Mayon v. San Francisco 2018

Greg and Ramona Mayon3377 Deer Valley Road #278Antioch, CA 94531Phone [email protected] perU.S. FEDERAL COURT, 9th DISTRICT NORTHERN CALIFORNIAGreg and Ramona Mayon CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT Plaintiffs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for 1st + 4th + 5th + 8th + 9th + 14th v. AMENDMENT VIOLATIONSThe City and County of San Francisco, OF MARITAL PRIVACY,Mayor Ed Lee, and Does #1 - #50 PARENTAL PRIVACY, AND BODILY PRIVACY; Defendants RIGHT-TO-TRAVEL PENALIZED; CURFEW ON PROPERTY RIGHTS/ FREE SPEECH; and HOUSING DISCRIMINATION under 1964/1968 Civil Rights Act

TABLE OF CONTENTSJurisdiction and Venue.....................................................................................................pg. 8 Plaintiffs mount both a facial and an applied challenge to the constitutionality of SFPDcode 97 (enacted 4/1971, which criminalizes property rights after a curfew from 10 pm to6 am imposed on the specific group known as vehicle-dwellers or vehicular-homeless) andS.F.M.T.A.7.2.54 ($110 tickets in effect 7/15/13 'Oversize Vehicle Overnight ParkingRestrictions' on certain posted streets 12am to 6am; residents instigate the posting).Strict Scrutiny standard for examination of violation of a fundamental right...........pg. 9 With the passage of S.F.M.T.A. 7.2.54, the City-Defendant attempted to separate the long-married plaintiffs by offering only one answer to the “problem” of their presence in the City,i.e. after they would voluntarily give over their motorhome to a storage facility on TreasureIsland, the couple then would have been sent to separate, gender-specific homeless sheltersfor “stabilization beds” until at some future, unspecified time they would be reunited in ahousing unit provided by the City-Defendant. This so-called “solution” re. the vehicledwellers' upcoming sleeping provisions was openly discussed in an email from the Cityofficials to merchants and other businesses, with the “problem” of vehicle dwellers mentionedplainly. The plaintiffs left San Francisco July 2013 to protect their marriage. What choice hadthey? Further, in the years that plaintiffs did live in San Francisco (1997 to 2013), theyendured numerous post-10 pm S.F.P.D. raids for the purpose of ascertaining a misdemeanori.e. eating and sleeping in their vehicle, after curfew), where they were made to go outside sotheir motorhome (a “hybrid vehicle” that could be searched 24/7 per Carney v. California 471U.S. 386 (1985)), was entered for purpose of ascertaining their post-curfew illegal habitation.It is an acute substantive due process issue to make a man and his wife get out of their maritalbed in the middle of the night to stand on a sidewalk in their nightclothes, for any passer-by toobserve, ridicule or otherwise+ shame, all because of a misdemeanor. Maynard v. Hill, 125U.S. 190 (1888); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Skinner v. Oklahoma 316 U.S.535, 541 (1942); Griswold v. Connecticut (381 U.S. 479 (1965); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.1, 12 (1967); Roe v Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973); P.O.P.S. v. Gardner, 998 F2d 764 (9th Cir.1993); Lawerence v. Texas 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Obergefell v. Hodges 570 U.S. ___ (2015)Mayon v. San Francisco 2 Civil Rights Complaint

Statement of Case............................................................................................................pg. 15 Can government craft municipal codes, as a “custom, policy or practice”, to outlaw acertain mode of (otherwise legal) housing, and then to plainly, openly instruct their agenciesto make life conditions unbearable, in order to compel a certain group of citizens to choosebetween forced migration and unwelcome sedentarization? Can government advise,empower and finance one group of its citizens in creating a ghetto (a.k.a. “Safe Parking Lots”see beginning of EXHIBIT PP re. SF Plans 11.25.15) for another group within its borders?Introduction.....................................................................................................................pg. 21A. Plaintiff Ramona Mayon is an American-born Scottish TravellerB. Plaintiffs live in a vehicle due to Mrs. Mayon's ethnicityC. Plaintiffs have been vehicle-dwellers since 1992, by intentD. Plaintiffs arrived in San Francisco May 31, 1997 for their wedding in Golden Gate ParkE. Plaintiff Greg Mayon's serious and chronic health issues forced their long sojourn in SFF. Plaintiffs were made to leave San Francisco due to S.F.M.T.A. 7.2.54 on July 15, 2013G. Plaintiffs are prohibited from returning to Ocean Beach neighborhood they lived in 16 years, if they come to visit grandchildren in their motorhome (their desire to use it during visits is due to health issues that include severe fatigue)H. Plaintiff Ramona Mayon is the author of this complaintStatement of the Issues...................................................................................................pg. 24ISSUE: DO PRIVACY RIGHTS VARY BASED ON STATUS?Edwards v California 314 U.S. 160 (1941) rejected a law that “stigmatized by a State as indigents, paupers, or vagabonds to be relegated to an inferior class of citizenship.”This is exactly what has happened to the group labeled by government and media as vehicle-dwellers, or that conundrum of a status assignation, the vehicularly homeless. California v Carney 471 U.S. 386 (1985) states a motorhome has “most of the privacy characteristics of a house” - well, which ones, exactly?Mayon v. San Francisco 3 Civil Rights Complaint

Plaintiffs bring TWO privacy questions: pg. 25) A. Do the 9th & the 14th amendments shelter a nomadic woman's relationships with her husband, children and home to the same extent they do for the woman who lives in traditional, cement-based housing? “to marry, establish a home and bring up children” Meyer v Nebraska 262 U.S. 390 (1923) pg. 33) B. Wouldn't life-sustaining bodily functions, such as those criminalized in S.F.P.D. 97 (i.e. eating and sleeping) be sheltered in the zone of privacy created by the 9th amendment for other bodily functions? “The claim and exercise of a constitutional right cannot be converted into a crime” Miller v United States 230 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1956) CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION ARTICLE 1, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS SECTION 1. All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy. ISSUE: CURFEW ORDINANCES CONTENT-BASED, NOT CONTENT-NEUTRAL AND RESTRAIN PROPERTY RIGHTS …...............................................................pg. 37 “[i]n our country, hostile and discriminatory legislation by the state against persons of any class, sect, creed, and nation, in whatever form it may be expressed, is forbidden by the 14t h amendment.” Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan (D. Cal. 1879) 12 Fed. Cas. 252 [5 sawy. 552]Discriminatory intent plainly shown in the codicil stating the Park and RecreationDepartment may issue a permit to stay overnight in a vehicle for anyone it chooses, such asrock stars or entertainment/fund-raising situations.Mayon v. San Francisco 4 Civil Rights Complaint

ISSUE: CAN POLICE IGNORE THE RULES FOR NIGHTTIME ARREST BECAUSEMOTORHOMES ARE DEEMED AN ILLEGAL HOME IN A PUBLIC PLACE.......pg. 38 California Penal Code 840: An arrest for the commission of a felony may be made on any day and at any time of the day or night. An arrest for the commission of a misdemeanor or an infraction cannot be made between the hours of 10 o'clock p.m. of any day and 6 o'clock a.m. of the succeeding day, unless:(1) The arrest is made without a warrant pursuant to Section 836 or 837.(2) The arrest is made in a public place.(3) The arrest is made when the person is in custody pursuant to another lawful arrest.(4) The arrest is made pursuant to a warrant which, for good cause shown directs that it may be served at any time of the day or night. Title XIII, Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 41: specifies that all warrants must be executed before 10 pm, unless the signature of a magistrate has been previously obtained specific to that person to be arrested and it must be a serious crime.ISSUE: DO PROPERTY RIGHTS VANISH BECAUSE OWNER IS NOMADIC? …..pg. 43 “It cannot be doubted that among the civil rights intended to be protected from discriminatory state action by the 14th amendment are the rights to acquire, enjoy, own and dispose of property. Equality in the enjoyment of property rights was regarded by the framers of that amendment as an essential pre-condition to the realization of other basic civil rights and liberties which the amendment was intended to guarantee.” Buchanan v. Warley 245 U.S. 60, 245 U.S. 73 (1917)ISSUE: LOCATION OF MOTORHOME NEGATES ALL PRIVACY RIGHTS? .......pg. 48 From California v Carney 471 U.S. 386 (1985) dissent by Justice Steven's: “When a motorhome is parked in a location that is removed from the public highway, I believe society is prepared to recognize thatMayon v. San Francisco 5 Civil Rights Complaint

the expectations of privacy within are not unlike the expectation one has in a fixed dwelling.” For the purpose of a warrantless search, the motorhome is considered to be a legitimate dwelling only when parked on private property and attached to utilities (as the plaintiffs' motorhome currently is), but property rights and the right to privacy in intimate relationships and bodily functions have also been suspended in a publicly-situated motorhome, while a tent without a permit on BLM land United States v. Sandoval, 200 F.3d 659, 660-61 (9th Cir. 2000) and a motel room acquired under an alias United States v. Domenech, 623 F.3d 325 (6th Cir. 2010) do provide privacy rights for the occupants of those “temporary abodes”.ISSUE: WHAT MAKES A VEHICLE A HOME? …....................................................pg. 55 Continued from Justice Steven's dissent in California v Carney 471 U.S. 386 (1985) “Motorhomes, by their common use & construction, afford their owners a substantial and legitimate expectation of privacy when they dwell within....a breadth of ordinary everyday living. Photographs in the record indicate its height, length, and beam provided substantial living space inside: stuffed chairs surround a table, cupboards provide room for storage of personal effects, bunk beds provide sleeping space, and a refrigerator provides ample space for food and beverages. Moreover, curtains and large, opaque walls inhibit viewing the activities inside from the exterior of the vehicle.”ISSUE: PARENT-CHILD BOND DISREGARDED ON TWO SEPERATE LEGAL OCCASIONS WHILE USING HOUSING STATUS AS CAUSE …...............pg. 63 “If a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the parents and their children, without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children's best interest, I should have little doubt that the State would have intruded impermissibly on 'the private realm ofMayon v. San Francisco 6 Civil Rights Complaint

family life which the state cannot enter.'” Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977) (Justice Stewart concurring), cited in Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978).Facial Challenge #1 to S.F.P.D. 97: status assignation is the required discriminatory intent.Robinson v. California + Powell v. Texas are the foundation for status crimes beingunconstitutional...............................................................................................................pg. 75Facial Challenge #2 to S.F.P.D. 97: unconstitutionally vague......................................pg. 87Facial Challenge to S.F.M.T.A. 7.2.54 violation of the 14th amendment right of equalprotection to travel without burden of penalty................................................................pg. 94Argument ….................................................................................................................pg. 102Conclusion …................................................................................................................pg. 112Prayer …......................................................................................................................pg. 114Table of Authorities......................................................................................................pg. 115Exhibits Index...............................................................................................................pg. 119Certificate of Service to City-DefendantCertificate of ComplianceService to California Attorney GeneralMayon v. San Francisco 7 Civil Rights Complaint

JURISDICTION and VENUE1. This action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which protects rights violated by a “policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted or promulgated [or for] deprivations visited pursuant to a governmental custom.” Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978)2. Plaintiffs mount both a facial and an applied challenge to the constitutionality of SFPDcode 97 (enacted 4/1971, which criminalizes property rights after curfew imposed on aspecific group from 10 pm to 6am) and S.F.M.T.A.7.2.54 ($110 tickets in effect 7/15/13'Oversize Vehicle Overnight Parking Restrictions' on certain posted streets 12am to 6am).Further streets of San Francisco are being cordoned off to the plaintiffs' vehicle-home (after amidnight curfew no other group except vehicle-dwellers are subject to); now there is a newand official procedure firmly in place to get one's own neighborhood protected from thevehicle-dwellers. When a municipal law is being challenged in the State of California, theAttorney General must be notified. Service attached.3. Standing is assorted tickets on both ordinances (EXHIBIT A); plaintiffs understand that: “impact is not enough for equal protection as applied challenge; the legislature must have had discriminatory intent when enacting the law.” Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp 429 U.S. 252 (1977)4. Plaintiffs now live behind a gate on private property 45 miles away but venue isappropriate for the City and County of San Francisco because plaintiffs did reside therewhile the acts and omissions herein complained of did occur. The continued criminalizationof plaintiffs' innocent acts after a 10 pm curfew (S.F.P.D. 97) coupled with banishment(S.F.M.T.A. 7.2.54) from the coastal area previously enjoyed for sixteen years, continues tobe a barrier for the plaintiffs' return to visit their family and friends in San Francisco.Plaintiffs will always want to visit to their old beach neighborhood. By what authority is itMayon v. San Francisco 8 Civil Rights Complaint

not “their” neighborhood? According to the “real” residents, it's because they don't own orrent real estate. So how dare the plaintiffs assert it is “theirs”? By having lived there.Having their wedding night there. Having honeymooned there. Having intense memoriesthere. Memories from sixteen years of raising their children in that beach neighborhoodmake it theirs. Plaintiffs are outraged at the disrespect to their marriage, to their home,to their children, to the contribution they have made to the community. They took nothingaway by their presence. Plaintiffs vehemently want the right to return without fear, in theirmotorhome, to visit Ocean Beach and the Great Highway. Their son and grandson live there.Similar injury – and its accompanying anxiety – will be inflicted upon their return to thestretch of 24/7 Ocean Beach access parking along the forty (or so) blocks of the GreatHighway (banned in bald, belligerent, prima facie violation of the California Coastal Act perthe recent decisions by the Coastal Commissioners in Venice Beach and Santa Cruz beachneighborhoods). This case is about specifically wanting to park on the “green curb” in a citythat deems the plaintiffs unworthy of being allowed into. This a liberty issue. That makesthe inevitable appeal ripe into perpetuity. STRICT SCRUTINY STANDARD FOR THE EXAMINATION OF A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT'S VIOLATION5. Strict scrutiny is deserved here because the right to privacy is integral in any intimaterelationship, especially marriage. And marriage has to have the privacy only a home canprovide. Does the intimacy end because the home moves from leased land to a public curb?Even on a surface examination, no one is supposed to be okay with separating a marriedcouple because they are a bit different from everyone else. Marriage is one of the: “basic civil rights of man fundamental to our very existence and survival” Skinner v. Oklahoma 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) \"Rights to marry, have children and maintain relationship with children are fundamental rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and thus, strict scrutiny is required of any statutes that directly and substantially impair those rights.\" P.O.P.S. v. Gardner, 998 F2d 764 (9th Cir. 1993)Mayon v. San Francisco 9 Civil Rights Complaint

More precisely, from Griswold v. Connecticut (381 U.S. 479 (1965) an understanding that: “The language and history of the Ninth Amendment reveal that the Framers of the Constitution believed that there are additional fundamental rights, protected from governmental infringement, which exist alongside those fundamental rights specifically mentioned in the first eight constitutional amendments... To hold that a right so basic and fundamental and so deep–rooted in our society as the right of privacy in marriage may be infringed because that right is not guaranteed in so many words by the first eight amendments to the Constitution is to ignore the Ninth Amendment and to give it no effect whatsoever...We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights, older than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.\" (Id. At 486.)A lesson on privacy and the 9th amendment from Roe v. Wade: “The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy. In a line of decisions, however, going back perhaps as far as Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891), the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution. In varying contexts, the Court or individual Justices have, indeed, found at least the roots of that right in the First Amendment, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968), Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967), Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 484-485; in the Ninth Amendment, id. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring); or in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). These decisions make it clear that only personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,'Mayon v. San Francisco 10 Civil Rights Complaint

Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) are included in this guarantee of personal privacy. They also make it clear that the right has some extension to activities relating to marriage, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)” Roe v Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973)In Zablocki v Redhail 379 U.S. 184 (1964), the Court struck down a Wisconsin law thatrequired persons under obligations to pay support for the children of previous relationshipsto obtain permission of a court to marry again, saying: “Although Loving arose in the context of racial discrimination, prior and subsequent decisions of this Court confirm that the right to marry is of fundamental importance for all individuals. Long ago, in Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888), the Court characterized marriage as 'the most important relation in life,' (id., at 205), and as 'the foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be neither civilization nor progress,' id., at 211. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), the Court recognized that the right 'to marry, establish a home and bring up children' is a central part of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause, id., at 399 For example, last term in Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), we declared: 'While the outer limits of [the right of personal privacy] have not been marked by the Court, it is clear that among the decisions that an individual may make without unjustified government interference are personal decisions relating to marriage, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).”In more recent times, the mega-opinion about gay marriage Obergefell v. Hodges570 U.S. ___ (2015) reveals even more of that which is missing in the GRT (gypsy-Roma-Traveller) marriage: “The Constitution promises liberty to all within its reach, a liberty that includes certain specific rights that allow persons, within a lawful realm, to define and express their identity. The lifelong union of a man and a woman always has promised nobility and dignity to all persons, without regardMayon v. San Francisco 11 Civil Rights Complaint

to their station in life. Marriage is sacred to those who live by their religionsand offers unique fulfillment to those who find meaning in the secular realm.Its dynamic allows two people to find a life that could not be found alone, fora marriage becomes greater than just the two persons. Rising from the mostbasic human needs, marriage is essential to our most profound hopes andaspirations. The centrality of marriage to the human condition makes itunsurprising that the institution has existed for millennia and acrosscivilizations. Since the dawn of history, marriage has transformed strangersinto relatives, binding families and societies together. As the SupremeJudicial Court of Massachusetts has explained, because 'it fulfills yearningsfor security, safe haven, and connection that express our common humanity,civil marriage is an esteemed institution, and the decision whether and whomto marry is among life’s momentous acts of self-definition.' Goodridge, 440Mass., at 322, 798 N. E. 2d, at 955. In addition these liberties extend tocertain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, includingintimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs. See, e.g.,Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438, 453 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381U. S. 479, 484–486 (1965). Two Terms ago, in United States v. Windsor, 570U. S. ___ (2013), this Court invalidated DOMA to the extent it barred theFederal Government from treating same-sex marriages as valid even whenthey were lawful in the State where they were licensed. DOMA, the Courtheld, impermissibly disparaged those same-sex couples “who wanted toaffirm their commitment to one another before their children, their family,their friends, and their community.” Further in the opinion “Marriageresponds to the universal fear that a lonely person might call out only tofind no one there. It offers the hope of companionship and understandingand assurance that while both still live there will be someone to care forthe other.” Windsor, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 14) The Court has recognizedthese connections by describing the varied rights as a unified whole: “[T]heright to ‘marry, establish a home and bring up children’ is a central part of theliberty protected by the Due Process Clause.” Zablocki, 434 U. S., at 384 CiteMayon v. San Francisco 12 Civil Rights Complaint

as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) Opinion of the Court (quoting Meyer, supra, at399). Under the laws of the several States, some of marriage’s protections forchildren and families are material. But marriage also confers more profoundbenefits. By giving recognition and legal structure to their parents’relationship, marriage allows children “to understand the integrity andcloseness of their own family and its concord with other families in theircommunity and in their daily lives.” Windsor, supra, at___ (slip op., at 23).Marriage also affords the permanency and stability important to children’sbest interests. (See Brief for Scholars of the Constitutional Rights ofChildren as Amici Curiae 22–27). Without the recognition, stability, andpredictability marriage offers, their children suffer the stigma of knowingtheir families are somehow lesser. They also suffer the significant materialcosts of being raised by unmarried parents, relegated through no fault of theirown to a more difficult and uncertain family life. The marriage laws atissue here thus harm and humiliate the children of same-sex couples. SeeWindsor, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 23). Loving did not ask about a “right tointerracial marriage”; Turner did not ask about a “right of inmates to marry”;and Zablocki did not ask about a “right of fathers with unpaid child supportduties to marry.” Rather, each case inquired about the right to marry inits comprehensive sense, asking if there was a sufficient justification forexcluding the relevant class from the right. See also Glucksberg, 521 U. S.,at 752–773 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 789–792 (BREYER,J., concurring in judgments). No union is more profound than marriage, forit embodies the highest ideals of love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family.In forming a marital union, two people become something greater than oncethey were... (T)hey (same-sex couples) seek to find its fulfillment forthemselves. Their hope is not to be condemned to live in loneliness, excludedfrom one of civilization’s oldest institutions. They ask for equal dignity in theeyes of the law. The Constitution grants them that right.” Obergefell v. Hodges 570 U.S. ___ (2015)Mayon v. San Francisco 13 Civil Rights Complaint

6. A gypsyTraveller's marriage matters just as much a gay marriage does to the peopleinside it.(Laws making same-sex intimacy a crime) “demea[n] the lives of homosexualpersons” and that the Constitution protected “people from unwarrantedgovernment intrusions into a dwelling or other private places”, as well, “anautonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, andcertain intimate conduct.” Lawerence v. Texas 539 U.S. 558 (2003)Under the Supreme Court’s equal protection doctrine, laws burdening fundamental rights aresubject to strict scrutiny. For a statute to survive strict scrutiny analysis, the proponent of thelaw must demonstrate that: “the classification is necessary to ‘serve a compelling state interest’ and that the ordinance is necessary to serve the stated evidence.” United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966)Strict scrutiny is given to laws that discriminate against a suspect class, especially whenfundamental rights are being criminalized, as in S.F.P.D. 97 “Suspect status has only been given to classifications based on race, national origin and alienage and quasi-suspect status only applies to gender and illegitimacy classifications. The traditional factors used to determine the suspectness of a classification are whether the classified shares an ‘unalterable trait’, whether it has a tradition of political powerlessness and whether it suffers from a stigma of inferiority caused by a history of discrimination.” Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center 473 U.S. 432, 430 (1982)“For a population to be a suspect class, a population must be ‘saddledwith … disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequaltreatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as tocommand extraordinary protection from the majoritarian politicalprocess.’ ” San Antonio ISD. v. Rodriquez 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)Mayon v. San Francisco 14 Civil Rights Complaint

STATEMENT OF CASE7. Plaintiffs come humbly before this honorable court to ask a bare and deceptively simplequestion: can government craft municipal codes, as a “custom, policy or practice”, to outlawa certain mode of (otherwise legal) housing, and then to plainly, openly instruct theiragencies to make life conditions unbearable, in order to compel them to choose betweenforced migration and unwelcome sedentarization? A municipality creating a ghetto, such asthe aforementioned “Safe Parking Lots”, banishment to unhealthy industrial zones, and ofcourse, as in San Francisco, the outright outlawing the unpopular group, is not allowed under Title 18 U.S. Code § 1091 which deals with systemic, ethnic cleansing, even when it doesn't reach murderous proportions, states: (a) (4) subjects the group to conditions of life that are intended to cause the physical destruction of the group in whole or in part.8. This is a case dealing with ethnic nomads, known as GRT (gypsy-Roma-Traveller)which is how the group is labeled by NGOs and European political parties; the group is alsocalled gypsyTravellers. The term 'gypsy' is generally perceived as derogatory when used byoutsiders to the group, but many younger GRT call themselves 'gypsy', much as African-American youth use the unacceptable N-word about themselves and their friends. In general,GRT is the more acceptable label. However, it should be noted that there are two distinctethnic groups, with the Roma (with a sub-group within the Roma called the Sinti) hailingfrom northern India while the Irish and Scottish Travellers are of Celtic origin. Thus, a gypsycan be an Irish or Scottish Traveller, a Roma or a Sinti, but a Roma or a Sinti can never be aTraveller or vice versa. For a scholarly example, there is a recognized ethnic type called anEnglish gypsy, who is specifically one of Roma descent whose ancestors settled (andsurvived settling) in Great Britain and they are known as Romanichal. Other sub-groupsexist within the Travellers also. Generally, the two groups don't associate; each tends toblame the other group on the settled majority's disdain for all GRT. Now to the sole reasonthat the majority dislikes the group for what is its “unalterable trait”: i.e. a distinct, historical,worldwide preference to living in oversized vehicles, instead of traditional housing. That'show a gypsy is defined by outsiders: they live on wheels. It's what they do.Mayon v. San Francisco 15 Civil Rights Complaint

9. This case would seem, to the casual reader, to be about homeless people's right to existin the public space. It has nothing whatsoever to do with homelessness, except to show howthe group has been labeled homeless for the purpose of exclusion. Plaintiff Ramona Mayonis an ethnic nomad, and stands this day on both the 1964 and 1968 Civil Rights Acts that sayher home and the relationships sheltered in it are as valid as anyone else's. Human dignity,self-respect and intimate bonds are irreparably harmed when an intact GRT family – notablevehicle-dwellers for over two decades – are informed that they must leave the Ocean Beachneighborhood where they have lived peaceably for 16 years, raising five children there sinceMay 31, 1997, banished by a parking ordinance because of WHAT they are: fiercely, proudly,and with intent, permanently nomadic. Plaintiff Ramona Mayon is simply a wife, a mother,a homemaker who, with the support of her non-GRT husband, has set out to draw a line inthe sand against society's unabashed hatred of nomadic people. Her people. A people whohave, for some strange, unfathomable reason, forever accepted their status as “other”,meekly agreeing that they (and their children) must live as 2nd class citizens who, along withbeing banished from certain areas, also become criminals after a curfew, subject toextrajudicial property seizures, middle-of-the-night police raids, the possible loss of theirchildren and the threat of a six-month jail sentence and/or fines if they feed or rest theirbodies within the confines of legally-possessed property, albeit sitting on a public road.10. One of the most praised opinions in the Supreme Court’s history is an 1883 dissent byJustice John Marshall Harlan in which he closed with this famous passage: “Today it is the colored race which is denied by corporations and individuals … rights fundamental in their freedom and citizenship. At some future time, it may be that some other race will fall under the ban of race discrimination. If the constitutional amendments be enforced according to the intent with which … they were adopted, there cannot be, in this republic, any class of human beings in practical subjection to another class.” Civil Rights Cases 109 U.S. 3 (1883) The most vile ruling in the history of this country was a mere twenty-six years earlier, the Dred Scott decision, in which the Court proclaimed that the black American had absolutely no expectation of the rights enjoyed by white men, including:Mayon v. San Francisco 16 Civil Rights Complaint

“... the right to enter any other State whenever they pleased, singly or incompanies, without pass or a passport, and without obstruction, to sojourn thereas long as they pleased, to go where they pleased at every hour of the day or nightwithout molestation...” Scott v. Sandford 60 U.S. 393 (1857)11. This case pins its hope on those long-ago words that show the full citizen can moveabout without fear or impediment, with all his or her fundamental rights intact. Plaintiffs seekrecognition that they too – in spite of their GRT ways and traditions - also have the right to“go wherever they please at every hour of the day or night without molestation” because itplainly states here that these anti-GRT laws are unconstitutional when the Court struck downa California state law criminalizing import of the indigent citizen, Justice Douglas (in hisconcurrence with the majority) stated:“It would also introduce a caste system utterly incompatible with the spirit ofour system of government. It would permit those who were stigmatized by aState as indigents, paupers, or vagabonds to be relegated to an inferior class ofcitizenship.” Edwards v. California 314 U.S. 160 (1941)12. In truth, a caste for the nomadic was already present when those words were penned,and continues to this current millennium, with the exact same intent and an equally plainbrutality. The ordinances that plaintiffs are challenging (S.F.P.D. 97 and S.F.M.T.A. 7.2.54)are NOT about mild police pressure to move along now or a few streets being closed to theplaintiffs' over-sized vehicle-home for six hours every night after midnight. They are aboutapartheid. Plaintiffs are challenging the automatic assumption that it is a legitimate use ofpolice authority because of the vehicle-dwellers' perceived status of (assigned) criminality.13. This argument has already been quite firmly settled in the 19th century. It's staring theCity-Defendant (and all similarly-inclined municipalities) in the face. In 1777, the sixthsentence of the Articles of Confederation plainly denies the rights of the nomadic citizen insociety:Mayon v. San Francisco 17 Civil Rights Complaint

“...the free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States.”Pretty clear what that means. The nomadic had been singled out for extra scrutiny and thus,had no expectation of civil rights, any more than a Negro slave or an Indian condemned tostagnant reservation life. However, by 1868, the Constitution's Amendment XIV, Section 1,Clause 2, stated: “The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”Society's response to the vagabond being welcomed into citizenship were the infamous'Tramp Acts' of the 19th and 20th centuries, which are still with us, both in spirit and word oflaw. Now it's called “illegal camping”. There can be no laws that are constitutional thatintentionally make “life conditions impossible” for the plaintiffs. That's what taking out theword “vagabond” meant 148 years ago. It still stands as a guidepost for modern man as hegrapples with the nomadic in his community. There is no “illegal camping” going on inmotorhomes. Only life. And life can't be criminalized. That is the elephant in the room, thesubstantive due process problem and it doesn't go away just because it is ignored. Beingignored is no longer an option.14. On July 15, 2013 plaintiffs were summarily deported by the City because of what theyare: vehicle-dwellers. Because of a municipally-assigned status, the plaintiffs had to choosebetween staying in their marriage bed or remaining in San Francisco, but sleeping apart. Nowthree years later, continuing to live in their Gulfstream motorhome but renting a private, gatedlocation, plaintiffs conclude that they desire to return, occasionally, in their motorhome to theCity. But should they, even for one night, they face the same treatment they suffered for manyyears, per the City's “custom, policy or practice” of driving out vehicle-dwellers. All anxietyand stress will return, so of course, they stay away except for the most essential events. Andisn't that exactly what the Defendant's goal was all along?Mayon v. San Francisco 18 Civil Rights Complaint

15. EXHIBIT B is plaintiffs' letter to the California Coastal Commission regarding therestrictions on beach parking to show how S.F.M.T.A. 7.2.54 did impact and will continue toimpact the plaintiffs whenever they begin again to visit San Francisco in their motorhome.Plaintiffs wrote of how late-night parking access specifically denied to Mr. Mayon (due to hishousing status) has harmed his health, because there was a purpose for which he used thebeach almost-nightly. Like many people who suffer from liver failure (as his extensivemedical records and receipt of SSI establish in EXHIBIT C), Mr. Mayon has an upside-downsleep pattern that is a secondary symptom of baseline hepatic encephalopathy. To preventdeclining even further, he and his wife would frequently walk the sand dunes in the veryearly morning hours. They were able to do this because they would park their RV along theGreat Highway's 40+ blocks of “green curb” parking. “Green curb” is a term used by cityplanners, referring to parking on streets that have no houses, but rather a park or a mediancovered with landscaping; this is an important point: nobody's house is being parking directlyin front of; there are literally miles of “green curb” parking on the Great Highway, LincolnAvenue and Fulton Street that were banned by S.F.M.T.A. 7.2.54. Regular beach parkingcloses 10 pm to 5 am. This has been an essential element for Mr. Mayon’s health in that hehas had access to the beach. Years of walking on the beach has helped him by keepingdepression at bay, sleep and eat better, and mostly enabled him to keep his bone mass up.This is the reason people are supposed to have access to their national treasure of the seashoreand woods and mountains. This is the same argument that the California CoastalCommission had already Venice Beach residents (this was the foundation to the cause ofaction in the Desertrain decision in 2014). The California Coastal Commission sided withthe vehicle-dwellers.16. Plaintiff Greg Mayon has advanced, chronic liver disease and back problems from anassault in 1999 that make riding public transit painful and debilitating. He attends the samepublic health center since 1998; plaintiffs point out that they were living in San Francisco inorder for Mr. Mayon to get treatment but once forced to leave the City, getting the samehealth care with the same doctor involves hardship and extensive travel (three hours one wayusing three different buses/train for a total of six hours round-trip). This is a direct (andongoing) consequence of the implementation of S.F.M.T.A. 7.2.54. Often the doctor visits areMayon v. San Francisco 19 Civil Rights Complaint

on days back-to-back or require all-day treatment. There are a minimum of one visita month, sometimes two or three (EXHIBIT D shows ticket stubs and appointment notices).Plaintiffs should, as a matter of liberty, be able to drive their legally-licensed and insuredmotorhome into the City, park it wherever, while they go about their day. After treatment, labwork and doctor visits, plaintiff Greg Mayon would then be able to go to his motorhome, rest,then if necessary, go back for further testing, or return to Antioch the next morning. Becauseit's a hundred-mile round-trip, it is reasonable to want to spend the night in the City.Furthermore, plaintiffs foresee wanting to use the motorhome, in the event of anotherhospitalization for plaintiff Greg Mayon (most recent was Jan/Feb 2015 – see EXHIBIT C),in order for his wife to be nearby and continue to support him.17. From Jan 6-9, 2016, plaintiffs desired to go into the City with their motorhome and parkit on the Great Highway, so Plaintiff Ramona Mayon (a trained midwife) could attend andassist the birth of the new grandchild, Josiah, born Jan 8, 2016. Instead, all she could do wasdrive in for a short visit. Another example (March 10, 2016), plaintiffs' daughter & grandsoncame from out-of-town, and plaintiff Mrs. Mayon was asked to watch the child while hismother attended to business. After the hour-and-half ride on public transit into the City, sheand the toddler wandered around the City, riding buses in the rain for three hours. Howpractical it would have been to drive the motorhome to the City to care for the child. PlaintiffGreg Mayon could have enjoyed the time, also. But for the plaintiffs to drive the motorhomeinto the City is to be subjected to a curfew that no one else has, except vehicle-dwellers.Mayon v. San Francisco 20 Civil Rights Complaint

INTRODUCTION18. Plaintiff Ramona Mayon (née Robertson) is an American-born Scottish Traveller,raised in Europe, who was made conscious of her ethnic background by her father, who is inthe oil business. Those ragged urchins in horse-drawn vardos, camping on the side of abarren Scottish road could have been her, she was oft told as a young child, had not a braveTraveller ancestor made it across the Atlantic in one piece. She traveled extensively frombirth through her formative years (seventeen countries by the time she was 17) and her self-identity was that of an expatriate and a Scottish Traveller. She has ALWAYS traveled as alifestyle choice. In 1977, she began a disastrous first marriage of seven years spenttraveling constantly from the coastal U.S. to Mexico and South America, racing boats. In1985, she returned to the United States permanently, and attempted to live in a (mostly)settled manner, but by 1992, with intent, she began to express her ethnic heritage by livingin the manner of her forebearers: nomadic (i.e. without a point-of-destination). The 1993marriage to plaintiff Greg Mayon (now almost 23 years long) was conditional upon himjoining her nomadic lifestyle. Mrs. Mayon consciously chose to raise her five offspring in amanner so they too would appreciate the positive, resilient aspects of their ancestry, butinstead...the reality (and the collateral damage) of the City's openly-held policy to outlawher lifestyle choice (based on her heritage) as well as banish her traditional GRT home frombig swathes of the City has crushed that naive dream and directly caused her children todislike, disdain and distance themselves from their heritage (and their mother). Make kidsfeel shame all the time, for sure that's how they will feel as adults. It's not the child's fault.Responsibility belongs to the policy-makers and their agents who deny the basic right of thenomadic to exist in society.19. As stated, plaintiff Ramona Mayon's maiden name is Robertson, which is anestablished Traveller family name in Scotland. The fact that the plaintiff was born inLouisiana does not alter her heritage any more than it would a Japanese-American's.Traveller names include Stewart, MacPhee, Williamson, Higgins, Robertson, Reid,Townsley, Whyte, Johnston, Macgregor, McAllister, McDonald and Kelbie. (source http://www.arts.gla.ac.uk/STELLA/STARN/crit/langtrav.htm)Mayon v. San Francisco 21 Civil Rights Complaint

20. From the Scottish government website: “Gypsy/Travellers have been in Scotland formany centuries and still retain their own cultures and customs. Historically,Gypsy/Travellers were known to have strong oral traditions of storytelling and music, andthey were crucial in taking Scots ballads from one area to another. Their diverse history isreflected in the ‘Cant’: a language used by Gypsy/Travellers, along with English, whichincludes Romani, Scots and Gaelic words. In Scotland today, some Gypsy/Travellers stilltravel year round. Others have a permanent base on a site or in housing, but may travel forpart of the year. Gaining access to health, education and social services, as well asemployment, can be difficult when traveling. The term 'Gypsy/Travellers' refers to distinctgroups – such as Romany Gypsies, Scottish and Irish Travellers – who regard the travelinglifestyle as being part of their ethnic identity. There are also other types of Traveller, such asOccupational Travellers, Show People and New Age Travellers, distinct groups who do notnecessarily regard themselves as Gypsy/Travellers. The Scottish Government recognizesGypsy/Travellers as an ethnic group in its work and encourages others to do likewise.The Equality Act 2010 provides the legislative framework which protects people (such asGypsy/Travellers) who are recognized as a distinct ethnic group from being discriminatedagainst on the grounds of ethnicity. This follows an Employment Tribunal ruling in 2008 inthe case of K. MacLennan vs Gypsy Traveller Education and Information Project, whichconcluded that: “Scottish Gypsy/Travellers are a group which can be defined by reference to their ethnic origins and can therefore be afforded legal protection under the Race Relations Act.” (http://www.gov.scot/Topics/People/Equality/gypsiestravellers)As early as 1573, Gypsies and Travellers in Scotland were ordered to leave the country orsettle down. In 1609, as with its neighbor England, the Scottish parliament passed an actagainst Romani groups known as the “Act against the Egyptians”; that made it lawful tocondemn, detain and execute Gypsies on proof solely if they are known or reputed to beRomanies on regards to their ethnic origins. In 1715, shipping records list “Ten Gypsies inScotland are recorded deported to Virginia in the Americas”. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scottish_Gypsy_and_Traveller_groups)Mayon v. San Francisco 22 Civil Rights Complaint

21. Nomadic DNA is not visible as is an African-American’s skin colour or an Orientalperson’s eye shape. Yet it is what sets them apart from other groups. Not all characteristicsare apparent in the physical body. For an example, the only common characteristic of thehomosexual is his or her erotic impulse for their own sex. This is now considered an'unalterable trait'. For the GRT community, that single common shared characteristic, theone 'unalterable trait' is to live on wheels, to be mobile by intent, and not out of hardship,not some misplaced adventure fantasy, not a sabbatical from life's responsibilities, but rathera driven, inescapable need to remain untethered to a plot of land or any specific locale. Itspeaks to an inherent trait when the group, as a whole, through the ages, has continued to“wander” in spite of belonging to a group that carries a monumental stigma, enduringdraconian laws that demanded their children be given up to the authorities, that theirproperty be seized on sight, as well as enslavement, mild to severe mutilations, even deathwithout consequence to the murderer, since 1383. GRT live, by choice and by heritage, in“over-size vehicles”. It is how they are recognized all over the world because above all,their choice of housing-on-wheels is how they define themselves.22. Plaintiff Ramona Mayon has self-published two books about GRT human rights. Thefirst book is Nomadic Proud, a collection of essays for an intimate portrayal of what it waslike for her (then) young GRT family to live under the hate-filled eye of their settledneighbors. It is available on Amazon, as well as her websites. Her second manuscript is a(free) downloadable eBook, nearly 2,000 pages long and only @ www.nomadicproud.comtitled My Big Fat Book of GRT Lies, Hate & Bigotry (its title is a play on the wildly popular,outlandish Traveller wedding TV reality show). It is a collection of over half-a-millionwords about how (modern) people feel about the nomadic in their part of the world(juxtaposed against the plaintiff's quips about hate and history and arranged geographically).Because the media pieces (from which the mostly hate-filled comments were culled) haveinformation pertinent to the “policy, custom and practice” in the prosecution of the GRT,and include open forums of comments (97% hate-filled), plaintiff Mrs. Mayon utilized thesearticles under the Fair Use clause of the Copyright Act, intending to educate. Thismanuscript begins with a footnote found in the Oxford Study Bible (pg. 14; OxfordUniversity Press):Mayon v. San Francisco 23 Civil Rights Complaint

“The first offspring, Cain and Abel, may personify a culture conflict between the settled farmer and the semi-nomadic shepherd.” (Genesis 4:1-26)This must be the first entry to the compilation since it is such a stunning theory about thefirst murder had to start off a compilation of GRT hate speech. There is violence beingpromoted in public forums, and it is because municipalities pass laws that encourage thosewho live in houses to feel that those who live in vehicles are potential criminals, intendingthem harm. “Othered” is the correct sociological term for this phenomenon. “A minority plaintiff can rely on the equal protection clause when denied equal treatment or equal status because of his historically disadvantaged position in society and denial of treatment occurs with similar situated individuals are treated differently without substantial reason.” Skinner v. Oklahoma 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1941) STATEMENT OF ISSUES23. Motorhomes are legally sold all across this country, as instant, furnished homes – withthe added advantage of mobility – in a huge variety of styles. It is a well-known, fairlyprevalent lifestyle choice of many American citizens, including rock stars on tour andpresidential candidates out stumping for the vote. It is an obvious 1st amendment right tochoose to live in one. The focus here is NOT whether this type of vehicle can be considereda home. That question has already been answered by the Court in California v. Carney: “The California Supreme Court correctly characterized this vehicle (a Dodge Midas mini-motorhome) as a 'hybrid' which combines 'the mobility attribute of an automobile……with most of the privacy characteristics of a house'. The hybrid nature of the motorhome puts it at the crossroads between the privacy interests that generally forbid warrantless invasions of the home Payton v New York 445 U.S. 57 585-590 (1980) and the law enforcement interests that support the exception for warrantless searches of automobilesMayon v. San Francisco 24 Civil Rights Complaint

based on probable cause. United States v Russ 456 U.S. 798, 806, 820 (1982) [California v. Carney 471 U.S. 386 (1985)]While the final ruling was that a motorhome was a movable vehicle, subject to warrantlesssearch, the Court did acknowledge some privacy rights exist for the nomadic. But whichones? For plaintiffs, there are two privacy questions at hand. PRIVACY OF INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS24. The first: does the 9th and the 14th amendment shelter a nomadic woman's relationshipsto the same extent it does for the woman who lives in traditional, cement-based housing?Plaintiff Mrs. Mayon's fundamental right to privacy in her most intimate relationships wouldseem to be guaranteed “to marry, establish a home and bring up children.” Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)25. Consider in 1973, the Court ruled that obscene films being watched in a public theaterare without the shelter of the Constitution, but they laid out the perimeters of what does: “The protection afforded by Stanley v. Georgia 394 U.S. 557, 89 S. Ct. 1243. 22 L. Ed. 2D 542 (1969) is restricted to a place, the home. In contrast, the constitutionally-protected privacy of family, marriage, motherhood, procreation, and child-bearing is not just concerned with a particular place but a protected, intimate relationship. Such protected privacy extends to the doctor's office, the hospital, the hotel room, or as otherwise required to safeguard the intimacy involved.” Paris Adult Theater I v. Salton 415 U.S. 49, 66n 13 (1973)26. “Establish a home... ” A marriage is not the time spent together. People don't getmarried to spend time together. They don't have to get married to do that. That is calledfriendship. A marriage centers around the creation of a home together. It is the primary taskMayon v. San Francisco 25 Civil Rights Complaint

that continues throughout the marriage, while a divorce is primarily about the fair andequitable division of the marital home. Evidence lies within social culture's worldwide andhistorical ritual of bridal showers with home-oriented gifts given to honour the about-to-be-married couple. Again, at the wedding, gifts for the home are given, or large cash giftstowards purchasing the first home. The last third of every bridal magazine is devoted tofurniture, china and small appliances. Anniversary gifts are home-oriented. Guests toWedding Vow Renewal ceremonies also bring gifts for the home. The central, all-consumingand on-going task of a marriage is to build and sustain a home. It's not really even necessaryto have children or pets to fill it. The importance of the creation of the newly-mintedcouple's home is even ritualized within the wedding vows: “to have and to hold”.Without a home, where exactly do you do this?27. It is from the Harvard Law Review Dec 15, 1890 Vol. IV No. 5 The Right of Privacy,written by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, widely regarded as the first publication inthe United States to advocate a right to privacy, articulating that right primarily as a “rightto be let alone”, we learn: “That the individual shall have full protection in person and in property is a principle as old as the common law; but it has been found necessary from time to time to define anew the exact nature and extent of such protection. Political, social, and economic changes entail the recognition of new rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the new demands of society. Thus, in very early times, the law gave a remedy only for physical interference with life and property, for trespasses vi et armis. Then the 'right to life' served only to protect the subject from battery in its various forms; liberty meant freedom from actual restraint; and the right to property secured to the individual his lands and his cattle. Later, there came a recognition of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and his intellect. Gradually the scope of these legal rights broadened; and now the right to life has come to mean the right to enjoy life—the right to be let alone; the right to liberty secures theMayon v. San Francisco 26 Civil Rights Complaint

exercise of extensive civil privileges; and the term 'property' has grown to comprise every form of possession – intangible, as well as tangible.”28. Plaintiffs assert that their right to the privacy of their physical marriage bed is a tangibleproperty right, abused by S.F.P.D. 97, manifesting in post-10 pm police raids and awarrantless search for a misdemeanor instead of the required felony; while an intangibleprivacy right was abused by S.F.M.T.A. 7.2.54, i.e. the threat to the plaintiffs' right tocontinue to sleep together as man and wife, to care for one another in sickness and health.This privacy right was disrespected by the City's discussion (full details in paragraphs 30-33)in the public forum. No one is supposed to be okay with separating a married couple. Right?Right? Plaintiffs keep asking because it begs the question: is this a subtle form of genocide?There was no choice for the plaintiffs. They left the City altogether rather than “enter Cityprograms” and be forced to sleep apart even one single night. The desire to return to theCity to visit a newborn grandchild, to help with a toddler grandchild, while utilizing theirmotorhome for the comfort of a chronically-ill spouse is the impetus for this lawsuit.29. To find what is the exact thing the plaintiffs desire to protect, one must continue withthe famous essay, The Right to Privacy: “...solitude and privacy have become more essential to the individual... through invasions upon his privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress, far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury. It is our purpose to consider whether the existing law affords a principle which can properly be invoked to protect the privacy of the individual; and, if it does, what the nature and extent of such protection is... The common law secures to each individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others... A man records in a letter to his son, or in his diary, that he did not dine with his wife on a certain day. No one into whose hands those papers fall could publish them to the world, even if possession of the documents had been obtained rightfully; and the prohibition would not be confined to the publication of a copy of the letter itself, or of the diary entry; the restraintMayon v. San Francisco 27 Civil Rights Complaint

extends also to a publication of the contents. What is the thing which is protected? Surely, not the intellectual act of recording the fact that the husband did not dine with his wife, but that fact itself. It is not the intellectual product, but the domestic occurrence... These considerations lead to the conclusion that the protection afforded to thoughts, sentiments, and emotions, expressed through the medium of writing or of the arts, so far as it consists in preventing publication, is merely an instance of the enforcement of the more general right of the individual to be let alone. It is like the right not be assaulted or beaten, the right not be imprisoned, the right not to be maliciously prosecuted, the right not to be defamed. In each of these rights, as indeed in all other rights recognized by the law, there inheres the quality of being owned or possessed – and (as that is the distinguishing attribute of property) there may some propriety in speaking of those rights as property... The design of the law must be to protect those persons with whose affairs the community has no legitimate concern, from being dragged into an undesirable and undesired publicity and to protect all persons, whatsoever; their position or station, from having matters which they may properly prefer to keep private, made public against their will. It is the unwarranted invasion of individual privacy which is reprehended, and to be, so far as possible, prevented. The distinction, however, noted in the above statement is obvious and fundamental. There are persons who may reasonably claim as a right, protection from the notoriety entailed by being made the victims of journalistic enterprise. There are others who, in varying degrees, have renounced the right to live their lives screened from public observation.”30. For all the disingenuous things the City-Defendant had to say about the newparking ordinance enacted July 15, 2013, not singling out those who live invehicles, it is a plainly-stated policy and the solitary solution offered, i.e.problem motorhome presents to the community is to store it at a facility onTreasure Island (at City cost) and move into a ghetto otherwise known as theMayon v. San Francisco 28 Civil Rights Complaint

homeless shelter system. The author of the email in EXHIBIT E is an assistant of the “Office of Supervisor Marcia Cohen”, co-sponser for S.F.M.T.A. 7.2.54.From: [email protected]: September 13, 2012 4:16:34 PM PDTSubject: Upcoming Legislation at Monday's Land Use HearingDear Merchants and Neighbors -We are writing because I believe that you would be interested in two items on thiscoming Monday's Board of Supervisors Land Use Committee Agenda, I have detailedthem below. It is always helpful for neighbors to attend and share public comment onthese items or send letters to the Committee members (Supervisors Cohen, Mar andWiener). Please let me know if you will be able to attend or send a letter or any writtentestimony as we can assist with getting them to the committee members. The meetingwill take place on Monday, September 17th at 1:00 in City Hall, Room 263 or you cansend written letters or testimony to the below email addresses: Carmen.Chu @sfgov.org Scott.Wiener @sfgov.org Malia.Cohen @sfqov.org Eric.L.Mar @sfgov.org Item 2. File No. 120142 [Ordinance amending the Transportation Code to imposenew large vehicle parking restrictions] For the last several years, residentialneighborhoods have seen an increase in oversized vehicles on their streets. Theneighborhoods most impacted have little or no parking regulations, so it is an attractivefree storage space for boats, recreational vehicles, trailers, panel trucks, constructionequipment and other large vehicles. We particularly see this problem along Evans Ave,Innes and Hunters Point Boulevard and near Progress Park. Long term storage ofoversized vehicles on residential streets creates a number of issues. These vehicles areoften magnets for illegal dumping, graffiti, blight, and criminal activity. The size ofthese vehicles also limits visibility for motorisi (sic) pedestrians and cyclists and makesparking difficult for the residents of the neighborhood. If passed this, legislation wouldapply to all oversized vehicles, which are defined as (any vehicle, trailer, watercraft,recreational vehicle, over 22 feet in length, 8 feet in height or 7 feet in width. Parkingof oversized vehicles will be prohibited on certain streets between the hours ofmidnight and 6:00am). We have heard some concerns that this legislation may beperceived as targeting those individuals or families who live on their vehicles and afterdiscussions between the Coalition on Homelessness and Supervisor Chu, weunderstand that many of the vericularly housed (sic) remain so because they arereluctant to participate in City programs for fear they will lose their vehicles. As aresult Supervisor Chu has been working with the office of HOPE to find a solution, andBevan Dufty has been able to negotiate an agreement at Treasure Island to storecampers and rvs while the owners enter City programs and begin the process forpermanent housing. We believe that this legislation would significantly improve theability of SFPD to quickly enforce overnight camping restrictions and limit the areas inMayon v. San Francisco 29 Civil Rights Complaint

our neighborhoods where these oversized vehicles can stay. – – – Andrea Bruss Officeof Supervisor Malia Cohen City Hall, Rm 24431. Additionally, the following statements by Supervisor Bevan Dufty found online re.the “new” Navigation Centers when compared to the shelter system which the only reality ofwhat happens to couples currently when they go into City programs support plaintiffs'assertion that in 2013 they would have been separated once they gave up their motorhome atthe City-Defendant's demand. Feb 2015 media article http://wn.ktvu.com/story/27947061/former-san- francisco-school-converted-to-homeless-support-center “'If you've got possessions, you really can't fit those possessions in a shelter,' said Bevan Dufty, Director of the Mayor's Office of Housing Opportunity, Partnership and Engagement. 'If you're a male or female or if you're a couple, you can't stay together in a shelter. If you have a dog and it's not a service animal, that dog is going to be crated and separated from you.' When it opens in March, guests and their pets can stay in bungalows for up to 10 days, using showers and laundry facilities and receiving treatment as case managers work to find them more permanent housing.”Plaintiffs were forced to leave the City July 2013, so prior to the opening of the new type ofshelter called the Navigation Center March 2015, the standard protocol was separation intoa “stabilization bed”. Even if these “Navigation Centers” had been available for theplaintiffs to be “sent” to, the couple would have been put into a dorm-style setting(i.e. former school bungalows) outfitted with single beds (not a queen-size like they share intheir motorhome). Age 64 and 56, after 23 years of marriage, to end up in a dorm full ofstrangers. The marital privacy is gone. And why? Dislike of the GRT. But it's also aviolation of the plaintiffs' zone of privacy to continue to parent their socially-active, teen-age son as he begins to see what is about to happen to his home. Where will the 17-year-oldboy spend his final year of school? In a homeless shelter with only his father, not hismother. Yet the City-Defendant constantly kept a discussion going about the “solution” ofsending of vehicle-dwellers into a homeless-shelter situation, who endured a publicdiscussion and setting forth an official plan that blithely strips away the marital privacy ofthis couple as well as their relationship with their (then) still-at-home son. This was a publicMayon v. San Francisco 30 Civil Rights Complaint

humiliation because every one in the plaintiffs' circle of friends and acquaintances could seethat the family was being made to leave the neighborhood. The child could see his familywas being driven away, and by a parking law! EXHIBIT F is the same official, SupervisorBevan Dufty, in the minutes (10.1.12 … 11.3.12 … 12.3.12 … 3.4.13) of the LocalHomeless Coordinating Board (LHCB) establishes that the only policy going forward forthose living in their vehicles is assimilation or banishment. In these minutes, Dufty andcompany discuss the procedure for addressing the impact issue. A Homeless OutreachTeam (i.e. HOT) was assigned responsibility for assisting the vehicle-dwellers move intoCity Programs.32. At no time were plaintiffs ever approached by the HOT team. They received aticket the night the signs went up. However, this is what a “City Program” would havemeant to the plaintiffs if they couldn't have moved: once they agreed that their home isto be put away (very much out-of-reach, since Treasure Island actually is an island withlimited bus service), then the next step in the City-Defendant's plan to assimilate theminto the community is to separate the family by putting them into a gender-specificshelter system, sending the husband (and their then-seventeen year-old, teen-age son) toone shelter and the wife alone to another. Social workers would be assigned. Quotasand paper to fill out. In “one to six months”, there will be a room or studio apartment“given” to them in one of the slum hotels or housing projects, like a reward forjumping through the myriad hoops of a social worker's quantifications. One-third oftheir income will go to pay for this sub-standard housing, if it were actually available.However, there is already a waiting list of 236 homeless families, at the time of theCity's implementation of S.F.M.T.A. 7.2.54. It is doubtful plaintiffs could havesurvived the trauma of a few weeks (if not months) of shuffling their basic belongingsback and forth, along the streets of the Tenderloin, to exchange their comfortable,marital abode that they had made together for the following type of housing describedin this paragraph from an article in Atlantic magazine's 'City Lab': Homelessness and the Impossiblitity of a Good Night's Sleep by Hanna Brooks Olsen published Aug 14, 2014. This is a quote that described by San Diego-based blogger and self-proclaimed chronic homeless man Kevin Barbiuex who writes under the pen name, The Homeless Guy: He states: “You check into in to aMayon v. San Francisco 31 Civil Rights Complaint

homeless shelter and hope for the best. After a long period of processing and standing in lines … you'll finally be assigned a bed. You'll find this bed is located in a large warehouse-type room with many other beds – more than likely they will be bunk beds, or army cots. You will be in a room with anywhere from 25 to 150 other homeless people, and not all of them will be ready to go to sleep. They will be talking, laughing or yelling, getting into fights (verbal and physical) making noises, the mentally-ill will be trying to wind down from their constant hallucinations. As is practiced in many shelters, you'll be required to undress, give your clothes over to shelter personnel to be placed in a closet, you'll have to wear hospital scrubs. You'll be given a thin blanket, regardless of the temperature, you may, or may not be issued a pillow … you'll be awakened, sometimes rudely, at 5 a.m. at most shelters. 5 a.m. every single morning.”33. Why would a man voluntarily give up up his own bed, with his legally-wed wife oftwenty-three years in it, for what can plainly be said to be an unpleasant, uncomfortable, andpotentially-dangerous environment full of possibly-deranged individuals and bed bugs?But equally, how could he sleep worrying about how his wife was dealing with her equally-rough environment? What if one of them got kicked out of shelter and had to wander thestreets until the other left their assigned shelter and they found one another? This is a tightly-knit couple that spends 100% of their time together. To be told to leave an area theyconsidered their home as much as any other citizen, after sixteen years, anybody would feelaffronted but to be made to do so for increased parking and general beautification of theneighborhood, begs the question WHY the plaintiffs must give up their marital intimacy, inorder to begin a lifestyle that involves them giving up their much beloved motorhome tospend most their time apart, big huge unknown portions of their days, every single day, eachof them outdoors no matter the weather, standing in separate lines for a solitary bed. Sincethe couple would then no longer sleeping together, now that their home-on-wheels is putaway from them in storage, the most sacred act of marriage can not be performed. No, notsex, but rather, a wife ministering to her ill husband in the middle-of-the-night, when the painis at its worse. Mr. Mayon’s doctor lists his wife as his full-time care-giver due to his healthissues (see earlier EXHIBIT C). Thus, for the plaintiffs particularly, marriage is a potentiallylife-saving “expression... of emotional support and public commitment.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987)Mayon v. San Francisco 32 Civil Rights Complaint

34. How exactly does she care for him in the middle-of-the-night if they are in “Cityprograms” and their real home in a warehouse on an island? Why do the plaintiffs have to beseparated, then punished with what is obviously a miserable existence in a shelter? And whyexactly is their home “illegal”? This GRT couple – and their unusual home – have the rightto privacy and equal protection as any other couple. Every other resident in San Francisco hassome kind of tenant laws protecting them from arbitrary landlord actions. The GRT recognizethat City has a vested interest in keeping the streets clear. Their only choice is depart or settleinto “real” housing. While that decision protected the marriage, it tore the fabric of theirrelationship with their son, who refused to depart the City, instead becoming a couch-surfer.35. From late 2012 to this date, no alternative to storing their home was put forth. Theonly way the plaintiffs could stay married was to leave town. That it was publicly discussedby the whole City where they would sleep is just too insulting to be borne silently. Do theGRT have a right to have their marital sleeping arrangements kept private, intact and un-invaded by Government action and public discussion? Do they have a right to “establish ahome”? Do the plaintiffs have a valid expectation that no matter where they reside inAmerica, they will be able to maintain their marriage and be confident that no officialentity can tear that legal union asunder, even for a short period, even for a night?EXHIBIT G is a compilation of online media pieces about the laws against living in avehicle in various cities and counties, throughout the 9th District (as found September 2016in a casual search the Internet), showing just how much trouble it is for the plaintiffs andother GRT to be secure. At every turn, if offered “help”, it is based on the condition thatthey will seek “case management” in order to obtain permanent housing, which carries theobvious implication that to be nomadic or to be a vehicle-dweller is wrong. PRIVACY OF BODILY FUNCTIONS36. The second privacy question plaintiffs bring: wouldn't life-sustaining bodily functions,such as those criminalized in S.F.P.D. 97 (i.e. eating and sleeping) be sheltered in the zone ofprivacy created by the 9th amendment for other bodily functions?Mayon v. San Francisco 33 Civil Rights Complaint

“Legitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.” Rakas v. Illinois 439 U.S. 128 (1978)This is further supported per: “The claim and exercise of a constitutional right cannot be converted into a crime.” Miller v. United States, 230 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1956)37. Plaintiffs are nomadic citizens, and yes, they are vehicle-dwellers, but they are citizensnonetheless. They have equal expectations of liberty as those who live in traditional,cement-based housing. All humanity must eat and sleep. What is innocent for some,must be innocent for all. “[S]leep is a psychological need, not an option for humans. It is common knowledge that loss of sleep produces a host of physical and mental problems (mood irritability, energy drain, low motivation, slow reaction time, inability to concentrate and process information.” In re. Eichorn, 69 Cal. App 4th 382, 389-390 “It should be a foregone conclusion that maintaining human life requires certain acts, among them being the consuming of nourishment, breathing and sleeping. They have no place to go other than the public lands they live on. In other words, they must be in public. And it is also clear that they must sleep. Although sleeping is an act rather than a status, the status of being could clearly not be criminalized under Robinson. Because being does not exist without sleeping, criminalizing the latter necessarily punishes the homeless for their status as homeless, a status forcing them to be in public. The Court concludes that it is clear, then, that the sleeping in public ordinance as applied against the homeless is unconstitutional.” Johnson v. City of Dallas N.D.Tex. 860 F.Supp. 344, 350 (1994)38. Under international law, sleep deprivation is considered torture. How can it be a crimeto attempt to stay alive? All humans equally must do so. After oxygen and water, rest andMayon v. San Francisco 34 Civil Rights Complaint

food are the building blocks of life itself. To have a private place (i.e. a home) to engage inthose life-sustaining activities is a basic human right, set forth in the Universal Declarationof Human Rights, regardless of who a person is (underlined points are plaintiffs' emphasis):Article 2 Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration,without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or otheropinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.Article 5 No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatmentor punishment.Article 12 No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, homeor correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone hasthe right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.Article 13 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the bordersof each State.Article 17 1. Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others. 2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.Article 25 1. Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health andwell-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical careand necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment,sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyondhis control.Mayon v. San Francisco 35 Civil Rights Complaint

2. Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. Allchildren, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.39. The Constitution explicitly states that no State may enact a law that violates aninternational treaty such the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Yet for the vehicle-dweller in San Francisco, to eat or sleep from 10pm to 6 am in their vehicle-home is a crime.A crime with a possible six-month sentence in county jail and/or fines. Plaintiffs don't wantto press an overly-dramatic point where it isn't warranted, but logically-speaking, isn'tcriminalizing a specific group's very acts of life in and of itself, genocidal in nature? Itcertainly signals the required discriminatory intent and serious substantive due processissues. Unlike most activists, plaintiffs understand fully that they live under a nation ofnegative rights, not positive ones. In simple English, that means nobody has the right to doanything specifically, whether it is to marry the same sex, procreate with someone who hasskin a darker tone, abort said fetus, or to practice an obscure (possibly dangerous) religion.But what we do have is the expectation that our government will not interfere with, via lawsand codes, the inalienable rights that each of us is equally born with. We are all born withthe requirement to eat and sleep, mate and raise children, but in truth, before any of that canhappen, one must “establish a home”.40. Plaintiffs claim an absolute and fundamental right to engage in the initimacies of life,as well as life-sustaining actions such as eating and sleeping, regardless of San Francisco's“custom, policy or practice” of forbidding the plaintiffs' “over-sized” vehicle-home to berecognized as a “real” home. Even the nomadic citizens have a fundamental right to“establish a home” per Meyer v. Nebraska. The 9th amendment clearly shelters the privacy oflife's intimate bonds. The 1st, 4th and 14th amendments support the 9th and bar any Stateimposition of criminal penalties (after a curfew) into the zone of privacy of plaintiffs' homethat happens to be a vehicle. After sixteen years as second-class citizens, subject todozens and dozens of raids, plaintiffs realize privacy in marital functions, privacy in bodilyfunctions, and privacy in choices surrounding bodily functions, goes straight to what exactlyis meant to be protected:Mayon v. San Francisco 36 Civil Rights Complaint

“These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.” Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) ORDINANCES CONTENT-BASED, NOT CONTENT-NEUTRAL, CURFEWS41. S.F.M.T.A. 7.2.54 (passed Sept 2012; enacted July 15, 2013): “To park a vehicle over twenty-two feet in length or seven feet in height or camp trailers, fifth-wheel travel trailers, house cars, trailer coaches, mobilehomes, recreational vehicles, or semi-trailers as defined by the California Vehicle Code and Health and Safety Code, between the hours of 12 a.m. and 6 a.m. when Municipal Transportation Agency signs are posted giving notice.”S.F.P.D. 97 (enacted April 1971) uses a night-time curfew to criminalize specificallythe vehicle home: “No person shall use or occupy or permit the use or occupancy of any house car, camper or trailer coach for human habitation, including but not limited to sleeping, eating or resting, either single or in groups, on any street, park, beach, square, avenue, alley or public way.”Discriminatory intent is evident by the way the Parks and Recreation Departmentis able to issue permits for sleeping and eating in their vehicles to whomever theydeem worthy, for example: politicians, entertainers and charity fund-raisingsupport team members.Both ordinances are content-based, rather than content-neutral, because theyspecifically refer to the GRT's common mode of housing but more to the point,suspect because:Mayon v. San Francisco 37 Civil Rights Complaint

“[i]n our country, hostile and discriminatory legislation by the state against persons of any class, sect, creed, and nation, in whatever form it may be expressed, is forbidden by the 14t h amendment.” Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan (D.Cal. 1879) 12 Fed. Cas. 252 [5 sawy. 552]42. Because ethnicity is involved, plaintiffs invoke the 1964 Civil Rights Act whichprohibits a citizen being excluded from use of public facilities due to ethnicity. By thedefinition of the Department of Defense 2005 Handbook of Military Terms, the roadway andthe actual dirt underneath it is considered (for the purposes of war) to be a public facility.To live now as a nomadic citizen is to pass through towns and cities who have intentionallydenied them a legal, equal place. And the number of doing so is growing every day.Otherwise, there is a patch-work system of RV parks, truck stops and industrial areas wherethe vehicle-dweller can only hope to abide unmolested. If he can afford an RV park, if one isavailable, and if the motorhome is not so old or unkempt or the occupants pass muster, theycan get off the public thoroughfare. Zoning the GRT into the village should come in under theprotection 1968 Civil Rights Act.43. Their first amendment right of self-expression has limited their access to the publicspace. EXHIBIT H is the S.F.M.T.A. map of where plaintiffs would want to park duringtheir visits, in order to access the beach and its nearby “green curb” parking but “oversizedvehicles” are prohibited by S.F.M.T.A. 7.2.54 after midnight. No RV parks or private lots areavailable to rent at any price, within San Francisco city limits; there are two luxury RV parks,one in Pacifica and the other at Candlestick Park in South San Francisco. Both these parkshave an age limit, meaning that the plaintiffs' 1996 Gulfstream motorhome is too old to gainadmittance. This is a common method used by private parks to keep out the undesirables'RVs. More acceptable discrimination.CAN POLICE IGNORE THE RULES RE. NIGHTTIME ARRESTS SIMPLY BECAUSE MOTORHOMES ARE DEEMED AN “ILLEGAL HOME” AND PARKED IN THE “PUBLIC ROAD”Mayon v. San Francisco 38 Civil Rights Complaint

44. The structural problem with SFPD 97 lies in the way it specifically ignores the tworules (Federal and State) that control night-time visits to any citizen's residence by police.The City crafted this ordinance and has enforced it for decades. Police feel very entitled touse it. Yet, it is a home. That fact is not always ignored; some officers are very respectful,even apologetic. Some act charmed by the bus and asked to come in for a tour (odd as thatsounds). But nonetheless, they are at the plaintiffs front door, for a misdemeanor, in themiddle-of-the-night, without warrant and on the probable cause for plaintiffs engaging in anact of sustaining the human body (eat/sleep) which is essential to all humans, the verypremise for being there in the first place is faulty. They are knocking on the door of a homeafter 10 pm for a misdemeanor when only felonies will suffice.California Penal Code 840: An arrest for the commission of a felony may be made onany day and at any time of the day or night. An arrest for the commission of amisdemeanor or an infraction cannot be made between the hours of 10 o'clock p.m. ofany day and 6 o'clock a.m. of the succeeding day, unless: (1) The arrest is made without a warrant pursuant to Section 836 or 837. (2) The arrest is made in a public place. (3) The arrest is made when the person is in custody pursuant to another lawful arrest. (4) The arrest is made pursuant to a warrant which, for good cause shown directs that it may be served at any time of the day or night.Title XIII, Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 41: specifies that all warrants must be executedbefore 10 pm, unless the signature of a magistrate has been previously obtained specificto that person to be arrested and it must be a serious crime. “The new Federal Rule, though less specific than the local rule, provides that a search warrant must be served in the daytime, 'unless the issuing authority, by appropriate provision in the warrant, and for reasonable cause shown, authorizes its execution at times other than daytime,' and abandons the old, cumbersome positivity standard” Gooding v. United States 416 U.S. 430 (1974).Mayon v. San Francisco 39 Civil Rights Complaint

However, the best instruction for Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 41 comes from the dissentin Payton v Riddick (445 U.S. 573 100 S.Ct. 1371 63 L.Ed.2d 639) Mr. JusticeWhite, with whom the chief justice and Mr. Justice Rehnquist join, dissenting. “At the core of the Fourth Amendment, whether in the context of a search or an arrest, is the fundamental concept that any governmental intrusion into an individual's home or expectation of privacy must be strictly circumscribed (Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S.Ct. 524 [532,] 29 L.Ed. 746; Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 528, 87 S.Ct. 1727 [, 1730,] 18 L.Ed.2d 930). … These four restrictions on home arrests—felony, knock and announce, daytime, and stringent probable cause—constitute powerful and complementary protections for the privacy interests associated with the home. The felony requirement guards against abusive or arbitrary enforcement and ensures that invasions of the home occur only in case of the most serious crimes. The knock-and-announce and daytime requirements protect individuals against the fear, humiliation, and embarrassment of being aroused from their beds in states of partial or complete undress. And these requirements allow the arrestee to surrender at his front door, thereby maintaining his dignity and preventing the officers from entering other rooms of the dwelling. The stringent probable-cause requirement would help ensure against the possibility that the police would enter when the suspect was not home, and, in searching for him, frighten members of the family or ransack parts of the house, seizing items in plain view. In short, these requirements, taken together, permit an individual suspected of a serious crime to surrender at the front door of his dwelling and thereby avoid most of the humiliation and indignity that the Court seems to believe necessarily accompany a house arrest entry. Such a front-door arrest, in my view, is no more intrusive on personal privacy than the public warrantless arrests which we found to pass constitutional muster in Watson. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S., at 431, 96 S.Ct., at 831.”Mayon v. San Francisco 40 Civil Rights Complaint

45. The casual police search of the vehicular home is in the middle-of-the-night is toascertain if there is probable cause for a municipal – not felonious – law being broken,a law against committing innocent human acts in certain types of vehicles at certain hours oncertain streets by certain people. It is clearly outlined that only the most serious of crimes areto be dealt with at nighttime in the residence, under both Federal and State rules. Instead, theCity-Defendant sends out its agents in high-octane raids with the intent to either ticket (orthreaten to arrest) unknown person (s) for ‘habitation of a vehicle’ after curfew. Plaintiffs(and their children) have experienced this repeatedly in San Francisco. Several police,enough to require multiple cars, gather at the small hours of the morning, loudly banging onthe door, demanding to know if the occupants are asleep, both their high-power flashlightsand the q-beams lighting up the place, red-and-blue lights flashing. The cops bang theirnightsticks down the side of the GRT home, leaving small dents on the metal, yelling threatsthat if the door is not opened, the vehicle will be towed with the family inside. All will bearrested. If ignored, they start rock the motorhome and sometimes, windows also have beenbroken (twice for the plaintiffs). All this just to see if they are engaging in human acts (afterdark, when these things usually take place) in order to ascertain if a “quality-of-life” crimehas been committed, a misdemeanor under City law. Once they open the door they arelectured by the police for their lifestyle, while the plaintiffs' children are forced to listen tothis nonsense while a police officer (or two or three), wander through the family homechecking to see if it is sufficient. “Well-being checks” of small children previously asleep.It would be mildly interesting to see whether or not a single arrest has actually ever beenmade because the most jr. public defender would have seen this seemingly-glaring structuralerror in SFPD 97. In the newspaper article in the Examiner SFPD states that a certainnumber have been arrested. (EXHIBIT I). “The commission of the intrusion into the Wangers' private residence at night exacerbates the degree of the intrusion. See Payton v. New York, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1394, 63 L.Ed.2d 639, 668 (1980) (White, J., dissenting); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 480, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2045, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499-500, 78 S.Ct. 1253, 1257, 2 L.Ed.2d 1514, 1519 (1958). The place of the intrusion, the Wangers' private residence, is entitled to the strictestMayon v. San Francisco 41 Civil Rights Complaint

fourth amendment protection against unwarranted intrusions. An individual's privacy interests are nowhere more clearly defined or rigorously protected by the courts than in the home — the core of fourth amendment rights. Payton v. New York, ___ U.S. at ___, 100 S.Ct.” Wanger v. Bonner 621 F.2d 675, 677 (5th Cir. 1980)46. The City-Defendant will argue that the police's night-time visits, with threats of arrestas the late night searches of the (lower-income) RV dweller’s papers and his home, as wellas “well-being checks” of their children, and the over-all invasion of their physical zone ofmarital privacy (i.e. their actual bedroom is poked around in by cops with flashlights) isconstitutional because the RV is not a home but rather a vehicle and thus, comes under theauspices of a ruling which, in 1985 allowed them to be searched like any other vehicle.Yet there is a clear demand for probable cause in California v Carney (471 U.S. 386), “The California Supreme Court correctly characterized this vehicle (a Dodge Midas mini-motorhome) as a ‘hybrid’ which combines ‘the mobility attribute of an automobile … with most of the privacy characteristics of a house’. The hybrid nature of the motorhome puts it at the crossroads between the privacy interests that generally forbid warrantless invasions of the home (Payton v New York 445 U. S. 57 585-590 (1980)) and the law enforcement interests that support the exception for warrantless searches of automobiles based on probable cause (United States v Russ 456 U.S. 798, 806, 820 (1982)).” “Automobile or no automobile, there must be probable cause for the search”. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 269, 93 S.Ct. 2535, 2537, 37 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973) “To be arrested in the home involves not only the invasion attendant to all arrests but also an invasion of the sanctity of the home. This is simply too substantial an invasion to allow without a warrant, at least in the absence of exigent circumstances, even when it is accomplished under statutory authority and when probable cause is clearly present.” United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 423 (1978)Mayon v. San Francisco 42 Civil Rights Complaint

47. So what exactly is probable cause that precipitated the execution of an investigation of(misdemeanor) quality-of-life crimes to the home-on-wheels after 10 pm? Probable causewould be that there are life-sustaining activities going on. The officer is driving by themotorhome (called there by the repeated complaints of the settled citizens), it's after 10 pmand the officer smells garlic cooking in butter. Or he looks through an open window, spyinga plate of fried chicken cooling. Is food in plain view sufficient or must it actually be seenbeing consumed for it to fulfill the probable cause requirement? Perhaps the RV is dark,and the absence of movement and noise indicates to the officer that sleep might be takingplace. Plaintiffs are not being factitious or glib. Its the cause of raids that distress theplaintiffs in the middle-of-the-night and an unconstitutional vagueness surrounds probablecause. Even approaching the vehicle requires probable cause and it's a misdemeanor thatthey are approaching the home about in the first place, in the middle-of-the-night. Un-American and a substantive due process issue. Obvious targeting of an unpopular group.Multiple media attacks. Watch groups out on night-time patrol. Slight Nazi feel to all this. DO PROPERTY RIGHTS VANISH BECAUSE THE OWNER IS NOMADIC?48. However disagreeable “over-sized vehicles” are to the settled citizen, they are,nonetheless, the traditional home of the nomadic citizen and his real property as much as thesettled man owns his cement-based home and property. There are equal expectations of aninalienable right to freely use one's property in a variety of ways, and not be penalized forsaid use. TIME and USE restrictions are the basis for this facet of the plaintiffs' challengebecause, as stated in the main cause-of-action, the City-Defendant can't criminalize of theplaintiffs' fundamental right to use their own property in the first place: “The claim and exercise of a constitutional right cannot be converted into a crime” Miller v. U.S. 230 F2d. 486. 489 (1956) “There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one because of this exercise of constitutional rights” Sherar v. Cullen 481 F. 945 (1973)Mayon v. San Francisco 43 Civil Rights Complaint

49. That has to include the right to access one's property at any time day or night,without a curfew. City-Defendant only infers that the plaintiffs' presence abuses thecommunity but present nothing more than words and a computer-generated map.“A right to property is founded in our natural wants, in the means withwhich we are endowed to satisfy these wants, and the right to what weacquire by those means without violating the similar rights of othersensible beings.” –Thomas Jefferson to Pierre Samuel Dupont deNemours (1816)The question at hand then would be, HOW exactly does the full and unencumbered exerciseof the plaintiffs' property rights affect the property rights of the traditionally-housed resident?Constitutionally, without question, even the vagabond is allowed to:“acquire and enjoy property” Barbier v. Connolly 1113 U.S. 27 (1885)50. Regarding the right to be nomadic citizen to freely use and stay in possession oftheir property:“It cannot be doubted that among the civil rights intended to be protected fromdiscriminatory state action by the 14th amendment are the rights to acquire, enjoy, ownand dispose of property. Equality in the enjoyment of property rights was regarded bythe framers of that amendment as an essential pre-condition to the realization of otherbasic civil rights and liberties which the amendment was intended to guarantee.” Buchanan v. Warley 245 U.S. 60, 245 U.S. 73 (1917)51. Plaintiffs lived on the beach for 16 years in San Francisco and raised their children.They came to San Francisco for their wedding trip. They were nomadic for years prior totheir arrival. They arrived in a 32' retrofitted 1979 Bluebird schoolbus May 31, 1997. Thatwas their family home for ten years, until it was seized by SFPD for being an illegal home onAug 14, 2006. There was no pre-deprivation hearing. It had been the only home theiryoungest child since he was 4-months-old, until he was ten-years-old. His sister was 4 whenMayon v. San Francisco 44 Civil Rights Complaint

they moved into it. He and his 14-year-old sister were present when it was seized and weredeeply traumatized by being forced out of their home in less than an hour in front of a crowdof about 30 people, by the time it was over with. His 16-year-old brother was at his job as aclerk at Safeway. The father (the plaintiff) was forced by the police to agree to walk calmlyaway with the younger child, taking public transit to a nearby motel, while his sister and theirmother (the plaintiff), also under the threat of arrest if they didn't comply with the seizure,were allowed to quietly collect a few belongings, get in a taxi and drive away from theextrajudicial seizure of their home of more than a decade. The family was unceremoniouslykicked out of their home, because the City seized it as abandoned and not running, eventhough it was running and four family members were present when the authorities arrived.The family only suffered 3 weeks of homelessness because the Sunset Youth Center collecteddonations and bought the family a small, older RV so they could resume their chosenlifestyle. The plaintiffs sued the City (this included a police officer and a DPT agent) fortaking their vehicular home under the Banes Civil Rights Act because the SFPD officer on-scene threatened to arrest plaintiff Mr. Mayon if he started the schoolbus and left. There wasa jury trial in a county court and by that time, the youngest boy was 12–years-old and duringafternoon proceedings of the two-day trial, he would arrive unexpectedly at the courtroom tosit alone in a corner seat, observing the efforts his parents made at achieving accountability.His sister, by then-16, testified eloquently about what had happened, as well as other issuessurrounding the lifestyle. By this time, his older brother was in Marines boot camp as the2008 trial was underway.52. CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION ARTICLE 1, DECLARATION OF RIGHTSSECTION 1. All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienablerights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing,and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.These rights have completely passed the GRT by. Is there really a way to completelydescribe the sheer creepiness of having people call in to the police even though, “the Constitution confers upon no individual the right to demand action by the state which results in the denial of equal protection of the laws toMayon v. San Francisco 45 Civil Rights Complaint

other individuals. And it would appear beyond question that the power of the state to create and enforce property interests must be exercised within the boundaries of the 14th amendment.” Shelley v. Kraemer 334 U.S. 1, 68 S. Ct 836, 92 L. Ed 1161 (1948) citing Marsh v. Alabama 326 U.S. 501 (1946)53. This loss is a plain example of anti-GRT policy being one that sends out directives tomake life conditions intolerable for the vehicle dweller and plaintiffs intentionallyestablished-by-trial FACTS that the plaintiffs’ school bus/home of a decade seized by one ofthe agents of the City-Defendant, supposedly for being a few minutes past a notice referringto abandoned vehicles law.54. The Federal Constitution refers to the right to be free from the government's“unreasonable” search or seizure and the right of due process. Judge Oliver W. Wagnerof U.S. District Court of the Eastern California issued a permanent injunctionprohibiting the City of Fresno from continuing \"the practice of announce, strike, seize, and destroy (the property of the homeless) immediately is against the law\" and \"violates the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.” Kincaid v. City of Fresno 244 F.R.D. 597 (E.D. Cal. 2007)55. Where does each property owners' rights (the settled and the nomadic home-owners)begin and end? Under the 14th amendment, the GRT have the right to their property aswell. Instead, they are criminalized for using their property at certain hours. Is there anyother group but the GRT that suffers this indignity? “Property in a thing consists not merely in its ownership and possession, but in the unrestricted right of use, enjoyment, and disposal. Anything which destroys any of the elements of property, to that extent, destroys the property itself. The substantial value of property lies in its use. If the right of use be denied, the value of the property is annihilated and ownership is rendered a barren right.” Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55Mayon v. San Francisco 46 Civil Rights Complaint

Wn.2d 400, 409, 348 P.2d 664 (1960) (quoting from Spann v. City of Dallas, 111 Tex. 350, 355, 235 S.W. 513, 19 A.L.R. 1387 (1921))56. Plaintiffs lost 11-1 after the jury deliberated mere minutes. It had been a two-day trialin which plaintiffs presented prima facie evidence in the form of multiple parking citationsfor the 6 weeks prior to the seizure, showing the schoolbus had been parked at variousdifferent locations up and down Great Highway, and did operate and was not “abandoned”.The parking officer and police had arrived on scene fifteen minutes prior to the 72-hourwarning expired. The police had threatened to arrest plaintiff Greg Mayon if he started thevehicle and attempted to drive off.57. Plaintiffs present this information only as background for their motion for a bench trial.Anything else said (except for the fact it happened) is pointless, due to the Constitutionalrules that a matter heard by a jury has exhausted its options. There is, however, aninteresting testimony by the parking office who seized the bus, as she nonchalantly explainedto the jury how the residents call the “Abandoned Vehicles” hotline to report people living intheir vehicles and the process by which due process is served the GRT. During juryselection, deputy City Attorney Meredith Osborne asked the jury pool, by a show of hands,how many felt this case was a waste of their time. Two-thirds of the room held up theirhands. This, as well as the example of the large crowd that gathered to watch the hour thatthe bus was taken, is why plaintiffs ask for a bench trial (at the same time as filing thiscomplaint). If they are forced to endure another jury trial, they will ask that GRT (gypsy-Roma-Traveller) or vehicularly-housed persons be included on said jury.58. More insight to the City-Defendant's “custom, policy and pattern” of driving the GRTfrom the City by aggressive property seizures and improperly using the 72-hour abandonedvehicle protocol to tow vehicle-homes is found in the Local Homeless Coordinating Board(LHCB) minutes (EXHIBIT J). According to these minutes, the Board approved a “Bill ofRights” for the “vehicularly homeless”. At no point did plaintiffs ever know such adocument existed until doing GRT hate speech research in 2011. In order words, it had noeffect on the interactions with police, social services, the City Attorney's office, etc.Mayon v. San Francisco 47 Civil Rights Complaint

DOES LOCATION OF MOTORHOME NEGATE ALL PRIVACY RIGHTS?59. From California v Carney 471 U.S. 386 (1985)'s dissent by Justice Steven's: “When a motorhome is parked in a location that is removed from the public highway, I believe society is prepared to recognize that the expectations of privacy within are not unlike the expectation one has in a fixed dwelling.”For the purpose of a warrantless search, the motorhome is considered to be a legitimatedwelling only when parked on private property and attached to utilities (as the plaintiffs'motorhome currently is), but exactly why are the rights to privacy in intimate relationshipsand bodily functions able to be suspended in a publicly-situated motorhome, while a tentwithout a permit on BLM land United States v. Sandoval, 200 F.3d 659, 660-61 (9th Cir.2000) and a motel room acquired under an alias United States v. Domenech, 623 F.3d 325(6th Cir. 2010) do provide privacy rights for the occupants of those “temporary abodes”.60. Four other cases, all dealing with a warrantless search, indicate the court recognizes thefact the motorhome is, indeed, a “hybrid” vehicle. A. Search of a motorhome parked in a residential driveway with an electrical cord was found legitimate. However, the dissent reveals this statement: “The location and use being made of the vehicle was much more akin to functional part of a private residence than to a motor vehicle on the highway.” United States v. Hamilton, 792 F.2d 837 (9th Circuit 1986) B. A travel trailer not attached to a vehicle was found to be with a home's protection as it “not readily mobile”. State v. Durbin 489 N.W. 2d 655 (Wisconsin Ct. App 1992) C. The warrantless search of a houseboat was found valid “Carney also asks whether there was 'a reduced expectation of privacy stemming from its use as a licensed motor vehicle subject to a range of police regulation inapplicable to a fixed dwelling'” U.S. v. Albers 136 F. 3d 670 (9th Cir. 1997)Mayon v. San Francisco 48 Civil Rights Complaint

D. The factors are “the vehicles location, whether the vehicle is readily mobile orinstead, for instance, elevated on blocks, whether the vehicle is licensed, whether it isconnected to utilities, and whether it has convenient access to a public road.” citingCarney, 471 U.S. at 394 n.3 United States v. Aguilar, No. 08-50155 (9th Cir. Unpub.Decided July 29, 2009)61. Is this the only way the semi-nomadic plaintiffs can live, as a second-class citizen?Have the plaintiffs, by the fact of DNA, of lifelong habit, and by choice, “renounced the rightto live screened from public observation?” (from the essay “Right to Privacy”) So exactlywhen does society attribute an objective privacy for the nomadic? Only if they are parked onprivate land and paying a fee. Does the value of the marriage bed – both tangible andintangible - disappear when it (the traditional GRT home on wheels) is parked in the publicspace? Again referring to aforementioned essay: “The general object in view is to protectthe privacy of private life... The common law has always recognized a man's house as hiscastle, impregnable...” To narrow the privacy question down even more:“At common law, the curtilage is the area to which extends the intimate activityassociated with the 'sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life,' Boyd v. UnitedStates, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886), and therefore has been considered part of the homeitself for Fourth Amendment purposes. Thus, courts have extended FourthAmendment protection to the curtilage; and they have defined the curtilage, as did thecommon law, by reference to the factors that determine whether an individualreasonably may expect that an area immediately adjacent to the home will remainprivate.” Oliver v. United States 466 U.S. 170 (1985)But what if there is no curtilage, but rather only a public curb? “It is well settled that one who through no fault of his own is attacked in his home is under no duty to retreat therefrom. The oft-repeated expression that a man’s home is his 'castle' reflected the belief in olden days that there were few if any safer sanctuaries than the home. The 'castle' exception, moreover, has been extended by some courts toMayon v. San Francisco 49 Civil Rights Complaint

encompass the occupant’s presence within the curtilage outside his dwelling.” United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1973)From U.S. v. McRae156 F.3d 708 (6th Cir. 1998): A defendant bears the burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 130 n. 1 (1978). The two-part test requires that a defendant show (1) he had a subjective expectation of privacy in the searched premises and (2) that society is prepared to recognize that expectation as legitimate. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) United States v. Carr, 939 F.2d 1442, 1446 (10th Cir. 1991) In Carr, the court noted that important factors to be considered in determining whether there was a legitimate expectation of privacy include ownership, lawful possession, or lawful control of the premises searched. Id. at 1446 (citing Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n. 12). See also United States v. Gale, 136 F.3d 192, 195-96 (D.C. Cir. 1998) The plaintiffs maintained legal ownership, registration, insurance, etc. and a licensed driver. The property of the vehicle-dweller is treated differently from the property of those who live in “real” housing. With help of media hit pieces that feed on community xenophobia, City-Defendant has swayed public opinion to the point that NO societal expectation of privacy can be expected. But is that valid in light of the ethnic identity of plaintiff Ramona Mayon?62. All individuals retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in a wide variety of semi-public or shared circumstances. For example, a person may have a reasonable expectation ofprivacy in a tent, whether in a public campground: “on land where camping is not authorized” United States v. Gooch, 6 F.3d 673, 676-79 (9th Cir. 1993) “Only if both the subjective and objectiveMayon v. San Francisco 50 Civil Rights Complaint