Rise of the Maratha Power

9 2 R i se of tlze M ar a’tlzd P owe r seizure o f Kalyz’m roused the authorities at Bijapur and they brought pressure to bear , upon S hivaji through his father. Shah aji was recalled from his jak dg i r in t he K ar nétik and treacherously seized and thrown, into p r i s o n Th is d gan er to his father s’ life . compelled Shivaji to abstain from further aggressions. He how ever, turned t he tables by offering his services to the M oghul Emperor Sh ahajahan, and t he protection o f the Emperor was found effective enough to secure ' Shahaji’s release from imprisonment. I n t he offer of serv ice which Shi vaji made to the Delhi Emperor on this o cc as i o n we , tio de i efind men n ma fo r t he first t m o f t he o sfam u Choai b and clai m s . isS hahajahén said to have promised co usi d erations o f these claims when ShlV aJI would visit Delhi to press them in p e rs o n an event which did no t happen i n , ti eS hahéjahén’s These events happened m . i n 1 6 52 , with which year t he first period may be isa d to vha e closed. S h ah jé i ’ release in 1 657 removed the s restraint which had kept Shivéji compara t i vely inactive during the past few years. The Buapur authorities also had patched up a peace wi th the M oghul commanders, and were thus free to turn their forces

T/ze tr ee blossoms. 93 g sa ain t ShiV éjl. The leading feature of this second period the i hwas co nflict w t t he Bijapur o rp This conflict brought Shiva we . ji i n contact with the more powerful r tM a a h a ja hdg r r d d r s in the Bij apur service . These rwe e udhot he Gho rpadés o f M l t he , v ts W diM o ré s o f Javli , t he S a an of a the D alv i s o f So uth Konkan, t he Manes of M hasw ad , t he Surv és and t he S hi rk és o f the ltShri ngar pur, N i mbalk ars o f F a an, and t he Gh é d g ’ s of M alaw di . Shivaji ’s e object during these years appears to h va e been to unite these chiefs, whose jahdg i r s lay to t he south of the Nira and north o f t he K ri s h na as he had uni te d those , who lived i n his neighbourhood, under his leadership. His offers were, however, de or the ostcli ned, and Chandrar ao Mé m , powerful o f them, allowed his jalzcig ' s to zr be used ' a protection to a party sent as from Bijapur under a Brahman S ar d é r Baj i Shamaraj, with the intention o f surprising Shiv aji and assassinating him The plot . was discovered, and the Bij apur tagen s were in their turn surprised by Shivaji . This active hostility o f Chandrarao M ore could not be safely put up with any longe r, and Shivaji ’s agents, Ragho Ballal and Sambbaji Kéwji, resolved on their own account to punish t he M ores . The

9 1 R i se of tire fil ar d flzd P ower . vengeance was swift and sure, but t he deed was none the less t o be censured, seeing that it was open and avowed treachery in return for what had only been a suspected connivance at treachery. The Maratha chroniclers themselves attempt no defence o f the murder of Chandrarao, and the only extenuating feature of the incident is that S h i jvai ’ agents planned and carried it out s o n their own responsibility, though after wards Shivaji accepted the results without much misgiving. The conquest of J avli O pened up the way to the subjugation o f the country south o f Pratapgad, down to the limits h lo f aa also Southern Pan , as t he Ko k i cludi gn an, jn n the ak dg ’ of the zr s Savants o f Wadi , who made their submis s i o n The theD alvis and Surv és who held . j a/zdg ir s in those parts were also reduced to s ub m i s s i o n The S i d d i ’ territory w as . s also attacked, but without any decided result. These successes brought matters to a crisis, and the Bijapur authorities resolved t o make a supreme eftort . They had found out that Shivéji was no t amenable t o his father’s control, and that any pres sure put upon him through his father only d rove him to seek the support o f the



9 6 R i se of tire AI a r d t/zd P ower . iyas c h , but before Shivéji adopted his final pl san , he invoked the guidance of his goddess Bhawani. He asked his Clu' t m’ to s note down in writing the words which t he goddess might put into his o wn mouth , while he was under the i nfluence o f divine p o s s e s s i o n The words were noted down as . they were uttered in unconscious excitement . Encouraged by the promise of protection thus assured, and by the blessing of his mother, and the devotion of his army , Shivaji resolved to meet his great antagonist on a spot carefully chosen by himself . While all this care and caution were being bestowed on the part o f S hivaji , A fz ulk han , proud in the possession of th e large army th at he was l e ad i gn and certain that S hi v éji , w ould no t stand up against him in t he field, was intent upon one subject only, namely, to bring o ut Shivéji from the shelter of his forts, and if possible, to capture , him and take him i n triumph to Bijapur, and thus avoid all the perils of a long c ampai g n While S h i jvéi ’ army occupied . s t he valleys of t he Krishna and Koyana, and the thick jungles concealed them from t he enemies' view, A fz ulk han’s army spread from W ai to M ahabalesh rwa , exposed to fl unk attacks on both sides A pparently .

Tlze tree blossoms 97 each was anxious to surprise and capture the other s’ p e rs on fo r both knew that in , eastern warfare the fall of the General leading the army t oo often determined or greatly influenced the result o f the fight . A fz ulk h én was approached by S h i jvai ’ s emissaries who represented to hi m that Shi vaji was ready t o make his su bm i s s i on , and thereupon A fz ulk han sent his own Brahman Pandit to obtain correct inform at i o n This man was gained over by an . appeal to his religious and p ta riotic senti ments. It was then arranged that both should meet one another for personal ex planations unattended by their forces. W hat happened at the interview has been various ly described. The M ahomedan historians, whom Grant D fi’ follows, charge S hi vaji u W ith treachery in the first attack he made with the lfata d lza-nak lza (tiger-claws) and the Bhaw ani sword ; while the Maratha chroniclers, both Sabhasada and Chitnis, state that the stalwart Khan first seized Shi vap ’s neck by the left hand and, drawing him towards h i ms el f caught him , under his left ar m and it was no t till the , Kh san’ treachery was thus manifested that Shivéji dealt the fatal blow. I n those times the practice of treachery on such occasions was a very common occurre cn e,

f9 8 R i se o tile M ar dtfid P ower . and it may be presumed that both A fz ul khan and Shivéji were prepared for such a risk Shiv éji had on his side strong . motives ; he h ad his brother s’ thdea and the desecration of the Tulj apur and Pandharpur temples to avenge . He knew he was then unequal to face th e enemy in the Open field. The success o f all that he had achieved and pl eann d during the past twelve years depended on the result. He had therefore stronger motives t o effect his purpose by stratagem than his e yen m The . personal character o f the two men must also be considered. The one w as apparently vain and reckless, while the other was supremely sel pf- ossessed and never beside his guard. The arrangements that Shivéji had made for a surprise of the M ahomedan army as soon as A fz ulk hén was disposed o f and the perfect confusion which follow , cd the attack dma e by the Marathas, also showed that while Shivéji was prepared t o follow up the result of the personal inter view A fz ulk hén’s people were wholly un , prepared to resist such an attack. These considerations certainly lend support to the view to which M r. Grant Duff has given the weight of his tau hority. cThe fa t may well b e that rwhe e both parties are mutually suspicious of each other, each



1 00 R i se of [be M ardtlzd P ower . né A fourth expedition was led by the . Bij apur king in person in but1 66 1 -1 6 6 2 , no important advantage was gained, and the war linge dre on for a year and more. It was about this time that jShivz’ni first organiz ed his fleet , and made himself mas ter of all the Konkan ortssea-f , except that of J anj i r a I n 1 6 6 2 the Bijépur . Government found its resources so thorough ly exhausted by the long struggle that had been gwa ed that the goo d o ffi ces of S ha héji were iaga n utiliz ed by them, and a peace w as concluded, by which jS hi v ’ i w as zr left master o f all the territories he had brought under his influence. A t t he end o f the first period S hi v jéi ’ possessions extend s cd from Chék an to the river Niré and included his o wn jahdg ' , and the fo rt s in zr the S ah yé d ri range from Purandar to K alyé n . At the end of the second period, S h i v jéi ’ s possessions included the whole of the Konkan from K alyé n to GO 6 and the , Ghétmz’uthé districts parallel t o this coast line, from the river Bhima to the river W érné, about one hundred and sixty miles north to south and one h dun red miles to the east of the Ghat range. The Bij apur kings broke the conditions of this treaty at a later stage i n t he third period of S h i v é ji ’ str ug s gles with the Delhi E mp erors But .

77 m tree blossoms . 1 01 Guj r Co derP ja i ’ mman -i n rat é p ’ Shivé ' s rzro , C h i e f repelled that attack on the first , o ccas i o n but allowed the enemy to escape , back to their country. Shivéji found fault with his General for his leniency in pursuit, and Pratéprao was so touched by his master s’ rebuke that, when next the jBi ’ zi pur Generals again invaded S hi v jai’ posses s sions, Prat épréo again defeated them with great slaughter, and hotly pursued them this time at t he sacri fice of his own pre li ecious f When Bijapur later on was . besieged by the M oghuls, the king of jBi ’ ur made an earnest appeal for help to zrp Shivéji, and he on his part, forgetting the i nj u ri e s that had been done t o him attack , cd the invading M oghuls from b e h i dn and , on the flank s, and by carrying the war into the M oghul territory, forced them to raise the siege. This generous help saved Bij apur this time, and gave it a ne w lease o f life for twenty years more. These events have thei r proper place in the third period but are mentioned here mainly for the sake o f bringing together i n one view the history o f S h i jvai’ re lati o ns with B ji apur. s

CHAPTER VI . IUT H E TR E E BEA R S F R T . HE third period commences with 1 6 6 2 . Down to that year, st dijShi i v ’ h ad u zi ously refrained from co ming into conflict w ith t he M oghul armies occupying the ecD can and excepting a single plundering , expedition to Junnar in 1 6 5 7, there had been no act o f overt hostility on either side. t iI n fac i n Shahéjahén’s t me, S hiv éji had made offers of submission to that Emperor , not only w ith a view t o bring pressure on iki gs the r l sjBt he p’ ur n fo r e ea e of his zr father, but also with a view to secure a recognition for certain claims in his own i tn erest, which Shahajahé n promised to consider favourably when hjSi v ’ i pressed zn them i n person as a suitor in his court. hW en Aurang zeb ab doan ned the siege of Bij apur, and proceeded hastily to fight with his brothers for the Delhi throne, he left instructions b eh i nd , by which S hi v jé i ’ claims s to t he Konkan were recognized, and it was suggested that he should serve t he Emperor with a picked body o f horse and maintain , tranquility in the imperial district south of the



R i se o tire M ar dtlzd P ower f04 . ships bound from uS rat to M e cc a Another . portion of the fleet plundered a rich port t o the south of Go a in 1 66 5, and as a result of this e xpe di ti on Shivaji established , his authority in north Kanaré . Shéhisték hén never rallied from the defeat he had sus t ai ned in the night surprise at P o ona and , had to be recalled, and a second army under the famous Raj é Jayasingh and se tD ilérk hén was n in 1 66 5 to accomplish the task of reducing S hi v jéi ’ power. The s M oghul army entered the Maratha country unopposed, and finally laid siege to Purandar. The fort was defended by a Prabhu com mander, named Murér Baj i Deshpande, of Mahéd. He maintained the unequal contest till he was killed. For reasons no t sufli ciently explained either in the native chro nicles or by Mr. Grant uD ff Shivéji was at , this time persuaded that the most politic course for him was to make his submission to jRaa J ayasi ngh, who was then the premier Hindu nobleman at the Delhi court, and to effect by peaceful means the aims he had iei n V w This resolution was not suddenly . adopted in a moment of despo dn ency. The native chronicle states that Shivép appealed for guidance to divine help, and the god dess iBhawan counselled him to make his sub missi on at the time, as Javasingh was

fThe tr ee bear s r ui t. 05 also a favourite with the gods, and success against him could not be secured by con tinning the war. Seeing that Shi vaji had so easily defeated A fz ulk hz’rn and Shéhist ék han , and that later o n when Aurangzeb with his whole army occupied the Deccan, the M aréthé Generals were able to carry on the war against him without any recognized leader, and with no single fort in their o c cu p ati on it cannot be for a moment , supposed that Shivaji was unable to continue hi s contest with Jayasingh on equal terms. Throughout his career of thirty four years, Shi vaji did not on a single occasion suffer defeat where he led his armies in p e rs on and even , when his affairs were at t he w orst , he s e mde me to gather new courage res urc e and o fro the inspiration of the dangers about him . W e m ay therefore take it for granted that when he deliberately offered to submit to Jayasingh and make over most of hi s forts and territories, there must have been some deep-laid scheme of policy which justified to him and his councillors t he course he pursued. Shivéji might well have thought that his temporary submission and visit to Delhi would introduce him to a larger sphere of act i on or at least would enable , him to make the acquai t cn an e o f the great Rajput nobles of t he empire . J ayasi ng h ’ s

1 06 fR i se o t he M ani thd H wer . friendship, cemented by such an act of sel f sacri fice, might prove helpful i n t he furt her can e o f his larger designs. Shivéji had been always urging his claims to chauth and sar deshmuhhi, and though these claims had not been recognized either by Aurangzeb o r jS hah é mh ’ hopes had been held out which az , e ncouraged him to think that by temporary submission he might secure a legiti tma e basis for t he r ioasse t n o f th ese claims. These, and considerations li k e these, might have had more weight allowed to them than the course of future e vents proved to be reasonable, but it is certain that o n this o ccas i on S h i v éji w as resolved to kma e , his peace w ith t he Emperor at any price . A truce was accordingly arranged. Twenty forts were dma e ove r into t he M oghul rgcha e, while twelve were retained i n the h ds co d sjan A Council of Shi vé i ’ mman er , s of Regency was formed of his three most trusted advisers with Jijébéi at its h dea , and Shivéji entered t he M oghul rvise ce , and marched, with Javasingh as his com iop an ga ainst Bij apur. t r hLa e n o n w en , , assurances of personal safety had been bt i ed t i hjo a n , Shi vé i wen w t his son and a c onsiderable body of horse and M avlis to Delhi, where he was received by the oE mper r rather c oldly, and he soon found



1 08 R i se of the M ard thd P ower . army unde r his son with Jaswantsingh, the Réné Jo f odhpur, i n place of Raj a Jayasingh as commander. The emperor s’ son was appointed Viceroy of the Deccan, and his first act as Viceroy was to conclude an arrangement with Shivéji with the con sent of his father. Under this arrangement, Aurangzeb granted the title of Réja to g veShivéji, and a ma ns a b S h i ai ’ ja to v so n s of five thousand horse, and toja ahdg ’ zr S hivéji himself in the Bérars in lieu o f his claims over Junnar and Ahmednagar. The old ja hd g ’ districts ooo f P na Chék an, and , zr S up é were also restored back to him with , exceptiot he n o f Si nhagad and Purandar . By this arrangement, Shivéji became a noble of the Empire, and engaged t o serve the Emperor with a considerable body o f horse, who were stationed near Aurangabad under the charge of Prat éprao Gujar. This arrangement lasted for t wo years, till the war with Bij apur carried on by the M oghul Emperors was concluded i n 1 669. Shivéjl was not a party t o the treaty then made between the Bijapur kings and the M oghul commanders, but in considera tion of the good understanding then pre valent between t he Viceroy of the Deccan and Shi vaji , his claims to chouth and

The tr ee fbear s r ui t. 1 09 sar d e’sh muhk ’ which had been several times z, urged by him before, were in 1 669 for the first time recognized by the kings of Go lcondé and Bij apur, who agreed t o pay respectively five and three lakhs of rupees t o Shivaji in lieu of those claims. This recognition must have been the result of an i mderstanding arrived at between the parties, including the M oghul commanders i n the Deccan. S h i v jé i ’ position in 1 669 s was thus considerably strengthened. He got back his jah ég ’ s and most of the zr h ill-fons. He secured a mansab and a jahdg ir from t he emperor, and he further secured the recognition of his claims to levy ro the hochauth and s ar d é sh m u hh ’ fm Ma z medan kingdoms in the Deccan. With these advantages, Shivaji was enabled t o carry 011 with greater chances of success the war w hen it was forced upon him by Aurang z éb’s violation of the understanding that had been established in 1 667. Aurangzeb ordered his so n the D eccan Viceroy, to , apprehend Shivéji by force or stratagem under penalty of his severe disple uas re. Guj rPrat apré o who was stati oned at An a, rangabad with his contingent of Maratha horse, obtained news of this intended treachery, and managed to es pca e. Shiv éji thus found himself again face to face wi t h

1 10 s ]e 0 the M arci thci P o wer . the whole power of the Emperor of Delhi. The necessity of sel df- efence suggested the recapture o f Sinhagad which had for the last five years been garrisoned by Rajputs in the imperial service. Tanéji M élusaré led t he attack, and scaled the walls, with his three-hundred M aylis, at dead of night, and effected the entrance, but only to meet death h dsat t he an of the garri so n His brother Suryéji completed the . work with heroism worthy o f the great hissacrifice brother Ténéii had offered in his o wn person for t he cause o f his c ountry. P urandar, M é huli Karnz’i lé , Lo hagad, and , Junnar were carried by storm. J jan ira was attacked, but the Siddis were able by their superior strength on the sea to hold their forts . Surat was plundered a second time . It was o n his return fro m Surat that S hivéji was overtaken by t he M oghul commanders i n pursuit o f him and though , greatly outnumbered, the M arat ha horse succeeded not only in sending their plun der safe to Réigad, but in routing the pursuers with heavy loss. G j rPrat épré o ua e nte re d K h’ ndé sh , levying contributions zi throughout - t he: District and penetrated fur r i tot he c ast n t he Bérars This was the . o c sio hefirst sar déshmuhhi ca n w n and chauth rwe e levied from pro vi cn es subje ct



1 12 s e o/ the M ard thd P ower . Tépti, and t he chiefs o f G olconda and Bédnore were made tributaries. In the words of t he native chroniclers, Shivéji had vindicated his claims t o be the Padshéhé o f the Hindus, alt er having defeated the for ces of the thr s lee M u a man Padshéhé s, and forced them to yield submission to his claims. This naturally suggested to Shivéji and his council t he idea lo f a forma coro nation ceremony which would fitly celebrate the greatness of the work accomplished by nearly thirty years’ i cn essant efiorts and , in t he then disordered condition of Sou therh India furnish a rallying centre to all the Deccan chiefs to resist with a united effort the apprehended danger of Aurang z éb ’ great i nvas i o n . s We thus enter upon the fourth and the last period of S hi v aji ’ career. The coro s nation ceremony ushered it in with proper pomp and festivities. The ctfa of t he establishment o f a powerful Hindu king dom had to be proclaimed with due solemnity and every hill-fort along the Sahyadri range, as also o n the sea coast proclaimed the event by ocann n salvoes all over the country. During t he remaining portion of S hi v jé i ’ life he w as comparative s lly eft t o himself by the M oghul com

fThe t r ee bea r s r uzt . 113 manders, who directed their efforts chiefly to t he conquest o f Bi japur and Go l c o nd a . A n attack made by t he M oghul com m eand r on Golconda was frustrated by t he timely arrival o f Hamb’irrao M oh i t e , and the king of Golconda was safe for a time under t he protecti on o f Shi vaji , and actually helped him with his own orf ces i n t he expedition against the Karnétik , which Shiv éji led in p e rs on and in the course of , which he penetrat ed as far sout h T j oas an re, and seized Vellore, fo rti fied Gingi, and se ta blished military posts all along the line o f t he road through Mysore. Bijapur was very hard-pressed by the M oghul commanders who laid siege to t he city. The A dilshahi kings and councillors had no resource left but to turn to S hiv éji for help, and not w ithstanding t he memories of past wrongs, Shivaji lent the help o f his army, which devastated t he Moghul country from Surat to Barhanpur, and attacked the flank s and rear o f the invading army, and thus forced th e M oghul com dman ers to raise the si ge e , and return to Aurangabad. These were t he only important military events of this period, which was chicfly distinguished for the re forms in civil adm ini str ati on carried out , and completed by Shi vaji during the com leis rparat iveu e he found ab out this time . 8

1 14 fR i se o the M a r d thd P ower . W e shall briefly notice t hese reforms i n the next chapter. It wi ll suffi ce here t o state that while at the end o f t he first period s r pS hi vap s i nfluence w as co nfine d t o t heti o f country lying between Chakan and t he Nit a river, at t he time o f his death he was t he most powerful native ruler south o f the river Tzi pti , and his paramount i n fluence W as kac nowledged both by Hindu and M aho medan sovereigns from the Tapt i to the Kai véri .



116 R i se of the M ar d thd P ower . cessors returned to the traditions o f t he past, and departed from the lines laid down by the founder of the M ar at h ’ power, and zt in so departing from the model he had set up, they sowed t he seeds o f that disunion and separation which it was his constant solicitude to avoid in all that he attempted and achieved. As has been stated before, Shivéji did not aspire to found an universal empire dun er his own direct rule through out diIn a He strove to secure the freedom . of his own people, and unite them into one nati o n powerful fo r sel df- efence, and for , sel sf-a sertion also ; but the extinction of all other powers w as no t contemplated by him . He had friendly relations wit h hit he C efs of Golconda and Bédnore, and even Bij apur, and did not i tn erfere with their respective sph res thee o f influence , in Télang an, Mysore and Karnat ik countries, and he allowed his brother V énk oji to retain his father s’ i h’ ' all to h i m s el f in the D ravid , a czg zr , country. He contented himself with levying o ly ro then e ho ulh and sa r d ’ h m uk h’ fm z es M oghul possessions. He made a cl rea dis tinction between S war éjya (territory directly governed by him thand (M lé ’ at og z governed by foreign k ings outside his y )S war dj a . The civil institutions fou dn ed by him w ere intended chicfly for the Ma

jS hzvd z as a C l' R uler . 117 zv z rétha country proper, though they were also introduced partially in the line of military forts, maintained by him to the e xtreme south of the P e ni ns u l a The civil . territory, held under his direct sway, was d ivided into a number of P r dm’s (Districts). Besides his ancestral jahdg ‘ about P o o na , zr there was ( 1 ) F rant M éval— corresponding w ith M aval, Ju rS éswad, and Khed nna , Talukas of the present day, and guarded by eighteen great hill-forts ; (2 ) the Prént s of and Karad— corresponding W ai S at ar a with , , the W estern portions of the present Satara d istrict, guarded by fi fteen forts ; (3) F rant Panhalé— corresponding ' with the western parts of Kolhapur, with thirteen hill-forts ; (4) F rant South Konkan— corresponding with R atnagi ri, with fi ft y-e i gh t hill-forts and se a , fortresses ; (5) F rant Thané— corresponding with N orth Konkan District, with t lwe ve forts ; ( 6-7) F rants Trimbak and Baglan corresponding with t he western parts of N é sik , with sixty-t wo hill-forts The terri . tories occupied by the military garrisons were, (8) Prént W anagad— corresponding with the southern parts of Dharwar district, with twenty-t wo forts ; r ts( )9, 1 0, 1 1 F an Bédno re , K ol h ra and Shrirangpatan— corres , ponding with the modern Mysore, with eighteen forts ; ( 1 2 ) Pré nt Karnét ik , being

118 ys e ( the M ard thd P ower . the ce ded districts in the Madrés Presidency south o l t he K ri s hna with eighteen forts ; , Vellore— modern ( 1 3) P r m’ t Arcot district s, a with t tywen -five forts ; and )( 1 4 Pr m’ t z T jan ore , with six forts. The whole of the Sahyadri range w as studded with forts, and the territories to t he W t st as far as t he to st th sse forts, varied a and t he ea o f ee , in breadth from fi fty to o ne hundred miles ostat t he m . The chronicles mak e mention of some t wo h und re d and eighty for t s ocji n i ’ S h iv é cupa s ti o n s sI n o ne en e it might be said tt ha . t he hill-forts, iw t h t he t erri tory commanded by it w as t he unit of jS h i v ’ i ’ civil govern , zi s p r d y bu i gment. He s a e no m o ne in i ld n ne w and re pairi ng old fo rts, and hi s , r sa rangement about t he garrisoning and pro visioning of these forts were of t he m ost e lab or at e i dk n The military exploit s w hich . made these forts so o sfam p o i nt s of u as , resist can e against t ka t ac , or ce ntre s o f aggre s si o n formed t he chief interest of , these early M aratha rswa . The Em pire k iwas n t toget her by the chain o f t h ese hill-forts, and they were its savio urs in days o f adversity. I n the Satara d istri ct , its l stood s g y taS t’ ’ zn zar ef a i e e for man m o n h s i st ol po e t ugaga n A é b ’ urangz wh e w r and ho h s ,



fR i se o the I Ma r d th/i P ower . o ther assistants, in charge of each circular wall o f defence from t he same class, and , he was assisted by a Brahman S ubhéd é r , or S a hm’s chosen from the three great divi , io ss n o f Bré hmans and a A’é r hhé nni s who , was a Prabhu ithThe H a vé ld ci r , w hi s . assistants, had t he military charge o f the g arri s o n The Br ha man S ubhe’dd r had t he . civil and revenue charge, and this charge i a cluded the villages withi n t he comm dan o f the fort, while the Prabhu o ffice r was in rgcha e o f the grain and fod der and military stores and of the repairs. The three classes rw e e thus joined together in a division of w ork, which ens ru ed fidelity, and prevented j ealousy. The hill-sides were carefully pro t ect ed by strict conservancy, and t he charge o f the forests below the forts was entrusted to the R d mo s h ’ and other lower classes of zs the p o p u l at i o n M inute directions were given . as to the way in which w atch rand wa d duties were to be performed by day and night. The garri son varied in numbers according to the size and importance of the forts . There w as a N é k' fo r every nine Sepoys , z and the arms were guns, short swords , j avelins, spears lo gand patté s— n thin swords. Each man received in sca h and kind o ts g sfixed am un fo r service as wa e according to his r kan .

S hw d/ z as a C a n! R uler . 1 21 Coming down from the hill-forts to the p lains, the country was divided into M a h d ls and F r ants, very much plon t he an no w in force i n our Té luhé system. The average revenue of a r gedM aha’zl an from three-fourths of a lakh to a lakh and a quarter, orand t wo three mahé ls made a S ubhd or a district. The average pay of a S ubhéddr w as four hundred H ons per ryea about per o tRs. 1 00 m nh Shiv aji di d not con . t inue the old Moghul system of leavi ng t he revenue management solely in the h dan s o f the village or orP d t l' K u lham ' of zs zs i ripD e’shmuhhs and D he’s dnd ’ of the d st ct . es These vi llage and district authorities received their dues as before, but the work of g e t t kemana em n was a n out of their dshan , and carried o n directly by the S ubhe’d é r s the or theo rM M a hé lhar ' fo r S ubhd ah é l , zs while every group o f t wo or three vill ga es ged bywas mana K am é é (Ké rk un )a v ’ d r , zs who made the direct collection o f the r evenue. The p i g l dlan o f farm n out an revenue, either of villages or mahé ls found no support under S h i v aji ’ system . s The gradations o f officers and men in t he garrisons of the hill-forts were only copied from the regulations w hich were enforced both i t yjbyShi i v ’ in his nfan r and i n his zz

1 22 fs e o the M ara' thé P ower . cavalry I n e hac infantry corps there was . ery soldi rsa N é h' fo r e v ten e , o ne H ami l z d dr had charge of fi ve such parties, t wo d j jH avé lé s m a e o ne m é /’ d é zm ui d' u e r , t en zs made a full corps o f one thousand men un~ der s ve d upa H az é r z, and n H mé ' ae a e az / z v c rge vli i t yS ar no bat ’ ha fo r t h e M a nfan r . s I n t he cavalry, there were t wo divisions, Bé rg i r s S i /e’d dr s, t tyand and we n -five Bé ' or S i léd ti r s had a H a zufld é r r g zr s over them, five H amflés d fma e o ne unni j d c glti , t en umd/li s ma e a H i i’ har e az t r s , c rg s dand fi ve H az é r t ha e ma e o ne P a nel: u deH é ' az r z. The P anel: H az dr i w as n r t he c v yS ar uobat o f t he v b tE ery a ch o f a alr . t ty ors s t r i rwen -five h e had o ne wa e -car r e r i rand fa r e . U d r h ign e e ac of t he h her r tM a a ha o ffi cers, bo th i n the i nfantry and v ry t re rca al , he was a B ahman S a h m' and a s bh or rPra u K dr k hé nnis a B ahman [V uz uma’é r r b j orand P a hu im ' ' BThe é rg t r ’ h se s c znzs . s were during t he m onso ons to dcan ne in camps, rwhe e every provision dwas ma e for grass and grain supplies, and barracks were built for t he men to live dun er shel t er All the o fficers and me n received fixed . pay, which i n the case of the H ig h H az é r i , th ous dwas o ne- an H o ns, and P ég d P anch t o s d the c sHH é ’ az r z, t wo - h u an o ns. I n a e of i try hu dret he nfan d H o ns , t he pay was fi ye - n



1 24 ]s e 0 t ’ze Al a m’ thd P ower . h ll th ird ay, w en a c a was m ade fo r e services . This system of cash pay ment and direct revenue management was introduced and extended by Shivéji throughout his domin ions. Native chroniclers notice this depar ture from old traditions in these two points more prominently because Shivéji appears to h av e laid gre at stress on it It was his . conviction that much of the disorder in o ld times w as due to the entrusting o f r ve enue duties to éZ ma ’ n a’ rs of Districts z and vill ga es. They collected more ofr m t he w yats, and paid less into the treasury than was strictly due , and used their o pportunities to cre ta e di sturbances and to resist t he commands o f t he central power. S hivaji engaged the serv ices o f paid men méK a d’ ’ M ahé lhar ’ , and S u bhéd é r s, v zs azr s, zs fo r the duties till th e n performed by Z am ’ zn t duty toId é r s. é w as t he K am vi sa’é r ’ s levy the grain and cash payments while the crops were standing. The refields we care fully measured out, and entered in books in the nam e of the h older s th e r e of and , annual habuldyats were taken from them for the payments ‘ due. I n the case o f grain payments, the Government assessment never e cx eeded t wo -fifths o f the act lua yield. The

j CS ’’ Rl’ lu er . hw a as a 1 25 z zv z remaining three-fift hs were left t o the culti vat br as his share o f the crops. I n times of distress, or in case of accident, tag d’ z advances were dma e liberally, and their recovery provided for by instalments spread over four or five years. The S ubhéd é r s per formed both revenue and criminal duties . The work of Civil Court s was not then o f much importance, and hw en disputes arose , parties were referred by the S ubhe‘ddr to t he P anch of the vill ga es, or to those of other villages in important cases, and enforced thei r decisions. The Civil organization of the District was, o f course, subordinate to the authorities at head-quarters, two o f whom—the P ant theA mé tya and P ant S achi v, -had re spec tively t he charge o f what in our time would be called the offic e of Finance M inister and t he Gene ral Accountant and Auditor . The district accounts had to be sent to these officers, and were there collated to gether, and irregularities detected and puni shed. These offi cers had power to depute men on their establishments to super vise the working of the district o ffi cers. The P ant A mé tya and the S aeh ' were, next to the zv P hw’ i , the highest civil th yo fficers, and e es c had besides these revenue duties, military ,

1 26 jR i se ( the M ard thci P ower . commands. They were both important mem bers of the Board of A d mi ni st rat i o n called , the A shta P r ad hé n o r Cabinet o f eight heads of departments . The P éshwci was Prime i is r e t kiM n te , n x to t he ng, and was at t he head o f both the civil and mi litary adminis the right h dt rat i o n and sat fi r st on an , below the throne. The Sénépatt was i n charge of the military administration and , sat first on the left side. A mé fya and S ae/n'v sat next to th e F éshwé while , the ext b loM antr i sat n e w t he S ar h’ zv , and was in charge o f the k ing s’ privat e iaffa rs. The S umaut was Foreign Secret ra y, and sat below the S é mi / é t ' on t he l e ft . z e t c eN x am P and i tr é o, who had charge of the ecclesiastical d e tpar m e tn and below him , on the left side sat the Chief Justice. It will be seen from these details that the A shta P r adhé n system has its counterpart in the present constitution o f the Government diIo f n a. The Governor-General and Viceroy occupies the place of the P eshwci ; next comes the Commander-in-Chief of the army . The Finance and Foreign Ministers come xtne . In the Government of India, the Executive Council makes no room for the h ead o f the ecclesiastical department o r for , t he Chief Justice on one side and t he Private Secretary on the other, and in their



1 28 R i se of the M aratha’ P wo er . M ohite. He deprived the first P eshwai o f his oth ee, and gave it to M oropant i gl si iP n e m . The P ant A m ya’t ’ o ffice as larly changed hands , and in fact the other o ffices were not allowed to be hereditary in particular families. This caution was, to some extent, observed in the early years of reigS but towards its end t he h é h ’ n , us talents and power of the first three B l ji j iP éshwci s, aa V ishvané t h, t he first Ba ré o , and Balaj i Bajir ao , made the P eshwé st he reditary in their family, whilst t he representatives of the other ministers were mostly incapable m e n and their impo tr ance , dwindled in c onse quence, and the e qual distribution and bal eanc of power was destroyed. Throughout the P ’ hwé ’ rule , es s t he A shta P r ad hdns, or t he eight hereditary ministers t t ctio so f S a e, had no fun n or , only nominal functions to discharge, and instead of being the organised government, which Shivéji designed it to be, we find an unorganised power of the old Asiatic yt pe, depending solely for i ts vitality upon t he capacity of the chief centre o f power. S hi v jéi ’ system cannot be blamed for such s a consequence. It was the departure from his system that was responsible for the failure of his plans .

f CS h ' ' ' i v i l R uler . 1 29 zv a z as a I n another re spect also, Shi véji was far in advance of his times. . He set himself steadily against any assignments of l dan as jah ég ’ to his successful civil or military zr c ommanders. Every one from the P e’shwci and senépati down to t he lowest sepoy or h dr k zm was, under S h i v jé i ’ arrangements , s d irected to draw his salary in kind or money from the public treasury and gr rana ies. The salaries were fix ed and paid regularly at stated periods. The assignment system was c ondemned because it was liable to be abus cd under the best circumstances, and with t he best motives. The jah ég ’ d é r naturally zr t ends to become a territorial or feudal land lord, and when his i nfluence is strengthened by hereditary connections, he cannot be removed except by force. The centrifugal t endencies towards separation and disunion are always naturally very strong in India, and the system of assigning jahég ’ s, and zr permitting the jahég zr d é r to maintain a force of his o wn out of t he revenue o f t he land assigned to him aggravates this , t e dn ency to a degree which makes well o rdered rule almost impossible. Shivéji would no t even al l o w Z am d’ é r s of the District to zn build forts for their protection, but required them to live in houses unprotected li ke hos thet e of r ayats . None o f t he great 9

1 -50 fR i se o t he Al a r ' t hd P ower . a men who distinguished themselves in Shivap 8 time, were able to hand over to their descendants large l dan ed estates. Neither Moropant Pingle nor Abaj i Sondév , nor Ragho Ballél or Datto A nnaji or N iréji Raoj i, among the Brahmans nor the or Guj rM alusarés or K ank s, Prat é prao a, ohitjN ét ’ i Palk ar, Hambirrao M e or the zi r thMa a aS ar d ér s, were able t o found ancient families such as those which Shabu s’ ministers in t he early part of the eighteenth century succeeded in doing. The only assignments of land which S hivéji sanctioned in his time were intended for the endowment of temples and charities . These were public trusts, and t he holders thereof had no military duties to discharge and could no t in the o rd i nary course of , things, become d gan erous to the State. Among the charities, the D ahshi mi system o f encouraging learning found strong sup port with Shivaji . I t was an old edit ion o f our modern system of payment by results. Brahmans received D ahshz’né accord ing to scale which was carefully graduated so as to provide both for the extent and quality of learning acquired. There were no public schools in those days, but private teachers taught pupils in their own homes,



1 32 fR i se o the M ar atha P ower . Second ly— I n his discouragement o f t he hereditary system of gtransmittin high o fii ccs in one and the same family. Thir d ty—I n his refusal to grant ja hég ' zr assignments o f land for the support of Civil or Military O ffi cers. F —our thly In the establishment o f a di rect system of revenue management, without the intervention of district or village Z a m’ zn d é rs. s thty— I n the disallowance of the farm ing system. —S h In t he establishment of a Coun ' t ty zx cil of M inisters w1th their proper work allotted to t h e m chand ea directly res , ponsible to the King in Council. theS eventhly—I n subordination of t he M ilitary to t he Civil element in the admi ni st r at i o n . E ' hthly— I n the intermixture of Brahmans, zg highPrabhus, and M arét has in all offices, and lo w so as to keep ch ec k upon one , anoth e r . O f course some of these distinctive fea tures could not be continued intact when the M ar at h a p ow er, instead o f being con . fined to the small area o f the S war éjya

jS h é' ' 133 zz' z as a d istrict, was extend ed in all directions so as to embrace provinces so distant as Katak o n the East, and Kat hi awad on the West, Delhi i n the N o rth and Tanj ore in the S outh. I n the M aratha country proper, t he nat i o n the army the o fficers, and t he , , kings were all o f the same race, and a c ommon bond o f loyalty knit them together in a way which it was impossible to se cure in distant parts o f iInd a, where the conquered population differed essentially from the army of o ccup at i o n and too often , rt he a my o f occupation consisted of mer cenari es who had no bond o f union w ith their c ommanding officers, or with the t e present at ives o f the central power. ' I t is therefore not to be wondered at , that Shi ai ’ institu tions, described above, w ere jv as s not found elastic enough to be suitable for all parts of I nd i a The connection of the . hill-forts with t he plains commanded by t h e m fo r instance, was a feature so en , tirely local that it could not be accepted as a practical basis o f government in the plains o f Gujarat or M alwa or in t he Eastern Districts of M ah arashtra i t s e l f For . a similar re as on the strict system of direct , revenue managem ent and t he total super cession of farmers and soZ m é a d’ r s was al zn not equally suited for distant provinces

1 34 fR i se o the M ar é tha P ower . where the traditions of government had been all along opposed to such direct col l e ct i o n While therefore allo cwan e may be . made for these and other conside tra ions, there can be no doubt that, in other re spect s, t he departure from Shivaji ’s syste m was a distinctly retrograde step, for which no similar excuse can be pleaded, except that the men who came after did not realisefl the wisdom of his pl san , and yielded to t he temptation of present convenience , only to hnd that they had thereby lowered the organised union he had established into an unorganised mass held together by t he very loosest ties, and threatening dissolution at the first great crisis in its history. The system o f Government by a Council of eight Ministers, for instance, was retain cd in the early years of Shabu s’ r ei gn but , gradually fell into disuse hw en t he P ’ h wa s es power increased so as to overshadow the other Ministers, and it act lua ly ceased to exist when the P éshwci s made Poona their pit lca a. The P ant A md tya and P ant hS ' ac zv, t he most powerful civil functionaries next to the P eshwa, occupy no place in the M arathahistory after Shabu s’ death, and sank into the position ereof m J ahég ’ dé r s. zr The P h’ wci s did no t ve nt ure or care to es



1 36 gR i se “ the M a r ti thd P ower . from being co d rya Sar d hr of se n a importance , became the most powerful military com mander of his time. There was no room for both of them and the like of them i n the central Council, and each tried to supplant the other by force or craft, and each dragged the other d o w n M ore ft c . quently still, the great military commanders became kings in their own territory, and made peace or war at their own will. This danger might have b ee n to a great , extent, obviated, if the system of govern ment by a Council, with the en cessary enlargements dictated by altered circum stances, had been conti un ed, and the here ditary principle not allowed to take such deep root, as it did in t he course of t wo generations from S hi v jéi ’ death. s The greatest departure, however, was in the abandonment ‘ of the pri nciple of not giving extensive territories jas ah hg ’ to zr those who could conquer them by the strength of their military p rowess. To some extent this departure was forced upon the Government of Shahu by the events that had preceded his accession to power. The whole country o f h rM a a ashtra had been con rq ue ed by t he M oghu ls after S am b h éji ’ s t br ther j rjd ea h and S am b h a i ’ o , Raa am and , , s

jS t' Ci vi l R uler . h' a as a 137 zv h is Councillors had been driven far to the s outh . The whole work had to be com m enced g ia a n and the ne w l e ad ers who , c ame to power had t o be allowed much h irt e o wn w ya N o fault therefore can be . laid at t he door of R ajar é m ’ advisers, and s t he stress and adverse circumstances continu -e d to be i n considerable strength in the early years of Shahu . Wh en however , , u s“Shab ’ Government was established in Maha r ashtra, and plans of extending the Em pire in all directions were entertained, the t emptation of present co vn enience was no t s o strong, and might h va e been resisted. It was just at this time that the mistake was committed of allowing every soldier of for t une to carve out his o wn jahag ' . Pilaj i zr and D amép Gaik awéd settled themselves as s overeigns of Guj arat. The Bhonslés o f Nagpur became supreme in those parts, while Shinde and Holk ar and the Pavars e stablished themselves in M al wa and North India, under a very loose system of alle giance to ‘ the central power, repre sented by t heir agreement t o pay a portion of the revenue to the P ’ s h wé as w i e l di ng the e chief authority in Maharashtra When these . jahég ’ assignments were continued heredi zr ytar , the transformation from organized t o unorganiz ed power was complete. Those

1 38 R i se of the M aratha P ower . who first acquired these large domains re tained some sense o f loyalty to the common cause. Their successors, however, resented all interference with what they came to re gard as their o wn private possessions. It was i n this way that t he more important departures from the policy laid down by Shivéji proved ruinous to the general ih t erest s. S hi jvai’ arrangements about the direct s management of land revenue, without the intervention of the district and vill ga e Z a m d’ ci r s, were on the whole faithfully zn carried out by his successors, and during best period of the ruleP almost the h’ wé ’ , es s down to the death o f Nana F adnavis, t he system of farming reve un e found no favour. It was only under the r lue of t he last P éshwd that districts began to be efarm d out in the Maratha country proper. I n the outlying conquests of M alw a G uj arat and , other parts of North India, the farming system was more in vogue, as being more suited to the unsettled condition o f those parts. While in this matter, therefore, Shivaji 's traditions were on the wh ole re spected, t he precautions he had taken about the distribution o gsto f o ffices am n Marathas, Brahmans doand Prabhus, not appear t o



1 40 R ise of the M aratha P ower . The military profession had not been monop olised by the Mar athas in Shivaji ’s it me b ut they constituted the chief strength , o f the army , both r ksin t he an and file. The Brahman commanders und er Shivaji w ere as brave in generalship as any Maratha Commander This continued to be the case under the e rlya P ’ hwas . es The greatest Maratha Commanders were t rained in t he sch ool of the first Baji rao P e s h w a When the great Maratha families, . who served under Bajirao, established them selves in distant provinces as vi rtual rulers, and became so powerful as to threaten the safety of central authority, it was an aim o f state policy at Poont’t cr tt o ea e an e quipoise o f Bréhman Commanders in t he S outh, and the thePat wardhans and F ad kes, th e Rastes and the Gok halés, rose t o o dc mman , but they never could hold their o wn against the armies of positions . of hi dS n e and Holk ar . The rivalry thus set ho v rup, proved, among other causes, we e , m ost harmful t o the general interest. It will thus be seen that in all the points in which the principles of government laid down by Shivaji were departed from by his successors, we can trace the causes of the weakness and decline o f the Marét ha

jS C Rh i’ ' zvt z as a l’ ’ lu er . 141 zv z power, long before it came in conflict with British authori ty diIin n a. That authority , when it obtained supremacy, gave its deli berate preference to the principles laid down by Shivaji over those which found favour with his successors. British rule in India is carried on on the principle of enforcing a complete separation of the Civil from the M ilitary department and a due subordination of the latter to the former. It insists upon cash payments fo r services rendered, and declines to kma e grants of lands by way of assignment for military or other services. It refuses t o recognise any hereditary claims to public offices, high or low. The government i s carried on by Boards and Councils, and not by the unfettered discretion of a single ruler. It collects its land revenue by its own paid agency, and never farms it out to the r ersold It also mZ da i o r fa m ’ . c rs zn provides for a due distribution of offices among all classes of its subjects. A s a consequence of the observance of these maxims of state policy, a handful of Englishmen have been able to govern the whole country in a way that strikes both native and foreign students of its admini strati on as a marvellous feat of states hmans ip . The wisdom of S h i jvai’ principles s