SDS Tradecraft Manual

Official 20180313 MPS-0728163 MPS>DLS>UCPI 9. AFTERCARE: 9,1, RESTRICTIONS ON DUTIES AND TIME PERIODS 9.1.1. On returning to a normal working life. SOS operatives will be resiricted on the nature of their employment and the officer's supervisors will maintain contact with SOS management to ensure the security ofthe SOS is not compromised. For the first two years after his return. the officer will have six-monthly interviews with SOS management and meetings with his mentor to ensure he has adjusted back into the role of an SB officer. The fonnal supervision will in all probability be supported by infonnal contact with ex SOS colleagues. The following restrictions will apply to every officer without exception. 9.1.2. There is a ten year ban on protection duties. 9.1.3. If you ask for a port posting you may not be employed on front-line control duties. 9.1.4. If you are employed outside the Branch, you will be expected to avoid any contact with the press and take no part in any publicity. 9.1.5. At all times, SOS management will have to be consulted when you come up for squad changes or redeployment and if any problems develop the SDS management will keep a close watch OD your progress. 9.2. RETURN TO SB LJFE AFTER AN SOS TOUR 9.2.1. First of all, ask yourself the following questions: . Q: Why does my suit not fit? A: Because you are fat. Q: Why do I have to get up at A: Because they will stop paying 7.30 am every day? you ifyou don't. Q: Why do I have to get offthe A: Because they took your van offyou. tube with the rest of the lemmings? Q: Why am l poor? A: Because you've got used to si,endin dosh which you no longer have. 9.2.2. The first thing you notice OD arriving back at CO is that you can't fmd anything. There will have been a huge change of personnel, what with retirements and recruitment of bright young things. For a while you will only know a small minority of people. Similarly, there are likely to have been changes in paperwork and other office practices. Just as the staff in SB have changed, people in organisaiions 41 MPS-0728163































































































------- .Official 20180313 MPS-0728170 --M-P-S>-O·L··S·>-U- CPI ···--··--··· SDSEND OJ' TOUR DEPARTURE.smA'IEGY nJl wil generalybe reprded byfield operalives that, regarcless ofmany ofthe no doubt wws difficultes eocourtered the early st&Bes cfamilation into the target IJOUP and then sewral years cl'mmtaining an increasin involved and often problemalical existence, the real challengepresents itaelf'when attempling to put ido pradice an operationallyviable plan that i sboth thoroughly convincing to the target gtoop and indeed to oaeaelf. that is to say in keepng with all aspeces ofone's persona that wiD have become 90 fiunilia to many associates. lfit isabundantlydear that all � will, bynecessity, have their own unicpe sussesnom as to what comprise, their ideal method ofdeparture, the importuce ofthe succ:e.uof this final episode in the SDS tour holds good fi>r everyone concerned with this - mmout& and maybe f8Cionali,ed asCaUows: I) The principal pi rLmy plan OODOtJDi the depart\\n 6001 the scene lDllll be that 11 much as it is in ID)'One'scontrol, the cnsdibilityofthe operadt. is in no way tarnished. Indeed it would pcilaps be &her to susse-,t that a ptnlyproiessional point ofview the aedi>ility would ideallybe enban.ce by a carafuOy thought dawgb set mcircumstaD be they related to a relativelyabmpt orcomiderablyprotnlded demise. 2) A disappemanoe that gives serious misgivin&9 among the tarset group that the operative was indeed su,pect is ofcow,eno diffe,eat from the point ofview of grounds for coocem as to similar misgivi• voiced during one's SDS tour. However, in the fidd, one isable to anempt to counter such suspiciom by any IU1lbar mproedM means . Once depaned, events are outa concrol mthe opendive and the verdict as to his or her credibility 'Will be, ifIMJr questiond, resolved on the strength ma codJinau ofone's target group spon90n and alies and the gemine level m!t,eling among them as to their percepti of the gellJineness ofthe openmve' aistenceover several )aJI. With the most recent event of the nature of tie disappearancebeing no doull uppermost in their minds it goes withoot saying that an uocoaviocing, clmnsy vanahing act will not only fuel any existing suspicions but, in the absence ofany such misSMD88, could easily give rise to newlyfounded apprehensions. 3) 'Ibe inevitable naive and cynical commed that might be hwd from a wide raJ>F ofpeop]e «not p-ivy to the dayto day opation mthe ament SOS team as to their seemingly needless obsession with end tour procedure and the incnuinglyadvanced steps laken to IS!ist officers wilb their pan may really be dismissed without a second thought. The bizam: and unique nature of SOS work lends it,elfto a system mcontilll81 improwJIDeDt with rep,ds to best practice for the squad as a whole and � that could be constNed within operalionll paramete as improvi� the crecibilty oftbe individual v.itlin tho eyes cf the target group ahould rL cnne he dMJoped and ln1n>duced . (Suitable noteworthy aqmples within recent I4 I I J • !�., al� [117) Jl is fair to say tbal it would be d>diemel) nue to find an SOS opndve that for promoml, peraonal reasons or in many caaes both, would be indif!mnt at some stage mhis post SOS am,er to the revelatio byhis target group that be or she was in &cl an iilfiltrtor. Sut6ce to saytbat the impad ofsuch an outcome on operatives isofCOll'5e ldested but the geruioe conoem is nonetheless