SUNNI MUSLIM SCHOLARS ON THE STATUS

sunni muslim scholars 213 SUNNI MUSLIM SCHOLARS ON THE STATUS OF LOGIC, 1500-1800* KHALED EL-ROUAYHEB (University of Cambridge)AbstractIn the present article, I discuss Goldziher’s contention (echoed in more recentliterature) that from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, Sunn¬ Muslim scholars(Æulam®æ) became increasingly hostile to rational sciences such as logic. On thebasis of discussions and fat®w® by Sunni scholars in the sixteenth, seventeenthand eighteenth centuries, I show that this idea is radically mistaken. Mainstreamscholars in the Maghrib, Egypt and Turkey considered logic to be not onlypermissible but actually commendable or even a religious duty incumbent onthe Muslim community as a whole (i.e. a far¥ kif®yah). Though there weredissenting voices in the period, such as the Q®¥¬z®del¬s, this seems to have beenthe mainstream opinion of Sunni scholars until the rise of the Salafiyyah movementin the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.In a classic article first published in 1916, the great orientalistIgnaz Goldziher surveyed the attitude of orthodox Islam to what hecalled the “ancient sciences,” i.e. the sciences that had been handeddown to the Muslims from Greek antiquity.1 Goldziher devoted almosthalf of the article to discussing attitudes to logic amongst Muslimscholars. He noted that opposition to logic gained strength in thethirteenth and fourteenth centuries, when condemnations of the dis-cipline were advanced by influential scholars such as the Sh®fiƬ juristIbn al-—al®Ω (d. 643/1245) and the ºanbal¬ scholar Ibn Taymiyya(d. 728/1328). “From this period on,” Goldziher asserted, “the studyof logic was more or less decisively considered to be part of the * I would like to thank the Executive Editors of ILS and the anonymous readersfor their helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this essay. 1 Goldziher’s article was originally published as “Stellung der alten islamischenOrthodoxie zu den antikken Wissenschaften,” Abhandlung der KöniglichenAkademie der Wissenschaften, 8 (1915): 3-46. In what follows, all references andquotations will be to and from the English translation “The Attitude of OrthodoxIslam Toward the Ancient Sciences,” in M.L. Swartz (transl. and ed.), Studies onIslam (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 185-215.© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2004 Islamic Law and Society 11, 2Also available online – www.brill.nlils262-el-rouayheb 213 02-06-2004, 16:32

214 khaled el-rouayheb category of Ωar®m (forbidden).”2 Goldziher’s article is almost a hundred years old, but the view just cited is still current in the scholarly literature. In an influential series of articles from the 1960s, George Makdisi argued that “the main current” in “Muslim theological thought” was represented by traditionalist opponents of rational theology (and logic) such as Ibn Taymiyya and his fourteenth century followers.3 In his influential A History of Islamic Philosophy (1st ed., 1970; 2nd ed. 1983), Majid Fakhry likewise stated that Ibn Taymiyya and his disciples “insured the victory of Neo-ºanbalism over scholastic theology and philosophy.”4 More recently, Jonathan Berkey has suggested that between the eleventh and fifteenth centuries, “rational sciences” such as logic tended to become marginalized from what he calls the “Sunn¬ intellectual maintream,” largely due to the increased hostility of Sunn¬ Æulam®æ.5 According to Goldziher, the intensification of Muslim scholars’ hostility to logic in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries coincided with the onset of “decline in literature and art.”6 The idea that Arabic- Islamic civilization entered a period of “decline” or “stagnation” after the thirteenth century is well known, and still influential in academic circles, both Western and Arab. The suggestion that hostility to logic “made decisive progress” from around this date may seem to fit well with this overall interpretation of the course of Arabic-Islamic intellectual history. Yet, Goldziher himself, towards the end of his article, noted that opposition to logic gradually disappeared in subsequent centuries, and that “up until the modern period, logic was treated in the theological curriculum as an ancillary discipline.”7 In support of his statement, he mentioned that the eighteenth century Egyptian scholar AΩmad al-Sij®Æ¬ (d. 1197/1783) composed a poem on the syllogistic figures.8 Yet, he did not discuss how this purported 2 Goldziher, “The Attitude of Orthodox Islam,” 207. 3 G. Makdisi, “AshÆari and the AshÆarites in Islamic religious history,” Studia Islamica 17 (1962): 37-80 and 18 (1963): 19-39. See also idem, “Law and Traditionalism in the Institutions of Learning of Medieval Islam,” in G. E. von Grünebaum (ed.), Theology and Law in Islam (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1971). 4 M. Fakhry, A History of Islamic Philosophy (2nd ed., New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 323. 5 Jonathan Berkey, The Formation of Islam: Religion and Society in the Near East, 600-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 229-30. 6 Goldziher, “The Attitude of Orthodox Islam,” 204. 7 Ibid., 208. 8 Goldziher writes “al-Shuj®Æ¬” but this is a misprint or misreading. The scholarils262-el-rouayheb 214 02-06-2004, 16:32

sunni muslim scholars 215change in attitude came about. The reader of his article is left won-dering just how and why logic went from being considered religiouslyforbidden in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries to being a fixedfeature of the education of a Muslim scholar in the eighteenth. In the present article, I examine some of the discussions concerningthe status of logic by Sunn¬ scholars in the period between 1500 and1800. The picture that emerges is that hostility to logic was indeeda minority view in scholarly circles throughout this period. However,many of the scholars regularly invoked earlier authorities in supportof their position. It is therefore questionable whether hostility to logicwas ever a predominant view amongst Sunn¬ scholars, at least betweenthe endorsement of the discipline by Ab‚ º®mid al-Ghaz®l¬ (d. 505/1111) and the rise of the Salafiyya in the nineteenth and twentiethcenturies. IThe last Muslim scholar cited by Goldziher as an opponent of logicwas the Egyptian Jal®l al-D¬n al-Suy‚fl¬ (d. 911/1505), who on severaloccasions condemned logic as both useless and inimical to the Muslimfaith. One such condemnation, entitled al-Qawl al-mushriq f¬ taΩr¬mal-ishtigh®l bi’l-manfliq, is included in the collection of his religiousresponsa (fat®w®).9 Suy‚fl¬ also produced an abridged version of anextended attack on logic by Ibn Taymiyyah.10 However, Suy‚fl¬’shostility to logic was not representative of his age. Already in hisown lifetime, his condemnation of logic was contested by the Maghrib¬scholar MuΩammad b. ÆAbd al-Kar¬m al-Magh¬l¬ (d. 909/1503-4).11in question is mentioned in ÆAbd al-RaΩm®n al-Jabart¬, ÆAj®æib al-®th®r f¬ al-tar®jimwa’l-akhb®r (Cairo: al-MaflbaÆa al-Æ®mira, 1297/1879), vol. 2, 75-7. His poem onsyllogisms is extant in the Berlin Staatsbibliothek (MS: Landberg 962). Thevocalization of his home town is given in MuΩammad Murfla¥® al-Zab¬d¬, T®j al-Æar‚s f¬ sharΩ jaw®hir al-Q®m‚s, ed. Farr‚j et al. (Kuwait: Kuwait GovernmentPress, 1965-2001), vol. 21, 182. 9 Jal®l al-D¬n al-Suy‚fl¬, al-º®w¬ li’l-fat®w® (Beirut: D®r al-kutub al-Æilmiyya,n.d. [reprint of Cairo edition of 1352/1933-34), vol.1, 255-7. 10 Suy‚fl¬’s abridgment has been studied and translated by Wael Hallaq in hisIbn Taymiyya against the Greek Logicians (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993). 11 On Magh¬l¬, see AΩmad B®b® al-Tinbukt¬, Nayl al-ibtih®j bi-taflr¬z al-D¬b®j,printed on the margins of Ibn FarΩ‚n, al-D¬b®j al-mudhahhab f¬ maÆrifat aÆy®n al-madhhab (Cairo: MaflbaÆat al-saÆ®da, 1329/1911), 330-2. The poetic exchangebetween Magh¬l¬ and Suyufl¬ on logic is cited on p. 332.ils262-el-rouayheb 215 02-06-2004, 16:32

216 khaled el-rouayheb Another Maghrib¬ contemporary of Suy‚fl¬, the influential theologian MuΩammad b. Y‚suf al-San‚s¬ (d. 895/1490), was himself a prominent logician, and left behind a series of works on the topic.12 Suy‚fl¬’s Egyptian contemporary, the highly esteemed judge Zakariyy® al-An◊®r¬ (d. 926/1520), also defended the permissibility of logic, and wrote a popular commentary on the introductory logical handbook ¡s®gh‚j¬ by Ath¬r al-D¬n al-Abhar¬ (d. 663/1264).13 Scholars like San‚s¬ and An◊®r¬ were by no means marginal—the former’s theological works were extremely popular for centuries throughout Muslim Africa, and the latter wrote highly esteemed works on Sh®fiƬ fiqh. There is no reason to suppose that Suy‚fl¬’s attitude to logic was typical of Sunn¬ scholars in the fifteenth century, and that as time went on scholars became more tolerant of the discipline. Suy‚fl¬ seems rather to have been a late—but by no means the last—exponent of an undercurrent of hostility towards logic that had crystallised from an early period, but which does not seem to have become the predominant attitude among Sunn¬ scholars, at least not before the twentieth century. Two prominent jurists of the Sh®fiƬ school of law, both of whom had studied with the aforementioned Zakariyy® al-An◊®r¬, illustrate the attitude of mainstream Sunn¬ scholars to logic in the sixteenth century. In a fatw®, the Egyptian jurist Shih®b al-D¬n AΩmad al-Raml¬ (d. 957/1550) responded thus to the question whether studying logic is prohibited: There are three positions on studying it: Ibn al-—al®Ω and [YaΩya] al- Nawaw¬ [d. 676/1277] have said that it is prohibited, and Ghaz®l¬ has said that he who does not know it cannot be trusted as a scholar, and the chosen position is, as some have said, that it is permitted to the person who can be trusted to be of sound mind and who adheres to the Holy Book and the Prophet’s sunnah. Its aim is to ensure man against errors of reasoning, and it is related to meanings as grammar is related to words, and it is an instrument that enables one to acquire the other sciences, and does not itself require any other instrument.14 12 On San‚s¬, see Tinbukt¬, Nayl al-ibtih®j, 325-9 and Carl Brockelmann, Geschichte der Arabischen Literatur [henceforth GAL], (Leiden: Brill, 1937-49), vol. 2, 250-2 (and Suppl.). 13 On An◊®r¬, see Brockelmann, GAL, vol. 2, 99-100 (and Suppl.). An◊®ri briefly defends the permissibility of logic in his Sharh ¡s®gh‚j¬ [printed on the margins of Y‚suf al-ºafn¬, º®shiya Æal® SharΩ ¡s®gh‚j¬ (Cairo: al-MaflbaÆa al-Æ®mira al- sharafiyya, 1302/1885)], 10. 14 AΩmad al-Raml¬, Fat®w® [printed on the margins of Ibn ºajar al-Haytam¬, al-Fat®w® al-kubr® al-fiqhiyya (Cairo: al-MaflbaÆa al-muyammaniyya, 1308/ 1891)], vol. 4, 337. Raml¬’s responsa were collected by his son Shams al-D¬nils262-el-rouayheb 216 02-06-2004, 16:32

sunni muslim scholars 217The Egyptian-born but Meccan-based jurist Ibn ºajar al-ºaytam¬(d. 973/1566) expounded at great length in one of his fat®w® on whathe saw as the correct position on logic. He started by noting thatsome scholars had prohibited logic, but went on to invoke the positionof Ghaz®l¬ in al-Musta◊f® (on the principles of jurisprudence), whereit is stated: “it is the preliminary to all the sciences and he who doesnot master it cannot be trusted in his scholarship.” Ibn ºajar alsoadduced the discussion of logic in Ghaz®l¬’s al-Munqidh min al-¥al®l,where it is stated: Nothing in logic is relevant to religion by way of denial and affirmation. Logic is the study of the methods of demonstration and forming syllogisms, of the conditions for the premises of proofs, of the manner of combining the premises, of the conditions of sound definition, and the manner of ordering it ... What connection has this with the essentials of religion, that it should be denied or rejected?15Ibn ºajar commented thus on Ghaz®l¬’s pronouncements: Consider these words without partisanship and you will find that he— may God bless him—has clarified the way and established the proof to the effect that there is nothing in it [i.e. logic] which is reprehensible or leads to what is reprehensible, and that it is of use in the religious sciences such as the science of the principles of religion (u◊‚l al-d¬n) and of jurisprudence (fiqh). The jurists have established the general principle that what is of use for the religious sciences should be respected and may not be derided, and it should be studied and taught as a far¥ kif®ya [i.e. studying and teaching it is a collective duty incumbent on the Muslim community as a whole, rather than a far¥ Æayn which is an individual duty incumbent on each and every Muslim].16Ibn ºajar went on to state that earlier jurists like Ibn al-—al®Ω whoprohibited logic were thinking of the logic of the philosophers (manfliqal-fal®sifah): As for the logic that is known now amongst prominent Sunn¬ scholars: it contains nothing that is reprehensible and nothing of the doctrines of the philosophizers, but is an intricate science, requiring mental exertion and consideration, which can be relied on for guarding against errors in reasoning as much as possible. God forbid that Ibn al-—al®Ω or even someone of lesser stature should think ill of this!17MuΩammad al-Raml¬ (d. 1004/1596), and the work is sometimes attributed to thelatter. 15 I follow the translation of W. Montgomery Watt, The Faith and Practice ofal-Ghazali (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1953), 35-36. 16 Ibn ºajar al-Haytam¬, Fat®w®, vol. 1, 50. 17 Ibid., vol. 1, 50.ils262-el-rouayheb 217 02-06-2004, 16:32

218 khaled el-rouayheb The logical handbooks studied in Sunn¬ scholarly circles in the sixteenth century belonged to the Aristotelian logical tradition, as modified by Avicenna and later logicians working within the Aris- totelian-Avicennian paradigm.18 The “logic known amongst Sunn¬ scholars” was, in other words, Aristotelian-Avicennian logic. It is thus doubtful whether there is much content to the distinction between the logic of the philosophers and the logic of the Islamic scholars. The notion of “the logic of the philosophers” seems simply to have been used to explain away—as opposed to contradicting—the hostile views of earlier, venerable jurists. As will be seen below, this strategy would be deployed repeatedly in later centuries. Ibn ºajar did not, however, extend his charitable reinterpretation to all scholars who were hostile to logic. He seems to have been more willing to criticize those who were closer to his own age, including— one presumes—Suy‚fl¬: A group of later scholars have attacked it because they were ignorant of it—as the saying goes: “he who is ignorant of something is against it.” It is sufficient for it to be deemed useful in religion that it is not possible to reply to the doubts raised by the philosophers or other [heretical] sects except by adherence to its principles. It ought to be motive enough for he who is ignorant of it that he will not be able to say a single word to the philosopher or anyone else who masters it. Rather, the philosopher or his like will deploy specious arguments and the person who is ignorant of it—even if he were one of the prominent scholars—will remain silent, not knowing how to reply. Al-Qar®f¬ [Shih®b al-D¬n AΩmad (d. 684/1285)]—one of the leading M®lik¬ scholars—was indeed right to make it [i.e. the mastery of logic] one of the preconditions for exercising independent legal reasoning (ijtih®d) ... He said in his discussion of the preconditions of exercising ijtih®d: “it is a precondition that the conditions of definition and inference are known ... and the one who practices ijtih®d needs to know these in each case. If that concerning which he practices ijtih®d is a single essence (Ωaq¬qa bas¬flah), then it cannot be ascertained except by means of a definition. And if he is to judge concerning a juridical matter, then every judgment presupposes two conceptions [of the subject and of the predi- cate] which ought to be ascertained, and thus he needs definition in both cases, and the conditions of definition are expounded in the science of logic ... As for the conditions of inference, he would need them because 18 This is true of the standard handbooks of the time, such as the Is®gh‚j¬ of Abhar¬ and the Shamsiyya of al-K®tib¬ al-Qazw¬n¬; see the description of the works in Tony Street, “Arabic Logic,” in J. Woods and D. Gabbay (eds.), Handbook of the History and Philosophy of Logic, vol. 1 (forthcoming). I am grateful to Dr. Street for making a copy of this article available to me prior to publication.ils262-el-rouayheb 218 02-06-2004, 16:32

sunni muslim scholars 219 he who practices ijtih®d necessarily needs a proof, whether conclusive or probable, for his judgments, and every proof has conditions which are expounded in the science of logic, and if they are missing, the proof will be rendered fallacious while he thinks it is sound ... and thus logic is a precondition for ijtih®d.”19Ibn ºajar rounded up his responsum by quoting the opinion of theprominent Sh®fiƬ jurist T®j al-D¬n b. al-Subk¬ (d. 771/1370), the cruxof which is that logic is like a sword, which may be used in fightingfor Islam and in a highway robbery. The fact that both Raml¬ and Ibn ºajar were asked about the statusof logic shows that there were still those who were suspicious of thediscipline. However, the fact that both jurists answered that logicwas permissible, indeed praiseworthy and necessary, also shows thatthis suspicion was not the dominant attitude amongst Sunn¬ scholarsof the sixteenth century. It should be emphasized that Suy‚fl¬, thoughhe was widely respected in his own day for his knowledge of Ωad¬thand tafs¬r and grammar, was not considered to be on the same levelas An◊®r¬, Raml¬ and Ibn ºajar in the field of fiqh.20 The latters’juridical works were still considered authoritative within the Sh®fiƬschool of law as late as the 1960s when Joseph Schacht wrote hisIntroduction to Islamic Law.21 Furthermore, the fact that a scholar like Ibn ºajar could invokeseveral earlier jurists in support of his position shows that he wasnot advancing a new position on the matter. Focusing, as Goldziherdid, on a few isolated scholars like Ibn al-—al®Ω, Ibn Taymiyya andSuy‚fl¬, may give the impression that their views were typical of theperiod between 1200 and 1500. The attitudes expressed by An◊®r¬,Raml¬ and Ibn ºajar could on this account be taken to indicate ashift in attitudes in the early sixteenth century, towards a more positiveevaluation of logic. However, once prominent jurists like Qar®f¬ fromthe thirteenth century and Subk¬ from the fourteenth are taken intoconsideration, the picture becomes much less clear-cut. Indeed, Wael 19 Ibn ºajar al-Haytam¬, Fat®w®, vol. 1, 50-1. 20 Suy‚fl¬ himself thought that he was better versed in tafs¬r and Ωad¬th andgrammar than any of his contemporaries, but not in fiqh; see Suy‚fl¬, —awn al-manfliq wa’l-kal®m Æan fannay al-manfliq wa’l-kal®m, ed. ÆAl¬ S®m¬ al-Nashsh®r(Cairo, 1947), l®m. 21 J. Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964),262. Brockelmann also wrote that the commentaries of Raml¬ and Ibn ºajar onal-Minh®j of al-Nawaw¬ were the two standard works of Sh®fiƬ fiqh in his time(GAL, vol. 2, 321).ils262-el-rouayheb 219 02-06-2004, 16:32

220 khaled el-rouayheb Hallaq has shown that during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries— the very centuries in which hostility to logic is supposed to have made “decisive progress”—Sunn¬ writers on the principles of jurisprudence (u◊‚l al-fiqh) consciously started incorporating the concepts and forms of argument of Aristotelian logic into their works.22 It is worth emphasising that there was no consensus on the status of logic, and that negative assessments continued to be made after the sixteenth century. For instance, an Egyptian contemporary of Raml¬ and Ibn ºajar, the ºanaf¬ jurist Ibn Nujaym (d. 971/1563), laconically noted that philosophy was a religiously prohibited science, and that logic was part of philosophy. However, for the purpose of ascertaining what seems to have been the “main current” or “mainstream”—to use the words of Makdisi and Berkey— opinion among Sunn¬ scholars, it is important to note that later ºanaf¬ commentators of Ibn Nujaym’s work dissented from this assessment. The Egyptian jurist AΩmad al- ºamaw¬ (d. 1098/1687) cited two earlier commentators on this issue. One stated: I have not seen in the books of jurists of our school the statement that logic is prohibited, and if the author has seen it he ought to have cited it. In the writings of Sh®fiƬ jurists, particularly the later among them, there occur statements to this effect. It may be that he reasoned that it leads to the wasting of one’s life, or that he who occupies himself with it usually inclines to philosophy, in which case his prohibition is one of closing off the means that can lead to evil (sadd al-dhar®æiÆ). Other- wise, there is nothing in logic that contradicts religious law. The other commentator stated: It may be that what is intended, i.e. by the author, is the logic of the philosophers. As for the logic of Muslim scholars, there is no reason for the statement that it is prohibited, since it does not include what contradicts the principles of Islam. Prominent Muslim scholars have written on it [i.e. logic], such as Quflb al-D¬n al-R®z¬ [(d. 766/1364-5)] from among the early scholars, and among the later scholars the Im®m Ibn ÆArafa [(d. 803/1401)] and Shaykh al-Isl®m Zakariyy® al-An◊®r¬. And the Im®m Ghaz®l¬ has called it the standard of the sciences, and has said that he who has no knowledge of it cannot be trusted in his scholarship.23 Prominent Egyptian jurists and theologians of the seventeenth century 22 W. Hallaq, “Logic, Formal Arguments and Formalization of Arguments in Sunn¬ Jurisprudence,” Arabica 37(1990): 315-58. 23 AΩmad al-ºamaw¬, Ghamz Æuy‚n al-ba◊®æir bi-sharΩ al-Ashb®h wa’l-na˙®æir (Cairo: al-MaflbaÆa al-Æ®mira, 1290/1873), vol. 2, 258.ils262-el-rouayheb 220 02-06-2004, 16:32

sunni muslim scholars 221seem to have shared the evaluation of the commentators of Ibn Nujaym.For instance, the ºanaf¬ theologian AΩmad al-Ghunaym¬ (d. 1044/1634) wrote glosses on An◊®r¬’s commentary on the ¡s®gh‚j¬.24 Anotherset of glosses on the same work was written by the prominent Sh®fiƬjurist AΩmad al-Qaly‚b¬ (d. 1069/1658).25 The M®lik¬ jurist ÆAl¬ al-Ujh‚r¬ (d. 1066/1656), who left behind a series of esteemed workson M®lik¬ fiqh, also wrote a commentary on the logical handbookTahdh¬b al-manfliq of SaÆd al-D¬n al-Taft®z®n¬ (d. 792/1390).26 Ujh‚r¬is also known to have taught the advanced logical handbook al-Shamsiyya f¬ al-qaw®Æid al-manfliqiyya by Najm al-D¬n al-K®tib¬ al-Qazw¬n¬ (d. 675/1277) to, among others, ÆAl¬ al-Shabr®mallis¬ (d.1087/1676) who would become perhaps the leading Sh®fiƬ jurist ofhis day.27 In other parts of the Ottoman empire too, scholars studied, taughtand wrote about logic, without worrying too much about the viewsof Suy‚fl¬ and Ibn Nujaym. For instance, the Ottoman scholar andjudge AΩmad fi®shköprüz®de (d. 968/1560), in his encyclopaedia ofthe sciences Mift®Ω al-saÆ®da, extolled the science of logic, callingit the “most noble” (ajall) of the auxiliary sciences and the “chief”(raæ¬s) of the rational sciences: In sum, logic is a science of evident certainties, like the sun that cannot but be clear everywhere. No one doubts its excellence except he who cannot perceive truths, and is incapable of understanding subtleties. And appropriate are the words of he who has said: Logic is ill thought of by people without intelligence, and there is no harm in their view. 24 See the entry on Ghunaym¬ in MuΩammad Am¬n al-MuΩibb¬, Khul®◊at al-athar f¬ aÆy®n al-qarn al-Ω®d¬ Æashar (Cairo: al-MaflbaÆa al-wahbiyya, 1284/1867-8), vol. 1, 312-15. See also Brockelmann, GAL, vol. 2, 329 (and Suppl.). 25 See the entry on Qaly‚b¬ in MuΩibb¬, Khul®◊at al-athar, vol. 1, 175 andBrockelmann, GAL, vol. 2, 364-5 (and Suppl.). Qaly‚b¬ also wrote esteemed glosseson MaΩall¬’s commentary on Nawaw¬’s authoritative compendium of Sh®fiƬ lawal-Minh®j, which were printed in Cairo (D®r iΩy®æ al-kutub al-Æarabiyya) in 1949. 26 See the entry on Ujh‚r¬ in MuΩibb¬, Khul®◊at al-athar, vol. 3, 157-60 andBrockelmann, GAL, vol. 2, 317-8 (and Suppl.). I give the vocalization indicatedby MuΩibb¬ (and by Zab¬d¬, T®j al-Æar‚s, vol. 10, 498). The modern Egyptianvocalisation of the scholar’s home town is Ajh‚r. 27 See the entry on Shabr®mallis¬ in MuΩibbi, Khul®◊at al-athar, vol. 3, 174-7and in Brockelmann, GAL, vol. 2, 322 (and Suppl.). Again, the vocalization ofMuΩibb¬ differs from modern Egyptian vocalization of the scholar’s home town,which is Shubr®millis. Shabr®mallis¬ wrote influential glosses on Raml¬’s standardcommentary on Nawaw¬’s al-Minh®j that have been printed several times in Cairo(for example by Mu◊taf® al-B®b¬ al-ºalab¬ in 1938 and in 1967-9).ils262-el-rouayheb 221 02-06-2004, 16:32

222 khaled el-rouayheb It does not harm the rising morning sun that the blind cannot see its light.28 To be sure, the so-called Q®d¬z®del¬ movement, which spread in the Turkish-speaking parts of the Ottoman empire in the seventeenth century, kept alive the hostility to logic. K®tib Çeleb¬ (d. 1067/1657), author of the well-known bibliography Kashf al-˙un‚n, attended one of the sermons of the founder of the movement, Q®d¬z®de MuΩammad Efend¬ (d. 1045/1635-6), and related that the preacher was wont to make statements like “Who sheds a tear if a logician dies?.”29 However, he clearly regarded the followers of Q®d¬z®de as marginal fanatics: “It is unnecessary to point out that the followers of Q®d¬z®de at the present time are notorious for their extremism and have earned general reproach.”30 He himself was proficient in logic, having studied hand- books such as the ¡s®gh‚j¬ of Abhar¬, the Tahdh¬b al-manfliq of Taft®z®n¬, and the Shamsiyya of K®tib¬, along with the standard commentaries on these works.31 It has been suggested that K®tib Çeleb¬ was not typical of his age, and that there had been a backlash against the rational sciences after the reign of Sulaym®n the Magnificent (r. 1520-1566).32 At least in the case of logic, such a backlash seems never to have happened. Several prominent Ottoman scholars of the seventeenth century were also accomplished logicians. For instance, Qara Khal¬l b. ºasan (d. 1123/1711), who reached the high ranking position of Chief Judge (Q®¥¬ ÆAskar) of Anatolia, and MuΩammad —®diq al-Shirw®n¬ (d. 1120/1708), who assumed the even higher position of Grand Muft¬ (Shaykh al-Isl®m) of the Empire, both wrote works on logic.33 MuΩammad S®çaql¬z®de (d. 1145/1732-3) seems 28 AΩmad fi®shköprüz®de, Mift®Ω al-saÆ®da wa mi◊b®Ω al-siy®da (Hyderabad: MaflbaÆat d®æirat al-maÆ®rif al-ni˙®miyya, 1327/1911), vol. 1, 235-6. 29 I follow the translation of G.L. Lewis, K®tib Cheleb¬: The Balance of Truth (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1957), 136. 30 Lewis, Ibid, 137. On the Q®¥¬z®deli movement, see M. Zilfi, The Politics of Piety: The Ottoman Ulema in the Postclassical Age: 1600-1800 (Bibliotheca Islamica: Minneapolis, 1988), ch. 4. Zilfi also states (on p. 190) that the Q®¥¬z®delis “were a minority among the religious intelligentsia.” 31 Lewis, K®tib Cheleb¬, 141. 32 H. Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1973), 179-85; M. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), vol. 3, 123. 33 On Qara Khal¬l, see Ism®Æ¬l P®sh® al-Baghd®d¬, Hadiyyat al-Æ®rif¬n f¬ asm®æ al-muæallif¬n wa ®th®r al-mu◊annif¬n (Istanbul: Wik®lat al-maÆ®rif al-jal¬la, 1951- 5), vol. 1, 354-5. His super-commentary on Fan®r¬’s commentary on ¡s®gh‚j¬ was printed in Istanbul (al-MaflbaÆa al-◊ult®niyya, 1265/1848). On Shirw®n¬, seeils262-el-rouayheb 222 02-06-2004, 16:32

sunni muslim scholars 223to have been representative of mainstream Ottoman scholars in holdingthe study of logic to be either commendable or a collective religiousduty. This was partly, S®çaql¬z®de wrote, because the study of proofs(adillah) was a prerequisite for the study of the principles of juris-prudence.34 Logic was also helpful in sharpening wits (tashΩ¬dh al-kh®flir), which was itself a religious duty: The mind is an instrument of religion, as he [i.e. Ghaz®l¬] has stated, and the stupid person corrupts religion. It is therefore commendable or a far¥ kif®ya to study some subtle works on the religious or in- strumental sciences in such a way as to sharpen wits.35Another seventeenth century scholar who rejected the position of thescholars who were hostile to logic was the Moroccan al-ºasan al-Y‚s¬ (d. 1102/1691). Y‚s¬ was himself a prominent logician, wholeft behind extensive glosses on the logical handbook al-Mukhta◊arf¬ al-manfliq by the aforementioned fifteenth century scholar Mu-Ωammad b. Y‚suf al-San‚s¬. Y‚s¬ also wrote an influential super-commentary on the major theological work of San‚s¬, ÆAq¬dat ahlal-tawΩ¬d (also known as al-Kubr® al-San‚s¬yyah), in which he devotedconsiderable space to refuting the position of those who consideredlogic and rational theology (kal®m) to be reprehensible or prohibited.Y‚s¬’s discussion starts by considering two possible reasons forconsidering logic and theology to be reprehensible: (i) they areinnovations (bidaÆ), and (ii) they cite and discuss heretical views andarguments. Y‚s¬ rejects both reasons. To the position that one oughtsimply to ignore heretical views and stick to the views of the earliestgenerations of Islam, he replied: How is it possible to know the truth and confine one’s attention to it and differentiate it from false views unless the false views are known? As for the earliest generations (al-salaf), the specious views were simply not around at their time, and hence they did not discuss them, and we are certain that if they had been confronted with them they would haveMehmet Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmani (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Amire, 1891-1897) vol. 3,188. Shirw®n¬ wrote SharΩ Takm¬l al-mantiq, a manuscript of which is extant inthe British Library (MS: Or.12405). For a list of Ottoman Chief Judges and GrandMuftis in these centuries, see Zilfi, The Politics of Piety, 246ff. 34 S®çaql¬z®de, Tart¬b al-Æul‚m, ed. MuΩammad b. Ism®Æ¬l al-Sayyid AΩmad(Beirut: D®r al-ba◊®æir al-isl®miyya, 1988), 104. Professor Stefan Reichmuth haskindly sent me a copy of his as yet unpublished paper on S®çaql¬z®de’s work.Professor Reichmuth also suggests that S®çaql¬z®de’s attitude towards logic wastypical of the Ottoman scholars of his age. 35 Ibid., 114-5.ils262-el-rouayheb 223 02-06-2004, 16:32

224 khaled el-rouayheb disproved them ... Furthermore, most of these matters are in the Quræ®n and they were Arabs who understood its meanings ... It [i.e. the Quræ®n] is full of arguments and replies to the unbelievers, and God—may He be exalted—mentioned their doctrines, such as the rejection of the resurrection, the Trinity and other examples of unbelief, and disproved them. In this there is the most powerful argument for rational theology (kal®m).36 To the position that theology and logic were innovations, Y‚s¬ replied by showing that all sciences were established after the earliest generations of Islam. Even such thoroughly respectable sciences as Quræ®n commentary (tafs¬r), the sciences of Ωad¬th, jurisprudence (fiqh), and Arabic grammar (Æilm al-naΩw) are thus all “innovations.” If a science is reprehensible or prohibited because it was developed after the earliest generations of Islam, then all sciences should be considered reprehensible. It could perhaps be argued that though the sciences of tafs¬r and Ωad¬th and fiqh—with their technical terms and systematic presentations—were developed at a later stage, the earliest generations nevertheless interpreted the Quræ®n, related Ωad¬th, and articulated legal principles. However, as Y‚s¬ pointed out, the earliest generations also argued and inferred and gave reasons. There would still be no reason for enjoining the sciences of tafs¬r and Ωad¬th and fiqh while proscribing logic. The need for the latter discipline arises when the other sciences develop and disagreements emerge concerning the legitimacy of inferences made by scholars: So as the need arose for that which will lead to knowledge, and distinguish between correct and incorrect reasoning, they wrote down the science of logic and translated it into Arabic so that this noble Arab community may benefit from it, since it is the ruler of minds and the chief amongst all the sciences. And it was originally part of the wisdom that was extracted by the Greeks.37 The general position of Y‚s¬, expressed in his work on the sciences, al-Q®n‚n f¬ aΩk®m al-Æilm, was that all sciences are permitted in themselves: We do not heed those who prohibit some of these sciences, for science in itself is food for the mind and the joy of the spirit and the attribute of virtue ... Even magic, which all jurists agree may not be used, if one were to learn it ... just to know it, and be able to distinguish 36 ºasan al-Y‚s¬, ºaw®sh¬ al-kubr® (MS: Berlin Staatsbibliothek: Or. Quart. 1440), fols. 31a-31b. 37 Ibid., fol. 32b.ils262-el-rouayheb 224 02-06-2004, 16:32

sunni muslim scholars 225 between it and miracles ... studying it would be permissible, or even a duty, as has been stated already. And the science of belles-lettres, which is licit by common consent, if one were to study it with the view to becoming a poet who lampoons those whom it is not permitted to lampoon, or praise those whom it is not permitted to praise, studying it would not be permitted to him. “Acts are judged according to their intentions.”38In his glosses on San‚s¬’s theological work, Y‚s¬ went on to considerthe views of Suy‚fl¬. The latter, in his responsum against logic, hadstated that the discipline had no worldly or religious use, since itdealt with inferences involving universals (kulliyy®t), and universalsdo not exist outside the mind and do not refer to existing particulars(l® tadullu Æal® juzæ¬ a◊lan). To this Y‚s¬ replied: As for his claim that universals do not exist outside the mind etc., I wonder how such a claim can be made in such a context by a rational being, not to mention a scholar. I had thought that he [i.e. Suy‚fl¬] was of a higher scholarly rank, and that he was one of those who, though not a specialist, had an idea of the discipline, but such a statement shows that he has not an inkling of the rational sciences.39The statement implies, wrote Y‚s¬, that there is no general scientificprinciple (q®n‚n) whatsoever, whether juridical or theological orgrammatical. The term q®n‚n in this context refers to a propositionthat has as its subject a general term (such as “man”) rather than asingular term (such as “Zayd”).40 Such propositions were clearlyconceived by Y‚s¬ to be essential to anything claiming to be a science.To say, as Suy‚fl¬ did, that logic was of no worldly or religious usebecause it involved such universals, meant that all sciences were ofno use. Furthermore, Suy‚fl¬’s statement suggested that he believedthat all of his own knowledge was only of externally existing parti-culars. But this view, which Y‚s¬ compared to that of the ancientSophists, was patently absurd. Propositions consisting of a subjectand predicate did not assert a relationship (nisbah) between twoexternally existing particulars. Rather, they assert that concepts 38 ºasan al-Y‚s¬, al-Q®n‚n f¬ aΩk®m al-Æilm wa aΩk®m al-Æ®lim wa aΩk®m al-mutaÆallim, ed. ºumayd ºamm®n¬ (Rabat: MaflbaÆat sh®la, 1998), 177. Y‚s¬ isquoting a well-known Ωad¬th. 39 Y‚s¬, ºaw®sh¬ al-kubr®, fols. 33a-33b. Also quoted in MuΩammad Murta¥®al-Zab¬d¬, ItΩ®f al-s®da al-muttaq¬n bi-sharΩ IΩy®æ Æul‚m al-d¬n (Cairo: al-MaflbaÆaal-muyammaniyya, 1311/1893-4), vol. 1, 178. 40 See al-Sayyid al-Shar¬f al-Jurj®n¬, Kit®b al-taÆr¬f®t (Beirut: Maktabat Lubn®n,1969 [reprint of Flügel ed. of 1895]), 177.ils262-el-rouayheb 225 02-06-2004, 16:32

226 khaled el-rouayheb (maÆ®n¬) applied or did not apply to externally existing particulars.41 Y‚s¬ ended his discussion by saying that he had intended to compose an independent treatise on this matter when he first came across Suy‚fl¬’s responsum, but then concluded that it would be a waste of time. He would indeed have ignored Suy‚fl¬’s idiosyncratic view altogether were it not for the fact that the dull-witted (al-bulad®æ) sometimes thought that it was correct. Y‚s¬ was explicitly reacting against Suy‚fl¬’s laconic responsum, and seems to have been unaware of the much longer and more formidable attack on logic by Ibn Taymiyyah. Y‚s¬’s logical and theological works were widely studied in the Maghrib in subsequent centuries, as is shown by the large number of extant manuscripts of his works in the national libraries of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. A number of his students settled in Egypt and taught his works to several local students who went on to become some of the most prominent Egyptian scholars of the eighteenth century, such as AΩmad al-Mallaw¬ (d. 1181/1767) and AΩmad al- Damanh‚r¬ (d. 1192/1778).42 Both scholars composed widely studied commentaries on a didactic poem on logic by ÆAbd al-RaΩm®n al- Akh¥ar¬ (d. 953/1546), in the introduction to which they discussed the permissibility of the discipline. Mallaw¬ mentioned the three standard positions on the issue: (i) the view, attributed to Ibn al- —al®Ω and Nawaw¬, that it is prohibited; (ii) the view, attributed to Ghaz®l¬, that it ought to be taught, and that scholars who are ignorant of it cannot be trusted to avoid errors of reasoning; and (iii) the predominant and correct view that it is permitted to those who are of sound mind and adhere to the Quræ®n and the Prophet’s sunnah. This is essentially the same tripartite division and ultimate assessment given in the above-cited responsum of the sixteenth century jurist AΩmad al-Raml¬. However, Mallaw¬ gave the discussion an important twist by stating that the controversy concerns only the logic that was “mixed with philosophy.” In other words, it was what Ibn ºajar had called “the philosophers’ logic”—and not the logic that was studied and taught in Islamic scholarly circles—that had been prohibited by some, and permitted or commended by others. 41 Y‚s¬, ºaw®sh¬ al-kubr®, fol. 33b; Zab¬d¬, ItΩ®f al-s®da al-muttaq¬n, vol. 1, 178. For the use of the term maÆ®n¬ to denote concepts or ideas (◊uwar dhihniyya), see Zab¬d¬, T®j al-Æar‚s, vol. 39, 123. 42 I discuss this development in my “Was There a Revival of Logical Studies in Eighteenth Century Egypt?” (forthcoming in Die Welt des Islams).ils262-el-rouayheb 226 02-06-2004, 16:32

sunni muslim scholars 227 As for the logic that is not mixed with philosophy, as in this book and the Mukhta◊ar of al-San‚s¬ and [the Mukhta◊ar] of Ibn ÆArafa and the treatise of Ath¬r al-D¬n al-Abhar¬ called ¡s®gh‚j¬ and the works of al- K®tib¬ [i.e. al-Shamsiyyah] and al-Kh‚naj¬ [Af¥al al-D¬n (d. 646/1249), i.e. al-Jumal] and SaÆd al-D¬n [al-Taft®z®n¬, i.e. Tahdh¬b al-manfliq], there is no disagreement concerning the permissibility of engaging in it, and it is rejected only by he who has no inkling of the rational sciences. Indeed, it is a far¥ kif®ya because the ability to reply to heretical views in rational theology (kal®m), which is a far¥ kif®ya, depends on mastering this science, and that which is necessary for a religious duty is itself a duty.43The same assessment, though couched in a slightly more cautioustone, was given by Damanh‚r¬, who in the last years of his life wasRector of the Azhar College in Cairo: Know that this disagreement concerns the logic that is mixed with the statements of the philosophers, as in the fiaw®liÆ al-anw®r of al-Bay¥®wi [d. ca. 681/1282]. As for that which is not so mixed, as in the Mukhta◊ar of al-San‚s¬ and the Shamsiyya and the present work, there is no disagreement concerning the permissibility of engaging in it. Indeed, studying and teaching it is plausibly held to be a far¥ kif®ya since on this depends the knowledge of how to reply to heretical doubts, which is known to be a far¥ kif®yah.44The same assessment was given by one of the most prominent EgyptianM®lik¬ jurists of the eighteenth century, ÆAl¬ al-ÆAdaw¬ al-—aƬd¬ (d.1189/1775): Know that this disagreement concerns the logic that is mixed with the statements of the philosophers, not that which is not mixed, such as the Sullam and the Mukhta◊ar of San‚s¬ and ¡s®gh‚j¬ and the Shamsiyya, about whose permissibility there is no disagreement, and it is not rejected except by he who has no inkling of the rational sciences. It is a far¥ kif®ya because the ability to address doubts in rational theology (kal®m), which is a far¥ kif®ya, depends on the mastery of this science.45An eighteenth century scholar residing in Egypt was unhappy withwhat he considered the undue popularity of logic in the scholarly 43 AΩmad al-Mallaw¬, SharΩ al-Sullam [printed on the margins of —abb®n,º®shiya Æal® SharΩ al-Sullam (Cairo: al-MaflbaÆa al-azhariyya, 1319/1901), 36-7. 44 AΩmad al-Damanh‚r¬, ¡¥®Ω al-mubham min maÆ®n¬ al-Sullam, ed. ÆUmarF®r‚q al-fiabb®Æ (Beirut: Maktabat al-maÆ®rif, 1996), 32-3. 45 ÆAl¬ al-ÆAdaw¬, º®shiya Æal® SharΩ al-Sullam (MS: British Library: Or. 3125),fol. 43a. On ÆAdaw¬, see Jabart¬, ÆAj®æib al-®th®r, vol. 1, 414-16 and Brockelmann,GAL, vol. 2, 319. His esteemed glosses on the commentary of Kharash¬ on thestandard manual of M®lik¬ law Mukhta◊ar Khal¬l have been reprinted several times(for example in Cairo: al-MaflbaÆa al-kubr® al-am¬riyya, 1317/1899-1900).ils262-el-rouayheb 227 02-06-2004, 16:32

228 khaled el-rouayheb circles of his time. MuΩammad Murta¥® al-Zab¬d¬ (d. 1205/1791), in his commentary on the IΩy®æ Æul‚m al-d¬n of Ghaz®l¬, cited the various opinions concerning logic that had been voiced by Muslim scholars in the past. In this connection, he mentioned the view of Suy‚fl¬, and Y‚s¬’s riposte thereto. Though he seems to have stopped short of the view that logic was prohibited, he argued that it was basically a reprehensible science. Knowledge of elementary logic might perhaps be helpful for mastering other sciences, but Maghrib¬ scholars such as Y‚s¬ were cultivating it far beyond this level. Furthermore, Maghrib¬ scholars had—according to Zab¬d¬—recently infected Egyp- tian scholars with this enthusiasm for logic, leading them to neglect the sciences of Ωad¬th.46 As a matter of fact, Zab¬d¬ argued, logic tends to encourage reprehensible character traits such as pride, dis- putatiousness, and the tendency to belittle others for no religious reason: You do not find in their [i.e. the logicians’] books any mention of God and his Prophet, except in the preamble, nor do you find their classes filled with anything but reprehensible disputations and illicit quarrels and refutations and condemnations and contestations and scorn.47 Suy‚fl¬ was indeed right in claiming that it was of no religious use: For the faith that comes from the profession of the unity of God (al- tawΩ¬d) is not based on logical demonstration, contrary to what they [i.e. the theologians and logicians] claim, but on knowledge bringing the one who possesses it to the truth of the matter. Its sign is the opening of the heart to the stations of faith, and acceptance of the decree of God, and turning to the recollection (dhikr) of Him, and loving Him while turning away from the world of vanity ... He who is preoccupied with it [i.e. logic] is preoccupied with his outward aspect and visible conditions, to the detriment of the inward condition (b®flin Ω®lihi), and the reason for him being in this sorry state is his love of prominence and his desire for acclaim from people... and so he wastes his days for their days, and his life for their desires, just so he can be called a scholar.48 Zab¬d¬ was a mystic initiated into the Naqshband¬ order, and his mystical inclinations clearly color his discussion. Yet, not all mystics shared his hostility to logic. For instance, the Damascene mystic (and fellow Naqshband¬) ÆAbd al-Ghan¬ al-Nabulus¬ (d. 1143/1731) seems to have been more sympathetic to it. He composed a short poem 46 Zab¬d¬, ItΩ®f al-s®da al-muttaq¬n, vol. 1, 179-80. 47 Ibid., vol. 1, 180. 48 Ibid., vol. 1, 181.ils262-el-rouayheb 228 02-06-2004, 16:32

sunni muslim scholars 229outlining its basics, along with a commentary in prose. The secondline of the poem states: Now then: Logic is a thing that should be sought by the one who wants to master any science.49Other eighteenth century Egyptian scholars who also belonged tomystical orders, such as the M®lik¬ jurist and Khalwat¬ mystic AΩmadal-Dard¬r (d. 1201/1786) apparently had no compunctions in engagingin the discipline. Dard¬r wrote a commentary on the poem on syllogisticfigures by AΩmad al-Sij®Æ¬ that was noted by Goldziher.50 Zab¬d¬ belonged to the ºanaf¬ school of law, but again there seemsto have been no correlation between belonging to a certain school oflaw and hostility towards logic. Nabulus¬ was also a ºanaf¬, as werethe sixteenth and seventeenth century Turkish scholars whose positionon logic has been described above. Several ºanaf¬ contemporariesof Zab¬d¬ were actually considered specialists in logic. For instance,the Egyptian scholar ºasan al-Jabart¬ (d. 1188/1774)—the father ofthe more famous historian ÆAbd al-RaΩm®n—was both a prominentºanaf¬ jurist and a specialist in the philosophical sciences. He studiedadvanced logical handbooks such as the Shamsiyya of al-K®tib¬, aswell as handbooks on physics and metaphysics, particularly Hid®yatal-Ωikma by al-Abhar¬ and various commentaries and glosses thereon.51 IIZab¬d¬’s discussion does not seem to have had much effect on theattitude of mainstream Egyptian scholars. Several prominent scholarsof the following generations continued to study, teach and write aboutlogic. For instance, ºasan al-ÆAflfl®r (d. 1250/1834-5), ºasan al- 49 The line is quoted in ÆAbd al-ºam¬d ºasan, Fihris makhfl‚fl®t d®r al-kutubal-˙®hiriyyah: al-falsafa wa’l-manfliq wa ®d®b al-baΩth (Damascus: Maflb‚Æ®tmajmaÆ al-lugha al-Æarabiyya, 1970), 173. 50 The commentary is extant in the Berlin Staatsbibliothek (MS: Landberg962). On Dard¬r, see Jabart¬, ÆAj®æib al-®th®r, vol. 2, 147-8 and Brockelmann,GAL, vol. 2, 353. Dard¬r wrote an esteemed commentary on Mukhta◊ar Khal¬l,printed in 1912-3 with the glosses of Das‚q¬ (Cairo: MaflbaÆat al-saÆ®dah). He alsowrote an independent manual on M®lik¬ law entitled Aqrab al-mas®lik il® madhhabal-Im®m M®lik which have been reprinted several times with Dard¬r’s owncommentary (for example in Cairo: MaflbaÆat al-madan¬, 1962-5). 51 See the long entry on ºasan al-Jabart¬ in Jabart¬, ÆAj®æib al-®th®r, vol. 1,390ff.ils262-el-rouayheb 229 02-06-2004, 16:32

230 khaled el-rouayheb Quwaysin¬ (d. 1255/1839) and Ibr®h¬m al-B®j‚r¬ (d. 1276/1860)— all three Rectors of the Azhar—wrote works on logic.52 However, the nineteenth century witnessed the strengthening of intellectual currents that were to challenge the predominant attitude of the pre- ceding centuries. The so-called Salafiyya movement, inspired in part by the Yemeni scholars MuΩammad b. Ism®Æ¬l al-Am¬r (d. 1182/1768) and MuΩammad al-Shawk®n¬ (d. 1250/1834), and in part by the Wahh®bi movement of central Arabia, gradually gained strength amongst Sunn¬ scholars during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. One of the hallmarks of the movement was a rehabilitation of Ibn Taymiyya and his fideist rejection of kal®m and logic for the sup- posedly pristine faith of the earliest generations of Islam (al-salaf).53 One of the most influential nineteenth century Salafis, the Indian- born MuΩammad —idd¬q b. ºasan Kh®n al-Qannawj¬ (d. 1308/1889), upheld Ibn Taymiyyah’s views on logic: I say: look at the book criticizing the logicians by Ibn Taymiyya— may God have mercy on him—and know that his replies [to the logicians] are many, and that they are all true ... He who is of sound and undistorted nature, heart and mind does not need the science of logic, rather he will have the corresponding know-how without acquaintance with the discipline.54 52 See Fihris al-kutub al-maΩf‚˙a bi’l-kutubkh®ne al-khediviyya al-mi◊riyya (Cairo, 1305/1888), vol. 6, 53 (on B®j‚r¬), 63 (on Quwasin¬), 91 (on ÆAflfl®r). B®j‚r¬’s glosses on San‚s¬’s SharΩ al-mukhta◊ar f¬ al-manfliq have been printed (Cairo: al- MaflbaÆa al-khayriyya, 1292/1875). ÆAflfl®r’s glosses on Khab¬◊¬’s SharΩ Tahdh¬b al-manfliq have also been printed (Cairo: al-MaflbaÆa al-azhariyya, 1327/1909). 53 On Salaf¬ ideology, see the older but still useful overview of H. Laoust, “Le Reformisme Orthodoxe des Salafiyya,” Revue des Etudes Islamique 6 (1932): 175-224. Laoust points out that the Salafiyya considered themselves to be reverting to the position of the early Ahl al-Ωad¬th in viewing all kal®m, AshÆar¬ as well as MuÆtazil¬ , as reprehensible innovation (see esp. 190). L. Gardet has also noted the “alienation from kal®m” amongst the Salafis; see EI2, s.v. ÆIlm al-Kal®m. The argument that a mastery of logic was necessary for dealing with doubts raised in kal®m would have carried little weight with them. 54 —idd¬q b. ºasan al-Qannawj¬, Abjad al-Æul‚m (Beirut: D®r al-kutub al- Æilmiyya, n.d), vol. 2, 523. On Qannawj¬, see EI2, s.v. Naww®b Sayyid —idd¬∆ ºasan Kh®n (Z. Khan). The fact that he was a second-generation student of Shawk®n¬, and his subsequent influence on Arab Salaf¬s, is apparent from NuÆm®n b. MaΩm‚d al-Al‚s¬, Jal®æ al-Æaynayn f¬ muΩ®kamat al-AΩmadayn (Beirut: D®r al-kutub al-Æilmiyya [reprint]), 48-50, and ÆAbd al-Razz®q al-B¬fl®r, ºilyat al-bashar f¬ t®r¬kh al-qarn al-th®lith Æashar, ed. MuΩammad Bahjat al-B¬fl®r (Damascus: Maflb‚Æ®t majmaÆ al-lugha al-Æarabiyya, 1961-3), vol. 2, 738-46. The influence of Qannawj¬ on later Arab Salafis is also noted in D. Commins, Islamic Reform: Politics and Social Change in Late Ottoman Syria (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 24-5.ils262-el-rouayheb 230 02-06-2004, 16:32

sunni muslim scholars 231Qannawj¬’s view of kal®m was not much more positive: The eminent scholar MuΩammad b. al-Waz¬r [d. 840/1436] has written a work entitled The superiority of the way of the Quræ®n to the way of the Greeks and a work entitled The Decisive Proof in which he has replied to the theologians. He has shown that all the issues dealt with by them can be established from the Quræ®n and the sunna, and that there is no need for the principles of theology. These two works are priceless.55Qannawj¬’s attitude to logic and kal®m seems to have been widely,if not invariably, shared by the Salafis.56 It was a far cry from thephilosophically sophisticated approach of prominent Sunn¬ theologiansand logicians of the period between the twelfth and the nineteenthcentury, such as Fakhr al-D¬n al-R®z¬ (d. 606/1209), SaÆd al-D¬n al-Taft®z®n¬ (d. 792/1390), al-Sayyid al-Shar¬f al-Jurj®n¬ (d. 816/1413),MuΩammad b. Y‚suf al-San‚s¬ (d. 895/1490), Jal®l al-D¬n al-Daw®n¬(d. 907/1501), ÆAbd al-ºak¬m al-Siy®lk‚t¬ (d. 1067/1657), and al-ºasan al-Y‚s¬ (d. 1102/1691).57 By the middle of the twentieth century, the Salaf¬ and Wahh®b¬movements were so influential that they could hardly be called an“undercurrent.” The “decisive progress” in the opposition to the studyof logic seems to have come about, not in the thirteenth and fourteenthcenturies, as Goldziher suggested, but during the second half of the 55 Qannawj¬, Abjad al-Æul‚m, vol. 2, 441. The Yemeni scholar MuΩammad b.al-Waz¬r was one of the major influences on the thought of Ibn al-Am¬r andShawk®n¬, see B. Haykal, Revival and Reform in Islam: The Legacy of MuΩammadal-Shawk®n¬ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 10-12, and the entryon him in MuΩammad al-Shawk®n¬, al-Badr al-fl®liÆ bi-maΩ®sin man baÆd al-qarnal-s®biÆ (Cairo: MaflbaÆat d®r al-saÆ®da, 1348/1929-30), vol. 2, 81-93. 56 It should be noted that Salafi attitudes towards logic have not yet beeninvestigated thoroughly. Given Qannawj¬’s personal influence, and the Salaf¬s’well-attested enthusiasm for Ibn Taymiyya and hostility to kal®m, one would expectthe cited assessment of logic to be typical of the movement. However, there mayhave been differences on this issue between various figures often described as“Salafi”. MuΩammad Abduh (d. 1905), who is sometimes—though ratherquestionably— considered a Salaf¬, shared the positive attitude of previous Rectorsof the Azhar towards logic, and wrote annotations to ÆUmar b. Sahl®n al-S®w¬, al-Ba◊®æir al-na◊¬riyya f¬ al-manfliq (printed in Cairo: al-MaflbaÆa al-kubr® al-am¬riyya,1898). 57 Ibn Khald‚n, writing in the late fourteenth century, noted (and regretted) thetendency of theologians after Ghaz®l¬ to mix theological speculation with logicand philosophy, to such an extent that “one discipline is no longer distinguishablefrom the other,” see F. Rosenthal (tr.), The Muqaddima (London: Routledge andKegan Paul, 1958), vol. 3, 53.ils262-el-rouayheb 231 02-06-2004, 16:32

232 khaled el-rouayheb nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth. Hostility amongst Sunn¬ scholars to rational theology and logic gained strength, not in the centuries of so-called “decline,” but in the period widely referred to as “the awakening” (al-nah¥ah).ils262-el-rouayheb 232 02-06-2004, 16:32