Foreign affairs 2016 09-10

september/october 2016 • volume 95 • number 5 • tomorrow's military JOE BIDEN: HOW HISTORY WILL JUDGE US SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2016 Tomorrow's Military How Much Is Enough? F O R E I G NAF FAI R S .C O M

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COVER: NIKLAS ASKER Volume 95, Number 5 TOMORROW’S MILITARY Notes From the Chairman 2 A Conversation With Martin Dempsey America’s Awesome Military 10 And How to Make It Even Better Michael O’Hanlon and David Petraeus Rethinking Nuclear Policy 18 Taking Stock of the Stockpile Fred Kaplan Preserving Primacy 26 A Defense Strategy for the New Administration Mac Thornberry and Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. Ending Endless War 36 A Pragmatic Military Strategy Andrew J. Bacevich September/October 2016

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ESSAYS Building on Success 46 Opportunities for the Next Administration Joseph R. Biden, Jr. From Political Islam to Muslim Democracy 58 The Ennahda Party and the Future of Tunisia Rached Ghannouchi China’s Infrastructure Play 68 Why Washington Should Accept the New Silk Road Gal Luft Parting the South China Sea 76 How to Uphold the Rule of Law Mira Rapp-Hooper Keeping Europe Safe 83 Counterterrorism for the Continent David Omand The Return of Europe’s Nation-States 94 The Upside to the EU’s Crisis Jakub Grygiel How to Fix Brazil 102 Breaking an Addiction to Bad Government Eduardo Mello and Matias Spektor America’s Brewing Debt Crisis 111 What Dodd-Frank Didn’t Fix Robert Litan ON FOREIGNAFFAIRS.COM Shannon O’Neil on Kathleen McNamara on Kanchan Chandra on Argentina and Brazil. Brexit’s false democracy. India’s authoritarianism. September/October 2016



The Strategic Costs of Torture 121 How “Enhanced Interrogation” Hurt America Douglas A. Johnson, Alberto Mora, and Averell Schmidt Venezuela on the Brink 133 How the State Wrecked the Oil Sector—and How to Save It Lisa Viscidi REVIEWS & RESPONSES 142 Mosque and State The Future of Political Islam Malise Ruthven How to Fix America’s Infrastructure 149 Build, Baby, Build Aaron Klein Spain’s Foreign Fighters 155 The Lincoln Brigade and the Legacy of the Spanish Civil War Sebastiaan Faber Worth the Trip? 162 Debating the Value of Study Abroad Eric R. Terzuolo; Sanford J. Ungar Recent Books 165 Letters to the Editor 191 “Foreign Affairs . . . will tolerate wide differences of opinion. Its articles will not represent any consensus of beliefs. What is demanded of them is that they shall be competent and well informed, representing honest opinions seriously held and convincingly expressed. . . . It does not accept responsibility for the views in any articles, signed or unsigned, which appear in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear.” Archibald Cary Coolidge, Founding Editor Volume 1, Number 1 • September 1922 September/October 2016

September/October 2016 · Volume 95, Number 5 Published by the Council on Foreign Relations GIDEON ROSE Editor, Peter G. Peterson Chair JONATHAN TEPPERMAN Managing Editor KATHRYN ALLAWALA, STUART REID, JUSTIN VOGT Deputy Managing Editors REBECCA CHAO Deputy Web Editor SIMON ENGLER, NIKITA LALWANI, SAM WINTER-LEVY Staff Editors PARK MACDOUGALD, ALASDAIR PHILLIPS-ROBINS Assistant Editors ANN TAPPERT Copy Chief LORENZ SKEETER Production Manager IB OHLSSON Contributing Artist SARAH FOSTER Business Administrator CHRISTINE CLARK Editorial Assistant Book Reviewers RICHARD N. COOPER, RICHARD FEINBERG, LAWRENCE D. FREEDMAN, G. JOHN IKENBERRY, ROBERT LEGVOLD, WALTER RUSSELL MEAD, ANDREW MORAVCSIK, ANDREW J. NATHAN, NICOLAS VAN DE WALLE, JOHN WATERBURY LYNDA HAMMES Publisher EMILIE HARKIN Marketing Director ANIQUE HALLIDAY Senior Product Manager JONATHAN CHUNG Business Operations Manager NORA MATHEWS Marketing Manager EDWARD WALSH Advertising Director MICHAEL PASUIT Senior Manager, Advertising Accounts and Operations ELENA TCHAINIKOVA Senior Manager, Events and Business Development ANDREW REISMAN Events and Marketing Associate YEGIDE MATTHEWS Publishing Assistant CLIFFORD HUNT Special Assistant to the Publisher TOM DAVEY Director, Web Management and Development CREE FRAPPIER Website and Mobile Operations PROCIRC LLC Circulation Services LISA SHIELDS, IVA ZORIC, JAKE METH Media Relations Board of Advisers JAMI MISCIK Chair JESSE H. AUSUBEL, PETER E. BASS, JOHN B. BELLINGER, SUSAN CHIRA, JESSICA P. EINHORN, MICHÈLE FLOURNOY, FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, ADI IGNATIUS, CHARLES R. KAYE, MICHAEL J. MEESE, RICHARD PLEPLER, DAVID M. RUBENSTEIN, KEVIN P. RYAN, MARGARET G. WARNER, NEAL S. WOLIN, DANIEL H. YERGIN SUBSCRIPTION SERVICES: Foreign Affairs ForeignAffairs.com/services 58 E. 68th Street, New York, NY 10065 TELEPHONE: ADVERTISING: Call Edward Walsh at 212-434-9527 or visit 800-829-5539 U.S./Canada www.foreignaffairs.com/advertising 813-910-3608 All other countries WEB SITE: ForeignAffairs.com EMAIL: [email protected] NEWSLETTER: ForeignAffairs.com/newsletters MAIL: P.O. Box 60001, Tampa, FL, 33662-0001 VIDEO: ForeignAffairs.com/video FACEBOOK: Facebook.com/ForeignAffairs R EPRODUCTION: The contents of Foreign Affairs are copyrighted. No part of the magazine may be reproduced, hosted or distributed in any form or by any means without prior written permission from Foreign Affairs. To obtain permission, visit ForeignAffairs.com/about-us Foreign Affairs is a member of the Alliance for Audited Media and the Association of Magazine Media. GST Number 127686483RT Canada Post Customer #4015177 Publication #40035310

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GHANNOUCHI PHOTO: ZOUBEIR SOUISSI / REUTERS CONTRIBUTORS Before becoming a leading critic of U.S. national security policy, ANDREW BACEVICH was a player in it. After graduating from West Point, serving in Vietnam, and rising to the rank of colonel, Bacevich earned a doctor- ate in diplomatic history from Princeton University and became a professor at Boston University. In a series of books and articles, he has sketched a more restrained vision of Washington’s role in the world, and in “Ending Endless War” (page 36), he argues that the next admin- istration should avoid the mistakes of its predecessors. RACHED GHANNOUCHI used to be Tunisia’s leading dissident; now he is one of its leading politicians. After decades in prison and exile, he made a triumphant return to his country following the so-called Jasmine Revolution in 2010–11 that drove out the dictator Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali and kicked off the Arab Spring. As a co-founder of the Ennahda movement, he has long been a key figure in global Islamist circles. Now, in “From Political Islam to Muslim Democracy” (page 58), he explains how En- nahda has moved beyond its Islamist roots. MIRA RAPP-HOOPER is a senior fellow in the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. After receiving a B.A. from Stanford University and a Ph.D. from Columbia University, she held research positions at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Council on Foreign Relations. In “Parting the South China Sea” (page 76), Rapp-Hooper analyzes the legal and strategic dimensions of conflicts in the world’s most volatile waters. Over the past three decades, DAVID OMAND has held many top national security posts in the British government, serving as director of the Government Communications Headquarters (the British equivalent of the U.S. National Security Agency), permanent secretary of the Home Office, and the United Kingdom’s first security and intelligence coordinator. Along the way, he found time to obtain a degree in mathematics and physics and sit on the board of London’s Natural History Museum. In “Keeping Europe Safe” (page 83), Omand traces the evolution of the contemporary terrorist threat and the continent’s counterterrorism response.

TOMORROW’S MILITARY A n old military saying has it that the U.S. armed forces are currently in “amateurs talk strategy; profes- “awesome” shape, with no true competi- sionals talk logistics.” Pretty tion in sight—but caution that slightly much everybody has an opinion about larger budgets and (again) less Washing- foreign policy and national security ton political dysfunction are necessary priorities, but few understand just how to sustain that edge. much a country’s choices in those areas are shaped by mundane details about Then, Fred Kaplan o ers a thoughtful the size, composition, and state o its analysis o U.S. nuclear policy—a sorely armed forces. neglected subject these days—and revisits the classic question posed by Defense After 15 years o constant ghting, Secretary Robert McNamara’s “whiz kids” the U.S. military is a di erent beast hal a century ago: How much is enough? than it used to be—experienced, battle- scarred, warier, more politically sensitive, A pair o contrasting perspectives, and more technologically sophisticated. nally, o ers a challenge to intellectual But will the challenges it faces over the complacency. Republican Representative coming decades be similar or di erent? Mac Thornberry o Texas, chair o the How big does it have to be, and how House Armed Services Committee, writes nimble, armored with what weapons with Andrew Krepinevich about the and training to meet what contingencies? need for the United States to do signi - These are the kinds o questions the new cantly more in order to reclaim global administration taking over in January leadership. And Andrew Bacevich takes will have to answer, and to help inform the opposite tack, making the case for a its deliberations, we’ve asked leading less expansive global role and a corre- experts from across the spectrum to spondingly restrained military policy. weigh in with their recommendations. Responding to soldiers complaining The package opens with an inter- about having to use insu cient military view with General Martin Dempsey, the equipment in Iraq, then Secretary o recently retired chairman o the Joint Defense Donald Rumsfeld noted, “You Chiefs o Sta . He notes the dangerous go to war with the army you have, not state o the world even as he defends the army you might want or wish to current policy in the Middle East have at a later time.” In that, at least, he and excoriates the domestic political was right, and the defense policy choices dysfunction that impedes serious made today will enable or constrain the military planning. tactical and strategic choices made tomor- row. Professionals understand this, even Next up comes a survey o the defense i amateurs don’t. policy landscape by another recently retired senior military commander (and —Gideon Rose, Editor former director), David Petraeus, and Michael O’Hanlon. They argue that

The next president is going to be faced with the prospect of realigning our national security interests with our resources—and for God’s sake, getting some certainty into the budget process, so that we can actually plan. —Martin Dempsey A Conversation With 2 Preserving Primacy Martin Dempsey Mac Thornberry and Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. NIKLAS ASKER America’s Awesome Military 26 Michael O’Hanlon and David Petraeus 10 Ending Endless War 36 Andrew J. Bacevich Rethinking Nuclear Policy Fred Kaplan 18

Return to Table of Contents TOMORROW’S MILITARY Notes From are. I would suggest that left unattended, the Chairman they could become much bigger threats than we appreciate today. State actors LARRY DOWNING / REUTERS A Conversation With like Russia and China are challenging Martin Dempsey our interests in Europe and in the Pacific. Neither is a peer competitor yet, but In September 2015, General Martin there are parts of their enterprises where Dempsey retired from the U.S. Army they’re approaching the status of peer after more than four decades in competitors. And then you have nonstate uniform. Commissioned as an armor actors like the Islamic State [or isis]. officer following his graduation from We are not in a position where we can West Point, he served in both the Gulf ignore any of these issues. And under­ War and the Iraq war and eventually pinning it all is our inability to take a rose to become chief of staff of the U.S. longer view—say, 20 years—and support Army and then chairman of the Joint it with the policies, authorities, and Chiefs of Staff. He spoke with Foreign resources necessary. Instead, we tend Affairs’ editor, Gideon Rose, in June. to look at things one year at a time. You have said that you think this is the Do you worry that what Russia has done most dangerous the world has ever on its periphery will escalate to a direct been. Why are you so concerned? challenge to NATO countries that have It’s the most dangerous period in my an Article 5 security guarantee? lifetime. In my 41 years of military experience, we often had the opportunity Russia is clearly trying to reestablish a to focus on one security threat or another. sphere of influence in the gray states First it was all about the Soviet Union, that sit between the Russian Federation then it was peacekeeping, then it was and nato. They are looking to reestab­ terrorism. Now we’ve got lots of things lish a group of nations who can be their cropping up at the same time. We have satellites, who can help them bolster multiple challenges competing for finite their economy and their security, because resources—and grotesque uncertainty as they look into the period beyond 2020, with regard to the military budget. most of their trend lines are declining. China’s not looking to make allies; it’s But are any of today’s challenges at the looking to make economic trading partners to make sure it has the resources scale of previous ones? It sounds like it needs to fuel its economy and manage its 1.5-billion-plus population. In contrast you’re worried about a broad range of to both Russia and China, our future security is based on our alliance structure, minor threats rather than one or two really which goes back to World War II and its aftermath. So here is where it becomes big ones. something to be wary of: Russia’s buffer zone is going to rub uncomfortably at We could debate how minor the threats points against our alliance structure in Europe. China’s efforts to establish This interview has been edited and condensed. 2 foreign affairs

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Notes From the Chairman supply chains and garner resources are The flash points between China and its going to rub uncomfortably at points against our alliance structure in the neighbors have come recently in the Pacific. That causes me concern. South and East China Seas. Has the U.S. But isn’t the alliance structure you response been too much, too little, or just described a source of strength just right? rather than weakness? If you add up I think our actions to date have been the United States and its allies and intended to send a clear signal that we’ve got several allies in the Pacific partners, you end up with something with whom we share interests and com­ mitments, and if Chinese assertions like two-thirds or three-quarters of of sovereignty threaten them, then we have a treaty obligation to support them. global defense spending. Why should Have we done enough in that region? I think we’ve got it about right. On the people who have all that be so occasion, I argued for more frequent freedom-of-navigation operations— worried about challenges from much fonops—to make it clear that China can go out and do a land reclamation weaker countries with much fewer project, but it’s not going to have any effect [on the legal status quo]. We’re resources and alliances? not going to honor a 12-mile territorial boundary [around their newly reclaimed Our allies and partners tend to be a bit land]. We’ve got to keep that up, because fragmented in terms of their interests. if someone declares something and no If you were talking to one of my nato one challenges it, it can become accepted. counterparts, they might define the I would have preferred more frequent Russian threat as most serious, but freedom-of-navigation operations. another might consider immigration But I think the way we’ve done it has or terrorism the greater threat. Russia been prudent. can affect the nato alliance in two ways. One is by threatening it physically Some have argued that what we’ve on its eastern flank, and the other is by threatening to sever the transatlantic link. actually done has been more innocent There are capabilities that the Russians are pursuing that are clearly intended passage than traditional FONOPs. to allow them to threaten our ability to reinforce Europe, and if they could do That distinction is more a matter of that, then nato would lose credibility law—of the declaration you make, the pretty quickly. way you maneuver inside that space. I don’t think that matters much to the What specific capabilities do you have Chinese. I think they recognize that our presence there is a signal. My Chinese in mind? counterparts were pretty clear about the fact that they didn’t appreciate us Some are still classified. But let’s just asserting the right to do that kind of say, for example, capabilities they’re operation, whatever we call it. developing in space, in cyber, with ground-based cruise missiles, under­ water capabilities, are all intended to eventually be able to threaten the transatlantic link and put nato in a precarious position. 4 foreign affairs

A Conversation With Martin Dempsey There have been a number of incidents might take far longer than it would if we were to do the job ourselves, but it in which U.S. ships or planes have been is necessary because we have to adopt a response that can be sustained for a long buzzed by foreign military aircraft. Is time, such as 20 years. As for individuals who are being radicalized online, groups the proper response to those kinds of like isis are losing the fight on the ground and probably winning the fight situations to ignore them or to escalate? in the virtual environment because it’s so hard to fight them there. Again, that’s You have to make note of them and a long-term problem and one that will protest them, both in diplomatic and require us to be both vigilant and aggres­ in military channels. One of the things sive in trying to counter them. We have that fascinated me about the Chinese is not grappled with that as much as we can whenever I would have a conversation and should. with them about international standards or international rules of behavior, they Bob Gates famously said, a few years would inevitably point out that those rules were made when they were absent ago, “In my opinion, any future defense from the world stage. They are no longer absent from the world stage, and so secretary who advises the president to those rules need to be renegotiated with them. We continued to make the assertion again send a big American land army that in the interests of safety, if nothing else, we really needed to have these rules into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa of behavior. And we were successful initially in maritime rules of behavior. should have his head examined.” Do We took much longer on standards of behavior in the air, and I’m not sure we you agree? ever closed the deal on my watch. There may be times in the future when Regarding nonstate actors, there are the our national security interests are so threatened that we would have to intro­ ones on the ground in foreign conflict duce a large force there. For example, if Iran ever decided to develop nuclear zones, such as ISIS, but then there are weapons and the ability to deliver them and threatened to do so, that seems to also global terrorist networks with me to be a case where you bring what­ ever force you need to make sure that affiliates, offshoots, and radicalized never occurs. local supporters in many countries. On the other hand, it seems to me to be counterproductive to introduce a What, if anything, can the U.S. military large U.S. presence in response to the persistent instability in the Middle East do about domestic terrorist attacks that generates terrorism, for two reasons. First, upon seeing our introduction of carried out by U.S. citizens? a large force, those in the region who should be dealing with the problem There are indeed two kinds of challenges would immediately step back and allow from radical Islamist groups. Some us to deal with it and provide very little actually stand and seek to hold ground. help. Second, we’ve got to make sure Such groups need to be countered on the ground, with most of the fight coming from those who have the most to gain and lose—and that means we have to work with and through people from the region who are willing to fight. This September/October 2016 5

Notes From the Chairman that we can sustain our military power nothing much to show for it. Is that a in order to be able to credibly deter potential threats from state actors— comment on the execution or about the Russia, China, North Korea, Iran. inherently problematic nature of such So in dealing with general instability in the Middle East, we shouldn’t take programs? ownership of it, but we should recognize that we have interests and partners there. Probably a little of both. Other agencies We should maintain a few platforms from of government had other programs in which we can conduct our own military existence, and we were trying to see if operations in the region if necessary, from we could provide the president with a which we can train and equip host-nation dod option. One of the first proposals forces, but recognize that the locals have that came out of Central Command to do most of the heavy lifting. You have was that we should try to find moderate to be dynamic enough to turn that up Syrian fighters, bring them out of the on occasion and dial it back on occasion. fight for a period of time, allow them to We’re really good at dialing things up, form coherent units, and then reintroduce not so good at dialing them down. them. The concept sounded good: if we could do this, then we would have a That doesn’t sound dramatically different group of Syrians we could support and, if they ultimately succeeded, influence from what we’re currently doing. to help manage the future of Syria. In retrospect, what we discovered was that It’s not. I don’t think acting dramati­ when we reintroduced these groups into cally differently would change anything; the environment, they were treated as in fact, it could make things worse. antibodies—not just by the regime, and not just by isis and the al-Nusra A lot of commentators feel that recent Front, but even by other groups we thought would welcome their appearance. U.S. military policy in the Middle East Where did we miss the signals that they wouldn’t be welcomed? I don’t know, has not been particularly successful. but we obviously did. Eventually, we terminated that program and began to Do you disagree? look for existing groups that expressed a moderate viewpoint, and we began Yes. I think the overall Middle East to equip and train them. And the jury’s strategy is about what it should be right still out on that. Some of them are now. But I think we did have a tendency doing well; some are not doing well. early on to mostly articulate what we But it’s tough, because Syria is as were not going to do. And that sent a fragmented and failed a state as I’ve message that was somewhat incompre­ ever seen. hensible to our partners in the region. We overcame that, and now they under­ What is the connection between stand what we are willing to do, how we can use our unique capabilities— national security policy and defense airpower, reconnaissance, training, equipping—to great advantage. policy? In other words, how much does In Syria, we spent half a billion dollars on the size and structure of the forces we the train-and-equip program and got have affect the choices we make about 6 foreign affairs

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A Conversation With Martin Dempsey intervention or how to handle any resources that we identified in 2012, and we’ve got to make a long-term particular situation? commitment to sustain the force and its readiness at those levels. They’re directly related. In 2012, in the Defense Strategic Guidance and the Is the biggest problem the uncertainty budget that was put together to implement it, we articulated the minimum essential in the budget process, the total size of requirements of a force structure necessary to meet U.S. national security interests. the military budget, or the details of its We identified that as the floor, and we’ve been pushed beneath that floor in a couple specific components? Are we spending of key areas ever since. Now there’s a mismatch, and the next president is going too much on some things and not to be faced with the prospect of realigning our national security interests with our enough on others? resources—and for God’s sake, getting some certainty into the budget process, That’s the right question. In 2012, we so that we can actually plan. identified the appropriate size of the force and the resources necessary to support If there’s a gap between resources and it and said that we needed three things: time, flexibility, and certainty. If you want commitments, is that best addressed by the Department of Defense to absorb budget cuts totaling, let’s say, $750 billion reducing the commitments or by over ten years, OK. There may be certain issues or points along that path where increasing the resources? you’re going to have to extend the time­ line a bit, but we can do it, if you give If we were having this conversation in us that time. But we also need flexibility. academia or in a think tank, we could When we’re told, “You have to find talk about how we should just reduce $750 billion to cut,” and we say, “OK, we our commitments across the globe. But can do that; we have 25 percent excess then the challenge is to identify which infrastructure, and we’ve got six or interest you will leave unattended. Were seven weapons systems that are aging I back in the [chairman’s] job, I’m not and largely redundant,” the Congress sure that I could, in good conscience, shouldn’t turn around and say, “Not in turn to the commander in chief and say, my district” or “Not my weapons system.” “Prioritize these interests out of the And we need certainty. Sequestration eight or ten we’ve talked about in our hung over my head like the sword of national security strategy.” And even if Damocles the entire time I was chairman. you did that, the fact of the matter is More important, it hung over the heads that from time to time, number ten is of the service chiefs, who really are the going to come screaming up to number ones that have to put the force together. one. The Ebola crisis is a good example. Responding to infectious diseases and Now that you’re out, are there any humanitarian disasters is rather low on the scale of our priorities. But for that specific weapons systems you want to period of time, it came screaming to the top, and it pulled resources in that talk about that we need more or less of? direction. We’ve got to restore the There are capabilities that we’ve always described as high demand, low density. The demand for intelligence platforms September/October 2016 7

Notes From the Chairman is intense, whether satellite delivered or we can afford to buy only a handful of unmanned aerial systems. We’ll never meet every combatant commander’s them. In a real war with a peer competitor, demand for those, but we ought to look at coming closer to that. We’ll continue could we have confidence that such a to replenish our fleet of ten aircraft carriers, but with better budget certainty, small force could sustain much attrition we would be better able to schedule ship maintenance and time in port— or operate effectively long enough to something that has got to be dealt with. We’re coming up on the replacement avoid pressures to escalate? for the Ohio-class submarine, which is an important part of our nuclear triad. Many of these systems are designed to Patriot batteries are constantly in demand. be two or three or four times more And there are portions of the force that capable than their predecessors. That’s are stressed at unreasonable levels. all been tested and computer simulated, and we have reason to believe that it In the past decade or two, it seems that will actually be true. On the other hand, if we don’t find a way to make sure that real increases in the defense budget we have an industrial base capable of replenishing losses . . . That’s a great every year have become necessary just concern of mine. Say you decide you need a ship to stay at sea, so you don’t to maintain the force structure we have. bring it back to the shipyard in its maintenance cycle. And the shipyard Is that true, and if so, why? And is that lays off workers, and those workers become tired of the uncertainty and really sustainable? they go elsewhere. Those are real issues, and I just don’t think we’ve unpacked There needs to be a few percent increase them and seen the damage that the last annually just to keep pace with the fact four years of uncertainty have created. that the force is aging. Weapons systems are aging out at a pace that was never What are you proudest of in your career, anticipated, because we’ve been using the force at a rate that we never antici­ and what is your greatest regret? pated. We’ve done a very creditable job of recapitalization and reconstitution. The proud part is easy to answer: the But those are expenses that were not people I worked with. Thank God we’ve anticipated in budget submissions. Beyond got young men and women in this coun­ that, you’ve got some of these huge try who are willing to raise their hands, recapitalization challenges, like the set aside many of their own personal Ohio-class replacement I mentioned, ambitions, and become part of some­ which come up in 25-year increments. thing larger because they believe in These conversations tend to be delayed service. That’s the part I miss most now until they become a crisis, and we’re that I’m out of uniform—watching and there. The navy has to maintain the nurturing and encouraging those young nuclear triad. men and women to do as much as they can for their country. The unit costs for cutting-edge weapons The regrets? Look, anytime you lose systems like the F-35 are so astronomical, a soldier, a sailor, an airman, or a marine, there are always moments of self-doubt— about the equipment you provided, or 8 foreign affairs

A Conversation With Martin Dempsey the guidance, or the policies. Every have a huge problem. The force is big time we took a casualty, we did the enough to do what it’s being asked now. forensics to figure out how and why it If it’s asked to do more, it’s got to grow. happened, to make sure it wasn’t some­ thing that we could have prevented. In We’re in the middle of a hotly contested the process of being introspective about it, you always regret the loss. How can presidential election campaign. Are you you not? And then when you get up to be the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of satisfied with the level of discussion of Staff, you make an argument about the budget, you talk about readiness, you military policy? talk about risk. Sometimes you persuade folks; oftentimes you don’t. I can’t tell No. I think that the discussions have you how many times I came back from been superficial and emotional. What those conversations or testimonies and we need are conversations that have real I just regretted that I hadn’t been able depth to them. Talking about what’s going to be more persuasive. to happen in the first 60 or 90 days of a presidency just doesn’t get it done for me. After Vietnam, we went to a volunteer What would happen if the commander force. It has turned into a small profes­ in chief gave an order to, say, commit sional force that has actually had a torture or kill an innocent civilian very high operational tempo. The public related to a terrorist? doesn’t get involved, and the profes­ We take our oath to the Constitution, sionals are stretched thin and overworked. which is to say the rule of law. And we are duty-bound not to follow any order Is that a good situation? that is illegal or immoral. If an order is illegal or immoral, we should and would That’s a great question and one that we resign, because we couldn’t follow it.∂ discussed often among the chiefs. When the volunteer force was conceived in the mid-’70s, no one thought it would be asked to do what it’s been asked to do recently. It has performed magnifi­ cently. But there was a period there when we increased the pace of deploy­ ments to 15 months away and a year at home, and we almost broke the force. Now we’re back to where it’s nine months deployed and, generally speak­ ing, two years at home, and it feels to me that that pace is sustainable. So as long as we can keep the force operating at that pace, we can do it in perpetuity. The family members are solid. But if we make deployments longer and allow less time at home, then I think we will September/October 2016 9

Return to Table of Contents TOMORROW’S MILITARY America’s resource levels are less than is advisable Awesome Military given the range of contemporary threats and the missions for which it has to And How to Make It prepare. No radical changes or major Even Better buildups are needed. But the trend of budget cuts should stop and indeed Michael O’Hanlon and be modestly reversed, and defense David Petraeus appropriations should be handled more rationally and professionally than has The United States has the best been the case in recent years. military in the world today, by far. U.S. forces have few, if any, Most major elements of U.S. defense weaknesses, and in many areas—from policy are on reasonably solid ground, naval warfare to precision-strike capa­ despite innumerable squabbles among bilities, to airpower, to intelligence and experts over many of the details. Through­ reconnaissance, to special operations— out the post–Cold War era, some variant they play in a totally different league of a two-war planning framework (with from the militaries of other countries. caveats) has enjoyed bipartisan support Nor is this situation likely to change and should continue to do so for many anytime soon, as U.S. defense spending years to come. Forward presence and is almost three times as large as that of engagement in East Asia, Europe, and the United States’ closest competitor, the Middle East remain compelling China, and accounts for about one-third pillars of U.S. national security strategy. of all global military expenditures— Robust research-and-development with another third coming from U.S. programs continue to be supported, as allies and partners. does an unparalleled intelligence com­ munity. The Defense Department’s Nevertheless, 15 years of war and procurement budget—the first victim five years of budget cuts and Washington of budgetary austerity in the 1990s and dysfunction have taken their toll. The in the early years of this century—is military is certainly neither broken nor once again relatively healthy. Pentagon unready for combat, but its size and leaders are spurring innovation, and the men and women of today’s armed forces MICHAEL O’HANLON is Senior Fellow in display high standards of professionalism, Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution and expertise, and experience. the author of The $650 Billion Bargain: The Case for Modest Growth in America’s Defense Budget. Yet there are also areas of concern. Follow him on Twitter @MichaelEOHanlon. Excess base capacity remains a problem. The navy’s fleet and the army are too DAVID PETRAEUS is former Director of the small, and current budget trajectories CIA, former Commander of Coalition Forces in imply further cuts rather than increases. Iraq and Afghanistan, and former Commander And the scale of some hugely expensive of U.S. Central Command. weapons programs in the pipeline or on the drawing boards, such as the F-35 fighter jet and some new nuclear weapons, needs to be reassessed. The challenge 10 foreign affairs

America’s Awesome Military for the next president will thus be how itself is changing. True military revolu­ to build on the strengths, address the tions are relatively rare, as even major problems, and chart a course for contin­ changes usually occur gradually, over uing to maintain U.S. military dominance decades. But there is clearly one such in a strategic environment that never revolution now in process, perhaps stops evolving. halfway along: in airpower, particularly in the effects of precision ordnance CHANGE VS. MORE OF THE SAME combined with the vast increase of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais­ The national interests that the U.S. sance (isr) systems on the contemporary military needs to advance remain battlefield. constant: protecting the homeland; safeguarding U.S. citizens at home and Harbingers of this revolution were abroad; and ensuring the security of apparent as far back as 1982, in the U.S. allies, the global economy, and effectiveness of the French-made Exocet international order more generally. These missiles used by the Argentinian military days, threats to those interests come from against British warships during the five sources: great powers (such as China Falklands War. Around the same time, and Russia), extremist nonstate actors nato put forward the concept of AirLand (such as al Qaeda; the Islamic State, or Battle, which envisioned using new types isis; and the Taliban), rogue states (such of advanced munitions to precisely strike as Iran and North Korea), pandemics critical targets behind the frontlines in and environmental turbulence, and the event of a conflict with the Warsaw developments in advanced technology Pact. (Hearkening back to the “first that could increase U.S. vulnera­ bilities offset”—nato’s reliance on nuclear (especially those related to cyberspace, weapons to counter its foes’ large land space, and weapons of mass destruction). armies—some called this the “second offset,” relying on the high-tech quality Fortunately, the United States has of its conventional forces to counter its many resources to draw on as it pre­ foes’ quantitative superiority.) pares for these threats, even beyond its military forces. The country’s high-tech The public began to take notice of and innovative sectors are the best in these developments during the Gulf the world. It has solid economic funda­ War in 1990–91, as laser-guided bomb­ mentals, including a gradually growing ing played as well on television as it did population base, the world’s best univer­ on the battlefield. Gps-guided bombs sities, and a large market at the center arrived a few years later, and they were of global finance and commerce. And eventually followed by armed drones. most important of all, the United States All these American weapons can now leads a globe-spanning system of alliances be employed in vastly greater quantities and partnerships that includes some through “sensor-shooter loops” that 60 countries, collectively accounting for take advantage of remarkable advances two-thirds of global economic output in reconnaissance systems, such as the and military capacity. “unblinking eye” of many dozens of drones and satellite-based communi­ A serious defense policy, however, cations that share targeting, video, needs to take into account the way war September/October 2016 11

Michael O’Hanlon and David Petraeus and critical data across the military in breakdown of complex systems that real time. usually provide essential services to millions of people. Precision-guided bombs accounted for about ten percent of the ordnance Given all of this, how should the used in the Gulf War. In recent conflicts, next administration handle defense they have accounted for about 90 percent, policy? By building on existing policies with a dramatic impact on the course and concentrating on preparing the of battle. As a result, Pentagon officials army for multiple missions, continuing now talk of a “third offset”—the hope, the navy’s rebalance of attention to the championed by Secretary of Defense Pacific, countering China and Russia, Ashton Carter and Deputy Secretary and maintaining adequate resources to of Defense Robert Work, among others, support a robust force. that it will be possible to rely on modern- day isr and precision assets to counter, PREPARE THE ARMY FOR ANYTHING say, larger Chinese missile, aircraft, ship, and submarine forces in the waters of After long, difficult wars in Afghanistan the western Pacific. and Iraq, some critics have argued that the entire notion of attempting to prepare For all this progress, however, there U.S. ground forces for complex missions are limits to what standoff warfare and beyond conventional combat is a fruitless advanced technology can achieve by or even counterproductive exercise. themselves. To make precision bombing Reprising the army’s attitude in the wake effective, for example, targets need to of the Vietnam War, when it eschewed be located accurately—something that counterinsurgency and focused instead can be difficult if those targets are in on high-end maneuver warfare and the cities, forests, or jungles, or are concealed nato–Warsaw Pact face-off, they favor or underground. Moreover, advanced developing a force with a more limited sensor and communications networks orientation. The Obama administration’s may prove fragile when fighting tech­ 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance report, nologically sophisticated adversaries. for example, stated that although U.S. forces would “retain and continue to refine Land warfare also remains complex, the lessons learned, expertise, and special­ particularly when fighting in cities or ized capabilities that have been developed against an adversary trying to hide or over the past ten years of counterinsur­ disguise what is being done (such as gency and stability operations in Iraq and Russia’s seizure of Crimea in 2014 using Afghanistan,” they would “no longer be “little green men”—mysterious soldiers in sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged unmarked uniforms). Future war fighting stability operations.” Partly as a result could be complicated by the introduction of this logic, today’s active-duty U.S. of chemical, electromagnetic-pulse, or Army has been cut by almost 100,000 in even nuclear weapons or take place in a recent years, to 470,000 soldiers. That war zone affected by pandemic infectious is fewer than the number fielded in the disease. And it is not hard to conjure up mid- to late 1990s. Under current plans, scenarios in which U.S. forces would be moreover, the army would decline responsible for helping restore order in further, to 450,000 by 2018, and some a chaotic environment marked by the 12 foreign affairs

America’s Awesome Military In fighting shape: a U.S. soldier in Laghman Province, Afghanistan, December 2014 LUCAS JACKSON / REUTERS key Pentagon officials have advocated Marine Corps, in preparing troops for a cuts to 400,000 or below. “three-block war,” in which U.S. forces might be providing relief in one part This reasoning—which was repeated in of a city, keeping the peace in a second, the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review— and fighting intensively against a deter­ is flawed. Washington might declare mined foe in a third. And it reflects its lack of interest in large-scale land awareness of what Raymond Odierno, operations and stabilization missions, former chief of staff of the army, has but history suggests that eventually it called the increasing “velocity of insta­ will find itself engaging in them never­ bility” in the world, with U.S. forces theless, driven by the pull of events and frequently participating simultaneously the logic of turbulent situations on in a broad range of contingency oper­ the ground. ations in several different theaters— everything from combat to deterrence The 2014 Army Operating Concept, to the provision of humanitarian aid. Win in a Complex World, wisely recognizes that the current and future army must be The George W. Bush administration ready to handle a wide range of possible took office averse to missions that smacked challenges. It accords with the notion of nation building, but eventually it came that the modern soldier must in effect to understand these realities. A Pentagon be a pentathlete, with skills across a directive issued in 2005 stated, “Stability wide range of domains that apply to operations are a core U.S. military many possible types of operations. The mission. . . . They shall be given priority document builds on earlier concepts, comparable to combat operations.” A such as the belief of General Charles decade on, that remains a sensible Krulak, former commandant of the September/October 2016 13

Michael O’Hanlon and David Petraeus approach, while recognizing the imper­ behavior continuing under its current ative of having host-nation forces and leader, Kim Jong Un. Pyongyang has coalition partners do as much as is now detonated four nuclear weapons absolutely possible to keep the United and apparently continues to expand States’ commitment in blood and its arsenal and its missile-delivery treasure to a minimum—and thus capabilities. China, meanwhile, has sustainable over what are likely to established itself as a near peer of the be generational struggles. United States by many economic and manufacturing measures, has the second- CONTINUE THE NAVY’S REBALANCE largest military budget in the world now, and could be spending half as During its first term, the Obama much as the United States on its armed administration put forward the notion forces within a few years, with much of rebalancing U.S. power and attention lower personnel costs and far fewer toward the Asia-Pacific, reflecting the regions on which to focus. Its stocks region’s increasing significance to U.S. of advanced combat aircraft, advanced interests. This sensible proposal met submarines, other naval vessels, and with broad bipartisan support and should ballistic and cruise missiles have grown be fleshed out and reinforced in coming enormously, and the majority of its years. To date, however, the Pentagon’s newer main platforms in these categories moves in this direction have been rela­ are gradually approaching parity with tively modest in scale, with a net shifting the United States. Factoring in everything of assets to the Asia-Pacific theater of from aircraft carriers to the latest planes no more than $10 billion to $15 billion and submarines, the U.S. military still has worth out of the approximately $600 a major lead over the People’s Liberation billion annual defense budget, by our Army, and the United States’ total stock estimates. If coupled with continued of modern military equipment is worth diplomatic efforts and economic measures perhaps ten times that of China’s. But the such as passage of the Trans-Pacific overwhelming superiority once enjoyed Partnership—not just a trade agreement by the United States is largely gone. but also a crucial signal of U.S. commit­ ment to the region in general—such The bulk of the U.S. military’s moves should suffice, at least for now. rebalance to the Pacific region involves But it will take a healthy, predictable the navy. In a 2012 speech, then Secre­ defense budget to fund even moves of tary of Defense Leon Panetta stated this scale, and anything less would that by 2020, Washington would focus fall well short of what the strategic 60 percent of its naval assets on the challenge requires. Pacific and only 40 percent on the Atlantic. But most of those ships will No “pivot” to the Pacific is needed be based in the United States, and or even truly possible given the United many could still deploy to the Persian States’ other interests and commitments. Gulf from their new home ports on Nevertheless, the case for reenergizing the Pacific coast. So the scale of the the nation’s emphasis on the Asia-Pacific rebalance is limited, and the changes in region is powerful. North Korea remains overseas basing arrangements associated a serious threat, with erratic and bellicose 14 f o r e i g n af fai r s

America’s Awesome Military with it are modest, as well. Only four As concerning as Beijing’s actions small littoral combat ships, for example, have been, its recent assertiveness amounts are currently planned to be based in more to moves in a long game of chess Singapore, along with perhaps two to than preparations for some imminent three more attack submarines based war of aggression. Washington should in Guam. thus respond, but do so calmly. The Obama administration’s general policy Other services are in on the act, too, of patient firmness is sound and should but even more modestly. The army has be continued by its successor, but the created a four-star subordinate command next administration should take care at Pacific Command, in Hawaii, to not to allow lags between rhetoric and strengthen its role in the region (although action, as was the case when the United it may not get the funds to continue it). States promised to demon­strate its The Marine Corps will rotate up to support for freedom of navigation in 2,500 marines at a time to Darwin, mid-2015 but then took months to Australia. New port and basing arrange­ deliver on it, sending mixed signals ments are being established with about its commitment. And if China Vietnam and the Philippines. In 2013, continues to reclaim and militarize then Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel islands in the South China Sea, the stated that 60 percent of many air force logical response by Washington should assets will also focus on the Asia-Pacific be not a direct use of force but the region, although their home airfields development of closer security ties with may not need to change much to make various states in the region, possibly that possible. And regional missile including new U.S. deployments or defenses are being buttressed somewhat, even bases. as well. COME LOADED FOR BEAR Yet the success of the rebalance will depend not just on how many U.S. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review forces are deployed to the region but was conducted before Russia’s invasion and also on how they are used. Wise recent seizure of Crimea, and like all previous actions in this regard include stepped- post–Cold War defense reviews, it did up freedom-of-navigation operations in not consider a contingency involving the the South China Sea, which challenge Russian Federation to be high on the list China’s right to stake out new holdings of priorities for force planning. That was near man-made islands and other land then. Now, some members of the U.S. features there, and the Obama adminis­ Joint Chiefs of Staff have described Russia tration’s public commitment to treat the as their top security concern. This makes group of islands known in China as the sense, because the combination of Russia’s Diaoyu and in Japan as the Senkaku as sheer firepower and President Vladimir being covered by the U.S.-Japanese Putin’s apparent ambitions make it a security treaty. (Washington takes no possible threat—indeed, a potentially position on the rightful owner of those existential one—that demands attention. islands, but since they are currently administered by Tokyo, it has agreed At the same time, however, perspective that they are covered by the treaty.) is needed. Putin is no friend of the West, September/October 2016 15

Michael O’Hanlon and David Petraeus nor of the smaller states near Russia Stationing a major nato force in the that represent challenges to his drive for Baltics, for example, not only is unnec­ regional hegemony. But his moves to date essary but also could provoke Putin as have been select and calibrated. Crimea easily as deter him, given his tempera­ was historically Russian, is populated by a ment and his desire to restore Russia’s majority of Russian speakers, and is home status. Firmness and prudence should be to Russia’s only Black Sea naval base. And the watchwords, and for that, a reinforced when Putin moved into Syria last fall, he tripwire is more appropriate than a did so only after having determined that robust forward defense posture. Current the Obama administration was keeping efforts, under the European Reassurance its own involvement limited. His inter­ Initiative and Operation Atlantic Resolve, vention there allowed him to shore up to maintain a nearly continuous U.S. an old ally, flex Russia’s long-range presence through exercises, position four power-projection muscles, retain Russia’s nato battalions in the Baltic states, and only port on the Mediterranean, and sustain modest stocks of equipment in demonstrate Russia’s geopolitical impor­ up to seven eastern nato countries make tance. These actions may have been sense. It also seems sensible to return a cynical and reprehensible, but they were U.S. heavy brigade to Europe, perhaps not completely reckless or random, nor to Germany, as is currently being consid­ were they particularly brutal by the ered. Greater participation by other standards of warfare. And they do not nato countries in the reassurance and likely portend a direct threat to more deterrence mission, with a sustained central nato interests. military presence in the eastern states of a magnitude comparable to that of The Obama administration has been the U.S. level, would also be useful, right to shore up its commitment to nato, demonstrating that alliance solidarity although it should go further and increase and security are truly collective efforts. its assistance to Ukraine, as well. Given It is heartening that nato decisions Moscow’s provocations of the Baltic states now codify such initiatives. in recent years and its frequent buzzing of nato military assets in the region, it Such moves in the military and makes sense to enhance deterrence of a diplomatic spheres will complement the Russian military threat to all nato ongoing impact of economic sanctions, member states. The dramatic downsizing which have played an important role of U.S. capabilities in Europe over the both in making Russia pay a price for last quarter century, to the point where its actions and in demonstrating alliance the United States now has only 30,000 cohesion. It is true that the drop in army troops and no heavy brigades on the energy prices has hurt Russia’s economy entire continent, was never intended to even more than the Western sanctions signal a lack of U.S. resolve in maintaining have, but the two pressures reinforce its ironclad support for the transatlantic each other and have driven Russia into alliance, and so there is no reason not to a recession for two straight years. Putin reverse some of those withdrawals. remains popular, having wrapped himself in the cloak of nationalism while sup­ At least for now, it should not take pressing domestic dissent, but he must much to reinforce U.S. commitments. 16 f o r e i g n af fai r s

America’s Awesome Military worry that his popularity will not endure could still happen, since the chief villain forever in the face of a protracted eco­ and cause of sequestration, the 2011 nomic downturn. In fact, the success Budget Control Act, remains the law of of sanctions in constraining Russia and the land). There are good reasons why the in helping drive Iran to the negotiating United States needs to spend as much as table indicates that comprehensive it does on defense: because it has such a strategies for dealing with regional broad range of global responsibilities, threats these days should involve the because asymmetric foreign capabilities Treasury Department and the Justice (such as Chinese precision-guided missiles Department just as much as the Defense and Russian advanced air defenses) can Department and the State Department. require large investments to counter convincingly, and, most important, because STEADY AS SHE GOES it should aim to deter conflicts rather than simply prevail in them. To be sure, many A national security strategy that main­ U.S. allies are wealthy enough to contrib­ tains international order, checks China ute substantially to their own defense and and Russia, and prepares properly for should certainly do more in that regard. handling future threats and possible But engaging in a game of chicken to try contingencies needs to be supported to persuade them to live up to their com­ by a defense budget of appropriate size mitments would be a dangerous mistake. and composition. That means not only holding off on any further cuts but also Having reached nearly five percent adopting a thoughtful, measured increase. of gdp in the later Bush and early It is also time to end the perennial threats Obama years, U.S. defense spending is of sequestration and shutdown and place now down to about three percent. That the Pentagon’s budget on a gentle upward is not an undue burden on the U.S. path in real terms. economy and is in fact a bargain given the peace, security, and international Those who worry about an American stability that it underwrites. There is military supposedly in decline should no need to return to significantly higher relax. The current U.S. defense budget levels, such as the four percent of gdp of just over $600 billion a year exceeds that some have proposed. But nor would the Cold War average of about $525 it be prudent to drop below three percent. billion (in 2016 dollars) and greatly That translates into perhaps $625 billion exceeds the pre-9/11 defense budget of to $650 billion a year in constant dollars some $400 billion. It is true that defense over the next few years for the overall spending from 2011 through 2020 has national defense budget, including war been cut by a cumulative total of about costs (assuming they remain at roughly $1 trillion (not counting reductions current amounts). That level is sensible in war-related costs). But there were and affordable, and what the next legitimate reasons for most of those president should work with Congress to reductions, and the cuts were made to a provide. With that sort of support, budget at a historically very high level. there is every reason to believe that the country’s fortunate military position can We disagree with those who counsel be sustained for many years to come.∂ further cuts, and we strongly resist a return to sequestration-level spending (as September/October 2016 17

Return to Table of Contents TOMORROW’S MILITARY Rethinking ment, with a different Congress,” and Nuclear Policy that the president “will continue to review these plans as he considers how Taking Stock of the to hand the baton off to his successor.” Stockpile In one sense, Rhodes was merely repeating the concern that Robert Work, Fred Kaplan the deputy secretary of defense, had expressed back in February—that the Four months into his presidency, nuclear plan’s price tag would force at a summit in Prague, Barack tradeoffs in an era of budget constraints Obama pledged to take “concrete and that if this meant cuts in conven­ steps toward a world without nuclear tional forces, then that would be “very, weapons.” Yet nearly eight years later, very, very problematic.” But other officials he presides over a program to modern­ have said that the review Rhodes men­ ize the entire U.S. nuclear arsenal at a tioned is propelled not only by budgetary cost of $35 billion a year through the dilemmas but by questions of strategy next decade and beyond. To those who and history, too. accuse him of hypocrisy, Obama has said that he always regarded a nuclear- Rhodes’ statement set off alarm bells free world as a long-term goal, unlikely in certain corridors of Congress. In a to be met in his lifetime, much less his June 16 letter, Senators John McCain and time in office—and that his moderniza­ Bob Corker, both Republicans, reminded tion program is designed not to build Obama that during the debate over the more or more deadly nuclear weapons New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty but rather to maintain and secure the (New start) in 2010, he had promised arsenal the United States has now. to modernize or replace all three legs of the nuclear triad—the land-based inter­ This claim is true, by and large, but continental ballistic missiles (icbms), it leaves open a bigger question: Does the submarine-launched ballistic missiles the United States need the arsenal it (slbms), and the long-range bombers— has now? Obama seems to be mulling in exchange for Senate ratification. this very question as his tenure winds They warned him not to backpedal on down. In a June 6 speech to the Arms this commitment. Control Association, his deputy national security adviser, Ben Rhodes, noted And so a quarter century after the that “the modernization plan was put end of the Cold War, the United States together in a different budget environ­ stands on the precipice of another nuclear debate. In the 1980s, nuclear weapons FRED KAPLAN is the “War Stories” columnist dominated discussions of national security for Slate and the author of Dark Territory: The affairs to a degree that speciali­sts under Secret History of Cyber War and The Wizards of the age of, say, 50 would find baffling. Armageddon. Follow him on Twitter @fmkaplan. The arsenals of both sides had grown to such staggering levels, and the chance of a real war between the two super­ powers had so diminished, that the nuclear arms race entered a realm of 18 f o r e i g n a f fai r s

Rethinking Nuclear Policy almost pure abstraction, in which such cities or population centers per se; they recondite (and substantively meaningless) were always aimed mainly at Soviet measures as “missile throw-weight military targets. Still, the warheads and ratios” became tokens of competition bombs were so enormous at the time— and conflict. many delivering an explosive punch of well over a megaton—that tens or hun­ Notwithstanding the tensions between dreds of millions of people would have the United States and Russia in the era been killed anyway, not to mention the of Vladimir Putin, this sort of contest millions more around the world who has long been abandoned. Tabulations would have died from radioactive fallout. of each side’s nuclear arsenal, which were once parsed with scholastic flair, are now The first coordinated U.S. nuclear hard to come by. No one serious would war plan, known as the siop (for Single dream of presenting such statistics as a Integrated Operational Plan), was drawn measure of the “balance of power,” how­ up at the Strategic Air Command (sac) ever that phrase might be defined. So it’s in Omaha, Nebraska, in 1960, just before an ideal time—before the renewed debate Kennedy was elected. It supplied a is taken over by baroque abstractionists— rationale for as many bombs and missiles to ask some basic questions. What as the military desired. Every remotely does the United States need nuclear valuable facility in the Soviet Union weapons for? And how many, of what (and in communist China and Eastern sort, are enough? Europe) was designated a target, and officers in sac’s Joint Strategic Target THE DETAILS OF DOOMSDAY Planning Staff decreed that several particularly valuable targets had to be Public discussion of these questions has destroyed with a 90 percent probability, always been disingenuous. President others with a 98 percent probability. John F. Kennedy’s defense secretary, Under these rules, several weapons Robert McNamara, devised a formula would have to be fired at those targets— for “finite deterrence,” a concept popu­ and thus the military would have to buy larized as “mutual assured destruction,” several times as many weapons as might or mad: if, after a Soviet first strike, seem reasonable at first glance. enough U.S. weapons survived to destroy the Soviet Union’s 200 largest cities in In 1961, just after the start of a retaliatory blow, then that would be Kennedy’s term, McNamara revised enough to deter the Russians from con­ the siop to give the president an option templating a first strike to begin with. to launch “limited” strikes, just against The damage done by any additional Soviet strategic military targets (icbms, weapons, McNamara argued, would be submarine pens, and bomber bases), so marginal as to be superfluous. In avoiding cities. Still, sac’s requirements fact, this formula was only the secretary’s remained enormous. And as the Soviets way of capping the military’s appetite. built up their nuclear arsenal through (The Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted 10,000 the 1960s, largely in response to the U.S. icbms; McNamara held them to 1,000.) buildup, the requirements grew propor­ Even in McNamara’s day, the U.S. tionately. McNamara’s 1,000-icbm limit missiles were never aimed at Soviet remained in place, so the U.S. military September/October 2016 19

Fred Kaplan developed missiles tipped with several again in the decade after. Some of warheads, each of which could be flung these cuts stemmed from nuclear arms at a separate target. These were known control accords beginning in the early as mirvs, for “multiple independently 1970s. But to a much larger extent, targetable reentry vehicles.” When Soviet they occurred because, starting under and American icbms were “mirved,” President George H. W. Bush and they became at once the most lethal continuing with President Bill Clinton, weapons and, because of that, the most civilian analysts in the Pentagon wrested vulnerable. The sheer existence of these control of the siop for the first time weapons created a new sort of instability: since McNamara’s revision in 1961. in a crisis, each side might have an incen­ tive to launch a first strike with its Taking a close look at sac’s beyond- icbms, if just to preempt the other side’s top-secret list of targets and how many launching a first strike with its icbms. weapons were aimed at each, the civilian analysts concluded that it was all wildly This situation, which theorists inflated: many facilities on the list dubbed “crisis instability,” spawned a didn’t need to be targets, and many of small library of nuclear-exchange sce­ the targets didn’t need to be hit with so narios, replete with deceptively precise many weapons. As a result, according to calculations. They all envisioned a U.S. Uncommon Cause, a new book by retired president and a Soviet premier firing General George Lee Butler, former sac hundreds or thousands of nuclear war­ commander, the nuclear requirements heads at each other’s country, killing were slashed from 10,000 weapons to tens or hundreds of millions of citizens, 5,888. (The civilians regarded even this all while maintaining the perspicacity to many as excessive, but political com­ lob missiles back and forth (assuming, promise prevailed.) The actual number absurdly, that surveillance satellites of weapons came down almost propor­ and data-processing computers would tionately and has continued to slide still function well enough to assess the since, although much less steeply. damage)—and that, through this curious chess match, one side or the other would The most recent (and fairly modest) achieve some sort of victory. In retrospect, reductions were the result of the New these books and articles (many of them start treaty. Obama hoped to reach a reviewed and published in journals such follow-on accord but never did, a failure as this one) seem bizarre, if not insane. that he has attributed to Putin’s return to the Russian presidency. Yet even if When the Cold War ended, so did Obama’s negotiating partner, the more this strange discourse. And so did the moderate Dmitry Medvedev, had re­ nuclear arms race. The U.S. nuclear mained Russia’s president, it’s doubtful stockpile, which had peaked in 1967 at the two could have concluded a New an astounding 31,255 weapons, had start II. Obama said at the time that a already been wound down to 19,008 by second treaty should impose cuts not 1991, mainly due to the dismantlement just on long-range missiles but also on of tactical nukes in Western Europe and short- and medium-range weapons. Yet South Korea. This number was cut by given the United States’ superiority in half over the next decade and by half conventional arms, no Russian leader 20 foreign affairs

Rethinking Nuclear Policy Balancing act: a ballistic missile on parade in Moscow, May 2014 MAXIM SHEMETOV / REUTERS would likely have gone down that path. the military has enough weapons to do When the Soviet Union and its Warsaw so. If the calculations indicate that Pact allies outgunned nato along the they need, say, 1,000 nuclear weapons, border between East and West Germany, it shouldn’t matter whether Russia or U.S. presidents saw nuclear weapons— some other hostile country has two, including missiles, tactical bombs, and three, or ten times as many. But that’s even nuclear artillery—as an offset to not how the question has ever played the military imbalance. Russian leaders out politically. similarly see nuclear weapons as offsets today. (The United States maintains SYSTEM UPGRADE just 184 nuclear bombs in Europe, kept in storage and capable of being loaded Today, the United States has 440 icbms, onto tactical fighter jets, but Russia is 288 slbms (on 14 submarines), and 113 estimated to have more than 2,000, many strategic bombers—loaded, all told, with of them deployed.) 2,070 nuclear bombs and war­heads, with another 2,508 held in storage as a hedge Once the nuclear talks hit a dead end, against a total breakd­ own in international should Obama have proceeded with relations and a resumption of a serious unilateral reductions? In the realm of arms race. Russia has 307 icbms, 176 slbms nuclear weapons, there is no need, after (on 11 submarines), and 70 bombers— all, to match an adversary missile for with an estimated total of 2,600 bombs missile, warhead for warhead, or kiloton and warheads and about 2,400 more in for kiloton. Presidents must determine storage. China has 143 icbms, 48 slbms what missions they want the nuclear (on four submarines), and three bombers arsenal to accomplish and ensure that, with the range to hit the western United even under pessimistic assumptions, States—with a total of roughly 180 bombs September/October 2016 21

Fred Kaplan and warheads. (These figures come from for 12 new nuclear-missile-carrying Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris, submarines, $55 billion for 100 new who have compiled the most complete— bombers, $30 billion for 1,000 new cruise and, sources tell me, most reliable— missiles, and $50 billion for faster, more unclassified tabulation of the world’s flexible, and more secure command-and- nuclear arsenals.) control systems—to say nothing of the roughly $80 billion over the next decade The Chinese have never played the to maintain the nuclear laboratories. nuclear arms race game; they follow a policy of “minimum deterrence,” holding The original reason for the nuclear just enough to keep two enemies at bay, triad was entirely bureaucratic. The Russia and the United States. (There army was building icbms, the navy was are, however, reports of a modest recent building submarines, and the air force was buildup, perhaps in response to U.S. building bombers. (Eventually, the air progress on a missile defense system.) force won the contract for icbms, leaving The Russians, on the other hand, are the army to field short- and medium- in the midst of an active modernization range nukes in Western Europe and program. They have retained 46 of their South Korea, as well as conduct R & D old mirved icbms and are developing a on antiballistic missiles to defend the replacement for two-thirds of those. continental United States. These army projects have since largely evaporated.) Compared with the Russians, the Yet as the arms race took off in the 1960s, Americans aren’t doing much beyond the triad took on a strategic rationale. replacing old missiles and bombers Icbms were the most powerful and with new ones—almost none of which accurate of the three legs, the ideal tool will have greater destructive power for promptly attacking blast-hardened than the old ones—and Washington Soviet missile silos. Slbms were much isn’t in a rush to do even that. The less powerful and less accurate, but they United States got rid of its mirved were the most secure, since they were icbms long ago, and a new model loaded onto submarines, which prowled (armed with just one warhead each), the oceans undetected. If deterrence called the Ground-Based Strategic was defined as the survivability of a Deterrent, is not expected to debut second-strike force, slbms were crucial. until 2028. A new submarine, the Bombers were slower, taking hours, not ssbn-x, won’t undergo sea trials until minutes, to reach their targets, but because 2031. A new aircraft called the Long- of that, their pilots could linger outside Range Strike Bomber is scheduled for Soviet borders awaiting instructions or the late 2020s, as is the Long-Range even be called back to base if a crisis Stand-Off weapon, an upgrade of the was resolved. current air-launched cruise missile. The case for land-based icbms today Even so, the U.S. modernization is extremely weak and has been since plan, if carried out in full, will be very 1990, when the U.S. Navy started expensive: according to the Congressional deploying Trident II missiles on subma­ Budget Office, it will cost about $60 rines. Unlike earlier slbms, the Trident II bil­lion for 642 new icbms (400 of which is accurate enough to destroy blast- will be deployed in silos), $100 billion 22 foreign affairs

hardened missile silos. In other words, SIPACOLUMBIA one of the icbm’s unique properties— its ability to hit blast­hardened targets At the world’s most global quickly—is no longer unique. Meanwhile, public policy school, its other unique property—its vulner­ ability to an adversary’s first strike—is all students earn a too enduring. Even by the esoteric logic of nuclear strategists, then, icbms make Master of International the United States less secure, with no Affairs or Master of compensating advantages. Public Administration During the Cold War, a case was degree that teaches core made for icbms on the grounds that the analytic skills and pair it with United States needed to keep up with one of six career-oriented whatever the Soviets were doing, if just concentration areas, as well as to demonstrate “resolve” and “credibil­ a specialization, such as ity.” A dubious notion at the time, it makes no sense whatever today. So what United Nations Studies, is the rationale for preserving, much less modernizing, land­based icbms? If to prepare to be the next they are inherently destabilizing, why generation of shouldn’t they be dismantled? world leaders to address The air force and some civilian strategists do have a new rationale. They critical issues. call it “the sponge theory.” Without land­based icbms to soak up Russian Discover the next step missiles, the logic goes, there would be in your career. only six strategic targets in the conti­ nental United States: the three bomber sipa.columbia.edu bases (in Louisiana, Missouri, and North Dakota), two submarine ports (in Bangor, 23 Washington, and Kings Bay, Georgia), and the National Command Authority (otherwise known as Washington, D.C.). The Russians could launch an attack on those six targets with just two mirved missiles, or possibly even one. An American president might not strike back, knowing that the Russians had thousands of warheads remaining and that, therefore, if the United States retaliated, Russia would retaliate further. (In the 1970s, some hawkish strategists outlined a similar scenario, which they called “deterring our deterrent.”) On

Fred Kaplan the other hand, if the United States new design. It has a longer range and maintained its 400 icbms, so the theory better accuracy, neither of which is goes, the Russians would have to fire at controversial, but it’s also built to carry least 400 warheads to destroy them. either a conventional or a nuclear war­ By any definition, this would constitute head, and that feature has raised concerns. a major attack, thus prompting certain, Former Defense Secretary William Perry massive retaliation—the prospect of has argued that if the Long-Range Stand- which would deter them from launching Off weapon were launched, the leader an attack in the first place. of the country being attacked would have no way of knowing which kind This is a strange theory. It assumes that of warhead the missile was carrying. a U.S. president would tolerate a nuclear Assuming the worst (as leaders tend attack that, despite its supposedly limited to do in wartime), he or she might scope, would kill hundreds of thousands, assume it was carrying a nuke and possibly millions, of civilians and not respond accordingly. strike back with any of the hundreds of missiles poised on invulnerable sub­ As for a new class of nuclear-missile- marines. But let’s posit that the theory carrying submarines, objections here are has some validity—that the military hard to muster. The current Ohio-class needs to have more than six targets on submarines are between 20 and 40 years U.S. soil to act as sponges to absorb a old. At some point, subs get too old to Russian nuclear attack. Even so, it’s a huge risk plunging them into the ocean for stretch to contend that the United States another voyage. Does the navy need 12 needs 400 icbms—400 sponges—for that new submarines? Would, as some suggest, purpose. How many would be needed? A eight to ten be enough? Any calculus has dozen? Two dozen? Almost certainly no to take into account that some subs have more than that. Nor would those missiles to be in the Pacific Ocean, some have to (again, assuming the theory makes a lick be in the Atlantic Ocean, and some have of sense) have to be up-to-date models. to be in port for refueling and repairs. In other words, a strong case can be made If one can safely assume that three are that the United States does not need a enough for each location, then nine should new land-based icbm at all. be fine. If that’s considered excessive, then eight would do; if that’s deemed too Does it need a new long-range risky, then ten would do. The rationale manned bomber that can penetrate for 12 is hard to parse. Russian air defenses? The case for this, too, is far from persuasive. With a range Finally, the program for more of 1,500 miles, air-launched cruise missiles rugged command-and-control systems can be fired from bombers loitering well is unassailable, given the growing vuln­ er­ outside the reach of Russian air defenses. ability of satellite communi­cations, Does this mean a new air-launched cruise either to a direct attack or to hacking. If missile is a good idea? It might be, except the United States is stuck with nuclear that the air force’s Long-Range Stand-Off weapons, the president should at least missile is not simply a replacement. This appear to have the ability to launch is the one new weapon in the U.S. them, or withhold them, preferably mod­ernization plan that is a completely in a controlled way. 24 f o r e i g n a f fa i r s

Rethinking Nuclear Policy THE NUKES WE NEED in others, a couple of hundred. If Obama is serious about reassessing the nuclear- The fact is that short of a transformation modernization plan, he should start by in world politics, which doesn’t seem reassessing the requirements of deter­ remotely in the offing, we are—all of rence. No civilian officials have scruti­ us—stuck with nuclear weapons. They nized the U.S. nuclear war plan—the list do serve a function: they tend to deter of targets and the number of weapons aggression, not just nuclear attacks but aimed at each one—since the review of a conventional invasions, as well. During quarter century ago, under Bush and a mid-1960s border dispute, the Kremlin Clinton. Given that the U.S. and Russian considered invading a patch of China stockpiles have shrunk since then, the but held back because China had a requirements could certainly be reduced handful of nuclear weapons. Israelis with no change in the underlying logic, fear an Iranian bomb not so much and they could probably be slashed if because they think the supreme leader the logic were questioned, as well. might suddenly launch nuclear missiles at Tel Aviv (Israel is estimated to have It’s long past time for the government roughly 200 nuclear weapons and could to conduct a zero-based budget review easily incine­ rate Tehran in response) of the siop—scouring the war plan clean, but because a pocketful of nukes could as if there were no nuclear weapons at all, provide cover to other forms of Iranian then building it up from scratch, based aggression. on a rational assessment of how many are needed, to do what. The reason this hasn’t A possible parallel: if Israel hadn’t happened already is simple: the military, destroyed Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor powerful factions of which are wedded to in 1981, and if Saddam Hussein had gone nuclear weapons, and Congress, powerful on to build a few atomic or hydrogen members of which have nuclear manu­ bombs, it’s hard to imagine so many facturers or labs in their districts, won’t Western and Arab nations joining the allow it. Every time a president has signed coalition to oust the Iraqi army from a nuclear arms control treaty, the Senate Kuwait a decade later. The United States has demanded an increase in spending— might have offered to extend its nuclear or, at times, the approval of new, more umbrella to the coalition partners, lethal nuclear weapons—in exchange for pledging to retaliate against an Iraqi its ratification. It’s unlikely that the mil­itary nuclear attack, but the Arab countries, or Congress would tolerate unilateral in particular, might not have trusted it. reductions, however sensible they may be. In the 1960s, British and French leaders, questioning the credibility of nato, Even if the politics were more asked whether the United States would amenable, Obama probably couldn’t, in risk New York to protect London or the time he has left, so much as set the Paris; Egyptian and Saudi rulers would stage for such a calculation. But it would rightly have doubted whether it would be a worthy task for his successor—and do the same for Cairo or Riyadh. for other world leaders, too.∂ But as these scenarios illustrate, deterrence doesn’t require a lot of nuclear weapons: in some cases, a mere handful; September/October 2016 25

Return to Table of Contents TOMORROW’S MILITARY Preserving Primacy sanctions, but these have done little to deter Putin. A Defense Strategy for the New Administration Nor has the administration’s “pivot” to Asia, now five years on, been matched Mac Thornberry and Andrew F. by effective action. China continues to Krepinevich, Jr. ramp up its military spending, investing heavily in weapons systems designed to The next U.S. president will threaten U.S. forces in the western Pacific. inherit a security environment As a result, it is proving increasi­ngly in which the United States con­ willing and able to advance its expansive fronts mounting threats with increasingly territorial claims in the East China and constrained resources, diminished stature, South China Seas. Not content to resolve and growing uncertainty both at home its disputes through diplomacy, Beijing and abroad over its willingness to protect has militarized them, building bases on its friends and its interests. Revisionist natural and artificially created islands. powers in Europe, the western Pacific, The United States has failed to respond and the Persian Gulf—three regions vigorously to these provocations, causing long considered by both Democratic allies to question its willingness to meet and Republican administrations to be its long-standing security commitments. vital to U.S. national security—are seeking to overturn the rules-based The lack of U.S. leadership is also international order. In Europe, Russian fueling instability in the Middle East. In President Vladimir Putin has seized Iraq, the Obama administration forfeited Crimea, waged proxy warfare in eastern hard-won gains by withdrawing all U.S. Ukraine, and threatened nato allies on forces, creating a security vacuum that Russia’s periphery. Further demonstrating enabled the rise of both Iranian influence its newfound assertiveness, Russia has and the Islamic State, or isis. Adding to dispatched forces to Syria and strength­ its strategic missteps, the administration ened its nuclear arsenal. After a failed fundamentally misread the character of attempt to “reset” relations with Moscow, the Arab Spring, failing to appreciate that U.S. President Barack Obama has issued the uprisings would provide opportunities stern warnings and imposed economic for radical Islamist elements rather than lead to a new democratic order. The MAC THORNBERRY is a Republican Con- administration also failed to learn from the gressman from Texas and Chair of the House previous administration’s experience in Armed Services Committee. Iraq when it chose to “lead from behind” in Libya, intervening to over­throw ANDREW F. KREPINEVICH, JR., is President Muammar al-Qaddafi, only to declare of Solarium and a Distinguished Senior Fellow victory and abandon the country to at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary internal disorder. It then drew a “redline” Assessments. over President Bashar al-Assad’s use of chemical weapons in Syria but failed to act to enforce it. The result is growing instability in the Middle East and a decline in U.S. influence. 26 foreign affairs

Preserving Primacy The threat of Islamist terrorism has from establishing dominance over a grown on the Obama administration’s key region—Europe, the western watch. Al Qaeda and isis, both Sunni Pacific, or the Persian Gulf—where it groups, have gained new footholds in could accumulate sufficient power to Iraq, Libya, Syria, Yemen, and even West threaten core U.S. interests. Thus, in Africa. Obama’s negotiations with Iran, the first half of the twentieth century, the home of radical Shiite Islamism, have the United States waged war twice in not curbed the country’s involvement Europe to defeat Germany and once in proxy wars in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen in the Pacific to defeat Japan. During or its support for Hezbollah in Lebanon the Cold War, it worked with allies to and Hamas in the Palestinian territories. prevent the Soviet Union from domi­ What the talks did produce—the nuclear nating Western Europe or expanding its deal—may slow Tehran’s march to ob­ influence into the Middle East and East taining a nuclear weapon, but it also gives Asia. This goal remains valid today. the regime access to tens of billions of dollars in formerly frozen assets. The In order to preserve access to its ink on the agreement was barely dry allies and trading partners, the United when, in March, Tehran tested ballistic States also needs access to the global missiles capable of delivering a nuclear commons. For over 70 years, the U.S. warhead, in blatant defiance of a un military has borne the responsibility Security Council resolution. Adding to for guaranteeing access to the seas and all this instability, military competition the air, not only for the United States but has expanded into the relatively new for other countries, too. It has accom­ domains of outer space and cyberspace— plished this task so well that many take and will eventually extend to undersea it for granted. Yet preserving access to economic infrastructure, as well. the global commons is neither cheap nor easy. Should the United States decline With the current approach failing, the to play this role, there is no other like- next president will need to formulate a minded power that could take its place. new defense strategy. It should include three basic elements: a clear statement of These two tasks have been made all what the United States seeks to achieve, the more challenging by the revisionist an understanding of the resources powers’ growing “anti-access/area-denial” available for those goals, and guidance (A2/AD) capabilities, such as long-range as to how those resources will be used. precision-strike weaponry, antisatellite The strategy laid out here, if properly systems, and various cyberweapons. All implemented, will allow the United States are designed to attack the U.S. military’s to preclude the rise of a hegemonic power muscle (its forward air bases and aircraft along the Eurasian periphery and preserve carriers) and its nervous system (its sur­ access to the global commons—without veillance, reconnaissance, targeting, and bankrupting the country in the process. communications systems). ENDS AND MEANS What resources are available for accomplishing these two goals? Although The chief goal of U.S. foreign policy the United States is no longer as dom­ has long been to prevent a hostile state inant as it was at the end of the Cold War, relative to the revisionist powers, September/October 2016 27

Mac Thornberry and Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. the country enjoys an enviable position. budgets—especially in comparison to It possesses extensive natural resources, the invest­ments that the revisionist an efficient free-enterprise system, and powers are making—puts the United the healthiest demographic profile of States and its allies at ever-greater risk. any major power. The United States has As former Secretary of Defense Robert a proven ability to assimilate immigrants, Gates said in 2014, cutting U.S. defense and its educational system, although funding “sends a signal that we are badly in need of reform, still ranks among not interested in protecting our global the world’s finest. Thanks to its insular interests.” But Washington needs to do geographic position and peaceful neigh­ more than simply spend more money on bors, it can mount a defense of the home­ defense. It needs a strategy that allocates land far from its shores. Its long list these dollars more efficiently and in ways of allies includes most of the world’s that create a more effective military. biggest economies. And it boasts the world’s best military, in terms of quality CHARTING A COURSE of people and equipment, as well as in terms of experience conducting a wide Resources are always limited, so strategy range of operations. is about making choices. In doing so, policymakers must consider not only the Yet even as the challenges to U.S. immediacy of a threat but also its scale, security grow, Washington continues to form, and trajectory. Radical Islamism cut its military spending. Between 2010 represents the most immediate threat and 2016, the U.S. defense budget fell the United States faces, but China and by over 14 percent in real terms, and by Russia have far greater potential to roughly 30 percent as a percentage of threaten U.S. security. China, a rapidly gdp, and it will likely fall further over rising power, has built the most capable the next decade, as interest payments conventional forces besides those of on U.S. government debt rise. The the United States, and Russia, although United States’ most capable allies are showing clear signs of decline, still main­ contributing even less. Of the richest tains the world’s largest nuclear arsenal. powers within nato, only the United The threat from Iran, meanwhile, mainly Kingdom budgets more than the alli­ entails the risk that its progress toward ance’s minimum target of two percent achieving a nuclear capability will trigger of gdp. In Asia, Japan remains con­ a cascade of proliferation in the Middle strained by its self-imposed ceiling of East. Since the aim should be to minimize one percent. the overall risk to its security over time, the United States should focus principally This is not to say that the United on preparing for the threats from China States should simply peg its defense and Russia and secondarily on checking spending to a particular percentage of Iranian expansionism and supporting gdp. The level should depend on many like-minded partners in suppressing factors, including the types of threats radical Islamist groups. faced, the amount of risk the American people are willing to accept, the con­ To meet these challenges, given that tributions made by allies, and more. resources are limited, the U.S. military Nevert­heless, the decline in military will have to adopt a “one-and-a-half- 28 foreign affairs

Preserving Primacy Access denied: during a Chinese naval exercise, April 2009 GUANG NIU / REUTERS war posture”—giving it the ability to and perhaps Vietnam, the door is in­ at once deter or wage a major war with creas­ingly open to greater U.S. military China and send expeditionary forces to pre­sence and assistance, but it will not either Europe or the Middle East. In remain open indefinitely. Nor will the the western Pacific, this means pursuing United States be able to establish a a strategy of “forward defense” of the forward defense posture quickly. So the first island chain, which runs from Japan next administration should begin the through Taiwan and along the Philippines, process without delay. three countries with which the United States has firm security commitments. The immediate problem posed by What it should not do is pursue a strategy Russia is its use of proxy forces beyond centered on a distant blockade of China its borders. Given the character of or one that relies on mobilization to retake this threat, Washington should deploy lost territory, as the United States did more ground and air forces to front­ in World War II. This would be tanta­ line count­ries in eastern Europe. Their mount to exposing allies and partners mission would be to help those states to aggression or coercion and would be deter and, if need be, suppress the seen as such. Instead, by positioning Kremlin’s attempts to employ local sufficient forces forward, including ground Russian nationals as proxies. The United forces in Japan and the Philippines, the States should encourage its major nato United States could, along with its allies, allies to make similar contributions. offset China’s military buildup and pre­ And to further deter Russian adven­ serve the peace. In Japan, the Philippines, turism, it should preposition weapons, munitions, and supplies in the region September/October 2016 29

Mac Thornberry and Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. to facilitate the rapid reinforcement of government. It should tighten the allied forces. sanctions and remove them only after Pyongyang takes verifiable and irre­ In the Middle East, the United States versible actions to reduce its nuclear has oscillated from too much involve­ capability as part of a plan to eliminate ment to too little, while announcing the arsenal entirely. unrealistic objectives, such as destroy­ ing isis and defeating Iranian proxies. GAINING THE UPPER HAND Washington cannot expunge these corrupt forms of Islam; only the local A core element of any defense strategy populations can do that. It can and involves gaining military advantages in should, however, support those states certain areas to offset losses in other and groups that seek to do so, and with areas. For example, the near monopoly far more vigor than it has to date. Given that the United States has enjoyed in the greater challenges posed by China precision warfare is coming to an end as and Russia, the emphasis should be on its rivals acquire new A2/AD capabilities. quality over quantity. This means relying For over 70 years, the U.S. approach to more on Special Forces and military projecting power has centered on build­ advisers to assist local governments ing up ground and air forces at forward and groups, supported by airpower and bases and positioning its fleet close to cyber-operations. As in eastern Europe, the enemy’s shores. But with ever-greater it also means adopting an expeditionary numbers of missiles and aircraft armed military posture that emphasizes the with precision-guided munitions, China ability to send in reinforcements rapidly and other rivals are increasingly able to in the event of overt aggression, in this target U.S. forces at greater distances. case by Iran. The United States is also losing its North Korea, with its radical regime, edge in a number of key military tech­ weakening economy, and growing nuclear nologies. Artificial intelligence, big data, arsenal, poses a unique challenge. For directed energy, genetic engineering, years, the United States agreed to give and robotics all have military applica­ economic aid to the country to prevent tions, yet their development is being it from becoming a nuclear power. After driven primarily by the commercial Pyongyang crossed that threshold in sector. So they are available to anyone 2006, Washington pursued still more with the means to obtain them, includ­ agreements in a vain effort to limit the ing U.S. rivals. regime’s nuclear arsenal, which continues to expand. Fortunately, there are indi­ To sustain its advantage in key areas of cations that the Obama administration competition, the U.S. military will have is beginning to supplant this failed to develop new operational concepts— strategy with one emphasizing tougher the methods by which it organizes, equips, economic sanctions, and both Japan and and employs forces for deterring an South Korea are improving their missile enemy or prevailing against one should defenses. The next administration should deterrence fail. Above all, this means not abandon these efforts in exchange ensuring that the military is focused on for promises from the North Korean the right set of challenges, such as the A2/AD threats in those regions where 30 foreign affairs

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS Palestinians in Syria Centrifugal Empire Nakba Memories of Shattered Communities Central–Local Relations in China ANAHEED AL-HARDAN JAE HO CHUNG “An original exploration of the evolution “Chung gives a novel answer to the of memories of the traumatic events of oldest problem in Chinese governance: the Nakba which a ected the entire how does Beijing—or the center— Arab population of Palestine in 1948 . . . control local administrations? He [the book] takes on added importance draws a key conclusion: the center’s in light of the violent displacement of ability to shape local outcomes has most of this community during the actually increased over time, in spite of bitter fighting in and around Yarmouk marketization and new local interests. camp near Damascus.” Instead of weakening the regime, local —Rashid Khalidi, author of Palestinian governance has become an asset to Identity: The Construction of Modern ensure its resilience.” National Consciousness —François Godement, director of the Asia and China Programme and senior The Taliban’s Virtual Emirate policy fellow, European Council on Foreign Relations e Culture and Psychology of an Online Militant Community Pakistan at the Crossroads NEIL KRISHAN AGGARWAL Domestic Dynamics and External Pressures “Nothing less than astonishing — EDITED BY CHRISTOPHE JAFFRELOT The Taliban’s Virtual Emirate is a blueprint for how to do cultural analysis “Pakistan at the Crossroads provides a of terrorist/insurgent activity online. diverse collection of articles from a vast The depth of what’s on o er here should array of reputable scholars who have a only spur more academics to figure out deep understanding of and knowledge how they too can do work like this.” about Pakistan. The contributors —John G. Horgan, author of imaginatively and incisively venture The Psychology of Terrorism to explain the disabilities, constraints, and missed opportunities of Pakistani A History of the Iraq Crisis civil and military regimes that could reinvigorate deliberation and France, the United States, and Iraq, 1991-2003 dialogue. This multiplicity of views and interpretations and the multidisciplinary FRÉDÉRIC BOZO content and analysis is the real strength Translated by Susan Emanuel of this multiauthored work.” —Saeed Shafqat, president, Population “This book should be required reading Association of Pakistan for every serious observer of the Syria crisis. It is not about Syria, but about another country with a dictator who dominated international diplomacy for years and was the target of two western military interventions, one successful, the other disastrous: Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.” —Sylvie Kau mann, Le Monde CUP.COLUMBIA.EDU · CUPBLOG.ORG

Preserving Primacy the United States has vital interests. The to get new equipment from the drawing effort should entail experimenting with board into the hands of its men and different types of forces and equipment, women in uniform—more than a decade, since history shows that experimentation in many cases. In large part, that’s because lies at the heart of every great military the Pentagon often seeks to push new innovation. In the period between the systems’ performance characteristics to world wars, for example, the German an extreme. Projects incur cost overruns army experimented with exploiting rapid when their overseers attempt to incor­ advances in commercial technologies— porate new technologies before they are mechanization, aviation, and radio—thus mature, wasting both time and money laying the foundation for the blitzkrieg while troops make do with old equipment. form of warfare; the U.S. Navy exper­ Compounding the problem, Uncle Sam imented with similar technologies to too often spends, relatively speaking, make the leap from a fleet centered on thousands of dollars ensuring that it battleships to one organized around the doesn’t get cheated out of nickels and aircraft carrier. In addition to encouraging dimes. It’s past time to reform that system innovative thinking, experimentation by setting more realistic requirements and helps ensure that new weapons systems speeding new equipment into the field. are sufficiently mature before large-scale production begins, reducing the odds Preserving access to the global that a program will have to be canceled. commons remains among the United States’ most important goals. Its military History also shows that a military strategy must take this into account. A will have to accept regular failures in little more than a century ago, “the global order to make major breakthroughs. If commons” generally referred to the every experiment is a success, then no high seas. Over the ensuing decades, one is learning much. The German army technological advances expanded the suffered many failures along its path to definition to include the air and space the blitzkrieg, as did the U.S. Navy as it and, eventually, cyberspace and undersea created the aircraft carrier force. Above energy and telecommunications infra­ all, past experience shows that because structure. Once the Cold War ended, preparing for new problems frequently the United States’ access to the commons requires making major changes, there was taken as a given. The U.S. military is often firm resistance to such efforts. controlled the seas and the air, and it Strong civilian and military leadership viewed the other, more novel domains is needed to overcome it. as benign. Not only must the U.S. military This is no longer the case. Revisionist identify the right operational concepts states are increasingly challenging U.S. to exploit emerging technologies; it access to the commons. Both China must also field the forces needed to and Russia are perfecting antisatellite execute them more quickly than rivals. weapons. As lasers grow more powerful, The faster it generates new capabilities, more states will be able to blind or even the less it needs to spend on standing destroy satellites. Cyberspace has emerged forces. Currently, however, the United as a place for economic warfare, espionage, States takes far longer than its adversaries crime, and terrorism. It is only a matter September/October 2016 31

Mac Thornberry and Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. of time before undersea infrastructure Chinese have opposed similar plans in becomes a target. States and nonstate South Korea designed to guard against actors can obtain unmanned underwater a North Korean attack. Concerns that vehicles that can reach the seabed. As is cyberweapons could be used to disable the case with cyberattacks, it may prove early warning and command-and-control difficult to identify the source of attacks systems complicate matters even further. on the United States’ assets in space or on the seabed, which means that a strategy Despite these profound changes, the based on deterrence is unlikely to work. Obama administration has remained Instead, the U.S. military will have to firmly rooted in the Cold War paradigm shift to a strategy based on defending of arms control, focusing on U.S. and its assets, limiting damage to them, and Russian nuclear arsenals while envision­ repairing or regenerating them rapidly. ing a world without nuclear weapons. The United States’ principal rivals, by A NEW NUCLEAR AGE contrast, are already operating in the new nuclear age. The Russians have adopted The United States’ nuclear forces remain an “escalate to de-escalate” doctrine, the foundation on which its security rests. which calls for the use of nuclear weapons But the context in which these forces to offset Russia’s inferiority in conven­ function has changed dramatically. The tional forces, and have tested weapons world has entered a second nuclear age, that likely violate the 1987 Intermediate- having shifted from a bipolar U.S.-Soviet Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. China competition to increasingly multipolar shares Russia’s concerns about the United regional and global competitions. These States’ precision-strike capabilities and competitions are also becoming multi­ missile defenses and has refused to dimensional. Although nuclear weapons provide anything but the most modest retain pride of place, other capabilities— details about its own nuclear capabilities such as precision-guided munitions and and intentions, even as it modernizes its cyberweapons, as well as advanced air nuclear forces and expands its arsenal and missile defenses—have entered the of precision-guided munitions and discussion of strategic warfare. What cyberweapons. used to be called “the nuclear balance” might now more accurately be described It is time to move beyond Cold as “the strategic balance.” War–era thinking and assess the compe­ tition not by merely counting weapons China and Russia, for example, have but by looking at it through the lens of expressed concerns about the United the second nuclear age. A key initial States’ nascent “prompt global strike” step toward adapting the U.S. nuclear capability, which would allow the U.S. arsenal involves developing detailed military to hit a target anywhere in the plans to address various plausible crisis world within one hour. They have also scenarios—ones involving the United complained about U.S. air and missile States, China, and Russia; the possible defenses: the Russians have protested use of nuclear weapons by minor powers U.S. plans to place missile defenses in such as North Korea; or a conflict between eastern Europe to deal with attacks two nuclear-armed states, such as India launched from the Middle East, and the and Pakistan. In the meantime, the 32 f o r e i g n a f fa i r s

United States must maintain a robust #1 in nuclear posture—the ultimate guarantor International of its security. U.S. warheads, delivery Relations methods, and command­and­control systems have been neglected to the point International where they will soon become obsolete all Security at once. The United States can afford to modernize its nuclear deterrent, which Setting the agenda for would cost only around five percent of scholarship on international the total defense budget. But it needs security affairs for forty years. to begin this effort now to ensure that it has a nuclear deterrent that can address Yours for 40% off. future challenges—not one designed for Subscribe now. a bygone age. bit.ly/ISEC16 MIND THE GAP Ranking reported by the 2015 Thomson Reuters Journal Citation Reports Even the best strategy will fail if it is not properly resourced, and the strategy outlined here requires significantly greater resources than what the Pentagon is currently projecting will be made available. Fortunately, there is bipartisan support for restoring funding for defense to levels called for by the budget Gates proposed as secretary of defense for fiscal year 2012. Doing so would go a long way toward closing the gap between the United States’ security needs and its ability to meet them at a reasonable level of risk. Yet the rapid growth in entitlements and projected increases in federal deficits will likely impose political constraints on defense spending. The Obama admin­ istration’s policies have produced an anemic economic recovery while burden­ ing future generations with ever­greater debt, thus accelerating the erosion of the United States’ position. The next pres­ ident must make restoring the country’s economic foundation a priority. The long­term solution lies in stimulating economic growth, making tough choices on entitlements, and revising the outdated IS-FA-skinny bw july16.indd 1 337/15/2016 12:55:19 PM

Mac Thornberry and Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. tax code. Success on this front is far from much of the uncertainty that plagues assured, and even if progress is made, it defense planning. For too long, U.S. will not reverse the country’s economic military planners have lacked explicit fortunes overnight. directions, resulting in the poor allo­ cation of resources. As the saying goes, There are other ways to reduce the “If you don’t know where you’re going, gap between ends and means, but they any road will take you there.” will take foresight and political courage. One approach involves relying more A clear strategy can realign forces in on the United States’ economic power. ways that not only conserve resources Sanctions exerted substantial pressure but also reduce the overall risk to security. on Iran and North Korea, yet the last For example, South Korea has twice the three administrations abandoned them population of the North and over ten in exchange for promises that proved times its gdp. Over time, it should be illusory. The United States’ economic possible for Seoul to assume a greater might is a poorly developed source of share of the U.S.–South Korean alliance’s power that, properly employed, can ground force requirements, freeing up impose substantial costs on rivals, even some U.S. ground forces for other to the point of compelling them to divert prio­ rity missions. Similarly, developing resources from their military efforts. new operational concepts—for example, one that enables an effective forward Washington should also draw more defense of the first island chain—would on U.S. allies’ military potential. Too further refine the military’s under­ often, the Obama administration has standing of which forces and capabilities treated allies as impediments to its efforts would be most useful and which could to accommodate U.S. adversaries, despite be cut at little risk. The result would the lack of evidence that they will some­ be the more efficient use of resources how abandon their hostile aims. Working and a more effective military. with like-minded governments to craft well-designed regional strategies would The ability to field new capabilities help restore allies’ confidence in the quickly should also cut costs for the United States as a capable and reliable United States, in part by reducing the partner. Better relationships would prove practice of relying on immature tech­ especially valuable in the western Pacific, nologies, which leads to cost overruns where prospective partners must decide and production delays. If policymakers whether to accommodate themselves set realistic requirements during the to an increasingly demanding China or acquisition process, the military could work with the United States. field equipment more rapidly and effic­ iently. What’s more, such a move Just as important, Washington needs would impose costs on rivals, since the to clearly articulate its strategy, so that uncertainty created by a fast timeline allies know which military capabilities would force them to prepare for a wider will be contributing to common objec­ range of possible U.S. military capabili­ tives. A clear strategy should also help ties: they would need to either spread reduce the gap between ends and means their resources more thinly, reducing by giving the military precise instructions the threat they posed, or increase their about national priorities, removing 34 f o r e i g n a f fa i r s