SAFETY DIGEST - RCDL 2015

This RCDL Flight Safety E-Magazine is published for Internal Safety Communication Purpose only.

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FLIGHT SAFETY MAGAZINE 19TH EDITION- JUL-SEP'15July’15 to September’15 (Third Quarter of 2015) 19th EditionThis RCDL Flight Safety E-Magazine is published for internal Safety Communication Purpose only.

Flight Safety E-Magazine ACKNOWLEDGEMENTThe posting of stories, articles, reports and documents in this magazine does not in any way, implyor necessarily express or suggest that all the information is correct. It is based on details gatheredfrom various sources and is for information purpose only. The Flight Safety Department is makingthis material available in its efforts to advance the understanding of safety. It is in no wayresponsible for any errors, omissions or deletions in the reports.If you have an article proposal, manuscript or technical paper that you believe would make a usefulcontribution to the on-going dialogue about aviation safety, Flight Safety department will be glad topublish. Utmost importance will be given to your valuable comments and feedback.Please do send an E-Mail to: [email protected] you will enjoy reading this issue and the safety updates will keep you updated with what ishappening within RCDL. The articles published are for your reading pleasure and understanding thesafety culture.Happy Reading!!Warm Regards, TABLE OF CONTENTS PageSaurabh Tyagi No.(Chief of Flight Safety) Subject 1 S. No. 2 3-51 Cover Page - Acknowledgement 62 Flight Safety Updates4 Voluntary and Anonymous Hazard Reports 73 Safety Awareness Programme 8-9 10-11 - Safety Bulletins and SMS Training 12-134 RCDL Updates - Technical Specifications - Global 60005 Article– Ground Handling and Safety Practices6 Safety Advisory Article- Smoke Toxicity7 Safety Promotion Posters, Something Interesting, Good Bye VT-RPL19th Edition - July’15 to September’15 (Third Quarter of 2015) Page 1 of 14

Flight Safety E-MagazineFLIGHT SAFETY UPDATES1. Internal Safety Audit & SurveillanceFlight Safety Department conducted Internal Safety Audit on 20th to 22nd June’2015:To check the efficacy of the operations and management systems through a systemic audit process,Flight Safety Department conducted the Safety surveillance of entire organisation and submitted thereport to the management. Points weretaken up and closed successfully before Internal Audit & DGCA Audit FIndingsThird party audit. 2012 - 2015 (Excluding 20-21 August 2015 DGCA Audit Findings)Internal Audit & Surveillance Benefit: Internal Audit DGCA AuditFlight Safety Department is conductingregular surveillance of Operations and 72 56other area to keep the operations safe 46and the regular safety audit and 53 54surveillance has benefited us as the 26 24observations were closed internally 4before Regulatory Audit, benefitting inclosing of core standing issues. 2012 2013 2014 2015-Till Date2. Regulatory Audit of RCDL A. DGCA, Western Region Air Safety Surveillance on 30th June’2015 :Annual Regulatory Surveillance was conducted by the office of DGCA Western Region in the area ofFlight Safety Set-Up, FOQA Monitoring, and Pre-Flight Medical Checks. All the findings weresuccessfully implemented and closed.B. DGCA, HQ, Delhi Annual Audit on 20-21 August’2015:Regulatory Audit of RCDL was conducted by the DGCA headquarter on 20th and 21st August 2015,awaiting Non-Compliance Report. However, departments have been informed on the same.3. Audit of Service partner (FOQA) NeST Aerospace, Bengaluru:NeST Aerospace is our service partner for FOQA (Flight Operational Quality Assurance) monitoring,Flight Safety Team visited Office of NeST Aerospace at Bengaluru to observe the process of Flight dataAnalysis.Flight Data Analysis is process of analysing recorded flight data in order to improve the safety of flightoperations. Operational Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) is the pro-active use of recorded flight datafrom routine operations to improve safety.4. Audit of Ground Handling Agent – Celebi NAS:Audit of ground Handling Agent M/s. Celebi Nas was conducted by Quality Assurance and Flight SafetyDepartment of RCDL. 30 findings were raised, which later on discussed with Management of M/s.Celebi Nas. ****19th Edition - July’15 to September’15 (Third Quarter of 2015) Page 2 of 14

Flight Safety E-MagazineHAZARD REPORTS - VOLUNTARY & ANONYMOUS1. ACTION- Quality Manager andMRO: On various occasions it wasobserved that outsourced staff (MROTechnicians and Celebi-Nas cleaners)was working on Ramp in Casualfootwear, Slipper/Floater and evenbarefooted. Engineering manager havebeen advised and the same is notexpected to be repeated again.2. ACTION- Quality Manager andMRO: The Step Ladder used forloading/unloading of baggage in hold, isbeing marked with clear instructions - \"1PERSON ONLY\". However, 2-3 personare stepping on it at a time to loadbaggage. 3. Voluntary Report by one of our Captain (Closed): “Operated at Night (pitch darkness) in rains and poor visibility to Jamnagar and Marshaller did not have BRIGHT / LIGHTED marshalling wand's to safely guide aircraft and signalling purposes.” Additional marshalling wands were purchased and dispatched to Jamnagar station by flight safety department. ‘Thank you Captain’ Cheers!4. ACTION- Quality Manager and GM Engineering: On various occasions MRO Engineers and Technicians were found working on Ramp/Aircraft without AMM/Task Cards. Human brain have a tendency to forget. It holds small amounts of data for a very short time, which is to be used immediately. Mental repetition may be required to achieve the task, but once completed the information is lost within 30 seconds and replaced with the next set of data we need.5. ACTION- Admin Department (Closed): Inside the hangar, FOD bins (both DRY and WET) were found to be filled with Garbage which includes Edible items. It was discussed with Admin department to monitor it and clean it regularly to avoid any edible item to be thrown in FOD bin, as it may attract birds inside the hangar premises and increases bird activity. Admin department was informed to clean the FOD bins. Outsourced workforces was briefed to not throw edible item in FOD bins.19th Edition - July’15 to September’15 (Third Quarter of 2015) Page 3 of 14

Flight Safety E-Magazine 6. ACTION- Quality Manager and MRO: On various occasions MRO engineers and technicians were found sitting on the TOWBAR while connected to the aircraft. Do our Towbar is manufactured to take push-pull loads rather vertical static loads? 7. Voluntary Report by one of our Captain (Closed): Go Around due some unavoidable circumstances at Jabalpur was reported by one of the captain. “VERY GOOD Captain” keep it up!!8. ACTION- FlightSafety: Few of the pilotand security staff werefound walking on theramp/apron withoutwearing Safety Vest(Ramp Jacket). It is amandatoryrequirement to wearsafety vest in the bestinterest of your ownprotection! Flight SafetyCircular 01 of 2015 andDGCA Air Safety Circular04 of 2007 mandatesthe requirement to wearPPE (personal protectiveequipment) whileworking on theApron/Ramp.9. ACTION- Quality Manager and MRO: On many Occasions it was observed that MROtechnicians / Wing walkers do not perform wing walking as per set procedures. Repeatedly, MROStaff was found least situational aware and busy on mobile while towing is in progress.19th Edition - July’15 to September’15 (Third Quarter of 2015) Page 4 of 14

Flight Safety E-Magazine10. Voluntary Report by one of our Staff-ACTION- Admin Department (Closed): “Fireextinguisher in F&B stores was removed for fixingon the wall but the same not fixed. Reasons notknown.” Also there was no Fire extinguisher in theBasement to avoid any uncertainties. – Admindepartment was informed and briefed regardingthe same and Fire extinguishers were placedimmediately in F&B store/office and basementstore.11. Voluntary Report by one of our Staff(Closed)-While carrying out pre-flight check on VT-DHA, it was noticed that the fire extinguisher positioned inaft cupboard opposite the washroom was kept lying in horizontal position whereas it has to be keptin vertical position.12. Anonymous Report by one of our Staff (Closed)-“One of the ropes, used to tie safety harness duringcleaning and maintenance exercises at hangar wastorn and short in length. (Someone tied some clothwith the rope to extend its length.) The specific ropewas repaired immediately and Aircraft Cleaning wasdeferred till repair of the rope.13. ACTION – Admin and Flight Safety: It wasobserved that Outsourced workforce/vendorsworking at hanger were not using safety harnesswhile working. Procedure was made thatwhenever any vendor/workforce comes for anywork at Hangar premises, admin department willinform flight safety department so that they canbe supervised and briefed regarding safetyprecautions and preventive action can be takenaccordingly. **** Page 5 of 1419th Edition - July’15 to September’15 (Third Quarter of 2015)

Flight Safety E-Magazine SAFETY AWARENESS PROGRAMME1. Internal Safety Bulletin 03 of 2015: PRECAUTIONS – MONSOON HAZARDS:In this issue of Safety Bulletin Safety Hazards of Monsoon Flying were emphasised, also few of theprecautions during Pre-Flight, During-Flight, and Post-Flight, were detailed to make all RCDL air crew/maintenance personnel and operational personnel aware regarding hazards during monsoon season.2. SMS (Safety Management System) Training:On 24th July’2015, SMS training was conducted by Flight Safety Department at a third party facility(Jet Airways Hangar). 10 RCDL Personnel including Air Crew, Cabin Crew, and Operations Staffattended the training. Certificates has also been given for completion of SMS and Safety AwarenessTraining Capsule.40 RCDL Staff have been trained by Flight Safety Department for SMS (Safety Management System)and HIRA (Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment) in last 06 month.19th Edition - July’15 to September’15 (Third Quarter of 2015) Page 6 of 14

Flight Safety E-Magazine RCDL UPDATESTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS – VT-AHI (GLOBAL 6000)As our Founder Chairman Late Sir Dhirubhai Ambani Quoted: “GROWTH IS LIFE”. RCDL is growingrapidly and a brand new aircraft recently we have added VT-AHI Bombardier Global 6000 (SerialNumber- 9651) in our fleet.A maximum range of 6,000 nautical miles (equal to 6,900 miles) makes this aircraft most appropriatefor medium-to-long international flights. The service ceiling (max cruise altitude) of 51,000 feet isextremely high for this type of aircraft. This Bombardier aircraft normally cruises at a speed of 513knots, equivalent to 590 mph. If time is of the essence, it can safely fly as fast as Mach 0.89. The LRC(long-range cruise) speed at which this aircraft attains its maximum range is 488 knots (561 mph),roughly the same velocity as similar models.BASIC DETAILS PERFORMANCEAircraft Type: Global 6000 Series BD700- Maximum speed: Mach .89 (513kt, 590mph, 9501A10 (New Aircraft) km/h)Manufacturer’s Serial Number- 9651 Cruise speed: Mach .85 (488kt, 562mph, 904 km/h) Range: 5,200nmi (9,360km)Engines: Rolls-Royce Deutschland BR710A2- Service Ceiling: 51,000ft (15,000m)20 turbofans Balanced Field Length- 5,540ft (1,689 m) Landing Distance- 2,670ft (814 m)Thrust: 14,750 lb. (65.6kN) Flat rated to ISA + Take-off Distance - 6,476ft (1,974m)20°CAuxiliary Power Unit- HONEYWELL RE220(GX)Total Number of Hours Flown Since Operating Altitude:Manufacture: Maximum Operating Altitude- 51,000ft (15,545m)Aircraft Hours: 47:24 Landings- 17 Initial Cruise Altitude- 41,000ft (12,497m)Engine Hours: 47:24 – 22Cycles (Both WEIGHTSEngines) DIMENSIONS Maximum Ramp Weight - 99,750lbs / 45,246kgs Maximum Take-off Weight - 99,500lbs /Exterior Length - 96ft 10in (29.5m) 45,132kgsWingspan - 94ft 0in (28.7m) Maximum landing Weight - 78,600lbs /Wing area - 1,022ft 2in (94.8m) 35,652kgsHeight - 25ft 6in (7.8m) Maximum zero fuel Weight - 58,000lbs /Interior Cabin length - 42ft 5in 26,308kgs(13.18m) Basic Empty Weight - 52,315lbs / 23,730kgsCabin width centreline - 8ft 17in Dry Operating Weight- 52,878lbs / 23985kgs(2.49m) Maximum fuel weight – 43,720lbs / 19,831kgsCabin width floor line- 6ft 9in (2.11m) Maximum Payload (with Fuel Tank full) –Cabin Height- 6ft 25in (1.91m) 2901lbs/ 1316kgsCabin Floor Area- 317 ft² (29.4 m²) Maximum Number of Passengers- 14Cabin Total Volume- 1,884 ft³ (53.9 m³) Maximum Number of Crew- 02 Cockpit + 01 Cabin Crew Cabin height - 6ft / 2in 1.88m19th Edition - July’15 to September’15 (Third Quarter of 2015) Page 7 of 14

Flight Safety E-Magazine ARTICLE: GROUND HANDLING AND SAFETY PRACTICESGround handling is a key component of the air transport logistics supply chain as it facilitates themobility of cargo and people from one destination to another. Ground handling facilitatesinternational trade hence its existence is critical to the competitiveness of a nation. Airline businessesusually overshadow ground handling due to the historical dominance of airlines in the aviation industry. The importance and effectiveness of the ground handling function as part of the air transport business is fast becoming a global issue as the industry is slowly emerging. Ground handling work performance is an important part of the civil aviation flight cycle. Safe and efficient performance in handling aircraft has to be maintained and concerns both the aircraft and frontline personnel. Safety and economy are strongly coupled in this type of operation. Safety management of ground handling is one of the issues that still need follow- up. There are times when we are doing everything right.Crossing a pedestrian crossing, for example – with the light indicating that we can cross. We shouldbe able to let our guard down knowing we are safe. But accidents can still happen. Life can find a wayto turn things upside down when we least expect it.And so it is with ground handling. We work in what can be an unforgiving environment each day.Engine exhaust, heavy equipment and flammable fuels can pose more risks than we can count. Theold cliché “out of sight out of mind” proves most dangerous since it breeds complacency. The morecomfortable we become with the danger, the easier and further from our focus it drifts, and the easierit can be to fall into it.The first step to take to mitigate these risks is to be aware.Once the plane lands, and after the engines stop whining, there are areas of risk that requiresituational awareness at all times. They include marshalling and parking; safety and security of thepassengers; servicing the aircraft; aircraft security and fuelling.Some pertinent questions to be considered may be:  Who is handling the plane?  Are they properly trained and staffed?  Do they have the proper type and size of equipment for the task to be accomplished?  What is the safety culture like?  Does it tolerate work-around and shortcuts?Aircrafts are extremely expensive to repair, and delays or cancelled flights due to aircraft damage canresult in substantial indirect costs.Well-functioning safety management work plays a decisive role in minimizing the risk for both small-scale accidents (e.g. work injuries; minor damage to aircraft) and large-scale aircraft accidents.19th Edition - July’15 to September’15 (Third Quarter of 2015) Page 8 of 14

Flight Safety E-MagazineWell-functioning safety management in an organisation is very much dependent on the safety cultureof management as well as workforce levels.In comparison to an aircraft crash it may soundinsignificant, but direct costs associated with aircraftdamage on the apron and in maintenance facilitiesare upwards of $1.2 billion a year. Factoring in theindirect costs of the aircraft being out of service,increased insurance premiums, temporaryreplacement, injuries, and other associated expenses,that number can approach $5 billion.The sad reality is that much of it is preventable withtraining and standardization of best practices.TrainingThe most significant risk factors for ground damageoccur in towing, ramp movements, ground service equipment and hangar movements, which includemaintenance facilities and operations.One common thread running through all of these risk areas is a lack of training. As a manager, thetraining of employees is paramount to a safe operation. Once training is completed, and the employeehas demonstrated proficiency at the task, a system of Recurrent Refresher Training should beestablished to ensure continued proficiency.Best PracticesThere are some basic best practices that go a long way in reducing ground accidents and incidents,the foundation of which is to never ask anyone to do a job or task they have not been trained to do.So keep an open door to questions. Be approachable. Teach others to stop if they are unsure, andembrace a request for assistance. Safety procedures such as the chocking of the main gear at all rampparking situations or while the aircraft is in maintenance sounds a bit elementary, but this is an areathat is subject to being ignored, especially if the aircraft will not be parked for an extended period oftime. A ground marshaller should be used as aircraft arrive and depart from parking spots. Wing walkers are especially helpful when pulling or backing an aircraft into or out of a hangar. Industry best practice tells us that we need two people plus a tug driver when maneuvering the aircraft on the ramp, and three people plus a tug driver when removing or pushing an aircraft into a hangar or tight parking location. The use of warning cones at wing tips and tail to avoid wing overlap hazards are considered preventative best practices. Confirm with the pilot that the brakes are off before beginning to tow the airplane. A trained person in the cockpit as a brake monitor for heavy aircraft is recommended. If you are not familiar with the aircraft type, and have not been properly trained, do not attempt to move the aircraft, leave the aircraft where it is and seek out someone who is familiar before towing. All of the above can be culminated in an integrated and comprehensive safety program for the entire organization. It may not be possible to eliminate all risk as it is inherent in what we do, and the tools and equipment we use to do it, but documenting procedures establishes expectations and sets standards for operational behavior. Furthermore it provides a framework with which to measure accountability and strive for continued improvement. Remember Remaining safe on the ground is everyone’s responsibility.19th Edition - July’15 to September’15 (Third Quarter of 2015) Page 9 of 14

Flight Safety E-Magazine SAFETY ADVISORY ARTICLE: SMOKE TOXICITYF The spectre of fire in the air is a pilot’s recurrent nightmare... ire is an integral part of our everyday life, and smoke is one of its products. There have always been efforts to control fire and use it for constructive purposes, but even then, accidental fires do occur and fire continues to cause loss of lives and property.Uncontrolled fires threaten homes, factories, andtransportation systems. The spectre of fire in theair is a pilot’s recurrent nightmare, carried overfrom the early days of fabric covered aircraft,when the time between ignition and loss of theaircraft could be measured in relatively fewminutes.Modern aircraft benefit from flame retardantmaterials and improved fire extinguishing systemsto such an extent that in-flight fires are rareoccurrences.However, survivable crashes followed by firehappen, primarily from fuel spills around the downed aircraft. In the confined environment of anaircraft cabin, the presence of smoke automatically indicates the existence of an emergency situation.Extinguishment of fires obviously has first priority, but smoke inhalation should be recognized as avery real danger while this is being accomplished. Inhalation of toxic gases in smoke is the primarycause of fatalities in most fires this is true whether the fire is in an aircraft cabin, a residentialbedroom, or a high-rise building. Smoke gases do not need to reach lethal levels to seriously impairpilot performance. Sublethal exposures can cause even experienced pilots to make potentially fatalmistakes.In view of the seriousness of any aircraft fire, let us examine the various aspects of fire and smoke.FIRE: Each fire is different. Fire is a complex, dynamic, physicochemical event and is the result of arapid chemical reaction generating smoke, heat, flame, and light. Each fi re is different. Smokecomposition and heat generated in a fire depend on types of burning materials and environmentalconditions.SMOKE: Its gases could be toxic. Smoke is a complex of particulate matter, as well as a variety ofinvisible combustion gases and vapours suspended in the fire atmosphere. Smoke may diminish lightand obscure vision, and its gases could be toxic.SMOKE GASES: Carbon dioxide levels increase and oxygen concentrations decrease.Carbon monoxide and hydrogen cyanide are the two principal toxic combustion gases. Most cabinfurnishings contain carbon and will generate both carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide whenburned; carbon monoxide can also be released from faulty cabin heaters. Burning wool, silk, andmany nitrogen- containing synthetics will produce the more toxic hydrogen cyanide gas. Irritantgases, such as hydrogen chloride and crolein, are generated from burning wiring insulation andsome other cabin materials. Generally, carbon dioxide levels increase and oxygen concentrationsdecrease during fires.SMOKE EFFECTS: At high altitude, the effects are greatly enhanced.Visual smoke can delay escape from a fire, while the irritant gases can induce tears, pain, anddisorientation.19th Edition - July’15 to September’15 (Third Quarter of 2015) Page 10 of 14

Flight Safety E-MagazineThe visual obscuration is obvious, but the subtle effects of carbon monoxide and hydrogen cyanideinhalation, although less readily detected, can cause physical incapacitation and subsequent death.Toxicologically, carbon monoxide combines with the haemoglobin in blood and interferes with theoxygen supply to tissues, while hydrogen cyanide inhibits oxygen utilization at the cellular level.Carbon dioxide, a relatively innocuous fire gas, increases the respiration rate causing an increase inthe uptake of the other combustion gases. The decreased oxygen level found in most fire scenariosfurther enhances the problem of getting enough oxygen to the biological sites to maintain normalfunction. Continued inhalation of these gases can result in severe hypoxia. At high altitude whereoxygen levels are lower, the effects of carbon monoxide and hydrogen cyanide are greatlyenhanced.SIGNS AND SYMPTOMS: Not all symptoms will necessarily be experienced.Carbon monoxide poisoning produces headache, weakness, nausea, dizziness, confusion, dimness ofvision, disturbance of judgment, and unconsciousness followed by coma and death. Although carbonmonoxide causes deleterious effects on the central nervous system, death usually occurs fromcardio toxicity.Not all symptoms will necessarily be experienced by every individual exposed to this gas. Some havesuccumbed from inhaling low carbon monoxide levels, while others have survived breathing higherconcentrations. Hydrogen cyanide poisoning signs and symptoms are weakness, dizziness, headache,nausea, vomiting, coma, convulsions, and death. Death results from respiratory arrest. Hydrogencyanide gas acts very rapidly symptoms and death can both occur quickly.SURVIVAL: Knowledge of the less obvious hazards and a few simple preparations can increaseone’s chances.There is no universal best procedure to follow in the event of an aircraft fire because no two fi res arelikely to be the same. Extinguishing the fire, if possible, is the immediate priority. An equally obvioussecond priority is to breathe as little smoke for as short a duration as possible.Some larger aircraft are supplied with portable, self-contained breathing masks for the crew, but smallprivate aircraft usually are not. Any cloth held over the nose and mouth will provide protection fromsmoke particulates; if the cloth is wet, it will also absorb most of the water-soluble gases (i.e.,hydrogen cyanide and hydrogen chloride).Cabin venting will reduce the concentrations of combustion gases, but is not usually a viable optionwhile actually fighting the fire. Knowledge of the less obvious hazards and a few simple preparationscan increase one’s chances for survival in an aircraft fi re. A small, hand-held fire extinguisher can beused to put out small on-board fires. Careful inspection and maintenance of cabin heaters willminimize the chance of carbon monoxide leakage into the cabin air system. A carbon monoxidedetector could also be installed in the cockpit to detect the presence of this colourless, odourless gas.As always, planning your probable actions before an emergency arises will increase your chances foracting quickly and correctly.REMEMBER... Fires are the main hazard for the occupants of a survivable crash. A fire generates smoke, heat, flame, and light Inhalation of toxic gases in smoke is the primarycause of death in most fires. Carbon monoxide and hydrogen cyanide are the main toxic gases in smoke. Exposure to carbon monoxide can also be the result of faulty heaters. A wet cloth held over the nose and mouth provides some protection from smoke inhalation. A small, hand-held fire extinguisher must always be carried aboard the aircraft. Before everydeparture, make sure to check the Fire extinguisher. ***End of Article*** Page 11 of 1419th Edition - July’15 to September’15 (Third Quarter of 2015)

Flight Safety E-MagazineSAFETY AWARENESS / PROMOTION SOMETHING INTERESTING“The First Aircraft (A seaplane) with VT-AHI Registration belonged to ‘Irrawaddy Flotilla AirwaysLtd.’ in 1934” ***END OF MAGAZINE*** Page 12 of 1419th Edition - July’15 to September’15 (Third Quarter of 2015)

Flight Safety E-MagazineGOOD-BYE VT-RPLThis RCDL Flight Safety E-Magazine is published for internal Safety Communication Purpose only.19th Edition - July’15 to September’15 (Third Quarter of 2015) Page 13 of 14

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Quarterly Safety E- MagazineApril’15 to June’15 (Second Quarter of 2015) Edition – 18 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSThe posting of stories, articles, reports and documents in this magazine does not in any way, implyor necessarily express or suggest that all the information is correct. It is based on details gatheredfrom various sources and is for information purpose only. The Flight Safety Department is makingthis material available in its efforts to advance the understanding of safety. It is in no wayresponsible for any errors, omissions or deletions in the reports. Flight Safety Department also takethis opportunity to Thank Captain Venkateshwaran and Captain Melvin Veall for their inputstowards Safety. SHARE YOUR EXPERTISEIf you have an article proposal, manuscript or technical paper that you believe would make auseful contribution to the on-going dialogue about aviation safety, Flight Safety department willbe glad to publish. Utmost importance will be given to your valuable comments and feedback.Please do send an E-Mail to: [email protected] . Safety is Everyone’s Responsibility. Published By- Flight Safety Department of RCDL Page1This Safety E-Magazine is published for internal Safety Communication Purpose onlySecond Quarter of 2015 Safety E- Magazine Edition-18

DELIGHTFUL READING- TABLE OF CONTENTSS. No. Subject Page No.1 Acknowledgement & Editorial 01-022 Incidents / Occurrences Reported 033 FOQA Benefits 044 Circulars and Bulletins issued 045 Internal Audit & Surveillance Updates 056 Pilot’s Input by Capt. Venky 05-097 Pilot’s Input –MRO Safety Issues by Capt. Melvin Veall 098 Case Study - Columbian 707 – Fuel Starvation at JFK 10-119 Article- Stress and Stress Management 11-1310 Safety Awareness Flyer 13 EDITORIAL“By far the greater number of aeroplane accidents are due to precisely the same circumstancesthat have caused previous accidents. A distressing feature of these accidents is the evidence theyafford of the unwillingness, or the inability, of many pilots to profit from the experiences andmistakes of others.”Normally, we experience some form of stress in our life, but understanding exactly what stress is andhow it affects an individual’s performance can be difficult. A situation that is stressful for one personmay not be stressful for another. Sometimes stress can enhance performance, but many a times itnegatively affects how a flight crew member performs a task. In This Issue, you will read an overviewof what stress is and to provide best practice to help flight crew also a case study is published,which is featured on Columbian 707- Fuel Starvation at JFK where the crew experienced an acutestressful situation.Flight safety department always keep you updated with what is happening within RCDL. Here areupdates from last quarter and about this issue of E-Safety Magazine.  As you must be aware that Flight Safety department is conducting Safety survey’s within RCDL. Hope you have participated. If not, Request you to please spare few minutes from your busy schedule to participate. Please read the question carefully and answer honestly what you feel and understand about our Safety Culture. The outcome of this survey will help us in doing Gap analysis of our Safety Culture, The result will be shared with you all in next edition of our safety magazine. http://kwiksurveys.com/s.asp?sid=ey44r98ts9anhop494084  VT-JMN is functional now and started flying safely from 06th April’15.  Flight Safety Manual, SMS manual, Operations Manual and Ground Handling Manual are now approved by DGCA.  06 Incidents and Occurrences were reported in last quarter, a brief description is given for your ready reference.  Flight Safety Issued 02 circulars and 02 Safety Bulletins in last quarter. Apart from Safety Circulars 02 Operations Circulars were also issued. Brief details are given in this issue for your reference.  08 Safety Hazard Reports were reported in last quarter and flight safety department has successfully closed all of them.  Apart from Routine Ramp Inspections and Load & Trim sheet Checks, Flight Safety department has also conducted Product audit of Global and Jamnagar Station audit in last quarter. Observations are discussed in this issue for your reference.  Continuous FOQA Monitoring has benefited us and number of exceedences have reduced. Reports for last 3 years are shared in this issue in the form of Chart.  Pilot’s Inputs from Captain Venkateshwaran and Captain Melvin Veall has also been shared in this issue, to keep you updated about safety issues in the organisation and the world.Hope you will enjoy reading this issue and the internal safety updates will keep you updated withwhat is happening within RCDL.Happy Reading!! Page2Warm Regards,Saurabh Tyagi Safety E- Magazine Edition-18(Head of Flight Safety) Second Quarter of 2015

INCIDENTS / OCCURRENCES REPORTED Page3 List of Incidents/ Occurrences from 01 January 2015 to 30th April’2015 and their brief details:1. VT-RPL – Air Turn Back : On 27th Jan’2015, VT-RPL Hawker 800XP (MSN 258465) while operating a flight from Mumbai to Rajahmundry experienced Air Turn back soon after take-off from Mumbai, due Pilot's side Altimeter Failure. Pilot reported that during climb at 800' Left Hand side Altimeter indications were failed with a Red failure flag. The same was subsequently informed to ATC with a request to return back. On preliminary inspection, it was found that the Altimeter installed with Serial No. - 91106763 was found defective after installation. Trouble shooting carried out and L/H Altimeter with Serial No. - 91106763 was replaced with Serial No.-92107272. Operational test and functional test of air data system #1 and #2 carried out in accordance with AMM and found satisfactorily.2. VT-ISH – Ground Turn Back: On 05th Feb'2015, our aircraft VT-ISH Falcon900 EX Easy Serial No. - 166 while operating a flight from Mumbai to Kolhapur returned back to base from starting point. Pilot reported that No.2 Engine did not rotate while attempting to start. Post reset of CB's, Pilot further attempted to restart engine no. 2 but did not start. The Crew decided to return back safely. There was no CAS message appeared. The same was subsequently informed to ATC with a request to return back. On preliminary inspection, engine no. 2 was inspected and no visual leak, damage was observed. On further troubleshooting and on removing starter generator, the spline was found sheared.3. VT-AKU – Bird Hit: On 21st March’15, our aircraft Falcon 900Ex Easy-II, VT-AKU was operating VABB-VAJM Sector. Pilot reported that during post flight-checks, bird ingestion marks were seen on engine intake no.-03 engine. During inspection, bird remains were found on engine intake no.-03 engine, bits of feathers on fan blades and remains on inlet stator guide vane leading edge tips with flesh bits on exhaust by pass duct. No damage to airframe, inlet duct, fan blades or inlet stator vanes found. Also, no evidence of core entry observed as the remains were concentrated along the tip end on both fan and inlet guide vanes. During rectification, cleaning of Inlet, fan blades, inlet guide vanes for bird remains and blood stains carried out with clean water. All the areas were further re-inspected for damage and no abnormalities were observed. On further inspection, fan rotation was checked and found no restrictions or bindings. Aircraft was inspected and found satisfactory. The aircraft was released to service.4. VT-RPL – Ground Turn Back: On 24th April’2015, our aircraft Hawker 800xp VT-RPL was on its way to Rajahmundry from Mumbai. On way to taxy out for take-off point pilot had noticed that “# 1 inverter light appeared”. Aircraft returned back to apron safely. There was no warning light on the advisory panel on arrival of the aircraft. Reported snag could not be reproduced on ground. Detailed wiring check carried out. Inverter #1 & #2 swapped. Functional check carried out and found satisfactory. The aircraft was released to service.5. VT-JMN – Air Turn Back: On 24th ApriI’2015, our aircraft VT-JMN Embraer 135 ER while operating a flight from Mumbai to Jamnagar experienced air turn back \"Rudder System 1-2 INOP Message on EICAS\". The aircraft was under the command of pilot monitoring Captain Gopalakrishnan Laxman (ATPL4879) along with pilot flying Captain Paschalis Zilidis (FATA No.-115/2013). During positioning of flight to Jamnagar the pilot observed that \"autopilot failed along with rudder system 1-2 INOP and \"yaw damper fail\" autopilot disconnected and all messages disappeared. Then \"rudder system 1 INOP\" momentarily on and disappeared. Then rudder system 1-2 INOP came on EICAS.\" The same was subsequently informed to ATC with a request to make an air turn back and the aircraft returned back to Mumbai safely. During troubleshooting no EICAS was observed. However, as a precautionary measure #2 pressure switch of rudder system was replaced. The aircraft was released to service.6. VT-JMN Air Turn Back: On 28th April 2015, our aircraft VT-JMN Embraer 135 ER while operating a flight from Mumbai to Jamnagar experienced air turn back due \"Auto Pilot Fail and Rudder System 1-2 INOP Message on EICAS\". During climb, after 27000 feet, 'AUTO PILOT FAIL' EICAS warning came on along with 'RUDDER SYS 1-2 INOP' and 'YAW DAMPER FAIL' EICAS caution messages, autopilot was disconnected and all messages subsequently disappeared. A 'RUDDER SYS 1 INOP' caution message appeared on the EICAS and went off a couple of time. QRH actions for 'RUDDER SYS 1 INOP' was completed. The same was subsequently informed to ATC with a request to make an air turn back and the aircraft returned back to Mumbai safely. Rectification action was in progress till 30th April and aircraft was under AOG.Second Quarter of 2015 Safety E- Magazine Edition-18

FOQA (Flight Operations Quality Assurance) BENEFITSFew parameters were considered to evaluate number of exceedences in 2011, 2013 &2014, results are in Chart Format which is self-explanatory.e.g., HIGH ROD exceedences – 44 in 2011, 14 in 2013, 04 in 2014 Number of Exceedances - Entire RCDL Fleet 2011 2013 201444 14 4 15 8 2 34 28 14 0 39 14 35 15 18 3 44 6High ROD High g in Air Low on Approach High Pitch during Bank Angle high VMO Exceedance Take-Off CIRCULARS AND BULLETINS ISSUED Page4 1. Flight Safety Circular 01 of 2015 - Ramp Safety (Issuance of Safety Ear Plugs):- The purpose of this circular was Hazard identification and Risk Management and it emphasizes on usage of PPE/ Ear Plugs while working moving at apron area. Hope you have received Safety Ear plugs, if not please contact Flight Safety immediately. 2. Flight Safety Circular 02 of 2015 – Missed Approach / Go Around: - To reiterate DGCA Operations Circular 1 of 2013, a circular was issued which discusses about go around and missed approach management. 3. OCC Circular 01 OF 2015 – Numbering on Boarding Passes - Mandates Seat Number allocation for Passenger Boarding Cards. 4. OCC Circular 02 OF 2015- Use of Ear Plugs while at Ramp – In addition to Safety Circular 01 of 2015 it also discusses about importance of Ear Plugs on Ramp and mandate the requirement of wearing ear plugs while at Apron/Ramp.Flight Safety department has re-started RCDL Safety Bulletins, and will be sending informativereading material related to Aviation Safety periodically. The Safety Bulletin would containinformative reading materials. The RCDL SAFETY BULLETIN is an educational series of safety articlesrelated to Aviation and the aim of it is to provide a short synopsis on requirements of safety. In last quarter two safety bulletins were sent to all pilots through E-Mail: 1. Flight Safety Bulletin 01 of 2015: Descent Management – Being Prepared for Go-Around 2. Flight Safety Bulletin 02 of 2015: Precautions- Summer Flying & Maintenance Hazards ***Second Quarter of 2015 Safety E- Magazine Edition-18

INTERNAL AUDIT & SURVEILLANCE UPDATES Load & Trim Open Observations : As a routine process Load & Trim sheets were checked and below are few of the observations, all are open: 1. DGCA Approval Letter No. and date of Approval not mentioned on System generated Load & Trim Sheet for the Aircraft VT-DHA & VT-HMA. 2. VT-IAH 11 JAN- Corrections on Load & Trim Sheet are not counter signed by the signing Authority, Non Compliance to OM Chapter 14 Point 14.3. 3. VT-HMA 25-26 JAN- Aircraft Registration and Type not mentioned on Load & Trim Sheet, Non Compliance to DGCA CAR Section 8 Series D Part I Point 15.9 and OM Chapter 14 Point 14.2 and 14.3 . 4. VT-IAH 16 JAN - Corrections on Load & Trim Sheet are not counter signed by the signing Authority. 5. VT-IAH 25 JAN- Discrepancy in Passenger Count mentioned in Load sheet. 6. Crew & Pax weight Taken for CG calculation does not match for many aircraft types. There is discrepancy between weight taken for CG calculation and weight given in Ops manual Chapter 14 Point 14.3 and DGCA CAR Section 2 Series X Part II point 10.1. (For Airbus and Embraer weight is taken in Kilogram however for rest aircraft type weight is taken in pound). Jamnagar Station Audit: Jamnagar Internal audit was conducted and below are the observations, all are open : 1. Technicians at Jamnagar Airport have not been provided with General Familiarization course or any familiarity training on the type pertaining to operating aircraft VT-JMN. 2. Nitrogen bottle did not have any usage guidelines nor any marking for the operating pressure / instruction. 3. The serviceable tags were not found on the GSE and other Equipment. 4. The Water cart service operator is not positioned permanently at Jamnagar. Ramp Inspections: As part of routine ramp inspections few of the observations were raised against MRO (Airworks), all are Open : 1. Aircraft VT-AKU Date 12-Jan-15 - During DGCA FOI Ramp Inspection, No Marshaller was available at Ramp at the time of Arrival of Aircraft VT-DHA. 2. Aircraft VT-ISH Date 09-Jan-15 - During Maintenance at Reliance Hanger, Cleaning staff was found walking on the aircraft without any safety harness / belt, Safety Precautions. 3. Aircraft VT-AKU 04-Jan-15 - Post Arrival of Aircraft, while towing ground engineer was not using Headset. Product Audit Of Global – Product Audit of Global was conducted for reliability of aircraft. Observations were discussed on 06th April’15 with Bombardier representatives and Engineering Team, Closing Action from Engineering is still awaited. PILOT’S INPUT – (By Capt. Venkateshwaran)Below Minimums and Unstabilized Approaches Article by - Richard N. AaronsA Gulfstream crew lucks out after dragging the wheels thorough the approach lights at StanstedThis month we’ll take a look at a serious incident at London Stansted Airport in which A Gulfstream Page5550 hit the ILS aerials mounted on the Runway 22 approach light structures and then plopped downsome 520 meters (1,706 ft.) short of the touchdown zone. Despite those dire circumstances, theincident resulted in no injuries among the four crewmembers and three passengers. Still, thesequence of events demonstrates how quickly an unstabilized approach can put even anexperienced crew into harm’s way.The information that follows comes from the U.K. Air Accident Investigation Branch’s (AAIB) reporton the Dec. 10, 2013, incident. Investigators concluded “the accident occurred as a result of theapproach becoming destabilized and the pilots attempting to regain the correct glide path at alate stage rather than performing a go-around. Descending below the glide path at such a lateSecond Quarter of 2015 Safety E- Magazine Edition-18

stage caused the aircraft to collide with the ILS antennas. The RVR was below the 550-meter [1,804ft.] minima required for the crew to commence a CAT I approach.”The pilot in command (PIC) of the flight was a 53-year-old ATP with 8,685 hr. of flight time, of which1,311 were in type. He had flown 70 hr. in the previous 90 days, but 0 hr. in the previous 26 days. Thecopilot was appropriately licensed and current.The PIC was the pilot flying (PF) and the copilotwas the pilot monitoring (PM).The passengers and crew were unaware of theimpact with the antennas and it was not until theaircraft was taxied to the parking area and theafter-flight inspection was carried out that thedamage was seen. Credit: AAIBThe Gulfstream 550 (HZ-A6) was conducting acharter flight from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, toLondon. The flight crew reported for duty at 1730and carried out normal flight-planning activitiesincluding a review of the weather. The TAF forStansted covering the aircraft’s ETA gave a 40%probability of fog between 0300 and 1000, with a surface visibility of 500 meters (1,640 ft.) and cloudovercast at 100 ft. Weather at Manchester Airport, the selected alternate, was forecast to be 10km (6.2 mi.) visibility with scattered clouds at 3,500 ft. for the same period.The log showed one deferred maintenance item concerning the captain’s audio control panel.The mask/boom selector button was stuck in the mask position, but he could use the hand-heldmicrophone so the defect was accepted.The aircraft departed at 2001 and arrived in the London area about 0300 after an uneventful enroute segment. The Stansted ATIS reported: Information Bravo, Runway 22 at time 0220, wind 160deg. at 4 kt., Runway 22, Runway Visual Range (RVR) 250 meters (820 ft.) in fog with broken cloudat 100 ft., temperature 2C with a dew point of 1C and a QNH of 1030 hPa. The crew descendedand set up for a CAT II approach.The ATIS was updated at 0250 with Information Charlie, which was essentially the same but with theRVR increased to 300 meters (984 ft.) and the temperature and dew point both at 1C. The crewtold investigators later that they carried out the normal and missed approach briefings for the ILSDME approach for Runway 22 at Stansted with Manchester as their alternate.The aircraft was radar vectored for the ILS and cleared by ATC for the approach. Landing weightwas 63,000 lb., with a V ref of 126 KIAS to which 5 kt. had to be added, giving an approach speedof 131 kt. The pilots armed the autopilot’s localizer and glideslope upper modes and engaged theauto thrust system. The aircraft intercepted the localizer at 10.84 nm and the glideslope at 8.41 nmfrom the runway threshold. The aircraft successfully captured the localizer and descended with theglideslope.Distance Radio IAS (kt) UTC Event to Height (feetRunway22 (nm) agl)4.99 1612 178 3:22:56 AP disengaged4.1 1387 167 3:23:14 AP briefly engaged3.58 1388 165 3:23:25 AT disengaged3.07 1234 161 3:23:39 AP briefly engaged2.43 1000 167 3:23:52 1000'1.79 690 152 3:24:11 FD-vert: Glideslope to Go Around FD-lat: AppLOC to HdgHold1.66 647 150 3:24:13 FD-lat: HdgHold to Lnav(FMS)1.02 300 129 3:24:31 300'0.9 179 130 3:24:40 APPROACHING MINIMUMS' Page6Second Quarter of 2015 Safety E- Magazine Edition-18

Distance Radio IAS (kt) UTC Event to Height 128 3:24:45 (feet MINIMUMS' Runway 22 (nm) agl)0.64 1410.26 20 116 3:24:56 20'0.25 19 115 3:24:57 Collision with localiser0.13 10 112 3:24:59 10'0 3 108 3:25:04 Main wheel touchdown0 0 103 3:25:06 Nose wheel touchdown Data Source- AAIBThe crew changed to the Tower radio frequency, established radio contact at 6 nm, and were Page7issued the following landing clearance: “The surface wind 170 [at] 5 kt.; you’re cleared to land;RVR 325, 400 300.” (For a CAT I approach the RVR must not be less than 550 meters [1,640 ft.].)The clearance was acknowledged by the copilot transmitting: “Cleared to land HZ-A6.” At 5 nmand a height of 1,625 ft., the flaps were selected to fully down. The speed was 181 KIAS, which isabove the flap limiting speed of 170 KIAS, and an over speed audio warning was generated. Theflap travel stopped at 20 deg. Shortly thereafter, the autopilot was disengaged. The flaps were re-selected to the fully down (landing) position at 4.3 nm.At 4 nm the autopilot was re-engaged, but shortly thereafter, at a height of 1,212 ft., the autopilotwas disengaged, and at 3.6 nm and a height of 1,388 ft. and 165 kt. the auto thrust wasdisengaged.The aircraft was significantly above the glideslope at this point, prompting ATC to advise the crew:“HZ-A6 indicating slightly high on the glide path — confirm correcting,” to which the copilotresponded: “Yes, we are correcting.” At 3 nm, the autopilot was again engaged but almostimmediately disengaged and the captain hand flew the aircraft in a descent toward theglideslope.The pilots told investigators they both had the approach and runway lights in sight throughout theapproach, but did not see the PAPIs. At 1.7 nm, for reasons that could not be established, theautopilot mode, auto thrust and vertical mode all changed to go-around, but the commandercontinued to fly the aircraft toward the runway.Selecting the go-around mode changes the Primary Flight Display (PFD) from an ILS presentationto the horizontal and vertical go-around presentation. ILS guidance is no longer provided and theEGPWS Mode 5 “GLIDESLOPE” warning is no longer available. The captain continued the approachfrom that point by visual reference to the approach and runway lighting.At 1.0 nm, the aircraft was at a height of 237 ft., 120 ft. below the glideslope, and it continued todescend to 30 ft. at 0.3 nm —130 ft. below the glideslope. At a height of 11 ft. and just under 0.2nm from the runway threshold, the lower part of the fuselage and landing gear struck the Runway22 ILS localizer monitor aerial and the Runway 04 localizer aerial array.The aircraft continued in the flare at a height of 3 ft. at 0.1 nm from the threshold, before touchingdown at 108 kt. on the concrete surface of the runway undershoot area, 55 ft. below the glideslopeand 109 ft. short of the runway threshold.During the final approach there were no EGPWS warnings, apart from the normal radio altimeterheight “callouts” and “APPROACHING MINIMUMS” alert, which were heard on the CVR. Thepassengers and crew were unaware of the impact with the antennas and it was not until theaircraft was taxied to the parking area and the after-flight inspection was carried out that thedamage was seen.It was apparent that the aircraft’s left landing gear had struck the monitor aerial and the localizerarray. The left-wing underside panels ahead of the gear showed evidence of scratches andorange paint transfer. Most of the scratches were superficial, although one gash was 300 mm (1ft.) in length and 5-mm (0.2 in.) deep. The skin had remained intact, with no fuel seepage. Theleading edge was unmarked.The left landing gear door showed significant impact damage on its leading edge; theappearance and dimensions of the damaged area suggested this had been made by one ormore of the dipoles. The geometry of the main landing gear is such that it is probable the tires alsomade contact with the ILS equipment, although they bore no obvious marks. A hydraulic line alsohad been damaged.Second Quarter of 2015 Safety E- Magazine Edition-18

After the on-site examination, the aircraft was cleared for the short flight to the aircraftmanufacturer’s U.K. facility at Luton Airport, where temporary repairs were made. The aircraft wasthen flown to the manufacturer’s main base in Savannah, Georgia, for annual inspection andpermanent repairs.AAIB and ATC personnel determined that the aircraft had successively struck the Runway 22 ILSlocalizer monitor aerial and the Runway 4 localizer aerial array — structures that were located only5 to 6 meters (16.4 to 19.7 ft.) apart.The monitor aerial consisted of a tower approximately 5.5 meters (18 ft.) high, which wasconstructed from lightweight fiberglass material and supported a coaxial aerial cable. The 4.2-meter-high (13.8 ft.) ILS array comprised a series of 24 stanchions, each carrying 14 horizontallyorientated dipoles made of aluminum alloy tubes covered with orange plastic sheathing. Thestanchions were arranged equidistant from each other, with 12 on either side of the runway centreline. The aircraft had broken off the top of the monitor tower before striking the dipoles onstanchions 13 and 15, which placed the aircraft slightly right of the runway centerline. The latterimpact had dislodged eight of the dipoles, which were scattered over the grass toward therunway.Some tire marks were observed on an 85-meter (279 ft.) paved extension that preceded the “pianokey” marks at the start of the runway. These indicated that touchdown had been made rightlanding gear first, left of the runway centerline and approximately 40 meters (131 ft.) from the startof the paved extension. This was approximately 520 meters (1,706 ft.) from the start of thetouchdown zone.ATC recorded the aircraft landing at 0325 UTC and at 0328 was advised that Runway 22 ILS hadsuffered a “technical fault.” A technician was dispatched to investigate and the ILS wasdowngraded from CAT III to CAT I; the airfield operations duty manager issued a NOTAM to thateffect at 0345.The AAIB Analysis: AAIB investigators issued the following analysis.The aircraft struck the ILS antennas and touched down more than 500 meters (1,640 ft.) short of the Page8touchdown zone as a result of descending below the glideslope. There were no EGPWS warnings,which initially posed questions as to the serviceability of the TAWS system. Although some messagesin the fault history database (FHDB) could not be explained, it was concluded that the system hadfunctioned correctly up to the point where the go-around mode was selected, which would haveinhibited the glideslope alerts. This was reinforced by the genuine Mode 5 alert that was issued bythe system during the subsequent flight from Stansted to Luton.The crewmembers were properly licensed and qualified to conduct the flight. In their preflightbriefing and planning they had identified the possibility of fog at Stansted and had nominatedManchester as a suitable alternate. The transit flight to Stansted was uneventful and thecommander’s unserviceable radio selector panel was not relevant to the accident.The RVRs in the ATIS reports and those passed to the crew with their landing clearance were belowthe CAT I minimum RVR of 550 meters (1,804 ft.). The approach should not have commenced asthe U.K. ANO requirements did not allow the crew to descend below 1,000 ft. above airport levelin these conditions and the company general operating manual procedures did not permit anapproach to be made in such conditions.During the descent toward Stansted Airport the crew briefed the arrival and missed approachshould one be necessary. The autopilot captured the localizer and the glideslope for Runway 22,but the selection of full flap, above the flap limiting speed, appears to be the start of a chain ofevents that destabilized the approach.The disengagement of the autopilot and auto thrust led to the aircraft leveling and rising abovethe glide path, which was notified to the crew by ATC. While correcting the flight path to regainthe glideslope, two attempts were made to re-engage the autopilot; however, these wereunsuccessful so the captain continued to hand fly the aircraft. The reason for the unsuccessful re-engagements was not determined.The aircraft flew above the glideslope where it remained (mostly between one and two dotsdeviation) until about 300 ft. AGL and 1 nm from the runway, just as the airspeed slowed to 131 kt.At a height of 691 ft., the go-around mode was selected, but the captain continued visually towardthe runway, passing through the glide path at about 300 ft. at 1.0 nm. The reason for the changeto go-around mode could not be determined, but it was significant in that glideslope deviationalerts would no longer have been provided. The aircraft continued to decelerate and thendescended below the glideslope, reaching four dots deviation as the aircraft collided with thelocalizer antenna at 19 ft. AGL.The glide path deviations were outside the stabilized approach criteria and when combined withthe reducing airspeed below VAPP, a go-around should have been flown. (See the accompanyingtable for timing of configuration changes.)Second Quarter of 2015 Safety E- Magazine Edition-18

Although the approach and runway lights were visible to the pilots, the PAPIs were not andtherefore the approach path angle was a matter of judgment. Apart from the normal advisorycallouts, the EGPWS did not alert the crew to the deteriorating situation as the aircraft began toundershoot the runway because the go-around mode had been selected.The radio altimeter height callouts, combined with the visual perspective of the runway lights,provided the cues to flare the aircraft.The fact that the pilots could see the runway and approach lighting caused them to believe that,as long as they remained visual with these landing references, they would comply with theircompany procedures and thus could continue their approach.Final ThoughtsSo, the unstabilized approach led to an under shoot that could have been disastrous were it notfor a few feet of vertical luck.Stabilized approaches are always important for a reasonably good landing, but they areabsolutely essential for a safe approach at minimums. If, for some reason, you are forced into abelow minimums approach, then conducting a stabilized approach is vital in the true sense of theword.Boeing studies determined two decades ago that pilots cannot depend on their eyes or the seatsof their pants when landing swept-wing jets in low visibility, night approaches. Human eyes justaren’t equipped to do it. We have to depend on the systems and the SOPs (to say nothing of theregs) to tell us that it is time to call it off the moment the approach destabilizes or the airplanebecomes misconfigured. PILOT’S INPUT- MRO RELATED ISSUES PRE-FLIGHT ISSUES (By Captain M G Veall & Capt. Ashish Gupta) Page9Pre-Flight Issues that need to be reviewed. 1. The aircraft is never ready by Airworks till, in some causes 15 minutes before departure time is now a regular occurrence. The solution is simple, the aircraft should be completely serviced, refuelled, cleaned and all maintenance documents signed 1 hour before flight. 2. Aircraft towing has been a continuous recurring problem, particularly on weekend departures. There are two tow tractors available in Air Works however, many time only one driver is on duty. Therefore, when two or more aircraft have to be pulled out at the same time, this causes un-necessary delay which becomes crucial just before closures at Mumbai. 3. The flight crew must be made aware of what repairs and component changes have been completed. Example, the recent brakes change.Pilot’s Suggestion: We require on first flight of the day that the aircraft be completely serviced,cleaned and all documents signed and in the cockpit one hour before departure. This way whenthe crew arrive at the aircraft they may then complete their duties as required by Company Opsand DGCA Cars.In conclusion what is been asked for and should be happening is that the aircraft be turned overto the flight crew in complete readiness one hour prior to flight departure. WINDSHIELD CLEANING PROCEDURES: (By Captain M G Veall)On 05th of April’15, prior to the departure of RPL the cleaning crew arrived to clean the windshieldsof the aircraft. PIC inspected that the cloth they planned to use and found once again that theywere intending to use old rags and paper napkins to clean the aircraft windshields. PIC spoke withthe Airworks' staff servicing the Hawker and he was unaware of the proper procedure to cleaningthe windshield.It would appear that the message, \"CLEAN COTTON CLOTH ONLY for VT-RPL, with CLEAN WATER, usingSTRAIGHT UP AND DOWN CLEANING MOTION NOT CIRCULAR MOTION\" has not beenconveyed. Furthermore, PIC was advised that a clean cotton cloth would be available on theairplane for this purpose and it is not in the aircraft. Somehow we have to get the messageto Airworks that their staff have to be trained on how to clean the windshields correctly.Second Quarter of 2015 Safety E- Magazine Edition-18

CASE STUDYColumbian 707- Fuel Starvation at JFKHistoryThe 23-year-old Boeing 707 started itsjourney in Bogotá, stopping in Medellinat 2:04 pm after flying for half an hour. Itthen took off at 3:08 pm. The flight crewconsisted of 51-year-old CaptainCaviedes with 16,787hrs of flyingexperience, 28year-old First Officer Klotzwith 1,837hrs of flying experience and44year-old Flight Engineer Moyano with10,134hrs of flying experience.FlightOn the evening of January 25, 1990, fogand wind conditions was causingcongestion at New York, which meantthat Avianca Flight 52 was held by airtraffic control in a series of three holdingpatterns, initially for 19 minutes, then for29 minutes near Atlantic City and at (39nautical miles (72 km)) south of theairport for another 29 minutes. In total,the flight is held for 1 hour and 17 minutes.At 8:44 pm, the first officer indicated thatthey needed \"priority\", probably relatingto the fact that their plane's fuel wasgetting critically low. The first officer toldair traffic control, \"... we'll be able to holdabout five minutes that's all we can do\".The first officer also stated, \"(ouralternate) was Boston but we can't do itnow, we run out of fuel now.\" Once onapproach, the critically low fuel meantthat the flight only had about 5 minutesof fuel and would need to land urgently.Due to the prolonged holding andweather conditions at New York, thecrew were in a very STRESSFUL SITUATION.The New York approach controllerclaimed that he failed to hear thatAvianca Flight 52 could no longer makeits alternate, so was unaware of thecritical fuel situation. He cleared theaircraft for a final approach to runway22L at 9:02 pm. The low fuel necessitatesthat the crew land the plane on the firstattempt.Kennedy tower cleared Flight 52 for landing at 9:15 pm. At 9:22 pm at an altitude of 500 feet above Page10the ground, the aircraft encountered wind shear. The aircraft's ground proximity warning systemwas triggered, sounding warning alarms. The flight crew desperately tried to visually locate therunway, but were unable to do so because of the weather forcing the Captain to abort thelanding. The aircraft came close to crashing just short of the runway. The first officer alerted thecontroller that they were low on fuel, and in a subsequent transmission stated, \"We're running outof fuel, sir.\" The controller then asked the crew to climb, to which the first officer replied, \"No, sir,we're running out of fuel.\" At approximately 9:32 pm, engines number four and three flamed out.This situation was reported to the controller, who cleared the flight for another approach. TheSecond Quarter of 2015 Safety E- Magazine Edition-18

remaining engines quickly also flamed out. The controller lost radio contact with the aircraft at 9:34pm. The aircraft lost height and crashed into a hillside on the north shore of Long Island, 16 miles(26 km) from the airport. The cockpit separated from the rest of the fuselage, smashing into awooden deck of an unoccupied home. The captain, first officer and the second officer all died inthe crash. Because there was no fuel, there was no fire, which may have contributed tosaving some lives. The cockpit was found 100 feet (30 m) from the crash site. 85 people survivedthe crash with injuries, while 73 passengers and crew died.Cause and InvestigationThe NTSB's report on the accidentdetermined the cause as pilot errordue to the crew never declaring a fuelemergency to air traffic control as perInternational Air Transport Association(IATA) guidelines. A contributing factorwas the lack of a standardizedterminology for pilots and controllers for minimum and emergencyfuel states. The crew asked for a\"priority\" landing which, because ofclaimed language differencesbetween English and Spanish, can beinterpreted as an emergency toSpanish-speaking pilots but not toEnglish-speaking air traffic controllers.Contributing to the accident was theairline’s failure to use an operationalcontrol dispatch system to assist themduring the international flight into ahigh density airport in poor weather.\"This accident, along with Hapag-LloydAirlines Flight 3378, has been used as anexample of why airlines in all countriesshould always have flight dispatchersproactively following flights, as required in the U.S. by Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) Part 121. ARTICLE Stress in Aviation and Stress ManagementIntroductionStress is a reaction that is initiated when a situation or eventis evaluated as a threat and requires actions beyond anindividual’s normal operational intensity level.Understanding the factors that lead to stress, as well as howto cope with stressful situations, can greatly improve a crewmember’s performance. Also,understanding that fellow crewmembers may reactdifferently to the same stressor is important and can help aflight crewmember control a situation that can quickly getout of hand if an individual is having a negative reaction.Causes of Stress: Environmental/physical stressors Page11 Work-related stressors Personal StressorsThe common factor among all of these stressors is that theyall create a physically uncomfortable environment that can cause stress. Stress is not solelySecond Quarter of 2015 Safety E- Magazine Edition-18

dependent on the intensity of a stimulus but also on the duration of exposure. For example, a low-pitched but persistent noise can cause as much stress as a sudden loud noise.In the cockpit some common environmental/physical stressors are: Persistent radio communication noise Sudden alarms or warning horns Uncomfortable temperature Engine and system noise Vibration Cramped workspace Air quality Lighting conditions.Effects of Stress on Physical and Mental PerformanceIn cases of significantly high stress a flight crew member will often:  Difficulty concentrating and reduced vigilance - easily distracted  Errors, omissions, mistakes, incorrect actions, poor judgment and memory  Tendency to cut corners, skip items and look for the easiest way out  Either slowness (due to lack of interest) or hyperactivity (due to adrenaline)  Focusing on easily manageable details while ignoring serious threats  Tendency to pass responsibility on to others  Fixation on single issues or even a mental block  Unwillingness to make decisions - decisions are postponed or take longer to make  Fewer plans and backup plans are made  Increase in risk-taking leading to an increase in the number of violations, especially when frustrated with failures  Excessively hurried actions - Due to adrenaline and alertness level, there is a tendency to act very quickly even when there is no time pressure. Hurried actions increase the chance of errors.  Return to old procedures that may no longer be applicable  Use non-standard phraseology  When communicating return to the use of one’s native language.  Look for items in a place where they used to be but are no longer located.Other Effects - Interpersonal Relations in the CockpitAs one might expect, since stress affects behavior it also affects relationships between people. Inthe cockpit, this situation can be critical. Two negative interpersonal conflicts that can developinvolve aggressive behavior or withdrawal.  Aggression is a natural consequence of high adrenaline and alertness levels.  Withdrawal occurs when a person has feelings of incompetence and results in an inability to face the situation at hand. The best way of coping with such stressors involves a combination of preparation (pre-flight) and in-flight corrective actions. 1. Preparation: Knowledge of techniques for dealing with certain flight situations that are not frequently encountered and the ability to apply these techniques proficiently is crucial for safety. 2. Anticipation: It is good to anticipate possible scenarios and threats that could arise during the flight even if they are very unlikely to happen. This will reduce the surprise factor if something does happen. Page12Second Quarter of 2015 Safety E- Magazine Edition-18

3. Planning. Anticipating what might happen is notenough. It is important that once all reasonable scenariosand threats are identified, a sound plan for dealing withthem is made on the ground before flight. This furtherincreases preparedness.4. Communication. Briefings both on the ground beforethe flight and in flight are critical. Letting othercrewmembers know what the plans are will ensure thateveryone knows what to do and that no one will besurprised or will do anything that is contrary to the plannedaction.5. Use of Resources. Make the best use of all availableresources. This includes careful distribution of tasks in the cockpit and other resources, such as on-board equipment and ATC, which can always help by providing information and advice that willhelp you deal with the situation and reduce stress levels.6. Crew Resource Management (CRM). Share tasks to avoid work overload. If you are overloaded with too many tasks, do not avoid asking for assistance. Learn to recognize the symptoms of stress, not only in yourself, but also in other crewmembers. Provide advice or assistance when necessary. A good cabin atmosphere with plenty of humour always helps.7. Time Management. Always do things in advance whenever possible. Do not leave tasks until thelast moment (e.g., asking ATC for clearances). Whenever possible, buy yourself more time toanalyze and solve a situation properly in order to avoid rushed actions.Should you still be faced with a totally unexpected stressful situation despite all your carefulplanning and anticipation, the keys are to recognize the symptoms, remain calm and buy yourselfas much time to think as possible. By understanding stress mechanisms, you can control negativeemotions resulting from stress such as irritation, nervousness and anxiety, and attempt to solve theproblem in the most logical and safe way possible.Example of an acute stressful situation which was well managed is the HUDSON RIVER LANDING atNEW YORK when both engines failed after take-off. Example of succumbing to acute stress is theAF 474 crash in the ATLANTIC and recent crash of Germanwings flight 9525 killing 150 people. SAFETY AWARENESS FLYERS Page13Second Quarter of 2015 Safety E- Magazine Edition-18

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January 2015 Edition 17Share Your Expertise:-If you have an article proposal, manuscript or technical paper that you believe wouldmake a useful contribution to the on-going dialogue about aviation safety, we will beglad to publish it. DELIGHTFUL READING 1. Editorial ……………………………………………………... Page No. 02 2. Hearing and Noise in Aviation ……………………………….. Page No.03 to 05 3. RCDL Updates………………………………………………..... Page No. 06 4. Icing In Clouds & its Aerodynamic Effects ……………………. Page No. 07 to 08 5. The Cockroach Theory of Self Development………………….. Page No. 09 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSThe posting of stories, articles, reports and documents in this magazine does not in anyway, imply or necessarily express or suggest that all the information is correct. It isbased on details gathered from various sources and is for information purpose only.The Flight Safety Department is making this material available in its efforts to advancethe understanding of safety. It is in no way responsible for any errors, omissions ordeletions in the reports. 1

EDITORIAL“That is very much fine; but it is impossible to make the men perfect; the men willalways remain the same as they are now; and no legislation will make a man havemore presence of mind, or, I believe, make him more cautious; and besides that, thenext time such an accident occurs, the circumstances will be so different, that theinstructions given to the men, in consequence of the former accident, will not apply.”With this I would like to pay Homage to the Crew members and Passengers of Air AsiaFlight QZ8501, who died in the tragic accident in Java, Indonesia. May their souls restin Peace….All of us especially pilots seem to take good care of their eyes with protective glasses,regular check-ups etc. However the next most important sensory organ namely theears are relatively neglected. The younger generation who have been brought up witha staple fare of I-Pods and such other devices seem to be unable to step-out withoutearphones attached to a music device even jogging or going for a walk! Exposure toloud music through earphones can also cause significant hearing loss over a period oftime. Music and sound in general is played at high volumes everywhere, in discos,movie halls or parties. In this issue we have featured an article describing thephysiology of hearing.We at RCDL gives first and utmost priority to personal Safety. You will be receiving aSafety Ear Seal soon, Start protecting your Ear for your personal Safety.In this Issue of our Safety Magazine we have given two worth reading articles onHearing and Noise in Aviation and another article on Icing In Clouds & itsAerodynamic Effects, a brief detail of our new aircraft ERJ 135; at the end you will findan Inspirational Self-development story and some Aviation humor.Flight Safety Department wish all readers a Very Happy and Safe New Year.Happy Reading!!Safety is Everybody’s Concern…Warm Regards,Flight Safety Department 2

HEARING AND NOISE IN AVIATIONHEARINGThe term hearing describes the process, function, orpower of perceiving sound. Hearing is second only tovision as a physiological sensory mechanism to obtaincritical information during the operation of an aircraft.The sense of hearing makes it possible to perceive,process, and identify among the myriad of soundsfrom the surrounding environment.NOISEThe term noise refers to a sound, especially one which lacksagreeable musical quality, is noticeably unpleasant, or is tooloud. In other words, noise is any unwanted or annoying sound.Categorizing a sound as noise can be very subjective. Forexample, loud rock music can be described as an enviable soundby some (usually teenagers), and at the same time described asnoise by others (usually adults).SOURCES OF NOISE IN AVIATIONThe aviation environment is characterized by multiple sources of noise, both on theground and in the air. Exposure of pilots to noise became an issue following theintroduction of the first powered aircraft by theWright Brothers, and has been a prevalentproblem ever since. Noise is produced by aircraftequipment power plants, transmission systems,jet efflux, propellers, rotors, hydraulic andelectrical actuators, cabin conditioning andpressurization systems, cockpit advisory andalert systems, communications equipment, etc.Noise can also be caused by the aerodynamicinteraction between ambient air (boundarylayer) and the surface of the aircraft fuselage,wings, control surfaces, and landing gear. Theseauditory inputs allow pilots to assess andmonitor the operational status of their aircraft. All pilots know the sounds of a normal-functioning aircraft. On the other hand, unexpected sounds or the lack of them, mayalert pilots to possible malfunctions, failures, or hazards. Every pilot has experienceda cockpit or cabin environment that was so loud that it was necessary to shout to beheard. These sounds not only make the work environment more stressful but can, over 3

time, cause permanent hearing impairment. However, it is also important toremember that individual exposure to noise is a common occurrence away from theaviation working environment—at home or work, on the road, and in public areas.The effects of pre-flight exposure to noise can adversely affect pilot in-flightperformance.EFFECTS OF NOISE EXPOSUREPhysiologic  Ear discomfort  Ear pain  Eardrum Rupture  Temporary hearing impairmentPsychologic  Subjective effects  Speech interference  PerformanceDaily exposure to noise levels that exceed 90dB can cause hearing loss.HOW TO PROTECT YOUR HEARINGUse Hearing Protection Equipment. If the ambient noise level exceeds permissible noiseexposure limits, you should use hearing protection devices— earplugs, earmuffs, orheadsets. Even if an individual already has some level of permanent hearingloss, using hearing protection equipment should prevent further hearingdamage. These protection devices attenuate noise waves before they reach theeardrum, and most of them are effective at reducing high-frequency noise levelsabove 1,000 Hz. It is very important to emphasize that the use of these devices does notinterfere with speech communications during flight because they reduce high-frequency background noise, making speech signals clearer and more comprehensible.Earplugs: Insert able-type earplugs offer a very popular,inexpensive, effective, and comfortable approach to providehearing protection. To be effective, earplugs must be insertedproperly to create an air- tight seal in the ear canal. The wax-impregnated moldable polyurethane earplugs provide aneffective universal fi t for all users and provide 30 to 35 dB ofnoise protection across all frequency bands.Earmuffs: also known as ear defenders, protect the wearerfrom extreme noises. The head-band and outer covering isusually made from a hard thermoplastic or metal. Theprotection usually comes from acoustic foam – this absorbssound waves by increasing air resistance, thus reducing theamplitude of the waves. 4

Headsets: In general, headsets provide the same level ofnoise attenuation as earmuffs, and are also more easilydonned and removed than earplugs, but themicrophone can interfere with the donning of an oxygenmask. Headset uses active noise reduction technology thatallows the manipulation of sound and signal waves to reducenoise, improve signal-to-noise ratios, and enhance soundqualitySUMMARYHearing is second only to vision as a sensory mechanism to obtain critical informationduring the operation of an aircraft.All sounds have three distinctive variables: frequency, intensity, and duration.Normal conversation takes place in the frequency range from 500 to 3,000 Hz.Daily exposure to noise levels higher than 90dB can cause hearing impairment. Thiscan go unnoticed initially because it occurs in the vicinity of 4,000 Hz (outside theconversational range). If the ambient noise level reaches 90dBA, you must usehearing protection equipment to prevent hearing impairment.Exposure to loud noise before flying (at home, while driving, at a party, etc.) can be asharmful as exposure to aircraft noise. ****End of Article**** 5

RCDL UPDATESAs our Founder Chairman Late Mr. Dhirubhai Ambani Quotes: “GROWTH ISLIFE”.RCDL is growing and recently we have added New Aircraft in our Fleet EmbraerERJ135. Let us give you a brief introduction of this Aircraft.The EMBRAER EMB-135 / ERJ 135 is a Twin-Engined regional airliner with acapacity of maximum 37 passengers produced by the Brazilian manufacturerEmbraer (Empresa Brasileira de Aeronautica, S.A.). It is part of the EMBRAERERJ family.Crew 02 Flight Crew + 01 Cabin Crew + 01Passengers ObserverPropulsionEngine Model 37Engine Power (each)Speed 2 Turbofan EnginesMmo (max. Mach)Service Ceiling Allison / Rolls-Royce AE3007A1RangeEmpty Weight 33 Kn 7419 lbfMax. Takeoff WeightMax. Landing 833 km/h 450kts 518 mphWeightMax. Zero Fuel Mach 0.78WeightWing Span 11278 m 37000 ftWing AreaLength 3232 km 1745NM 2008 mi.HeightFirst Flight 11636 kg 25652 lbsProduction StatusDeveloped from 18990 kg 41865 lbsICAO CodeFAA TCDS 18500 kg 40785 lbsEASA TCDSData for (Version) 15600 Kg 34392 lbsVariants 20,04 m 65,7 ft 51,2 m² 551 ft² 26,33 m 86,4 ft 6,71 m 22,0 ft 04.07.1998 in production EMBRAER EMB-145/ERJ-145 E135 T00011AT A.032 EMBRAER ERJ-135ER ERJ 135ER, ERJ 135LR, Legacy 6

ICING IN CLOUDS & AERODYNAMIC EFFECTSIcing ConditionsNearly all aircraft icing occurs in super-cooled clouds. Liquid droplets are presentat outside air temperatures below 0°C (32°F) in these clouds. At outside airtemperatures close to 0°C (32°F), the cloud may consist entirely of such droplets,with few or no ice particles present.At decreasing temperatures, theprobability increases that iceparticles will be found in significantnumbers along with the liquiddroplets. In fact, as the ice watercontent increases, the liquid watercontent tends to decrease since theice particles grow at the expense ofthe water particles. Attemperatures below about -20°C (-4°F), most clouds are made upentirely of ice particles.The general rule is that the more ice particles and the fewer liquid droplets that arepresent, the less ice accumulation on the airframe. This is because the ice particlestend to bounce off an aircraft surface, while the super-cooled droplets freeze andadhere. As a result, ice accumulation is often greatest at temperatures not too farbelow 0 °C (32°F), where liquid water content can be abundant, and is usuallynegligible at temperatures below about -20°C (-4°F).An exception to the general rule just stated may be made for surfaces heated by athermal ice protection system (or by aerodynamic heating near the stagnationpoint of an aircraft component at speeds in excess of perhaps 250 knots). For suchsurfaces, ice particles may melt upon impact and then run back to colder aftregions and refreeze.The higher liquid water content associated with temperatures near freezing is notthe only concern. Tests have shown that at outside air temperatures near freezing,the total air temperature may be above freezing. The result is no ice accretion nearthe stagnation, but the refreezing of the water running back on the airfoil, causingrunback ice accretions, possibly behind the protected areas. The formation of aridge is possible. Pilots should be vigilant at total temperatures (TAT) between -5°C (23°F) and +2°C (35°F). Pilots should know whether the temperatureinstrument they are reading in the cockpit is outside air temperature (OAT) orTAT.The greater the liquid water content of the cloud, the more rapidly ice accumulateson aircraft surfaces. The size of the droplets also is important. Larger dropletshave greater inertia and are less influenced by the airflow around the aircraft than 7

smaller droplets. The result is that larger droplets will impinge on more of theaircraft surface than smaller droplets.Types of Clouds and Their Effects on LiftStratus clouds, sometimes called layer clouds, form a stratified layer that maycover a wide area. The lifting processes that form them are usually gradual, and sothey rarely have exceptionally highliquid water contents. Icing layers instratus clouds with a verticalthickness in excess of 3,000 feet arerare, so a change of altitude of a fewthousand feet may take the aircraftout of icing.Cumulus clouds, which often formbecause of vigorous convection, canhave high liquid water content. If anaircraft traverses them, the icing can be rapid. Because they tend to be of limitedhorizontal extent, it may be possible to avoid many of them. Because of the verticaldevelopment of cumulus clouds, icing conditions can be found in layers thousandsof feet in depth, but with much less horizontal development than in stratus clouds.This class of clouds includes the cumulonimbus, or thunderstorm, clouds. Updraftsin such clouds can be great and result in very large liquid water contents. Thus, a large icing threat can be added to the other excellent reasons to stay out of such clouds. The thunderhead anvil can spread out from the core for several miles and is composed mainly of ice crystals. These crystals will not adhere to unheated surfaces when they hit, but they may melt on a heated surface, run back, and refreeze. The ice content in the anvils can be high, and ingestion of the ice crystals has resulted in un-commanded thrust reductions.Orographic clouds form when moist air is lifted by flowing up the side of amountain. As the parcel of air is lifted, it cools and forms a cloud. Such clouds cancontain a large volume of water, and in some cases, large droplets.Wave clouds, recognized by their \"wavy\" tops, can have high liquid watercontents. Continued flight along a wave may result in airframe icing.Cirrus clouds, found at very high, cold altitudes, are composed entirely of iceparticles. Flight through these clouds should not result in structural icing, althoughthe possibility exists for runback icing from the refreezing of particles that meltedon thermally or aerodynamically heated surfaces. ****End of Article**** 8

THE COCKROACH THEORY FOR SELF-DEVELOPMENTAt a restaurant, a cockroach suddenly flew from somewhere and sat on a lady.She started screaming out of fear. With a panic stricken face and trembling voice,she started jumping, with both her hands desperately trying to get rid of thecockroach. Her reaction was contagious, as everyone in her group also gotpanicky. The lady finally managed to push the cockroach away but ...it landed onanother lady in the group. Now, it was the turn of the other lady in the group tocontinue the drama. The waiter rushed forward to their rescue. In the relay ofthrowing, the cockroach next fell upon the waiter. The waiter stood firm,composed himself and observed the behavior of the cockroach on his shirt. Whenhe was confident enough, he grabbed it with his fingers and threw it out of therestaurant.Sipping my coffee and watching the amusement, the antenna of my mind pickedup a few thoughts and started wondering, was the cockroach responsible for theirhistrionic behavior? If so, then why was the waiter not disturbed? He handled itnear to perfection, without any chaos.It is not the cockroach, but the inability of the ladies to handle the disturbancecaused by the cockroach that disturbed the ladies.I realized that, it is not the shouting of my father or my boss or my wife thatdisturbs me, but it's my inability to handle the disturbances caused by theirshouting that disturbs me. It's not the traffic jams on the road that disturbs me,but my inability to handle the disturbance caused by the traffic jam that disturbsme. More than the problem, it's my reaction to the problem that creates chaos inmy life.Lessons learnt from the story:I understood, I should not react in life. I should always respond.The women reacted, whereas the waiter responded.Reactions are always instinctive whereas responses are always well thought of,just and right to save a situation from going out of hands, to avoid cracks inrelationship, to avoid taking decisions in anger, anxiety, stress or hurry.A beautiful way to understand............LIFE.Safety is also about responding to the issue and hazards.Start Reporting Hazards... **** End of Story**** 9

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Share Your Knowledge: If you have an article proposal, manuscript or technical paper that you believe would make a useful contribution to the on -going dialogue about aviation safety, we will be glad to publish it. SAFETY E-MAGAZINE ISSUE-16Delightful Reading:Page 1 ForewordForeword Dear ColleaguesPage2 -3 Last month we had gone through a rough phase where one of our aircraft was grounded on account of Ramp checkRamp-Check findings. The Ramp check in other terms is basically a spot check, categorized under the definition of surveillance and isProcedure defined as the examination and testing of systems including sampling of products and gathering of evidence data,Page3 information and intelligence. The officer is authorized to check all related documents, equipments, equipment onRCDL Incident board etc… that is necessary to make the flight safe. This edition will describe a full fledged procedure, Aircraftupdates documentation, Personnel documents.Page 3-5 I must tell this to all my engineering as well flying colleagues to \"Must Ensure\" on board safety equipments as wellInternal-Safety documents including personnel documents beforeAdvisory undertaking any flight.Page 6MIAL-SafetyAdvisoryPage7RegulatoryUpdates This edition is prepared exclusively to make all operational personnel aware about the Ramp Check Warm Regards, Saurabh Tyagi

What is a Ramp Check Aircraft suspected of non- compliance shall be subjected to Ramp check inspections. Suspicion is based on  Maintenance Information  Report of abnormal manoeuvers upon entering airspace  Previous ramp inspection indicating serious concern of non- compliance or no corrective actions madeRamp Check Inspection checklist  Flight Deck General: Cockpit equipments, Manuals, Flight Preparation, Weight and Balance. Licences, Tech Log…  Safety/Cabin: Safety Equipment, Emergency exits, Cabin’s Condition…  Aircraft Condition: Wheels, Tyres, Undercarriage, Powerplant, Leakages, Repairs  Cargo: Cargo compartment, Dangerous Goods, Safety of Cargo on Board  General: Any other matter related to the safety of the operator Example of significant finding leading an aircraft or crew to have restrictions before operating the flight may be as follows:  Lack of Quick Donning Masks: Restriction to the FL250  Aircraft full of passengers and one seat inoperative: Pax disembarking  Cargo compartment declared as inoperative  Lack of B-RNAV authorization: restricted to the FL115  Return to base as ferry flight only  Repair of defect according to AMM  Recalculation of Mass and Balance, Performance of Fuel calculation

 Getting information from missing NOTAMS Change of the OFP Proper restraining of the cargo A copy of missing licence/document to be sent by FAX (SAFA Procedure)IMMEDIATE OPERATION BAN  In case of an immediate or obvious safety hazard, an operating ban may be imposed on one ramp inspection Eg Lack of installation EGPWS, ACAS/TCAS11, ELT, ELT 406 MHZ… Difference in level finding on the same issueA05 Minor Major SignificantChecklists 1. No checklist details in 1. Different versions are the operation manual used by Pilot 2. Checklist do not and co-pilot confirm with the 2. No normal and checklist in the ops emergency manual checklists 3. Normal and available emergency checklist not readily accessible to all relevant Flight crew members 4. Checklist not covering all flight phases

RCDL INCIDENTS Case-1VT-DHA while operating a flight from Delhi-Mumbai had a rejected take-off due to CS message on Take-off Config appeared. The case is pending inDGCA pending final enquiry.Case-2VT-DHA while operating a flight from Mumbai- Delhi had a rejected Take-off due to right thrust reverser warning. The case is pending in DGCApending final enquiry.Internal Safety AdvisoriesInternal Advisory 01/14-There was a recent case where one of the NSOP was spot checked.Following were the deficiencies observed:1. The BA equipment was unserviceable and the medical book was signedby crew as well doctor2. Documents fudging on the same was also observed.The above were the main observation and based on which DGCA havesuspended 11 Pilots and 06 cabin crew members.An FIR has been registered against the doctor.As stated above it can be well said that DGCA have made signing crewequally responsible for using the U/S equipment and subsequently signingthe medical book. This case was taken with such gravity that all crewwhosoever has signed the book for a month period were penalized.I therefore request all my crew members to ensure that whenever they signthe book, must do in well acknowledgement of the procedures andpractices as per Flight safety Manual.

Though Doctor must ensure all time that the equipment is serviceable butwith DGCA actions it is obvious to say that its crew members responsibilityto ensure equipment serviceability before appendix signature.Though Dr Shah is very prompt in discharging his duty while in RCDL andthe undersigned also do make a random check on such equipment but theabove information is for your understanding as a first line of safety in thesystem.02/14-This advisory is issued based on one of the observation raised on FlightFolders.During the monthly surveillance on FLIGHT FOLDERS by Flight Safety, itwas observed that on some occasions the Flight Crew missed to appendtheir signatures on the L &T sheets. The importance of appendingsignatures on any of the regulatory approved documents is a critical itemand MUST be in nature.This seems to be minor in nature but seldom carrying its own importancein case of emergencies...It is therefore advised and further requested to kindly append thesignatures on all mandatory documents as PIC.03/14I was on the Ramp during one of the last night visit for Ramp check onGlobal Departure. Post receiving the VVIP guest, the PIC did not make awalk around. In addition to this the cargo net was not installed and the

boarding passenger was VVIP. The pressure at that pointof time was immense to release the aircraft and also noone (including the undersigned) have informed the PIC onunsecured Cargo Net. This has happened not due toanyone’s incompetency to check but I feel more of apractice for not doing the same.I must say that such stressed situations are very frequentin our organization due to the nature of our operations butwe need to keep and match our production goals with protectiongoals.I do respect the efficiency and professionalism of entire crew team and alsothe “on time departure” requirement of our operations but trust the aboveis a latent situation where one deficiency is leading to other and so on…It is therefore advised and further request to kindly do a final walk aroundbefore departure.04/14As you must be aware that our system has now moved and upgraded tonew equipment Breath Analyser BA-1V. This equipment is the replica ofBA-3, as the previous one, except with an additional feature of in-buildextended memory card with an attached printer.Extended memory is programmed as “First In, First Out”, which meansthat once the memory is full, the next test performed will erase the oldesttest in the memory of the unit. So the most recent 1000+ tests are retainedin the memory. Please follow the following protocol during this test…

1. After consuming any alcoholic item like Cough syrup, Mouth Wash, Homeopathic Pills, give at-least 30mints to allow any alcohol to dissipate. 2. A positive result on the initial test , however , would require waiting 2 to 15 mints depending on the protocols of the testing and then a second test or confirmatory test must be administered. A similar result on both tests indicates true blood alcohol level. 3. If a subject refuses to provide a breath sample the operator/doctor can enter that data into ASIV. The ASIV will printout the test with the refusal notation and it will be stored in the memory. The above points are important to know by flying crew and therefore released as advisory. I request to kindly disseminate this important advisory to your fleet members for proper understanding and future compliance.MIAL SAFETY ADVISORY 1. As per the new guidelines the safety cones should be as per IATA standards. The colour of the safety cones should be orange with reflective tape and height of 750mm 2. Standardization of HVJ 9Hight Visible Jackets) EN71 3. Shift pattern of drivers 4. IATA standard passengers carrying coaches and tractors 5. Spark arrestors must be fitted on vehicles