kler̄ oi in 479. Potentially, the Spartans also possessed a powerful tool for extending the ability of any number of kler̄ oi to support Spartiates: a delay after birth in initial assignment of kler̄ oi made 9,000–10,000 kler̄ oi, for example, support a larger population because mortality was heavy in the first years of life and boys could easily be supported by their parents up to age seven, the beginning of the agoḡ ē (Figueira (1984) 96–7, and n. 26 above). Therefore, any attempt to model flows of output in the Spartan economy inevitably works from this ‘snapshot’, one which reflects the demo- graphic highpoint of the political economy of Lakōnike.̄ 47 This is the demographic profile of a self‐confident power, one not unduly troubled by Attic promotion of the Delian League, however unwelcome the transfer of the hege- mony at sea appeared. During the 470s, this Sparta saw off threats to its Peloponnesian supremacy in Arkadian dissension and a revived Argos. Nevertheless, the homogeniza- tion and mixture of elements of the helot population, which expansion and even the basic operation of the kler̄ os‐system entailed, nurtured the seeds of challenge for Sparta’s social order. Because Spartan ideology necessitated that helot cultural identity manifest the converse of civic identity, it is unsurprising that the helots fashioned a self‐image in an inversion of Spartan myth‐history that embodied aspirations to escape from their exploited status. Their raw material comprised folk memories of early resistance to Sparta that accreted around the charismatic hero Aristomenes and a peasant religiosity that encompassed fertility rituals.48 A central theme was a purported descent from the citizens of a subjugated polis, Messene, which had occupied the region west of Mt. Taygetos until destroyed by Sparta. Thucydides states that the helots were generally called Messenians by virtue of the descent of their majority from the ancient Messenians (1.101.2).49 Thus, if they chose a path of resistance regarding their status, the helots throughout Lakōnikē could claim that they were Messenian (and not entirely unreasonably on our hypothesis of demographic mixture). This Messenian persona, however, was not adopted by all helots. Some staked their aspirations on cooperation with the Spartiates and sought opportunities for upward mobility within the dominant ideological system and not in opposition to it. The next stage of Spartan demography is punctuated by an exogenous event of enor- mous impact. In c.465, an earthquake convulsed Lakōnike,̄ its epicenter near Sparta itself. Perhaps 20,000 free Laconians perished and Sparta was laid waste. This natural

Helotage and the Spartan Economy 581 disaster was understood by many helots as a providential signal for armed resistance. The ensuing revolt lasted ten years, although the Spartans soon pacified Laconia itself and later confined the rebels to the environs of Mt. Ithome in Messenia. The Spartan victory came only at the cost of a further loss of manpower in which the surviving rebels with their families were accorded the right of withdrawal. When the Spartan army is next glimpsed during the Peloponnesian War, it is substantially smaller. Rather than accept an inexplicable change in procreative patterns, one should assign this reduction of 50–60 percent of all Spartiates to the effects of the earthquake and rebellion.50 Thucydides notes the presence in 431 of a large number of Peloponnesian young men who were both without experience of war and enthusiastic for hostilities (2.8.1). If Sparta was included in this phenomenon, as appears likely, a large cohort of men had matured since the Thirty Years Peace of 446/5, the oldest of whom had been sired right after the earthquake. Thus Sparta had probably returned during the years 465–31 to its typical demographic growth of the archaic period. However, the earthquake perma- nently changed Sparta (Figueira (2004b) 51–2.). The more fearful community of 431 is clearly a legacy. But more important for our purposes is a hypothetical change in land tenure. Aristotle speaks of a situation where land sale was discouraged but other transfers by gift, dowry, and testament were possible (Pol. 1270a18–21). Another tradition refers to an arkhaia moira (‘ancient portion’) that could not be alienated.51 As Myron of Priene implies, this moira was not merely land, but included obligations from the helots bound to that land. Another tradition, which appears in Plutarch’s Agis (5.3), describes a one‐heir system in which kler̄ oi descended from fathers to single sons in unbroken succession. That was a biological impossibility, but its likely appearance in Peripatetic and Stoic constitutional writing about Spartan traditions may indicate its role in classical Spartan discussion about how to manage inheritance. In interpreting these testimonia, one should envision where land tenure must have stood after the earthquake and helot revolt (Figueira (1986) 184–7). Kler̄ os‐land was damaged significantly by the death or flight of its helots. Losing helot men threatened the Spartan economy, because the high rents at 50 percent of output kept the labor needs for cultivation of the kler̄ oi dangerously near a level of insufficiency (Figueira (1984) 104–6). Subsistence agriculture is always dependent on work inputs from adult males, those most likely lost in rebellion. Moreover, there were now many vacant kler̄ oi because their beneficiaries had died. It is perhaps inevitable that such kler̄ oi passed to the next in line of property succession. That was the easiest means to handle a stock of vacant kler̄ oi, some with insufficient labor, and it guaranteed that any uneven distribution of helots was offset by multiple kler̄ os‐holdings for many Spartiates. The original kler̄ os of  each Spartiate, apparently called the arkhaia moira, was declared indivisible and inviolate. These provisions were perhaps enacted during the revolt itself, 465–55, when rent extraction and worker availability were most unpredictable. The Spartans may still have felt obligated to provide a kler̄ os for anyone completing the agoḡ e.̄ The growing reservoir of helot laborers that had once allowed such provision had vanished, however. Spartiates could only provide for younger sons out of land acquired through the deaths of so many fellow citizens during the earthquake and revolt. Concomitantly, the treatment of heir- esses changed as the nearest kinsman played a central role. That he was called a kler̄ onomos (usually ‘inheritor’ but here probably ‘guardian’) implies that his function was to

582 Thomas Figueira preserve a kler̄ os, probably the arkhaia moira, of the heiress’ father (Aris. Pol.1270a26–9). Furthermore, a manipulation of communal memory served to promote the ‘single‐heir’ system (Plut. Agis 5.3 cf. [Plut.] Mor., Comm. in Hes. 37). The ‘single‐heir’ system placed the onus on the individual Spartiate to procreate his heir, but also discouraged fragmentation of holdings through engendering multiple male successors, who might be a challenge to equip with sufficient estates. Such policy defied procreative reality, where families failing to raise sons to adulthood must be offset by those with multiple sons. The single heir appears as ‘Lykourgan’ legislation in later historiography, admittedly an impossible designation, so that the important questions become the date of its inception and its purpose. It belongs to a moment when family planning was a sensitive issue. Did the single‐heir practice originate in the period after the earthquake and revolt, as patri- otic exhortation for ordinary Spartiates? In politicized economies, invocations of civic duty, relying on high degrees of conformity, clash with opportunistic behavior. Yet the demographic situation of Sparta after the withdrawal of the rebels from Mt. Ithome to Naupaktos in 455 was not desperate. Sparta still had many Spartiate hoplites, comparable to mid‐sixth-century levels, and its perioikic levy was much less affected by earthquake and revolt. The perioikoi were vulnerable only to catastrophic and military casualties, and not to an economic threat of losing servile laborers. What differed, after hostilities with Athens in the First Peloponnesian War ended (446), was the balance bet- ween social gradations within the Spartiate class. The massive reallocation of property and helots attendant upon a 45+ percent fall in the Spartiate population must have been quite uneven in its incidence. Some of those unlucky in the deaths of their kinsfolk became lucky in inheritance. Were there not families that suddenly found themselves heirs to land and labor equivalent to three or four kler̄ oi? If so, Sparta may have con- fronted for the first time non‐elite persons who possessed holdings approximating those of members of its old aristocracy. Such persons might now have aspired to leading places. Nonetheless, the Spartan economy appears to have stabilized. Thucydides vouches for a mass of young men in 431 eager for war. Spartiate numbers had probably been growing, and there was no sign of an inability either to extract sufficient rents from the kler̄ os‐land or to tender the required mess dues. We may date after the Thirty Years Peace (446/5) an initiative Thucydides notes, ostensibly intended to reward helots who had aided Sparta ‘in the wars’.52 Two thousand eventual honorees who made a circuit of Laconian sanctuaries – presumably entering the damos and freed from their servile obligations – were then secretly eliminated by the Spartans. Thucydides notes that the Spartans espe- cially feared the neotes̄ (‘young of military age’) and plet̄ hos (‘large number’) of the helots (4.80.3). This affair indicates that the available helot labor force had again achieved a satisfactory level. Eliminating workers by elevation, followed by assassination, seems inexplicable if many Spartiates possessed non‐viable kler̄ oi. The Peloponnesian War, however, brought disastrous changes (Figueira (1986) 175–87). There were naturally attritional casualties, possibly not replaced by maturing youths in the war’s early years. Our first demographic conclusion depends on calculating the size of basic military units (enom̄ otiai, ‘platoons’) during the Pylos campaign (425).53 A likely size‐range for the enom̄ otia indicates a whole army smaller by 22–9 percent. This decline had been restricted to the Spartiates, now 45 percent fewer and only 38–41 percent of the army (50 percent at Plataia). This shows the lingering effects of the much earlier earthquake and revolt. Population decline had necessitated a major army reorganization.

Helotage and the Spartan Economy 583 The mobilization for Pylos also allows a comparison with the Spartan army at Mantineia (418). Yet the size and organization of Spartan forces there is a notorious crux because Thucydides’ order of battle (5.68.2–3) appears to yield a smaller force than the circum- stances and other evidence permit. Our solution is to double the size of the whole army by inserting morai (‘regiments’) above Thucydides’ lokhoi (‘battalions’). Thus the Spartans at Mantineia number 35 percent less overall than at Plataia and the Spartiates 58 percent fewer (considering the same ages). If one does not correct Thucydides, his smaller Spartan army at Mantineia would mean that the continuing damages from earth- quake and revolt amounted to c.71 percent of total Spartan manpower. Even with Thucydides corrected, the reduction from Pylos to Mantineia was significant at c.18–25 percent.54 This reconstruction does coincide with other evi- dence from Thucydides, who stressed the damage of Attic raids and Messenian forays from Pylos, later from Kythera, and still later from Cape Malea.55 The strong Spartan desire to achieve peace with Athens reflects this economic crisis.56 Beyond direct damage to the productivity, the main effect of these raids was to draw off vigorous helot workers, especially young men, indispensable for the workload of the kler̄ os‐ system. So long as the traditional rents (for grain, at least, at the 50 percent rate) had to be levied to pay for Spartiate mess dues, the kler̄ os‐system did not have a large safety margin (Figueira (1984a) 105–6). Mantineia also reveals another negative trend, increasing dependence on the perioikoi: rising from 47–50 percent at Plataia to 72 percent at Mantineia. Inasmuch as their conditions of service approximated the Spartiates, perioikic infantrymen bore heavier burdens than hoplites in other poleis. A higher proportion of perioikoi meant that some had to stand further forward in the phalanx. As Sparta began to mobilize more year‐classes for more intense service, perioikic hoplites had greater costs and dangers to bear without helot labor subsi- dizing them. Aristotle notes how Spartiates lost their status on failure to pay their mess dues (Pol. 1271a26–37; 1272a13–16). Such disfranchised persons were termed hypomeiones (‘infe- riors’).57 Disruption of agricultural production was the principal cause for such arrears in mess contributions. The Spartiates appear adamant in their determination not to relax these requirements. One cause was perhaps the tendency in servile economies to trace problems with laborers to inadequacies of individual masters rather than to systemic flaws in dependency. If that were operative at Sparta after Pylos, it would suggest how far, under the influence of mid‐fifth‐century changes in land tenure, relations between helots and the owners of kler̄ oi had evolved beyond the depersonalized exploitation described above. Second, our surviving sources are mute on what happened to the helots of persons losing mess membership and Spartiate status. Hypomeiones probably did not retain their helots, because that would breach the monopoly of the Homoioi, earned by martial arete,̄ over benefits from land and laborers. If their kler̄ os‐land and helots passed to their heirs, one can envisage why the less vulnerable disregarded the plight of the downwardly mobile. Those sympathetic would presumably have intervened to help tender mess dues of their kindred and friends before the crisis of default, so that those falling into arrears had already lost the safety net offered by others. Furthermore, Sparta began to use liberated helots as hoplites during the Archidamian War, not only to sup- plement manpower, but also as surrogates for citizens whom it preferred not to risk overseas.58 Thus, for each Hypomeion̄ there were potential Neodamod̄ eis, as manumitted

584 Thomas Figueira ex‐helot soldiers were eventually called, no matter whether these soldiers were enrolled from helots released by Hypomeiones or from volunteers from their masters’ most devoted, strongest dependents, who were replaced by the helots of degraded Spartiates. Some such hypothesis is required to explain how Sparta in the 420s could be short of helot workers and yet at the same time be enlisting helots as soldiers.59 Hypomeiones were potentially a dangerous component of the community, as illustrated by the conspiracy in c.399 of Kinadon, a Hypomeion̄ of considerable ability who continued to serve the state after his degradation (Xen. Hell. 3.3.4–11). The Hypomeiones were probably ranked lower than perioikoi as second‐class citizens, since the latter preserved rights in their communities, but the Hypomeiones could serve militarily, perhaps for compensation. Unknown is the scale of Kinadon’s plot, which was uncovered by an informant in Kinadon’s recruiting efforts.60 Clearly he hoped to establish a political order with full participation by a wider circle than the Spartiates and with improved status for the helots, whom he expected to assist him. Another controversy involves the rhet̄ ra (‘law’) of the ephor Epitadeus, a legislative act that supposedly freed Spartans from restrictions in alienation and bequest of property.61 Some consider it a fabrication (being in my view too skeptical).62 Plutarch mentions the rhet̄ ra as a cause for the social crisis prevailing (244–42) during the reign of a reforming Hellenistic king, Agis IV. Plutarch derived his treatment from a Hellenistic politeia of Sparta, perhaps that of the Stoic Sphairos.63 Epitadeus’ proposal is accorded a selfish motivation, estrangement from his son, and Plutarch correlated the rhet̄ ra with an upsurge in self‐interested behavior, including intensified competition for status differentiation. A ‘single‐heir’ system was supposedly discarded. Such lack of fidelity toward traditional mores and self‐aggrandizement brought Sparta down. In the naive view that the causes of Spartan decline ran current with their most dramatic manifesta- tions, some scholars date the rhet̄ ra to the fourth century. Yet a fourth‐century rhet̄ ra cannot explain the problems of disfranchisements and of accelerating inequality in late‐ fifth‐century Sparta. The only Epitadas (the Laconian variant of Epitadeus) known is a Spartan commander who fell at Pylos in 424.64 Yet a personalized explanation for the rhet̄ ra fails to account for its passage. Fathers disowning sons can never have been a substantial factor in the crisis. The ‘single‐heir’ system of succession was a fantasy. It could only have been a dan- gerous aspiration – if applied, a chief result could have been a lowered birthrate – and never a genuine recollection of past ‘family planning’. Rather than precipitating the decline of the kler̄ os‐system and the Lykourgan order, the rhet̄ ra of Epitadeus was prob- ably meant as a remedy to early manifestations of inequality of property in the generation before Pylos. The rhet̄ ra served to free Spartiates to deploy their assets so as to ensure the status of all of those in affinity with them by managing division of inheritances, by dowering, or by gift giving. The practice of mentoring of poorer citizens as mothon̄ es also occurred in this period.65 The size of dowries may already have been perceived as problematic, as Aristotle would later note (Pol. 1270a24–6). The social competition expressed by increasing dowries was the result of contention for the most elite husbands by upwardly mobile Spartiates, who benefited from the huge shift of assets after the earthquake (c.465) and ensuing rebel- lion. Not only was the rhet̄ ra of Epitadeus a failure as a reform, but it may also have sharpened the emergent contention for upward mobility by putting more utensils in the

Helotage and the Spartan Economy 585 toolkit of the ambitious (Figueira (1986) 193–5). Such aspirations toward upward mobility were out of harmony with the rigidity of the kler̄ os‐system. The Peace of Nikias (421) and the shift of Athenian energies elsewhere, first in offense to Sicily and then defensively in the Aegean, superficially brought respite to Sparta. The army mobilized at the Battle of the Nemea River in 394 retrospectively illuminates Spartan losses after 421 (Figueira (1986) 199–206). That force indicates a 12 percent decline in Spartan numbers, a substantial reduction but one reflecting a slowing of the damage to the Spartan economy as Athens also weakened. The early fourth century saw intense military activity in the Greek homeland, so that many indications exist of deploy- ments that illuminate the size of various units and their battle order. A major reorgani- zation halved the number of enom̄ otiai, basic units, from 192 to 96 (Figueira (1986) 200–1), because Spartan numbers were inadequate for manning the larger number and carrying out a full range of tactical dispositions. The reorganization and preserved evi- dence on the size of Spartan morai (‘regiments’) are consistent with a period of stability followed by accelerated decline owed to fourth‐century attrition. The Messenians – the liberated helots and their descendants  –  suffered a corresponding disaster, since they were uprooted not only from the Athenian‐controlled enclaves in Lakōnike,̄ but even from Naupaktos, a haven since 455. They were scattered around Greece, with some withdrawing to Sicily. The account by Xenophon of Spartan forces at Leuktra (371) is particularly valuable for containing an enumeration of the total forces and of the Spartiates in the four morai present.66 The twenty‐three years since the Nemea River marked another major decline in Spartan numbers, 36 percent since 394. The years after Mantineia (418) reveal a Spartiate decline of an astounding 58 percent. This reduction necessitated that five more age‐classes were regularly mobilized. It turned the army into a force largely composed of perioikoi (about 70 percent), although the soldiers from the perioikoi were themselves much fewer, dropping 37 percent between Mantineia and Leuktra.67 Manifestly, the early fourth century witnessed a continuation of Spartiate degradations, presumably through the widespread failure to tender mess dues. To achieve stability Spartiates not only needed to produce enough male offspring to replace themselves, but also to match that next generation with a sufficient supply of two inputs, land and helot workers, that themselves had to balance each other. And this goal had to be achieved without an administrative superstructure and without the application of management techniques. Attrition from continual fighting played its role in the absence of any single disaster. Yet the acceleration of decline exhibits another demographic trend. The rate of Spartiate decline increases c.390 at just the point at which the proportion of men born after 424 exceeded 50 percent of all males of an age for service. Thus Spartan family limitation probably factored alongside casualties and loss of citizenship (Figueira (1986) 203–4; (2003b) 224–7). Spartan parents may have feared for their sons’ prospects in a Lakōnikē under Attic pressure. Whether deliberately or instinctively, they reacted by applying the ‘single heir’ rule, of which the result was a population incapable of replacing itself. Any cushion that was provided by money and precious metals accumulated during the Ionian and Corinthian Wars would now have been exhausted. Simultaneously, the Spartans were using perioikoi more intensively, exposing them to greater mortality and damaging them economically. Naval war with Athens also affected the perioikoi since they suffered losses as trireme crews and marines. Population loss almost always means output loss in

586 Thomas Figueira ancient poleis. The shrinkage of perioikic economies inevitably harmed even the more affluent of those bearing hoplite duties. Moreover, some helots were freed and elevated in status for naval service (Myron FGrH 106 F 1). Leuktra was a battlefield manifestation of the manpower shortage that was affecting Lakōnikē (oliganthrop̄ ia: Aris. Pol. 1270a34; cf. Xen. Lak. Pol. 1.1) and included its ser- vile population. Our only datum on helot numbers is the 35,000 helots marched off to Plataia over a century earlier. In light of continuous reductions during the next hundred years through earthquake, revolt, withdrawal, flight, battle losses, and enfranchisements, the helots probably never again approached their acme of 479–65. The Theban general Epameinondas prevailed against a smaller Spartiate contingent in a smaller Spartan army at Leuktra (371), and would hardly have won at all or, at least not decisively, against the Spartans of Mantineia (418), let alone Plataia (479). So too his establishment of Messene would have had to surmount the resistance of many more Spartans, and he would have been challenged to integrate a larger indigenous population of liberated helots; instead Laconia seemed ‘deserted’ at the time of the first Theban invasion (Xen. Hell. 6.5.23, 25). Some Messenian helots and perioikoi rallied to refounded Messene, but Epameinondas gathered ‘Messenians’ and ordinary volunteers from abroad.68 By the time of Leuktra, the natural, barter‐based economy of archaic and early classical Lakōnikē lingered as nothing more than an ideological fiction. The Spartans managed logistics in Aiginetic coins that had even infiltrated the mess dues. Sparta had adminis- tered the costly Ionian War in monetary terms, largely Attic owls and associated coins of Attic allies (Figueira (1998) 469–76). After victory, the Spartans decided to maintain a state treasury for hegemonic purposes.69 The notorious avarice exhibited by Spartan commanders and harmosts abroad was associated by observers such as Xenophon with the breakdown of the traditional ‘Lykourgan’ diaita, the self‐denying and egalitarian pattern of consumption fostered by the traditional mess system (Xen. Lak. Pol. 14.1–7). Yet acquisitiveness overseas was a logical response to the uncertainties of the domestic servile economy, where inequalities of land holding and access to laborers could be com- plicated by helot flight and noncompliance (Figueira (1986) 202). Spartiates were barred from licitly accumulating income by gainful activities within Lakōnike,̄ and were practi- cally unable to work to supplement the production of their kler̄ os‐land. Reserves of coined money provided status insurance for themselves, sons, relatives, and friends. The reference by Theopompos (FGrH 115 F 178) to a xenel̄ asia in the 340 s serving to remedy a crop failure demonstrates that a single market for foodstuffs had replaced the old politicized distributive system (Figueira (2003a) 68–70). Spartiates were using coins and other goods in an informal or ‘black’ economy, to cope with mess dues which were largely expressed in agricultural measures. Leuktra imposed heavy casualties70 and opened the path for the Thebans to attack Laconia, maul the kler̄ os‐system, and liberate many Messenian helots. Paradoxically, however, this catastrophe did not signify an immediate decline in manpower. The economic impact of an independent Messenian state lay not in further curtailment in Spartiate numbers, but rather in setting a ceiling for any demographic recovery (Figueira (1986) 207–10). The immediate reduction in Spartan forces after Leuktra was around 10 percent, and Sparta appears to have recouped in available troops in the next few years. This demographic resilience may be owed to the existence of many Hypomeiones, who continued to reside in Lakōnike.̄ With the loss of many Spartiates at Leuktra, these

Helotage and the Spartan Economy 587 ‘Inferiors’ regained sufficient land to resume payment of mess dues and recover active citizenship. The components of the Spartan army facing Thebans and Arkadians in the years down to Second Mantineia (362) are not well attested. Yet Sparta apparently mounted forces comparable to its pre‐Leuktra mobilizations. Sparta settled into the role of a secondary power after Mantineia, and focused on maintaining its boundaries with Argos, Arkadia, and Messene. Its overarching aspiration was to recover Messenian kler̄ os‐ land. Reoccupying central Messenia, an enormous enterprise, would not, however, have permitted reinstallation of thousands of kler̄ oi there, as fourth‐century conditions would not have provided an appreciable mass of laborers. The great reservoir of helot labor of archaic and early classical Sparta was irrecoverable. The mid‐fourth century provides a backdrop for Aristotle’s negative remarks in the Politics. His criticism of the conditions of land tenure and arrangements for subsidizing the messes (where he contrasts the Cretan practice of drawing on public revenues) misses how the traditional system had integrated the agoḡ e,̄ rents, mess dues, and redistribution (1270a15–39, 1271a26–37). Yet his critique was surely valid for the fourth‐century messes, where loss of civil rights accompanied an invidious game of upward mobility for the survivors amid intensifying inequality. Aristotle criticized the laxness of rules controlling the alienation of property. He does not reflect that contemporary arrange- ments were probably designed, albeit unsuccessfully, to compensate for the unevenness both in access to and control of kler̄ os‐land and in the supply of helot workers. Disequilibrium emerged when the archaic agrarian regime was unbalanced by the Great Earthquake (c.465). Aristotle cites the scale of dowries and competition for heiresses, observing that 40 percent of Spartiate property was in women’s hands. He stressed the oliganthrop̄ ia (‘shortage of manpower’) of a state with vast arable lands which he thought capable of supporting 1,500 cavalry and 30,000 hoplites, but which in his day sustained a tiny population of less than 1,000 citizens (1270a29–31) (cf. Cawkwell (1983)). Certainly, high fourth‐century mortality in battle was a factor here. It generated many female inheritors in high demand by suitors. Nonetheless, it is also conceivable that other factors promoted a movement of property into women’s hands. Except for the mess dues, no evidence survives on the mechanisms by which the Spartan government assigned taxes and liturgies based on agricultural production. Some advantage for female property holders may well have existed.71 Women did not pay mess dues, so that they did not risk loss of citizenship over arrears. If helots were stripped from those dropping out of the messes, women could have safely preserved their holdings. Aristotle puts much blame on Spartan women for the decline of Lykourgan austerity. In terms of our reconstruction, they were important agents in the sharpening drive for upward mobility that started in the mid‐fifth century. The tools for this competition probably included family limitation, amassing and pursuing large dowries, and marriage politics. The later fourth century saw Sparta continue on its downward spiral. Its kings adopted the pretensions of Hellenistic monarchy; they presided, with a small elite, over a community comprising various strata of the disfranchised, including helots. Only seven hundred adult male citizens remained, of whom only one hundred eventually possessed a klēros by the period of Agis IV (Plut. Agis 5.4). That meant sufficient land and helots to contribute traditional mess dues. The traditional syssitia no longer operated, and their Hellenistic counterparts were mechanisms by which the elite patronized the

588 Thomas Figueira impoverished damos with subsidies (Phylarchos FGrH 81 F 43) (Figueira 2004b.57–59). Each ephor may have presided over one of a handful of large messes. There is some evi- dence that the kings exercised special control of the helots, whom they could grant to foreign allies for the cultivation of gift estates (Stephanos, fr. 1, PCG 8.614–15). This was the situation in the 240s when Agis IV was contemplating his reforms (Marasco (1981/83) 1.211–16). 22.6 Conclusion The Spartan sociopolitical dispensation has wielded enormous influence over western ideas on constructing a just social order. Despite our admiration for Spartan accom- plishments, it is probably fairer to judge this influence a pernicious legacy, deserving a place alongside chattel slavery. One needs, however, to transcend a ready, if justified, condemnation of Spartan cruelty toward, and exploitation of, the helots to appreciate this fully. In the late seventh century, the Spartans created an innovative polity that dealt with prevailing tensions over the social and political predominance of an inherited aris- tocracy, over how far different social groups might vary in their lifestyles, and over the legitimacy or even feasibility of social mobility. Their response was to suppress differentiation, re‐stage mobility in the circumscribed social spaces of the agoḡ e,̄ messes, and army, and politicize acquisition and consumption. The Spartans integrated their body politic by reducing material life to formulae of extraction and redistribution. Kler̄ oi were allotted and reallocated, rents collected from the helots, contributions paid into syssitia, and surplus food either circulated from the messes or were used to barter in a vast exercise in suppressing manifestations of individualistic and opportunistic behavior. Through the creation of the Peloponnesian League, this system was progres- sively insulated politically from more differentiated, less static societies emerging else- where, and isolated economically through prohibition of precious metals, iron money, and the recourse to xenel̄ asia (‘expulsion of foreigners’). When Sparta was crowned with an unlikely total victory over Athens in 404, the stage was set for its empire in political theory. That hegemony over theory distorted contemporary political options and tainted recollection of archaic social integration. It lasted much longer than the military hegemony won at Aigospotamoi in 405, for it appeared to have conquered not only the Athenians, but homo oeconomicus himself. Helotage inspired Plato and Aristotle to favor polities with caste‐like divisions, bet- ween those fulfilling merely economic roles and the military and political segments of society. Theorists were accordingly less welcoming of the market economy, economic differentiation and integration, democracy, and more individually‐centered visions of civic life. Furthermore, theorists could promote their more truly communistic systems by adducing the communally mediated flows of material goods in Lakōnike,̄ the public‐spir- itedness of the earlier Spartans, and the principle of interchangeability in which any citizen could be replaced by his fellow. Such hints fell on fertile soil among modern thinkers. Naturally, the technological and social circumstances differed so radically bet- ween Sparta’s politicized economy and Marxist, Leninist, and Maoist command econ- omies that the real relevance of ancient Sparta to these modern totalitarian regimes may be slight. Sparta does, however, provide some important parallels in its defiance of

Helotage and the Spartan Economy 589 market forces and its masking of incentives toward more efficient uses of resources. Finally, it is in the politicization of Spartan life and not in ‘communism’ per se that the grounds to explore such convergences may be found. A careful reading of Spartan demographic history indicates that the injuries dealt Sparta in the 420s by Athenian military activity, coming as they did only a generation after the shocks of the earthquake and helot revolt, mortally wounded this political economy. The process of disfranchisement amid intense conflict was promoted by a reig- nited struggle for upward mobility. Modest initiatives toward liberalization of the Spartiate oikonomia, however intended, such as the rhet̄ ra of Epitadeus, were bound to fail as half‐measures because they adjusted a thoroughly politicized economy only at its margins. Sparta was unlucky in having Athens as adversary, because any opening toward reform threatened a plunge toward a democratic, money‐based society. Disfranchisement worsened the oliganthrop̄ ia that rendered Sparta incapable of sustaining hegemonic ambitions. That the Athenians failed to discern the extent of the wounds they had dealt and subsequently embarked on foreign policy adventures (not only profoundly risky, but also extraordinarily unlucky) qualifies as one of history’s great ironies. However, it must stand alongside another irony that the final assessment of helo- tage charts its impact most clearly on the Spartiates, not on the helots themselves. That historiographical displacement is a product of the exploitation that left them nameless and largely unattested, save for the record of their victimization and the inverted image of the Spartiate ethos that was imposed on them. Those helots who found voice for themselves did so through an exercise in ethnogenesis as Messenians. Those who achieved liberation from servility through elevation as Spartans are totally mute. ‘Lykourgan’ Sparta was, nevertheless, a remarkable social experiment, albeit an outlier in Greek institutionalization, and one that proved a dead end in terms of applied para- digm. Laconizers may well have paraded their adherence to Spartan values and behavior and on the level of the individual such imitation had psychological relevance. But such Laconism was a contradiction in terms, because true adaptation could only be enacted on the polis level, and not on that of the individual polites̄ . One could never truly be indi- vidually Spartan. Moreover, the archaic Spartans would have had little in common in spirit with the anti‐democratic partisans who were the most ardent supporters of classical Sparta, such as the factionalists so vividly portrayed in Thucydides’ description of the stasis on Kerkyra or the die‐hards among the followers of the Thirty Tyrants at Athens. What common ground exists here would lie between those exploiting earthquake and revolt to climb upward or the greedy harmosts and the allied extremists whom Lysandros installed as decarchs. NOTES 1  Figueira (2004b) 47, 66 (n. 1). For those envisaging a Sparta that diverged from the institutions of other city‐states, see, e.g., Manso (1800–5) 1.118–28; Toynbee (1969) 201–2, 223–5, 230–3, 301–9. For those who emphasize Spartan convergences with other poleis, see, e.g., Grote (1872) 2.310–36; Hodkinson (2000) 187–208. 2 See Figueira (2004a) and Figueira (2016), also see below.

590 Thomas Figueira 3 For brief overview, see de Ste. Croix (1972) 89–95. Ducat (1990) represents the most thorough assessment. 4 This massacre is often dated in the 420s: e.g., Harvey (2004) 200–2; for the period 451–47: Figueira (1986) 186; (2003b) 224–5. 5 For Sparta: Huxley (1962) 13–25; Kiechle (1963) 95–115. 6 See Ducat (this volume, Chapter 23). 7 E.g., Finley (1973) 63–4; Austin and Vidal‐Naquet (1977) 86–90; Wiedemann (1981) 36–44. 8 Antiochos FGrH 555 F 14; Hellanikos FGrH 4 F 188 = 323a F 29; Ephoros FGrH 70 F 117; Theopompos FGrH 115 F 13, cf. F 122a; cf. Paus. 3.20.6; ΣPlato Alkib. I.122d; EM s.v. Eἵλωτες 300.7–15 Gaisford. 9 See, e.g., Chrimes (1949) 284–5; Huxley (1962) 75; Ducat (1990) 7–18; Cartledge 2002, 83–4. 10 Xenia ‘guest/gift friendship’ was the characteristic form of Dark Age/Early Archaic (850–600) inter‐community relations that were mediated through inherited friendships among elite males who visited or hosted each other and exchanged gifts as tokens of mutual honor. 11 E.g., Chrimes (1949) 285–7; Toynbee (1969) 199, cf. 210, 223–4; Hodkinson (1986) 388–89; Nafissi (1991) 99–108. 12 From spartós ‘sown’, but with a change in accent. Compare the Spartoí (‘sown men’) who are known from Theban mythology as the aristocratic lineages arising from the earthborn men who grew from the dragon’s teeth sown by the founding hero Kadmos. The myth supported a claim of autochthonous or indigenous status for elite Thebans. 13 Sosibios FGrH 595 F13 with Paus. 3.10.6, 3.15–2–9, 3.19.7; cf. 2.2.2, 3.26.6, 5.3.1, Apollod. Biblio. 2.7.3–4. Spartan kingship, however, was also legitimized from the pre‐ Dorian Atreidai as shown by the cult in the Menelaion. 14 That the non‐royal Heraklid Lysandros tried to open the kingship to all Heraklids (in one ver- sion), supporting himself on both traditional and fabricated oracular material, indicates that this elevation of the royal houses did not appear unassailable, even as late as the early fourth century (Plut. Lys. 24.4–26.4, 30.3–4, with Ephoros FGrH 70 F 207; cf. Plut. Ages. 8.3). 15 Cf. Lukermann and Moody (1978) 92–5; McDonald and Coulson (1983) 326; Spencer (1998). 16 Figueira (1999) 225–9. 17 Hdt. 6.23.2–24; Thuc. 6.4.6; Strabo 6.1.6 C257; Paus. 4.23.6–10. See Luraghi 2008, 147–72. 18 In general, see Kahrstedt (1919); Buckler (1977); Cozzoli (1979); Ducat (1983); Cartledge (1987) 166–74; (2002), 142–5; Papazoglou (1993); Lazenby (1995). 19 Figueira (2015); with (1991) 57–62, 73–4; (2008) 440–2. 20 Direct evidence is admittedly late archaic or classical, but does encompass not only democratic Athenians (e.g., Thuc. 3.50.2), but also oligarchic Corinthians (Thuc. 1.27.1–2, 29.1) and the Spartans themselves (Thuc. 3.92.4–5, 93.2; Diod. Sic. 12.59.3–5). 21 Polyb. 6.45.3–4, based on Ephoros (FGrH 70 F 148); cf. Just. 3.3.3. 22 Figueira (1984a) 100–2; (2003b) 199–201; cf. Hodkinson (2000) 131–45; Catling (2002) 161–3, 193–5. 23 We should not forget that Aristotle in his Politics offers a different understanding of Spartan land tenure. Its relation to the rest of the source material and how it enhances our treatment is discussed later in this chapter. 24 Isok. 12.255 with Figueira (1986) 170, (2003b) 223. 25 Figueira (2004b) 62–3. See also Ducat (1983) 145, 151; Hodkinson (2000) 74–81. 26 Plut. Mor. 238E (cf. Lyk. 16.1), which is derived from a constitutional work on Sparta (possibly that of the Stoic Sphairos) and ultimately descends from the work of Aristotle on the Spartan constitution. See Figueira (2004b) 51–2, 55–6. While passage of the agoḡ ē constituted a requirement for kler̄ os possession, Plut. Lyk. 16.1 places the initial allocation of the kler̄ oi in infancy. 27 Figueira (2004b) 63–4. See also Hodkinson (2000) 400–5.

Helotage and the Spartan Economy 591 28 I emphasize that the vulnerability of the system to disruption, as much as the threat of outright revolt, caused the famous Spartan anxiety over the helots. See Thuc. 4.80.2–4; Kritias fr. 37 DK; Plato Laws 698E; Aris. Pol. 1269a37–b5. Cf. Roobaert (1977); Baltrusch (2001). 29 Whether these measures are Attic or Laconian is uncertain (Figueira (2003b) 201–2). 30 Cf. Figueira (2003b) 216–220. 31 See Figueira (2003b) 219. Cf. Hunt (1997); van Wees (2004) 181–2, for the view that the helot muster did have military value. 32 For Messenia, see McDonald and Hope Simpson (1972) 144–5, maps 8–15–17; for possible traces of the evolution at Kelephina, see Catling (2002) 168, 249, with Cavanagh et al. (1996) 285. 33 Or to be more specific, a helot could not amass such resources before the third century, when Sparta had a monetary economy, as illustrated by the 6,000 helots prepared to pay 500 drachmas (a considerable sum) for their freedom in 223. 34 Hodkinson (1986). Cf. Figueira (2002b). 35 In addition to the authorities of n.18 above, note Ducat (1990) 61–2; Singor (1993) 45–6. 36 Crete: Aris. Pol. 1272a16–21; Dosiadas FGrH 458 F 2; Tiryns: Verdelis et al. (1975). See Figueira (1984a) 97–8. 37 Figueira (1984a) 91–5 suggests that annual mess dues were equivalent in value to 1278–1478 kg. of wheat. Figueira (2003b) 217 offers even higher estimates (up to 2880 kg. of wheat). 38 Kritias fr. 6W, FHG 2.68, fr. 2; Xen. Lak. Pol. 5.4, 7; Plut. Lyk. 12.14. 39 Plut. Lyk. 28.8–9; Demetr. 1.5; Mor. 239A. Cf. Ducat (1974) 1455–8. 40 Figueira (1984a) 96–7; (2003b) 207–10. 41 Figueira (1984a) 103–4; Hodkinson (1992). 42 Other treatments: Busolt (1905); Ziehen (1933); Toynbee (1969); Lazenby (1985). 43 Cavanagh et al. (1996) 321–3; Catling (2002) 168–9, 183. 44 Hdt. 6.120; cf. Isok. 4.87. See Figueira (1986) 169. 45 Hdt. 7.202, 205.2 with Figueira (2006) 61–2. 46 Figueira (2003b) 217–20; cf. Grundy (1908) 81; Cartledge (1987) 174; Talbert (1989) 23. 47 The archaeological evidence is not sufficiently detailed to confirm the population figures implied by Herodotos for Plataia (Hdt. 9.10.1, 11.3, 28.2; cf. 7.103.3: 5,000 Spartiates, 5,000 peri- oikoi, 35,000 helots), but the conclusions of Catling (2002) 206–7 note the classical falloff in population in the Laconia survey area (cf. pp. 249–50 for changes at Chrysapha). 48 Figueira (1999) 225–32; cf. Figueira (2010). See also Alcock (1999); Luraghi (2001) 293–301; Luraghi (2008) 173–208. On the Messenian folk hero Aristomenes, see Ogden (2004). 49 Luraghi (2008) disputes this view, but note Figueira (1999) 211–13; Figueira (2010). 50 See Figueira (1986) 177–9, 181–7; Hodkinson (2000) 417–23. 51 Aris. apud Herakleides Lembos fr. 12 (Dilts); Plut. Mor. 238E; cf. Myron FGrH 106 F2. Cf. Lazenby (1995); Lupi (2003). 52 Thuc. 4.80.3–4; cf. Plut. Lyk. 28.6; Diod. Sic. 12.67.3–4. See Figueira (1986) 186. 53 The critical assumption (widely accepted) is that the garrison at Sphakteria (420) was formed from one enom̄ otia (of 35) from each of 12 lokhoi. See Figueira (1986) 175–7, with full bibliography including Chrimes (1949) 388–91; Toynbee (1969) 319, 368–77; Lazenby (1985) 114. 54 The maximum number for the Spartiates at Pylos appears to be c.2755 and the Spartiate force at Mantineia (with Thucydides’ number of lokhoi doubled!) fell within a range c.2086–2251. 55 Thuc. 4.41.2–3, 6.1–2; 5.14.3, 56.2–3. See Powell (2001) 234–6. 56 Thuc. 4.81.2, cf. 4.108.7; 4.117.1–2, cf. 5.15.1–2; 4.119.9–10; 5.7–11, cf. 5.13.2; 5.14.3–4, cf. 5.15.1, 17.1. 57 Xen. Hell. 3.3.6, 11; cf. Thuc. 5.34.2; also 4.41.3, 55.1. 58 Thuc. 5.34.1; also Xen. Hell. 3.3.6; Hesych. s.v. δαμώδεις; νεοδαμώδεις; ΣThuc.5.34.1; Poll. 3.83; Myron FGrH 106 F 1; Dio Chrys. 36.38. Previously helots were employed as hoplite attendants or as light skirmishers, as at Sepeia (492) or Plataia (479). In general, see Welwei (1974) 142–58.

592 Thomas Figueira 59 It is unlikely that the massacre of helots described in Thuc. 4.80. 2–4 belongs in the 420s, despite Thucydides’ mentioning it while discussing Spartan reactions to Pylos. See Figueira (1986) 186. For recent discussions, see Harvey 2004; Paradiso 2004. 60 Powell (2010) 117–21 sees the plot as a ploy by King Agesilaos to augment his authority, but Powell rightly points out to me that such a hypothesis would add credibility to the background details, which must have been fabricated for their plausibility. 61 Plut. Agis 5.3. See Figueira (2004b) 50–1. 62 Contrast Ducat (1983) 159; Cartledge (1987) 167–9; Schütrumpf (1987); Hodkinson (2000) 93–4 with Toynbee (1969) 337–43; Christien (1974). 63 Figueira (2004a) 151–2; Figueira (2016) 28–9. 64 Thuc. 4.8.9, 31.2, 33.1, 38.1. 65 Plut. Lys. 2.1–2; Ael. VH 12.43; Phylarchos FGrH 81 F 43; cf. Isok. 4.111. 66 Xen. Hell. 6.4.12–15. Figueira (1986) 206–7. 67 Figueira (1986) 198–9; for later declines pp. 204–5. 68 Diod. Sic. 16.66.1, 3; Paus. 4.27.4–11, with Figueira (1999) 219–21; Luraghi (2008) 209–48. 69 Plut. Lys. 17.5–6 with Ephoros FGrH 70 F 205; Theopompos FGrH 115 F332. See Figueira (2002a) 141–3. 70 Xen. Hell. 6.4.15: 400 Spartiates dead out of 700 present (perhaps c.1,333 for Spartiates 20+) and 400 other Spartans. Diod. Sic. 15.56.4 has 4000 dead. See Figueira (1986) 206–8. 71 Aristotle did observe that the Spartans pay and supervise military levies badly (Pol. 1271b11–15). BIBLIOGRAPHY Alcock, S.E. (1999), ‘The Pseudo‐History of Messenia Unplugged’, TAPA 129: 333–41. Austin, M.M and Vidal‐Naquet, P. (1977), Economic and Social History of Ancient Greece: An Introduction. Berkeley and Los Angeles. Baltrusch, E. (2001), ‘Mythos oder Wirklichkeit? Die Helotengefahr und die Peloponnesische Bund’, HZ 272: 1–24. Birgalias, N., ed. (2004), The Legacy of Sparta, Athens. Buckler, J. (1977), ‘Land and Money in the Spartan Economy: A Hypothesis’, Research in Economic History 2: 249–79. Busolt, G. (1905), ‘Spartas Heer und Leuktra’, Hermes 40: 387–449. Cartledge, P. (1987), Agesilaos and the Crisis of Sparta. London. Cartledge, P. (2002), [1979] Sparta and Lakonia: A Regional History 1300 to 362 bc2. London and New York. Catling, R.W.V. (2002), ‘The Survey Area from the Early Iron Age to the Classical Period (c.1050– c.300 bc)’, in Cavanagh, Crouwel, Catling and Shipley, eds, 151–256. Cavanagh, W., Crouwel, J., Catling, R.W.V. and Shipley, G., eds (1996), Laconia Survey. II. Archaeological Data. [BSA Supp. 26]. London. Cavanagh, W., Crouwel, J., Catling, R.W.V. and Shipley, G., eds (2002), Laconia Survey. I: Methodology and Interpretation [BSA Supp. 27]. London Cawkwell, G.L. (1983), ‘The Decline of Sparta’, CQ 33: 385–400. Chrimes, K.M.T. (1949), Ancient Sparta: A Re‐examination of the Evidence. Manchester. Christien, J. (1974), ‘La loi d’Épitadeus: un aspect de l’histoire économique et sociale à Sparte’, RD 52: 197–221. Cozzoli, U. (1979), Proprietà fondiaria ed esercito nello stato Spartano dell’età classica. Rome. Davis, J.L., ed. (1998), Sandy Pylos: An Archaeological History from Nestor to Navarino. Austin.

Helotage and the Spartan Economy 593 De Ste. Croix, G.E.M. (1972), The Origins of the Peloponnesian War. London. Ducat, J. (1974), ‘Le mépris des hilotes’, Annales 30: 1451–64. Ducat, J. (1983), ‘Le citoyen et le sol à Sparte à l’époque classique,’ in Hommage à Maurice Bordes [Annales de la Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines de Nice]. 45: 143–66. Ducat, J. (1990), Les hilotes, BCH Supp. 20. Paris. Figueira, T.J. (1984a), ‘Mess Contributions and Subsistence at Sparta’ TAPA 114: 84–109. Figueira, T.J. (1984b), ‘The Lipari Islanders and their System of Communal Property’, CA 3: 179–206. Figueira, T.J. (1986), ‘Population Patterns in Late Archaic and Classical Sparta’, TAPA 116: 165–213. Figueira, T.J. (1991), Athens and Aigina in the Age of Imperial Colonization. Baltimore. Figueira, T.J. (1998), The Power of Money: Coinage and Politics in the Athenian Empire. Philadelphia. Figueira, T.J. (1999), ‘The Evolution of the Messenian Identity’, in Hodkinson and Powell, eds, 211–44. Figueira, T.J. (2002a), ‘Iron Money and the Ideology of Consumption in Laconia’, in Powell and Hodkinson, eds, 137–70. Figueira, T.J. (2002b), review of S. Hodkinson, Property and Wealth in Classical Sparta, CW 95: 203–4. Figueira, T.J. (2003a), ‘Xenêlasia and Social Control at Sparta’, CQ 53: 44–74. Figueira, T.J. (2003b), ‘Helot Demography and Class Demarcation in Classical Sparta’, in Luraghi and Alcock, eds, 183–229. Figueira, T.J. (2004a), ‘The Spartan Constitutions and the Enduring Image of the Spartan Ethos’ in Birgalias, ed., 143–58. Figueira, T.J. (2004b), ‘The Nature of the Spartan Kler̄ os’, in Figueira, ed., 47–76. Figueira, T.J., ed. (2004), Spartan Society, Swansea. Figueira, T.J. (2006), ‘The Spartan Hippeis’, in Hodkinson and Powell, eds, 57–84. Figueira, T.J. (2008), ‘Classical Greek Colonization’, in Tsetskhladze, ed., 427–523. Figueira, T.J. (2010), review of N. Luraghi, The Ancient Messenians: Constructions of Ethnicity and Memory, CR 60: 160–3. Figueira, T.J. (2015), ‘Modes of Colonization and Elite Integration in Archaic Greece’, in Fisher and Van Wees, eds, 313–47. Figueira, T.J. (2016), ‘Politeia and Lakon̄ ika in Spartan Historiography’, in Figueira, ed., 7–104. Figueira, T.J., ed. (2016), Myth, Text and History at Sparta, Piscataway, N.J. Finley, M.I. (1973), The Ancient Economy. Berkeley and Los Angeles. Fisher, N.R.E. and Van Wees, H., eds (2015), ‘Aristocracy’ in Antiquity: Redefining Greek and Roman Elites. Swansea. Grote, G. (1872), A History of Greece4, vol. 2. London. Grundy, G.B. (1908), ‘The Population and Policy of Sparta in the Fifth Century’, JHS 28: 77–96. Harvey, D. (2004), ‘The Clandestine Massacre of the Helots (Thucydides 4.80)’, in Figueira, ed., 199–217. Hodkinson, S. (1986), ‘Land Tenure and Inheritance in Classical Sparta’, CQ 36: 378–406. Hodkinson, S. (1992), ‘Sharecropping and Sparta’s Exploitation of the Helots’, in Sanders, ed., 123–34. Hodkinson, S. (2000), Property and Wealth in Classical Sparta. Swansea and London. Hodkinson, S. and Powell, A., eds (1999), Sparta: New Perspectives. Swansea. Hodkinson, S. and Powell, A., eds (2006), Sparta and War. Swansea. Hunt, P. (1997), ‘Helots at the Battle of Plataea’, Historia 46: 129–44. Huxley, G.L. (1962), Early Sparta. Cambridge, MA. Kahrstedt, U. (1919), ‘Die Spartanische Agrarwirtschaft’, Hermes 54: 279–94. Kiechle, F. (1963), Lakonien und Sparta. Munich and Berlin.

594 Thomas Figueira Lazenby, J.F. (1985), The Spartan Army. Warminster. Lazenby, J.F. (1995), ‘The Archaia Moira: A Suggestion,’ CQ 45: 87–91. Link, S. (2004), ‘Snatching and Keeping: The Motif of Taking in Spartan Culture’, in Figueira, ed., 1–24. Lukermann, F.E. and Moody, J. (1978), ‘Nichoria and Vicinity: Settlements and Circulation’, in Rapp and Aschenbrenner, eds, 78–107. Lupi, M. (2003), ‘L’archaia moira. Osservazioni sul regime fondiario a partire spartano da un libro recente,’ Incidenza dell’ antico, Dialoghi di storia greca 1: 151–72. Luraghi, N. (2001), ‘Der Erdbebenaufstand und die Entstehung der messenischen Identität’, in Papenfuss and. Strocka, eds, 279–301. Luraghi, N. (2008), The Ancient Messenians: Constructions of Ethnicity and Memory. Cambridge, MA. Luraghi, N. and Alcock, S., eds (2003), Helots and their Masters: The History and Sociology of a System of Exploitation. Cambridge. Manso, J.C.F. (1800–5), Sparta, 3 volumes. Leipzig. Marasco, G. (1981/83), Commento alle biografie Plutarchee di Agide e di Cleomene, 2 vols. Rome. McDonald, W.A. and Coulson, W.D.E. (1983), ‘The Dark Age at Nichoria’, in McDonald, Coulson and Rosser, eds, 316–29. McDonald, W.A., Coulson, W.D.E. and Rosser, J., eds (1983), Excavations at Nichoria. Volume III. Dark Age and Byzantine Occupation. Minneapolis. McDonald, W.A. and Hope Simpson, R. (1972), ‘Archaeological Exploration’, in McDonald and Rapp, 117–47. McDonald, W.A. and Rapp, G.R. (1972), The Minnesota Messenian Expedition: Reconstructing a Bronze Age Environment. Minneapolis. Nafissi, M. (1991), La nascita del Kosmos: Studi sulla storia e la società di Sparta. Naples. Ogden, D. (2004), Aristomenes of Messene: Legends of Sparta’s Nemesis. Swansea. Papazoglou. F. (1993),‘Sur le caractère communautaire de la propriété du sol et de l’Hilotie à Sparta: A propos d’une thèse de J. Ducat’, ZA 43: 31–46. Papenfuss, D. and Strocka, V.M., eds (2001), Gab es das Griechische Wunder?, Mainz. Paradiso, A. (2004), ‘The Logic of Terror: Thucydides, Spartan Duplicity and an Improbable Massacre’, in Figueira, ed., 170–98. Powell, A. (2001), Athens and Sparta: Constructing Greek Political and Social History from 478 bc2, London. Powell, A. (2010), ‘Divination, Royalty and Insecurity in Classical Sparta’, in Powell and Hodkinson, eds, Sparta: The Body Politic, Swansea, 85–135. Powell, A. and Hodkinson, S., eds (2002), Sparta: Beyond the Mirage, Swansea. Powell, A. and Hodkinson, A., eds (2010), Sparta: The Body Politic, Swansea. Rapp, G. and Aschenbrenner, S.E., eds (1978), Excavations at Nichoria. Volume I. Site, Environs, and Techniques. Minneapolis. Roobaert, A. (1977), ‘Le danger hilote?’, Ktema 2: 141–55. Sanders, J.M. ed. (1992), ΦIΛOΛAKΩN: Lakonian Studies in Honor of Hector Catling: London. Schütrumpf, E. (1987), ‘The Rhetra of Epitadeus: A Platonist’s Fiction’, GRBS 28: 441–57. Singor, H.W. (1993), ‘Spartan Land Lots and Helot Rents’, in De Agricultura: In memoriam Pieter Willem De Neeve. Amsterdam. 31–60. Spencer, N. (1998), ‘Nichoria: An Early Iron Age Village in Messenia.’ in Davis, ed., 167–70. SVA = Die Staatsverträge des Altertums. Zweiter Band. Die Verträge der griechisch‐römischen Welt von 700 bis 338 v. Chr.2, 1975. Munich. Talbert, R.J. (1989), ‘The Role of the Helots in the Class Struggle at Sparta’, Historia 38: 22–40. Toynbee, A. (1969), Some Problems of Greek History. Oxford. Tsetskhladze, G.R., ed. (2008), A History of Greek Colonisation and Settlement Overseas. Leiden. Van Wees, H. (2004), Greek Warfare: Myth and Realities, London.

Helotage and the Spartan Economy 595 Verdelis, N., Jameson, M. and Papachristodoulou, I. (1975), ‘APΧAIKAI EΠIΓPAΦAI EK TIPYNΘOΣ,’ AE: 150–205. Welwei, K. (1974), Die Unfreie im griechische Kriegsdienst. Mainz. Wiedemann, T. (1981), Greek and Roman Slavery. New York Ziehen, L. (1933), ‘Das Spartanische Bevölkerungsproblem’, Hermes 68: 218–37. FURTHER READING For a basic view on the helots (and on fifth‐century Sparta), consider the discussion in G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, (1972), The Origins of the Peloponnesian War, London. The most systematic treatment is J. Ducat (1990), Les Hilotes, BCH Supp. 20, Paris, and useful also are the contributions in N. Luraghi and S. Alcock, eds (2003), Helots and their Masters in Laconia and Messenia: Histories, Ideologies, Structures. Washington, DC. On the roots of helotage, consider S. Link, ‘Snatching and Keeping. The Motif of Taking in Spartan Culture’ in Figueira, ed., Spartan Society, 2004, Swansea, 1–24. Paul Cartledge is the leading contemporary Anglophone student of Sparta: his Sparta and Lakonia: A Regional History 1300 to 362 bc2. 1st edn (1979), 2nd edn (2002), London and New York, is an important overview, and his (1987), Agesilaos and the Crisis of Sparta, London, is a detailed discussion of classical Sparta. I note three of my works on economics: (1984) ‘Mess Contributions and Subsistence at Sparta’, TAPA 114, 84–109; (1986) ‘Population Patterns in Late Archaic and Classical Sparta’, TAPA 116, 165–213; (2004) ‘The Nature of the Spartan Kler̄ os’, in Figueira, ed., Spartan Society, Swansea, 47–76. A reconstruction along different princi- ples is provided in S. Hodkinson (2000), Property and Wealth in Classical Sparta, Swansea and London. On the helot creation of a Messenian identity, see Figueira (1999), ‘The Evolution of the Messenian Identity’, in S. Hodkinson and A. Powell, eds, Sparta: New Perspectives, Swansea, 211–44; N. Luraghi (2008), The Ancient Messenians: Constructions of Ethnicity and Memory, Cambridge, MA. For the helots, Spartan religion, and state security: A. Powell (2010), ‘Divination, Royalty and Insecurity in Classical Sparta’, in S. Hodkinson and A. Powell, eds (2010), Sparta: The Body Politic, Swansea, 85–135.

CHAPTER 23 The Perioikoi Jean Ducat (Translated by Anton Powell) With the opening words of his Lakedaimonion Politeia (“Constitution of the Lake­ daimonians”), Xenophon highlights the paradox which Sparta presented to other Greeks: What really amazed me about Sparta was realising that it has one of the smallest citizen populations of any city‐state, and yet this has not prevented it from emerging clearly as the most powerful, and the best‐reputed, state in Greece … And yet, in the rest of this text Xenophon’s approach – singing the praises of the laws of Lykourgos while restricting himself to matters internal to Sparta itself – has led him to say nothing about one of the main reasons for Sparta’s power: the perioikis.This term refers to the political entity formed by the communities of perioikoi (“dwellers around”). Without this entity, Sparta would have been – in spite of “Lykourgos” – no more than an average power. Modern historians, like their ancient counterparts, are agreed in defining the perioikoi as the class of men who, when added to the Spartans themselves, formed the community of Lakedaimonians. Several ancient texts are particularly clear on this point. In Herodotus (7.234) the exiled Spartan king Damaratos says to the Persian ruler Xerxes, after the battle of Thermopylai: “O King, the Lakedaimonians are large in their population, and numerous are their cities … And there is in Lakedaimon one city, Sparta, possessed of about eight thousand warriors. All of them are similar to the men who have fought here. As for the other Lakedaimonians, they are different from the Spartans, but they are brave nevertheless.” A Companion to Sparta, Volume II, First Edition. Edited by Anton Powell. © 2018 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Published 2018 by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

The Perioikoi 597 Similarly clear statements are made by Thucydides (4.8.1) and Xenophon (Hell. 6.4.15). To put it in formulaic terms, Sparta + perioikis = Lakedaimon. But what exactly were the perioikic communities? Were they city‐states, or were they communities without political independence which were no more than small towns or villages (kom̄ ai) within a Lakedaimonian state? In modern scholarship on the subject, by far the prevailing view is that the perioikoi lived in city‐states, but the opposite view still has proponents (Eremin (2002); Mertens (2002)). The question is therefore worth investigating now. And in the view of the present writer, it can be answered decisively. 23.1  The Perioikic City‐states Scholars have collected the ancient evidence – of varying value – for the political status of individual perioikic communities, from literary texts and from inscriptions (Shipley (1997); Hansen (2004)). The clearest evidence concerns the island of Kythera: namely, the fact that Aristotle wrote a text entitled “Constitution (Politeia) of the Kytherans”. If Kythera had a politeia, necessarily it was a polis, a city‐state. Also helpful, though slightly less so, is the fact that individual perioikoi, when named in official records of other communities, are referred to not only by their personal names but also by their “ethnic”, the name of their community (e.g. “Asinaios”, “of Asine”).The largest such category consists of proxeny decrees: that is, inscriptions recording that certain individuals are, within their home communities, the official representatives (proxenoi) of another community. The places referred to by such “ethnics” are: Asine in Messenia, Epidauros, Kyphanta, Oinous, Pellana and Kythera. Less compelling, though still significant, evi­ dence is the fact that other, unofficial, kinds of text – funerary inscriptions and literary works – use such “ethnics”: the individuals concerned are from Aithaia, Asine (Asine in Messenia in some cases, and in others possibly Asine in Laconia), Aulon, Thouria, Aigys, Chen and Kythera. Finally, the authors of some texts from the classical period refer to a perioikic community as a polis: the places concerned are Asine, Mothone, Anthana, Boia, Epidauros, Gytheion (?), Kythera, Las, Oitylos, Prasiai, Side, Tainaron and Thyrea. The value of this last kind of evidence varies greatly, depending on how reliable in general is the author in question and in what context the information occurs. Taken together, these various categories of evidence do not quite settle the general question of whether perioikic communities were poleis. But they do clearly point to an answer. Given that Kythera for certain was a polis, and that Asine, Epidauros, Kyphanta, Oinous and Pellana almost certainly were, it would be rash indeed to suppose that the same status was not enjoyed by some, at least, of the other perioikic communities. Moving now to Greek texts which refer to the perioikic communities en bloc, as a special category, we find that these communities are always referred to as poleis. Thus on one occasion (5.54.1–2) Thucydides simply calls them “the city‐states” (poleis). Xenophon writes as follows: “the perioikic city‐states” (Lak. Pol. 15.3; Ages. 2.24); “[Agesilaos] sent the perioikoi back to their own city‐states” (Hell. 6.5.21), and “the perioikic [poleis]” (hai perioikides, Hell 3.5.7). In such expressions the word polis does not have the same meaning as it would have if a particular community were referred to in passing as a polis. The collective character of the term implies that the writer believes that there existed a normal status for a perioikic community, and that this status was that of a polis.

598 Jean Ducat Also, while in phrases such as those just quoted there are several instances of formulae such as hai perioikides poleis (“the perioikic city‐states”), we never meet any such expres­ sion as hai perioikides kom̄ ai (“the perioikic villages”). Finally, there are two texts where the perioikic city‐states, viewed as a whole rather than being identified individually, are described in a way which reveals what the authors thought of them. First, there is the passage of Herodotus with which we began (7.234). Damaratos is seeking to explain to Xerxes what kind of opponents the Lakedaimonians will be: first, how many of them remain after Thermopylai, and second whether those who do remain will prove as effective warriors as those the Great King has just had to deal with. To the first question, his answer is that the Lakedaimonians as a whole form a large mass, while to the second question his response involves making a distinction between the Spartiates and “the others”. Taking together his two expressions, “the Lakedaimonians have numerous polies” and “there is in Lakedaimon one polis, Sparta, which boasts some eight thousand warriors”, we see that, as regards having the status of city‐state, Herodotus puts the Spartans and “the other Lakedaimonians” on the same level. He does not say “In Lakedaimon there is only one city‐state, Sparta, and all the other concentrations of population are mere kom̄ ai (villages)”: in fact, he says the exact opposite, that Lakedaimon has many cities, of which Sparta is one. He focuses on the latter alone, not on the grounds that it is more of a city‐state than the others but because it is the only one to have eight thousand warriors “similar” to those at Thermopylai. Our second text is perhaps even more explicit. Isokrates, writing c.342–339, describes what he sees as the appalling way in which the Spartiates have treated, and continue to treat, their perioikoi (Panath.177ff.). In his eminently partisan view, the origins of the sad condition of the perioikoi go back to a distant era in which there was violent conflict between the aristocracy and the dem̄ os. The aristocracy won, and subsequently obliged the former dem̄ os to live separately from the aristocracy, and as inferiors. “They split up the mass of the people into groups as small as possible, and settled them in a large number of locations with inadequate amounts of land. Officially these were called ‘city‐states’, but their real significance is less than that of the demes we have here at Athens” (Panath. 179). Among the various forms of injustice practised by the Spartiates against those they had made their perioikoi, Isokrates emphasizes in particular the techniques used to prevent perioikic societies enjoying a normal form of development. Isokrates’ very bias makes it clear that it was impossible to deny that the perioikoi had their own poleis: if he could have claimed as much, he certainly would have done. Instead, his case is: the perioikoi do indeed live in poleis but that term is a sham. These so‐called poleis are in reality so small as to be inferior in importance (dynamis, a term which includes both size of population and political influence) to the demes of Attike. His term “inferior” is no doubt an exaggeration, but in other respects the facts related by Isokrates seem beyond dispute. What can be disputed is the interpretation he puts on those facts, in claiming that the smallness of the perioikic city‐states was the result of deliberate contrivance by the Spartiates. We note that he does not say that the perioikic communities had a status like that of the Attic demes, that they were thus no more than sub‐divisions of the city‐ state of Sparta (as the demes were of the Athenian state). In fact he says the opposite: that the perioikic communities are city‐states, and it is precisely this which makes Sparta’s behaviour towards them unacceptable. Sparta, in order to dominate them, had prevented them from enjoying the process of development which was normal for city‐states.

The Perioikoi 599 How many perioikic poleis were there? Lists of such were compiled from the end of the fourth century onwards. They involved some one hundred names, but not all of these corresponded to actual poleis. (Shipley (1997) in his catalogue of perioikic poleis from all periods including Homeric and legendary times has ninety‐five items.) For the classical period the number of perioikic communities which may have been poleis can be estimated at around sixty. Of these, we have evidence of polis status in the case of twenty‐three – though these were not necessarily the most important communities at the time. Many others have left no such evidence. About half of these sixty communities can be firmly located (see Map 23.1). What kind of life and culture existed in a perioikic city‐state is hard to determine. Were these poleis all like miniature Spartas, or how did they differ? There is some evidence that the perioikic communities in Laconia (Oinous, Pellana, Geronthrai, Sellasia, Gytheion, Las) or nearby (Tainaron, Thalamai) had been so much under Sparta’s influence as to resemble her in fundamental respects such as political institutions and social structure. Perioikic cities on the east coast, separated from Sparta by the massive Parnon range of mountains and for long dominated politically by Argos, were importantly different. Aulon Malea Oios Thyrea MESSENE Karyai Eua Anthana Aigys Belbina Kyparissia Tyros Pellana Oinous Pylos Sellasia Prasiai Mothone Thouria Pharai SPARTA Korone Kardamyle Geronthrai Kyphanta Asine Thalamai Helos Zarax Las Gytheion Epidauros Asine Oitylos Etis Boia Side Tainaron Zarax: perioikic city Kythera Anthana: perioikic city, localisation uncertain Skandeia Tyros: kome Map 23.1  Laconia and Messenia: map of perioikic communities mentioned in this chapter.

600 Jean Ducat These were Thyrea, Anthana, Eua, Prasiai, Kyphanta, Zarax and Epidauros. Most of them were essentially maritime communities and probably differed from Sparta in their political, economic and social arrangements. A third category is formed by the cities of Messenia, such as Kardamyle, Pharai, Thouria, Korone, Asine, Mothone, Kyparissia and Aulon. We know practically nothing of their internal arrangements in the classical period. Not every perioikic community mentioned in our literary and epigraphic sources amounted to a polis: some were mere kom̄ ai (“villages”) (Hansen (1995) 74, n.122; (2004) 156). We know that there were kom̄ ai in the territory of Sparta, but they are not our concern here. The villages which matter for present purposes are those which belonged to perioikic poleis sufficiently important to include such. We hear, in three lines of a lost comedy of the poet Stephanos (fourth–third centuries bc), of a kom̄ ē which had belonged to Thouria but which a king (probably Philip II of Macedon) had separated off, in order to confer it on one of his favourites (Kassel‐Austin PCG 7 (1989), p. 615). The polis of Boia, the territory of which was extensive, seems to have included several kom̄ ai: Etis, Aphroditia and Side. Thucydides (4.54.1, 4) reports that Kythera (itself a polis, as we have seen, and with its urban centre in the interior of the island) had a kom̄ ē named Skandeia on the sea. A final, untypical, case is that of the Skiritai, who seem not to have lived in poleis, but to have formed an ethnos and to have lived in kom̄ ai: of these, we know the names of Oios and Karyai. A profound break in the history of perioikic territory occurred in 369, with the inva­ sion of Lakedaimonian territory by Thebes. To the west of Mount Taygetos first: not only was Messene refounded as a polis, but the surrounding region was largely or entirely reorganized. The details, however, are disputed. From the time that the question was first raised (by Kuhn in 1878), scholars have disagreed on when the structure changed and on how the new Messenia was organized. Some (such as Shipley (2004) 562) believe that Messenia became a federal state controlled by the city of Messene – on the lines of the Boiotian confederacy which was controlled by Thebes. Others (such as Christien (1998) 460‐1) see Messenia, while still dominated by Messene, as having been a more informal structure, on the lines of the Lakedaimonian perioikis. As to dating: were the main changes the work of the Theban Epameinondas in 369/8 or of Philip of Macedon in 338/7? That question applies particularly to the poleis around the Messenian Gulf: Philip, it may seem, was instigator of the main change here. But the change was not total: Asine and Mothone probably continued to be part of the Lakedaimonian sphere. To the east of Mount Taygetos, there is corresponding uncertainty as to how the perioikis developed after 369. In general terms, the status of perioikic cities appears to have remained unchanged until 195, when it was abolished by the Roman Flamininus. There was, however, instability in certain places. The frontier with Arcadia had been brought very close to Sparta following the Theban invasion, but later receded north­ wards as Sparta managed to regain part of its lost territory. In 338/7, however, Sparta again lost land in this area (Shipley (2000) 370–5). East of Mount Parnon, even less is known about the development of Sparta’s frontier with Argos: throughout the third century control of the coastal settlements was disputed between the two powers. In Shipley’s view ((2000) 376–7), the Thyreatis region passed into the control of Argos in 338/7. A dedication surviving at Delphi, made by the inhabitants of Tyros, shows that in 277 Tyros (which refers to itself as a kom̄ ē and not as a polis) was still part of the Lakedaimonian sphere: the same must therefore have been true of those

The Perioikoi 601 communities further south than Tyros, and thus nearer to Sparta. On the other hand, Polybios (4.36.4–5) refers to places in the same region  –  Polichna, Prasiai, Leukai, Kyphanta, Glympeis and Zarax – as being under the control of Argos in 219 bc. 23.2  The Perioikic Cities, Independence and Dependence: The Military Aspects Perioikic communities were, then, poleis but their sovereignty was not complete. In certain crucial respects, they were politically under the control of Sparta. Foreign policy and war are the most obvious areas of this dependence. But, in addition, aspects of the cities’ internal affairs were dictated by Sparta. Which aspects were concerned, and how far this Spartan control extended, we shall now discuss. Our evidence, however, is often fragmentary in the extreme: the independence or otherwise of the perioikoi is not a field for definitive answers. Isokrates, in a text generally and intensely hostile to Sparta and written c.342–39, devotes several paragraphs to showing how the Spartans managed first to establish complete domination over the perioikoi and then to maintain it indefinitely (Panath. 177–81). The picture he gives of the perioikoi was probably widely shared by his Greek contemporaries. As we saw earlier, he first gives a pseudo‐historical account of events which, according to him, led to the status of perioikos coming into existence. After winning a civil war (stasis), the aristocrats of Sparta “reduced the dem̄ os to the status of perioikoi, enslaving the souls of these men as thoroughly as those of their slaves”. This expression does not mean that Isokrates is conflating the perioikoi with the helots. For him, while the latter were slaves in body and soul, the perioikoi were only slaves in their psychology, because they accepted the inferior status which the Spartans had imposed upon them. The secret of Sparta’s successful dominance lay in having contrived to place strict limits on how far the poleis of the perioikoi could develop the size of their populations and the nature of their economies. This had been achieved by exiling this underclass to outlying and unproductive land, and by fragmenting them into poleis which were numerous and tiny. In this way the perioikoi had been made permanently incapable of resisting the will of Sparta. This reconstruction of events by Isokrates is, of course, pure fiction. But the fiction is woven around historical fact. The poleis of the perioikoi were indeed situated in outlying parts of Lakedaimonian territory, and in some cases were very far from Sparta itself. It was true also that these poleis were many in number, and usually of no great size. But all this had not been decided by Sparta. And it is surely untrue that the perioikoi lived wretched and impoverished lives. They had other resources than agriculture: mining, fishing, trade and crafts. Isokrates’ account is, in short, ideologically deeply biased. On the other hand, what he says (ss. 180–1) about the methods used by the Spartans of his own day to perpetuate their domination over the perioikoi should be taken seriously. His two main points are: Sparta’s use of the perioikoi as soldiers, and the power of the Spartan ephors to have perioikoi put to death without trial. Among Isokrates’ criticisms of Spartan treatment of the perioikoi is the accusation that the latter were exploited shamelessly as a military force. Was such an accusation true? We can see how far the perioikoi, in the military sphere, were subject to the will of Sparta

602 Jean Ducat from the way that decisions were taken to go to war, and how war was conducted. Xenophon in the Hellenika recounts fifteen episodes of wars begun by Sparta (Richer (1998) 324–34), which show clearly that only the Spartan authorities, and the Assembly in particular, deliberated and voted on the question of beginning hostilities. The Spartan ephors then gave to the perioikic poleis the order to mobilize, no doubt specifying how many troops to supply, and also set a time and place for the forces to assemble. The place might be within Lakedaimonian territory, close to the frontier, or at some point beyond. Before deciding to go to war, Sparta might consult its allies; as for the perioikoi, they played no role in the decision‐making. However, although the perioikic poleis were thus completely subject to Sparta in questions of war and peace, they were able to conduct some interstate relations on their own account: inscriptions show that certain of them had proxenoi of their own for other states. So much is certain. In the rest of this chapter we deal with more speculative matters. Were the perioikoi obliged to take part in every campaign of the Spartans? The great majority of modern historians have thought so: that the Spartans never went to war without the perioikoi. However, in his book on the Spartan army, Lazenby (1985) argued the opposite. In his view, until the time of Leuktra (371) Sparta avoided mobilizing the perioikoi for wars against other Peloponnesians. And it is true that no ancient source mentions explicitly a perioikic presence in any such campaign. Lazenby points out in particular that when Thucydides (5.64–74) gives his description of the forces present at the battle of Mantineia (418), he makes no mention of perioikoi. Similarly in Xenophon, there is no mention, before the battle of Leuktra, of perioikic troops on a campaign against Peloponnesians. Lazenby’s theory has not found many supporters, but it must be admitted that – like other arguments from silence – it cannot be definitively disproved. A chief consideration against it, however, is the assumption on which it is based: that the Spartans would have been so suspicious of the perioikoi as to forego their help on cam­ paigns against neighbouring peoples, which usually meant those against Arcadian states and Argos. The assumption that relations between Sparta and the perioikoi were based solely on force seems not to be borne out by the facts, and cannot be relied on. Also, there are positive signs in Xenophon’s work that the Spartans never went to war alone. As we shall see in a moment, he uses a consistent set of expressions to denote the Lakedaimonian army, referring, for example, to “the citizen contingent” on campaigns inside and outside the Peloponnese, before and after 371. This suggests that in his view the army of Sparta always took essentially the same form. This impression is confirmed by the fact that when describing, in the Lakedaimonion Politeia, how the army created by Lykourgos was organized and how it operated, not only does he twice mention the presence of a perioikic contingent, the Skiritai, but he attributes to it a precise role, that of ensuring the safety of the whole army, both when it was static (12.3) and when it was on the move (13.6). Because protection of this kind was essential for every campaign, Xenophon must have understood that the Spartan army could never have set out without some, at least, of the perioikoi. How large a proportion of Spartan‐led forces consisted of perioikoi? In the first episode where we have such information, the battle of Plataia against the Persians in 479, equality in numbers was the rule, according to our main source, Herodotus. Thereafter, the perioikoi disappear from our records of great battles until Leuktra, and we are obliged to rely on calculations made by modern historians. Thomas Figueira ((1986) 212)

The Perioikoi 603 estimates thus the numbers of Spartiate and perioikic soldiers of mobilization age at the following two major battles: Mantineia (418 bc): Spartiates – between 2086 and 2141; perioikoi – between 3349 and 3404 (plus 600 Skiritai); Leuktra (371 bc): Spartiates – 938; perioikoi – 2150 (plus the Skiritai?). An impressive process of change can be seen. Overall, and without counting the Skiritai, the proportion of Spartiates to perioikoi moves from 50:50 in 479 to 39:61 in 418 and then to 30:70 in 371. The proportion of the fighting which fell to the perioikoi has grown palpably larger over the years. The organization of the Lakedaimonian army is in many ways an obscure and difficult subject. And perhaps the most obscure aspect of all is the question whether the perioikoi fought in separate units of their own, or whether they were brigaded together with the Spartiates. Lazenby may be the only historian in modern times to reject the possibility that some, at least, of the perioikoi were integrated in Spartan units ((1985) 14–18). His position is at least consistent, given his view that before 371 the perioikoi took no part in campaigns within the Peloponnese: it would be difficult to imagine an army which changed its fundamental structure from one campaign to another. But Lazenby’s hypothesis would beg the question of how, with an ever‐decreasing population of Spartan citizens to draw on, Sparta continued to be able to mobilize an adequate army – unless she was drawing on more and more perioikoi to supply the deficit. Lazenby recognized the problem: his answer was, that the shortfall was made up by Sparta’s population of Inferiors. But it seems highly unlikely that the Inferiors were sufficiently numerous for that. The fact that the Lakedaimonian army was maintained at a viable level, in spite of the ceaseless decline in Spartiate numbers in the classical period, is best explained by the assumption that Sparta was using the military resources of the perioikoi. This is why almost all specialists are now agreed that in the fourth century every unit of the Lakedaimonian army was mixed, with Spartiates and perioikoi fighting together, except for the Skiritai, who always fought separately. Could perioikoi become commanders of Lakedaimonian forces? In the Lakedaimonian land army, there is no record that such a thing ever took place. It was apparently unthinkable that a perioikos should give orders to a Spartiate, which is what would have happened as soon as military units became mixed (from the mid‐fifth century, perhaps) if any of the perioikoi had been allowed to command. Indeed, in the fourth century even the contin­ gents of non‐Lakedaimonian allies were commanded by Spartiates. In the whole of Greek history, the only known case of a perioikos entrusted with a command concerns the navy: Deiniadas was commander of a squadron in the Aegean in 412 (Thuc. 8.22.1). Now, for obvious reasons of geography, seafaring was a specialism of the perioikoi: this makes the uniqueness of the case of Deiniadas all the more significant. In military matters, then, the perioikoi were far from being free and equal allies of the Spartans. So much is clear from the way wars were decided upon, from the way the Lakedaimonian army was mobilized, and from the structure of command. However, if we take account of the size of their respective populations, war weighed less heavily upon the perioikoi than it did upon the Spartiates. While the perioikis may be estimated as having contained over these periods at least four times as many citizens as Sparta (Ducat (2008), n. 117), in 371 it supplied only slightly more than twice as many fighting men.

604 Jean Ducat 23.3 The Perioikoi and Spartan Kings Various evidence shows that perioikic poleis had close ties with the kings of Sparta. Xenophon states (Lak. Pol. 15.3) that Lykourgos had assigned to each of the Spartan kings “select pieces of land in many of the perioikic poleis, sufficient to give him a middling fortune but not to allow him to become extremely rich”. The way in which Xenophon describes the size of these landholdings shows that he is attempting to answer a criticism, no doubt current in his time, according to which the Spartan kings were indeed too rich. The attribution to Lykourgos is clearly a politically‐motivated fiction, but that Spartan kings held land in some of the perioikic cities can be taken as fact. Should this be seen as another aspect of perioikic subordination to Sparta? To judge by the present passage, Xenophon obviously thought so. These royal holdings consisted of “choice land” (gen̄ exaireton), land of the highest quality. Now, we have seen from Isokrates that such land was alleged to be, for the perioikoi, a rare commodity. To lose it was therefore a serious sacrifice. Xenophon suggests that this sacrifice was not made voluntarily: it has been imposed by Lykourgos as if he were all‐powerful in the perioikis, as he was at Sparta. Such is Xenophon’s version of history. It cannot of course be correct. In the Iliad we read of several cases of communities’ making similar grants of land to military leaders from elsewhere, in return for their services. In each case the community itself defines the land in question and presents it as a gift: the Lycians to Bellerophon, the Aitolians to Meleagros. Now, Spartan kings were supreme commanders in war, for the perioikoi as for the Spartiates, so probably it was in this capacity that they received these landholdings. Admittedly these gifts may not have been entirely spontaneous on the part of the perioikoi, but neither can they be seen simply as an aspect of their subjection to Sparta. The landholdings express a different mentality, and reflect a recognition by the perioikoi that the kings of Sparta were royalty indeed: Sparta’s kings were their kings too. We hear also of a somewhat mysterious “royal tribute”. The only source for this is the doubtfully‐Platonic dialogue the First Alkibiades (122d–123b), the date of which is uncertain. Its author writes: Concerning these riches, the largest and most frequent levies are made in favour of the kings, not to mention the royal tribute (basilikos phoros) which the Lakedaimonians pay to the kings and which itself is far from insignificant. These words have generally been taken as referring to a tribute supposedly paid by the perioikic poleis to the kings of Sparta in the classical period. It is commonly linked with a passage of Ephoros (ap. Strabo 8.5.4 = 70 F117) which states that Agis, son of Eurysthenes, imposed on the “neighbouring peoples” (perioikoi) at one and the same time political subjection and “the payment of tribute to Sparta”. This is then taken to refer to a forerunner of the tribute recorded of the classical period. The latter, however, is described by our single source as paid to the kings and not to the Spartan polis. And while it is conceivable that tribute paid originally to the kings was later paid to the polis, the opposite development is very hard to imagine. Also, the idea that Agis’s tribute was a forerunner presupposes that in our passage of the First Alkibiades the word “Lakedaimonians” means the perioikoi alone, something

The Perioikoi 605 which is at odds with classical usage: in classical Greek the word “Lakedaimonians” means the whole entity formed by the Spartiates and the perioikoi. It seems that, concerning the very existence of the “royal tribute”, the mystery must remain. Spartan royal funerals are a subject which evidently concerned the perioikoi and on which we have a detailed and very striking passage of Herodotus (6.58). “Whenever the death occurs of a king of the Lakedaimonians, the whole of Lakedaimon – the Spartiates but also the perioikoi in predetermined numbers – is obliged to attend the funeral”, a description of which then follows. Herodotus here emphasizes the compulsory nature of the attendance by a fixed number of “representatives” of the perioikoi as participants in the funeral. (For all the perioikoi to attend would have been physically impossible.) Evidently he saw this compulsion as a sign of the political subordination of the perioikic communities. We may wonder, however, whether he was right. In every society an event such as the funeral of the supreme leader is seen to require, above all, a display of whole­ hearted unanimity on the part of the community. The tendency on such occasions is for integration, not for exclusion or the enforcement of hierarchy. So in the present case: taking part in royal funerals was, for the perioikoi, not so much an obligation imposed on them as the recognition of a privilege, signalling that the deceased had been king for them as much as for the Spartiates. Or perhaps the truth is rather that in such cases obligation and privilege are two facets of the same social relationship. Was there an aristocracy within the perioikoi and, if so, what were its relations with the Spartan royal families? Here our starting point is a passage of Xenophon (Hell. 5.3.9), which states that among those who came to accompany king Agesipolis on the campaign against Olynthos in 381/0 were members of the perioikic aristocracy: “He was escorted by many members of the elite (kaloi kagathoi) of the perioikoi, who had come as volun­ teers, and also by men from other states (xenoi) of the class known as trophimoi”. These men were volunteers, but their intention, implies Xenophon, was not so much to take part in the expedition as to “attend” (akolouthein) the king. This episode reveals that there existed personal relations between, on the one hand, the leading families of certain perioikic poleis and, on the other, the two Spartan royal houses and probably also other eminent Spartiate families. That there were also present on the expedition certain trophi- moi (citizens of other states who as children had been invited by a Spartan family to grow up in the Spartan public education) prompts us to see that this institution concerning trophimoi may very well have been one of the main ways in which these leading families co‐operated. The children of the perioikic aristocracy were eminent candidates for invitation to become trophimoi, and their families were similarly well‐placed to agree to such. In this way the royal or aristocratic families of Sparta could build a relation of patronage with the elite of the perioikoi. In this case we should be in a very different moral climate from the simple subjection which is too often seen as the fate of perioikoi. Xenophon’s account of this episode suggests that the reality was more complicated. Close and direct relations existed, then, between the kings of Sparta and the perioikic cities. The reasons for such a relationship are clear. During a military campaign, which­ ever king Sparta had chosen to command the army was the supreme commander of the perioikic soldiers just as much as of the Spartiates present, and the more obviously so once Spartiates and perioikoi began to be brigaded together. Also, for the duration of the campaign the king was, for perioikoi and Spartiates alike, their intermediary with the gods, the person who conducted sacrifices in their name. The narratives of Thucydides

606 Jean Ducat and Xenophon show how this relationship was deepened by the fact of shared danger. During an expedition, for all the perioikoi present Sparta’s king was also truly their own. 23.4  Sparta and the Internal Affairs of Perioikic Poleis So far we have seen a situation which was normal for those Greek cities involved in an unequal alliance: the less powerful member of the relationship lost part of its sovereignty, in the sphere of war and foreign policy. But for perioikic poleis the subordination went wider, since it touched elements of internal affairs. Quite which, we shall now try to establish. The idea that the poleis of the perioikoi were regularly “administered” by envoys from Sparta, named “harmosts”, although it long remained orthodoxy, was rejected by MacDowell ((1986) 29; Hampl (1937) 44 had written similarly) and now has few or no supporters. Rightly. The idea was based on a single ancient passage, the comment of an anonymous scholiast (to Pindar, Ol. 6.154). The passage in question states: “The Lakedaimonians had twenty harmosts”. The term “Lakedaimonians” was taken to mean the perioikoi (contrary to classical Greek usage, as we have seen), and the rest of the phrase as meaning that “twenty harmosts exercised power over the ‘Lakedaimonians’”, whereas its most natural sense would be “Among the Lakedaimonians twenty men were designated as harmosts”. And the context, in which the scholiast’s phrase occurs, confirms our doubts: the commentator was using “harmost” in its familiar sense: a Spartiate sent abroad to govern a polis within Sparta’s empire, during the first quarter of the fourth century. There is, then, no reason to think that there were harmosts in the perioikic poleis. But did Sparta perhaps place garrisons there, under the control of a phrourarchos? That would in practice have amounted to the same thing. Scholars have claimed to identify the following cases: Mothone in 431 (Thuc. 2.25.2), Kythera in 424 (Thuc. 4.53.2), Thyrea in 424 (Thuc. 4.56.2), Aulon c.399 (Xen. Hell. 3.3.8), Oios and Leuktron in 370 (Hell. 6.5.24), Asine‐in‐Laconia c.369 (Hell. 7.1.25). Consideration of these cases suggests two things, one strategic and one political. The strategy adopted in wartime by the Spartiates, for defending Lakedaimonian territory, was not one of “garrisons” in the modern sense, but instead involved “surveillance forces” (phrourai) distributed over a very wide area and moving about constantly to meet any and every enemy incursion. As for Sparta’s political attitude towards the perioikic cities in general, it did not involve dependence on the kind of force which a harmost or garrison would have represented. This moderation was not motivated by respect for the rights of perioikoi; rather, such use of military force would have been far too expensive in manpower, at a time when Sparta was increasingly short of fighting men. Relations between Sparta and the perioikic poleis were not based simply on superior force; a policy of military constraint was not needed. If such was the rule, there were  –  as to most rules  –  certain exceptions. In the Lakedaimonian system, we know of one: Kythera. Recounting the invasion of the island by Athens in 424, Thucydides (4.53.2) writes: Kythera is an island close to Laconia, south of Cape Malea. Its inhabitants are Lakedaimonians, of the class known as perioikoi. Every year an official sent from Sparta, the “judge for Kythera”, used to come to the island. The Spartans also used to send there a company of hoplites, whose membership was rotated constantly, and they guarded the place with the utmost care.

The Perioikoi 607 The historian goes on, in the following section, to set out the reason for this watchful­ ness: the strategic position of the island. Under Spartan control, Kythera served as a way‐station for trade with Cyrenaica, and was a base for the fight against piracy. Under enemy control, it would be a deadly threat to Laconia (cf. Herod. 7.235). Thucydides evidently understood that the reason why the Spartans customarily had a “judge for Kythera” was to keep a close eye on what happened within the Kytheran community. To this end, he will have had – as his title suggests – sovereign power over all important trials, and especially the political ones. We see, then, that where the affairs of a perioikic polis had vital importance for the Spartans, they were quite ready to intervene in them openly, and even to create a government institution to do so. In the passage of the Panathenaicus (177–81), of which the pseudo‐historical ­elements were discussed above, Isokrates criticizes the Spartans’ treatment of the perioikoi for two main things: for the way in which they exploited the perioikoi as soldiers (180) and – in his eyes “the most serious of their injustices” – for the fact that “the ephors have complete discretion to have any of them whom they wish put to death without trial” (181). This latter claim must be taken very seriously as historical evidence. It is strongly supported by Xenophon’s reference to the alleged mission to perioikic Aulon, which is at the heart of his account of how the conspiracy of Kinadon was repressed by Sparta (Hell. 3.3.8–9). Although this supposed mission was merely a fiction, designed to remove Kinadon from his accomplices, the fiction had to be plausible. It thus casts light on Isokrates’ claim, and helps to explain it. Why, we should ask, did the ephors need and receive the power to judge the perioikoi and to condemn them to death? Xenophon’s account shows that, in order to condemn particular perioikoi, the ephors had the power to have them arrested in their own communities by members of the only standing armed force which Sparta possessed, the corps of hippeis. The arrested suspects were then taken to the ephors; it is at this stage that Xenophon’s account fits fairly well with Isokrates’ words. The latter then states that the perioikoi were put to death “without a trial”. These words must not be taken to mean that the unfortunate suspects were executed promptly on their arrival at Sparta, without any further form of examination. Inevitably they were questioned, above all to obtain information on the affair in which they were involved, but also to determine whether they were guilty of impairing the security of Sparta. It was in Sparta’s own interest to condemn to death as few innocent perioikoi as possible. Suspect perioikoi must therefore have undergone some sort of trial, but only before the ephors and not before a court as was normally the case for free men. To say that they were executed “without trial” is therefore an oversimplification, hardly surprising as coming from Isokrates. As for the affair at Aulon, we shall never know what – if anything – had happened there. But the case does reveal that the ephors received information on the internal affairs of perioikic poleis. Information implies informers. The perioikic system evidently depended on the Spartan authorities’ having a network of informers, recruited among the local population, to keep them permanently abreast of events. It was this power of the ephors – to intervene in the perioikis whenever they thought that Sparta’s security required it, to arrest and take to Sparta persons considered dangerous, to try them and, in appropriate cases, to condemn them to death – which for Isokrates symbolized the subjection of the perioikoi. And so it does for ourselves. But, in fairness, we should add

608 Jean Ducat that the Greek world in general produced, where there were alliances between unequals, many similar cases of brutal intervention by the stronger partner in the internal affairs of the weaker. 23.5  The Role of the Perioikoi in Lakedaimon as a Whole We began with the formula “Sparta + perioikis = Lakedaimon”. To understand the position of the perioikoi, we need to ask what exactly Lakedaimon was. Recent historians are fully agreed on their answer: Lakedaimon was a state. But how far can we understand this state theoretically? As an initial summary, we might say that the Lakedaimonian state had, as its body of citizens, Spartiates and perioikoi. It had a political centre, also called Lakedaimon, which geographically‐speaking was identical with – Sparta. It had a political structure, a politeia, determining who counted as citizens and how the state was governed. And its territory was the sum of the land belonging to Sparta and to the various perioikic poleis. How to characterize this Lakedaimonian state? On first principles, we might suppose that historians of today would have chosen one or other of two possibilities: either Lakedaimon was a polis, a city‐state, or it was a state of some other kind: a federal state, perhaps, or an ethnos. But recent scholarly literature reveals that no such choice has been made. It is not a case of scholars’ having clear but divergent opinions: instead, for Lakedaimon the same writers use indiscriminately the terms polis and “state”, whereas in other cases they would carefully distinguish between the two terms. As there was supposedly a single Lakedaimonian state, there is correspondingly supposed to have been a single Lakedaimonian population, comprising the Spartiates and the perioikoi. This population, this society, was eminently hierarchical. At its pinnacle were the Spartiates, who alone possessed full political rights, alone meeting in an Assembly which took decisions affecting the whole of Lakedaimon, and alone having the right to become officials. Thus, in Lakedaimon the perioikoi are supposed to have formed an inferior social category. The classic definition is that given by the German scholar F. Hampl ((1937) 7): “Die Periöken waren … als Lakedaimonioi eine Klasse minderen Rechtes innerhalb der Gesamtheit der Angehörigen des lakedämonischen Staates” (“the perioikoi were …, as Lakedaimonians, a second‐class category within the member­ ship of the Lakedaimonian state”). Cartledge ((1987) 16) goes further, stating that the condition of the perioikoi fell some way short of full civic rights: “The Perioikoi were personally free, unlike the Helots …. But vis‐a‐vis Sparta they had no public rights whatsoever …, and probably for most of them their private rights of landholding and marriage and civil contracts were conditioned upon the goodwill of the suzerain.” This comes close to suggesting that the perioikoi resembled the subjected inhabitants of a conquered territory, whose masters allowed them only a limited form of “municipal” independence. Such is the image of Lakedaimon and of the status of the perioikoi, as generally accepted by modern scholars. We may however criticize it as follows. To begin with the idea of society: the notion of a single, overall Lakedaimonian society is a strange one. Once we admit that the perioikoi lived in city‐states, we are admitting also that the society in which every individual citizen, Spartiate or perioikos, within this

The Perioikoi 609 Lakedaimonian entity, lived was – that of his own city‐state. So, what evidence is there for this theory of a single, overall Lakedaimonian society? The evidence in question has been conveniently collected by Shipley ((1997) 198). It consists of passages from Xenophon’s Hellenika, which all occur – with a single exception – in military contexts, and which refer not to social categories but to bodies of soldiers. The author’s purpose in these references is solely to describe the composition of the Lakedaimonian army on a particular campaign; where the perioikoi are mentioned it is purely as military contin­ gents. The sole exception is the list which Kinadon is described as giving, of his potential allies (3.3.6). It mentions the perioikoi, but only as such potential supporters, not as inferior members of a Lakedaimonian polis; the text mentions no such polis. The idea of a single, overall Lakedaimonian polis seems to the present writer thoroughly problematic. To take first its citizen body: to claim that there existed a polis of Lakedaimon involves conceding that both the Spartiates and the perioikoi were citizens of two poleis at once. This is seriously problematic, because we know of no other Greek society where such a thing applied. The obvious recourse would be to envisage the Lakedaimonian state as being a state of a different kind from a polis: a federal state, for example. But scholars have, quite reasonably (as we shall see), unanimously rejected this possibility. Our sources contain no trace of any institutions belonging strictly to Lakedaimon. One might of course evade this difficulty, by saying that the institutions of Sparta did duty as such: that the Spartan assembly was the assembly of Lakedaimon; that the gerousia was the council of Lakedaimon, and that the ephors were the chief magistrates of Lakedaimon. That in fact is what scholars do claim; but it is a claim for which there is no proof. Let us admit that there was indeed such a thing as Lakedaimonian territory, with a precise frontier. But if one were to argue that this was the territory of a state, from the fact that it comprised the territory of Sparta, on the one hand, and the territories of many perioikic poleis on the other, one would be faced with the conclusion that every part of this territory was under dual ownership: that it belonged, at the same time, both to Lakedaimon and to another polis, in some cases to Sparta and in other cases to one or other of the perioikic poleis.We have no known case anywhere in Greece of such co‐ownership of land. The “polis of Lakedaimon” thus has, it seems, no citizens of its own, no institutions, no territory. It is truly a ghost polis. Why, then, given these various problems, has the theory of a Lakedaimonian state been generally accepted, right up to the present? A brief review of scholarship shows that this theory has been remarkably consistent in its appeal. It has persisted from German scholarship of the 1920s and 1930s (Kahrstedt (1922), Wilcken (1924), Ehrenberg (1924), Busolt and Swoboda (1926), Hampl (1937)), until the international scholarship of today. This is all the more surprising in that, since 1970, all the other main aspects of Spartan society as traditionally conceived have been called into question. As we have seen, the status of perioikic communities has itself been recon­ sidered. In the years when the theory of the Lakedaimonian state was worked out, perioikic communities were seen as entirely subject to Sparta politically, with at most a qualified local independence. Nowadays, on the other hand, with more and more published source‐material to work from, most specialists regard these communities as poleis, effectively contradicting the idea of a Lakedaimonian state. But the necessary adjustment of theory has not been made. This is not yet the point to reject the old orthodoxy, but it is high time to see what evidence that orthodoxy drew on.

610 Jean Ducat Essentially, the orthodoxy was based on three expressions used in certain texts of the classical period: “the polis of the Lakedaimonians”, “king of the Lakedaimonians” and phrases such as “the citizen army”. Of these three expressions the clearest are the first two, since they both contain the phrase “the Lakedaimonians”. Before we examine their meaning, we should dwell for a moment on something which is in one sense well known, but seldom fully understood: a blurring in Greek authors of Sparta and Lakedaimon, and correspondingly of Spartiates and Lakedaimonians. Now there is no real confusion in the minds of these authors: when it matters to them, they make the distinction perfectly well. But even Thucydides, famed for his precision, can blur the point on occasion: at 1.10.2 he calls the town of Sparta, with its physical monuments, “the polis of the Lakedaimonians”. Likewise Xenophon, deemed so knowledgeable about Sparta, refers at Hell. 3.2 to the “Lakedaimonians” (s.21) but shortly afterwards (s.23) writes of the same people as “the ephors and the Assembly”, which shows that he is in both passages referring only to the Spartiates. And Herodotus in several passages alternates between the terms “Spartiates” and “Lacedaimonians” without any distinction of meaning: thus, 1.65; 1.152‐3; 6.52 and the entire narrative of the battle of Thermopylai. When a Greek author uses the name “Lakedaimonians”, not only do we have no way of telling  –  except sometimes from context  –  whether he means Lakedaimonians or Spartiates; for the author himself, in most cases, it amounted to the same thing. To come now to the term “polis of the Lakedaimonians”: it is this expression which has given rise to the theory that there existed a “city‐state of Lakedaimon”. It has been taken to show two things for certain: that a Lakedaimonian state existed, and that it took the form of a city‐state. Eleven occurrences of the term have been found (Bölte (1929) 1282). The instance at Thuc. 1.10.2 is unique, in referring to Sparta as a town. The other ten instances fall into two categories. In the first category (Thuc. 7.56.4; Xen. Hell. 2.1.14; Isocrates Panath. 61 and Philip 40; Aristotle Pol. 1273a, 1–2), the author is referring to Sparta, not only as a state but as a major power in the Greek world. In the second category (Thuc. 8.2.3 and 5.3; Xen. Hell. 3.5.6; 5.4.23; 8.4.21) the reference is to the Spartan “authorities”, the members of the government who are in possession of all information about current developments and have the power to take decisions as a matter of urgency. It is entirely clear that never in the classical period do we find the expression “polis of the Lakedaimonians” referring to any “polis of Lakedaimon” apart from Sparta. Nowhere does the expression even hint at such a thing. Only Sparta is meant: what we have is just a further case of the Greek capacity to refer to Sparta as “Lakedaimon” and to the Spartiates as “Lakedaimonians”. Then we have the term “king of the Lakedaimonians”. The occurrences of this expres­ sion in Xenophon (twice), Androtion (once) and the doubtfully‐Platonic Alkibiades (once) are not decisive. All the other cases of its use are in Herodotus and Thucydides, but with an important difference between the two authors. In Herodotus, the king is usually (in twenty‐one cases = 75 per cent) mentioned in connection with Sparta or the Spartiates; only in seven cases (=25 per cent) is he linked instead with Lakedaimon or the  Lakedaimonians. This proportion, 75:25, is the same as we find overall in this author’s use of the respective terms “Sparta” and “Lakedaimon”. Thucydides, on the other hand, uses invariably the term “king of the Lakedaimonians”. This consistency is connected with the fact that all his usages (except one, where he is referring to the kings of Sparta in general) occur in the same connection: the occasions, regular and frequent

The Perioikoi 611 in his narrative, on which the Lakedaimonian army sets out on campaign. In other words, we are dealing with a set formula, all the more understandable in that the king was in effect commander of the Lakedaimonian army. There is nothing here to suggest that Thucydides believed in the existence of a “polis of Lakedaimon”. The last of the three expressions used to support the idea of a “polis of Lakedaimon” is politikon strateuma. Unlike the other two phrases just considered, this one does not involve the term “Lakedaimonians”; the above‐mentioned “confusion” is therefore not at work. Scholars have argued from eight occurrences, all of them in Xenophon’s Hellenika (Hampl (1937) 26 n. 2; Lotze (1993/4) 39–40; Mertens (2002) 288 and n. 19). These cases do not, in fact, involve a single expression but a group of related expressions, the most significant of which is to politikon strateuma (“the citizen army”), which is found twice. The shorter phrase to politikon (“the citizen [army]”) also occurs twice. There is one occurrence of ta politika (“the citizen [soldiers]”), two of hoi politai (“the citizens”), and one of to oikothen strateuma (“the army from home”). What Xenophon is referring to, in all these cases, is simply the Lakedaimonian army – Spartiates and perioikoi together (cf. 6.5.21; 7.4.20, 27) – though in a particular context. The context always involves a contrast with another group of soldiers, usually Sparta’s allies but on one occasion mercenaries. The circumstances are, either departure for a campaign (three cases), or the last phase of a campaign, when the mercenaries and the allies have been sent away and the king is leading back the Lakedaimonian contingent to their homes (five cases). An expression based on the idea of citizenship could, then, be applied to the perioikoi as well as to the Spartiates. But of what state can these perioikoi and Spartiates all be citizens, if not of Lakedaimon? The logic seems inescapable. We should note, however, that these expressions do not refer to the body of citizens in general but only to the army, in circumstances where – the allies and the mercenaries being absent – it was reduced to its citizen component. Expressions of this kind are not peculiar to Xenophon or to Sparta; they are found – politikon strateuma (“citizen army”), politikai dynameis (“citizen forces”) – especially in Demosthenes and Aischines. In the fourth century such refer­ ences were common; they were to continue into Hellenistic times (as in Polybios and Diodorus Siculus). There was nothing peculiarly Lakedaimonian about their context; they reflect a world in which mercenary soldiers were increasingly common and a nos­ talgia for an age when Greek armies were made up exclusively of citizens. When Xenophon uses such expressions about Sparta, and calls perioikoi “citizens”, he is reflecting not legal technicalities but social status. He is contrasting citizen soldiers, from the Lakedaimonian territory as a whole, with allies and mercenaries who were outsiders. To summarize: the theory of the “Lakedaimonian state” or the “polis of Lakedaimon” is deeply problematic. The ancient passages on which it was based, in the early twentieth century, can be explained much more easily as a result either of blurring of Spartiates and Lakedaimonians, or of a desire to distinguish between an army of local citizens and one of outsiders. But a question remains: if Lakedaimon was not a city‐state, what was it, and what was the status of the perioikoi within it? A good starting point is a comment made by J.A.O. Larsen (1970) on the character of the Lakedaimonian entity: “Thus the entire complex resembled a federal state, with the federal government delegated to the Spartiates, though the emphasis on military service caused it to resemble an alliance.” While we may not be able to say what Lakedaimon was, we can try to say what, in our

612 Jean Ducat eyes, it was like. It was like a city‐state, in that it had the power to declare war, make a peace treaty and form an alliance. However, it resembles even more closely a federal state, something which also possessed those various powers. It brought together several city‐states, poleis, one of which, far more powerful than the rest, deprived the others of an important element of their sovereignty. It had a territory which was the sum of the territories of the city‐states which belonged to it, and it also possessed a combined army. But Lakedaimon was not a federal state. No source from the classical period uses of Lakedaimon the distinctive language of federalism, terms such as ethnos or koinon.There is no trace whatsoever of federal institutions for Lakedaimon, not even in the religious sphere. As Larsen observed, it also in a way resembles an alliance; we might be tempted to view Lakedaimon as the result of an unequal military alliance which had gone through a long period of evolution with an army increasingly integrated. But Lakedaimon was not an alliance, and the perioikoi are never, in relation to Sparta, described by the definitive term for allies, symmachoi. From this survey of plausible but ultimately unacceptable theories we conclude that the collectivity known as hoi Lakedaimonioi (“the Lakedaimonians”) formed a community but not a state. What held it together was the feeling of its members that they formed an ethnic and cultural unity (rather as Hampl long ago suggested (1937) 21–30). This unity involved their dialect of Greek, their alphabet, their religious cults and festivals, and above all the possession of a territory which must have been felt all the more as a shared possession in that it was defended by a shared army. It may be said with truth that the Lakedaimonian collectivity served the common interest of its members. For Sparta, the perioikis formed a circle of “first friends” always available for military mobilization, forming part of the foundation of the city’s pre‐ eminent power. As for the perioikoi, they must have taken pride in fighting alongside the men reputed as the best warriors in Greece. But in addition having Sparta on, and at, their side was the best possible guarantee of physical security in a Greek world where turbulence and threats of invasion were the norm. This is the answer to the question, Why was the “perioikic system” so durable? During the great revolt of the Messenian helots c.464, Thucydides (1.101.2) records only two perioikic cities as joining the insur­ rection: one, Thouria, was important; the other, Aithaia, was much less so. For other known defections we have to wait until the Theban invasion of 369, when Sparta had its back to the wall and when the perioikoi had little choice. We have rejected the traditional view, that the perioikoi were no more than second‐ class citizens within a Lakedaimonian state. There was no such state. And although the poleis of which they were citizens had lost to Sparta a significant part of their sovereignty, the perioikoi remained full citizens of their communities, enjoying the many privileges which citizenship involved. BIBLIOGRAPHY Bölte, F. (1929), ‘Sparta’, Pauly‐Wissowa RE III A 2, col. 1265–373. Busolt, G. and Swoboda, H. (1926), Griechische Staatskunde. Munich. Cartledge, P. (1987), Agesilaos and the Crisis of Sparta. London. Christien, J. (1998), ‘Sparte et le Péloponnèse après 369’, Praktika tou 5ou Diethnous Synedriou Peloponnesiakon Spoudon. Athens: 433–67.

The Perioikoi 613 Ducat, J. (2008), ‘Le statut des Périèques lacédémoniens’, Ktèma 33: 1–86. Ehrenberg, V. (1924), ‘Spartiaten und Lakedaimonier’, Hermes 59: 23–73. Eremin, A. (2002), ‘Settlements of Spartan Perioikoi: Poleis or Komai?’, in Powell, A. and Hodkinson, S., eds, 267–83. Figueira, T.J. (1986), ‘Population Patterns in Late Archaic and Classical Sparta’, Transactions of the American Philological Association 116: 165–213. Hall, J. (2000), ‘Sparta, Lakedaimon, and the Nature of Perioikic Dependency’, Copenhagen Polis Centre Papers 5 (Historia Einzelschriften 138): 73–89. Hampl, F. (1937), ‘Die lakedaimonischen Periöken’, Hermes 72: 1–49. Hansen, M.H. (1995), ‘Kome: A Study on how the Greeks Designated and Classified Settlements which were not Poleis’, Copenhagen Polis Centre Papers 2 (Historia Einzelschriften 95): 45–81. Hansen, M.H. (1996), ‘City Ethnics as Evidence for Polis Identity’, Copenhagen Polis Centre Papers 3 (Historia Einzelschriften 108): 169–96. Hansen, M.H. (1997), ‘A Typology of Dependent Poleis’, Copenhagen Polis Centre Papers 4 (Historia Einzelschriften 117): 29–37. Hansen, M.H. (2004), ‘The Perioikic Poleis of Lakedaimon’, Copenhagen Polis Centre Papers 7 (Historia Einzelschriften 180): 149–64. Hansen, M.H. and Nielsen, T.H., eds. (2004), An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis, Oxford. Hodkinson, S. (2000), Property and Wealth in Classical Sparta. Swansea and London. Hodkinson, S. and Powell, A., eds. (1999), Sparta: New Perspectives. Swansea and London. Kahrstedt, U. (1922), Griechisches Staatsrecht I, Sparta und seine Symmachie. Göttingen. Kennell, N. (1999), ‘From Perioikoi to Poleis: the Laconian Cities in the Late Hellenistic Period’, in Hodkinson, S. and Powell, A., eds, 189–210. Larsen, J.A.O. (1970), ‘Perioikoi’, Oxford Classical Dictionary2. Oxford: 801. Lazenby, J.F. (1985), The Spartan Army. Warminster. Lotze, D. (1993/4) ‘Burger zweiter Klasse: Spartas Periöken’, Akademie gemeinnütziger Wissenschaften zu Erfurt. Sitzungsberichte der geisteswissenschaftlichen Klasse 2: 37–51. = Burger und Unfreie im vorhellenistischen Griechenland, Stuttgart 2000: 171–83. MacDowell, D.M. (1986), Spartan Law. Edinburgh. Mertens, N. (2002), ‘Oὐκ ὁμοȋοι, αγ̓ αθοὶ δέ: the Perioikoi in the Classical Lakedaimonian Polis’, in Powell, A. and Hodkinson, S., eds, 285–303. Mossé, C. (1977), ‘Les Périèques lacédémoniens. A propos d’lsocrate, Panathénaïque, 177 sqq.’, Ktèma 2: 121–4. Niese, B. (1906), ‘Neue Beiträge zur Geschichte und Landeskunde Lakedämons: die lakedämonischen Periöken’, Nachrichten von der königlischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen: 101–42. Parke, H.W. (1931), ‘The Evidence for Harmosts in Laconia’, Hermathena 46: 31–8. Powell, A. and Hodkinson, S., eds (2002), Sparta: Beyond the Mirage, Swansea and London. Richer, N. (1998), Les Ephores. Paris. Ridley, R.T. (1974), ‘The Economic Activities of the Perioikoi’, Mnemosyne 4th ser. 27: 281–92. Sanders, J.M., ed., (1992), Φιλολάκων: Laconian Studies in Honour of H. Catling. London. Shipley, G. (1992), ‘Perioikos: the Discovery of Classical Laconia’, in Sanders, J.M., ed., 211–26. Shipley, G. (1997), ‘The Other Lakedaimonians: the Dependent Perioikic Poleis of Lakonia and Messenia’, Copenhagen Polis Centre Acts 4 (Historia Einzelschriften 117): 189–281. Shipley, G. (2000), ‘The Extent of Spartan Territory in the Late Classical and Hellenistic Periods’, Annual of the British School at Athens 95: 367–90. Shipley, G. (2004), Chapters ‘Messenia’ and ‘Lakedaimon’ in Hansen, M.H. and Nielsen, T.H., eds, 547–98. Wilcken, U. (1924), Griechische Geschichte im Rahmen der Altertumsgeschichte. Munich and Berlin.

614 Jean Ducat FURTHER READING The study of this subject by Hampl in German still repays careful reading, in spite of its date (1937). He gives a thorough general discussion, collects the source material and makes numerous eminently lucid observations. Among more recent studies, the most thorough is Shipley (1997). Its main element (pp. 223–71) is the list it gives of all centres of population in perioikic territory, at all periods: poleis and humble kom̄ ai alike. The relevant source material is given for each place separately. An updated version by the same author can be found in the Inventory edited by Hansen and Nielsen (Shipley (2004)). Shipley’s catalogue is preceded by an Introduction (Shipley (1997) 192–213) dealing with, inter alia, the political status of perioikic communities. This latter subject was subsequently treated more systematically by Hansen (2004), who shows – in response to the articles of Eremin (2002) and Mertens (2002) – that the perioikic communities were not subdivisions either of Sparta (as Eremin) or of the “polis of Lakedaimon” (as Mertens), but were poleis in their own right. On the political status of the perioikoi and their relations with the Spartiates, the traditional point of view – that there was a single Lakedaimonian state, with the perioikoi as second‐class citi­ zens within it – has been defended by Lotze (1993/4), who nevertheless shows signs of conceiving this Lakedaimonian state as a sort of federation, and by Hall (2000). For the latter, Lakedaimon combined a horizontal structure, made up of numerous neighbouring poleis, with a state structure which was vertical: the Spartiates being the ruling class and the perioikoi being their social inferiors. Thus the picture of the perioikoi which I have given in the present chapter differs from that found in previous literature. For a fuller version, Ducat (2008) may be consulted.

CHAPTER 24 Roads and Quarries in Laconia Jacqueline Christien (Translated by Christopher Annandale and Anton Powell) 24.1 Introduction Students of Sparta have traditionally concentrated on its political, military and cultural qualities. Far less has been written on the material structures which made possible the peculiar achievements of this the largest, and in several ways the most important, of the Greek states. With, at its height, 8,800 square kilometres of land, Sparta was not so much a city, more a category of state which originated from the Dark Ages and perhaps from the Mycenaean world. Its system, which managed to survive the development of civic institutions, allowed Laconia to remain – by Greek standards – a state of exten- sive territory until the arrival of the Romans. The latter, after the end of the Second Macedonian war (197 bc), understood that they had to split up this large Greek state which had dared to resist them. The present chapter relies largely on investigations con- ducted on the ground by the writer and by a small number of other modern specialists. 24.2  Roads in Laconia 24.2.1  Questioonfs eoxfp manetdhiondg: Sinpaterrteast’s roads: an area Work on Greek roads had already been undertaken on a broad scale by W.K. Pritchett (1980, 1982). But for the history of particular localities a different level of precision was necessary. The first step was a survey of all the fortifications, known or discoverable, A Companion to Sparta, Volume II, First Edition. Edited by Anton Powell. © 2018 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Published 2018 by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

616 Jacqueline Christien ARCADIA Tegea nos R. Argolid Gulf R. Neda AnalipsisMA N I Thyreatis R. Ta Mt Karyai Chelmos Belmina Skotitas Vamvakou BRASIOTIS R. Aulon Stenyklaros Skiritis VALLEY Mt Ithome Glympeis Ampheia Pellana R. EurotasSellasiaVresthena PARNON MTS Poliani TAYGETOS MTS Bassaras Prasiai Thouria Sparta Oinous Polichne Aris Mistra Skoura Geronthrai Marios Pharai Kalamai Amyklai Kyphanta Pylos Gulf of R. Choerios Sphakteria Messenia Gerenia Alagonia Goranoi Kardamyle Krokeai Methone Milia Helos Akriai Lefkai Zarax Thalamai Gytheion Epidauros Limera Cape Akritas Oitylos Las Gulf of Asopos Monemvasia Pyrrichos Laconia Pyrgos Dirou Teuthrone Messa Boiai Elaphonissos Cape Marmari Malea Cape Tainaron 0 Kilometres 20 0 Miles 10 Kythera Map 24.1  Roads in Laconia. across Laconian territory. Starting in 1978, initial results were published in Laconia itself (Christien (1983)). When translated into the form of a map (see Map 24.1), a road network appeared. This was, on reflection, an understandable phenomenon given the size and the cultural uniformity of the territory controlled by Sparta; a high degree of centralized control might even have been predicted. A substantial article in Pritchett’s Studies in Greek Topography ((1980) Part III: 143–96) underlined the importance of the problem and collected the evidence of previous travellers and historians. In Part IV of his work Pritchett ((1982) 1–63) supplied information about the roads which ran through the northern valleys of Laconia. In addition, the present writer’s own work, beginning with the study of sites on the east coast of the Laconian state, rapidly brought to attention a large number of roads in Parnon.1 It seems that all the east coast ports were linked to Sparta from the middle of the sixth century bc onwards (Christien (1992) 160–3). Further, I believe that my own work has identified, on the ground in Laconia, traces of the routes by which Thebans and allies invaded in 369 bc (Christien (1988)).

Roads and Quarries in Laconia 617 24.2.2  The first question: chronology The traces of roads were definitely ancient. In several places it was clear that they pre‐dated other kinds of roads. For example, for the descent to Sellasia, north of Sparta (Figure 24.1), the modern paved road is superimposed on the furrows of ancient traces and even incorporates elements of the latter. In Thyreatis, at the foot of Parnon on the table‐land (to the east of Kastro tis Orias), the Turkish paving stones of the road have been displaced and the wheel grooves (‘rodiès’, in today’s local Greek speech) appear beneath. On the road between Geraki (ancient Geronthrai) and Mari (ancient Marios), where a more recent road has been superimposed on the ancient traces, we can see that the latter have been carved up to allow the soil to be flattened. Is it possible to refine these vague indications? Figure 24.1  Road from Sparta to the north, descent to Sellasia. Ancient grooves incorporated in later, Turkish, cobbled road (photo: author).

618 Jacqueline Christien 24.2.3  Can these roads be dated to the Greek era? Several ancient texts mention practicable roads. For instance, Herodotus (8.124) tells us that Themistokles, when visiting Sparta after the Persian Wars, was presented with a ceremonial chariot and escorted to the frontier. Xenophon (Lak.Pol.11.2) shows that the Spartan army loaded its baggage on wagons or on load‐bearing animals, depending on its destination. He also writes that Kinadon in the early fourth century was ordered by Sparta to search for suspects and to ask for wagons to avoid having to bring those arrested back on foot from Aulon in north‐western Messenia (Hell. 3.3.9). Again, Herodotus (6.57.3) attributes responsibility for road maintenance to the Spartan kings. It therefore appears that Spartan roads date back at least to the early fifth century. Thucydides (1.13.5) states generally that before the development of the Athenian navy people travelled more often on land than by sea. 24.2.4  The second question: are surviving traces really due to wheels? Laconia presents a complex and interesting case. As it had long coasts, there were also coastal roads. Variations in sea level over the years have swallowed up some of these roads, but parts of them come to the surface from time to time and allow us to see their original state. The reply to our question above, ‘are surviving traces really due to wheels? (and, if so, why did chariots of later periods not leave the same traces?)’, after study of numerous existing traces, was more surprising: our Laconian roads were dug intentionally. In the region of Cape Malea, subsidence has resulted in the south eastern corner of the Peloponnese being submerged under the sea. Thus, in Antiquity, Elaphonissos was a promontory, whereas it is now separated from the mainland by several metres of water. In the Mycenaean era there was a town at the head of the gulf. In classical Antiquity a road crossed what is now a branch of the sea and its remains can be found in several places on the west side of the island. When we examine these traces, there can be no doubt. (Figure 24.2.) The ‘wheel traces’ were in fact grooves for wheels dug by human hand for several kilometres. The scattered traces now visible were not near urban sites but far away in the countryside in places which seem sometimes not to have been frequented by much traffic. In addition, there were clearly crossing‐places. In other words there was a road network, created by specialists. 24.2.5  A third question: how were these roads adapted to the terrain of the Spartan state? In general, when modern authors examine the question of ancient roads, they privilege roads on plains, travel on mountains being  –  now (as then)  –  dangerous. However, Laconia is a largely mountainous state. Sparta is surrounded by mountains. The Taygetos Mountains, rising to an altitude of 2,400 metres, are very close to the city, to the west, separating it from Messenia. Mount Parnon forms a large mass to the east of Sparta, and to the north reaches an altitude of more than 2,000 metres. Skiritis, situated between the

Roads and Quarries in Laconia 619 Figure 24.2  Elaphonissos, ancient road on the west coast of the (modern) island. Much of the ancient road nearby now lies under the sea (photo: author). two ranges, to the north of Sparta, is also hilly, with only a single natural, easy access, the Eurotas valley. Even access to the sea is blocked by a range of hills which forces the river Eurotas to make a detour and go through a gorge impassable for human beings. 24.2.6  Can we understand the reason for digging grooved roads? To go from Sparta to Messenia it appears that men had to climb, in Antiquity, to an altitude of 1,700 metres; to reach Thyreatis they had to cross passes at least 1,200 metres high even though the foot of the relevant mountains was at sea‐level. These passes were in many cases ravines. The sides of the ravines, often used to give a gentle ascent to the head of the pass, provided an obvious route which, however, might be extremely dangerous. Following the traces of wheel grooves was the best way to stop chariots from toppling into the ravine. 24.2.7  Progress of research The above conclusion was first communicated in 1985, and published in 1989.2,3 However, while a historian such as the present writer may aim to understand and explain the commu- nication systems of the Spartan state, the contribution of archaeologists was also essential.