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Mindfulness Meditation: Deconditioning and Changing View Henk Barendregt Abstract Mindfulness interventions and meditation form a mental training towards deconditioning. This paper outlines the mental development during long term mind- fulness meditation (vipassanā). It is intended to give researchers in the neurosci- ences and practitioners of mindfulness based interventions an idea of the phenomenological side of this form of meditation. Mindfulness acts as a separator between the perceived actor in us and the things we cognize and act upon. This makes us more fexible. At the same time our view of self will change: no longer is our ‘agency’ seen as a fxed ‘thing’ or ‘being’ that acts in the world, but as a process of sensory input, appraisal, thinking, acting, depending on various mental states. The Human Condition We are conditioned: depending on circumstances our behavior is pushed in certain directions. Already in some unicellular organisms this is the case. If there is food nearby, then the fagellum of the organism starts running in order to move towards the source; in case there is a poison, then movement goes in the opposite direction. In multicellular species and fnally in mammals, primates, and homo sapiens the conditioning forces are much more sophisticated, making use of tools like neurons, hormones and long-term memory. Usually the ‘possessor’ has an evolutionary advantage: a better survival mechanism. For example, the feeling of ‘self’ of a human being, in particular our feeling of ‘agency’, with all of its planning and pos- sessing up to egocentricity, forms a powerful way to survive. Thus nature has provided organisms, from the unicellular ones to humans, with the mechanism of desire and H. Barendregt (*) Faculty of Science, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands e-mail: [email protected] H. Walach et al. (eds.), Neuroscience, Consciousness and Spirituality, 195 Studies in Neuroscience, Consciousness and Spirituality 1, DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-2079-4_12, © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011
196 H. Barendregt aversion. Humans suffer, when they cannot get what they want (and also when they cannot avoid what they resent). This means that we have a strong tendency to arrange things in order to fulfll our desires. Driven by desire humans have constructed cities and cultures. The same drive, however, is also the cause of madness and war. Considerable human misery has resulted. How is it possible that desire, which is there for our increased chance of survival, sometimes is against us? A frst reason why this happens is that circumstances may change. Take for example insects that during fight orient themselves towards the moon. They keep a fxed angle to the ‘infnitely distant’ source of light and then they fy in a straight line. After humans had invented fres and lamps, this form of condi- tioning caused the insects to spiral towards the light source and then they burn their feet or worse. But there are ‘higher’ insects that are able to learn from the heat of fres and lamps and avoid them. Another example of conditioning is initially increas- ing survival chances, but under some circumstances works against the animal. This can be seen in certain monkeys. The story is that they like bananas so much that after grabbing one they cannot let go of it, until they eat the fruit. If the banana is behind a hole just large enough to pass through their hand, they will grab it. But with the banana in the monkey’s fst it cannot get out of the hole. As it is impossible for the monkey to let go of the banana it is stuck. If men come with a cage in order to catch it, then the monkey cannot avoid this. Here we see that a seemingly useful conditioning turns into a monkey-trap. We all have friends that do similar things: holding on to things or situations in such a way that it becomes a hindrance. And if we dare to be honest, we may have to admit that sometimes we also do this our- selves. A fnal reason for conditioning becoming a cause of suffering is that what we want may simply be impossible. Science People have developed science: insight in the phenomena around ourselves. This means that we can explain a great many of these from a small subset of them using a predictive model. This insight can lead to technology, by which we are capable to obtain partial control over some of the phenomena. This makes it possible to fulfll needs in ways that are easier than before. Against the cold we construct a heater, against heat an air-conditioner. Science is an impressive human endeavor towards understanding nature. If applied with wisdom, it can diminish human suffering and bring us a higher standard of living. But it is good to realize that not everything can be controlled. What we want may be expensive, illegitimate, immoral, unecological or sheer impossible. Therefore, in spite of science and technology, there will remain suffering, namely in those cases where control is beyond the possible or that control causes conficts. People may fght for the same scarce natural resources. Human conditioning is even so strong that one may fght about cherished ideas.
Mindfulness Meditation: Deconditioning and Changing View 197 Phenomenology We may cognitively understand that conditioning causes conficts with ourselves, with others and with our living environment, the earth. Even then this does not set us free from conditioning. There is another type of investigation that may be useful towards this end. It is the research directed inwards, towards consciousness as it is presented to us. This investigation is called ‘phenomenology’. A highly successful example of phenomenology is the following. I heard the story from colleagues, but see Duck (1988), Ribe and Steinle (2002) and Sepper (2007) for the main parts of it. Around 1800 physicists after Newton knew that colored light forms a one-dimensional (1D) phenomenon. Light comes in various wavelengths and a particular one determines the color of the light. In 1810 the poet Goethe, who was also interested in perception, suggested another theory. He claimed that colors form a 3D phenomenon for the following reason. When we have, say, 125 cubes, each one colored evenly in a different color, then it is not possible to put them in a linear row such that the colors change ‘smoothly’; also it is not possible to do this in a plane. But in a cube 5 × 5 × 5 of it is possible to arrange the colors such that in all directions they change smoothly. This observation is phenomenological: it is based on direct perception, independent of rational considerations. At frst physicists maintained their position that colors form a 1D phenomenon. But then the physician Young (1773–1829) and later the physicist Helmholtz (1821– 1894) tried to reconcile the observations of Goethe with those from physics. They coined the hypothesis that the human eye has three different receptors for color vision. If this is the case, then a single wavelength induces a triple of reactions in the retina and in the rest of the brain. This implies that colors are 1D at their physical formation, but 3D at their perception. The Young-Helmholtz hypothesis was fnally proved as late as 1960, that is 150 years after Goethe’s observation. In the meantime the multibillion industry of color photography and color TV-monitors had started, all based on the fact that we have three receptors for color perception. Today in 2009 the idea is still going strong in digital cameras, fat-screens, and video-projectors. Politicians should be happy: fundamental research does lead to economic growth. But in this case one had to wait about 150 years for the spin-off. This is longer than the re-election term, so politicians do not notice it. Religion What is the goal of religion? My answer is this: to fnd threefold peace, within ourselves, with others and with the world. Sometimes we may think: “fnding peace within ourselves is easy, the others are being nasty; and as to peace with the world, well we are mortal, but I’m not yet concerned with that.” But the problem of death is just a particular case of a more general problem. We are not the absolute boss,
198 H. Barendregt neither of the circumstances, nor of our body, nor of our minds. This last fact has been expressed well by St. Augustin: imperat animus corpori, et paretur statim; imperat animus sibi, et resistitur. imperat animus ut moveatur manus, et tanta est facilitas ut vix a servitio discernatur imperium: et animus animus est, manus autem corpus est. imperat animus ut velit animus, nec alter est nec facit tamen. unde hoc monstrum? et quare istuc, inquam, ut velit qui non imperaret nisi vellet, et non facit quod imperat? Augustine (1955), Book VIII, Ch. 9, 21. [The mind commands the body, and the body obeys. The mind commands itself and is resisted. The mind commands the hand to be moved and there is such readiness that the command is scarcely distinguished from the obedience in act. Yet the mind is mind, and the hand is body. The mind commands the mind to will, and yet though it be itself it does not obey itself. Whence this strange anomaly and why should it be? I repeat: The will com- mands itself to will, and could not give the command unless it wills; yet what is commanded is not done. (The Confessions of St Augustine, translated and edited by A.C. Outler, Dover Thrift Editions, 2002).] Although the body does not always listen so well as in this example, for example we can get ill at moments that are inconvenient, the meaning of the statement of St. Augustine is well-known. We are not always doing what we think we should be doing; conditioning prevents us. Through a religious view, for example that of the three monotheistic systems (Judaism, Christianity and Islam), one can fnd a purpose in life, an ethical code and mentioned threefold peace. A religion helps to fnd faith, hope, and love. If the assumptions of a religion are formulated carefully, then they do not need to be in contradiction with a scientifc worldview. They are, however, metaphysical: assump- tions about life after death cannot be verifed. In some visions on faith (fdes quae), this is not necessary. One can accept the religious dogmas as a collection of axioms, in the mathematical sense, that provide a mental hold. Sometimes it is even claimed that this form of faith is more stable than the one in which one interprets the dogmas as being really true (fdes qua): indeed, in that case one can be contradicted. Meditation In many religious traditions the preference is to base peace not on faith, but on mental development. Insight (or mindfulness) meditation (vipassanā) coming from classical Buddhism is a prime example showing the possibility of transform- ing the mind. Meditation can be divided into two main classes. In order to describe these we need to introduce some terminology concerning consciousness. Even if consciousness cannot be properly defned, we have an idea of what is meant by it: an awareness of the things around and within us. Of course, the transition (‘con- sciousness’ → ‘awareness’) does not help very much. But the following descrip- tion of aspects of consciousness delineates it, just like an axiom system explains the meaning of the primitive (undefned) mathematical objects occurring in it. Consciousness has two aspects. First there is the object (or content) of conscious- ness: it is what one sees, hears, smells, tastes, touches or thinks. Next to the object there is the ‘coloring’ of consciousness, resulting in mental ‘states’. One can
Mindfulness Meditation: Deconditioning and Changing View 199 observe the same object together with e.g. joy or with boredom or with anger. Other colorings are for example sleepiness, restlessness, equanimity, and compas- sion. Buddhist psychology, the Abhidhamma (Bodhi 2000), distinguishes 51 such colorings. These 51 are called cetasikas, ‘mental factors’, and form ingredients of the mental states, called cetas, by combining several of them. There are 89 states, obtained as such mixtures. It is mentioned that there are more mental factors and states than these 51 and 89, but the listed ones are particularly important for the mental development towards deconditioning. Some of the mental factors are called unwholesome (like e.g. hatred, restlessness, and jealousy), some are called beautiful (like e.g. mindfulness, fexibility, and compassion), and fnally some are called neutral (like e.g. concentration and joy: these states can be combined with both compassion and hatred). Now we are ready to describe the two classes of meditation. (1) Concentration (or samādhi) meditation is aimed at increasing positive states of consciousness. (2) Insight (also called mindfulness or vipassanā) meditation is aimed at decreasing and eventually eliminating the negative states of consciousness. The highpoint of concentration meditation consists of various mystical experi- ences, including rapture and bliss. Mystical states are described in many cultures, but the theoretical explanation may differ in the various traditions (Staal 1975). The Buddhist mystical states are called jhānas (Pali for ‘absorptions’, states of high concentration). These states are explained in a language that is understandable in cognitive psychology. The word jhāna has come to the English language as follows: jhāna > dhyana (Sanskrit) > chan (Chinese) > sun (Korean) > zen (Japanese and English). The jhānas form an increasing chain of mystical states, ordered linearly. According to the Abhidhamma jhāna 3, 4 and 5 are distinguished as follows: in jhāna 3 one has rapture, bliss or compassion and equanimity; in jhāna 4 one has bliss or compassion and equanimity; and in jhāna 5 one just has equanimity. State 4 is said to be higher than 3, as rapture gives some restlessness; state 5 is higher than 4 as bliss or compassion give some attachment. It is tempting to relate the states 3 and the two variants of 4 to neuromodulators like dopamine, opioids, and oxytocin (said to correspond to libido, postorgastic bliss and inter-human binding). The situ- ation may be more complex, though. Because these mystical experiences are very pleasant, there is a tendency to get attached to them, for example in Christianity they are described as the “unity with God”. From a Buddhist point of view, but also from that of several Christian mys- tics, this attachment is to be avoided. The highpoint of insight meditation is purifcation or enlightenment that elimi- nates some or all of the negative states. When these do no longer occur, consciousness has a tendency towards neutral and beautiful states. Metaphorically speaking, one can state that concentration meditation aims at nice weather, while insight medita- tion aims at a nice climate. The last thing is more diffcult to reach, notably because one has to proceed along unpleasant states called ‘dark night of the soul’ by St. John of the Cross (2008). In the tradition of insight meditation they are called the ‘three characteristics’ of consciousness: anicca, dukkha, anatta, best translated as ‘non-permanence, disgust and loss of control’. This passing along negative states is necessary for the domestication of them. As a pretty high degree of concentration
200 H. Barendregt meditation is needed for successful insight meditation, 10 of the 22 chapters of Nanamoli (1976) are devoted to concentration, it takes most people more work to reach enlightenment than to reach mystical states. But the effect of purifcation is lasting and therefore more worthwhile to be pursued. The Buddhist tradition distinguishes several types of deconditioned mind: liber- ated by suppression (vikkhambhana-vimutti), a temporary state, and by insight (paññā-vimutti), which is permanent. The jhānas all belong to the frst type, whereas the purifed state is permanent. Mindfulness One of the beautiful mental factors is mindfulness. During mindfulness one observes the input from the senses in a non-reactive way. This sometimes may happen to us while window-shopping: when we look at nice merchandise that is too expensive to be bought, we may look in a manner that is ‘observing’, but not ‘reacting’. Then we may observe ‘there is beauty’. Or if desire comes up, then we even may observe ‘there is desire’ and still not buy the objects. Another way of explaining mindful- ness is the classical metaphor of the money-changer. A child sees money bills as colored pieces of paper. An adult can look at the same money with desire, especially to the higher bills. But a money-changer observes the money with attention and, if all is well, doesn’t develop desire, as the money is not hers. This is looking with mindfulness. It is something that happens naturally every now and then, but it also can be trained to make its occurrence intentionally more frequent. Using developed mindfulness one can work towards detachment from the condi- tioning mechanisms that nature has bestowed upon us. We already have explained why this is benefcial. In some cases the conditioning brings suffering, like to the insects that fy in the candle or to the monkeys that are being caught while grabbing a banana. In cases there is a free banana, there is no problem to pick and eat it. If a human grabs the banana in the ‘monkey-trap’, then mindfulness would enable him to observe the object and his desire and then to let go of it. Whether monkeys can learn this I do not know, but humans can. By systematic training mindfulness can become our second nature and this deconditions our negative traits, like entering ruminations of negative thoughts. To decondition the full mechanism of desire, more work is needed: mindfulness should become our frst nature. Vipassanā During vipassanā meditation one trains to apply mindfulness to all phenomena in consciousness. If one sees something, then one observes ‘seeing, seeing’. If there are notable sounds, then one observes ‘hearing, hearing’. This constitutes the so called frst foundation of mindfulness directed to the input of the senses. Next to this
Mindfulness Meditation: Deconditioning and Changing View 201 is the foundation of immediate appraisal: something can be pleasant, unpleasant or neutral. The third foundation consists of mindfulness directed to mental phenom- ena, like thinking and mental factors and states. Finally the fourth foundation con- sists of the observations of conditioning, like holding onto something without our really wanting to do this. Increased mindfulness can separate the four foundations. In this separated form of consciousness the mechanisms of conditioning are much looser. This brings freedom. This separation of the composed consciousness is also related to dissociation, as it is known from psychiatry. In vipassanā one prefers to speak about dis-identifcation. Our phenomenological world consists of fuctuating patterns of consciousness. These patterns are being reifed, by imagining them as being a fxed thing. Think of a wave in the sea that we perceive as an object that moves towards the shore. Note that there is no particle of water that moves from the sea towards the land. It is only the relative height of the particles of water that is being transmitted as a wave from the sea towards the coast. Our mind is used to turn moving patterns into things: the act of reifying. During vipassanā training one learns to be aware of this. This frees us from the manipulating and conditioning effects of our perception and cognition. One remarkable pseudo-paradoxical aspect of the deconditioning is that in order to be mindful, one has to accept what happens without judgment. Initially one is able to do this. But then our mechanism of desire tries to employ ‘mindful- ness’, making it no longer true mindfulness: there is the hidden agenda to become better by using it. Strong suffering results, as one is doing something apparently without success. If one has enough discipline to continue the training, then after a while one gives up any hope of becoming better by the training. At that moment one regains the right mindfulness and then the method works again and one feels fne. Following an intensive vipassanā retreat this mechanism causes several up and down phases. Domesticating Existential Fear Some people may observe dissociations as a result of genetic tendencies or trau- matic events; this can happen also without training mindfulness. Then anxiety may result, as one seems to loosen the hold of one’s self (depersonalization), of the body (desomatization) or of the world (derealization). If this has happened for a longer period, notably during growing up, then one’s personality is often unstable and proper therapeutic aid is advisable, in particular before starting insight meditation. Often the meditator will also develop temporary fear after the experience of dis- identifcation. If one works in the safe environment of a meditation center and in the proximity of a skillful and compassionate meditation teacher, this fear will at frst be diluted and then one can restart the process of reifcation in a mindful way. This is the core mechanism of deconditioning. Although the mentioned fear of falling apart is temporary, it may be very strong. In fact it is the mother of all fears and the very cause of suffering. During the process of falling apart one clearly sees that consciousness is in a constant fuctuation; moreover it is unbearable as one goes
202 H. Barendregt 1 beyond meaning and arrives in a kind of ‘emptiness’; and fnally it is beyond our control, also called selfessness. These fundamental qualities of phenomenal con- sciousness – it is fuctuating, unbearable and selfess – are called the three character- istics. The original text about uncovering the three characteristic states is the following (Nanamoli (1976), Ch XXI, 3–4), with some parenthetical remarks by me. The characteristic of impermanence does not become apparent because, when rise and fall are not given attention, it is concealed by continuity [due to reifcation]. The characteristic of suffering does not become apparent because, when continuous oppression [to sitting still; i.e. there is desire to move, scratch one’s nose, etcetera] is not given attention, it is con- cealed by the [holding on to the meditation] postures. The characteristic of not-self does not become apparent, because when resolution [dissolution] into the various elements is not given attention, it is concealed by compactness [the feeling of ‘agency’]. However, when continuity gets disrupted by discerning rise and fall, impermanence becomes apparent in its true nature. When the postures are exposed by attention to continuous oppression, the char- acteristic of pain becomes apparent in its true nature. When the resolution of the compact is effected by resolution into elements, the characteristic of no-self becomes apparent in its true nature. By focusing systematically on input of the physical senses as a mental hold, and by constantly observing the negative aspects of the fear and the corresponding effects on behavior, one can learn to diminish the strong phenomena of the three characteristics and eventually to eliminate them. This can happen by applying mindfulness to the four foundations as they come and go. Mindfulness should be developed such that it is fxed for a while on one of the foundations. After that one develops the mental states of equanimity, calmness and joy. At a certain moment the meditation development is mature for ‘surrender’. One sees that the phenom- ena continue, even if one is dis-identifed and subject to the three characteristics of consciousness. In case the meditation is not yet matured, then one of the states of mind will ‘glue together’ the broken consciousness. And because that state hides the three characteristics, the unbearable feeling disappears. But there will be side- effects of this ‘emotion’ acting as symptomatic medicine. If the hiding factor is, say, desire, then one becomes greedy. If it is fear, then one becomes phobic (Barendregt 1982). It is far better to reconstruct consciousness using mindfulness, than to glue using emotions. Mindfulness domesticates the three characteristics and sets us free. It should be emphasized that this domestication work can be done only if one is willing to invest the right effort under the right conditions. This happens in so called intensive meditation retreats. One needs to meditate for an uninter- rupted period, for example during a 10 day intensive vipassanā retreat. It happens at a place in which one is not disturbed by others, where there is an experienced meditator to help and where the living conditions are appropriate. In short: one 1 Children sometimes play the following game. They repeat an ordinary word, like ‘yellow’, many times. After a while they loose the meaning of the word, there is just the sound. This phenomenon is called a ‘semantic fateague’. From the point of view of insight meditation a word has a sound and a meaning. When a word is repeated often, the sound and meaning are separated. Actually the child still knows very well what ‘yellow’ means.
Mindfulness Meditation: Deconditioning and Changing View 203 goes to a meditation center for an intensive vipassanā retreat under the guidance of a skillful teacher. Cover-Up and Purifcation During the path of insight meditation one sooner or later discovers the three charac- teristics. It is a powerful dissociation. The feeling of self (‘agency’, ‘ego’, or how- ever you want to call it) is lost. One then notices that this phenomenal experience of the three characteristics is always nearby, but usually we hide it by our feeling, thinking and acting. This is called the ‘cover-up’ of the characteristics. Although they are always there, usually one does not see the three characteristics. After insight has penetrated to the three characteristics, one also sees clearly that one usually cov- ers them up, including the painful selfessness (Barendregt 1996). This is like dis- mantling the motor of a car piece by piece. After that the pieces may be purifed by mindfulness, i.e. be released from the occurring fear. Usually one is not yet ready for this and the three characteristics are covered-up again: a feeling of agency is created in such a way that one takes it for real, having certain side-effects. At this stage the meditator feels discouraged to continue the training: a problem that he did not know before has resulted, without there being a known solution. A compassionate meditation teacher encourages the meditator to continue to work by mindfulness and not to cover-up the phenomena. If the meditator works hard and summons the discipline to continue the work, eventually an equanimous, calm and joyful mind is developed. At that moment the meditator becomes ready to surrender. Mindfulness that has become a reliable second nature of the meditator now has to become our frst nature. This cannot be done at will, but it helps (and it seems to be essential) if the trainee has the patient intention that this will happen. And then it may happen indeed, but unexpectedly: negative mental factors get eliminated. This means that the negative side-effects of the cover-up like fear or depression to give us agency are no longer necessary for being in balance. According to tradition the negative states of mind will not all be eliminated at the same time. There are four milestones. At frst one stops believing in ‘self’ or ‘agency’ as a fxed kernel of consciousness. After that greed and hatred are being diluted. Then at the third milestone these two ‘poisons’ will be eliminated com- pletely. At the fourth and last milestone it is said that one eliminates (i) restlessness, (ii) sleepiness, (iii) pride, (iv) desire for certain forms of existence and (v) ignorance about unconscious processes that nevertheless do infuence us in major ways. In order to be able to do the work of deconditioning, one needs to embrace insight meditation as a life-style: knowing that it is useful to meditate often and then actu- ally doing it! The training to domesticate the three characteristics may be compared to a training for a parachutist or astronaut. An inexperienced person is afraid to fall and gets nauseated by it. But one can domesticate the mental fear and physical dis- gust for weightlessness by a systematic training. This changes one’s view on agency and liberates us from a heavy burden: ego does no longer need to be defended.
204 H. Barendregt Meditation and Research The claims above are being taught in the living oral tradition of insight meditation, backed by ancient texts, and has been partly verifed by the author as a trainee (Barendregt 1988, 1996). Buddha mentioned about such theories the following: “Do not believe in anything simply because you have heard it. Do not believe in anything simply because it is spoken and rumored by many. Do not believe in anything because it is found written in your religious books. Do not believe in anything merely on the authority of your teachers and elders. Do not believe in traditions because they have been handed down for many generations. But after observation and analysis, when you fnd anything that agrees with reason and is conducive to the good and beneft of one and all, then accept it and live up to it.” Taken from the Kalama Sutta, AN 3.65, see Gethin (2008). This witnesses a scientifc attitude. Nevertheless is seems worthwhile to verify the claims made by the tradition of insight meditation, not only by personal experi- ence of meditators, but also by a scientifc evaluation. It may bring the method of deconditioning known to a wider audience, and thus bring more peace to the world. A second reason is that it may help science to progress, as the mentioned mecha- nisms of conditioning and deconditioning are plausible and highly relevant. In the author’s opinion the following questions are important. 1. Is the experience of the three characteristics (chaos, suffering, selfessness) measurable? 2. Is the symptomatic cover-up with side-effects of the three characteristics measurable? 3. Is purifcation by means of mindfulness measurable? By ‘measurable’ I mean physiologically and/or behaviorally observable. During data-collection for this research it will be relevant to receive feedback from the meditators about the mental state in which they reside. To start with question 3, the Abhidhamma claims that mindfulness is correlated with equanimity, fexibility, good memory, and attention. For more common psychological factors there are vali- dated tests. One could investigate these in meditators before and after a retreat and analyze whether they are increased in similar ways. Also one can compare medita- tors with non-meditators. Research has reported that years of practicing insight meditation correlates with cortical thickness (Hölzel et al. 2008, see also the chapter by Ott et al., this book). Moreover, attention is increased by a different neuronal strategy (Slagter et al. 2007; van den Hurk et al. 2009). One may conjecture that during mindfulness one uses different neural pathways, not in the limbic system but in the cortex. In question 1 it is asked whether the dis-identifcation is measurable. A possible hypothesis is that the phenomenon of dis-identifcation has to do with desynchronized fring of distant neurons. The reason for this is that dis-identifca- tion is related to unbinding and that there is the hypothesis (Singer 1999), that bind- ing is related with long-distance synchronization. Question 2 may be addressed by researching the infuence of neuro-modulators on mind-states. See Veening et al. (2010, 2010) for work in this direction.
Mindfulness Meditation: Deconditioning and Changing View 205 The number of scientifc papers on mindfulness training and meditation is growing considerably: presently there are several hundred. It is beyond the scope of this paper to review the present literature. But it seems fair to say that typical aspects of insight meditation, like the experience of the three characteristics, have been neglected in past research. This is understandable, as not all meditators reach this state within a limited period of time. The fundamental fear hampers progress in that right direction: people try to avoid the three characteristics. But in vipassanā inten- sive retreats of 10 days and longer, experiencing them does occur relatively often. There should be collaboration between the researchers and the teacher for the selec- tion of the subjects having reached certain stages. The methodology of this proposal is the following: in this early stage of research one does not yet study the effective- ness of insight meditation as a cure, but one investigates the mechanism of a univer- sal human problem consisting of existential suffering as caused by conditioning. If the neurophysiology of the problem is better understood, this will probably contrib- ute to understanding the solution as presented by insight meditation. References Augustine of Hippo. (397) (1955). Confessions (A. C. Outler, Trans.). , St. Augustine: Christian Classics Ethereal Library. Augustine of Hippo (2008). Confessions, Translation: H. Chadwick Oxford World’s Classics, Oxford University Press. Barendregt, H. P. (1988). Buddhist phenomenology. In M. dalla Chiara (Ed.), Proceedings of the Conference on Topics and Perspectives of Contemporary Logic and Philosophy of Science (pp. 37–55). Bologna: Clueb. URL: www.cs.ru.nl/~henk/BP/bp1.html Barendregt, H. P. (1996). Mysticism and beyond, Buddhist phenomenology, Part II. In The Eastern Buddhist (New series, Vol. XXIX, pp. 262–287). URL: www.cs.ru.nl/~henk/BP/bp2.html Barendregt, J. T. (2008). Phobias and related fears. Unpublished. Available at ftp://ftp.cs.kun.nl/ pub/CompMath.Found/JTBarendregtFobias.pdf. (Original work published 1982: Fobiëen en verwante angsten. In J. T. Barendregt De zielenmarkt, Over psychotherapie in alle ernst (pp. 163–180). Meppel: Boom). Bodhi, B. (2000). A comprehensive manual of Abhidhamma: The Abhidhammattha Sangaha of Ācariya Anuruddha. Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, Pariyatti Editions. Gethin, R. (2008). Sayings of the Buddha: New translations from the Pali Nikaya, Oxford World’s Classics, Oxford University Press. Hölzel, B. K., Ott, U., Gard, T., Hempel, H., Weygandt, M., Morgen, K., & Vaitl, D. (2008). Investigation of mindfulness meditation practitioners with voxel-based morphometry. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 3(1), 55–61. Kabat-Zinn, J. (2003). Mindfulness-based interventions in context: Past, present and future. Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice, 10(2), 144–156. Ñañamoli, B. (1976). The path of purifcation [Visuddhimagga] (B. Buddhagosa, (approximately 430 A. D.), Trans.). Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society. Ribe, N., & Steinle, F. (2002). Exploratory experimentation: Goethe, land, and colour theory. Physics Today, 55(7), 43–49. Sepper, D. L. (2007). Goethe contra Newton: Polemics and the project for a new science of color. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Singer, W. (1999). Neuronal synchrony: A versatile code for the defnition of relations? Neuron, 24(1), 49–65.
206 H. Barendregt Slagter, H. A., Lutz, A., Greischar, L. L., Francis, A. D., Nieuwenhuis, S., et al. (2007). Training affects distribution of limited brain resources. PLOS Biology, 5(6), e138. St. John of the Cross (2008). Dark night of the soul, translated by E. Allison Peers, Wilder, Radford VA. Staal, F. (1975). Exploring mysticism. Berkeley: University of California Press. van den Hurk, P. A. M., Giommi, F., Gielen, S. C., Speckens, A. E. M., & Barendregt, H. P. (2009). Greater effciency in attentional processing related to mindfulness meditation. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 63(6), 1168–1180. URL: www.informaworld.com/smpp/ content~db=jour~content=a915419588 Veening, J. G., & Barendregt, H. P. (2010). The regulation of brain states by neuroactive substances distributed via the cerebrospinal fuid; a review. Cerebrospinal Fluid Research, 7(1), 1. URL: www.cerebrospinalfuidresearch.com/content/7/1/1 Veening, J. G., de Jong, T., & Barendregt, H. P. (2010). Oxytocin messages via the cerebrospinal fuid: Behavioural effects, a review. Physiology & Behavior, 101(2), 193–210.
Endless Consciousness: A Concept Based on Scientifc Studies of Near-Death Experiences Pim van Lommel As for me, I am more than ever convinced that it is the greatest enemy of scientifc progress if one rejects or refuses beforehand to study unknown and seemingly strange facts and fndings. Frederik van Eeden, MD and author (1860–1932) Abstract In this chapter a concept of non-local consciousness will be described, based on recent studies on near-death experiences (NDE). Recently several theo- ries have been proposed to explain a NDE. The challenge to fnd a common expla- nation for the cause and content of a NDE is complicated by the fact that a NDE can be experienced during various circumstances, such as during severe injury of the brain as in cardiac arrest to a continuum when the brain seems to function normally. Since the publication of several prospective studies on NDE in survi- vors of cardiac arrest, with strikingly similar results and conclusions, the phenom- enon of the NDE can no longer be scientifcally ignored. It is an authentic experience which cannot be simply reduced to imagination, fear of death, halluci- nation, psychosis, the use of drugs, or oxygen defciency. People appear to be permanently changed by a NDE during a cardiac arrest of only some minutes duration. According to these studies, the current materialistic view of the relation- ship between the brain and consciousness held by most physicians, philosophers and psychologists is too restricted for a proper understanding of this phenomenon. There are good reasons to assume that our consciousness does not always coin- cide with the functioning of our brain: enhanced consciousness can sometimes be experienced separately from the body. P. van Lommel (*) Department of Cardiology, Rijnstate Hospital, Arnhem, The Netherlands e-mail: [email protected] H. Walach et al. (eds.), Neuroscience, Consciousness and Spirituality, 207 Studies in Neuroscience, Consciousness and Spirituality 1, DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-2079-4_13, © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011
208 P. van Lommel Introduction A near-death experience (NDE) can be defned as the reported memory of a range of impressions during a special state of consciousness, including a number of special elements such as an out-of-body experience, pleasant feelings, seeing a tunnel, a light, deceased relatives, or a life review. Many circumstances are described during which NDEs are reported, such as cardiac arrest (clinical death), shock after loss of blood, traumatic brain injury or intra-cerebral haemorrhage, near-drowning (chil- dren) or asphyxia, but also in serious diseases not immediately life-threatening, during isolation, depression or meditation, or without any obvious reason. Similar experiences to near-death ones can occur during the terminal phase of illness, and are called deathbed visions. Furthermore, so-called “fear-death” experiences are mainly reported after situations in which death seemed unavoidable like serious traffc or mountaineering accidents. The NDE is usually transformational, causing enhanced intuitive sensibility, profound changes of life-insight, and the loss of fear of death (van Lommel 2010). The content of an NDE and the effects on patients seem similar worldwide, across all cultures and all times. However, the subjective nature and absence of a frame of reference for this experience lead to individual, cultural, and religious factors determining the vocabulary used to describe and interpret the experience. Near-death experiences occur with increasing frequency because of improved survival rates resulting from modern techniques of resuscitation. According to recent random polls in the US and in Germany, about 4% of the total population in the western world experienced an NDE (Gallup and Proctor 1982; Schmied et al. 1999). Thus, about nine million people in the US and about two million people in the UK should have had this extraordinary conscious experience. A NDE seems to be a rela- tively regularly occurring, and to many physicians an inexplicable phenomenon and hence an ignored result of survival in a critical medical situation. Physicians hardly ever hear a patient tell about his or her near-death experience. Patients are reluctant to share their experience with others because of the negative responses they get. As a doctor you have to be open to hear about a NDE. Patients must feel that you trust them and that you can listen without any comment or prejudice. How It Started As a cardiologist I had the privilege to meet many patients who were willing to share their NDE with me. The frst time this happened was in 1969. In the coronary care unit the alarm suddenly went off. The monitor showed that the electrocardio- gram (ECG) of a patient with a myocardial infarction had become fat. The man had a cardiac arrest. After two electric shocks and a spell of unconsciousness lasting some 4 min, the patient regained consciousness, much to the relief of the nursing staff and attendant doctor. That attendant doctor was me. I had started my cardiology
Endless Consciousness: A Concept Based on Scientifc Studies… 209 training that year. Following the successful resuscitation everyone was pleased, except the patient. To everyone’s surprise he was extremely disappointed. He spoke of a tunnel, of colors, of a light, of a beautiful landscape and of music. He was extremely emotional. The term near-death experience did not yet exist, nor had I ever heard of people having any recollection of the period of their cardiac arrest. Whilst studying for my degree, I had learnt that such a thing is in fact impossible: being unconscious means not being aware, and that applies to people suffering a cardiac arrest or patients in a coma. In the event of a cardiac arrest, patients are unconscious; they have stopped breathing and have no palpable pulse or blood pres- sure. At such a moment, it should be simply impossible to be conscious or to have memories because all brain function has ceased. Although I had never forgotten the successfully resuscitated patient from 1969 with his memories of the period of his cardiac arrest, I had never done anything with the experience. This changed in 1986 when I read a book by George Ritchie about his near-death experience with the title ‘Return from Tomorrow’ (Ritchie 1978). When suffering double pneumonia as a medical student in 1943, Ritchie had expe- rienced a period of clinical death. At the time, antibiotics such as penicillin were not yet widely used. Following a period of very high fever and extreme tightness of the chest, he passed away: he stopped breathing and his pulse had gone. He was pronounced dead by a doctor and covered with a sheet. But a male nurse was so upset by the death of this medical student that he managed to persuade the attendant doctor to administer an adrenalin injection in the chest near the heart – a most unusual procedure in those days. Having been ‘dead’ for about 9 min, George Ritchie regained consciousness to the immense surprise of the doctor and nurse. It emerged that during his spell of unconsciousness, the period in which he had been pronounced dead, he had had an extremely deep experience of which he could recollect a great many details. At frst he was quite unable and afraid to talk about it. Later he wrote his book about what happened to him in those 9 min. And after graduation, he shared his experiences with medical students in psychiatry lectures. One of the students attending these lectures was Raymond Moody, who was so intrigued by this story that he started looking into experiences that may occur during critical medical situations. In 1975 he wrote the book Life after Life (Moody 1975). In this book Moody frst used the term near-death experience (NDE). After reading George Ritchie’s book I kept asking myself how someone can possibly experience consciousness during cardiac arrest and indeed whether this is a common occurrence. That is why, in 1986, I started systematically asking all the patients at my out-patient clinic who had ever undergone resuscitation whether they had any recollection of the period of their cardiac arrest. I was more than a little surprised to hear, within the space of 2 years, 12 reports of such a near-death experi- ence among just over 50 survivors of cardiac arrest. Since that frst time in 1969, I had not heard any other such reports. I had not enquired after these experiences either. But all these reports I was hearing now roused my curiosity. After all, accord- ing to current medical knowledge it is impossible to experience consciousness when one’s heart has stopped beating.
210 P. van Lommel Questions For me it all started with curiosity. With asking questions; with seeking to explain certain objective fndings and subjective experiences. The phenomenon of near- death experience raised a number of fundamental questions. A NDE is a special state of consciousness that occurs during an imminent or actual period of death, or sometimes without any obvious reason. But how and why does a NDE occur? How does the content of a NDE come about? Why does a person’s life change so radi- cally after a NDE? I was unable to accept some of the answers to these questions, because they seemed incomplete, incorrect or unfounded. I grew up in an academic environment in which I had been taught that there is a reductionist and materialist explanation for everything. And up until that point, I had always accepted this as indisputably true. Some scientists do not believe in questions that cannot be answered, but they do believe in wrongly formulated questions. The year 2005 saw the publication of a special anniversary issue of the journal Science, featuring 125 questions that scien- tists have so far failed to solve (Kennedy and Norman 2005). The most important unanswered question ‘What is the universe made of?’ was followed by ‘What is the biological basis of consciousness?’ I would reformulate this second question as follows: Is there a biological basis of consciousness (at all)? We can also distinguish between both temporary and timeless aspects of our consciousness. This prompts the following question: Is it possible to speak of a beginning of our consciousness and will our consciousness ever end? In order to answer these questions, we need a better understanding of the relationship between brain function and consciousness. We shall have to start by examining whether there is any indication that consciousness can be experienced during sleep, general anesthesia, coma, brain death, clinical death, the process of dying and, fnally, after confrmed death. If the answers to any of these questions are positive, we must look for scientifc explanations and scrutinize the relation- ship between brain function and consciousness in these different situations. By studying everything that has been thought and written about death throughout history, in all times, cultures and religions, we may be able to form a different or better picture of death. But we may achieve the same on the basis of fndings from recent scientifc research into near-death experiences. It has emerged that most people lose all fear of death after a NDE (van Lommel 2010). Their experience tells them that death is not the end of everything and that life goes on in one way or another. According to most people with a NDE, death is nothing other than a different way of being with an enhanced and broadened consciousness, which is everywhere at once because it is no longer tied to a body. This is what someone wrote to me after his NDE: ‘It is outside my domain to discuss something that can only be proven by death. However, for me personally this experience was decisive in convincing me that consciousness endures beyond the grave. Death turned out to be not death, but another form of life.’
Endless Consciousness: A Concept Based on Scientifc Studies… 211 The Dutch Prospective Study on NDE in Survivors of Cardiac Arrest In order to obtain more reliable data to corroborate or refute the existing theories on the cause and content of a NDE, we needed a properly designed scientifc study. This was the reason why in 1988 Ruud van Wees and Vincent Meijers, both psy- chologists who wrote their doctoral theses on NDE, and I, a cardiologist with an interest in the subject, started designing a prospective study in the Netherlands (van Lommel et al. 2001, p. 2041). This study was carried out under the auspices of Merkawah, the Dutch branch of the International Association of Near-death Studies, IANDS the Netherlands. At that point, no large-scale prospective studies into NDEs had been undertaken anywhere in the world. Our study aimed to include all con- secutive patients who had survived a cardiac arrest in one of the ten participating Dutch hospitals. In other words, this prospective study would only be carried out among patients with a proven life-threatening crisis. All of these patients would have died of their cardiac arrest had they not been resuscitated within 5–10 min. This kind of design also creates a control group of patients who have survived a cardiac arrest but who have no recollection of the period of unconsciousness. In a prospective study such patients are asked, within a few days of their resuscitation, whether they have any recollection of the period of their cardiac arrest, i.e. of the period of their unconsciousness. All patients’ medical and other data are carefully recorded before, during and after their resuscitation. The advantage of this prospec- tive study design was that all procedures were defned in advance and no selection bias could occur. We had a record of the electrocardiogram, or ECG, for all patients included in our study. An ECG displays the electrical activity of the heart. In cardiac arrest patients this ECG record always displays a normally lethal arrhythmia (ventricular fbrillation) or an asystole (a fat line on the ECG). In the event of resuscitation out- side the hospital we were given the ECG done by the ambulance staff. Following successful resuscitation we carefully recorded the demographic data of all patients, including age, sex, education, religion, foreknowledge of NDE and whether or not they had had an earlier NDE. They were also asked whether they had been afraid just before their cardiac arrest. Likewise, we carefully recorded all medical informa- tion, like: what was the duration of the actual cardiac arrest? What was the duration of unconsciousness? How often did the patient require resuscitation? What medica- tion, and in what dosage, was administered to the patient before, during and after resuscitation? We also recorded how many days after resuscitation the interview took place, whether the patient was lucid during the interview and whether his or her short-term memory was functioning well. Within 4 years, between 1988 and 1992, 344 successive patients who had undergone a total of 509 successful resusci- tations were included in the study. In other words, all the patients in our study had been clinically dead. Clinical death is defned as the period of unconsciousness caused by lack of oxygen in the brain (anoxia) because of the arrest of circulation, breathing or both, as caused by cardiac arrest in patients with an acute myocardial
212 P. van Lommel infarction. If, in this situation, no resuscitation is initiated, the brain cells will be irreversibly damaged within 5–10 min and the patient will always die. A longitudinal study into life changes was based on interviews after 2 and 8 years with all patients who had reported a NDE and who were still alive, as well as with a control group of post-resuscitation patients who were matched for age and sex, but who had not reported a NDE. The question was whether the customary changes in attitude to life after a NDE were the result of surviving a cardiac arrest or whether these changes were caused by the experience of a NDE. This question had never been subject to scientifc and systematic research before. The Dutch study was pub- lished in The Lancet in December 2001 (van Lommel et al. 2001). If patients reported memories from the period of unconsciousness, the experi- ences were scored according to a certain index, the WCEI, or “weighted core expe- rience index” (Ring 1980). The higher the number of elements reported, the higher the score and the deeper the NDE. Our study found that 282 patients (82%) had no recollection of the period of their unconsciousness, whereas 62 patients – 18% of the 344 patients – reported a NDE. Of these 62 patients with memories, 21 patients (6%) had some recollection; having experienced only some elements, they had a superfcial NDE with a low score. And 42 patients (12%) reported a core experi- ence: 18 patients had a moderately deep NDE, 17 patients reported a deep NDE and 6 patients a very deep NDE. The following elements were reported: half of the patients with a NDE were aware of being dead and had positive emotions, 30% had a tunnel experience, observed a celestial landscape or met with deceased persons, approximately a quarter had an out-of-body experience, communication with ‘the light’ or perception of colours, 13% had a life review and 8% experienced the pres- ence of a border. In other words, all the familiar elements of a NDE were reported in our study, with the exception of a frightening or negative NDE. Are there any reasons why some people do but most people do not recollect the period of their unconsciousness? In order to answer this question we compared the recorded data of the 62 patients with a NDE to the data of the 282 patients without NDE. To our big surprise we did not identify any signifcant differences in the dura- tion of the cardiac arrest, no differences in the duration of unconsciousness and no differences in whether or not intubation was necessary for artifcial respiration in seriously ill patients who remained in a coma for days or weeks after a complicated resuscitation. Nor did we fnd differences in the 30 patients who had a cardiac arrest during electrophysiological stimulation (EPS) in the catheterization laboratory and whose heart rhythms were always re-established via defbrillation (an electric shock) within 15–30 s. So we failed to identify any differences between the patients with a very long or a very brief cardiac arrest. The degree or gravity of the lack of oxygen in the brain (anoxia) appeared to be irrelevant. Likewise, it was established that medication played no role. Most patients suffering a myocardial infarction receive morphine-type painkillers, while people who are put on a respirator following com- plicated resuscitation are given extremely high doses of sedatives. A psychological cause such as the infrequently noted fear of death does not affect the occurrence of a NDE either, although it did affect the depth of the experience. Whether or not patients had heard or read anything about NDE in the past made no difference either. Any kind of religious belief, or indeed its absence in non-religious people or
Endless Consciousness: A Concept Based on Scientifc Studies… 213 atheists, was irrelevant and the same was true for the standard of education reached. Factors that do affect the frequency of a NDE are an age below 60 and if patients required several resuscitations during their stay in hospital, the chances of a NDE report were greater. Remarkably, we found that patients who had had a NDE in the past also reported signifcantly more frequent NDEs in our study. A complicated resuscitation can result in a long coma and most patients who have been uncon- scious on a respirator for days or weeks are more likely to suffer short-term memory defects as a result of permanent brain damage. These patients reported signifcantly fewer NDEs in our study. This suggests that a good memory is essential for remem- bering a NDE. We were particularly surprised to fnd no medical explanation for the occurrence of a NDE. All the patients in our study had been clinically dead and only a small percentage reported an enhanced consciousness with lucid thoughts, emotions, memories, and sometimes perception from a position outside and above their life- less body while doctors and nursing staff were carrying out resuscitation. If there were a physiological explanation such as a lack of oxygen in the brain (anoxia) for the occurrence of this enhanced consciousness, one might have expected all patients in our study to have reported a NDE. They had all been unconscious as a result of their cardiac arrest, which caused the loss of blood pressure and the cessation of breathing and all physical and brain-stem refexes. And it is also well established that people without any lack of oxygen in the brain like in depression or meditation can experience a ‘NDE’. Likewise the gravity of the medical situation, such as long- term coma after a complicated resuscitation, failed to explain why patients did or did not report a NDE, except in the case of lingering memory defects. The psycho- logical explanation is doubtful because most patients did not experience any fear of death during their cardiac arrest as it occurred so suddenly they failed to notice it. In most cases they were left without any recollection of their resuscitation. This is borne out by Greyson’s study (Greyson 2003), which only collected the subjective data of patients after their resuscitation and showed that most patients did not even realise they had had a cardiac arrest. This is similar to fainting. When people regain consciousness they have no clear idea of what happened. A pharmacological expla- nation could be excluded as well, as the medication had no effect on whether or not patients reported an NDE. The later interviews in our Dutch longitudinal study were conducted using a standardised inventory featuring 34 life-change questions (Ring 1984). Among the 74 patients who consented to be interviewed after 2 years, 13 of the total of 34 fac- tors listed in the questionnaire turned out to be signifcantly different for people with or without a NDE. The second interviews showed that in people with NDE fear of death in particular had signifcantly decreased while belief in an afterlife had signifcantly increased. We then compared these 13 factors, which had been so sig- nifcantly different between the two groups with and without NDE after 2 years, in the same patients after 8 years. It struck us that after 8 years the people without NDE were also undergoing unmistakable processes of transformation. Nevertheless, clear differences remained between people with and without NDE, although by now these differences had become a little less marked. We were also surprised to fnd that the processes of transformation that had begun in people with NDE after 2 years had
214 P. van Lommel clearly intensifed after 8 years. The same was true for the people without NDE. In summary, we could say that 8 years after their cardiac arrest all patients had changed in many respects, showing more interest in nature, the environment and social jus- tice, displaying more love and emotions and being more supportive and involved in family life. Nevertheless, the people who had experienced a NDE during their car- diac arrest continued to be clearly different. In particular, they were less afraid of death and had a stronger belief in an afterlife. We saw in them a greater interest in spirituality and questions about the purpose of life, as well as a greater acceptance of and love for oneself and others. Likewise, they displayed a greater appreciation of ordinary things, whereas their interest in possessions and power had decreased. The conversations also revealed that people had acquired enhanced intuitive feel- ings after a NDE, along with a strong sense of connectedness with others and with nature. Or, as many of them put it, they had acquired ‘paranormal gifts’. The sudden occurrence of this enhanced intuition can be quite problematic, as people suddenly have a very acute sense of others, which can be extremely intimidating, and also experience clairvoyance (non-local perception), prophetic feelings (precognition) and visions. This intuitive sense can be quite extreme, with people ‘sensing’ feel- ings and sadness in others, or having the sense of knowing when someone will die – which usually proved to be accurate (van Lommel 2010). The integration and acceptance of a NDE is a process that may take many years because of its far- reaching impact on people’s pre-NDE understanding of life and value system. Finally, it is quite remarkable to see a cardiac arrest lasting just a few minutes give rise to such a lifelong process of transformation. Only the large-scale Dutch study allowed for statistical analysis of the factors that may determine whether or not a NDE occurs. It thus ruled out the aforementioned possible physiological, psychological and pharmacological explanations for the occurrence of a NDE. Our study was also the frst to include a longitudinal compo- nent with interviews after 2 and 8 years, which allowed us to compare the processes of transformation between people with and without NDE. We identifed a distinct pattern of change in people with a NDE and revealed that integrating these changes into daily life is a long and arduous process. And we reached the inevitable conclusion that patients experienced all the aforementioned NDE elements during the period of their cardiac arrest, during the total cessation of blood supply to the brain. Nevertheless, the question how this could be possible remained unanswered. Other Prospective Studies on NDE Bruce Greyson, who published a prospective study in 116 survivors of cardiac arrest in the USA (Greyson 2003), found that 15.5% of the patients reported a NDE: 9.5% reported a core NDE and 6% a superfcial NDE. He writes that no one physiological or psychological model by itself could explain all the common features of an NDE. The paradoxical occurrence of a heightened, lucid awareness and logical thought processes during a period of impaired cerebral perfusion raises particular
Endless Consciousness: A Concept Based on Scientifc Studies… 215 perplexing questions for our current understanding of consciousness and its relation to brain function. A clear sensorium and complex perceptual processes during a period of apparent clinical death challenge the concept that consciousness is localized exclusively in the brain (Greyson 2003, p. 275). The British prospective study by Sam Parnia and Peter Fenwick (Parnia et al. 2001) included 63 patients who survived their cardiac arrest. They found in their study that 11% reported a NDE: 6.3% reported a core NDE, and 4.8% a superfcial NDE. They write that the NDE-reports suggest that the NDE occurs during the period of unconsciousness. This is a surprising conclusion, in their view, because “when the brain is so dysfunctional that the patient is deeply comatose, those cerebral structures, which underpin subjective experience and memory, must be severely impaired. Complex experiences as reported in the NDE should not arise or be retained in memory. Such patients would be expected to have no subjective experience, as was the case in the vast majority of patients who survive cardiac arrest, since all centres in the brain that are responsible for generating conscious experi- ences have stopped functioning as a result of the lack of oxygen.” (Parnia et al. 2001, p. 151) Another, frequently cited explanation might be that the observed experiences occur during the early phases of the cessation or during the recovery of consciousness. Parnia and Fenwick, however, claim that “the verifable elements of an out-of-body experience during unconsciousness, such as patients’ reports on their resuscitation, render this extremely unlikely” (Parnia et al. 2001, p. 151). Over a period of 4 years Penny Sartori carried out an even smaller study into NDE in 39 survivors of cardiac arrest in the UK (Sartori 2006). She found that 23% reported a NDE: 18% reported a core NDE, and 5% a superfcial NDE. She con- cludes that “according to mainstream science, it is quite impossible to fnd a scien- tifc explanation for the NDE as long as we ‘believe’ that consciousness is only a side effect of a functioning brain.” The fact that people report lucid experiences in their consciousness when brain activity has ceased is, in her view, “diffcult to reconcile with current medical opinion” (Sartori 2006, p. 25). Some Typical Elements of an NDE Before I discuss some of our current medical and neurophysiological ideas about consciousness and the function of our brain in more detail, I would like to recon- sider certain elements of the NDE that were experienced during a transient period of a non-functioning brain during cardiac arrest: an out-of body experience, a holo- graphic life-review, a meeting with deceased relatives, and a conscious return into the body. First the out-of-body experience (OBE): in this experience people have veridical perceptions from a position outside and above their lifeless body. This out-of-body experience is scientifcally important because doctors, nurses, and relatives can verify the reported perceptions, and they can also corroborate the precise moment the NDE with OBE occurred during the period of cardiopulmonary resuscitation
216 P. van Lommel (CPR). This proves that OBE cannot be a hallucination, i.e. experiencing a perception that has no basis in “reality”, like in psychosis, neither can it be a delusion, which is an incorrect assessment of a correct perception, nor an illusion, which means a misapprehension or misleading image. Should an OBE be considered as a kind of non-sensory perception? This is the report of a nurse of a Coronary Care Unit (van Lommel et al. 2001, p. 2041): During night shift an ambulance brings in a 44-year old cyanotic, comatose man into the coronary care unit. He was found in coma about 30 minutes before in a meadow. When we go to intubate the patient, he turns out to have dentures in his mouth. I remove these upper dentures and put them onto the ‘crash cart.’ After about an hour and a half the patient has suffcient heart rhythm and blood pressure, but he is still ventilated and intubated, and he is still comatose. He is transferred to the intensive care unit to continue the necessary artifcial respiration. Only after more than a week do I meet again with the patient, who is by now back on the cardiac ward. The moment he sees me he says: ‘O, that nurse knows where my dentures are.’ I am very, very surprised. Then the patient elucidates: ‘You were there when I was brought into hospital and you took my dentures out of my mouth and put them onto that cart, it had all these bottles on it and there was this sliding drawer underneath, and there you put my teeth.’ I was especially amazed because I remembered this happening while the man was in deep coma and in the process of CPR. It appeared that the man had seen himself lying in bed, that he had perceived from above how nurses and doctors had been busy with the CPR. He was also able to describe correctly and in detail the small room in which he had been resuscitated as well as the appearance of those present like myself. During a holographic life review the subject feels the presence and renewed experience of not only every act but also every thought from one’s life, and one real- izes that in some way we are connected to others and to ourselves such that we infuence ourselves as well as others. All that has been done and thought seems to be signifcant and stored. Because one is connected with the memories, emotions and consciousness of another person, you experience the consequences of your own thoughts, words and actions to that other person at the very moment in the past that they occurred (interconnectedness or entanglement). They understand now what in some religions and cultures is known as the cosmic law that everything one does to others will ultimately be returned to oneself. Patients survey their whole life in one glance; time and space do not seem to exist during such an experience (non-locality). Instantaneously they are where they concentrate upon, and they can talk for hours about the content of the life review even though the resuscitation only took minutes. Quotation (van Lommel 2004, p. 121): “All of my life up till the present seemed to be placed before me in a kind of panoramic, three-dimensional review, and each event seemed to be accompanied by a consciousness of good or evil or with an insight into cause or effect”. “Not only did I perceive everything from my own viewpoint, but I also knew the thoughts of everyone involved in the event, as if I had their thoughts within me. This meant that I perceived not only what I had done or thought, but even in what way it had infuenced others, as if I saw things with all- seeing eyes. And so, even your thoughts are apparently not wiped out. And all the time during the review the importance of love was emphasised. Looking back, I cannot say how long this life review and life insight lasted, it may have been long, for every subject came up, but at the same time it seemed just a fraction of a second,
Endless Consciousness: A Concept Based on Scientifc Studies… 217 because I perceived it all at the same moment. Time and distance seemed not to exist. I was in all places at the same time, and sometimes my attention was drawn to something, and then I would be present there.” Also a preview (fash-forward) can be experienced, in which both future images from personal life events as well as more general images from the future occur. Again it seems as if time and space do not exist during this preview (non-locality). If deceased acquaintances or relatives are encountered in an otherworldly dimen- sion, they are usually recognized by their appearance, and communication is pos- sible through what is experienced as thought transfer. Thus, it is also possible to come into contact with felds of consciousness of deceased persons (interconnected- ness). Quotation (van Lommel 2004): “During my cardiac arrest I had an extensive experience (…) and later I saw, apart from my deceased grandmother, a man who had looked at me lovingly, but whom I did not know. More than 10 years later, at my mother’s deathbed, she confessed to me that I had been born out of an extramarital relationship, my father being a Jewish man who had been deported and killed during the second World War, and my mother showed me his picture. The unknown man that I had seen more than 10 years before during my NDE turned out to be my bio- logical father.” Some patients can describe how they returned into their body, mostly through the top of the head, after they had come to understand that “it wasn’t their time yet” or that “they still had a task to fulfl.” This conscious return into the body is experi- enced as something very oppressive. They regain consciousness in their body and realize that they are “locked up” in their damaged body, meaning again all the pain and restriction of their disease. Quotation (Van Lommel 2004): “And when I regained consciousness in my body, it was so terrible, so terrible…that experience was so beautiful, I never would have liked to come back, I wanted to stay there….. and still I came back. And from that moment on it was a very diffcult experience to live my life again in my body, with all the limitations I felt in that period.” Theories About NDE With our current medical and scientifc concepts it seems indeed impossible to explain all aspects of the subjective experiences as reported by patients with an NDE during a transient loss of all functions of the brain. Scientifc studies into the phenomenon of NDE highlights the limitations of our current medical and neuro- physiological ideas about the various aspects of human consciousness and the rela- tionship between consciousness and memories on the one hand and the brain on the other. The prevailing paradigm holds that memories and consciousness are pro- duced by large groups of neurons or neural networks. For want of evidence for the aforementioned explanations for the cause and content of a NDE the commonly accepted, but never proven concept that consciousness is localised in the brain should be questioned. After all, how can an extremely lucid consciousness be expe- rienced outside the body at a time when the brain has a transient loss of all functions
218 P. van Lommel during a period of clinical death, even with a fat EEG? Furthermore, even blind people have described veridical perceptions during out-of-body experiences at the time of their NDE (Ring and Cooper 1999). Another theory about NDE holds that NDE might be a changing state of consciousness (transcendence, or the theory of continuity), in which memories, self-identity, and cognition, with emotion, function independently from the unconscious body, and retain the possibility of non-sensory perception. Obviously, during NDE enhanced consciousness is experienced inde- pendently from the normal body-linked waking consciousness, during the period of cardiac arrest, during the period of apparent unconsciousness. But how do we know that the EEG is fat in those patients with cardiac arrest, and how can we study this? Through many studies with induced cardiac arrest in both human and animal mod- els cerebral function has been shown to be severely compromised during cardiac arrest, with complete cessation of cerebral blood fow (Gopalan et al. 1999), causing sudden loss of consciousness and of all body refexes, but also with the abolition of brain-stem activity with the loss of the gag refex and of the corneal refex, and fxed and dilated pupils are clinical fndings in those patients. And also the function of the respiratory centre, located close to the brainstem, fails, resulting in apnoea (no breathing). The electrical activity in the cerebral cortex (but also in the deeper structures of the brain in animal studies) has been shown to be absent after 10–20 s (a fat-line EEG) (De Vries et al. 1998; Clute and Levy 1990; Losasso et al. 1992; Parnia and Fenwick 2002). In acute myocardial infarction the duration of cardiac arrest in the Coronary Care Unit is usually 60–120 s, in an out-of-hospital arrest it even takes much longer. Thus, all 562 survivors of cardiac arrest in the four prospec- tive studies on NDE should have had a fat EEG because no patient had been resus- citated within 20 s. The quite often proposed objection that a fat line EEG does not rule out any brain activity, because it is mainly a registration of electrical activity of the cerebral cortex, misses the mark. The issue is not whether there is any brain activity of any kind whatsoever, but whether there is brain activity of the specifc form, and in different neural networks, as regarded by contemporary neuroscience as the necessary con- dition of conscious experience. And it has been proven that there is no such specifc brain activity at all during cardiac arrest. A fat line EEG is also one of the major diagnostic tools for the diagnosis of brain death, and in those cases the objection about not ruling out any brain activity whatsoever is never mentioned. Moreover, although measurable EEG-activity in the brain can be recorded during deep sleep (no-REM phase) or during general anesthesia, no consciousness is experienced because there is no integration of information and no communication between the different neural networks (Massimini et al. 2005; Alkire and Miller 2005; Alkire et al. 2008). So even in circumstances where brain activity can be measured some- times no consciousness is experienced. A functioning system for communication between neural networks with integration of information is essential for experienc- ing consciousness, and this does not occur during deep sleep or general anesthesia, let alone during cardiac arrest. So there are good reasons to assume that our consciousness does not always coincide with the functioning of our brain: enhanced consciousness can sometimes be experienced separately from the body.
Endless Consciousness: A Concept Based on Scientifc Studies… 219 Consciousness and Brain Function For decades, extensive research has been done to localize consciousness and memories inside the brain, so far without success. Also we should ask ourselves how a non- material activity such as concentrated attention or thinking can correspond to an observable (material) reaction in the form of measurable electrical, magnetic, and chemical activity at a certain place in the brain by EEG, MEG and PET-scan, and in the form of increased blood fow by fMRI. Neuro-imaging studies have shown these aforesaid activities, with specifc areas of the brain becoming metabolically active in response to a thought or feeling. However, although providing evidence for the role of neuronal networks as an intermediary for the manifestation of thoughts (neu- ral correlates), those studies do not necessary imply that those cells also produce the thoughts. A correlation doesn’t elucidate anything about cause or result. And how should “unconscious” matter like our brain “produce” consciousness, while the brain only is composed of atoms and molecules in cells with a lot of chemical and electrical processes? Direct evidence of how neurons or neuronal networks could possibly produce the subjective essence of the mind and thoughts is currently lack- ing. We cannot measure what we think or feel (van Lommel 2010). There are no known examples of neural-perceptual matches, and hence reasons to doubt the truth of the “matching content” doctrine. The assumption in the “matching content” doc- trine is that following activation of special neuronal networks you always will have the same content of thoughts or feelings. This seems extremely unlikely, because neural activation is simply neural activation; it only refects the use of structures. This could be compared with a radio: you can activate the radio by turning it on, and you can activate a certain wavelength by tuning in on a special channel, but you will not have any infuence on the content of the programme you are going to hear. Activating the radio does not infuence the content of the programme, and neural activation alone does not explain the content of emotions or sensations. In the last decade many articles and books have been published about conscious- ness, but up to now there are no uniform scientifc views about the relationship between consciousness and the brain (Chalmers 1996). Most of the people who carry out research into consciousness, such as neuroscientists, psychologists, psy- chiatrists and philosophers, are still of the opinion that there is a materialist and reductionist explanation for consciousness. The well-known philosopher Daniel Dennett believes, and many with him, that consciousness is nothing other than mat- ter (Dennett 1991), and that our subjective experience that our consciousness is something purely personal and differs from someone else’s consciousness is merely an illusion. According to these scientists, consciousness originates entirely from the matter that constitutes our brain. If this were true then everything we experience in our consciousness would be nothing but the expression of a machine controlled by classical physics and chemistry, and our behaviour the inexorable outcome of nerve cell activity in our brain. Obviously the notion that all subjective thoughts and feel- ings are produced by nothing other than the brain’s activity also means that it is an illusion to believe in free will. This viewpoint has serious implications for concepts such as moral responsibility and personal freedom. To many others consciousness
220 P. van Lommel seems to resist a materialistic explanation, so besides several materialistic concepts there is also an ‘interactionistic-dualistic’ model, where consciousness and the brain are totally different entities with different fundamental properties but somehow are able to interact with each other. And fnally there is a concept of ‘phenomalism’ or ‘immaterial (or neutral) monism’, which is also called ‘panpsychism’ or ‘idealism’. According to this model all material, physical systems should have a form of sub- jectivity at a fundamental level, and intrinsic properties of the physical world should be themselves phenomenal properties. If so, then consciousness and physical reality are deeply intertwined. This view acknowledges a clear causal role for conscious- ness in the physical world, and so consciousness should be regarded as a fundamental property of the universe (Chalmers 2002). Summary of Conclusions from Research on NDE, Consciousness and the Brain – At present more and more experiences are reported by serious and reliable people who to their own surprise and confusion have experienced an enhanced conscious- ness independently of their physical body. These experiences have been reported in all times, in all cultures and in all religions (van Lommel 2010). – In several prospective empirical studies it has been proven that an enhanced and clear consciousness can be experiences during the period of cardiac arrest (clinical death) (van Lommel et al. 2001; Greyson 2003; Parnia et al. 2001; Sartori 2006). – Based on these well documented prospective studies about NDE in survivors of cardiac arrest one has to come to the conclusion that current scientifc views fail to explain the cause and content of a NDE (van Lommel et al. 2001; Greyson 2003; Parnia et al. 2001; Sartori 2006). – It seems scientifcally proven that during cardiac arrest no activity of the cortex and the brainstem can be measured, and also the clinical fndings point out the transient loss of all functions of the brain (De Vries et al. 1998; Clute and Levy 1990; Losasso et al. 1992; Parnia and Fenwick 2002). – All scientists who performed prospective studies on NDE came to the same con- clusion: lack of oxygen by itself cannot explain the cause and content of NDE (van Lommel et al. 2001; Greyson 2003; Parnia et al. 2001; Sartori 2006). And this view is also supported by the fact that a NDE can be reported by people who did not have life threatening illnesses but were in fear of death or in depression (van Lommel 2010). – In studying the function of the brain it has been proven that under normal daily circumstances, during deep sleep and during general anesthesia a functioning network and a co-operation between many different centres of the brain is a pre- requisite for the experience of our waking consciousness (Massimini et al. 2005; Alkire and Miller 2005; Alkire et al. 2008). This is never the case during a car- diac arrest (De Vries et al. 1998; Clute and Levy 1990; Losasso et al. 1992; Parnia and Fenwick 2002).
Endless Consciousness: A Concept Based on Scientifc Studies… 221 – It is scientifcally proven that consciousness can change the structure and function of the brain. This is called neuroplasticity (Schwartz and Begley 2002; Beauregard 2007; Davidson et al. 2003; Benedetti et al. 2005). – In many respects consciousness as well as the function of the brain is still a great mystery. About Concepts in Science When empirical scientifc studies discover phenomena or facts that are inconsistent with current scientifc theories, so-called anomalies, these new facts must not be denied, suppressed or even ridiculed, as is still quite common these days. In the event of new fndings the existing theories ought to be developed or adjusted, and if necessary rejected and replaced. We need new ways of thinking and new kinds of science to study consciousness and acquire a better understanding of the effects of consciousness. Some scientists, such as the philosopher Chalmers, are more recep- tive and take consciousness seriously (Chalmers 1995, p. 200): ‘Consciousness poses the most baffing problems in the science of the mind. There is nothing that we know more intimately than conscious experience, but there is nothing that is harder to explain.’ Chalmers has specialised in the problem of consciousness and has written a review of the various theories that seek to explain the relationship between consciousness and the brain (Chalmers 2002). In the past, too, new kinds of science developed when prevailing scientifc con- cepts could no longer explain certain phenomena. At the start of the previous cen- tury, for instance, quantum physics emerged because certain fndings could no longer be accounted for with classical physics. Quantum physics upset the estab- lished view of our material world. The slow acceptance of the new insights provided by quantum physics can be attributed to the materialist worldview we have been raised with. According to some quantum physicists, quantum physics even assigns to our consciousness a decisive role in creating and experiencing the physical world as we perceive it. This not yet commonly accepted interpretation holds that our picture of reality is based on the information received by our consciousness. This transforms modern science into a subjective science with a fundamental role for consciousness. The quantum physicist Werner Heisenberg (1901–1976) formulates it as follows (Heisenberg 1958, p. 21): ‘Science no longer is in the position of observer of nature, but rather recognizes itself as part of the interplay between man and nature. The scientifc method … changes and transforms its object: the procedure can no longer keep its distance from the object.’ For me science means asking questions with an open mind. Science should be the search for explaining new mysteries, rather than stick with old concepts. He, who has never changed his mind because he could not accept new concepts, has rarely learned something. We desperately need a real paradigm shift in science, and I sincerely hope that quantum physicist Max Planck was wrong when he said in 1934 (Planck 1948, p. 33–34): “A new scientifc truth does not triumph by convincing
222 P. van Lommel its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it.”. In my opinion, current science must reconsider its hypotheses about the nature of perceptible real- ity, because these ideas have led to the neglect or denial of signifcant areas of con- sciousness. Current science usually starts from a reality based solely on objective, physical phenomena. Yet at the same time one can (intuitively) sense that besides objective, sensory perception there is a role for subjective aspects such as feelings, inspiration and intuition. As stated before, current scientifc techniques are incapa- ble of measuring or demonstrating the content of thoughts, feelings and emotions. A purely materialist analysis of a living being cannot reveal the content and nature of our consciousness. Non-local Consciousness So it is indeed a scientifc challenge to discuss new hypotheses that could explain the reported interconnectedness with the consciousness of other persons and of deceased relatives, to explain the possibility to experience instantaneously and simultaneously (non-locality) a review and a preview of someone’s life in a dimen- sion without our conventional body-linked concept of time and space, where all past, present and future events exist, and the possibility to have clear and enhanced consciousness with memories, with self-identity, with cognition, with emotion, with the possibility of perception out and above the lifeless body, and even with the expe- rience of the conscious return into the body, which is experienced as something very oppressive. And it is important to mention that until now it has been impossible to induce a real out-of-body experience with veridical perception from a position out and above the body by any method whatsoever, despite incorrect suggestions about this possibility in the medical literature (van Lommel 2010). In some articles (van Lommel 2004, 2006) and in my recent book (van Lommel 2010) I describe a concept in which our endless consciousness with declarative memories fnds its origin in, and is stored in a non-local space as wave-felds of infor- mation, and the brain only serves as a relay station for parts of these wave-felds of consciousness to be received into or as our waking consciousness. The latter belongs to our physical body. These informational felds of our non-local consciousness become available as our waking consciousness only through our functioning brain in the shape of measurable and changing electromagnetic felds. Could our brain be compared to the TV set, which receives electromagnetic waves and transforms them into image and sound? Could it as well be compared to the TV camera, which trans- forms image and sound into electromagnetic waves? These waves hold the essence of all information, but are only perceivable by our senses through suitable instru- ments like camera and TV set. The function of the brain should be compared with a transceiver, a transmitter/receiver, or interface. Thus there are two complementary aspects of consciousness, which cannot be reduced one to the other, and the function of neuronal networks should be regarded as receivers and conveyors, not as retainers
Endless Consciousness: A Concept Based on Scientifc Studies… 223 of consciousness and memories. This view is highly compatible with the concept of ‘phenomalism’ or ‘immaterial (or neutral) monism’ (Chalmers 2002). In this concept, consciousness is not rooted in the measurable domain of physics, our manifest world. This also means that the wave aspect of our indestructible consciousness in the non-local space is inherently immeasurable by physical means. However, the physical aspect of consciousness, which originates from the wave aspect of our consciousness through collapse of the wave function, can be measured by means of neuro-imaging techniques like EEG, fMRI, and PET-scan. This non-local aspect of consciousness, which can also be called our higher consciousness, divine consciousness or cosmic consciousness, could be compared to gravitational felds, of which only the physical effects throughout the universe can be measured, but the felds themselves are not directly demonstrable. In trying to understand this concept of interaction between the invisible non-local space and our visible, material body, it seems appropriate to com- pare it with modern worldwide communication. There is a continuous exchange of objective information by means of electromagnetic felds for radio, TV, mobile telephone, or laptop computer. We are not consciously aware of the vast amounts of electromagnetic felds that constantly, day and night, exist around us and even permeating us, as well as permeating structures like walls and buildings. At each moment we are invaded by hundreds of thousands of telephone calls, and hundreds of radio and TV programmes. We only become aware of these electromagnetic infor- mative felds at the moment we use our mobile telephone or by switching on our radio, TV or laptop. What we receive is neither inside the instrument, nor in the components, but thanks to the receiver, the information from the electromagnetic felds becomes observable to our senses and hence perception occurs in our consciousness. The voice we hear over our telephone is not inside the telephone. The concert we hear over our radio is transmitted to our radio. The images and music we hear and see on TV are transmitted to our TV set. Internet with more than a billion websites can be received at about the same moment in the USA, in Europe and in Australia, and is obviously not located inside our laptop. One cannot avoid the conclusion that endless consciousness has always existed and will always exist independently from the body, because there is no beginning nor will there ever be an end to our consciousness. There is a kind of biological basis of our waking consciousness, because during life our physical body functions as an interface or place of resonance. But there is no biological basis of our whole, endless, or enhanced consciousness because it is rooted in a non-local space. Our enhanced and non-local consciousness resides not in our brain and is not limited to our brain. So our brain seems to have a facilitating, and not a producing function to experience consciousness. It is quite interesting to mention that this conclusion is in striking concurrence with the view of the philosopher and neuroscientist Alva Noë, who, based on totally different neuroscientifc research, writes in his recent book ‘Out of our heads’ (Noë 2009): ‘All scientifc theories rest on assumptions. It is important that these assumptions be true. I will try to convince the reader that this startling assumption of consciousness research that consciousness is a neuroscien- tifc phenomenon and that it happens in the brain is badly mistaken. Consciousness does not happen in the brain. What determines and controls the character of
224 P. van Lommel conscious experience is not the associated neural activity. That is why we have been unable to come up with a good explanation of its neural basis’. Noë proposes that the brain’s job is that of facilitating a dynamic pattern of interaction among brain, body and world. Conclusion By making a scientifc case for consciousness as a non-local and thus ubiquitous phenomenon, this view can contribute to new ideas about the relationship between consciousness and the brain. I am aware that this concept can be little more than a stimulus for further study and debate, because at present we lack defnitive answers to the many important questions about our consciousness and the relationship between consciousness and the brain. I have no doubt that in the future, too, many questions about consciousness and the mystery of life and death will remain unan- swered. However, faced with extraordinary or abnormal fndings we must question a purely materialist paradigm in science. A near-death experience is one such extraordinary fnding. Although consciousness remains a huge mystery, new scien- tifc theories based on research into NDE appear to be helping us answer some of the questions about this mystery. Scientifc studies on NDE challenge our current concepts about consciousness and its relation with brain function, and its conclusions are important for many aspects in healthcare, because this view of consciousness as a non-local phenome- non might well induce a huge change in the scientifc paradigm in western medi- cine. It could have practical implications in actual medical and ethical problems such as the care for comatose or dying patients, euthanasia, abortion, and the removal of organs for transplantation from somebody in the dying process with a beating heart in a warm body but with a diagnosis of brain death. Such understanding also fundamentally changes one’s opinion about death, because of the almost unavoid- able conclusion that at the time of physical death consciousness will continue to be experienced in another dimension, in which all past, present and future is enclosed. As someone with an NDE wrote to me: “Death is only the end of our physical aspects”. But we should acknowledge that research on NDE cannot give us the irre- futable scientifc proof of this conclusion, because people with a NDE did not quite die, but they all were very close to death, and without a functioning brain. But, as I have explained, it has been scientifically proven that during NDE enhanced consciousness was experienced independently of brain function. Quoting from a recent death announcement: “All what you have, falls into decay, but what you are, lives on, beyond time and space”. So we have a body and we are conscious. Without a body we still can have conscious experiences. Recently someone with a NDE wrote me: ‘I can live without my body, but apparently my body can not live without me’. The conclusions seems compelling that endless consciousness has and always will exist independently from the body. There is no beginning nor will there ever be an end to our consciousness. For this reason we indeed should seriously consider the
Endless Consciousness: A Concept Based on Scientifc Studies… 225 possibility that death, like birth, can only be a transition to another state of con- sciousness, and that during life the body functions as an interface or place of reso- nance. This view of a non-local consciousness also allows us to understand a wide variety of special states of consciousness, such as mystical and religious experi- ences, deathbed visions (end-of-life experiences), peri-mortem and post-mortem experiences (nonlocal interconnectedness), heightened intuitive feelings (nonlocal information exchange), prophetic dreams, remote viewing (non-local perception) and the effect of consciousness on matter (nonlocal perturbation). A NDE is both an existential crisis and an intense lesson in life. People change after a NDE as it gives them a conscious experience of a dimension in which time and distance play no role, in which past and future can be glimpsed, where they feel complete and healed and where they experience unlimited knowledge and uncondi- tional love. These life changes mainly spring from the insight that love and compas- sion for oneself, for others and for nature are major prerequisites for life. Following a NDE most people realize that everything and everyone is connected, that every thought has an effect on both oneself and the other, and that our consciousness con- tinues beyond physical death. Regarding what we can learn from people who are willing to share their NDE with others, I would like to quote Dag Hammerskjöld (Hammerskjöld 1964): “Our ideas about death defne how we live our life”. Because as long as we believe that death is the end of everything we are, we will give our energy towards the temporary and material aspects of our life. We should recognize that our view of the world is wrong, because we do not realize that the world, as we see it, only derives its (subjective) reality from our consciousness. Because it is only our consciousness that is determining how we see this world. If we are in love, the world around us is beautiful, when we are depressed our world is like hell, and when we are frightened (made terrifed by politicians and by the press) our world will be full of terror. ‘The mind in its own place, and in itself, can make a heaven of hell,’ wrote John Milton even in 1667 in his poem ‘Paradise Lost’. People with a near-death experience have been my greatest teachers. My many conversations with them and my in-depth study of the potential signifcance of an NDE have changed my views on the meaning of life and death. I feel more con- nected with nature. I realize that everything originates from consciousness. I under- stand now that people create their own reality based on their consciousness and also create the intention one lives his life. So for me there was much to learn from the insights acquired through an NDE, and according to me it is evident that one doesn’t need his own near-death experience to gain new insights into life and death. References Alkire, M.T., & Miller, J. (2005). General anesthesia and the neural correlates of consciousness. Progress in Brain Research, 150, 229–244. Alkire, M.T., Hudetz, A.G., & Tononi, G. (2008). Consciousness and anesthesia. Science, 322(5903), 876–880.
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The Hard Problem Revisited: From Cognitive Neuroscience to Kabbalah and Back Again B. Les Lancaster Abstract The dialogue between cognitive neuroscience and spirituality/mysticism has largely entailed measuring the neural and cognitive effects of spiritual practices. Such research follows from the spiritual traditions’ teachings about the intended psy- chological effects of practice. The ontologically more challenging postulates of spiri- tual traditions (e.g., mind beyond brain, ‘higher’ or ‘ultimate’ realities) are ignored when focusing in this way on measurable concomitants of practice. In this chapter I argue that the dialogue should be widened to include some of the ontologically more challenging concepts, where these involve references to the brain and psychological states. A specifc example is examined in some detail: the kabbalistic worldview pos- its a correspondence between higher and lower levels in the cosmos (‘macrocosm’ and ‘microcosm’), and includes notions of unconscious thought arising in ‘brains’ in the Godhead. I demonstrate that the macrocosmic principles advanced in kabbalistic literature display a degree of concordance with the results of current research into the neural correlate of consciousness. I explore the implications of this concordance for the light it may cast on the enduring hard problem of consciousness. The Challenge of Explanation Recent interest in the interrelationships between cognitive neuroscience and spiritual traditions has focused in two areas: the correlates of specifc experiential states (Aftanas and Golocheikine 2002; Beauregard and Paquette 2006, 2008; Lutz et al. 2004; Newberg et al. 2001a; for recent reviews, see Cahn and Polich 2006; B.L. Lancaster () School of Natural Sciences & Psychology, Liverpool John Moores University, UK e-mail: [email protected] H. Walach et al. (eds.), Neuroscience, Consciousness and Spirituality, 229 Studies in Neuroscience, Consciousness and Spirituality 1, DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-2079-4_14, © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011
230 B.L. Lancaster Lutz et al. 2007, 2008) and the evolutionary psychology of belief (Boyer 2001; Boyer and Bergstrom 2008; Persinger 1987). Thus, for example, studies have examined the spatial and temporal characteristics of brain activity associated with meditative or prayerful states, the therapeutic benefts of mindfulness, and the ways in which religious beliefs ft into the overall cognitive and social organisation of the human mind. The picture of religion that emerges from this recent interest inevitably sees religion as ‘naturalistic,’ meaning that religious phenomena can be integrated into our current scientifc worldview with its materialistic bias. According to this approach, some experiential states may have benefcial effects in terms of physical and mental health, but, from the evolutionary standpoint, religion is generally seen as a mundane consequence of the normative quest for explanation and security that characterises our psychological makeup. Its central postulates are, at best, illusory. The question I wish to address in this chapter concerns the extent to which such observations do adequate justice to the complexities of spiritual and mystical tradi- tions. My concern is not simply that our view of the traditions may be impoverished if we effectively take from them only those aspects which sit easily with the prevail- ing scientifc worldview. Were that the only issue then one could rightly retort that it is for theologians and devout practitioners to present the noble insights of religion; psychologists and neuroscientists should not muddy the waters of their own disci- plines in the process of extolling spiritual teachings. No, my concern lies rather with the knowledge base that is growing where spirituality and psychology come together. The knowledge base will be compromised if we draw on spiritual ideas with, as it were, one hand tied behind our backs. The point may be expressed another way by emphasising that we should not be approaching spiritual teachings and practices merely in order to ft them into the explanatory categories that are currently de rigueur in neuroscience and psychol- ogy. Such an approach means that one is inevitably blinded to new insights that may arise when those categories are transcended. As Rothberg argues, “To assume that the categories of current western epistemology are adequate for interpreting spiri- tual approaches is to prejudge the results of [a profound encounter with practices of spiritual inquiry], which might well lead to signifcant changes in these categories” (Rothberg 2000, p. 176). I am concerned here with the unbridled psychologising of spiritual concepts. My emphasis should not be taken as implying that I am less concerned over what may be construed as ‘smuggling in’ religious or spiritual categories to the discourse of psychology. Of course such fundamentalism is problematic. However, in introduc- ing my chapter I want to draw attention to the bias that has been present in recent conceptualising of the relationship between cognitive neuroscience and religion. I believe that this bias has ensued from an unquestioning acceptance of the hegemony of psychological science as it has held sway over recent decades, and has compromised the potential outcomes of the relationship. It seems to me that there is an intellectual path that flls the area of overlap between psychology and religion, and which, crucially, is not reducible to either of those disciplines. The topic of enquiry on that path is the mind as it extends beyond the immediate confnes of personal consciousness. From this perspective, the
The Hard Problem Revisited: From Cognitive Neuroscience to Kabbalah… 231 subject matter includes what we perhaps rather simplistically call the unconscious as well as those spheres of mind that might be deemed transpersonal. Transpersonal realms have been identifed using terms such as self (when this is distinguished from the personal ego, e.g., Jung’s concept of the Self), transpersonal self, and higher unconscious (Assagioli 1993; Firman and Gila 2002). It is of course one thing to coin a term; it is another to demonstrate that the con- struct proposed has any validity. This is by no means a trivial issue; indeed, to my mind it goes to the heart of psychology as an empirical discipline. Psychological constructs are heuristically valuable, but the ontological status of even as ubiquitous a construct as ‘I’ (or ‘ego’) may be questioned (Lancaster 1991, 1997; Metzinger 2003). From this perspective there is little difference between the empirical basis of transpersonal psychology and other branches of psychology. If we posit a ‘transper- sonal self’, it is because it is useful in synthesising and organising data drawn from experience; no-one is suggesting that one can objectively observe such an entity. This is a crucial point when it comes to studying the psychological value of mys- tical texts. The majority of writings classed as ‘mystical’ do not focus on experience per se, but rather are directed to understanding the ways in which the “mystery out of which everything arises” (Ferrer and Sherman 2008, p. 18) unfolds into our spatial-temporal realm. The logic of such writings entails acceptance of entities (‘celestial intelligences’, ‘souls’) that enable the scholarly community within the given tradition to synthesise and organise data, just as occurs in psychology. The insights from such writings may be valuable irrespective of the ontological status of the entities, just as psychological insights into self-related activity are valid irrespective of the reality of ‘I’. Given that the focus of most mystical writings is not directly on experience, psychological studies focussing on correlates of meditative, or mystical, experi- ence are exploring a selective feature of the spiritual traditions. In itself this selec- tivity is not problematic. The study of experience is clearly a legitimate approach for psychology, and the fact that the experiences may be extraordinary, even within the traditions of mysticism, is no reason to ignore them. Moreover, exploring the neural correlates, and psychological impact, of such experiences raises no major ontological issues. Whilst some may challenge materialistic explanations of the data (Beauregard and O’Leary 2007), the data themselves are neutral with regard to the prevailing worldview of psychological science. I want to suggest, however, that this narrow focus on the concomitants of spiri- tual experiences generates an inadequate foundation for our interest in the connec- tions between mysticism and cognitive neuroscience. And the inadequacy comes about for two reasons. Firstly, the seeming distinction between mystical writings that are refective of direct experience and writings which attempt to explain spiri- tual realms from a more hermeneutic approach (e.g., exegesis and commentary on revealed scripture) is by no means clear-cut. I shall substantiate this point shortly, but just to note here the consequence that asking participants in a study to engage in a specifc practice, or to re-live moments of mystical union, is not doing justice to the range of experience relevant to our interest. The second reason why I believe that we must engage fully with the seemingly more ‘theoretical’ material in the
232 B.L. Lancaster mystical traditions concerns the interpretations we place on experience. Experience is undoubtedly structured by the categories established through enculturation, and to de-code experiential referents in mystical material requires a rich understanding of the categories involved. The problem here is that those of us coming from a psy- chological background tend to operate with a highly simplifed dichotomous approach when it comes to interpreting mystical experience: either the experiences 1 are fantasies or they represent contact with an Ultimate of which nothing further 2 can be said. The phrase “devil and the deep blue sea” comes to mind! It is the “of which nothing further can be said” that stymies us. And the fact is that plenty has been said, especially of those intermediary realms which, I purport, are crucial for the debate between psychology and mysticism. Let me elaborate on the points I have raised in this last paragraph, with specifc refer- ence to the tradition of Kabbalah, which, as I shall explain later, seems to me peculiarly important for our present purposes on account of its psychological orientation and elab- oration of the intermediary realms between the Ultimate and the human mind. Kabbalistic texts in which an individual mystic describes a more-or-less ineffable experience are the exception. Most writings are exegetical and explore the concealed teachings which give shape to the intermediary realms between human and God. However, in line with my frst point above, it is evident to all scholars of Kabbalah, that exegetical material is both framed through the lens of experience and acts as a spur to mystical experience. Wolfson (1994) uses the term “inspired exegesis” to cap- ture the point that kabbalistic insights invariably arise between the two poles of the revealed scriptural text and the mystic’s own experience. As he writes in relation to the central text of Kabbalah, the Zohar, “visionary experience is a vehicle for hermeneu- tics as hermeneutics is a vehicle for visionary experience” (Wolfson 2004, p. 113). 3 1 Again, the reductive approach can cover a number of viewpoints, not all of which are necessarily dismissive of mystical practice. Mindful experiences, for example, may be viewed as constructive simply in terms of health benefts. However, my term ‘fantasies’ is meant to convey the fact that in the vast majority of the world’s spiritual traditions, such experiences include transcendent categories (‘soul’, ‘godhead’, ‘world soul’, etc.) which are dismissed as irrelevant in psychological discourse. 2 The ‘deep blue sea’ may be a sacrilegious term to apply to the Ultimate, but I claim dispensation from Rabbi Meir’s aphorism that, ‘blue resembles the colour of the sea, and the sea resembles the colour of the sky, and the sky resembles the colour of the Throne of Glory’ (Talmud, Menakhot 43b)! 3 Wolfson is writing here about the mystical experience of light, and therefore his interest lies with visionary experience. The point stands that more generally for the Jewish mystic, hermeneutics is intertwined with all forms of mystical experience. TheZohar has assumed canonical status within Judaism as being the teaching par excellence of the ‘secrets of the Torah.’ Kabbalah holds that the Torah comprises revealed and concealed teach- ings, the latter pertaining to the nature of God and the ways to align oneself with God in order to promote divine benefcence to fow to the world. Thus, the mysticism that pervades the Zohar is one that promotes ‘ascent for the sake of descent,’ as Hellner-Eshed (2009, p. 317) characterises it. The Zohar comprises a corpus of writings, many of which are presented as esoteric commentary on the biblical text, with others cryptically elaborating the structure of the Godhead. Its authorship has been the subject of extensive scholarly debate. The major part of the corpus is seen by most scholars as having been penned in thirteenth-century Spain by Moses de León. This view is opposed by religious authorities who regard the Zohar as having been revealed through miraculous means to the second-century Shimon bar Yohai in the Land of Israel.
The Hard Problem Revisited: From Cognitive Neuroscience to Kabbalah… 233 One example will suffce to make this point. The twelfth-century Sefer haBahir explores the meaning of the prayer of the biblical Habakkuk in which the prophet writes, “Lord, I have heard thy hearing [otherwise translated, “teaching”, but liter- ally “hearing”] and feared” (Habakkuk 3:1): What did he understand that he should fear? He understood God’s thought. Just as [human] thought has no end, for even a mere mortal can think and descend to the end of the world, so too the ear also has no end and is not satiated. It is thus written [Ecclesiastes 1:8] “The ear is not satiated from hearing” (Abrams 1994, p. 149 [Bahir para 53]). The writer is evidently asserting that real fear brings about a dissolution of the normal boundaries of self, such that thought itself is no longer dominated by ‘I’-associations. The idea of “hearing God’s hearing” is reminiscent of the Islamic scripture, “When I [Allah] love my servant … I become the hearing with which he hears, the seeing with which he sees, the hand with which he grasps …” (Hadith, Bukhari 81:38). The insight that there is ultimately no subject other than the divine is a fundamental of all theistic traditions. Whilst the Bahir’s exegesis is supported by the scriptural text, it is undoubtedly the writer’s experience of thought in mysti- cal states that underpins the meaning. In the Zohar, which circulated in the century after the Bahir, the subtleties of such transpersonal thought are explored in relation 4 to the sefrotic pleroma that mediates between the transcendent mystery and the divine presence in our world. The “mystery of the concealment of thought” (Zohar 1:21a) is traced from its origin in the infnite divine essence until it manifests as outward speech. Although the codifed format by which the various stages in this unfolding of thought are presented makes it diffcult to capture succinctly, it is clear that the pattern broadly entails the progression from unconscious roots to outer expression (Lancaster 2005). Moreover, there is a reciprocity between the ‘down- ward’ movement as seen in the process of Creation (from ‘above’ to ‘below’) and the ‘upward’ movement in mystical states of consciousness (from ‘below’ to ‘above’). The ascent, then, entails moving towards the unconscious roots of thought: “Human thought has the ability to strip itself and to ascend to and arrive at the place of its source. Then it unites with the supernal entity whence it comes, and it [the thought] and it [its source] become one entity” (anonymous thirteenth-century Kabbalist, cited in Idel 2005a, p. 219). To capture my argument in this chapter succinctly, I think our interest in bringing neuroscience, consciousness, and spirituality together will be served by paying more attention to these discussions of ‘higher realms’. At present, the project seems to be focused on the concomitants of experiential states, and, to elaborate my earlier point, we are presented with two alternatives. Either the spiritual experience under examination is basically nothing but the distinctive brain state associated with it, or the brain state is mediating contact with something beyond itself, designated by terms such as “Absolute Unitary Being” (Newberg et al. 2001b, p. 171) or the “divine Ground of Being” (Beauregard and O’Leary 2007, p. 293). The frst 4 This term refers to the intermediary realm between the unknowable transcendent God and the natural world. The sefrot are the emanations of God.
234 B.L. Lancaster alternative essentially leads up a blind alley as far as the goals of mysticism are concerned. At best, it may be claimed that the spiritual state has some value in pro- moting mental effciency and increased well-being. But study of the brain states is tangential to those benefts. The second alternative also seems to me to be somewhat limited. There may be some ‘Absolute’ beyond the brain, but without further detail of its ‘hither’ dimension (as William James might have put it) this is simply a matter of belief and assertion. Earlier I referred to the kinds of constructs (‘higher self’ etc.) psychologists with a transpersonal inclination have employed to explain not only experiences that seem to go beyond the normal realms but also the notion that the individual may grow into higher levels or stages of development (Wilber 2006). In order to link this aspect of contemporary psychology with the classical worldview of the Kabbalah, let me pro- pose that these constructs are heirs to the Aristotelian term, Active Intellect, which was used during late antiquity and the middle ages by scholars and mystical writers of the Abrahamic traditions to convey the notion of a realm of mind bridging human and divine (see Lancaster 2004, for more detail). According to Aristotle, the active intellect comes into the soul from outside, and thus brings into human psychology an element of the divine and the potential to reach the divine. Whilst some psy- chologists would resist aligning this term and one such as ‘higher self’ for reasons of ontology, the challenge of accounting for transcendent experiences and attain- ment of higher levels of being (“synthesising and organising data”, as I put it earlier) unites the kabbalist and the transpersonal psychologist. All explanation requires use of appropriate structures and processes that can be seen as the underpinning and cause of the matter to be explained. On account of its presumed extra-bodily, divine source, the active intellect served to explain mystics’ experiences of intellectually participating in a divine realm. In our day, when the connotations of a term such as ‘active intellect’ are no longer seen by many as onto- logically acceptable, the challenge for those – like myself – who wish to hold onto the sense of a “mystery out of which everything arises” is to embrace the data relat- 5 ing spirituality to cognitive neuroscience in non-reductive ways. But it is not sim- ply a matter of generating appropriate terminology; we need to conceptualise mystical states in operational terms. This challenge is one and the same as the challenge to explain consciousness in non-reductive ways. The cognitive neuroscience of consciousness is a burgeoning feld, yet its rich database does nothing to explain the core mystery of conscious- ness, its phenomenality. I use this term to convey the subjective element, the fact of 5 I make no defence for my “wish to hold onto” this sense of mystery. The key point is that my sense of the mystery is independent of data in cognitive neuroscience. The data themselves do not justify any overarching belief for explanation, be it materialistic or transcendental. I hold onto the sense of mystery for a host of reasons, mainly relating to what I consider to be meaningful values and goals in life. In this chapter I am not attempting to ‘prove’ the truth of kabbalistic, or any other, insights. My point is simply that those insights are worthy of exploration for the relationship they have with observations in the cognitive neuroscience of consciousness.
The Hard Problem Revisited: From Cognitive Neuroscience to Kabbalah… 235 qualia, or what it is to have experiences. Brain science can yield copious data about neural processes involved in signalling the presence of certain sensory details, for example, but it cannot explain this inner quality whereby we experience the blueness of light of a given wavelength or the scent of lavender when certain chemicals interact with the olfactory system. We need to be clear about “what brain science can, and what it cannot, tell us about the mind,” as I put it many years ago (Lancaster 1991, p. 5). The explanatory gap (Levine 1983) between our understanding of neural dynamics and the nature of experience remains as much of a gap as it ever was, and our approach to bridging it depends more on our beliefs than it does on the objective data available (Barušs 2001; Lancaster 2004). Given the parallel between the two challenges – to understand consciousness and to explain spiritual and mystical states – it follows that the division that has been made between the “hard problem” and the “easy problems” (Chalmers 1995), which applies to one, will in turn pertain to the other. Such a division has indeed informed my research into Kabbalistic Psychology (Lancaster 2005), which forms the sub- stance of this Chapter. In brief, the “easy” aspects include those kabbalistic teach- ings which can be related to processes known to psychological science (e.g., the effects of concentrative practices in bringing about altered states of consciousness; the role of language in relation to self; associative processes in accessing uncon- scious material). Whilst the original teachings are inevitably embedded in the language of religion, with its ontological assumptions of a divine realm etc., the teachings themselves are meaningful when extracted from the religious belief system. The “hard” aspects, by contrast, are those which depend upon the ontological assumptions and seem to have no applicability when viewed outside the religious framework (teachings of ontologically separate worlds; microcosm-macrocosm correspondence; the goal of cleaving to God). I shall return shortly to elaborate on these “easy” and “hard” aspects of Kabbalah. The Principles of Kabbalistic Psychology My specifc interest in Kabbalah is not only a result of my own Jewish roots but also stems from the distinctive psychological emphasis found within this mystical path. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to explore fully the reasons for this psychological emphasis, but it is worth noting in passing that three factors are primarily involved. First is the emphasis in Judaism on embodied spirituality. The separation at the inception of the Common Era between nascent Christianity and what became Rabbinic Judaism was fundamentally about worldview. The Rabbis taught that the spiritual path is very much this-worldly, and that ordained embodied action brings holiness to the world. In perpetuating this emphasis, Kabbalah enters into elaborate discussion of what might be best described as spiritual anatomy. As will become clear below, the Godhead is understood in terms of its relation to highly physical features, such as brains and facial structures. Embodied structure becomes the key to grasp ‘higher structure’.
236 B.L. Lancaster This frst factor is itself entwined with the second, namely the core teaching that the human is in the image of God (Genesis 1:27; 5:1). This refective principle means that understanding human nature, and especially the human mind, is the key to understanding God. ‘Psychology’ is therefore essentially spiritual. There can be no such thing as a ‘secular’ psychology, for any insight into the human mind neces- sarily pertains to the divine mind. “From the ‘I’ of fesh and blood you may learn 6 about the ‘I’ of the Holy One, blessed be He,” runs a Jewish Midrashic text. The insight that the human mind recapitulates the mind of God is implicit in much kab- balistic literature. Insights into the divine mind – God’s thought, His will to create – illumine deep aspects of the human mind (the unconscious determinants of thought, creativity). Indeed, this notion of correspondence becomes an explicit iso- morphism between God and man (Shokek 2001). As Wolfson puts it, “In seeing God, one sees oneself, for in seeing oneself, one sees God” (Wolfson 2005, p. 39). A relationship with human psychology is evident wherever kabbalistic texts dis- cuss thought processes in the Godhead. In the Zohar, the initial stirrings of creation are repeatedly described in these psychological terms. To take just one example of the Zohar’s teaching about the primordial moments of creation: “From the midst of thought a desire arose to expand, and it spread from the place where thought is con- cealed and unknown until it expanded to settle in the larynx” (Zohar 1:74a). The larynx is the source of spoken language and in this passage symbolises the creative voice of God preparing for the great “Let there be…” of Genesis. For our purposes, the key notion in this extract is that God’s initial thought, which precedes vocalisa- tion, arises in the “place where thought is concealed,” and that its development is grasped through the embodied experience of using the human larynx. This “place where thought is concealed” parallels the human unconscious, in which the thinking that occurs is indeed unknown. The earliest explicit reference to a human uncon- scious in kabbalistic literature is found in the work of Dov Baer, the Maggid of Mezeritch (1710–1772), although the idea is implicit in much earlier work. In the Maggid’s thought, the unconscious is both a dimension of the human mind in which thoughts arise prior to their entering the realm of consciousness, and also an aspect of the ‘mind’ of God Himself. The unconscious is, accordingly, a region of confu- ence between the mind of man and the mind of God. The third factor that underpins the psychological emphasis found in Kabbalah again interrelates with the frst two, since it relates to the concealment of thought and the logic of the unconscious. This principle concerns the multiplicity of meaning inherent in the divine text, the Torah. The Talmud conveys the point as follows: “In Rabbi Ishmael’s School it was taught: ‘…And like a hammer that shatters the rock’ (Jeremiah 23:29). Just as this hammer produces many sparks, so also may one Biblical 6 Genesis Rabbah 90:1; Leviticus Rabbah 24:9. The quote is given in the name of Rabbi Levi. Midrashrefers to a corpus of Jewish literature, dating from the second to the twelfth centuries C.E., and still of the utmost importance to the practice of Judaism today. The style of Midrash is largely homiletical, and frequently draws on word play to derive a teaching from a scriptural passage. Jewish mysticism largely draws its intellectual roots from the Midrashic imagination (Idel 1993).
The Hard Problem Revisited: From Cognitive Neuroscience to Kabbalah… 237 verse convey many meanings” (Talmud, Sanhedrin 34a). The quintessence of Jewish spirituality lies in the unpacking of the meaning of sacred scripture, and a whole armoury of techniques for decoding those meanings is central to all branches of Judaism, with the most elaborate being found in the Kabbalah. As has been pointed out by many authors, these techniques parallel those used by Freud and others in their attempts to discern unconscious meanings in outward thought, speech and action (see Lancaster 2004 for elaboration of these parallels and for bibliography). Again, the isomorphism between man and God is crucial here, for it implies that the exegetic path to uncovering deeper meaning in the mind of God – the Torah – must apply in parallel fashion to the human mind. In other words, the implication is that concealed meanings in our own thoughts and actions may be made conscious by applying rules of herme- neutic analysis that parallel those used in scriptural exegesis. These three factors – embodied spirituality, isomorphism between human and divine, and the logic of discerning ‘unconscious’ meaning – ensure that my term, ‘Kabbalistic Psychology’ penetrates to the core of the mystical enterprise within Judaism. For Kabbalah, the unconscious is very much the domain for the most pro- found human-divine encounter, and many kabbalistic practices are directed towards 7 engaging with the unknown roots of thought. No wonder, then, that Jung recogn- ised the Maggid of Mezeritch as an illustrious predecessor: He is reported to have said in a 1955 interview, “But do you know who anticipated my entire psychology in the eighteenth century? The Hassidic Rabbi Baer from Meseritz, whom they called the Great Maggid. He was a most impressive man” (Jung 1977, pp. 271–2). The Hard Problem There is no light except that which emerges from darkness. 8 Earlier I suggested that kabbalistic teachings may be divided into “easy” and “hard” as far as their implications for the links between cognitive neuroscience and mysticism are concerned. The easy teachings can be incorporated into psychologi- cal discourse in ways that evade major challenges to our prevailing scientifc world- view. That is to say that they may be explored psychologically whilst ignoring any unmeasurable factors (e.g., those pertaining to the divine) and any ontological chal- lenges to physicalism. Thus, for example, many kabbalistic practices may be 7 Terminology is always diffcult here. Obviously, as soon as one engages with the unknown it is no longer ‘unknown!’ Indeed, the prefx ‘un-’ in ‘unconscious’ I fnd problematic, and for this reason I prefer to use the term ‘preconscious,’ although this does not fully resolve the problem (for further discussion, see Lancaster 2004). Introspectively, my sense is of a region of mind detached from the everyday imposition of I-centeredness, this detached region being always already engaged with the ‘Mystery’ (to use Ferrer and Sherman’s term mentioned earlier). Mystical practice builds bridges between this non-I-centred region of mind and the everyday realm of consciousness (see below). 8 Zohar 2:184a.
238 B.L. Lancaster understood as employing distinctive linguistic techniques to deconstruct normal perceptual categories pertaining to the outer world and the self (Lancaster 2000). Such linguistic deconstruction is a specifc case of the deautomatization that Deikman (1966) sees as a hallmark of the mystic experience. For the purposes of psychological analysis, the traditional context for such kabbalistic language prac- tices (which holds that the kabbalist is ultimately enjoining with the divine mind in its arcane linguistic activity) may be bracketed off. Similarly, practices that entail breath control, repetitive body movements, chanting, fasting etc. (Idel 1988) may be understood in normative psychophysiological terms as promoting a state of trance (Lancaster 2004). An example would be the intense concentrative practices taught by the thirteenth-century Abraham Abulafa, which have been viewed psychologi- cally in terms of absorption and neurologically in terms of activity in the brain’s temporo-parietal junction (Arzy et al. 2005). But what of the hard problem? Kabbalistic practices can be viewed alongside those of other traditions as instilling mental discipline, and training skills of atten- tion and associative imagination. For all the “easy” psychology involved here, the central consideration in the texts in which these practices are described is that of formatting the mind in correspondence with a higher realm. This touchstone of kab- balistic practice is captured by the thirteenth-century Azriel of Gerona when he writes that all practice comes down to one great principle: “to attune one’s thought in faith as if it were attached to the world above” (cited in Tishby 1949/1989, p. 9). It is only by such formatting of one’s mind that the mystic becomes a suitable vessel to receive the divine infux from above. In the kabbalistic worldview, when like is attuned to like, then the inner essence fows. Azriel goes on to specify that such attunement comes about through use of the letters of the divine name, YHVH, for they embody the higher realm. Here we fnd the core of all kabbalistic practice: “The goal for the kabbalist – indeed what justi- fes him being called a kabbalist – is to receive the secret of the name, that is, to cleave to YHVH” (Wolfson 2005, p. 2009). The hard problem – transposed from the study of consciousness to the cognitive neuroscience of mysticism – is to account for these ideas of lower and higher realms, and for the principle of correspondence which links them. Indeed, the three factors I enunciated above as underpinning kab- balistic psychology centre on this microcosm-macrocosm relationship. In Wolfson’s exquisite language: There is a single essence shared by all three [God, human and world], whence follow the corollaries that knowledge of God is equivalent to self-knowledge, and self-knowledge to knowledge of the cosmos. The consubstantiality of self and God in kabbalistic literature … is coupled with the correspondence of the macrocosm and microcosm, the depiction of the world as a “large human” (adam gadol) and the human as a “small world” (olam qat . an). God, world, and human are intertwined in a reciprocal mirroring (Wolfson 2005, p. 32). It bears repeating that these ideas form the very heart of Kabbalah (and of esoteric Christianity, alchemy, and Sufsm; indeed they are hardly foreign to many Vedic teachings). Are they simply the dogmatic dross that can be jettisoned in arriving at a cognitive neuroscience of spirituality?
The Hard Problem Revisited: From Cognitive Neuroscience to Kabbalah… 239 There are two reasons for answering no to this question. The frst I have already mentioned: the spiritual experiences that we may wish to view positively in psycho- logical terms are typically arrived at in connection with the interpretive framework provided by the ideas of correspondence, microcosm etc. Attempting to explain the experience without reference to the interpretive framework would be like trying to explain the experience of love without addressing the relationship within which it arises. Kabbalistic mystics elevating their core state of mind are the selfsame mys- tics who are penetrating into a scriptural text understood as explicating some secret of the higher realm. The “enchanted chain” (Idel 2005b) that interconnects lower and higher, is inseparably both the ladder of ascent and the lens through which the mystic’s perceptions are focussed. “God, Torah and man share the same structure, and this is the reason why the scholar is able to ascend on high” (Idel 2005b, p. 141). The second reason for my hesitance in rejecting the microcosm-macrocosm framework central to Kabbalah is that I believe it holds up in the face of recent developments in our understanding of the cognitive neuroscience of consciousness (Lancaster in press). As I have argued elsewhere (Lancaster 2004), there are different levels of explanation through which the mystical material may be examined. At the level of depth psychology, these notions of correspondence might be explored for their archetypal signifcance: a ‘correspondence’ may underpin the way that images forming in the ‘lower’ mind recapitulate structures transmitted through a ‘higher’, collective mind. But such a level of explanation lacks foundation in the substantive research project that addresses the brain’s involvement in the mind. I believe that two features of recent developments in the cognitive neuroscience of consciousness provide tentative evidence that the kabbalistic worldview is uncannily grounded in neuroscience. These features are refexivity and resonance. Refexivity There is a growing body of evidence to suggest that the neural correlate of consciousness involves recurrent processing through which neural activity at ‘higher’ levels impinges on that at ‘lower’ levels (Boehler et al. 2008; Dehaene et al. 2006; Edelman and Tononi 2000; Lamme 2003, 2004, 2006). The evidence largely comes from studies of the timing of events in the brain’s perceptual systems, using, for example, trans-cranial magnetic stimulation to interfere with neural activity in discrete brain areas at specifc times (Pascual-Leone and Walsh 2001; see Ro 2010, for review), and from studying paradigms such as backward masking (e.g., Supèr et al. 2001; Fahrenfort et al. 2007) and the attentional blink (e.g., Sergent et al. 2005). I have argued that the importance of such recurrent processing for conscious- ness may lie in its role in integrating object-related and self-related processing (Lancaster 1991, 1997, 2004, in press). Such a proposal is supported by recent research demonstrating the role of reafference (cf. recurrent processing) in bringing about a self-specifc perspective in perception (Legrand and Ruby 2009).
240 B.L. Lancaster Lamme succinctly captures the essence of this principle of refexivity in his assertion that, “RP [recurrent processing] is the key neural ingredient of conscious- ness. We could even defne consciousness as recurrent processing” (Lamme 2006, p. 499). Whilst agreeing that recurrent processing is the key neural ingredient that correlates with the immediate sense of access consciousness, I would refrain from defning consciousness in this way. As argued more fully elsewhere (Lancaster 2004), a defnition of consciousness requires that we recognize different dimensions of consciousness. Recurrent processing appears to be the key ingredient in the brain mechanisms involved with the dimensions of intentionality and accessibility. This form of processing does not, however, account for the fundamental dimension of phenomenality; it does not answer the hard problem of consciousness. Resonance Many have stressed the importance for understanding the neural correlate of consciousness of the binding problem (Crick and Koch 1990; Treisman and Schmidt 1982; Treisman 1996). The problem concerns how the brain registers that certain neural responses should be linked with others in order to establish the presence of whole objects in the world. If I am looking at a pen lying on my desk, the feedforward visual sweep (i.e., neural activity preceding recurrent activation) will detect a host of features in the sensory array. The question is, on what basis can the brain determine that a subset of these features (e.g., those relating to the pen) belong together? The emphasis on recurrent processing leads to a straightforward answer, namely that the feedforward sweep does not itself establish the presence of objects. Recognition of objects requires the contribution of recurrent processing. It is likely that the feed-forward system simply detects the presence of basic features in the visual input. On the basis of these features, higher cortical regions connected with the memory store become activated, with those structures (memory traces, or sche- mata) sharing the greatest number of features with the sensory analysis becoming the most highly activated. The re-entrant system (neural pathways from higher to lower areas, giving rise to recurrent processing) then modulates the responses of the feedforward system in an attempt to establish whether or not the most activated schemata can match the current input. Again, considerable research underpins the summary view of Enns and di Lollo that the perceptual system, “actively searches for a match between a descending code, representing a perceptual hypothesis, and an ongoing pattern of low-level activity. When such a match occurs, the neural ensemble is ‘locked’ onto the stimulus” (Enns and di Lollo 2000, p. 348). The stages hypothesized as being involved in the perceptual process are represented in Fig. 1. Models of this kind have replaced those favoured some 30 years ago that stressed only the spatial aspects of brain organization. Previously, the search was for increas- ing evidence of localization of function, with consciousness being seen as merely the most complex in a hierarchy of functions. Over recent years, however, there has been a major shift towards greater emphasis on the temporal dimension of cerebral processing.
The Hard Problem Revisited: From Cognitive Neuroscience to Kabbalah… 241 MEMORY 2. Activate memory schemata schemata accessed from sharing specific features with memory (maybe several input alternatives) e.g. 3. Compare schemata Re-entrant system accessed with input model feedforward system neuronal input model yes Does schema match input? no ‘pen’ ‘spoon’ 4. Perceive input-schema 1. Analysis of input by match 5. Mismatch from phase 1 drives sensory analyzers go to 1 modulation of sensory analyzers in (‘feature detection’) attempt to fit accessed schema sensory input (e.g., slightly obscured pen) Fig. 1 A psycho-physiological model of stages in perception (based on Lancaster, 2004) As frst proposed by von der Malsburg (1981), it is the temporal dimension of neural signals that underpins the binding of neurons into functional groups. There is thus a principle of resonance that seems to be the key for assemblages of neurons to integrate data processing. Much research has demonstrated that phase synchrony, or resonance, in the gamma band (40 Hz approx.) is established between individual neurons, and amongst groups of neurons that are functioning together at a given time (for reviews, see Engel and Singer 2001; Revonsuo 1999; Singer 1999, 2000). Such neural phase synchrony, or coherence, is sometimes viewed as a necessary condition for consciousness. The relation between neural coherence and consciousness is unlikely to be mono- lithic, however. As Luo et al. (2009) conclude from a recent study, neural coherence “is related to, but not suffcient for, consciousness” (p. 1896). We need to distin- guish binding in the feedforward pathway alone, which is unlikely to be the corre- late of consciousness, from binding which unifes feedforward and recurrent processing. It is this latter which appears to underlie the brain’s relation to con- sciousness. It is this form of binding which, for example, would be involved in the unifcation across different orders of cognitive representation that has been pro- posed as the basis of consciousness (see, for example, Kriegel 2007). 9 9 “Conscious states arise from the integration, or unifcation, of what are initially two distinct repre- sentations, a frst-order representation of an external stimulus and a higher-order representation of that frst-order representation; once the two representations are unifed, they form a single represen- tational state with two parts, one directed at the other and the other directed at the stimulus” (Kriegel 2007, p. 899). I would accord the neuronal input model in Figure 1 the status of frst-order representa- tion, and the schemata accessed from memory, the status of second-order representation.
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