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CHAPTER 20 The Big Picture — Future Challenges Earlier chapters’ tours of NASA’s advisory his- coin. Chapter 1 noted that involving outside expert tory should be able to open a window through advice was woven into the very fabric of NASA’s which to peer into the future. Given past experi- predecessor, the NACA, and that independent ences and trends, can one count on the process experts played key roles in the early framing of a working as well in the future, or are there obstacles national space research program before NASA to be anticipated and overcome? How might, or was established. Later chapters traced the continu- should, the advisory ecosystem adapt to be an asset ing influences on NASA’s approach to building a to space research in the future? Finally, are there space and Earth science program. Dan Baker put any fundamental principles that need to be heeded this aspect of NASA’s culture in metaphorically going forward? This chapter will deal with each of genetic terms: those questions, more or less in order. My belief is that in the very DNA of NASA Future Advisory Ecosystem the government-academic partnership was sort Challenges and Threats of built in. I think a lot of the founders … rec- ognized that it was just absolutely crucial to Chapter 6 introduced the idea of a NASA science the vitality of the disciplines to have this strong advisory ecosystem and described it in terms of six academic involvement, the constant refresh- key aspects at the end of NASA’s first thirty years. ment and turnover. And so this aspect got built Chapter 14 revisited those perspectives and exam- into NASA’s very being.… And in fact I think ined how they had evolved as NASA approached that the lack of … a natural way to include the its 60th year. Let’s take another look, this time in academic advice and insight and review, really terms of what contemporary or emerging stresses has been detrimental to many non-NASA might affect the future. agencies. The different government agencies, institutions, all suffer arteriosclerosis to some CULTURE OF ACCEPTANCE OF OUTSIDE extent or another. But I think it’s hastened in the case where you have this insular attitude.1 ADVICE IN AN ENVIRONMENT OF CONSTRUC- Likewise, constructive tension has been an TIVE TENSION: These two factors — openness enduring element of NASA’s relationship with its and conflict — are so interrelated that they are best considered together as two sides of the same 1. Baker interview, p. 6. 237

238 Science Advice to NASA: Conflict, Consensus, Partnership, Leadership scientific advisors and the broader scientific com- generally been possible with the resources NASA munity. Such tensions were evident all the way back has been able to secure. And at times, scientists to NACA days; they appeared in the earliest SSB have been particularly critical of the Agency and efforts and in the 1966 Ramsey committee’s pro- even naïve about what they can influence and what posal to provide management guidance to NASA; NASA can control. But by and large, the relation- and they charged the atmosphere during conflicts ship has been positive and productive. with the Astronomy Missions Board and the Lunar and Planetary Missions Board in the late 1960s Two issues — one longstanding and another (see chapter 3). Homer Newell’s advice to James rather recent — are relevant to this relationship. Fletcher in 1971 to nurture a climate of openness, The first relates to the questions of how much stay true to prior commitments, and establish close advice is too much advice and where the line should communications and working relationships with be drawn between when the scientific community outside advisory bodies was precipitated in part by should expect to have a say and when NASA should tensions between NASA and its advisors.2 be left to proceed on its own. NASA Administrator Mike Griffin raised this issue in his dialog with the As chapter 19 noted, outside advice and criti- scientific community over his expectations of advi- cism provide a kind of market competition in a situ- sory bodies during the debates over science budgets ation where there is only one source — NASA — of in 2005 (see chapter 12). He argued that as public goods or services. When there are multiple offer- servants, NASA managers had to be expected to ors, competition pushes suppliers to meet or exceed take responsibility and be accountable for their customers’ expectations. Since NASA is funda- decisions and not become reliant on advisors to tell mentally the only supplier of opportunities for them what to do.4 space science, the scientific advisory process pushes NASA to respond. Lennard Fisk drew a line in 1988, when he developed a strategic plan for NASA’s science pro- Al Diaz observed that one reason for the ten- gram that was based on scientific priorities from sion stemmed from how the scientific community the SSB and its committees, but he considered appeared to view its relationship with NASA: responsibility for translating those science goals into program plans and priorities to be NASA’s job. [I]t was more than simply the community According to Fisk, advising NASA. It was really the community determining what the course of the program The strategic plan was, of course, based upon should be and NASA being the trustee that Academy reports. It had its footprints there. So provided the capability to get it done. And you could say that was the influence that the while NASA was dedicated to achieving mis- Academy reports had on the NASA strategic sion success — it really wasn’t [NASA’s] pro- plan — a foundation for the strategic plan. At gram, it was the community’s program.3 no point did we ask the Academy to review the strategic plan and to comment on it.5 Scientists have always set the bar high and pushed the Agency to do more and to move faster than has 2. “Relations with the Scientific Community and the Space Science Board,” Homer E. Newell memo to James C. Fletcher, 3 December 1971, Historical Reference Collection folder 4247, History Division, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC. 3. Diaz interview, p. 2. 4. Griffin interview. 5. Fisk interview, pp. 20–21.

Chapter 20  •  The Big Picture — Future Challenges 239 In fact, this is basically the same conclusion that everything else, as well as a growing sense inside the SSB reached in its 1995 report on managing NASA that less advice is needed. Since the enact- the space sciences (see chapter 16) when it con- ment of the National Academies amendments to cluded that as the span of a decision expands from FACA in 1997, there has also been an increase in being relevant to a single discipline to affecting the government requests across the NRC for convening full program, the decision-making process moves activities (e.g., workshops), which do not require beyond being purely scientific.6 It may be fine for organizing a formal advisory committee, instead of scientific advisors to articulate their views on the study committees to prepare consensus reports.8 In scientific aspects of a decision, but they need to any case, this is something that the scientific com- understand that the final decision will rest on inte- munity and the advisory mechanisms that it uses grating across other dimensions as well. need to consider. Furthermore, even if all the advice that flows The second, more recent and more troubling, to NASA is somehow relevant, the mere appear- issue relates to the propensity of high-level gov- ance of too much advice can compromise the advi- ernment officials outside NASA’s science office to sory ecosystem. Michael Griffin’s restructuring ignore outside advice. Ed Weiler observed that after of the NASA Advisory Council directly reflected the early 2000s OMB officials were less inclined his opinion that NASA officials were getting too to be responsive to advice from the National much advice from too many, sometimes conflict- Academies and were possibly even covertly dis- ing, directions. Science policy expert Kevin Marvel dainful of decadal survey priorities.9 A senior con- saw evidence of a similar attitude in his interactions gressional science committee staff member had a with congressional staffers: “And one joke that I similar impression, noting that OMB had become heard a staffer say at one point is ‘The Academy less attentive to outside advice, especially when the produces a report every day, which one am I sup- advice was contrary to what OMB wanted. This posed to read?’ So they are a little bit jaded.”7 staffer added that OMB didn’t want to hear advice Although Marvel was describing congressional that the Administration felt it couldn’t afford reactions to the totality of NRC advisory reports to implement. and not just ones for NASA, the idea is still rele- vant: Can the advisory system dilute its utility and Tom Young, who has accumulated vast expe- impact by saturating the audience? At what point rience in leading and assessing space programs, will the targets of advice just stop listening? saw this development as a serious threat to space research: Such concerns may reflect a mismatch between perceptions and reality. In the years 2013 to The one thing that’s different today … is the 2015, the SSB delivered only half as many advi- interaction with the Administration. Largely sory reports (13) as it did between 2003 and 2005 OMB [and] to a lesser extent OSTP are much (26). Part of the reason for the drop may be the more involved today. There is no question but tightening of NASA budgets, which constrains today, for all organizations including NASA, funds available for advisory studies along with the epicenter of power, if that’s the way to say 6. National Research Council, Managing the Space Sciences (The National Academies Press, Washington, DC, 1995). 7. Marvel interview, p. 3. 8. Peter D. Blair, “The evolving role of the U.S. National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine in providing science and technology policy advice to the U.S. government” (Palgrave Communications 2, Article number: 16030, 7 June 2016). 9. Weiler interview, p. 14.

240 Science Advice to NASA: Conflict, Consensus, Partnership, Leadership it, is really more at the OMB level, than it is at NASA, outside advisors and NASA still can have a the NASA level.… [I]t complicates interactions dialog about the situation. But when the decisions with the outside scientific community, because and priorities are set at and handed down from out- there is such a strong influence on the civil side NASA (i.e., at OMB as Tom Young observed) space program from arenas where science is not then there is no opportunity for dialog with the sci- necessarily the priority, but other factors play. entific community. Such seemed to be increasingly Starting towards the end of [the 1990s] — and the case starting in the late 2000s. it’s been true both for the republican admin- istration and now the democratic administra- THE SSB, NASA’S INTERNAL COMMITTEES, tion — there’s a new player. I happen to think it’s stronger today than ever … there’s a new AND FACA: Four other factors — (1) the power of player who’s playing a much broader role. As the SSB, (2) evolution of NASA’s committees, (3) a result, I actually think that the capabilities of the division of labor between the two, and (4) the organizations like NASA, and NOAA too, are impacts of FACA — have become so closely cou- not playing as significant a role in leadership of pled that they also are best considered together. the civil space program. I assume it’s because Three issues tend to dominate the picture. First, the OMB et al. has usurped that role.… And budgetary and programmatic environments appear my personal view is that it’s a negative trend.10 to be more dynamic and to be changing much more rapidly than in the past. It has become very OMB has always been a major player in ensur- hard for advice with a decadal horizon to cope with ing that agency programs and budgets reflect and five-year budgets that change in one year. Even the implement administration priorities. That respon- midterm reviews that are now conducted between sibility, of course, engenders tensions as OMB decadal surveys may be occurring at intervals that ultimately recommends approval or disapproval are too long to keep up with the pace of changes in of agency proposals and sometimes even gives an the programmatic and political landscape. agency specific policy direction. The new aspect of the tension seems to be about who controls the Second, flat or even declining budgets extended priorities and the message embodied in NASA’s sci- into the 2010s. How does an advisory process adapt ence program. Should scientific considerations and to be responsive to a changing environment where the scientific community play a major role in deter- past optimistic assumptions or options appear to mining the scientific content and priorities? If so, be dead on arrival? Ed Weiler described this as an then scientific advisory bodies should be nurtured especially important time for good outside advice: and heard. Or should the administration have con- “Now that the budget is really getting tighter I trol and expect that its priorities define the direc- would argue that the need for tactical and strategic tions of the science program? In that case, perhaps advice is even greater.”11 the scientific community should be humored but kept in check. Third, FACA has turned out to be a fine exam- ple of the law of unintended consequences. The The fundamental problem, even in the likely legislation was meant to improve the transparency case that the answer falls in between those two of the advisory process, and while that has hap- alternatives, is that when decisions are made in pened, implementation of FACA has also limited the efficacy of the advisory process. Agency law- yers’ conservative approaches to complying with 10. Young interview, p. 8. 11. Weiler interview, p. 15.

Chapter 20  •  The Big Picture — Future Challenges 241 conflict-of-interest constraints seriously handi- 2000s. Earlier chapters have noted that the bound- capped NASA’s internal committees in the 2000s. aries between internal tactical advice and external In examining scientific advice all across the fed- NRC strategic advice have never been rigid and eral government, Bruce Smith has written about that the NRC has offered programmatic advice on the problem of overly zealous conflict-of-interest many occasions. But in what some have called a protections: perfect storm, the NRC’s implementation of FACA section 15 put new constraints on whether and [C]onflicts of interest in the narrow sense are how NRC committees could continue to respond a vastly overstated danger for most advisory to urgent requests for advice. New procedural committees. The group dynamics of commit- requirements prolonged the turnaround time in tees of distinguished citizens mitigate against which the SSB might respond to an important any member seeking to influence government question identified either by NASA or the Board policy to advance narrow personal or institu- itself. Letter reports in particular, which had often tional interests. The clash of different interests been prepared to address an urgent, narrowly and perspectives ensures that no single narrow focused issue, were eliminated except in rare cir- interest will dominate a committee’s delibera- cumstances. Furthermore, the policy effectively tions. Moreover the concept behind FACA is emasculated the Board and its standing commit- that the public interest is protected through tees, which were no longer permitted to provide competition among points of view and that advice themselves. In effect, the NRC committees the decision makers benefit from the inter- found themselves hamstrung. change and know when and whether to accept advice from outsiders. In Dan Baker’s opinion, recent expectations about the division of labor between internal NASA The government should not of course be committees and the NRC have become misaligned: beholden to, or overly dependent on, any group of advisers. Ever more stringent rules I think more and more is being asked of the … and regulations do not, however, contribute NRC to provide tactical advice, which I don’t to the goal of protecting the public interest. think it should be doing and it’s not well suited Rather, the search for the last ounce of pro- to be doing. I think it’s really important that tection by assailing the advisory apparatus all we as a nation look at how … one gets appro- too often is a sideshow that merely confuses priate advice fed back into the agencies and the public and feeds the populist illusion that how that advice is dealt with. But it fundamen- all government is corrupt. The inner check tally starts with making sure that you have got of professionalism rather than the legislature good internal advice for tactical matters and acting as external policeman is the better route that you have got a very strong and deliberate to high ethical standards and good perfor- kind of strategic advice from the … Academies mance in the executive branch.12 and from the [NRC] boards.… [W]hen that gets out of whack and when you try to get the At NASA, managers’ traditional internal source boards to deliver immediate, instantaneous, of tactical advice nearly ground to a halt in the tactical advice it just doesn’t work.13 12. Bruce L. R. Smith, The Advisers: Scientists in the Policy Process (The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 1992), p. 198. 13. Baker interview, p. 7.

242 Science Advice to NASA: Conflict, Consensus, Partnership, Leadership In essence, Baker was calling for a return to a divi- As these pages have mentioned earlier, the sci- sion of roles that is closer to Newell’s original call entific community plays a critical leadership role for the SSB to concentrate more on “guiding prin- by serving on advisory bodies. The process is a tre- ciples … rather than a detailed program formula- mendous bargain for NASA and the U.S. taxpayer, tion.”14 (See chapter 1.) because hundreds of top experts in space science and technology serve as consultants without being NEED FOR LEADERSHIP: The final element of compensated by the government for their time. the advisory ecosystem involves leadership and Regardless of whether their service is entirely altru- how participants in the advisory process contrib- istic or out of self-interest, the members of NASA’s ute to the overall leadership of U.S. space and and the NRC’s committees and task forces lend Earth science. There are plenty of examples of their experience and expertise to analyzing com- how strong and timely leadership has made a dif- plex issues and crafting recommendations for ways ference. Consider the vision and insight of senior to ensure that space and Earth science activities NASA science leaders such as Noel Hinners, who address the most compelling scientific questions of saw the value of creating the Hornig committee the day and do so effectively. to formulate an approach for a Space Telescope Science Institute; Charlie Pellerin, who focused In spite of the strengths and benefits of stake- the imaginations of some top astrophysicists on holder leadership noted above, there are some wor- how to market the Great Observatories concept; risome soft spots and vulnerabilities. They hint Shelby Tilford and Burt Edelson, who established that the system may not be as robust or effective the Bretherton committee that transformed the in the future as it was in the past. We will look at future of Earth observations from space; Len Fisk, them as follows, in ascending order of complexity: who framed the first science strategic plan; and Wes Huntress, whose Discovery mission study 1. transience of congressional familiarity with teams defined a new and enormously successful the advisory system, approach to planetary science missions. On other occasions NASA leaders took actions that ensured 2. increasing workloads and diminished avail- that engagement of outside advisors would become ability of volunteer advisors, a regular, recurring process. For example, consider Guenter Riegler, who devised the senior review 3. committees’ ability to do their jobs, and process; Wes Huntress and Carl Pilcher, who initi- 4. the NRC’s business model. ated regular SSB reviews of NASA science strategic plans; and Ed Weiler, who expanded decadal sur- The first concern has been around forever, so veys to cover all space science. one must simply acknowledge it and compensate. Both the members of key congressional commit- Members of Congress, and their key staffers, tees and their staffs have a relatively high turnover understood the value of regular advisory activi- rate, and so there is a need for continuous educa- ties, and they played a leadership role by provid- tion about space research and about the character ing a formal legislative mandate for the expanded and role of outside advice. It’s not unusual for a new decadal surveys, midterm progress reviews, and member of one of the congressional space commit- mission operations senior reviews. tees to never have heard of a decadal survey or the NAC. And the same can be true for many new, extremely bright but green, political science majors 14. See John E. Naugle, First Among Equals: The Selection of NASA Space Science Experiments (NASA SP-4215, NASA History Division, Washington, DC, 1991), ch. 5, p. 72.

Chapter 20  •  The Big Picture — Future Challenges 243 who join the Hill staff. Consequently, NASA, its “summer studies” of the 1960s and 1970s have advisory entities, and the scientific community all become virtually impossible. need to regularly explain how the scientific com- munity interacts with the Agency and how outside There is also a danger of advisor fatigue — that advice gives decision makers access to independent, is, if too many advisory committee activities are expert perspectives. The need is even more acute undertaken, the scientific community can become at a time when public support for science and the exhausted by being asked to donate too much time concept of using measurements and data to test and energy. The net result of this situation is that a hypothesis or establish a factual foundation are many members of the research community find increasingly vulnerable due to the politicization of themselves becoming too busy to take on volunteer the acceptance of science. The tradition of openness roles as members of advisory bodies. Committee to outside advice is sustained by corporate memory organizers continuously struggle to recruit the inside NASA, but that kind of corporate memory is best-qualified candidates and to coerce the mem- much less prevalent in the halls of Congress. bers that they do recruit to meet commitments on study deadlines. (The recruitment problem was The second problem pertains to the availability exacerbated when NASA committee members felt of members of the scientific community to serve on that they were reined in under the restructuring advisory bodies. Space research professionals have of the NASA Advisory Council committee system become increasingly busy and therefore less able or and when NRC standing committees felt that they inclined to take on substantive responsibilities on were disenfranchised by NRC FACA policies that NASA or NRC committees. The typical university prevented standing boards and committees from professor’s plate is already full with teaching, gradu- writing advisory reports.) ate student mentoring, serving on university commit- tees, preparing new research proposals, contributing One key attribute of an advisory project can to journal article peer reviews and agency research neutralize the problem of recruiting very busy proposal review panels, and of course, conducting his people, and that is when the advisory task is widely or her own research projects. Experts from industry understood to be especially important. The higher and government laboratories have their own com- the visibility and the greater the potential impact parably demanding set of “day-job” responsibilities. on space research, the easier it becomes to secure For relatively junior scientists, all these roles become participation by the best people. For example, this essential metrics on their résumés as they compete was the case for the study on alternative approaches for permanent jobs and tenure. For more senior to extending the life of the Hubble Space Telescope scientists, the demand for their time just increases. where the NRC succeeded in forming an extraor- Consequently, recruiting good candidates to serve on dinarily capable committee. The decadal surveys advisory committees has become a real challenge. are another prime example of where members of the community are willing to commit large blocks Serving on a single NASA or NRC advisory of their time to the effort because they consider the committee might entail at least three trips per year surveys to be crucial to the future of their fields. to meetings of a few days each, and serving as a committee chair will often require twice as many The third leadership problem area relates to trips in order to represent the committee in the next whether NASA’s internal and external advisory body up the advisory chain. NRC study commit- bodies are properly empowered to do their respec- tee members are expected to spend additional time tive jobs. Earlier chapters have often lamented the outside of meetings helping prepare their commit- structural and procedural changes in both the tee reports. The very productive one- or two-week NAC and the NRC that have impacted their ability to fill NASA’s needs. Changes to NAC committee

244 Science Advice to NASA: Conflict, Consensus, Partnership, Leadership and subcommittee reporting relationships that one question: Does the NRC need a new business were introduced in the 2000s compromised the model? Evidence of the problem comes in at least value of subsidiary advisory units to Agency man- two forms. First, government officials seem to be agers below the level of the Administrator or increasingly anxious for faster and more readily Associate Administrator, especially on tactical available outside advice that they can use to address issues. Nearly simultaneously, the NRC FACA- important problems that demand more immedi- compliance policies made it practically impossible ate solutions. NRC officials point to increasing for NRC committees to pick up the slack, espe- requests for workshops and roundtables rather than cially given the NRC’s more deliberate pace driven traditional advisory studies, because the former can by its long-standing standards for in-depth analy- be produced relatively quickly. However the NRC sis and report peer review. Ed Weiler saw this as a is careful to note that workshops and roundtables problem from inside NASA: lack the strengths that come from formal consen- sus conclusions and reports that carry the full advi- So that’s still a hole in the system. Where do sory imprimatur of the National Academies.17 That you get that kind of — maybe when we use the is, a government agency cannot point to a work- word “advice” we are making the mistake, but shop report as the formal position of the National “input” — where do you get that input that’s Academies. While the Lanzerotti committee’s semi-strategic and semi-tactical but leans more review of options for extending the lifetime of toward the quick and dirty?15 the Hubble Space Telescope did produce a solidly argued consensus report in a relatively short time, As recently as 2015, the NRC committee to one must ask “Why did it have to be such a heroic review lessons learned from recent decadal surveys effort that it cannot often be replicated?” found that the system was still dysfunctional: “The current advisory structure does not adequately The other aspect of the problem that may argue provide for short-term tactical advice on strategic for a new business model for the NRC relates to programs.”16 Dan Baker’s comment above points to the possibility that NRC managers have become so the need for each player to do its job. The remark- driven by the business side of the institution (i.e., able successes of Tom Young’s independent review keeping the cash flowing) that its advisory activ- teams on NASA’s Mars program (see chapter 15) ities risk being diluted by producing too much and on NOAA’s environmental satellite program product. Board directors are almost constantly (see chapter 13) demonstrate that outside experts thinking about how to keep their staffs employed can provide timely, actionable tactical advice. But and how to generate enough business to keep their one has to ask why that can be accomplished only units financially stable. Consequently, there can by ad hoc groups and not by long-standing bodies be temptation to propose or accept advisory tasks of the NAC or the NRC. that cannot reasonably satisfy chapter 17’s criteria for effective advice. The NRC’s Governing Board The fourth, and probably knottiest, problem on Executive Committee reviews and approves every the advisory leadership horizon can be captured in proposal for a new study activity, and so there is a 15. Weiler interview, p. 13. 16. National Research Council, The Space Science Decadal Surveys: Lessons Learned and Best Practices (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, The National Academies Press, Washington, DC, 2015), p. 3. 17. Workshop reports usually contain no recommendations, findings, or statements of consensus, and they typically include a statement that the views contained in the report are those of individual workshop participants and do not necessarily represent the views of the workshop participants as a whole, the planning committee, or the NRC.

Chapter 20  •  The Big Picture — Future Challenges 245 mechanism for filtering out low-priority, low-added- accelerated while not attempting to rush the com- value projects. However, given that NRC board mittee’s deliberations towards consensus conclu- directors are generally more substantively knowl- sions in response to its charge. An example of this edgeable about a particular agency’s programs and kind of fast-track study was a 2014 study to evaluate interests than a typical governing board member, U.S. signals intelligence practices at the request of an adept board director could slip an earnestly the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, argued proposal through the review process even which was operating under Presidential direction when the proposal might not pass a chapter-17 test. to quickly address issues raised by the unauthorized release of data collected by the National Security Senior leaders at the National Academies are Agency. By pulling out all stops to get the effort well aware of these issues, and they have attempted under way quickly and keep it moving briskly, a to address them. In addition to making govern- study committee was able to begin work in June ment agency officials more aware of a menu of 2014, meet over a four-month period, and deliver faster advisory products such as workshop reports, its report by the end of the calendar year.19 Thus, which can summarize the individual opinions of the institution proved again that the Lanzerotti collected experts but not present more formal con- committee’s Hubble study wasn’t a fluke, but that sensus recommendations, the NRC has revisited it does take a serious effort to change the culture to so-called fast-track studies. In one approach to accomplish fast-track studies. The 2013 and 2014 speed an advisory study, the entire information col- cases are notable for the fact that both of them were lecting and deliberative phase of a study was com- in response to requests that originated in the White pressed to a single meeting. This occurred in 2013 House. That kind of backing does get an institu- following a Presidential Executive Order regarding tion’s attention. firearm violence and a subsequent request from the Centers for Disease Control for the National The National Academies are also making Academies to recommend a research agenda on efforts to create a more stable funding environment public health aspects of firearm related violence — at a time when funding from traditional sponsors, and to complete the effort in three months. The and the government in general, appears to be espe- expert committee established for the task held cially tight. Throughout most of the institution’s a single meeting that included a two-day public recent history, funding for advisory activities has workshop followed by a two-day session to pre- come from a few federal agencies, particularly the pare the committee’s report. After going through Departments of Defense, Transportation, and a full NRC peer review, the report18 was completed Health and Human Services, and the National on time. In a second fast-track approach, all ele- Science Foundation. According to Bruce Darling, ments of the NRC collaborated to shorten the time Executive Officer of the NRC, the institution’s required at the startup and concluding stages of a leaders are making efforts to become more engaged study — including, for example, contract negotia- with other agencies, especially ones that have not tions, committee formation and appointment, and turned to the National Academies much in the report peer review — so that those phases could be past, and also to increase private sector support, 18. Committee on Priorities for a Public Health Research Agenda to Reduce the Threat of Firearm-Related Violence, Priorities for Research to Reduce the Threat of Firearm-Related Violence (Institute of Medicine and National Research Council, The National Academies Press, Washington, DC, 2013). 19. Committee on Responding to Section 5(d) of Presidential Policy Directive 28: The Feasibility of Software to Provide Alternatives to Bulk Signals Intelligence Collection, Bulk Collection of Signals Intelligence: Technical Options (Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, The National Academies Press, Washington, DC, 2015).

246 Science Advice to NASA: Conflict, Consensus, Partnership, Leadership which has historically been below 20 percent of lessons about the strengths, impacts, and chal- the institution’s total revenue.20 One interesting lenges inherent in the process. Now we turn briefly potential source of new funding stems from a to what may lay ahead. Let’s examine four likely precedent set by legal settlements after the 2010 factors that will influence the future: Deepwater Horizon oil rig explosion and oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. As part of the settlement, the 1. The decadal surveys will continue to play National Academies are administering a 30-year, fundamentally important roles and set a $500 million activity to address issues regarding standard for outside advice, but they will oil system safety, human health, and environmen- need to evolve to stay relevant and useful. tal resources.21 NRC and government officials have had discussions about whether the Gulf Research 2. Continuing, and possibly accelerating, inter- Program might be a model for how the Academies nationalization of space and Earth science could serve in other cases where the government programs will call for advisors to pay more takes action to seek recovery from environmental explicit attention to international perspectives. abuses and can benefit from expert scientific and technical oversight. 3. Certain recurring themes that have charac- terized outside advice throughout NASA’s In working to help move forward on new ways history will be just as important in the future for the National Academies to meet the govern- as in the past; they cannot be ignored. ment’s needs for independent scientific and tech- nical expertise, Darling made it clear that while 4. Every stakeholder has a leadership role, all of he and other NRC leaders will be willing to which depend on staying true to a few key experiment selectively to find new and improved principles. approaches and products to serve the institution’s mission, they would go into such experiments only Let’s look at each of those four factors in turn. when they could be confident that the National Academies’ standards for quality and indepen- DECADAL SURVEYS. As chapter 11 explained, dence would not be compromised. This very prob- the SSB’s 2015 review of experience with the most ably means that the federal government will have to recent decadal surveys concluded that “[T]he accept that there will always be limits to what the decadal survey process has been very successful. NRC can deliver and that when an agency needs Indeed, decadal surveys set a standard of excellence a technical answer to a tactical question “immedi- that encourages the hope that similar processes ately or sooner,” the answer will have to come from could be applied more widely across the nation’s somewhere else. science programs. While it has no major flaws, the survey process can, and should, improve and evolve. The Advisory Ecosystem The remarkable record of decadal surveys makes of the Future the committee optimistic that useful changes can and will be made.”22 The changes that were rec- Our analysis of NASA’s use of outside scientific ommended for future surveys included ways to advice up to this point has sought to extract some provide state-of-the-science assessments that could give survey committees a running start on their pri- oritization of future science goals, approaches for 20. Darling interview. 21. For information about the Academies Gulf Research Program, see http://www.nationalacademies.org/gulf/index.html. 22. National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, The Space Science Decadal Surveys: Lessons Learned and Best Practices (The National Academies Press, Washington, DC, 2015), p. 6.

Chapter 20  •  The Big Picture — Future Challenges 247 weighing program proposals against more realistic • [D]ecadal surveys, in pursuit of ever more budget scenarios than in past surveys, and ways accurate cost estimates, may dig too far to sharpen decision rules that could help agency into implementation details…. [M]issions managers respond in the event that large programs described in the survey’s recommendations run into trouble and threaten to create havoc for an might best be considered as “reference mis- entire program.23 sions,” except for the concepts that have been studied for many years — where committees One of the most problematic aspects of the explicitly state their intention to recommend decadal surveys conducted in the early 2010s a specific implementation approach.25 revolved around the cost and technical evaluation (CATE) process that consumed lots of energy and • Future CATEs could … initially run a effort by both the survey participants and NASA much larger number of candidate missions but that too often was either misinterpreted or through a faster but coarser “cost-box” anal- overtaken by events. No one seems to doubt ysis, to provide a sense of scale for initial the importance of such a process. For example, consideration. This extra step would reserve former planetary science survey committee chair the full-CATE process for missions that are Steve Squyres put his belief in the need for CATEs likely to become part of the recommended quite directly: program — that is, those that require more detailed estimates.26 I’m a huge fan of the CATE process. The way I would put it is that we do these audacious • [A] reliable CATE process is crucial for the things where we fling these spacecraft out into largest, most ambitious missions … where the universe and we try to do nearly impossi- cost growth can threaten the health of a ble things. And plans like that really should be whole set of activities over a discipline, and devised by people who are by nature optimists, beyond…. [F]uture surveys [should] exer- because … you need optimists who are going cise greater attention and care in assessing to have the vision. But your costing should be and recommending potentially “discipline done by pessimists.24 disrupting” programs.27 While agreeing that CATEs are necessary ele- INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES. Research in ments of decadal surveys, the 2015 SSB report space and Earth science has always been an interna- made three key points about how the process of tional endeavor. The first post-Sputnik U.S. efforts identifying and evaluating future mission concepts were tied to the International Geophysical Year, should evolve: and NASA soon forged partnerships with many other countries. Currently active international 23. National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, The Space Science Decadal Surveys: Lessons Learned and Best Practices (The National Academies Press, Washington, DC, 2015), pp. 3–6. 24. Squyres interview. 25. National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, The Space Science Decadal Surveys: Lessons Learned and Best Practices, (The National Academies Press, Washington, DC, 2015), p. 4. 26. National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, The Space Science Decadal Surveys: Lessons Learned and Best Practices, (The National Academies Press, Washington, DC, 2015), p. 6. 27. Ibid.

248 Science Advice to NASA: Conflict, Consensus, Partnership, Leadership cooperative agreements in NASA’s Science Mission missions are notable examples of where scientific Directorate number in the hundreds. While the goals may exceed the grasp of any one space agency. United States was clearly the international leader If that is so, then international cooperation will in the space sciences well into the 1970s and early offer the only way forward. Therefore, planning 1980s, the scope and competence of other nations’ for such ambitious international projects must con- space science programs have grown steadily. Other sider international input and participation in the nations are quite capable of carrying out major sci- planning process. How, then, should this consider- ence missions entirely on their own. ation affect the advisory process? Advisory committees have generally been cogni- There are several obstacles to integrating inter- zant of the international dimensions of their topics. national input into planning for the space sciences. The SSB serves as the U.S. National Committee First, there is no close counterpart to the NRC of the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) Space Studies Board in other nations and no coun- of the International Council for Science, which is terpart to the independently developed, broadly the principal international scientific body for com- based decadal surveys. Individual space agencies munication about and promotion of space research. have their own planning processes that involve The SSB also has long maintained liaison with the outside scientists, but the results do not often carry European Space Science Committee, which is the the same political clout as the decadals do in the closest analog to the SSB in Europe. However, United States. international considerations have not been major factors in the advisory ecosystem.28 Some recent Secondly, the planning cycles of other national decadal surveys did arrange to obtain perspectives space agencies are almost always out of phase with from outside the United States. For example, the those at NASA. The same problem usually exists 2007 Earth science and applications survey had a with respect to decadal surveys in the United European scientist on the steering committee and States and science planning abroad. NASA’s John non-U.S. scientists on two of the survey’s topical Grunsfeld found that this was a particularly tough panels,29 and the 2011 planetary science survey had problem in trying to do joint planning with the European scientists on two of its topical panels and European Space Agency: also enlisted two European report peer reviewers.30 Right now they have their vision process, we Nevertheless, one can argue that long-range sci- have our decadal surveys, and they are out entific planning demands an even greater awareness of phase by five years. We have talked about, of international points of view. As proposed future “Well, is there any advantage to syncing them space missions become increasingly complex and up and cooperating?” The answer is that [my costly, they will also become impossible for a single ESA counterpart] has enough challenge trying nation to afford and conduct. Comprehensive to get 20 or more member countries … all to observations of the Earth from space, future agree to work together on the same time scale. advanced space telescopes, and Mars sample return Not that it is cantankerous, but it is difficult. 28. For three notable exceptions, see the SSB reports “U.S.-European Collaboration in Space Science” (1998), “Approaches to Future Space Cooperation and Competition in a Globalizing World: Summary of a Workshop” (2009), and “Review of the MEPAG Report on Mars Special Regions” (2015), all from the National Academy Press, Washington, DC. 29. National Research Council, aEarth Science and Applications from Space: National Imperatives for the Next Decade and Beyond”(The National Academies Press, Washington, DC, 2007), pp. v–ix. 30. National Research Council, “Vision and Voyages for Planetary Science in the Decade 2013–2022” (The National Academies Press, Washington, DC, 2011), pp. v–vi and xi.

Chapter 20  •  The Big Picture — Future Challenges 249 Trying then to incorporate something out of perspective. The roadmap authors also hoped that the European Union, out of the European they might help inform the deliberations of future Space Agency context, with the U.S., which decadal survey committees in the United States.34 has its own big communities and struggles, It is not yet clear whether this COSPAR initiative would be nearly impossible.31 will have an impact. Astronomer Marcia Rieke saw the phasing prob- In August 2015 the International Astronomical lem with the Europeans firsthand when she served Union held a two-day session during its triennial on the 2010 astronomy decadal survey committee: General Assembly to promote discussion of issues regarding increased international coordination and But the fact of the matter is then when it cooperation in astrophysics and heliophysics pro- comes time to do something like a decadal grams. The participants at that meeting agreed survey or they do their planning, they are not that COSPAR’s scientific roadmapping approach done at the same time. There isn’t a convenient was appropriate and that international discussions way to coordinate things. What happened to should take into account the priorities identified in [the 2010 astronomy and astrophysics survey] various national decadal surveys.35 is a good example where our [priority] num- bers two and three required European cooper- While scientists do often value international ation or collaboration at fairly deep levels. And collaboration and do collaborate, there are also because the Europeans didn’t choose either one rather deeply ingrained competitive motivations of those next … there we are out on the street.32 that can be obstacles to fully open cooperation, even in the advisory process. Marcia Smith saw this in her experience with NRC advisory studies: Rieke concluded that, given the difficulty in From my perspective as someone who is not synchronizing or coordinating interagency plan- an astronomer, for example, I think it makes ning, “It may be that one just has to work at the a lot of sense to get the world’s astronomy scientist-to-scientist level and come up from the community together just the way you get the bottom.”33 This view was shared by many of the U.S. astronomy committee together and figure author’s interview subjects. out what’s best to do and who’s going to do what. But I do know that astronomers feel per- COSPAR undertook one approach to inter- sonal pride and national pride in being the first national grassroots planning in the early 2010s. to discover something.36 Groups of scientists prepared a series of scientific roadmaps — covering lunar and planetary explo- Consequently, she found on at least one occa- ration, astrophysics, space weather, and Earth sion that the organizers of a long-range planning science — that were intended to communicate to study committee did not want international people national space agencies about important scientific because they viewed them as competitive. opportunities and priorities from an international 31. Grunsfeld interview. 32. Rieke interview, p. 6. 33. Ibid. 34. Fisk interview, pp. 22–23. 35. For background on the meeting, see http://astronomy2015.org/focus_meeting_11 36. Smith interview, p. 25.

250 Science Advice to NASA: Conflict, Consensus, Partnership, Leadership It is one thing to work together to identify planning and project commitment cycles of vari- important scientific priorities and opportunities ous nations remain misaligned. That includes the for international cooperation, but the actual plan- phasing of the decadal surveys in the United States. ning of missions is best left to the space agencies. In Given the fact that any ambitious space endeavor Grunsfeld’s opinion, international collaboration “is is, by definition, a long-term effort, it would make very tough for advisory councils or decadal surveys sense for U.S. decadal surveys, and the interna- to coordinate, but they can certainly encourage.”37 tional scientific community in general, to work to Former NASA science chief Al Diaz had a similar communicate extensively, early, and often to ensure view, saying that there might “be an international that informed perspectives about international science body that would advise agencies on how to opportunities are delivered to all space agencies. conduct and how to select missions”38 but that the agencies would not ask such a scientific group to BASIC RECURRING THEMES OF ADVICE. Certain help design the programs. From a U.S. perspective, themes or principles have been woven into nearly Claude Canizares also saw the task of promoting every element of outside advice throughout NASA’s an international discussion as being NASA’s job: history. Those themes have become the very foun- dation for what advisors have urged NASA to do. There ought to be a regular convening of something like a “space summit.” I know that 1. Priority for scientific quality and merit. Advisors there are international organizations that try to have argued without exception that the first cri- bring some of the right parties together, but terion for making decisions and choices about I think they are not the best ones to do this. NASA’s science program should be driven by scien- I think NASA should take the lead on that.39 tific merit. This principle was the basis for advice to NASA in the SSB’s 1961 letter report40 (see chapter In summary, the international picture seems 2); it has been the starting point for every decadal clear on a few points and murky on others. There is survey report; and it was the principal theme of general agreement that scientist-to-scientist discus- the SSB’s 2005 report, “Science in NASA’s Vision sions about scientific goals and priorities that per- for Space Exploration.”41 As chapter 16 notes, the colate up from the community are the best way to latter report was a bit of a dud, because it lacked build a scientific consensus about future opportu- actionable recommendations, but it did repeat and nities for international cooperation. However, the reinforce the principle of making scientific merit job of designing missions and forging specific part- a fundamental decision-making criterion. NASA’s nerships is better left to government space agencies. internal committees also have consistently espoused One can envision a role for advisory bodies, espe- the same view. For example, the Space and Earth cially at the National Academies, for the former but Science Advisory Committee’s 1986 Crisis report not the latter. Even when the players make their (see chapter 5) discussed criteria for selecting future best efforts, the task will be difficult as long as 37. Grunsfeld interview. 38. Diaz interview, p. 8. 39. Canizares interview, p. 14. 40. National Research Council, “Policy Positions on (1) Man’s Role in the National Space Program and (2) Support of Basic Research for Space Science” (The National Academies Press, Washington, DC, 31 March 1961). 41. Space Studies Board, “Science in NASA’s Vision for Space Exploration” (National Research Council, The National Academies Press, Washington, DC, 2005).

Chapter 20  •  The Big Picture — Future Challenges 251 research missions and placed scientific merit at the The process got off to a shaky start in the top of its list, saying years immediately before and after NASA’s for- mation. When the Working Group on Internal The fundamental purpose of the Space and Instrumentation of the NAS Technical Panel on the Earth Science Program is to obtain scientific Earth Satellite Program (see chapter 1) recommended understanding of the world around us; hence experiments to fly on the first Vanguard satellites, scientific merit and potential scientific con- the top four priorities included experiments from tributions must be the dominant values to be two of the working group’s own members — Herbert assessed.42 Friedman of NRL and James Van Allen — as well as an another experiment by NRL scientist Herman The Crisis report did go on to add other crite- LaGow. Panel member and Vanguard Program sci- ria — specifically, programmatic considerations ence coordinator Homer Newell was Friedman’s and and societal benefits — but science remained LaGow’s supervisor. In his book, Naugle describes number one. how extraordinary time pressures subsequently led to a rather chaotic selection process for experiments NASA has been largely responsive to this to fly on Explorer 1 and on the first Pioneer lunar view and has reflected the advice in practice. For missions, all due to a rush to respond to the success- example, the first Office of Space Science and ful Soviet Sputnik launches. Almost immediately Applications strategic plan in 1988 (see chapter 7) after its formation in June 1958, the Space Science was based on the principle of scientific excellence, Board sought to take over future experiment pro- and all subsequent science strategic plans either posal evaluations and selections, and they kicked off explicitly or implicitly reaffirmed that commit- the process by issuing a widely circulated invitation ment to scientific merit as a priority. to U.S. scientists to propose spaceflight experiments. However, NASA officials were convinced that pro- 2. Importance of peer review. The concept of posal review and selection were properly NASA peer review is a fundamental element of scien- responsibilities, and by 1960 NASA put a system in tific research in the United States. By subjecting place by which the Agency invited scientific propos- research proposals and results to critical examina- als for spaceflight experiments and then organized tion by an independent cadre of scientific experts, scientific peer review panels comprised of both out- the scientific community applies its own, usually side- and inside-NASA scientists to review the pro- rigorous and demanding, version of quality control posals and recommend ones for selection. Naugle to the scientific enterprise. Consequently, outside describes how that process eventually dealt with advisors have consistently emphasized that open the problems of conflicts of interest that colored the competition and peer review should be the princi- early selections for Vanguard, Explorer 1, and the pal means by which NASA selects scientists to par- first Pioneers.43 ticipate in space research missions, and NASA has largely embraced that approach. After getting an orderly peer review process in place for flight experiments, NASA eventually 42. Space and Earth Science Advisory Committee, “The Crisis in Space and Earth Science: A Time for a New Commitment” (NASA Advisory Council, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC, November 1986), p. 52. 43. See the discussion “Stress in the Selection Process” in chapter 1 of John Naugle’s book First Among Equals: The Selection of NASA Space Science Experiments (NASA SP-4215, NASA History Division, Washington, DC, 1991).

252 Science Advice to NASA: Conflict, Consensus, Partnership, Leadership moved to apply peer review more broadly to eval- balance goes back to debates over NACA’s balance uation of all research grant proposals (e.g., for data of emphasis on basic aeronautical sciences versus analysis, ground-based investigations, theoretical research in support of practical problems in aero- studies, and sounding rocket and balloon flight nautical engineering. The infant Space Science experiments) across the space sciences. The last Board staked out its position in the context of exception to a totally peer-review-based program space research in its 1961 letter to NASA (see chap- was erased in the 1970s, when NASA in-house ter 2) when it emphasized that a basic research scientists were required to compete against their program was essential “quite aside” from NASA’s non-NASA colleagues in the same process in space f light projects.44 science, and in the 1980s, when that approach was applied also to NASA’s Earth scientists. The Fisk The balance issue in the space sciences, how- strategic plan of 1988 and essentially every NASA ever, has many more facets than just fundamental science strategic plan thereafter have cited peer science versus applications, and it really involves review as a basic operating principle. a consideration of several kinds of portfolio mix. First, there is NASA’s portfolio of space mission The concept of peer review is integrated even sizes, which range from small individual-scientist- more broadly into the culture of space and Earth led projects that may cost a few $100 million or sciences, because the advisory process is itself a kind less up to major, flagship-class missions that cost of peer review process. As advisory bodies com- billions of dollars. Then there is the question of the prised of science, technology, and policy experts proportions of resources going to different classes of convene to debate potential advice, they challenge research activity, which range from small research one another to ensure that their arguments towards project grants in data analysis or theoretical studies, an eventual consensus will stand up under scrutiny on the one hand, to substantial spaceflight project from other scientists, government officials, and an investments. A more subtle and nuanced aspect of interested public. Both NASA’s internal advisory balance involves the relative levels of support and committees and committees operating under the participation by researchers at universities versus aegis of the NRC have explicit policies for deal- researchers at national laboratories and industry. ing with real or apparent conflicts of interest. The And finally, but in no way least significant, there process is not perfect, especially because there may is the question of balance in terms of relative always be contrary views when the topic itself is emphasis and support for different scientific disci- complex or controversial. Nevertheless, the process plines — e.g., astrophysics versus planetary science of information gathering, debate, and convergence versus solar and space plasma physics versus Earth towards consensus by a broadly based group of science. All of these dimensions enter into the dis- independent experts can provide the government cussion of balance. with as good an advisory product as is possible. In all of these discussions, balance has never 3. Balanced portfolio. Advisory body appeals for a been intended to mean equity. No advisory com- “balanced” research program have probably been mittee has suggested that NASA take its total the most often cited, most open to interpretation, budget and divide it equally amongst different and sometimes most difficult to implement rec- components. Rather, advisors have urged NASA ommendations over NASA’s history. The issue of to not only avoid putting all its eggs in one basket but to ensure that each element of the program 44. National Research Council, “Policy Positions on (1) Man’s Role in the National Space Program and (2) Support of Basic Research for Space Science” (The National Academies Press, Washington, DC, 31 March 1961).

Chapter 20  •  The Big Picture — Future Challenges 253 can remain viable even when some require more the solar system and an appropriate mix of resources than others. small, medium, and large missions.”47 Practically every decadal survey report and There have been occasions when the balance every SSB review of NASA science strategies have principle has appeared threatened and advisors have emphasized the principle of balance and have noted raised alarms. For example, in 1969 the Lunar and its various dimensions. For example, the 2010 Planetary Missions Board (see chapter 3) threat- astronomy and astrophysics decadal said, ened mutiny after the members felt that NASA had abandoned support for small and modest-sized “Maintaining a balanced program is an over- planetary missions in favor of the Administration’s riding priority for attaining the overall science interest in big Mars missions. In the early 1970s, objectives that are at the core of the program astronomers worried about whether the Large recommended by the survey committee.”45 Space Telescope would hurt support for smaller, or at least less expensive, ground-based telescopes (see The 2007 decadal for Earth science and applica- chapter 11). In 2005, scientists feared that President tions from space took a similar view: Bush’s Vision for Space Exploration would sacrifice astrophysics, space plasma physics, and even Earth The Earth observation and information system science (see chapter 16) in the pursuit of areas that program should seek to achieve and maintain were focused on exploration of the solar system. balance in a number of thematic areas in order to support the broad array of demands for Arguments for balance have for the most part Earth information. Balance is required in the been based on long-range strategic considerations. types of measurements (research, sustained, That is, to remain robust and resilient in the face and operational), in the sizes and complexity of budgetary or programmatic threats, the program of missions, across science disciplines, and needs a mix of sizes of investments, provisions for across technology maturity levels.46 ensuring healthy flight rates and new opportuni- ties, resources to enable each scientific discipline to The 2011 planetary science decadal echoed the make progress, and means to lay groundwork for same message: both the technologies and the workforce that will be needed in the future. An emphasis on any subset “[The] prioritized list of flight investigations of these at the detriment of others risks compromis- [has] been judged and ordered with respect ing program health either in the near term or the to a set of appropriate criteria…. The first long term. and most important was science return per dollar…. The second criterion was program- Astronomer Steven Strom noted a societal or matic balance — striving to achieve an appro- cultural argument for balance that goes beyond the priate balance among mission targets across cold, pragmatic considerations of investment strat- egy. When all members of the scientific community 45. National Research Council, “New Worlds, New Horizons in Astronomy and Astrophysics” (The National Academies Press, Washington, DC, 2010), p. 4. 46. National Research Council, “Earth Science and Applications from Space: National Imperatives for the Next Decade and Beyond” (The National Academies Press, Washington, DC, 2007), p. 40. 47. National Research Council, Vision and Voyages for Planetary Science in the Decade 2013–2022 (The National Academies Press, Washington, DC, 2011), p. 12.

254 Science Advice to NASA: Conflict, Consensus, Partnership, Leadership sense that their particular areas of interest are being 11), NASA Chief Scientist Waleed Abdalati noted considered and not being ignored, then NASA can that while scientists may believe that the space sci- draw on a broader base of support.48 More people ence program belongs to the scientific community are likely to back the program as a whole, and fac- because the scientific community uses the advisory tional infighting will be less likely to become an process to decide what science is to be done, the sci- impediment. Advisory panels are not oblivious to entific community really conducts space research this perspective, and so consensus recommenda- on behalf of the nation.50 Dan Baker applied this tions for NASA to attend to the multiple dimen- principle to the decadals: “[T]his is advice that is sions of balance have been a constant for scientific, being given to the whole nation. It really is advice strategic, and societal reasons. that applies as appropriate to all the spacefaring agencies.”51 LEADERSHIP PRINCIPLES. Finally, our glimpse into the future of outside scientific advice to NASA Second, by virtue of their different operating comes to rest on considerations of leadership. approaches and relationships to NASA, external All participants in space research — from policy NRC committees and internal NASA commit- makers to government managers and adminis- tees have distinct and distinctly important roles. trators to scientists and engineers from academia, Both systems are needed, and their practitioners government and non-government laboratories, and need to understand and work to meet their differ- industry — have leadership roles to play to ensure ent responsibilities. The general division of labor the success of NASA’s use of outside scientific between strategic advice from the NRC and tac- advice. This success, in turn, depends on four key tical advice from NASA’s committees is widely leadership principles. accepted. NRC committees require what John Grunsfeld described as “longer-term deliberation … First, all players need to appreciate that the U.S. much broader engagement of the community, and space and Earth science program is not NASA’s some time for fermentation.”52 They are more likely program, and it is not the scientific community’s to be viewed as speaking on behalf of the broader program; it is the nation’s program. Homer Newell scientific community and to be addressing advice and John Naugle understood this as they consid- not just to NASA but to all relevant elements of ered the basis for NASA’s relationships with advi- the government. NASA’s committees, on the other sory committees in the late 1960s and early 1970s hand, can respond more quickly to time-critical (see chapter 3). Ed Weiler’s perspective was typical issues and work more intimately with NASA as of most science leaders who followed Newell and their only client. Naugle: “I always felt that my job as Associate Administrator was to run a national science pro- Each of these two different advisory avenues gram.… I never said NASA space science program, has its own weaknesses, as well as strengths. The I said the nation’s space science program.”49 At the NRC bodies’ approaches to preserving indepen- 2012 SSB workshop on decadal surveys (see chapter dence and imposing strict standards of peer review make it practically impossible for them to deal with 48. Strom interview. 49. Weiler interview, p. 5. 50. National Research Council,“Lessons Learned in Decadal Planning in Space Science: Summary of a Workshop” (The National Academies Press, Washington, DC, 2013), p. 72. 51. Baker interview, p 8. 52. Grunsfeld interview.

Chapter 20  •  The Big Picture — Future Challenges 255 urgent tactical problems, and that has sometimes to the amendments to FACA legislation, and both frustrated both the advisors and the Agency. For the National Academies and NASA are still coping the NASA committees, the tension between pro- with those changes. Earlier, this chapter argued for viding independent advice versus serving on behalf a new business model for the NRC, and the organi- of NASA has sometimes caused trouble. A notable zation seems to be making modest progress in that example was when NAC chair Harrison Schmitt direction. However, whether an institution steeped urged Administrator Griffin to dismiss the scien- in history and tradition can keep up with the pace tist members of the NAC (see chapter 12), because of evolving national needs remains to be seen. he felt they were advocating changes to the admin- istration’s policy rather than helping implement it. The fourth leadership principle is possibly the most important. Providing and utilizing scientific To be sure, there have been cases where the two advice requires partnership. NASA cannot deliver a kinds of advisory bodies reached well beyond the world-class space research program without sound traditional limits cited above to provide critically advice about scientific opportunities and priorities important advice. Both the SESAC Crisis report from the research community, participation of U.S. and the Bretherton Earth system science report scientists in the enterprise, and supportive budgets (see chapter 5) were prepared by NASA committees and policies from the Congress and the White based on extensive analyses and deliberations. The House. The scientific community cannot make the NRC report on extending the life of the Hubble progress it wants without NASA’s direct support Space Telescope (see chapter 16) addressed an in planning and executing a space science research urgent near-term problem and did so in a remark- and development program. In addition, Congress ably short time. However, it appears that such cannot ensure that the American people will have exceptions are likely to be rare. a research program that serves the national inter- est unless it hears and understands the best sci- Third, the effectiveness of the advisory process entific advice that the nation can obtain. All the needs to be continuously assessed. As the science players need to understand and embrace a process makes progress, as the political and programmatic that is open to ideas, scientifically sound, tested by environment evolves, and as roles and relation- constructive tensions, and ultimately focused on ships between elements of the advisory ecosystem achievement via partnership. change, all the players need to examine the efficacy of the process and ask whether the process itself Earlier chapters have described an advisory eco- needs to be modified or sharpened. The series of system that has experienced a variety of stresses. reorganizations of NASA internal committees Ecosystems often manage to recover from stresses from the 1960s through the 1980s reflected NASA and to emerge as robust as they were before. officials’ views that the committee structure and NASA’s advisory ecosystem has demonstrated that roles needed to change as NASA’s programs pro- capacity in the past, and it should be able to do so gressed. The SSB’s continuing evaluations of the in the future. Past conflicts — whether over priori- decadal survey process have had important impacts ties or resources or authority — have been resolved on the utility of the surveys, and one can expect by players that have been willing to seek consensus, further improvements in future rounds. NRC pol- open to embrace partnership, and above all, pre- icies and procedures certainly changed in response pared to exercise leadership.



Bibliographic Essay To the author’s knowledge, this book is the first Newell’s Beyond the Atmosphere: Early Years of Space comprehensive treatment of the history and Science (NASA SP-4211, NASA History Division, implications of outside scientific advice to NASA. 1980) and John E. Naugle’s First Among Equals: However, Bruce L. R. Smith’s The Advisors: Scientists The Selection of NASA Space Science Experiments in the Policy Process (The Brookings Institution, (NASA SP-4215, NASA History Division, 1991) Washington, DC, 1992) provides a nice high- are superb. Both Newell and Naugle discuss rela- level overview of the history of science advice to tionships between NASA and its internal and exter- the government, and it includes case studies from nal advisory bodies during the Agency’s formative the Department of Defense, the Environmental years. For a detailed picture of the evolution of the Protection Agency, the Department of Energy, the NASA headquarters organization and how NASA’s Department of State, NASA, and the White House. science offices related to the rest of the Agency at Smith’s emphasis is on the interfaces between sci- different times, one can consult The Evolution of ence and politics, but he does not dig into the the NASA Organization, which was prepared by the details of the wide array of advisory fora. Also, Peter NASA Office of Management in 1985; it is avail- Blair provides a nice concise summary of the his- able on the NASA History Division Web site at tory of the advisory roles of the National Academy http://history.nasa.gov/orgcharts/evol_org.pdf. of Sciences and recent trends in its roles (Peter D. Blair, “The evolving role of the US National An August 1976 paper in the NASA Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine Archives — “The Lunar and Planetary Missions in providing science and technology policy advice to Board” — by University of Virginia professor Barry the US government,” Palgrave Communications 2, Rutizer (HHN-138) provides a particularly infor- Article number 16030, 7 June 2016). mative history of the activities of the Lunar and Planetary Missions Board. The NASA Archives also There are several useful historical treatments of have useful collections of correspondence and doc- the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics uments about NASA’s various advisory bodies. (NACA). In particular, chapter 1 of Model Research by Alex Roland (NASA SP-4130, NASA History The seven-volume Exploring the Unknown doc- Division, 1985) provides an excellent summary umentary history series, which has been prepared of the NACA’s origins, and Orders of Magnitude: for the NASA History Division by John Logsdon A History of the NACA and NASA, 1915–1990 and collaborators, has many useful documents that are complemented by incisive introductory essays. by Roger E. Bilstein (NASA SP-4406, NASA The following volumes were particularly helpful for History Division, 1989) covers the NACA’s early this book: years and its transition into NASA. A NASA History Division publication, The National • Logsdon, John M., ed., with Linda J. Lear, Advisory Committee for Aeronautics: An Annotated Jannelle Warren Findley, Ray A. Williamson, and Dwayne A. Day. Exploring the Unknown: Bibliography, (Monographs in Aerospace History, Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. No. 55, 2014, NASA SP-2014-4555) provides Civil Space Program, Volume I, Organizing many other useful sources. For coverage of the early for Exploration. NASA SP-4407, 1995. evolution of NASA’s science programs, Homer E. 257

258 Science Advice to NASA: Conflict, Consensus, Partnership, Leadership • Logsdon, John M., ed., with Amy Paige for SSB reports in each scientific discipline area. Snyder, Roger D. Launius, Stephen J. Garber, The National Academies Press Web site permits and Regan Anne Newport. Exploring the one to search for other National Research Council Unknown: Selected Documents in the History reports. of the U.S. Civil Space Program, Volume V, Exploring the Cosmos. NASA SP-4407, 2001. “Federal Advisory Committees: An Overview” by Wendy R. Ginsberg (Congressional Research • Logsdon, John M., ed., with Stephen J. Service, 7-5700, R40520, 16 April 2009) provides Garber, Roger D. Launius, and Ray A. a good overview of the Federal Advisory Committee Williamson. Exploring the Unknown: Selected Act history and content. Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program, Volume VI: Space and Earth For advisory committee activities and NASA Science. NASA SP-2004-4407, 2004. reactions over the period 1980 through late 1994, the author has also relied on his personal notes. Several episodes in the history of space science Those notes then cover NRC Space Studies Board are nicely captured in detail in various pieces. For activities from early 1998 through about 2012. example, John Logsdon’s account of the near death of NASA’s planetary program (“The Survival Crisis Two oral history collections have been helpful of the U.S. Solar System Exploration Program”) is to gain insights about some of the key players in in Roger Launius’ book, Exploring the Solar System: NASA science. One is the NASA Oral History The History and Science of Planetary Probes (Palgrave Program, for which many interview transcripts are Macmillan, 2012). Robert W. Smith describes the available at http://www.jsc.nasa.gov/history/oral_his- advisory history of the Hubble Space Telescope in tories/participants.htm. Another is maintained by the The Space Telescope: A Study of NASA, Science, and Niels Bohr Library and Archives of the American Politics (Cambridge University Press, 1989). Martin Institute of Physics, which has interview transcripts Harwit’s book, In Search of the True Universe: The online at https://www.aip.org/history-programs/ Tools, Shaping, and Cost of Cosmological Thought niels-bohr-library/oral-histories. (Cambridge University Press, 2013), complements Smith’s account and expands on it to cover other Finally, the author conducted interviews with space astronomy missions. many current and former government officials and with scientists who have been substantively The archives of the National Academy of involved in developing scientific advice for NASA. Sciences have relatively complete records of the A list of those interviews follows [an asterisk denotes activities of various National Academies boards interviews for which a transcript is available in the and committees. The Web site of the Space Studies NASA Oral History program collection.]: Board (http://sites.nationalacademies.org/SSB/index. htm) provides a complete list of all SSB study *Mark R. Abbott; Dean and Professor, College reports going back to 1958 (http://sites.nation- of Earth, Ocean, and Atmospheric Sciences, alacademies.org/SSB/SSB_051650#1950s), and the Oregon State University; interview via tele- site includes links to the reports themselves. The phone; 26 March 2014 SSB also tracks the history of its advisory activities in its annual reports, which are posted at http://sites. *Marc S. Allen; Deputy Associate Administrator nationalacademies.org/SSB/SSB_051650. One par- for Research, NASA Science Mission ticularly useful feature of the annual reports is a set Directorate; Washington, DC; 9 September of diagrams that display timelines and relationships 2013 and 7 May 2014

Bibliographic Essay 259 *Daniel N. Baker; Director, Laboratory for Harvard University, and former NASA Atmospheric and Space Physics, University of Administrator; Woods Hole, MA; 6 December Colorado; Boulder, CO; 2 November 2014 2013 Radford Byerly, Jr.; former Chief of Staff, Neil Gehrels; Chief of Astroparticle Physics Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, Laboratory, NASA Goddard Space Flight U.S. House of Representatives; Boulder, CO; 3 Center; telephone interview; 7 July 2014 November 2014 David Goldston; Director of Government Affairs, *Claude R. Canizares; Bruno Rossi Professor of Natural Resources Defense Council, and Physics and Vice President, MIT; and former former Chief of Staff of the House Committee SSB chair; Cambridge, MA; 5 December 2013 on Science; Washington, DC; 21 November 2014 Arthur Charo; Senior Program Officer, National Research Council; Washington, DC; 8 May *Richard M. Goody; Mallinckrodt Professor 2014 of Planetary Physics (Emeritus), Harvard University, and former SSB Chair; Woods Mary L. Cleave; former Associate Administrator, Hole, MA; 5 December 2014 NASA Science Mission Directorate; Annapolis, MD; 16 July 2014 James L. Green; Director of Planetary Science, NASA Science Mission Directorate; Bruce B. Darling; Executive Officer, National Washington, DC; 8 May 2014 and 7 Research Council; Washington, DC; 16 March December 2015 2015 Michael D. Griffin; Chairman and CEO, Schafer Dwayne A. Day; Senior Program Officer, National Corporation, and former NASA Administrator; Research Council; Washington, DC; 8 May Arlington, VA; 20 November 2014 2014 John M. Grunsfeld; Associate Administrator, *Alphonso V. Diaz; Vice President for Financial NASA Science Mission Directorate; Affairs and Treasurer, Marymount University, Washington, DC; 31 July 2014 and former NASA Associate Administrator for Science; Washington, DC; 1 August 2014 *Paul Hertz; Director of Astrophysics, NASA Science Mission Directorate; Washington, DC; *Lennard A. Fisk; Thomas M. Donahue 25 November 2013 Distinguished University Professor of Space Science, University of Michigan, former NASA James F. Hinchman; Deputy Executive Officer, Associate Administrator for Space Science and National Research Council; Washington, DC; Applications and former SSB Chair; Portland, 9 October 2014 OR; 10 October 2013 Noel W. Hinners; former NASA Associate *Robert A. Frosch; Senior Associate in Science, Administrator and Chief Scientist; telephone Technology, and Public Policy Program, interview; 11 and 17 December 2013

260 Science Advice to NASA: Conflict, Consensus, Partnership, Leadership *Wesley T. Huntress; Director Emeritus, Michael H. Moloney; Director for Space and Geophysical Laboratory, Carnegie Institution Aeronautics, National Research Council; of Washington, and former NASA Associate Washington, DC; 15 July 2014 and 18 March Administrator for Science; Washington, DC; 4 2015 November 2013 Richard M. Obermann; Democratic Chief of Amy P. Kaminski; Senior Policy Advisor, Office of Staff, House Committee on Science, Space, the NASA Chief Scientist; Washington, DC; and Technology; Washington, DC; 22 October 17 March 2015 2014 *Charles F. Kennel; Distinguished Professor of Kathie L. Olsen; Founder and Managing Director, Atmospheric Science, Scripps Institution ScienceWorks International LLC, former of Oceanography, former NASA Associate NASA Chief Scientist, and former NSF Administrator for Earth Science, former NASA Deputy Director; telephone interview; 25 Advisory Council Chair, and former SSB August 2014 Chair; telephone interview; 20 January 2014 Joel R. Parriot; Deputy Executive Officer Mary E. Kicza; former NOAA Assistant and Director of Public Policy, American Administrator for Satellite and Information Astronomical Society; Washington, DC; 14 Services; Washington, DC; 7 August 2014 July 2014 *Louis J. Lanzerotti; Distinguished Research *Charles J. Pellerin; President, 4-D Systems, Professor, New Jersey Institute of Technology, former NASA Director of Astrophysics; tele- and former SSB Chair; telephone interview; 25 phone interview; 23 October 2013 February 2014 Jeffrey D. Rosendhal; former NASA Assistant Grace Leung; Director of Finance, City of Associate Administrator for Space Science and Sunnyvale, CA; telephone interview; 14 August Applications; Washington, DC; 15 November 2014 2013 Janet G. Luhmann; Senior Fellow, Space Sciences *Marcia J. Rieke; Regents’ Professor of Astronomy, Laboratory, University of California at University of Arizona; Tucson, AZ; 11 Berkeley; Tucson, AZ; 11 November 2014 November 2014 *Kevin B. Marvel; Executive Officer, American Harrison H. Schmitt; Honorary Associate and Astronomical Society; Tucson, AZ, and Fellow of the College of Engineering at Washington, DC; 15 October 2013 and 14 University of Wisconsin-Madison and former July 2014 NAC Chair; telephone interview; 17 February 2015 Ralph L. McNutt; Chief Scientist, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory; Tucson, *Kathryn S. Schmoll; former Vice President AZ; 11 November 2014 for Finance and Administration, University

Bibliographic Essay 261 Corporation for Atmospheric Research; Michael S. Turner; Bruce and Diana Rauner Boulder, CO; 3 November 2014 Distinguished Service Professor in Astronomy and Astrophysics, Enrico Fermi Institute, Donald C. Shapero; Senior Program Officer, Director, Kavli Institute for Cosmological National Research Council; Washington, DC; Physics, University of Chicago, and former 17 December 2013 NSF Assistant Director for Mathematics and Physical Sciences; Chicago, IL; 11 November Paul Shawcross; Science and Space Branch Chief, 2013 Office of Management and Budget; with Grace Hu and J. D. Kundu, OMB budget examiners; *Edward J. Weiler; former NASA Associate telephone interview; 30 December 2014 Administrator for Science; Washington, DC; 14 August 2013 David S. Smith; Senior Program Officer, National Research Council; Washington, DC; 15 July Pamela L. Whitney; Professional Staff Member, 2013 House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology; Washington, DC; 8 August 2014 *Marcia S. Smith; Founder and Editor, SpacePolicyOnline.com, and former SSB Gregory J. Williams; Deputy Associate Director; Washington, DC; 3 September 2013 Administrator for Policy and Plans, Human Exploration and Operations Mission Steven W. Squyres; James A. Weeks Professor of Directorate; telephone interview; 21 February Physical Sciences, Cornell University, and 2014 Chair, NASA Advisory Council; telephone interview; 28 January 2015 George L. Withbroe; former Director of the NASA Sun-Earth Connection Division; tele- *S. Alan Stern; CEO and President, The Golden phone interview; 25 July 2014 Spike Company, and former NASA Associate Administrator for Science; telephone interview; Dan Woods; Director for Strategic Integration 6 August 2014 and Management, NASA Science Mission Directorate; Washington, DC; 23 March 2015 Ellen Stofan; NASA Chief Scientist; telephone interview; 12 January 2015 *A. Thomas Young; former Executive Vice President, Lockheed Martin Corporation, and Stephen E. Strom; former Chair of the Five former SSB Vice Chair; telephone interview; College Observatory Astronomy Department, 20 February 2014 MA, and former member of the scientific staff, National Optical Astronomy Observatory; Tucson, AZ; 6 November 2014



Acronyms AAAC Astronomy and Astrophysics Advisory DOE Department of Energy ELV expendable launch vehicle Committee EOS Earth Observing System ESA European Space Agency AEC Atomic Energy Commission ESAC Earth Sciences Advisory Committee ESSC European Space Science Committee AFTA Astrophysics Focused Telescope Assets ESSC Earth System Sciences Committee EUVE Extreme Ultraviolet Explorer AIM Astrometric Interferometry Mission FACA Federal Advisory Committee Act FESAC Fusion Energy Sciences Advisory APL Applied Physics Laboratory Committee FUSE Far-Ultraviolet Spectroscopic Explorer AMB Astronomy Missions Board GLAST Gamma-ray Large Area Space Telescope AMS Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer GP-B Gravity Probe B GPRA Government Performance and Results ASEB Aeronautics and Space Engineering Act GPRAMA GPRA Modernization Act Board HEAO High-Energy Astrophysics Observatory Athena Advanced Telescope for High Energy HEPAP High Energy Physics Advisory Panel HRC Historical Reference Collection Astrophysics HST Hubble Space Telescope IGY International Geophysical Year AURA Association of Universities for IMCE International Space Station Management and Cost Evaluation Research in Astronomy IRT Independent Review Team ISPM International Solar Polar Mission AXAF Advanced X-ray Astrophysics Facility ISS International Space Station IXO International X-ray Observatory BPA Board on Physics and Astronomy JAXA Japanese Space Agency JDEM Joint Dark Energy Mission CATE cost and technical evaluation JWST James Webb Space Telescope LGO Lunar Geoscience Observer COBE Cosmic Background Explorer LISA Laser Interferometer Space Antenna LPMB Lunar and Planetary Missions Board CODMAC Committee on Data Management LST Large Space Telescope and Computation COMPLEX Committee on Planetary and Lunar Exploration Con-X Constellation-X x-ray observatory COSEPUP Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy COSPAR Committee on Space Research COSPUP Committee on Science and Public Policy CRAF Comet Rendezvous and Asteroid Flyby CRS Congressional Research Service CSSP Committee on Solar and Space Physics CSTR Committee on Solar Terrestrial Research DOC Department of Commerce DOD Department of Defense 263

264 Science Advice to NASA: Conflict, Consensus, Partnership, Leadership MAO Mars Aeronomy Observer P5 Particle Physics Project Prioritization MEPAG Mars Exploration Program Analysis Panel Group PAC Physics Advisory Committee MOWG Management Operations Working PSC Physical Sciences Committee Group RTAC Research and Technology Advisory MPIAT Mars Program Independent Council Assessment Team RRC Report Review Committee MPSAC Mathematical and Physical Sciences SAB Space Applications Board Advisory Committee SAC Science Advisory Committee NACA National Advisory Committee for SAFIR Single Aperture Far Infra-Red Aeronautics observatory NAC NASA Advisory Council SDO Solar Dynamics Observatory NAE National Academy of Engineering SDT Science Definition Team NAPA National Academy of Public SESAC Space and Earth Science Advisory Administration Committee NAS National Academy of Sciences SIM Space Interferometry Mission NASA National Aeronautics and Space SIRTF Space Infra-Red Telescope Facility Administration SMD Science Mission Directorate NBS National Bureau of Standards SNAP Super Nova Acceleration Probe NEAR Near Earth Asteroid Rendezvous SOFIA Stratospheric Observatory for NEO near-Earth asteroid Infrared Astronomy NESDIS National Environmental Satellite, SPAC Space Program Advisory Council Data, and Information Service SSB Space Science Board or Space Studies NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Board (after 1989) Administration SSAC Space Science Advisory Committee NRC National Research Council SSEC Solar System Exploration Committee NRL Naval Research Laboratory SSAAC Space Science and Applications NSAC Nuclear Science Advisory Committee Advisory Committee NSB National Science Board STScI Space Telescope Science Institute NSF National Science Foundation TPF Terrestrial Planet Finder OAO Orbiting Astronomical Observatory UARRP Upper Atmosphere Rocket Research OMB Office of Management and Budget Panel OSSA Office of Space Science and UNH University of New Hampshire Applications WFIRST Wide Field Infrared Survey Telescope OTA Office of Technology Assessment

About the Author Joseph K. Alexander is a space scientist who pur- the Environmental Protection Agency’s Office of sued his research career at the NASA Goddard Research and Development, NASA Headquarters, Space Flight Center. He subsequently served in and the White House Office of Science and senior science management and policy develop- Technology Policy. He and his wife, Diana, reside ment roles at the National Research Council, outside Tucson, Arizona. 265



The NASA History Series REFERENCE WORKS, NASA SP-4000 November 8, 1962–September 30, 1964. NASA Grimwood, James M. Project Mercury: A SP-4009, 1973. Chronology. NASA SP-4001, 1963. Brooks, Courtney G., and Ivan D. Ertel. The Apollo Spacecraft: A Chronology, Volume III, Grimwood, James M., and Barton C. Hacker, with October 1, 1964–January 20, 1966. NASA Peter J. Vorzimmer. Project Gemini Technology SP-4009, 1973. and Operations: A Chronology. NASA SP-4002, 1969. Ertel, Ivan D., and Roland W. Newkirk, with Courtney G. Brooks. The Apollo Spacecraft: A Link, Mae Mills. Space Medicine in Project Chronology, Volume IV, January 21, 1966–July Mercury. NASA SP-4003, 1965. 13, 1974. NASA SP-4009, 1978. Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1963: Chronology of Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1968: Chronology of Science, Technology, and Policy. NASA SP-4004, Science, Technology, and Policy. NASA SP-4010, 1964. 1969. Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1964: Chronology of Newkirk, Roland W., and Ivan D. Ertel, with Science, Technology, and Policy. NASA SP-4005, Courtney G. Brooks. Skylab: A Chronology. 1965. NASA SP-4011, 1977. Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1965: Chronology of Van Nimmen, Jane, and Leonard C. Bruno, with Science, Technology, and Policy. NASA SP-4006, Robert L. Rosholt. NASA Historical Data Book, 1966. Volume I: NASA Resources, 1958–1968. NASA SP-4012, 1976; rep. ed. 1988. Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1966: Chronology of Science, Technology, and Policy. NASA SP-4007, Ezell, Linda Neuman. NASA Historical Data Book, 1967. Volume II: Programs and Projects, 1958–1968. NASA SP-4012, 1988. Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1967: Chronology of Science, Technology, and Policy. NASA SP-4008, Ezell, Linda Neuman. NASA Historical Data Book, 1968. Volume III: Programs and Projects, 1969–1978. NASA SP-4012, 1988. Ertel, Ivan D., and Mary Louise Morse. The Apollo Spacecraft: A Chronology, Volume I, Through Gawdiak, Ihor, with Helen Fedor. NASA Historical November 7, 1962. NASA SP-4009, 1969. Data Book, Volume IV: NASA Resources, 1969–1978. NASA SP-4012, 1994. Morse, Mary Louise, and Jean Kernahan Bays. The Apollo Spacecraft: A Chronology, Volume II, 267

268 Science Advice to NASA: Conflict, Consensus, Partnership, Leadership Rumerman, Judy A. NASA Historical Data Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1973: Chronology of Book, Volume V: NASA Launch Systems, Space Science, Technology, and Policy. NASA SP-4018, Transportation, Human Spaceflight, and Space 1975. Science, 1979–1988. NASA SP-4012, 1999. Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1974: Chronology of Rumerman, Judy A. NASA Historical Data Science, Technology, and Policy. NASA SP-4019, Book, Volume VI: NASA Space Applications, 1977. Aeronautics and Space Research and Technology, Tracking and Data Acquisition/Support Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1975: Chronology of Operations, Commercial Programs, and Science, Technology, and Policy. NASA SP-4020, Resources, 1979–1988. NASA SP-4012, 1999. 1979. Rumerman, Judy A. NASA Historical Data Book, Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1976: Chronology of Volume VII: NASA Launch Systems, Space Science, Technology, and Policy. NASA SP-4021, Transportation, Human Spaceflight, and Space 1984. Science, 1989–1998. NASA SP-2009-4012, 2009. Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1977: Chronology of Science, Technology, and Policy. NASA SP-4022, Rumerman, Judy A. NASA Historical Data Book, 1986. Volume VIII: NASA Earth Science and Space Applications, Aeronautics, Technology, and Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1978: Chronology of Exploration, Tracking and Data Acquisition/ Science, Technology, and Policy. NASA SP-4023, Space Operations, Facilities and Resources, 1986. 1989–1998. NASA SP-2012-4012, 2012. Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1979–1984: No SP-4013. Chronology of Science, Technology, and Policy. NASA SP-4024, 1988. Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1969: Chronology of Science, Technology, and Policy. NASA SP-4014, Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1985: Chronology of 1970. Science, Technology, and Policy. NASA SP-4025, 1990. Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1970: Chronology of Science, Technology, and Policy. NASA SP-4015, Noordung, Hermann. The Problem of Space Travel: 1972. The Rocket Motor. Edited by Ernst Stuhlinger and J. D. Hunley, with Jennifer Garland. Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1971: Chronology of NASA SP-4026, 1995. Science, Technology, and Policy. NASA SP-4016, 1972. Gawdiak, Ihor Y., Ramon J. Miro, and Sam Stueland. Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1986– Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1972: Chronology of 1990: A Chronology. NASA SP-4027, 1997. Science, Technology, and Policy. NASA SP-4017, 1974.

The NASA History Series 269 Gawdiak, Ihor Y., and Charles Shetland. Roland, Alex. Model Research: The National Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1991–1995: A Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, 1915– Chronology. NASA SP-2000-4028, 2000. 1958. NASA SP-4103, 1985. Orloff, Richard W. Apollo by the Numbers: A Fries, Sylvia D. NASA Engineers and the Age of Statistical Reference. NASA SP-2000-4029, Apollo. NASA SP-4104, 1992. 2000. Glennan, T. Keith. The Birth of NASA: The Diary Lewis, Marieke, and Ryan Swanson. Astronautics of T. Keith Glennan. Edited by J. D. Hunley. and Aeronautics: A Chronology, 1996–2000. NASA SP-4105, 1993. NASA SP-2009-4030, 2009. Seamans, Robert C. Aiming at Targets: The Ivey, William Noel, and Marieke Lewis. Autobiography of Robert C. Seamans. NASA Astronautics and Aeronautics: A Chronology, SP-4106, 1996. 2001–2005. NASA SP-2010-4031, 2010. Garber, Stephen J., ed. Looking Backward, Looking Buchalter, Alice R., and William Noel Ivey. Forward: Forty Years of Human Spaceflight Astronautics and Aeronautics: A Chronology, Symposium. NASA SP-2002-4107, 2002. 2006. NASA SP-2011-4032, 2010. Mallick, Donald L., with Peter W. Merlin. The Lewis, Marieke. Astronautics and Aeronautics: A Smell of Kerosene: A Test Pilot’s Odyssey. NASA Chronology, 2007. NASA SP-2011-4033, 2011. SP-4108, 2003. Lewis, Marieke. Astronautics and Aeronautics: A Iliff, Kenneth W., and Curtis L. Peebles. From Chronology, 2008. NASA SP-2012-4034, 2012. Runway to Orbit: Reflections of a NASA Engineer. NASA SP-2004-4109, 2004. Lewis, Marieke. Astronautics and Aeronautics: A Chronology, 2009. NASA SP-2012-4035, 2012. Chertok, Boris. Rockets and People, Volume I. NASA SP-2005-4110, 2005. Flattery, Meaghan. Astronautics and Aeronautics: A Chronology, 2010. NASA SP-2013-4037, Chertok, Boris. Rockets and People: Creating a 2014. Rocket Industry, Volume II. NASA SP-2006- 4110, 2006. MANAGEMENT HISTORIES, NASA SP-4100 Chertok, Boris. Rockets and People: Hot Days of the Cold War, Volume III. NASA SP-2009-4110, Rosholt, Robert L. An Administrative History of 2009. NASA, 1958–1963. NASA SP-4101, 1966. Levine, Arnold S. Managing NASA in the Apollo Chertok, Boris. Rockets and People: The Moon Race, Era. NASA SP-4102, 1982. Volume IV. NASA SP-2011-4110, 2011.

270 Science Advice to NASA: Conflict, Consensus, Partnership, Leadership Laufer, Alexander, Todd Post, and Edward Bilstein, Roger E. Stages to Saturn: A Technological Hoffman. Shared Voyage: Learning and History of the Apollo/Saturn Launch Vehicles. Unlearning from Remarkable Projects. NASA NASA SP-4206, 1980 and 1996. SP-2005-4111, 2005. No SP-4207. Dawson, Virginia P., and Mark D. Bowles. Realizing the Dream of Flight: Biographical Compton, W. David, and Charles D. Benson. Essays in Honor of the Centennial of Flight, Living and Working in Space: A History of 1903–2003. NASA SP-2005-4112, 2005. Skylab. NASA SP-4208, 1983. Mudgway, Douglas J. William H. Pickering: Ezell, Edward Clinton, and Linda Neuman Ezell. America’s Deep Space Pioneer. NASA SP-2008- The Partnership: A History of the Apollo-Soyuz 4113, 2008. Test Project. NASA SP-4209, 1978. Wright, Rebecca, Sandra Johnson, and Steven Hall, R. Cargill. Lunar Impact: A History of Project J. Dick. NASA at 50: Interviews with NASA’s Ranger. NASA SP-4210, 1977. Senior Leadership. NASA SP-2012-4114, 2012. Newell, Homer E. Beyond the Atmosphere: Early PROJECT HISTORIES, NASA SP-4200 Years of Space Science. NASA SP-4211, 1980. Swenson, Loyd S., Jr., James M. Grimwood, and Ezell, Edward Clinton, and Linda Neuman Ezell. Charles C. Alexander. This New Ocean: A On Mars: Exploration of the Red Planet, 1958– History of Project Mercury. NASA SP-4201, 1978. NASA SP-4212, 1984. 1966; rep. ed. 1999. Pitts, John A. The Human Factor: Biomedicine in Green, Constance McLaughlin, and Milton the Manned Space Program to 1980. NASA Lomask. Vanguard: A History. NASA SP-4202, SP-4213, 1985. 1970; rep. ed. Smithsonian Institution Press, 1971. Compton, W. David. Where No Man Has Gone Before: A History of Apollo Lunar Exploration Hacker, Barton C., and James M. Grimwood. Missions. NASA SP-4214, 1989. On the Shoulders of Titans: A History of Project Gemini. NASA SP-4203, 1977; rep. ed. 2002. Naugle, John E. First Among Equals: The Selection of NASA Space Science Experiments. NASA Benson, Charles D., and William Barnaby Faherty. SP-4215, 1991. Moonport: A History of Apollo Launch Facilities and Operations. NASA SP-4204, 1978. Wallace, Lane E. Airborne Trailblazer: Two Decades with NASA Langley’s 737 Flying Laboratory. Brooks, Courtney G., James M. Grimwood, and NASA SP-4216, 1994. Loyd S. Swenson, Jr. Chariots for Apollo: A History of Manned Lunar Spacecraft. NASA Butrica, Andrew J., ed. Beyond the Ionosphere: SP-4205, 1979. Fifty Years of Satellite Communications. NASA SP-4217, 1997.

The NASA History Series 271 Butrica, Andrew J. To See the Unseen: A History of Rocket, 1958–2002. NASA SP-2004-4230, Planetary Radar Astronomy. NASA SP-4218, 2004. 1996. Meltzer, Michael. Mission to Jupiter: A History Mack, Pamela E., ed. From Engineering Science of the Galileo Project. NASA SP-2007-4231, to Big Science: The NACA and NASA Collier 2007. Trophy Research Project Winners. NASA SP-4219, 1998. Heppenheimer, T. A. Facing the Heat Barrier: A History of Hypersonics. NASA SP-2007-4232, Reed, R. Dale. Wingless Flight: The Lifting Body 2007. Story. NASA SP-4220, 1998. Tsiao, Sunny. “Read You Loud and Clear!” The Heppenheimer, T. A. The Space Shuttle Decision: Story of NASA’s Spaceflight Tracking and Data NASA’s Search for a Reusable Space Vehicle. Network. NASA SP-2007-4233, 2007. NASA SP-4221, 1999. Meltzer, Michael. When Biospheres Collide: A Hunley, J. D., ed. Toward Mach 2: The Douglas History of NASA’s Planetary Protection Programs. D-558 Program. NASA SP-4222, 1999. NASA SP-2011-4234, 2011. Swanson, Glen E., ed. “Before This Decade Is CENTER HISTORIES, NASA SP-4300 Out…” Personal Reflections on the Apollo Rosenthal, Alfred. Venture into Space: Early Years of Program. NASA SP-4223, 1999. Goddard Space Flight Center. NASA SP-4301, Tomayko, James E. Computers Take Flight: A 1985. History of NASA’s Pioneering Digital Fly-By- Wire Project. NASA SP-4224, 2000. Hartman, Edwin P. Adventures in Research: A History of Ames Research Center, 1940–1965. Morgan, Clay. Shuttle-Mir: The United States and NASA SP-4302, 1970. Russia Share History’s Highest Stage. NASA SP-2001-4225, 2001. Hallion, Richard P. On the Frontier: Flight Research at Dryden, 1946–1981. NASA SP-4303, 1984. Leary, William M. “We Freeze to Please”: A History of NASA’s Icing Research Tunnel and the Quest Muenger, Elizabeth A. Searching the Horizon: A for Safety. NASA SP-2002-4226, 2002. History of Ames Research Center, 1940–1976. NASA SP-4304, 1985. Mudgway, Douglas J. Uplink-Downlink: A History of the Deep Space Network, 1957–1997. NASA Hansen, James R. Engineer in Charge: A History SP-2001-4227, 2001. of the Langley Aeronautical Laboratory, 1917– 1958. NASA SP-4305, 1987. No SP-4228 or SP-4229. Dawson, Virginia P. Engines and Innovation: Lewis Dawson, Virginia P., and Mark D. Bowles. Taming Laboratory and American Propulsion Technology. Liquid Hydrogen: The Centaur Upper Stage NASA SP-4306, 1991.

272 Science Advice to NASA: Conflict, Consensus, Partnership, Leadership Dethloff, Henry C. “Suddenly Tomorrow Came…”: Schultz, James. Crafting Flight: Aircraft Pioneers A History of the Johnson Space Center, 1957– and the Contributions of the Men and Women 1990. NASA SP-4307, 1993. of NASA Langley Research Center. NASA SP-2003-4316, 2003. Hansen, James R. Spaceflight Revolution: NASA Langley Research Center from Sputnik to Apollo. Bowles, Mark D. Science in Flux: NASA’s Nuclear NASA SP-4308, 1995. Program at Plum Brook Station, 1955–2005. NASA SP-2006-4317, 2006. Wallace, Lane E. Flights of Discovery: An Illustrated History of the Dryden Flight Research Center. Wallace, Lane E. Flights of Discovery: An Illustrated NASA SP-4309, 1996. History of the Dryden Flight Research Center. NASA SP-2007-4318, 2007. Revised version Herring, Mack R. Way Station to Space: A History of NASA SP-4309. of the John C. Stennis Space Center. NASA SP-4310, 1997. Arrighi, Robert S. Revolutionary Atmosphere: The Story of the Altitude Wind Tunnel and the Space Wallace, Harold D., Jr. Wallops Station and the Power Chambers. NASA SP-2010-4319, 2010. Creation of an American Space Program. NASA SP-4311, 1997. GENERAL HISTORIES, NASA SP-4400 Corliss, William R. NASA Sounding Rockets, Wallace, Lane E. Dreams, Hopes, Realities. NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center: The First Forty 1958–1968: A Historical Summary. NASA Years. NASA SP-4312, 1999. SP-4401, 1971. Dunar, Andrew J., and Stephen P. Waring. Power Wells, Helen T., Susan H. Whiteley, and Carrie to Explore: A History of Marshall Space Flight Karegeannes. Origins of NASA Names. NASA Center, 1960–1990. NASA SP-4313, 1999. SP-4402, 1976. Bugos, Glenn E. Atmosphere of Freedom: Sixty Anderson, Frank W., Jr. Orders of Magnitude: Years at the NASA Ames Research Center. NASA A History of NACA and NASA, 1915–1980. SP-2000-4314, 2000. NASA SP-4403, 1981. Bugos, Glenn E. Atmosphere of Freedom: Seventy Sloop, John L. Liquid Hydrogen as a Propulsion Years at the NASA Ames Research Center. NASA Fuel, 1945–1959. NASA SP-4404, 1978. SP-2010-4314, 2010. Revised version of NASA SP-2000-4314. Roland, Alex. A Spacefaring People: Perspectives on Early Spaceflight. NASA SP-4405, 1985. Bugos, Glenn E. Atmosphere of Freedom: Seventy Five Years at the NASA Ames Research Center. Bilstein, Roger E. Orders of Magnitude: A History NASA SP-2014-4314, 2014. Revised version of the NACA and NASA, 1915–1990. NASA of NASA SP-2000-4314. SP-4406, 1989. No SP-4315.

The NASA History Series 273 Logsdon, John M., ed., with Linda J. Lear, Volume VII: Human Spaceflight: Projects Jannelle Warren Findley, Ray A. Williamson, Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo. NASA SP-2008- and Dwayne A. Day. Exploring the Unknown: 4407, 2008. Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program, Volume I: Organizing for Siddiqi, Asif A., Challenge to Apollo: The Soviet Exploration. NASA SP-4407, 1995. Union and the Space Race, 1945–1974. NASA SP-2000-4408, 2000. Logsdon, John M., ed., with Dwayne A. Day and Roger D. Launius. Exploring the Unknown: Hansen, James R., ed. The Wind and Beyond: Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Journey into the History of Aerodynamics in Civil Space Program, Volume II: External America, Volume 1: The Ascent of the Airplane. Relationships. NASA SP-4407, 1996. NASA SP-2003-4409, 2003. Logsdon, John M., ed., with Roger D. Launius, Hansen, James R., ed. The Wind and Beyond: David H. Onkst, and Stephen J. Garber. Journey into the History of Aerodynamics in Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents America, Volume 2: Reinventing the Airplane. in the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program, NASA SP-2007-4409, 2007. Volume III: Using Space. NASA SP-4407, 1998. Hogan, Thor. Mars Wars: The Rise and Fall of the Logsdon, John M., ed., with Ray A. Williamson, Space Exploration Initiative. NASA SP-2007- Roger D. Launius, Russell J. Acker, Stephen J. 4410, 2007. Garber, and Jonathan L. Friedman. Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History Vakoch, Douglas A., ed. Psychology of Space of the U.S. Civil Space Program, Volume IV: Exploration: Contemporary Research in Historical Accessing Space. NASA SP-4407, 1999. Perspective. NASA SP-2011-4411, 2011. Logsdon, John M., ed., with Amy Paige Snyder, Ferguson, Robert G., NASA’s First A: Aeronautics Roger D. Launius, Stephen J. Garber, and from 1958 to 2008. NASA SP-2012-4412, Regan Anne Newport. Exploring the Unknown: 2013. Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program, Volume V: Exploring the Vakoch, Douglas A., ed. Archaeology, Anthropology, Cosmos. NASA SP-2001-4407, 2001. and Interstellar Communication. NASA SP-2013-4413, 2014. Logsdon, John M., ed., with Stephen J. Garber, Roger D. Launius, and Ray A. Williamson. MONOGRAPHS IN AEROSPACE HISTORY, Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents NASA SP-4500 in the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program, Launius, Roger D., and Aaron K. Gillette, Volume VI: Space and Earth Science. NASA SP-2004-4407, 2004. comps. Toward a History of the Space Shuttle: An Annotated Bibliography. Monographs in Logsdon, John M., ed., with Roger D. Launius. Aerospace History, No. 1, 1992. Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program,

274 Science Advice to NASA: Conflict, Consensus, Partnership, Leadership Launius, Roger D., and J. D. Hunley, comps. An Logsdon, John M. Together in Orbit: The Origins of Annotated Bibliography of the Apollo Program. International Cooperation in the Space Station. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 2, Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 11, 1994. 1998. Launius, Roger D. Apollo: A Retrospective Analysis. Phillips, W. Hewitt. Journey in Aeronautical Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 3, Research: A Career at NASA Langley Research 1994. Center. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 12, 1998. Hansen, James R. Enchanted Rendezvous: John C. Houbolt and the Genesis of the Lunar-Orbit Braslow, Albert L. A History of Suction-Type Rendezvous Concept. Monographs in Aerospace Laminar-Flow Control with Emphasis on Flight History, No. 4, 1995. Research. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 13, 1999. Gorn, Michael H. Hugh L. Dryden’s Career in Aviation and Space. Monographs in Aerospace Logsdon, John M., moderator. Managing the History, No. 5, 1996. Moon Program: Lessons Learned from Apollo. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 14, Powers, Sheryll Goecke. Women in Flight Research 1999. at NASA Dryden Flight Research Center from 1946 to 1995. Monographs in Aerospace Perminov, V. G. The Difficult Road to Mars: A History, No. 6, 1997. Brief History of Mars Exploration in the Soviet Union. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. Portree, David S. F., and Robert C. Trevino. 15, 1999. Walking to Olympus: An EVA Chronology. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 7, Tucker, Tom. Touchdown: The Development of 1997. Propulsion Controlled Aircraft at NASA Dryden. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 16, Logsdon, John M., moderator. Legislative Origins 1999. of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958: Proceedings of an Oral History Workshop. Maisel, Martin, Demo J. Giulanetti, and Daniel Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 8, C. Dugan. The History of the XV-15 Tilt Rotor 1998. Research Aircraft: From Concept to Flight. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 17, Rumerman, Judy A., comp. U.S. Human 2000. NASA SP-2000-4517. Spaceflight: A Record of Achievement, 1961– 1998. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. Jenkins, Dennis R. Hypersonics Before the Shuttle: 9, 1998. A Concise History of the X-15 Research Airplane. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 18, Portree, David S. F. NASA’s Origins and the Dawn 2000. NASA SP-2000-4518. of the Space Age. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 10, 1998. Chambers, Joseph R. Partners in Freedom: Contributions of the Langley Research Center to U.S. Military Aircraft of the 1990s. Monographs

The NASA History Series 275 in Aerospace History, No. 19, 2000. NASA No monograph 28. SP-2000-4519. Chambers, Joseph R. Concept to Reality: Waltman, Gene L. Black Magic and Gremlins: Contributions of the NASA Langley Research Analog Flight Simulations at NASA’s Flight Center to U.S. Civil Aircraft of the 1990s. Research Center. Monographs in Aerospace Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 29, History, No. 20, 2000. NASA SP-2000-4520. 2003. NASA SP-2003-4529. Portree, David S. F. Humans to Mars: Fifty Years Peebles, Curtis, ed. The Spoken Word: Recollections of Mission Planning, 1950–2000. Monographs of Dryden History, The Early Years. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 21, 2001. NASA in Aerospace History, No. 30, 2003. NASA SP-2001-4521. SP-2003-4530. Thompson, Milton O., with J. D. Hunley. Flight Jenkins, Dennis R., Tony Landis, and Jay Miller. Research: Problems Encountered and What They American X-Vehicles: An Inventory — X-1 to Should Teach Us. Monographs in Aerospace X-50. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. History, No. 22, 2001. NASA SP-2001-4522. 31, 2003. NASA SP-2003-4531. Tucker, Tom. The Eclipse Project. Monographs Renstrom, Arthur G. Wilbur and Orville Wright: A in Aerospace History, No. 23, 2001. NASA Chronology Commemorating the One-Hundredth SP-2001-4523. Anniversary of the First Powered Flight on December 17, 1903. Monographs in Aerospace Siddiqi, Asif A. Deep Space Chronicle: A Chronology History, No. 32, 2003. NASA SP-2003-4532. of Deep Space and Planetary Probes, 1958– 2000. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. Bowles, Mark D., and Robert S. Arrighi. NASA’s 24, 2002. NASA SP-2002-4524. Nuclear Frontier: The Plum Brook Research Reactor. Monographs in Aerospace History, Merlin, Peter W. Mach 3+: NASA/USAF YF-12 No. 33, 2004. NASA SP-2004-4533. Flight Research, 1969–1979. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 25, 2001. NASA Wallace, Lane, and Christian Gelzer. Nose Up: SP-2001-4525. High Angle-of-Attack and Thrust Vectoring Research at NASA Dryden, 1979–2001. Anderson, Seth B. Memoirs of an Aeronautical Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 34, Engineer: Flight Tests at Ames Research Center: 2009. NASA SP-2009-4534. 1940–1970. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 26, 2002. NASA SP-2002-4526. Matranga, Gene J., C. Wayne Ottinger, Calvin R. Jarvis, and D. Christian Gelzer. Renstrom, Arthur G. Wilbur and Orville Wright: Unconventional, Contrary, and Ugly: The A Bibliography Commemorating the One- Lunar Landing Research Vehicle. Monographs Hundredth Anniversary of the First Powered in Aerospace History, No. 35, 2006. NASA Flight on December 17, 1903. Monographs SP-2004-4535. in Aerospace History, No. 27, 2002. NASA SP-2002-4527.

276 Science Advice to NASA: Conflict, Consensus, Partnership, Leadership McCurdy, Howard E. Low-Cost Innovation in in Aerospace History, No. 44, 2009. NASA Spaceflight: The History of the Near Earth SP-2009-4544. Asteroid Rendezvous (NEAR) Mission. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 36, Fisher, Steven C., and Shamim A. Rahman. 2005. NASA SP-2005-4536. Remembering the Giants: Apollo Rocket Propulsion Development. Monographs in Seamans, Robert C., Jr. Project Apollo: The Tough Aerospace History, No. 45, 2009. NASA Decisions. Monographs in Aerospace History, SP-2009-4545. No. 37, 2005. NASA SP-2005-4537. Gelzer, Christian. Fairing Well: From Shoebox Lambright, W. Henry. NASA and the Environment: to Bat Truck and Beyond, Aerodynamic Truck The Case of Ozone Depletion. Monographs Research at NASA’s Dryden Flight Research in Aerospace History, No. 38, 2005. NASA Center. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. SP-2005-4538. 46, 2011. NASA SP-2011-4546. Chambers, Joseph R. Innovation in Flight: Arrighi, Robert. Pursuit of Power: NASA’s Research of the NASA Langley Research Center Propulsion Systems Laboratory No. 1 and 2. on Revolutionary Advanced Concepts for Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 48, Aeronautics. Monographs in Aerospace History, 2012. NASA SP-2012-4548. No. 39, 2005. NASA SP-2005-4539. Renee M. Rottner. Making the Invisible Visible: A Phillips, W. Hewitt. Journey into Space Research: History of the Spitzer Infrared Telescope Facility Continuation of a Career at NASA Langley (1971–2003). Monographs in Aerospace Research Center. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 47, 2017. NASA SP-2017-4547. History, No. 40, 2005. NASA SP-2005-4540. Goodrich, Malinda K., Alice R. Buchalter, and Rumerman, Judy A., Chris Gamble, and Gabriel Patrick M. Miller, comps. Toward a History of Okolski, comps. U.S. Human Spaceflight: the Space Shuttle: An Annotated Bibliography, A Record of Achievement, 1961–2006. Part 2 (1992–2011). Monographs in Aerospace Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 41, History, No. 49, 2012. NASA SP-2012-4549. 2007. NASA SP-2007-4541. Ta, Julie B., and Robert C. Treviño. Walking to Peebles, Curtis. The Spoken Word: Recollections of Olympus: An EVA Chronology, 1997–2011, Vol. Dryden History Beyond the Sky. Monographs 2. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 50, in Aerospace History, No. 42, 2011. NASA 2016. NASA SP-2016-4550. SP-2011-4542. Gelzer, Christian. The Spoken Word III: Dick, Steven J., Stephen J. Garber, and Jane H. Recollections of Dryden History; The Shuttle Odom. Research in NASA History. Monographs Years. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. in Aerospace History, No. 43, 2009. NASA 52, 2013. NASA SP-2013-4552. SP-2009-4543. Ross, James C. NASA Photo One. Monographs Merlin, Peter W. Ikhana: Unmanned Aircraft in Aerospace History, No. 53, 2013. NASA System Western States Fire Missions. Monographs SP-2013-4553.

The NASA History Series 277 Launius, Roger D. Historical Analogs for the Fueling Space Exploration: The History of NASA’s Stimulation of Space Commerce. Monographs Rocket Engine Test Facility DVD. NASA in Aerospace History, No 54, 2014. NASA SP-2005-4607, 2005. SP-2014-4554. Altitude Wind Tunnel at NASA Glenn Research Buchalter, Alice R., and Patrick M. Miller, Center: An Interactive History CD-ROM. NASA comps. The National Advisory Committee SP-2008-4608, 2008. for Aeronautics: An Annotated Bibliography. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 55, A Tunnel Through Time: The History of NASA’s 2014. NASA SP-2014-4555. Altitude Wind Tunnel. NASA SP-2010-4609, 2010. Chambers, Joseph R., and Mark A. Chambers. Emblems of Exploration: Logos of the NACA and CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, NASA. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. NASA SP-4700 56, 2015. NASA SP-2015-4556. Dick, Steven J., and Keith Cowing, eds. Risk and ELECTRONIC MEDIA, NASA SP-4600 Exploration: Earth, Sea and the Stars. NASA Remembering Apollo 11: The 30th Anniversary Data SP-2005-4701, 2005. Archive CD-ROM. NASA SP-4601, 1999. Dick, Steven J., and Roger D. Launius. Critical Issues in the History of Spaceflight. NASA Remembering Apollo 11: The 35th Anniversary SP-2006-4702, 2006. Data Archive CD-ROM. NASA SP-2004-4601, 2004. This is an update of the 1999 edition. Dick, Steven J., ed. Remembering the Space Age: Proceedings of the 50th Anniversary Conference. The Mission Transcript Collection: U.S. Human NASA SP-2008-4703, 2008. Spaceflight Missions from Mercury Redstone 3 to Apollo 17. NASA SP-2000-4602, 2001. Dick, Steven J., ed. NASA’s First 50 Years: Historical Perspectives. NASA SP-2010-4704, Shuttle-Mir: The United States and Russia Share 2010. History’s Highest Stage. NASA SP-2001-4603, 2002. SOCIETAL IMPACT, NASA SP-4800 Dick, Steven J., and Roger D. Launius. Societal U.S. Centennial of Flight Commission Presents Born of Dreams — Inspired by Freedom. NASA Impact of Spaceflight. NASA SP-2007-4801, SP-2004-4604, 2004. 2007. Of Ashes and Atoms: A Documentary on the NASA Dick, Steven J., and Mark L. Lupisella. Cosmos Plum Brook Reactor Facility. NASA SP-2005- and Culture: Cultural Evolution in a Cosmic 4605, 2005. Context. NASA SP-2009-4802, 2009. Taming Liquid Hydrogen: The Centaur Upper Stage Dick, Steven J. Historical Studies in the Societal Rocket Interactive CD-ROM. NASA SP-2004- Impact of Spaceflight. NASA SP-2015-4803, 4606, 2004. 2015.



Index A Apollo program, 24, 33, 36–39, 61, 136 Abbott, Mark, 147 Arecibo Observatory, 148 Abdalati, Waleed, 254 Armstrong, John, 196 Academy-Research Council, 2–3, 10, 26 Asrar, Ghassem, 116 Advanced Telescope for High Energy Astrophysics (Athena), “Assessment of Balance in NASA’s Science Programs, an” 113, 183 (report), 191–193, 201–202, 209–211, 214, 219, 233 Advanced X-ray Astrophysics Facility (AXAF), 76–77, 79, “Assessment of NASA’s Draft 2003 Earth Science Enterprise 170–171, 219, 233. See also Chandra X-ray Observatory Strategy” (report), 85 Advisors: Scientists in the Policy Process, The, 47n1, 209 “Assessment of Options for Extending the Life of the Hubble advisory committees. See also individual. Space Telescope” (report), 209. See also Hubble Space ad hoc committees, 3, 11, 17–18, 21, 98 Telescope (HST) life extension study; Lanzerotti report ad hoc NOAA, 154 “Assessment of Planned Scientific Content of the CRAF FACA list of, 146n4 Mission” (report), 19, 22 independence of, 12, 97–98 “Assessment of Programs in Solar and Space Physics” (report), NACA technical, 10 23 origin of, 1 “Assessment of the Planned Scientific Content of the LGO, precedent for, 8, 11–12 MAO, and NEAR Missions” (report), 19, 23 redundancy of, 47–48 astrobiology, 101, 180–181 structure, 54 cuts to, 137, 140, 191–192 timeline, 55, 114 defined, 14, 140 advisory reports, 15, 18–19, 64, 162–163. See also types of exobiology, 14n45, 17 reports, 19 reports; individual reports Astrometric Interferometry Mission (AIM), 113 versus advocacy, 212–214 astronomy, 2, 14, 28, 77, 79 clout, 202 Astronomy Missions Board (AMB), 42–43, 65, 67, 216, 233, Cold War effect on, 29 238. See also Missions Boards conflicts of interest, 223–225 charge, 35, 38 demand for, 244 folded into SPAC committee, 43 effectiveness of, 200 Goldberg at, 40, 111 eminence-based, 24 Long-Range Program in Space Astronomy report, 38–39, failures of, 202, 204, 210–214 and implementation, 23 216, 233 international perspectives, 247–250 scope, 38–39, 65 number of, 145n2 timeline, 34 recruitment for, 243 Astrophysics Focused Telescope Assets (AFTA), 183 scope, 20–21, 216n5 Atkins, William, 109n2 and self-interest, 244–245 Atomic Energy Commission, 11, 25, 111 successes of, 199–210, 250–255 Augustine, Norman, 151 workshop reports, 13, 118n32, 244–245 Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board (ASEB), 28, 31, 45, B Bahcall, John, 79, 112, 120–121, 209 98, 154, 187 Baker, D. James, 79 Agnew, Spiro, 39 Baker, Daniel, 155, 161–162, 237, 241–243, 254 Aldridge, Edward, 122 Balance report, 122, 189–193, 201–202, 209–211, 214, 219, Alexander, Joseph K., 116 Allen, Marc, 86–87, 89, 157, 194–195 233 Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer (AMS), 37, 228–229 Barron, Eric, 172–173 American Aeronautical Society. See National Advisory Beggs, James M., 24–25, 58, 75, 226 Belton, Michael, 114 Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) Berkner, Lloyd V. American Astronomical Society, 18, 112, 186, 222 analysis groups, 141–143, 224 ad hoc committees, 21 animal rights groups, 93, 99 background, 10 279

280 Science Advice to NASA: Conflict, Consensus, Partnership, Leadership International Geophysical Year (IGY), 7, 12, 34 Columbia (Space Shuttle), 121, 186, 189, 201, 228 ionospheric research, 37 Columbia Accident Investigations Board, 121 letter reports, 24 Comet Rendezvous and Asteroid Flyby (CRAF), 21–22, 59, personality of, 10 service of, 12 76–77, 234 SSB chair, 9–12, 14, 17–18 Comité Special de l’Année Geophysique Internationale summer studies, 25 Bernstein, Ralph, 30 (CSAGI), 7. See also International Geophysical Year (IGY) Blumenthal, Marjory, 212 Commission on Implementation of U.S. Space Exploration Board on Atmospheric Science and Climate, 23, 154, 173, 196 Board on Physics and Astronomy (BPA), 28, 112n14, 118, Policy, 122 Committee on Astronomy and Astrophysics (CAA), 122–123, 120, 149–150, 181 “Connecting Quarks” report, 121, 181–184, 202, 210 138–139, 225 Bodde, David L., 31–32 Committee on Planetary and Lunar Exploration Boehlert, Sherwood, 182n36, 192 Bolden, Charles, 140–142, 159, 205, 224 (COMPLEX), 22–23, 59, 66, 97, 208 Bretherton, Francis P., 60, 79, 172, 206, 209 Committee on Science and Public Policy (COSPUP), 28 Bretherton report, 60, 116, 172–173, 206, 242, 255 Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy Bronk, Detlev W., 9–11, 15 Brown, George, 79 (COSEPUP), 87–88 Burbidge, Geoffrey, 36 Committee on Solar and Space Physics (CSSP), 18, 23, 32, Burbidge, Margaret, 11n39, 36 Bush, George H. W., 61, 93 196, 211 Bush, George W., 116, 140, 151–152 Committee on Solar Terrestrial Research (CSTR), 196, 198 administration priorities, 139, 143, 228 Committee on Solar-Terrestrial Relations, 23 Vision for Space Exploration, 121–122, 136–139, Committee on Space Research (COSPAR), 26, 66, 248–249 Compton Gamma Ray Observatory, 171, 183 189–191, 210–211, 253 conflicts of interest, 4–5, 12, 34, 95, 223, 252 Bush, Vannevar, 2 Byerly, Radford, 56 DOE and, 151 FACA impacts, 127, 162, 213, 223n26 C NAS and, 17 Cameron, A.G.W., 20, 54 NASA advisory structure, 42, 224–225, 240–241 Canizares, Claude R. Newell on, 17 NRC and, 127, 151, 191n29 advisory structure, 156, 232 Smith on, 241 FACA section 15 compliance, 98–99 SSB and, 191n29 international collaboration, 250 Stern on, 225 quoted, 57–58, 68, 98–99, 147, 180 Congress (U.S.) SESAC chair, 57 advisory legislation, 242 SSAAC chair, 79 advisory structure, 64 SSB chair, 58n15, 179–180, 196 Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer (AMS), 228 Cannon, Robert, 226 Astronomy and Astrophysics Advisory Committee (AAAC), Carlucci, Frank, 48 Carper, Tom, 84 151–152 Carter, James Earl (“Jimmy”), 53–54, 56, 58, 69, 74 attitudes toward NASA, 222 Cassini program, 56, 59, 76–77, 101, 219, 233 decadal surveys, 114, 229 “Categorization of the Mars Orbiter Mission, the” (report), 19, DOE oversight, 150 FACA amendments, 94 22 FACA legislation, 47–52, 204 Challenger (Space Shuttle). See also Space Shuttle Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), 83–91 House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, 143 accident, 20–21, 56, 60, 75–76 Hubble Space Telescope (HST), 112, 185–189, 206, 209, accident impacts, 57, 64, 69, 73, 226 Chambers, W. Irving, 3 233 Chandra X-ray Observatory, 112, 170–171, 183, 233. See interim NASA decadal survey (2005), 116 knowledge of advisory processes, 242–243 also Advanced X-ray Astrophysics Facility (AXAF) mandated studies, 23, 163–164, 185–193, 233 Chandrasekhar, Subrahmanyan, 36 Mars missions, 201 Cleave, Mary, 140, 193 Mission to Planet Earth program reviews, 61 Clinton, William Jefferson (“Bill”), 83, 94, 146, 179–180 NAC independence, 141 Cluster program, 104 NACA appropriations, 3 NASA appropriations, 109, 115, 128–129, 170, 189–193, 195–196 NASA Authorization Acts, 104n14, 117, 123–125, 143–144, 164–165, 189

Index 281 NASA communication with, 89, 202, 208 Greenstein report, 109–113, 117 NASA oversight, 76, 79, 109, 123–129, 181–182, 222, interim NASA decadal survey (2005), 116–117 international perspectives, 248–250 231, 255 lessons learned, 118–120, 204 NASA senior reviews, 104–105 life-cycle cost estimates, 117 NASA strategic plan, 74 list of, 124 NASA Transition Authorization Act of 2017, 144 midterm reviews, 120–129, 124, 207 National Academy of Science, 1 mission cost estimates, 120, 240, 248–249 National Aeronautics and Space Act, 9 mission priorities, 119–120, 122, 183, 207 National Plan for Civil Earth Observations, 128 mission technical readiness, 117 National Strategy for Civil Earth Observations, 128 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and NRC decadal strategy surveys, 109–112 NSF Authorization Acts, 152 Medicine, 164–165 OSSA reorganization, 195–196 NOAA role in, 155 proposed elimination of SAB, 32 NRC decadal strategy surveys, 109–133 quoted (staff), 129 NRC reports, 89, 150 relationship with OSSA, 76 NSF role in, 148–149 “Connecting Quarks with the Cosmos: Eleven Science Ques- origin of, 109–113, 216 phasing problems, 118, 248–249 tions for the New Century” (report), 121, 181–184, 202, planetary science survey (2003), 114–115 210. See also Quarks-to-the-Cosmos report; Turner report process chart, 131 Constellation program, 136–137, 182–183 process review (2005), 122–123 Con-X Observatory, 113, 182–183 science strategies, 20 Cordova, France, 97 scope, 110, 114, 116, 121, 205–206, 228, 242 Cosmic Background Explorer (COBE) mission, 73 SSB chair, 117–118 Cosmic Frontier program, 184 SSB reports, 86, 149–150, 155, 190, 246–247 “Crisis in Space and Earth Science: A Time for a New SSB role in, 164, 254, 255 Commitment, the” (SESAC Crisis Report), 55–58, 210, status of, 112, 120–121 255 successes of, 130–133, 200, 202, 213–214, 232–233, 243 advisory timeline, 55 timeline, 114 Challenger accident, 64, 69 various, 112, 117, 120–121, 124, 206 circumstances leading to, 56–57, 69, 73–74, 101 Whitford report, 110 recommendations, 57–58, 194, 250–251 deGrasse Tyson, Neil, 122 Cuellar, Henry, 84 DeLauer, Richard D., 31 Culberson, John, 109n1, 115, 130 Department of Defense (DOD), 31, 111, 122, 135 Curiosity rover/science laboratory, 115–116, 139n20, 176 Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), 9–11 Cuzzi, Jeffrey, 77 advisory funding, 245 Fusion Energy Sciences Advisory Committee (FESAC), D Darling, Bruce, 245–246 150–151 “Data Management and Computation—Volume I: Issues and GPRA implementation, 88 Hubble Space Telescope (HST), 187 Recommendations” (report), 19–20 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 79 decadal surveys, 77, 126, 148, 211, 226 summer studies, 25 Department of Energy (DOE), 11, 111, 121 advisory timeline, 34 advisory structure, 149–152, 228, 231 and advocacy, 212 Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer (AMS), 37, 228 after NAC restructuring, 138 “Connecting Quarks” report, 181–183, 210 Astronomy and Astrophysics Advisory Committee (AAAC), GPRA implementation, 88 partnership with NASA, 183 152 role, 146, 228 astronomy and astrophysics decadal surveys, 120–121, 124, Super Nova Acceleration Probe (SNAP), 182–183 Department of Health and Human Services, 93–94, 195 147, 170, 219, 253 Diaz, Al, 171, 188, 219, 238, 250 attitudes toward, 159–160, 162 Discovery program, 126, 202–204, 233–234, 242 audience for, 205 Near Earth Asteroid Rendezvous mission, 173–174 Bahcall report, 79, 112, 120, 209 program definition group, 169 clout, 157, 182 Donahue, Thomas M. cost and technical evaluation (CATE), 247 background, 25 decision rules, 75n7 defined, 28 described (John Grunsfeld), 119 future of, 246–247

282 Science Advice to NASA: Conflict, Consensus, Partnership, Leadership budgetary concerns, 21 passage, 45 interpersonal relations, 225–226 provisions, 49–50, 67, 93, 217 letter reports, 24–25, 96 timeline, 55 NASA R&D budget, 75 Fellows, Jack, 61, 76 SSB chair, 18, 24–25, 32, 64, 80, 96 Field, George B., 54, 170–171, 218 summer studies, 25–26 Findlay, John W., 37, 39 Dressler, Alan, 118 Fink, Daniel J., 30 Dryden, Hugh L., 4–5, 12, 15, 63 Firor, John W., 54 DuBridge, Lee A., 39 Fisk, Lennard A. Dutton, John, 194–196 background, 73–74 FACA section 15 compliance, 98, 224 E Gravity Probe B mission, 227 Earth Observing System (EOS) program, 61, 74, 76–78, management style, 74–75 NAC independence, 135–136 171–173 NAC structure reform, 138 Earth system science, 14, 60, 172, 202–203, 206, 212, NASA advisory structure, 156, 221, 228 NASA budget growth, 101 246–248 NASA chief scientist, 80, 163 Earth Systems Science Committee (ESSC), 54–55, 59–61, NASA strategic plan, 74–81, 238, 252 O’Keefe’s administration, 135–136, 159, 217–218 169, 172, 206 OSSA Associate Administrator, 58, 65, 73, 172 Edelson, Burton I., 56–57, 60, 73, 172, 200, 242 quoted, 65–66, 76, 98, 118, 135–136, 138, 156 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 8–9, 27, 93 SAB elimination, 31 “eminence-based” reports. See letter reports SSB chair, 116, 208, 217 engineering-science tension, 4, 24, 252 SSB decadal survey workshop (2012), 118 Europa program, 115, 213 Fletcher, James C. European Space Agency (ESA) NASA Administrator, 16–17, 43–44, 67, 163, 238 opposition to Richard Goody’s SSB appointment, 16–17, budgets, 118 ISPM program, 58 217, 219 IXO program, 183 proposed elimination of SAB, 31–32 joint planning with NASA, 26, 37, 73, 223, 248–249 Sally Ride report, 60 Mars Sample Return, 115–116 support for Space Shuttle priority, 20–21 Everitt, Francis, 226–228 focused topical reports, 18–19, 23–24 Explorer program, 19, 57, 77, 112–113, 115 Ford, Kenneth, 140 experiments on, 251 Fowler, William A., 36–37 Explorer 1, 6, 9, 34, 251 Freedom of Information Act, 50–51 launch rate, 139 Friedman, Herbert A., 60–61, 66, 251 as Planetary Observer model, 59 Frosch, Robert A., 34, 53–54, 96 reports, 19 successes of, 9, 173 G Extreme Ultraviolent Explorer (EUVE), 21 Galileo program, 21, 55–56, 58, 73 Gamma-ray Large Area Space Telescope (GLAST), 112–113 F Gemini program, 33 Fairbank, William, 226 Geotail program, 21, 104 Fairchild Space Company, 41, 58 global climate change, 59–61, 173 Far-Ultraviolet Spectroscopic Explorer (FUSE), 112–113 go aheads, 25n38, 101, 170, 183, 220 Fast Auroral Snapshot Explorer (FAST), 104 Goddard, Robert H., 5, 12 “faster-better-cheaper,” 79–80, 174, 176n21 Goddard Space Flight Center, 16, 33, 38, 170 Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), 83, 90, 91, 255 Diaz at, 188 Astronomy and Astrophysics Advisory Committee (AAAC), Fisk at, 73 152 Great Observatories brainstorming group, 170 Hubble Space Telescope (HST), 186–189 Department of Energy (DOE), 149–150 NASA organization chart, 16 FACA section 15, 94 Riegler at, 101 impacts of, 160–163, 162, 217, 223–225, 229, 239, 240–242 scientific operations preference, 176–178 introduced, 49 senior reviews, 101 list of committees, 146n4 Young at, 175 NASA Advisory Council (NAC) role, 53, 141, 220 National Science Foundation (NSF), 145–146 NOAA, 153–155 origin of, 47–48

Index 283 Goldberg, Leo, 38–40, 42, 111 SSA Associate Administrator, 57, 65, 177–178 Goldin, Daniel, 201 Hornig, Donald F., 177 Hornig report, 176–178, 202, 205, 214. See also Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer (AMS), 228 “Connecting Quarks” report, 181–184 “Institutional Arrangements for the Space Telescope” faster-better-cheaper, 79–80, 174, 176n21 (report) International Space Station Management and Cost Hoyle, Fred, 36 Hubbard, Scott, 176 Evaluation (IMCE), 135 Hubble Space Telescope (HST), 16, 55, 121, 170–171, 219. Mars missions, 200 See also “Assessment of Options for Extending the Life of NASA Administrator, 61, 79, 135, 175, 179 the Hubble Space Telescope” report; Lanzerotti report NASA budget growth, 101 budget for, 56, 111–112, 253 NASA staff reductions, 138, 160–161 cancellation proposal, 58 OSSA reorganization, 79–81, 96, 195–196 Congressional mandated studies, 201–203, 208–209, personality of, 80, 175–176 Total Quality Management, 79 213–214, 217–219 Goldston, David, 212 decadal survey of 1972 (Greenstein), 111–112, 117 Goody, Richard, 16–18, 27, 60, 217, 219 International Solar-Terrestrial Physics program, 26 Gore, Albert Arnold Jr. (“Al”), 179–181 launch delayed, 73 Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), 83–91, life extension study, 185–189, 206, 213, 243–244, 255 mission control of, 176–178 114, 156, 160 scientific use report, 19 Government Performance and Results Modernization Act servicing missions, 121, 201–202, 206 Hunten, Donald M., 54 (GPRAMA), 84, 114, 164 Huntress, Wesley, 200 Gravity Probe A mission, 226n35 Discovery program, 203, 234, 242 Gravity Probe B mission, 19, 37, 226–228 management style, 174, 179 Great Observatories program, 56, 101, 233 NAC scientist, 137 NASA Associate Administrator, 84–85, 179–180 Beyond Einstein program, 183, 210 NASA budgets, 223 brainstorming group, 169–171, 182, 200–204 NASA Director of Solar System Exploration, 173–174 Greenstein, Jesse, 110–112, 117 quoted, 88–89, 137–138, 180, 203 Greenstein report, 109–113, 117 SSB reports, 242 Gregory, Fred, 136 Huygens probe, 59 Griffin, Michael, 231 Congressional mandated studies, 190 I Hubble Space Telescope (HST), 188–189 “Implementation Plan for Priorities in Solar-System Space NAC restructuring, 136–141, 146, 156, 159–160, 218–220, Physics, an” (report), 23 239, 255 Ink, Dwight, 48 NASA Administrator, 126, 136, 163, 190 Institute of Medicine (IOM), 93–94 NASA budgets, 139–140, 191–193, 218, 238 “Institutional Arrangements for the Space Telescope” (report), Grunsfeld, John ESA-NASA joint planning, 248–249 19, 177–178. See also Hornig report NAC Science Committee, 223 International Astronomical Union, 2, 38, 249 NASA Associate Administrator, 141, 161, 215 International Council of Scientific Unions, 7, 9 NASA internal relationships, 218–220 NRC reports, 254 Committee on Space Research (COSPAR), 26, 66 quoted, 119, 215–216, 248–249 International Geophysical Year (IGY), 7–9, 12, 34, 63, “Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals” docu- 247–248 ment, 93 International Solar Polar Mission (ISPM), 58, 74, 233 International Solar-Terrestrial Physics (ISTP) program, 21, 26 H International Space Station (ISS), 37, 122, 128, 133 Handler, Philip, 17, 217 Harwit, Martin, 170 Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer (AMS), 228 Hertz, Paul, 97–98, 103, 128, 192–193 budget shortfalls, 139–140 Heynes, Roger, 40 costs, 190–191 High Energy Physics Advisory Panel (HEPAP), 149–150 experiments on, 190 High-Energy Astrophysics Observatory (HEAO), 40 Management and Cost Evaluation (IMCE), 135, 175 Hinners, Noel, 201 servicing missions, 188 International X-ray Observatory (IXO), 183 management style, 177–178, 223, 242 Isakowitz, Steve, 180 NASA Associate Administrator, 68, 79 NASM Director, 58

284 Science Advice to NASA: Conflict, Consensus, Partnership, Leadership J “Man’s Role in the National Space Program” (report), 19, 24 James Webb Space Telescope (JWST), 112–113, 118, NOAA, 153 process, 23–24, 64 139n20, 183, 233 Shuttle versus backup modes of launch, 20–21 Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), 9, 173, 175–176, 203 SSB chair, 35 SSB prepared, 18–21, 153, 193, 205, 241, 250 NASA organization chart, 16 Levy, Eugene, 137 Joint Dark Energy Mission (JDEM), 183 Lewis, Deming, 29 Juno program, 115 Lincoln, Abraham, 1 Jupiter missions, 55–56, 73 Logsdon, John M., 79 Lunar and Planetary Missions Board (LPMB), 37, 67, 238, Cassini program, 56, 59, 76–77, 101, 219, 233 Europa program, 115, 213 253. See also Missions Boards Juno program, 115 charge, 35 Jupiter-C rocket, 9 creation of, 34–35 LPMB recommendations, 19, 37 folded into SPAC committee, 43 Pioneer program, 58 scope, 65 Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter, 105 K Kaplan, Joseph, 9 M Kennel, Charles F., 99, 118–119, 135–137 Magellan program, 21, 59 Kicza, Mary, 155 Management Operations Working Groups (MOWG), 76, Kistiakowsky, George, 27 Krause, Ernst H., 6 171, 219 advisory structure, 138, 141, 218, 221 L defined, 51–52 LaGow, Herman, 251 dissolution of, 156–157, 160 Lanzerotti, Louis J. FACA exemption, 65–67, 218, 224 “Managing the Space Sciences” (report), 196, 201–202, background, 57, 187 Hubble Space Telescope (HST) report, 187–189, 206, 213 209–210 letter reports, preference for, 96 Manhattan Project, 34, 177 NOAA ad hoc committee, 154 “Man’s Role in the National Space Program” (report), 19, 24 personality of, 187 Mark, Hans, 172, 200 proposed elimination of SAB, 32 Mars missions, 23, 37, 39, 58–59, 105, 173–176, 202 quoted, 146, 154 SESAC chair, 55, 57–58, 64 analysis groups, 142n28 SESAC Crisis Report, 194 budget cuts, 126 Solar and Space Physics Committee, 114 Curiosity rover/science laboratory, 115–116, 139n20, 176 SSB chair, 58, 79, 194 decadal surveys, 115–116 Lanzerotti report, 187–189, 201, 217–218, 244–245. See Discovery program, 174 failures of, 176n21 also “Assessment of Options for Extending the Life of human travel to, 60, 121 the Hubble Space Telescope” report; Hubble Space independent assessment, 175–176, 201–202 Telescope (HST) life extension study Mariner Mark II, 59, 173, 204, 223, 234 Large Space Telescope (LST). See Hubble Space Telescope Mars Observer, 21, 59 (HST) Mars Sample Return, 115, 116, 248 Laser Interferometer Space Antenna (LISA), 37, 113, 182 meteorites, 179–181 Lawler, Andrew, 211 NRC report (2006), 125–126 Leshin, Laurie, 122 Mars Rock symposium, 179–181, 191, 202, 205 letter reports, 23–25, 64–65, 65, 95–97, 97, 163 Marvel, Kevin “Assessment of Planned Scientific Content of the CRAF advisory committees, 146–147, 149, 222, 239 “Connecting Quarks” report, 182 Mission” (report), 19, 22 HST servicing missions, 186 “Assessment of the Planned Scientific Content of the LGO, quoted, 146–147, 149, 182 Turner (“Connecting Quarks”) report, 182 MAO, and NEAR Missions” (report), 19, 23 McDonald, Frank B., 25, 56, 225–226 “Categorization of the Mars Orbiter Mission, the” (report), McElroy, John, 79 McKay, David, 179–180 19, 22 McLucas, John L., 31–32 COMPLEX, 23, 97 Mercer, John, 83 defined, 13, 15, 97 eminence-based, 24 FACA section 15 compliance, 95–99, 163 list of, 19

Index 285 Mercury missions, 37 Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy Metcalf, Lee W., 49 (COSEPUP), 87–88 midterm reviews, 123–130, 157, 207, 233, 242 cross-discipline studies, 195–196 decadal, 124, 164, 240 FACA section 15 compliance, 95, 98–99, 156, 162, 239 decadal surveys, 130–133 fast-track studies, 245–246 Earth science, 127–128 Hubble Space Telescope (HST) report, 187–189, 201 list of, 124 independence of, 94, 130, 246 NASA budgets, 126 NASA/NSF midterm review, 148 National Academies prepared, 148 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and SSB prepared, 124, 128–129 Mikulski, Barbara, 96n10, 186–187, 189, 196, 201, 209 Medicine, 149–150 Mission to Planet Earth program, 59–61, 80, 136, 195, 233 relationship with NASA, 156, 215 Missions Boards, 34, 35–40. See also Astronomy Missions role, 161–162 Space Studies Board (SSB), 14 Board (AMB); Lunar and Planetary Missions Board National Academy of Engineering (NAE), 2n5, 15–16, 30, (LPMB) Moloney, Michael, 99 93–95, 99. See also National Academies Monagan, John S., 47–48 National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA), 15–16, Moon missions, 12, 23–25, 38, 121, 136, 191 Moore, Berrien, 78 94. See also National Academies Morrison, David, 58 2014 NASA Authorization bill, 143–144 FACA section 15 compliance, 94 N National Academy of Sciences (NAS), 123, 177. See also NASA. See National Aeronautics and Space Administration National Academies (NASA) advisory structure, 144 NASA Advisory Council (NAC), 30–31, 53–61, 84, 125. See Board on Atmospheric Science and Climate, 23 Committee on Science and Public Policy (COSPUP), 28, also Space Program Advisory Council (SPAC) advisory timeline, 55 109–110 attitudes toward, 159–160 creation of, 1 charge, 137, 144 criticisms of SSB, 27 committee structure, 54 FACA section 15 compliance, 94–97 independence of, 141–144, 161–162 independence of, 1, 16–17, 93–94 International Space Station Management and Cost International Geophysical Year (IGY), 8 laboratory animals, 94 Evaluation (IMCE), 135 Lloyd Berkner at, 10 NASA organization chart, 16 National Research Council (NRC) creation, 2 relationship with NASA internal committees, 161–162, 220 policy changes, 2–3 relationship with SSB, 138, 220 relationship with SSB, 9, 10–11, 15–16 role, 135–144, 176–184, 216 role, 1 Science Committee analysis groups, 142 U.S. National Academy for the International Geophysical Science Mission Directorate (SMD), 146 SESAC Crisis Report, 55–58, 64, 69, 73–74, 101, 194, Year (USNC-IGY), 7 National Academy of Sciences’ Space Science Board. See 210, 250–251, 255 Space and Earth Sciences Advisory Committee (SESAC), Space Science Board (SSB) National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), 157, 55–57, 76 Space Science Advisory Committee (SSAC), 54–55, 78–80 223 standing committees, 205 advisory precedence for NASA, 12, 42, 63, 123, 144, structure, 136–137 structure reform, 137–144, 225, 239 237–238 “NASA Leadership and America’s Future in Space” (Ride advisory structure, 3–5, 33 creation of, 3–4 report), 60–61 independence of, 4 National Academies, 15–16, 67, 76, 160. See also individual science advisory role, 3–4 science-engineering tension, 4, 24 academies Space Science Board (SSB) established, 9–11 advisory funding, 245–246 Special Committee on Space Technology, 6 advisory structure, 206–207, 241–242 technical committees, 10 annual reports, 2n7 transformed into NASA, 9–10 attitudes toward, 159–160, 221 National Aeronautics and Space Act, 9 Committee on Science and Public Policy (COSPUP), 28, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), 121, 109 234. See also NASA Advisory Council (NAC); Space Science Board (SSB)

286 Science Advice to NASA: Conflict, Consensus, Partnership, Leadership absorption of NSF, 151–152 mission longevity, 101 ad hoc committees, 21, 34–35, 141, 145, 183, 244 mission operations, 101n1 advisory committee costs, 221 mission priorities, 57, 61, 63, 79–80, 85–86, 117, 207, advisory committees, external, 3, 12, 13, 63, 135, 140, 238–239, 252 176–184 mission queue, 78–80, 210 advisory committees, external, impacts of, 185–193 mission resources, 125–128, 139, 189–196 advisory committees, external versus internal, 215, 229, 254 Mission to Planet Earth program, 59–61, 73 advisory committees, internal, 13, 33, 63–69, 125, Missions Boards, 34, 35–40 NAC structure reform, 137–144, 159–160 160–161, 169–176, 240 NACA advisory precedence, 12, 42, 63 advisory structure, 2, 33–45, 48, 50–52, 63–69, 123, National Space Policy Directive, 61 New Frontiers Program, 114–115 145–157 NRC committees, 145 advisory structure diagram, 64 Office of Space Science and Applications (OSSA). See also advisory structure reform, 125, 129, 136–144, 160–162, NASA strategic plan 255 Office of Space Science Plan, 85 advisory timeline, 34, 55, 114 Office of Space Sciences, 14 Astronomy and Astrophysics Advisory Committee (AAAC), organization chart, 16 organizational culture, 159–160, 237–238 152–153 OSS R&A evaluation, 105–106 Astronomy Missions Board (AMB), 35, 38–40, 42–43, 65, OSSA GPRA inquiry, 86 paper-free reports, 86n12 67, 216, 233, 238 partnership with DOE, 183 attitudes toward, 67, 140, 163, 176–178 peer review, 88, 251–252 Board on Physics and Astronomy (BPA), 120 perception of, 67 budget constraints, 26, 54, 61 Physics Advisory Committee (PAC), 35–40, 65 budget cuts, 40, 58–59, 68–69, 74, 116, 239 Planetary Science and Astrophysics Division, 106 budget cuts implemented, 139–140, 143 priorities set by SSB, 20, 119–120 budget decisions, 89, 126–128 Ramsey committee, 34–35, 53 budget growth, 75, 119, 121–122, 189–190 relationship with AMB, 40 budget projections, 40, 85–86, 120, 139 relationship with Congress, 242–243 budget reviews, 76, 126 relationship with NOAA, 31, 155 CODMAC recommendations, 20 relationship with NRC, 216–220 conflicts of interest, 223–225 relationship with scientific community, 231–232, 239–240, Cosmic Background Explorer (COBE) mission, 73 creation of, 3–4, 9–10 242–243 criticisms of, 192 relationship with SSB, 11, 25, 127 decadal surveys, 109–133 relationships with external advisory groups, 231 Earth Observing System (EOS) program, 61 research and analysis (R&A) programs, 105–106 Earth Science Enterprise (ESE), 85 Research and Technology Advisory Council (RTAC), 43 Earth Systems Science Committee (ESSC), 59–61, 66, 203, response to NRC’s advice, 23 Ride (Sally) report, 60–61 206, 209 role, 146 Earth-oriented satellite use studies, 29–30 Science Advisory Committee, 40 ESSC recommendations, 60 science discipline divisions, 87 FACA committees, 145–146, 204, 206–208, 217 science management and planning, 231–232 FACA legislation, 48, 50–52, 67, 162 Science Mission Directorate (SMD), 86, 119, 139, 248 Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), 83–91, security clearance reviews, 29 senior reviews, 102–107, 147, 169, 200, 203–204, 208 102, 120 Solar System Exploration Committee (SSEC), 23, 58, 66, Homer Newell at, 6 international collaboration, 113, 247–250 69, 173–174, 204, 234 International Geosphere-Biosphere Program, 60 Space Applications Board (SAB), 30, 194 launch vehicle costs, 75n9 Space Physics Paradox Report, 197–198, 201 letter reports, 24, 97 Space Program Advisory Council (SPAC), 42–45, 215. See Lunar and Planetary Missions Board (LPMB), 35–37, also NASA Advisory Council 42–43, 65, 67, 238, 253 Space Science Steering Committee, 34, 65 Management Operations Working Groups (MOWG), Space Shuttle priority, 20–21 Space Task Group, 43 65–67, 76, 141, 156–157, 160, 171, 218–219, 224 Management Operations Working Groups (MOWG), defined, 51–52 Mars program independent assessment, 233 mission data analysis, 101, 252