Psychology History entry

626 CHAPTER 20 colleagues stressed the active utilization of cognitive strategies in such learning. In 1959 Tracy and Howard Kendler analyzed children’s discrimination learning in terms of concept utilization rather than in terms of behavioristic principles. In 1959 Miller Chomsky published his influential review of A. Skinner’s book Verbal Learning (1957). As we saw George in Chapter 19, Chomsky’s nativistic explanation of of language was highly influential in reducing the Courtesy dominance of radical behaviorism. Also during the 1950s, humanistic theorists such as Maslow, Kelly, Rogers, and May continued George A. Miller developing their ideas, as did the Gestalt psycholo- gists and the psychoanalysts. about cognitive processes and thus to engage in battle with the behaviorists. Leon Festinger (1919–1989) noted that the ideas that one enter- DEVELOPMENTS AFTER THE tains may be compatible with or incompatible with one another. Incompatibility exists, for exam- 1950S ple, if one is engaged in an obviously boring task but is encouraged to describe it as exciting, or if one In 1960 Miller and his colleagues Eugene Galanter smokes cigarettes and yet believes that smoking and Karl Pribram published Plans and the Structure of causes cancer. When ideas are incompatible, a state Behavior, in which it was argued that cybernetic of dissonance exists that motivates a person to concepts (such as information feedback) explain hu- change beliefs or behavior. In the cases above, for man goal-directed behavior better than S–R con- example, a person could reduce cognitive disso- cepts do, and at least as objectively. Also in 1960, nance by telling the truth about the task being bor- Miller and Jerome Bruner founded the Center for ing or become convinced that the task is actually Cognitive Studies at Harvard. In addition to pro- exciting. With the smoker, cognitive dissonance moting research on cognitive processes, the center could be reduced by quitting the habit or by be- did much to popularize the ideas of Piaget among lieving there really is no proven relationship be- U.S. psychologists. In 1962 Miller published an ar- tween smoking and cancer. Festinger’s influential ticle titled “Some Psychological Studies of book A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (1957) made Grammar” (1962a), which introduced Chomsky’s no reference to behavioristic ideas. nativistic analysis of language into psychology. In In the early 1950s Jerome Bruner became in- 1890 William James had defined psychology as “the terested in thinking and concept formation, and in science of mental life”; in 1962 Miller purposefully 1955 he assisted Sir Frederic Bartlett in arranging, at used James’s definition as the title of his text Cambridge, one of the first conferences on cogni- Psychology: The Science of Mental Life (1962b). tive psychology (Bruner, 1980). In 1956 Bruner In 1963 as evidence of how far cognitive psy- (along with Jacqueline Goodnow and George chology had progressed and in recognition of Austin) published A Study of Thinking, which em- Miller’s role in that progress, Miller was presented a phasized concept learning. Although concept learn- Distinguished Scientific Contribution Award by the ing had been studied earlier by Hull and APA. Miller served as president of the APA in 1969, Thorndike, their explanations of such learning was received the Gold Medal for Life Achievement in couched in terms of passive, associationistic princi- Psychological Science from the American ples. The explanation offered by Bruner and his Psychological Foundation (APF) in 1990, and was

COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 627 awarded a National Medal of Science by President the term cognition as “all the processes by which … George Bush in 1991; in 2000 the Association of sensory input is transformed, reduced, elaborated, Neuroscience Departments and Programs presented stored, recovered and used” (p. 4). Also in this him with its Millennial Award. In 2003 Miller was book, Neisser attempted to integrate research on presented the APA’s Outstanding Lifetime such topics as perception, concept formation, mean- Contribution to Psychology Award. He is currently ing, language, and thinking, using a few concepts professor emeritus in psychology at Princeton adopted primarily from information theory. University. According to Roediger (2000), many of the ideas In 1959 Donald Hebb served as president of put forth in Neisser’s cognitive psychology were derived the APA, and his presidential address “The from Bartlett’s earlier work, and Neisser acknowl- American Revolution” was published in 1960. In edged this debt to him. this address, Hebb was referring not to a U.S. po- Once the grip of behaviorism—especially radi- litical revolution but to the country’s psychological cal behaviorism—had been loosened, many earlier revolution. According to Hebb, only one phase of efforts in experimental cognitive psychology were the American revolution in psychology had taken appreciated. About the influence of Ebbinghaus, place. This was the behavioristic phase, and it pro- Michael Wertheimer (1987) says, “His seminal ex- duced precise, factual knowledge and scientific periments can … be viewed as the start of what was rigor that had not previously existed in psychology. to become the currently popular field of cognitive However, in their effort to be entirely objective, psychology” (p. 78). Concerning the influence of the behaviorists had minimized or banished such Gestalt psychology, Hearst (1979) said, “Present- topics as thought, imagery, volition, and attention. day cognitive psychology—with its emphasis on or- Hebb urged that the second phase of psychology’s ganization, structure, relationships, the active role of revolution use the scientific rigor promoted by the the subject, and the important part played by behaviorists to study the long-neglected cognitive perception in learning and memory—reflects the processes. Concerning the second phase of the rev- influence of its Gestalt antecedents” (p. 32). In an olution, Hebb (1960) said, “The camel already has interview, Neisser describes how Gestalt psychol- his nose inside the tent” (p. 741). He noted the ogy influenced him: works of Festinger, Broadbent, the Kendlers, Miller, Galanter, and Pribram as good starts toward I … became particularly interested in a rigorous cognitive psychology. He was especially Gestalt psychology. It had an idealistic impressed by the possibility of the computer acting quality that appealed to me. To the Gestalt as a model for studying cognitive processes. He pro- psychologists human nature was something phesized that such a model will become “a power- wonderful, worth exploring, worth ful contender for the center of the stage” (1960, p. knowing about. They were constantly 741). Hebb’s preferred approach to studying cogni- doing battle with the behaviorists, who tive processes was to speculate about their biological seemed to see human nature as a mere foundations. We reviewed some of Hebb’s specula- collection of conditioned responses or tions in Chapter 19. blind associations. From the Gestalt view- In 1962 and 1963, M. D. Egger and Neal Miller point, the mind is something beautiful, demonstrated that, contrary to tradition, classical well-structured, in harmony with the conditioning phenomena cannot be explained in universe. (Baars, 1986, p. 274) terms of associative principles alone. Rather, the in- formation conveyed by the stimuli involved has to be And, regarding Piaget’s influence, Jerome taken into consideration. In 1967 Ulric Neisser, who Kagan (1980) said, “With Freud, Piaget has been studied with George Miller, published his influential a seminal figure in the sciences of human develop- book Cognitive Psychology, in which Neisser defined ment” (p. 246).

628 CHAPTER 20 One of the most popular cognitive theories in temporary cognitive psychology represents a return contemporary psychology is Albert Bandura’s social to a kind of psychology that existed before the cognitive theory. In several ways, Bandura’s theory domination of behaviorism. If anything, then, there can be understood as a direct descendent of occurred a counterrevolution, rather than a revolu- Tolman’s theory: tion (see Hergenhahn, 1994). Even George Miller, who, as we have seen, was as responsible as anyone If one had to choose a theory of learning for the current popularity of cognitive psychology, that is closest to Bandura’s, it would be rejects the idea that a revolution took place: Tolman’s theory. Although Tolman was a behaviorist, he used mentalistic concepts to What seems to have happened is that many explain behavioral phenomena … and experimental psychologists who were Bandura does the same thing. Also, studying human learning, perception, or Tolman believed learning to be a constant thinking began to call themselves cognitive process that does not require reinforce- psychologists without changing in any ment, and Bandura believes the same obvious way what they had always been thing. Both Tolman’s theory and thinking and doing—as if they suddenly Bandura’s theory are cognitive in nature, discovered they had been speaking cogni- and neither are reinforcement theories. A tive psychology all their lives. So our vic- final point of agreement between Tolman tory may have been more modest than the and Bandura concerns the concept of written record would have led you to be- motivation. Although Tolman believed lieve. (Bruner, 1983, p. 126) that learning was constant, he believed further that the information gained Robins, Gosling, and Craik (1999) note that through learning was only acted on when the popularity of cognitive psychology has in- there was reason for doing so, such as creased dramatically over the last three decades. when a need arose. For example, one may They agree with Miller, however, that it is incor- know full well where a drinking fountain rect to refer to this increased popularity as a cogni- is but will act on that information only tive revolution. when one is thirsty. For Tolman, this dis- In any case, from the many forms of cognitive tinction between learning and perfor- psychology that existed prior to the 1970s, mance was extremely important, and it is information-processing psychology emerged as the also important in Bandura’s theory. dominant form. Information-processing psychology (Hergenhahn and Olson, 2005, p. 341) is the kind of cognitive psychology that took the computer program as a metaphor for the workings (See Bandura, 1986, for an excellent summary of the mind. Before discussing information- of his extensive research in social cognitive theory.) processing psychology, however, we will first re- The journal Cognitive Psychology was founded in view the field of artificial intelligence that influ- 1969, and within the next two decades, 15 addi- enced its development. tional journals were established, featuring research articles on such topics as attention, problem solving, memory, perception, language, and concept forma- ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE tion. Interest in experimental cognitive psychology had become so extensive that many believed a rev- Developments in cybernetics, information theory, olution, or paradigm shift, had occurred in psychol- and computer technology combined to form the ogy (for example Baars, 1986; Gardner, 1985; field of artificial intelligence. Fetzer (1991) defines Sperry, 1993). Others, however, suggest that con- artificial intelligence (AI) as a “special branch of

COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 629 computer science that investigates the extent to proponents of weak AI claim). Rather, an appro- which the mental powers of human beings can be priately programmed computer really is a mind ca- captured by means of machines” (p. xvi). In 1950 pable of understanding and having mental states. the brilliant mathematician Alan M. Turing (1912– According to strong AI, human minds are com- 1954) founded the field of artificial intelligence in puter programs, and therefore there is no reason an article titled “Computing Machinery and they cannot be duplicated by other, nonbiological, Intelligence,” in which he raised the question, computer programs. For the proponents of strong Can machines think? Because the term think is so AI, computers do not simulate human cognitive ambiguous, Turing proposed an objective way of processes; they duplicate them. answering his own question. Searle’s Argument against Strong The Turing Test Artificial Intelligence Turing proposed that we play the “imitation game” to answer the question, Can machines (like com- John Searle (1980, 1990) describes his now famous puters) think? He asked that we imagine an inter- “Chinese Room” rebuttal to proponents of strong rogator asking probing questions to a human and to AI. Thinking, according to strong AI, is the manip- a computer, both hidden from the interrogator’s ulation of symbols according to rules, and because view. The questions and answers are typed on a computer programs manipulate symbols according keyboard and displayed on a screen. The only in- to rules, they think. According to strong AI, “The formation the interrogator is allowed is that which mind is to brain as the program is to the hardware” is furnished during the question-and-answer ses- (Searle, 1990, p. 26). To refute this claim, Searle sion. The human is instructed to answer the ques- asks you to consider a language you do not under- tions truthfully and to attempt to convince the stand—say, Chinese. Now suppose you are placed interrogator that he or she really is the human. in a room containing baskets full of Chinese sym- The computer is programmed to respond as if it bols, along with a rule book written in English tell- were human. If after a series of such tests the inter- ing how to match certain Chinese symbols with rogator is unable to consistently identify the human other Chinese symbols. The rules instruct you responder, the computer passes the Turing test how to match symbols entirely by their shapes and can be said to think. and do not require any understanding of the mean- ing of the symbols. “The rules might say such things Weak versus Strong Artificial as, ‘take a squiggle-squiggle sign from basket num- ber one and put it next to a squoggle-squoggle sign Intelligence from basket number two’” (Searle, 1990, p. 26). What does it mean when a computer passes the Imagine further that there are people outside the Turing test for some human cognitive function? room who understand Chinese and who slip For example, if an interrogator cannot distinguish batches of symbols into your room, which you between a human and a computer with regard to then manipulate according to your rule book. thinking, reasoning, and problem solving, does that You then slip the results back out of the room. mean that the computer possesses those mental at- Searle likens the rule book to the computer pro- tributes just as humans do? No, say the proponents gram. The people who wrote the rule book are the of weak artificial intelligence, who claim that, at “programmers,” and you are the “computer.” The best, a computer can only simulate human mental baskets full of symbols are the “database,” the small attributes. Yes, say the proponents of strong arti- batches of symbols slipped into the room are “ques- ficial intelligence, who claim that the computer is tions,” and the small batches of transformed sym- not merely a tool used to study the mind (as the bols you slip out of the room are “answers.”

630 CHAPTER 20 lating the symbols is not by itself enough to guarantee cognition, perception, un- derstanding, thinking and so forth. And since computers, qua computers, are symbol-manipulating devices, merely run- ning the computer program is not enough to guarantee cognition. (p. 26) Any problem that can be stated in terms of formal symbols and solved according to specified rules can be solved by a computer, such as balancing a checking account or playing chess and checkers. The manipulation of symbols according to specified rules is called syntax. Semantics, on the other hand, Searle involves the assignment of meaning to symbols. John According to Searle, computer programs have syn- of tax but not semantics. Human thoughts, percep- Courtesy tions, and understandings have a mental content, and they can refer to objects or events in the world; they have a meaning or, to use Brentano’s term, John Searle they have intentionality. A computer program (or Finally, imagine that your rule book is written in you enclosed in the Chinese Room) simply manip- such a way that the “answers” you generate are ulates symbols without any awareness of what they indistinguishablefromthoseofanativeChinesespeak- mean. Again, although a computer may pass the er. In other words, unknown to you, the symbols Turing test, it is not really thinking as humans slipped into your room may constitute the question, think, and therefore strong AI is false. “You can’t What is the capital of France? and your answer, again get semantically loaded thought contents from for- unknowntoyou,wasParis.Afterseveralsuchquestions mal computations alone” (Searle, 1990, p. 28). Our andanswers,youpasstheTuringtestforunderstanding brains are constructed so that they cause mental Chinese although you are totally ignorant of Chinese. events: “Brains are specific biological organs, and Furthermore,inyoursituationthereisnowaythatyou their specific biochemical properties enable them could ever come to understand Chinese because you to cause consciousness and other sorts of mental could not learn the meaning of any symbols. Like a phenomena” (Searle, 1990, p. 29). Computer pro- computer, you manipulate symbols but attach no grams can provide useful simulations of the formal meaning to them. Searle (1990) concludes, aspects of brain processes, but simulation should not be confused with duplication. “No one expects to The point of the thought experiment is get wet in a pool filled with Ping-Pong-ball models this: If I do not understand Chinese solely of water molecules. So why would anyone think a on the basis of running a computer pro- computer model of thought processes would actu- gram for understanding Chinese, then ally think?” (Searle, 1990, p. 31). neither does any other digital computer solely on that basis. Digital computers Are Humans Machines? merely manipulate formal symbols ac- cording to rules in the program. The argument about whether machines (in this case, What goes for Chinese goes for other computers) can think reintroduces into modern psy- forms of cognition as well. Just manipu- chology a number of questions that have persisted

COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 631 throughout psychology’s history. One such question not have been far-fetched for him. Similarly, the is, What is the nature of human nature? As we have philosophers, like Kant, who divided the mind seen, one answer has been that humans are machines. into various faculties were dualists. However, these Most of the English and French Newtonians of the faculties were often viewed as transforming sensory mind took Newton’s conception of the universe as a information in automatic, mechanistic, lawful ways, machine and applied it to humans. For anyone who and therefore both the physical and mental aspects believes that humans are nothing but complex ma- of humans were machinelike. In more recent times, chines—and there have been many philosophers and the methodological behaviorists, like Tolman, who psychologists with such a belief—there would be no postulated cognitive events that mediated between reason that a nonhuman machine could not be built stimuli and responses, followed in the tradition of that would duplicate every human function. This the faculty psychologists. Thus, being a dualist does might require placing a computer into a sophisticated not preclude one from viewing humans as machines robot, but in principle, there is no reason a nonhu- and thus embracing some form of AI. As we will man machine could not duplicate every human func- see, information-processing psychology is a form of tion because humans too are nothing but machines. cognitive psychology that followed in the traditions For example, materialists have no trouble with the of faculty psychology and methodological behav- contention that machines like robots could be built iorism and so found much that was useful in AI. that duplicate all human functions. Humans, say the Standing in firm opposition to using any form materialists, are nothing but physical systems. of AI as a model for understanding the human mind However, for the materialists, there is no “ghost in would be all rationalistic philosophers or psycholo- the machine” (that is, a mind); thus, there is no reason gists who postulated a free will (like Descartes). Also to wonder whether a nonhuman machine can think in opposition would be the romantic and existential or not. Neither nonhuman machines nor humans philosophers and the modern humanistic psycholo- can think. Thoughts, ideas, concepts, perceptions, gists. Aside from postulating human free will, hu- and understandings cannot exist if they are thought manistic psychologists claim that there are so to be nonphysical in nature; only physical things ex- many important unique human attributes (such as ist. To suggest otherwise, say the materialists, is to creativity and the innate tendency toward self- embrace dualism. Being materialists, radical beha- actualization) that the very idea of machine simula- viorists do not deny that machines could be made tion of human attributes is ridiculous and perhaps that duplicate human behavior. However, such a ma- even dangerous. It may be dangerous because if we chine could not think any more than humans can view humans as machines, we may treat them as think and, therefore, talk of duplicating human machines; and if we treat them as machines, they thought processes is plain nonsense. For materialists, may act like machines. According to the humanistic such as the radical behaviorists, both weak and strong psychologists, this is what tends to happen when AI are useless concepts. the methods and assumptions of the natural sciences Psychologists and philosophers who accept du- are applied to the study of humans. With such alism may or may not find AI useful. Postulating a methods, humans are treated like physical objects cognitive component to human nature does not (machines) and are thus desacralized. Most human- require that such a component be unlawful. Most istic psychologists find the very idea of AI repulsive. of the British empiricists and French sensationalists embraced mentalism, but the mental events they INFORMATION-PROCESSING postulated were governed by the laws of associa- tion. Even being a rationalist does not preclude be- PSYCHOLOGY ing a determinist concerning mental events. For example, Spinoza believed thought to be lawful, There is no better example of how developments and therefore a machine analogy of the mind would outside psychology can influence psychology than

632 CHAPTER 20 the emergence of information-processing psy- The analogy is important. It makes a dif- chology. Although individuals such as George ference whether a scientist thinks of hu- Miller (1956) and Donald Broadbent (1957, 1958) mans as if they were laboratory animals or had already used the computer metaphor to study as if they were computers. Analogies in- human cognition, it is generally agreed that the fluence an experimenter’s choice of re- 1958 article by Allen Newell, J. C. Shaw, and search questions, and they guide his or her Herbert Simon marked the transition between arti- theory construction. They color the ficial intelligence and information-processing psy- scientist’s language, and a scientist’s choice chology. In their article, the authors claimed that of terminology is significant. The terms are the computer programs they developed solved pro- pointers to a conceptual infrastructure that blems the same way humans do. That is, they defines an approach to a subject matter. claimed that both the human mind and computer Calling a behavior a response implies programs are general problem-solving devices. This something very different from calling it an claim was highly influential, and an increasing output. It implies different beliefs about the number of psychologists began to note the similari- behavior’s origin, its history, and its ex- ties between humans and computers: both receive planation. Similarly, the terms stimulus and input, process that input, have a memory, and pro- input carry very different implications duce output. For information-processing psycholo- about how people process them. gists, the term input replaces the term stimulus, the (Lachman, Lachman, and Butterfield, term output replaces the terms response and behavior, 1979, p. 99) and terms such as storage, encoding, processing, capacity, retrieval, conditional decisions, and programs describe Information-processing follows in the rational- the information-processing events that occur be- istic tradition, and, like most rationalist theories, tween the input and the output. Most of these information-processing theory has a strong nativis- terms have been borrowed from computer technol- tic component: ogy. The information-processing psychologist usu- We do not believe in postulating mysteri- ally concentrates his or her research on normal, ous instincts to account for otherwise un- rational thinking and behavior and views the hu- explainable behavior, but we do feel that man as an active seeker and user of information. everything the human does is the result of As we have seen throughout this book, as- inborn capacities, as well as learning. We sumptions made about human nature strongly in- give innate capacities more significance fluence how humans are studied. The assumption than behaviorists did. We think part of the that the mind or brain either is or acts like a com- job of explaining human cognition is to puter demonstrates this point: identify how innate capacities and the re- sults of experience combine to produce Computers take symbolic input, recode it, cognitive performance. This leads us, es- make decisions about the recorded input, pecially in the area of language, to suppose make new expressions from it, store some that some aspects of cognition have or all of the input, and give back symbolic evolved primarily or exclusively in hu- output. By analogy, that is most of what mans. (Lachman, Lachman, and cognitive psychology is about. It is about Butterfield, 1979, p. 118) how people take in information, how they recode and remember it, how they make Note the similarity between the Gestalt posi- decisions, how they transform their inter- tion and the following statement of Lachman, nal knowledge states, and how they trans- Lachman, and Butterfield: “The human mind has form these states into behavioral outputs. parts, and they interrelate as a natural system” (1979,

COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 633 p. 128). Also note the similarity between Kant’s psychology takes seriously the apparent philosophy and another statement made by heterogeneity of the mental and is im- Lachman, Lachman, and Butterfield: “Man’s cogni- pressed by such prima facie differences as tive system is constantly active; it adds to its envi- between, say, sensation and perception, ronmental input and literally constructs its reality” volition and cognition, learning and re- (1979, p. 128). In fact, considerable similarity exists membering, or language and thought. between Kant’s rationalistic philosophy and Since, according to faculty psychologists, information-processing psychology. Many consider the mental causation of behavior typically Kant to be the founding father of information- involves the simultaneous activity of a va- processing psychology: “When cognitive scientists riety of distinct psychological mechanisms, discuss their philosophical forebears one hears the the best research strategy would seem to be name of Immanuel Kant more than any other” divide and conquer: first study the intrinsic (Flanagan, 1991, p. 181). As we saw in Chapter 6, characteristics of each of the presumed Kant postulated a number of categories of thought faculties, then study the ways in which (faculties of the mind) that act on sensory informa- they interact. Viewed from the faculty tion, thereby giving it structure and meaning that it psychologist’s perspective, overt, observ- otherwise would not have. In other words, accord- able behavior is an interaction effect par ing to Kant, the faculties of the mind process infor- excellence. (p. 1) mation. It is Kant’s philosophy that creates a kinship among Piaget’s theory of intellectual development, In his influential book How the Mind Works Gestalt psychology, and information-processing (1997), Steven Pinker also embraces faculty psy- psychology. chology: “The mind, I claim, is not a single organ but a system of organs, which we can think of as psychological faculties or mental modules” (p. 27). The Return of Faculty Psychology The Return of the Mind–Body Largely because of its relationship with phrenology, faculty psychology came into disfavor among scien- Problem tists and was essentially discarded by them along The current popularity of all varieties of cognitive with phrenology. To some, discarding faculty psy- psychology, including information-processing psy- chology with phrenology was like throwing out the chology, brings the mind-body problem back into baby with the bath water. We just saw that psychology—not that it ever completely disap- information-processing psychology marks a return peared. The radical behaviorists “solved” the prob- to faculty psychology. The recent discovery that lem by denying the existence of a mind. For them, the brain is organized into many “modules” (groups so-called mental events are nothing but physiologi- of cells), each associated with some specific function cal experiences to which we assign cognitive labels. such as face recognition, also marks a return to fac- That is, the radical behaviorists “solved” the mind- ulty psychology. As Jerry Fodor (1983) notes, body problem by assuming materialism or physical Faculty psychology is getting to be re- monism. Cognitive psychology, however, assumes spectable again after centuries of hanging the existence of cognitive events. These events are around with phrenologists and other du- viewed sometimes as the by-products of brain ac- bious types. By faculty psychology I mean, tivity (epiphenomenalism); sometimes as automatic, roughly, the view that many fundamen- passive processors of sensory information (mecha- tally different types of psychological me- nism); and sometimes as important causes of behav- chanisms must be postulated in order to ior (interactionism). In each case, bodily events and explain the facts of mental life. Faculty cognitive events are assumed, and therefore the

634 CHAPTER 20 relationship between the two must be explained. A and the journal Cognitive Science began. number of contemporary cognitive psychologists Since then, more than sixty universities in believe they have avoided dualism by noting the North America have established cognitive close relationship between certain brain activities science programs and many others have and certain cognitive events (for example, Sperry, instituted courses in cognitive science. 1993). The fact that it appears likely that such a (p. ix) relationship will soon be discovered for all mental events is sometimes offered in support of material- Why an interdisciplinary approach? “How the ism. D. N. Robinson (1986) explains why such mind works is the biggest puzzle that humans have reasoning is fallacious: ever tried to put together, and the pieces require contributions from many fields” (Thagard. 2005, p. 217). Thagard reviews the considerable success of cognitive science (pp. 133–141) but also notes some of its shortcomings. First, it lacks “A unified theory that explains the full range of psychological phenomena, in the way that evolutionary and ge- netic theory unify biological phenomena, and rela- Text not available due to copyright restrictions tivity and quantum theory unify physical theory” (p. 133). Second, an understanding of consciousness itself remains elusive: “No consensus has emerged, but some of the neurological and computational elements of a theory of consciousness are starting to appear” (p. 175). And last, the computer meta- phor on which it is based fails to provide for the Replacing the term mind-body with the term important role emotions play in everyday life: mind-brain does little to solve the problem of how something material (the brain) can cause something In humans, the evaluation of different mental (ideas, thinking). For an excellent historical states is usually provided by emotions, review of the controversies concerning the nature which direct us to what matters for our of consciousness and the current status of those learning and problem solving. Computers controversies, see D. N. Robinson, 2007. currently lack such intrinsic, biologically In the 1970s, an interdisciplinary field called provided motivation, and so can be ex- cognitive science was created to study cognitive pected to have difficulty directing their processes. Paul Thagard (2005) describes cognitive problem solving in nonroutine directions. science and its current status: (p. 221) Cognitive science is the interdisciplinary Perhaps partially because of the more compre- study of mind and intelligence, embracing hensive approach of cognitive science, there was a philosophy, psychology, artificial intelli- growing realization that information-processing gence, neuroscience, linguistics, and an- psychology and the AI from which it developed thropology. Its intellectual origins are in had become sterile. Even Ulric Neisser, whose the mid-1950s when researchers in several 1967 book Cognitive Psychology did so much to pro- fields began to develop theories of mind mote information-processing psychology, eventu- based on complex representations and ally became disenchanted with it. In 1976 Neisser computational procedures. Its organiza- published Cognition and Reality, in which he argued tional origins are in the mid-1970s when that information-processing psychology should the Cognitive Science Society was formed be replaced by ecological psychology. Ecological

COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 635 psychology moves away from computer models of neously active, the strength of the connections human cognition and the narrow confines of labo- among them increases. Although this rule strongly ratory experimentation and toward a study of cog- influenced new connectionism, it was not original nition as it occurs naturally in real-life situations. with Hebb. It is based on the associative laws of Neisser (1982) provides a collection of ecologically contiguity and frequency that go back at least to relevant studies on memory. Included are such to- Aristotle; and, as we saw in Chapter 5, David pics as flashbulb memories (vivid memories of such Hartley anticipated Hebb in applying these associa- important events as the assassination of John F. tive principles to neural activity by 200 years. Kennedy), mnemonics (strategies that enhance ef- William James (1890/1950, Vol. 1, p. 566) also an- fective memory retrieval), memorists (people with ticipated Hebb’s rule, and Pavlov’s neurophysiolog- exceptional memory), and the accuracy of eyewit- ical explanation of the development of conditioned ness testimony. For the details of his life, including reflexes followed Hartley and James very closely. the experiences that influenced him to dramatically Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts (1943) also revise his early version of cognitive psychology, see preceded Hebb in attempting to demonstrate the re- Neisser, 2007. lationship between patterns of neural activity and Neisser’s new approach to cognitive psychol- cognitive processes. In some ways, their approach ogy was influential, but the influence of AI in the was more closely related to new connectionism study of cognitive processes was far from over. than Hebb’s was. McCullock and Pitts were primar- Enthusiasm for AI was rekindled by a dramatic ily interested in showing how neurons, and networks new development that used the brain as a model of neurons, engage in logical operations that could be for cognitive functioning instead of the computer expressed mathematically. McCullock and Pitts used —new connectionism. the term neuro-logical networks to reflect their interest in expressing neuronal activity mathematically. This effort to describe neural activity mathematically and, NEW CONNECTIONISM in turn, to relate that activity to human intellectual functioning, is essentially what new connectionism Hebb’s speculations concerning how cell assemblies attempts to do. and phase sequences develop (see Chapter 19) have Hebb was well aware of the fact that the idea reemerged in one of contemporary psychology’s expressed in what became known as Hebb’s rule most popular research areas—new connection- was not original with him. In The Organization of ism. New connectionism is a form of AI that is Behavior (1949), he said, contrasted with Thorndike’s connectionism (see The general idea is an old one, that any Chapter 11). Thorndike’s connectionism and new two cells or systems of cells that are re- connectionism have in common the postulating of peatedly active at the same time will tend neural connections between stimuli (input) and re- to become “associated,” so that activity in sponses (output). However, as we will see next, the one facilitates activity in the other. The neural connections postulated by new connection- details of speculation that follow are in- ism are much more complex than those postulated tended to show how this old idea might be by Thorndike. put to work again. (p. 70) Although the idea that neurons that are active Antecedents together or in close temporal proximity become The cornerstone of one popular type of new con- associated was not original with him, it was nectionist model is Hebb’s rule, which states the Hebb’s version of that idea that most influenced following: If neurons are successively or simulta- new connectionism:

636 CHAPTER 20 It remains true that many ideas funda- produces general activity with no predictable out- mental to connectionism were set out by put. With experience, however, the weights among Hebb. At a very general level, his the connections within the network are modified commitment to trying to account for according to Hebb’s rule, and eventually, as was psychological processes given certain mentioned, output becomes correlated with input. neurophysiological constraints has en- Figure 20.1 shows a highly simplified neural dured. At a very specific level, Hebbian network. learning, as conveyed by the Hebb rule, New connectionism represents a radical depar- continues to be applied even in the most ture from what John Haugeland (1985) calls good recent systems. (Quinlan, 1991, p. 6) old-fashioned AI (GOFAI). GOFAI processes one sequence of information at a time in an if-then fashion; neural networks process several sequences simultaneously. The latter is called parallel distributed Neural Networks processing. GOFAI processes symbolic information New connectionism utilizes as its model a complex according to rules; neural networks process only system of artificial neurons called a neural net- patterns of excitation and inhibition expressed as work. There are typically three kinds of “neurons” mathematical weights within the system. In contrast (sometimes called units or processors) in a neural to GOFAI, learning and memory is no longer a network: input, hidden, and output. As with the matter of storing and retrieving symbolic represen- brain, the associations among neurons within a tations. “Using knowledge in processing is no lon- neural network change as a function of experience. ger a matter of finding the relevant information For Hebb neurons become associated when the in memory and bringing it to bear; it is part and anatomy or biochemistry of the synapses among parcel of the processing itself” (McClelland, them changes. In neural networks, synaptical Rumelhart, and Hinton, 1992, p. 281). A short- changes are simulated by modifiable mathematical coming of GOFAI, and its sequential processing of weights, or loadings, among the units in the net- information, is that any disruption in the flow of in- work. After each presentation of input, neural net- formation causes the entire system to fail. Within works are designed to detect which units within the neural networks, information processing occurs network are active and to reorganize themselves according to Hebb’s rule. That is, the strengths of the connections among units that are active to- Output unit gether are increased by mathematically increasing their weights. After each presentation, the network reorganizes itself in a similar fashion. This accom- Hidden unit Hidden unit plishes mathematically what is supposed to happen biochemically among neurons. That is, units within a neural network that are consistently active to- gether become associated and, when they have become associated, consistent input produces con- sistent output. The influences within a neural network are ar- ranged in a hierarchy. Hidden units mathematically convert the patterns of incoming activity they re- Input units ceive from the input units into single output pat- terns, which they (the hidden units) then broadcast F I G U R E 20.1 to the output units. At first, input into the network A highly simplified neural network.

COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 637 throughout the system and, therefore, substantial diminished considerably. In the 1980s, new devel- portions of the system would need to be destroyed opments in cognitive and computer science revived for disruption to occur. For this reason, Lashley’s interest in parallel processing computers. Interest in principle of mass action (see Chapter 19) applies GOFAI had declined substantially when, in 1986, to neural networks as well as to real brains. The David Rumelhart, James McClelland, and other most important distinction between GOFAI and members of the parallel distributed processing new connectionism is that new connectionism can (PDP) group published their two-volume book simulate or duplicate a number of human capabili- Parallel Distributed Processing: Explorations in the ties that GOFAI cannot—for example, learning. Microstructure of Cognition. Dreyfus (1992) describes Within new connectionism, learning is ex- the enthusiasm with which this text was received: plained in terms of changing patterns of excitation Rumelhart, McClelland, and the PDP and inhibition (represented by mathematical Research Group’s two-volume work, weights) within the neural network. For example, Parallel Distributed Processing, had 6000 let us say we want a neural network to learn to rec- backorders the day it went on the market in ognize a particular object. Presenting that object (say, 1986, and over 45,000 sets are now in print. the number 3) provides input into the system, but the Like the dissolution of the Soviet Union, output will not initially resemble the number 3. the speed of collapse of the GOFAI research However, after each presentation, the system is pro- program has taken everyone, even those of grammed to reorganize itself according to Hebb’s us who expected it to happen sooner or rule—that is, by increasing the associative strengths later, by surprise. (p. xiv) of the units that were active together when the num- ber 3 was presented. In this way, the output from the Soon new connectionism began solving pro- neural network gradually “learns” to match the in- blems that GOFAI either could not solve or could put. Like the infant’s brain, neural networks learn to solve only with great difficulty. Neural networks represent recurring environmental events. Quinlan showed their ability to recognize patterns, objects, (1991) describes how learning occurs both in brains phonemes, and words; to process sentences; to learn and in neural networks: concepts; to generalize; and even to speak (we will see It is straightforward to see how whole an example of the latter below). Rumelhart (1992) chains of associations and hierarchies of even believes that it is just a matter of time before associations could be built up over time by new connectionism will explain the loftiest of all hu- the recursive application of the general man cognitive abilities—reasoning: “I have become principles of Hebbian learning. Two si- increasingly convinced that much of what we call rea- multaneously active cells map onto a third, soning can … be accounted for by processes … which causing it to become co-active with a are well carried out by PDP models” (p. 70). fourth. In turn the third and fourth cells Note that many of the neurophysiological map onto a fifth whose behaviour even- speculations upon which neural networks are based tually comes to represent a whole pattern (such as Hebb’s rule) have been confirmed by ob- of associations. (p. 5) serving the functioning of actual neurons (see, for example, Cleary, Hammer, and Byrne, 1989; Connectionist models existed in the 1950s and Glanzman, 1995). 1960s (for example, Rosenblatt, 1958), and they competed with GOFAI. However, after the publi- Back-Propagation Systems cation of Marvin Minsky and Seymour Papert’s (1969) careful criticism of one type of connectionist Neural networks programmed in accordance with model (Rosenblatt’s), interest in neural networks Hebb’s rule are self-correcting; that is, patterns of

638 CHAPTER 20 output gradually match patterns of input, based on which would tend towards the correct experience alone. But not all connectionist systems output. This procedure is repeated many are programmed in that way. Some are back- thousands of times. Uncannily, the system propagation systems that require a “teacher” to slowly and audibly learns to pronounce provide feedback concerning the program’s perfor- English text, moving from babble to half- mance. Perhaps the most famous example of a recognizable words and on to a highly back-propagation system is NETtalk (see, for ex- creditable final performance. (p. 299) ample, Sejnowski and Rosenberg, 1987). Words are fed into the system, and their influence travels New connectionism is a diverse and complex through the hidden units until they are coded into field, and our discussion of it represents a vast over- phonemes. A phoneme is the smallest unit of dis- simplification. For a more comprehensive overview cernible sound within a language. This output of the field, especially as it applies to psychology, (coded phonemes) is then fed into a voice synthe- see Quinlan, 1991. sizer that produces actual speech sounds (pho- Although new connectionism is quite popular, nemes). At first, the weights within the system are it is not without its critics. For example, Hubert arbitrarily assigned and the output is phonemic gib- Dreyfus (1992), who because of his consistent criti- berish. Training consists of adjusting the weights cism has been called the “black knight of AI,” is not within the network so that the discrepancy be- impressed by a neural network’s supposed ability to tween the input and the desired output (correct learn: pronunciation) is systematically reduced. It is this Neural networks are almost as dependent corrective feedback that makes NETtalk a back- upon human intelligence as are GOFAI propagation system and not a system that learns au- systems, and their vaunted learning ability tomatically according to Hebb’s rule. Andy Clark is almost illusory. What we really need is a (1990) summarized how NETtalk learned how to system that learns on its own how to cope speak coherently: with the environment and modifies its The network began with a random distri- own responses as the environment bution of hidden unit weights and con- changes. (p. xxxix) nections (within chosen parameters), i.e. it had no ‘idea’ of any rules of text- Nor is Searle (1992) impressed by any com- to-phoneme conversion. Its task was to puter models of human intelligence: learn, by repeated exposure to training Like the drunk who loses his car keys in the instances, to negotiate its way around this dark bushes but looks for them under the particularly tricky cognitive domain (tricky streetlight, “because the light is better here,” because of irregularities, subregularities, we try to find out how humans might re- and context-sensitivity of text!phoneme semble our computational models rather conversion). And learning proceeded in than trying to figure out how the conscious the standard way, i.e. by a back- human mind actually works. (p. 247) propagation learning rule. This works by giving the system an input, checking (this Searle (1998, lecture 5) argues that new con- is done automatically by a computerized nectionism, although much more powerful than ‘supervisor’) its output, and telling it what earlier linear versions of AI, still employs only syn- output (i.e. what phonemic code) it should tax (the manipulation of symbols). Therefore, he have produced. The learning rule then says, the problem of semantics (the meaning of causes the system to minutely adjust the symbols) posed by his Chinese Room thought ex- weights on the hidden units in a way periment is not solved by new connectionism.

COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 639 Even Jerry Fodor, who has been largely sup- cause it has neglected the most important aspect of portive of what he calls the Computational Theory mental life—its meaning: of Mind (CTM), sees that theory as severely limited There is no question that cognitive science in explaining human cognition: has made a contribution to our under- So … when I wrote books about what a standing of how information is moved fine thing CTM is, I generally made it a about and processed. Nor can there be point to include a section saying that I much doubt on reflection that it has left don’t suppose that it could comprise more largely unexplained and even somewhat than a fragment of a full and satisfactory obscured the very large issues that inspired cognitive psychology; and that the most the cognitive revolution in the first place. interesting—certainly the hardest—pro- So let us return to the question of how to blems about thinking are unlikely to be construct a mental science around the much illuminated by any kind of compu- concept of meaning and the processes by tational theory we are now able to imag- which meanings are created and negotiated ine. I guess I sort of took it for granted that within a community. (pp. 10–11) even us ardent admirers of computational psychology were more or less agreed on Despite the criticisms such as those just de- that. (2001, p. 1) scribed, some believe that neural network theory (new connectionism) will synthesize contemporary Finally, Jerome Bruner (1990), who we recall psychology’s many schisms, allowing psychology to was among those responsible for the resurgence of become a mature, unified science (see, for example, interest in cognitive psychology in the late 1950s Tryon, 1995). For arguments for and against various and early 1960s, asserts that cognitive science has aspects of cognitive science, including new connec- failed in its effort to explain human cognition be- tionism, see Johnson and Erneling, 1997. SUMMARY Throughout most of psychology’s history, human utilized by the behaviorists to study behavior be cognition was studied philosophically. It was J. S. applied to the study of human cognition. Also in Mill who provided the framework within which 1960, Miller and Bruner founded the Center for human cognition could be studied scientifically. Cognitive Studies at Harvard. In 1962 and 1963, Fechner, Ebbinghaus, James, Bartlett, and Piaget Egger and Miller demonstrated that classical condi- were among the first psychologists to demonstrate tioning could not be understood in terms of asso- that human cognition could be studied experimen- ciative principles alone. Rather, the information tally. Also included among the pioneers of experi- conveyed by the stimuli involved had to be consid- mental cognitive psychology were the Gestalt ered. In 1967 Neisser synthesized the diverse find- psychologists, Rogers, Hebb, Wiener, Shannon, ings within experimental cognitive psychology, and Weaver. During the 1950s, interest in experi- using a few basic principles primarily from informa- mental cognitive psychology increased mainly be- tion theory. In 1969 Miller served as president of cause of the efforts of such individuals as George the APA, illustrating how far experimental cogni- Miller, Broadbent, Lashley, Festinger, Bruner, tive psychology based on information theory had Tracy and Howard Kendler, Chomsky, the human- come. istic psychologists, and the psychoanalysts. In 1960 In 1950 Alan Turing created the field of AI. AI Hebb urged that the rigorous scientific methods attempts to simulate or duplicate the intelligence

640 CHAPTER 20 exhibited by humans, using nonhuman machines plans; and then produce output. The major goal such as computers. Turing proposed the “imitation of the information-processing psychologist was to game” as a means of determining whether a ma- determine the mechanisms humans employ in pro- chine can think as a human does. If the answers cessing information. Information-processing psy- to questions given by a machine (like a computer) chologists followed in the rationalistic tradition, are indistinguishable from those given by a human, and their work and assumptions showed similarities the machine can be said to think. Those adhering to to Kantian philosophy, Gestalt psychology, Piaget’s strong AI believe that nonhuman machines can du- theory of intellectual development, and methodo- plicate human intelligence, and those adhering to logical behaviorism. Both faculty psychology and weak AI believe that nonhuman machines can the mind-body problem reemerged as cognitive only simulate human intelligence. Searle argues psychology became popular. In the late 1970s, that his thought experiment of the Chinese information-processing psychologists joined with Room showed that computers manipulate symbols researchers from other disciplines to form cognitive without assigning meaning to them, and therefore science. Hebb’s speculations concerning the neuro- strong AI must be rejected. Whether or not AI is logical basis of learning influenced the most recent seen as a useful model for studying humans depends version of artificial intelligence—new connection- on one’s view of human nature. According to ma- ism. New connectionism employs artificial neural terialists, such as the radical behaviorists, there is no networks consisting of input, hidden, and output reason machines cannot duplicate human behavior. units. One type of neural network “learns” accord- However, efforts to construct machines that simu- ing to Hebb’s rule. That is, the mathematical late or duplicate human thought processes must fail weights among units that are active together are because such processes do not exist. However, ac- increased. The result is that consistent patterns of cepting a dualist position does not necessarily pre- input into the network gradually produce consis- clude the usefulness of AI, because many dualists are tent patterns of output. Back-propagation networks also mechanists. It is only those dualist positions that do not apply Hebb’s rule but utilize a teacher or postulate unique features of the human mind (such model instead. A famous example of a back- as free will) that see AI as having little or no propagation system is NETtalk. Although neural usefulness. networks function more like brains than GOFAI Information-processing cognitive psychology does and are capable of learning, many remain developed from AI. As the computer does, humans skeptical that any form of AI can reasonably dupli- receive input; process that input by using various cate or even simulate human intelligence. programs, strategies, schemata, memories, and DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 1. Justify the contention that psychology has al- 3. Give examples of events that occurred in the most always been concerned with studying 1950s that contributed to the development of human cognition. Throughout most of psy- experimental cognitive psychology. chology’s history, how was cognition studied? 4. Describe the pivotal events that occurred in the What philosopher provided the framework 1960s that contributed to the current popular- within which cognition could be studied ity of experimental cognitive psychology. experimentally? 5. Define each of the following: artificial intelligence 2. Give examples of early efforts (before 1950) to (AI), strong AI, and weak AI. study human cognition experimentally.

COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 641 6. What is the Turing test, and for what was it faculty psychology? A return to the mind-body used? problem? 7. Describe Searle’s thought experiment involving 11. What is cognitive science? the Chinese Room. What, according to Searle, 12. What is new connectionism, and how does it does this experiment prove? compare to GOFAI? 8. Which philosophies would tend to support the 13. Describe an artificial neural network and then position of strong AI? Weak AI? Which would discuss how such a network learns by applying deny the usefulness of either type of AI? Hebb’s rule. 9. What are the major tenets of information- 14. Within new connectionism, what is a back- processing psychology? How is information- propagation model? Give an example. processing psychology related to AI? 15. Which of the criticisms of GOFAI remain valid 10. Why can information-processing psychology when directed against new connectionism? be seen as following in the tradition of Kantian Which are not? philosophy? Why can information-processing psychology be seen as marking a return to SU GGE STIONS FOR FURTHER READING Baars, B. J. (1986). The cognitive revolution in psychology. Pinker, S. (1997). How the mind works. New York: New York: Guilford Press. Norton. Beakley, B., & Ludlow, P. (Eds.). (1992). The philosophy Quinlan, P. (1991). Connectionism and psychology: A psy- of mind: Classical problems/contemporary issues. chological perspective on new connectionist research. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Block, N., Flanagen, O., & Güzeldere, G. (Eds.). (1997). Roediger, H. L. (2000). Sir Frederic Charles Bartlett: The nature of consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Experimental and applied psychologist. In G. A. Press. Kimble & M. Wertheimer (Eds.), Portraits of pioneers Boden, M. A. (Ed.). (1990). The philosophy of artificial in- in psychology (Vol. 4, pp. 149–161). Washington, telligence. New York: Oxford University Press. DC: American Psychological Association. Churchland, P. S., & Sejnowski, T. J. (1994). The Rychlak, J. F. (1997). In defence of human consciousness. computational brain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Dennett, D. C. (1991). Consciousness explained. Boston, MA: Little, Brown. Simon, H. A. (1996). The sciences of the artificial (3rd ed.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Dreyfus, H. L. (1994). What computers still can’t do: A critique of artificial reason. Cambridge, MA: MIT Thagard, P. (2005). Mind: Introduction to cognitive science Press. (2nd ed.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Fodor, J. (2000). The mind doesn’t work that way: The scope Von Eckart, B. (1993). What is cognitive science? and limits of computational psychology. Cambridge, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. MA: MIT Press. Von Neumann, J. (2000). The computer and the brain (2nd Franklin, S. (1995). Artificial minds. Cambridge, MA: ed.). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. MIT Press. (Original work published 1958) Johnson, D. M., & Erneling, C. E. (Eds.) (1997). The future of the cognitive revolution. New York: Oxford University Press.

642 CHAPTER 20 GLOSSARY Artificial intelligence (AI) A branch of computer among the units are systematically modified either ac- science that investigates the extent to which machines cording to Hebb’s rule or by back-propagation. (See also can simulate or duplicate the intelligent behavior of liv- Hebb’s rule and Back-propagation systems.) ing organisms. (See also Strong artificial intelligence New connectionism The most recent type of AI that and Weak artificial intelligence.) utilizes artificial systems of neurons called neural net- Back-propagation systems Neural networks that are works. As contrasted with GOFAI, which employed the programmed to learn by systematically reducing the dis- sequential processing of information according to speci- crepancy between their output and some desired output fied rules, new connectionism employs the brain as a represented by a model or “teacher.” Such systems learn model. That is, the processing of information within a by corrective feedback instead of by applying Hebb’s neural network is distributed throughout the entire net- rule. work. Like the brain, neural networks are capable of Cognitive science An interdisciplinary approach to learning; this was not true of GOFAI. (See also Hebb’s studying the mind and mental processes that combines rule and Neural network.) aspects of cognitive psychology, philosophy, artificial Searle, John (b. 1932) With his famous “Chinese intelligence, neuroscience, linguistics, and computer Room” thought experiment, sought to demonstrate that science. computer programs can simulate human thought pro- Hebb’s rule Hebb’s contention that neurons within the cesses but not duplicate them. Computer programs, he brain that are simultaneously or successively active be- says, can only manipulate symbols according to rules come associated. One type of neural network applies this (syntax), whereas humans assign meaning to symbols rule by adjusting the mathematical weights of units that (semantics). Therefore, he accepts weak artificial intelli- are simultaneously or successively active. The result is gence and rejects strong artificial intelligence. (See also that consistent input gradually produces consistent out- Strong artificial intelligence and Weak artificial in- put. (See also Neural network.) telligence.) Information-processing psychology The approach Strong artificial intelligence The contention that to studying cognition that follows in the tradition of machines (such as computers) can duplicate human cog- faculty psychology and methodological (mediational) nitive processes. behaviorism and typically employs the computer as a Turing test A test devised by Turing (1950) to deter- model for human information processing. mine whether a machine can think. Questions are sub- Miller, George, A. (b. 1920) Did pioneering research mitted to both a human and a machine. If the machine’s on information processing in the 1950s and 1960s that answers are indistinguishable from those of the human, it significantly enhanced the popularity of cognitive is concluded that the machine can think. psychology. Weak artificial intelligence The contention that ma- Neural network A system of input, hidden, and output chines (such as computers) can simulate human cognitive units that is capable of learning if the mathematical weights processes but not duplicate them.

21 ✵ Contemporary Psychology ontemporary psychology reflects its long, diverse history. In this text, we C have seen that at various times the philosophies of empiricism, sensational- ism, positivism, rationalism, romanticism, and existentialism have been employed in efforts to understand humans. We have also seen that one or more of these philosophies became the basis for psychology’s schools of thought: voluntarism, structuralism, functionalism, behaviorism, Gestalt psychology, psychoanalysis, and humanistic psychology. The methodologies most often used to study humans throughout psychology’s history have been introspection, naturalistic observa- tion, and experimentation. Remnants of all these philosophies, schools, and methodologies are found in contemporary psychology. THE DIVERSITY OF CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGY Psychology today is diverse, but psychology has almost always been diverse. In psychology’s long history, there has never been a time when all psychologists accepted a single paradigm. Perhaps the closest psychology ever came to being a single-paradigm discipline was during the Middle Ages, when departures from the view of humans contained in church dogma were simply not tolerated. Some might suggest that behaviorism dominated psychology during the period from about 1930 through the 1950s, but this was not quite the case. Although behaviorism was extremely popular, there were always influential critics of be- haviorism and an abundance of alternative views from which to choose. What distinguishes modern psychology from psychology during the period when schools existed is the current relatively peaceful coexistence of psycholo- gists holding dissimilar views. During the 1920s and 1930s, when several psycho- logical schools existed simultaneously, open hostility often arose between 643

644 CHAPTER 21 members of rival schools. Today, the schools are highest number of new PhDs obtained by women. gone, and a spirit of eclecticism prevails, reminis- In 1990, 58% of new PhDs in psychology were cent of the functional approach to psychology that obtained by women. In 1999, the figure grew to William James suggested. The eclectic chooses 66% (Kohout, 2001) and in 2005, it had grown to from diverse sources those ideas and techniques 72% (Cynkar, 2007). that are most effective in dealing with a problem. From the handful of individuals who founded It is this eclecticism toward solving psychology’s the APA in 1892 in Worcester, Massachusetts, un- problems that Sternberg and Grigorenko (2001) der the leadership of G. Stanley Hall, the member- believe may unify psychology as a discipline. It is ship has now grown to over 88,000 members. also the approach suggested by postmodernism. There are now more divisions of the APA (54) We will have more to say about both Sternberg than there were charter members (31) in 1892. and Grigorenko (2001) and postmodernism later Clearly, psychology’s popularity and diversity have in this chapter. been increasing, and they continue to do so. Divisions of the American Psychological Association THE TENSION BETWEEN Table 21.1 lists the 53 divisions of the APA, which PURE, SCIENTIFIC give a clear indication of the diversity of psychology PSYCHOLOGY AND APPLIED today (although the divisions go up to 55, there is no division 4 or 11, making a total of 53). Note, for PSYCHOLOGY example, that divisions include Experimental Psychology (3), Society for the Psychology of As we saw in Chapter 8, interest in sensory physi- Aesthetics, Creativity and the Arts (10), Society ology was stimulated by the discovery of individual for Military Psychology (19), Psychopharmacology differences in the observations made by astrono- and Substance Abuse (28), Humanistic Psychology mers. The scientific investigation that followed, (32), Society for the Psychology of Women (35), however, was concerned with sensation and per- and Psychoanalysis (39). The number of members ception in general, not with individual differences. in each division is also listed to show which areas of Such was the case with the work of Johannes psychology are currently the most popular. There is Müller, Helmholtz, Weber, Fechner, and Donders, no specific APA division of cognitive psychology, all of whom significantly influenced Wundt. When but if there were, it undoubtedly would have been Wundt founded psychology as an independent dis- among the fastest growing from the 1960s to the cipline in 1879, he saw its purpose as explaining the present (see, for example, Robins, Gosling, and human mind in general; he had little or no interest in Craik, 1999). Note that although a large number individual differences or in applied psychology. This of APA members have no divisional affiliation was not true of Wundt’s students from the United (49,216), total division memberships (71,054), ap- States, however. Typically, after receiving their proximates the total membership in the APA PhDs under Wundt’s supervision, students from (76,538). This occurs because it is common for an the United States returned home and pursued their APA member to belong to more than one APA interests in individual differences and applied psy- division. When affiliates (foreign psychologists, chology (for example, G. S. Hall and Witmer). high school psychology teachers, and undergradu- Cattell managed to pursue his interest in individual ate and graduate psychology students) are added to differences while studying with Wundt, but he was the APA membership, the number exceeds an exception. Of course, Cattell also pursued his in- 148,000. Incidentally, psychology continues to be terests in individual differences and applied psychol- one of the science and engineering fields with the ogy upon returning to the United States. Although

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646 CHAPTER 21 Text not available due to copyright restrictions

CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGY 647 Münsterberg was German, he eventually went to the cally oriented psychologists ever since, science came United States and did as much as anyone to develop first and applications came second. It was for this applied psychology. He too received his doctorate reason that the stated goal of the original APA under Wundt’s supervision. We see that from psy- was “to promote psychology as a science.” So chology’s very inception, there was tension between when the APA was founded in 1892, pure, scien- those wanting psychology to be a pure science de- tific psychology was valued more than applied psy- tached from practical concerns (such as Wundt) and chology, but both were valued. those wanting psychological principles to be applied In 1896, only four years after the founding of to practical matters (such as G. S. Hall, Cattell, the APA, Witmer created the first psychology clinic Witmer, and Münsterberg). It should be noted that and shortly thereafter coined the term clinical psy- one could be interested in individual differences chology. However, Witmer’s clinical psychology and from a purely scientific perspective without concern modern clinical psychology have little in common. for their practical implications (as Darwin was); but Witmer worked primarily with children with within psychology in the United States, interests in speech, motor, or learning disorders. He used what- individual differences and applied psychology have ever rudimentary tests and experimental principles always been closely related. were available to help diagnose, and then to solve, The fact that James, Münsterberg, Cattell, those problems; he “[groped] for adequate techni- Witmer, and Dewey were among the original ques as he went along” (McReynolds, 1987, p. members of the APA makes it clear that there was 854). Typically, Witmer created special educational considerable interest in applied psychology. This conditions to “treat” the problems he diagnosed. As observation is supported by the fact that the two we noted in Chapter 15, in addition to his contri- individuals most often mentioned as the founders butions to early clinical psychology, Witmer also of the school of functionalism—James and Dewey made significant contributions to school psychology —were part of this group. Functionalism, under the and special education. In any case, neither Witmer influence of evolutionary theory, was very con- nor any other psychologist at the time engaged in cerned with individual differences, and most psychotherapy; everyone agreed that the treatment functionalists had an active interest in applied of disease, both physical and mental, was the prov- psychology. ince of the medical profession. As we shall see However, Titchener, also an original member shortly, psychotherapy was rarely performed by of the APA, was even more disdainful of applied clinical psychologists until after World War II. psychology than was his mentor, Wundt. So upset Witmer nicely exemplifies the attitude of early was Titchener by the APA’s embracing of applied psychologists in the United States toward applied psychology that he refused to participate in any of psychology. First came rigorous, scientific training, its activities. Instead, he created his own organiza- and second came the attempt to apply scientific tion, The Experimentalists, which allowed its knowledge to the solution of practical problems— members to pursue their interests in pure, scientific in Witmer’s case, attempting to help troubled psychology—as he defined it. So the tension be- individuals. tween pure and applied psychology continued World War I greatly enhanced the growth and when the APA was created. popularity of psychology. In December 1916, shortly Note that no early psychologist argued for ap- before the United States entered the war, G. Stanley plied psychology instead of pure, scientific psychol- Hall addressed a joint session of the APA and the ogy. These psychologists knew the struggle that American Association for the Advancement of psychology had had in differentiating itself from Science (AAAS). He argued that the utilization of philosophy and religion, and they believed that applied psychology could increase military effi- anything in psychology worth applying came ciency. Even psychoanalytic theory, he said, could from its scientific base. For them, and for scientifi- be used to predict which soldiers would break

648 CHAPTER 21 down under fire. His address was well received by frustrated in their efforts to have that organization both scientists and the popular media (Ross, 1972, define and set standards for practitioners of psychol- p. 420). In March 1917, Hall launched the Journal of ogy; so in 1937 they left the APA and joined with Applied Psychology, the first journal in the United the ACP to create the American Association of States devoted to the problems of business and the Applied Psychology (AAAP), organized into four measurement of vocational aptitudes. A variation of sections corresponding to consulting, clinical, edu- the latter was to represent psychology’s major contri- cational, and business and industrial psychology. In bution to the war effort. We saw in Chapter 10 how, 1938 the AAAP took over the publication of the under the leadership of Yerkes, psychology be- Journal of Consulting Psychology. came deeply involved in the evaluation of soldiers In 1925 the APA had created the category of using the Army Alpha and Army Beta intelligence associate member for psychologists with a doctorate tests. but with no scientific publications beyond the dis- During the 1930s, applied psychologists con- sertation. Associates had no voting privileges within tinued as they had in the 1920s, serving primarily the APA. Most applied psychologists were associates as testers and evaluating juvenile offenders, troubled because they tended not to do research, and they children, and people seeking guidance about their were resentful of their second-class status. In 1941, intelligence, personality, or vocational aptitude. in an effort to reunify psychology, the APA re- Obviously, psychological testing developed far be- moved the requirement for full membership that yond the few intelligence tests created by Binet, an applicant had to publish research beyond the Terman, and others. Testing became a major indus- PhD dissertation. Instead, one became eligible for try, and this did not please many scientifically ori- full membership either through publication of sci- ented psychologists, who generally viewed testing entific research or by having a doctorate plus five as inferior to laboratory research. Scientific psychol- years’“contribution” to psychology as an associate ogy had always been associated with colleges and member. The availability of full membership in the universities (thus the terms academician and experi- APA based on practical experience was generally mental psychologist are often used synonymously). viewed as a significant step toward accepting ap- Tests allowed applied psychologists to work outside plied psychologists and pure, scientific psychologists of the university setting in industry, schools, and as equals. clinics or to be self-employed. The tension was In 1944, in a further attempt to unify the dis- increasing. parate interests of psychologists, the APA organized As the number of applied psychologists, includ- itself into 18 divisions, each with its own president ing clinicians, grew, they demanded greater recog- and officers. Further, the stated purpose of the APA nition and status within the APA. When this was changed to what it is today—“To advance psy- recognition was not forthcoming, applied psychol- chology as a science, as a profession, and a means of ogists began to create their own organizations. promoting human welfare.” Finally, a new journal, The first, the American Association of Clinical American Psychologist, first published in January Psychologists (AACP), was established in 1917 but 1946, was created as the voice of the new, unified disbanded in 1919 when the APA formed its first psychology. The reorganization of the APA into division, the clinical division. The resulting peace relatively independent divisions satisfied the applied lasted until 1930, when a group of applied psychol- psychologists, and in 1944 the AAAP disbanded by ogists from New York formed the Association of merging with the APA. Once again there was peace Consulting Psychologists (ACP). The ACP sought within psychology, but the peace was short-lived. to establish professional and ethical standards for After World War II, the need for psychother- practitioners of psychology and began publication apy among returning veterans far exceeded the ca- of the Journal of Consulting Psychology in 1937. pacity of psychiatrists and psychoanalysts to deal Members of the clinical division of the APA were with it. Rogers (1944) estimated that as many as

CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGY 649 80% of returning veterans requested counseling of chologists use reflect at least the following perspec- some kind. He noted that veterans needed help in tives, each with several subcategories: psycho- readjusting to civilian life; were often bitter because analytic, behavioristic, cognitive, humanistic, and few people at home realized the horrors of combat; existential. and expressed restlessness, disturbed sleep, excessive Before the end of World War II, clinical psy- emotionality, and marital and family disturbances. chologists were subservient to psychiatrists, who Also, veterans who had suffered disabling injuries dominated the mental health profession. When often needed psychological as well as physical ther- clinical psychologists began to engage in psycho- apy. In 1946 the Veterans Administration (VA) therapy, they entered into competition with psy- responded to the emergency by funding training chiatrists and therefore with the medical profession. programs at leading universities to train clinical psy- There followed a number of emotional battles (of- chologists whose jobs would include psychotherapy ten in the courts) concerning the kinds of services as well as diagnosis. Now the APA was confronted that psychologists could provide. For example, with a task it had avoided for decades—defining the Could psychologists admit and release patients professional psychologist and setting standards for into and out of mental institutions? Could psychol- his or her training and practice. We will see shortly ogists act as expert witnesses in court on matters of that the question concerning clinical psychologists’ mental health? Were clinical psychologists entitled training has still not been answered to everyone’s to third-party payment for their services (for exam- satisfaction. ple, from insurance companies and government When clinical psychologists became involved agencies)? Could clinical psychologists be certified in psychotherapy, they had little experience to by states as legal providers of mental health services? draw upon. Most clinicians knew something about Could clinical psychologists legally administer med- Freud, and his ideas were commonly utilized. ication? Until recently, clinical psychologists had Garfield (1981) commented on the domination of won all their battles with psychiatrists except the psychoanalysis following World War II: last one: psychiatrists could prescribe medication, but clinical psychologists could not. However, in The most important and influential orien- 2002 New Mexico became the first state in which tation in the 1940s was that of psycho- psychologists were granted prescription privileges, analysis. Psychoanalytic theory was the and in 2004 Louisiana became the second. In dominant force in psychiatry in the post- addition, 31 state psychological associations have war period and was embraced by a large prescription-privilege task forces working toward number of clinical psychologists. To a large such legislation. One of the newest APA divisions, extent, and for all practical purposes, the American Society for the Advancement of there was no rival orientation. (p. 176) Pharmacotherapy, facilitates and anticipates the As late as 1960, a survey indicated that 41% of inevitability of widespread prescription privileges clinical psychologists still adhered to a psychoana- among clinical psychologists. As matters now stand, lytic orientation (E. L. Kelly, 1961). Despite rather then, psychologists either have, or will soon have, serious controversies (see Chapter 16), psychoanal- all of the privileges that psychiatrists have. The ysis continues to be a formidable influence in both elimination of the prescription restriction is consid- contemporary psychiatry and clinical psychology. ered especially important because of the present In 1942 Rogers developed his client-centered concern with health care costs. Research has shown therapy, and it soon began competing successfully that medication is often at least as effective as psy- with psychoanalysis as a therapeutic technique. chotherapy in treating mental disorders. For exam- Other psychologists, such as George Kelly, simply ple, some forms of depression, perhaps the most invented their own techniques as they went along. common mental disorder of our time, have been Currently, the therapeutic techniques clinical psy- effectively treated by antidepressant drugs (for

650 CHAPTER 21 example, Klein, Gittelman, Quitkin, and Rifkin, the medical profession. Believing that such influ- 1980; Morris and Beck, 1974). Similarly, Baxter ence would demean the integrity of psychological and his co-authors (1992) demonstrated that medi- science, the authors suggest ways of preventing its cation is as effective as behavior therapy in treating occurrence. patients with obsessive-compulsive disorders. Finally, Reisman (1991) states, “It is no exaggera- Controversy Concerning the Training tion to say that the treatment of schizophrenia was of Clinical Psychologists remarkably altered by the use of drugs. Return of the patient to the community and maintaining The controversy between pure versus applied psy- the patient within the community were feasible chology is currently manifested in the question of goals” (p. 318). The important point is that if it how best to train clinical psychologists. As we have can be demonstrated that certain mental disorders seen, Witmer established a tradition in which clini- can be effectively and economically treated by cal psychology would be closely aligned with scien- drugs, clinical psychologists are at a disadvantage tific or experimental psychology. Then the person by not being able to prescribe them. performing the research and the person applying However, there is currently intense debate the knowledge gained from the research was often among those advocating medication as treatment the same person, as was true for Witmer. This tra- for mental disorders (such as depression), those ad- dition of scientist-practitioner was reconfirmed in vocating psychotherapy, and those advocating a 1949 at the Boulder Conference on Training in combination of the two. (For the flavor of this de- Clinical Psychology sponsored by the APA. The bate, see Antonuccio, 1995; Antonuccio, Danton, Boulder model upheld the tradition that clinicians and DeNelsky, 1994; DeNelsky, 1996; Hayes and obtain the Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in psychol- Heiby, 1997; Karon and Teixeria, 1995; Lorion, ogy, which meant that they were trained in re- 1996; Muñoz, Hollon, McGrath, Rehm, and search methodology as any other psychologist was. Vander Bos, 1994.) We have in this debate a mod- Increasingly, however, clinicians and students ern manifestation of the old tension between the of clinical psychology questioned the need to be medical and psychological models of mental illness. trained in scientific methodology in order to be- Physicians tend to view mental disorders such as come effective clinicians. As early as 1925, Loyal depression as illnesses or diseases, and they advocate Crane argued for the establishment of a special de- treating disorders with medication (medical model). gree to be earned by applied psychologists as op- Psychologists tend to view mental disorders as re- posed to scientifically oriented psychologists, but sulting from life’s circumstances (such as economic “the response to Crane’s plea was imperceptible” frustration, marital conflict, and personal loss), and (Reisman, 1991, p. 161). The professional degree they advocate treating disorders with psychotherapy that Crane suggested was later called the Doctor of (psychological model). Of course, some accept both Psychology (PsyD). In 1968 the University of models and thus advocate that patients be offered a Illinois offered the first PsyD degree, and in 1969 choice between, or a combination of, the two kinds the California School of Professional Psychology of treatment (for example, Muñoz et al., 1994). For (CSPP) was founded. The CSPP was significant discussions of the history of psychologists’ efforts to not only because it offered the PsyD degree but gain prescriptive privileges, the training necessary because it existed independently of any college or for such privileges, and the debate concerning its university. Problems associated with the creation of usefulness, see Sammons, Paige, and Levant, 2003. the PsyD degree and with free-standing professional Antonuccio, Danton, and McClanahan (2003) schools needed to be addressed, and a second con- are concerned that as psychologists gain prescription ference on the training of clinical psychologists was privileges, the pharmaceutical industry will seek the held in Vail, Colorado, in 1973. At this conference, same pervasive influence in psychology as it has in two decisions were made that broke radically from

CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGY 651 the tradition of clinicians as scientists-practitioners: tists and some are practitioners, but almost all PsyDs (1) professional schools (like CSPP) that could offer are practitioners. They propose that “all practi- advanced degrees in clinical psychology were sanc- tioners of psychology be clearly identified as doctors tioned, and they would be administratively auton- of psychology and hold the appropriate PsyD de- omous from university psychology departments; gree. … The PhD degree in psychology … should and (2) the PsyD degree was recognized. The be reserved for individuals who are qualified to en- PsyD degree provides professional training for clin- ter a career in research and scholarship” (p. 209). ical psychologists but without the intense exposure (For arguments opposing the PsyD, see, for exam- to research methodology typical of training for ple, Belar and Perry, 1991; Perry, 1979. For efforts the PhD. Proponents of the PsyD indicated that to reconcile the differences between scientific psy- the degree was equivalent to the Doctor of chologists and practitioners, see, for example, Medicine degree (MD), where practitioners of Beutler, Williams, Wakefield, and Entwistle, medicine apply the principles of biology, chemistry, 1995; Peterson, 1995; Stricker, 1997; Stricker and pharmacology, and other scientific fields to the Trierweiler, 1995.) For concerns about the quality treatment of physically ill persons. The PsyD would of training in PsyD programs, see Peterson, 2003; have a similar relationship to scientific psychology; Kenkel, DeLeon, Albino, and Porter, 2003. that is, the PsyD would apply principles discovered No matter how the question of clinical training by experimental psychologists to the treatment of is ultimately resolved, it is clear that practitioners of disturbed individuals. After the Vail decision, pro- psychology now dominate the membership of the fessional schools of psychology became very popu- APA. In 1940 about 70% of APA members worked lar, and as early as 1979, there were 24 such schools in academia and were therefore associated with sci- in California alone (Perry, 1979). As of 2000, the entific psychology; by 1985 only about 33% did. number of institutions granting the PsyD degree Currently, the vast majority of APA divisions reflect had grown to more than 50 and the number of applied (mainly clinical) psychology, whereas only a PsyDs that have been awarded is approximately minority reflect academic, research-oriented psy- 9,000 (Murray, 2000, p. 52). Although the PsyD chology. Shapiro and Wiggins (1994) indicate that degree is becoming increasingly popular, the train- nearly 70% of APA members identify themselves as ing of clinicians as scientist-practitioners continues health care providers. It is only natural, therefore, to dominate clinical programs (Baker and that the APA expend considerable resources addres- Benjamin, 2000; O’Sullivan and Quevillon, 1992). sing the needs of psychology’s practitioners. The In 1990 a conference was held in Gainesville, historic shoe is now on the other foot. Instead of Florida, to clarify aspects of the scientist- practitioners believing they are second-class mem- practitioner model that the Boulder conference bers of the APA, many scientifically oriented psy- had left unclear. Participants at the Gainesville con- chologists believe they are. As early as 1959, a ference reaffirmed the Boulder model as the one group of scientific psychologists, believing that most appropriate for the training of professional the APA no longer adequately represented their psychologists (Belar and Perry, 1992). interests, formed their own organization—the The decisions to establish the PsyD and profes- Psychonomic Society, under the leadership of sional schools of psychology independent of Clifford T. Morgan. The society held its first con- university psychology departments remain highly ference in 1960 and soon began publishing its own controversial. (For supporting arguments see, for journal, Psychonomic Science. In 1988 a group of example, Fox 1980, 1994; Meehl, 1971; Peterson, scientific psychologists founded the American 1976; and Shapiro and Wiggins, 1994.) Shapiro and Psychological Society (APS) with Janet Taylor Wiggins (1994) argue that the current degree situa- Spence as its first president (J. T. Spence had been tion in psychology is confusing to both professionals president of the APA in 1984). This national orga- and the public. For example, some PhDs are scien- nization, dedicated to scientific psychology, held its

652 CHAPTER 21 first convention in 1989 in Alexandria, Virginia, is made upon an emotional and not a rational basis” and began publication of its journal Psychological (1923, p. 344). Science in 1990. Recently, the name of the organi- The British scientist-novelist C. P. Snow (1964) zation was changed from American Psychological was so impressed by the different ways scientists Society to Association for Psychological Science and literary intellectuals (such as novelists) em- (still APS). Membership in APS rose from an initial braced the world that he concluded they actually 500 to approximately 18,000 in 2007. represented two distinct cultures—like the two We see that the tension between pure, scien- conflicting temperaments James noted among phi- tific psychology and applied psychology that char- losophers. Snow observed that one of these tem- acterized psychology in its earliest days is still very peraments (tender-minded) characterizes members much alive. It may be unduly optimistic to hope of the humanities and the other (tough-minded) this tension will ever be completely resolved. characterizes scientists, making meaningful com- Perhaps the discord is inevitable because psychol- munication between the two groups all but ogy embraces at least two basically incompatible impossible. Thomas Kuhn (1996) said of scientists, cultures. “The proponents of competing paradigms practice their trades in different worlds” (p. 150). Gregory Kimble (1917–2006) provided evidence that James’s Psychology’s Two Cultures two temperaments, Snow’s two cultures, and Kuhn’s Given contemporary psychology’s great diversity, incommensurability among competing scientific para- what is it that inclines a particular psychologist to- digms also characterize contemporary psychology. ward one brand of psychology as opposed to other Kimble (1984) administered a scale that mea- brands? A case can be made that it is a psychologist’s sured the extent to which various psychologists and personality or biography that, to a large extent, de- students of psychology accepted rigorous scientific termines the choice. James once said that the single values as opposed to humanistic values. The scale most informative thing you could know about a was administered to undergraduate students en- person is his or her Weltanschauung, or world- rolled in an introductory psychology course; offi- view. According to James, it is a philosopher’s cers of all divisions of the APA; and members of temperament that determines what type of Division 3 (Experimental Psychology), Division 9 Weltanschauung he or she has and thus the type of (Society for the Study of Social Issues), Division philosophy he or she will be inclined toward. As we 29 (Psychotherapy), and Division 32 (Humanistic saw in Chapter 11, James (1907/1981) argued that Psychology). The students showed a slight inclina- philosophers can be divided into two general tion toward humanistic values, and APA officers groups according to their temperaments: the (from all APA divisions collectively) showed an tender-minded and the tough-minded. James be- even more slight inclination toward scientific va- lieved that tension between tender-minded and lues. When data from members of individual APA tough-minded philosophers has existed throughout divisions were analyzed, however, the results were history: “The tough think of the tender as senti- more dramatic. Scores for members of Division 3 mentalists and soft-heads. The tender feel the tough (Experimental Psychology) were strongly biased in to be unrefined, callous, or brutal” (1907/1981, p. the direction of scientific values. Almost the oppo- 11). In 1923 Karl Lashley discussed the reason some site was true for the members of the other divisions psychologists accept a mechanistic brand of psy- tested. Scores for members of Division 9 (Society chology (such as Watson’s) and others accept a pur- for the Study of Social Issues) were moderately bi- posive brand (such as McDougall’s). Lashley ased in the direction of humanistic values. Scores reached much the same conclusion about psychol- for members of Division 29 (Psychotherapy) were ogists that James had reached about philosophers: strongly biased in the direction of humanistic “It is wholly a matter of temperament; the choice values, as were scores for members of Division 32

CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGY 653 (Humanistic Psychology). To use James’s terminol- A string of raw facts; a little gossip and a ogy, experimental psychologists tend to be tough- wrangle about opinions; a little classifica- minded, and humanistic psychologists and tion and generalization on the mere de- psychotherapists tend to be tender-minded. scriptive level; a strong prejudice that we Kimble (1984) concluded that two essentially in- have states of mind, and that our brain commensurable cultures exist in psychology. If conditions them: but not a single law in Kimble’s conclusion is correct, it would explain the same sense in which physics shows us the historic tension between pure, scientific and ap- laws, not a single proposition from which plied psychologists. If these two groups embrace any consequence can causally be deduced. basically incompatible values, then perhaps the ten- … This is no science, it is only the hope sion between them can be resolved only by the for a science. (p. 335) groups going their separate ways. However, dividing philosophers, psychologists, More than 40 years later, Heidbreder (1933) or educated people into just two categories is a offered her description of psychology: gross oversimplification. Snow realized this prob- Psychology is, in fact, interesting, if for no lem, saying that “the number 2 is a very dangerous other reason, because it affords a spectacle of number. … Attempts to divide anything into two a science still in the making. Scientific cu- ought to be regarded with much suspicion” (1964, riosity, which has penetrated so many of the p. 9). Kimble agreed, saying that the appearance of ways of nature, is here discovered in the just two cultures in psychology was created by the very act of feeling its way through a region careful selection of the APA divisions he evaluated. it has only begun to explore, battering at Although some psychologists fall at either end of barriers, groping through confusions, and the scientific-humanistic continuum, most psychol- working sometimes fumblingly, sometimes ogists would fall at various points in between. craftily, sometimes excitedly, sometimes Instead of describing psychology in terms of two wearily, at a problem that is still largely cultures, a description in terms of several cultures unsolved. For psychology is a science that would be more accurate. In fact, there are probably has not yet made its great discovery. It has as many “cultures” in psychology as there are con- found nothing that does for it what atomic ceptions of human nature. theory has done for chemistry, the principle Apparently, psychology’s history and the of organic evolution for biology, the laws of Zeitgeist have combined to create a psychological motion for physics. Nothing that gives it a smorgasbord, and it is the psychologist’s personality unifying principle has yet been discovered that determines which items in that smorgasbord or recognized. As a rule, a science is pre- are appealing. Of course, the same is true for stu- sented, from the standpoint of both subject- dents of psychology. matter and development, in the light of its great successes. Its verified hypotheses form the established lines about which it sets its facts in order, and about which it orga- nizes its research. But psychology has not PSYCHOLOGY ’SSTA T US A S yet won its great unifying victory. It has had A SCIENCE flashes of perception, it holds a handful of clues, but it has not yet achieved a synthesis This is James’s (1892/1985) description of psychol- or an insight that is compelling as well as ogy as it appeared to him: plausible. (pp. 425–426)

654 CHAPTER 21 Although the views of James and Heidbreder knowledge elements and associated are separated by more than four decades, they are methodological-theoretical structures. remarkably similar. Have things improved in the (p. 149) more than 70 years since Heidbreder recorded her thoughts? As we saw in Chapter 1, after addressing Only rarely can a psychologist be found who the question of whether psychology is a science, believes that psychology is a unified discipline. For Koch (1981, 1993) concluded that rather than psy- example, Matarazzo (1987) argues that a body of chology being a single discipline, it is several—some knowledge and basic processes and principles form of which are scientific, but most of which are not. the core of psychology, and they have remained Koch believed that it would be more realistic to essentially the same for the last 100 years. refer to our discipline as psychological studies rather Furthermore, Matarazzo maintains that various than as the science of psychology. The designation types of psychology (such as clinical, industrial, so- psychological studies recognizes the diversity of psy- cial, experimental, and developmental) simply apply chology and shows a willingness to use a wide va- the same core content, processes, and principles to riety of methods while studying humans. different types of problems. Although in 1984 Finally, Staats (1989) offered his assessment of Kimble described psychology as consisting of contemporary psychology: two basically incompatible cultures, he recently expressed hope that psychology might become a Fields of psychology have developed as unified discipline. His version of unification, how- separate entities, with little or no planning ever, sides with psychology’s scientific culture: with respect to their relationships. “Psychology’s best hope for unity derives from Research areas grow in isolation without the simple truth that the sundry versions of the dis- ever being called on to relate themselves cipline are all kin to natural science” (Kimble, 1994, to the rest of psychology. There are vari- p. 510). Kimble (1996b) elaborated his vision of ous oppositional positions—nature versus psychology as a unified science: nurture, situationism versus personality, scientific versus humanistic psychology— It portrays psychology as a natural science that separate works throughout the many and offers a set of axioms, fashioned after problem areas of psychology. Different Newton’s laws of motion, as the funda- methods of study are employed and psy- mental principles that hold the field chologists are divided by the methodology together. that they know and use and will accept. The argument begins with a reminder There are innumerable theories, large and that a science of psychology must obey the small—it is said that there are 100–400 rules of science: it must be deterministic, separate psychotherapy theories alone— empirical, and analytic. To honor those and everyone is free to construct a per- criteria, it must be some form of behav- sonal theory without relating its elements iorism, based on stimuli and response, be- to those in other theories. Many theoret- cause the sciences are about observable ical structures, which serve as the basis for reality. (p. ix) empirical efforts, are taken from the common language as opposed to system- Kimble (1999) extended his argument that psy- atically developed theories. The practice of chology’s diverse elements could be reconciled constructing small common sense con- using a natural science model. Edward Wilson ceptual structures as the basis for one’s (1998) argues that differences within psychol- specialized work in psychology provides ogy can be reconciled within the framework of an infinity of different and unrelated evolutionary theory. It is unlikely, however, that

CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGY 655 psychology’s other culture, or cultures, would ac- Sternberg (2005) presents several strategies that cept either Kimble’s or Wilson’s premise for unifi- could be used to accomplish the difficult task of cation. Perhaps the approach toward unification unifying psychology. suggested by Sternberg and Grigorenko (2001) is We see that in the more than 100 years since more promising: James made his assessment of psychology, and in the more than seven decades since Heidbreder’s assess- We believe that a more sensible and psy- ment, the situation has not significantly changed. chologically justifiable way of organizing Most would agree that psychology is still a collec- psychology as a discipline and in depart- tion of different facts, theories, assumptions, meth- ments and graduate study is in terms of odologies, and goals. It is still not clear how much psychological phenomena —which are not of psychology is scientific or even can be scientific, arbitrary—rather than so-called fields of and even those who believe psychology can be a psychology—which largely are arbitrary. science debate over what type of a science it Under this approach, an individual might should be. choose to specialize in a set of related Some psychologists see psychology’s diversity phenomena, such as learning and memory, as necessary because of the complexity of humans. stereotyping and prejudice, or motivation Others see it as a sign that psychology has failed to and emotion, and then study the phe- carefully employ scientific method. Still others say nomena of interest from multiple points of that psychology is diverse because it is still in the view. The individual thus would reach a preparadigmatic stage that characterizes the early fuller understanding of the phenomena development of a science. Thus, psychology is being studied because he or she would not characterized by diversity even regarding opinions be limited by a set of assumptions or as to what its ultimate status can be. The answers to methods drawn from only one field of the question, Is psychology a science? include the psychology. (p. 1075) following: no, it is a preparadigmatic discipline; no, According to Sternberg and Grigorenko, it is its subject matter is too subjective to be investigated the tendency of psychologists to identify with a scientifically; no, but it could and should be a sci- specific perspective or methodology that creates ence; yes and no, some of psychology is scientific, unnecessary and unproductive diversity within psy- and some is not; yes, psychology is a scientific dis- chology. This can be avoided by realizing that psy- cipline with a core content and a shared scientific chological phenomena are most effectively studied methodology. The answer then depends on who is from a variety of perspectives. They offer the study asked and which aspect of psychology is considered. of learning as an example: Psychology’s status as a science features promi- nently in the current debate between modernism If one considers a basic psychological and postmodernism, to which we turn next. phenomenon, such as learning, one realizes that it can be studied in terms of an evo- lutionary paradigm, a brain-based biologi- cal paradigm, a cognitive paradigm, a be- POSTMODERNISM haviorist paradigm, a psychoanalytic paradigm, a genetic-epistemological para- Premodernism refers to the belief, prevalent dur- digm, and so forth. There is no one correct ing the Middle Ages, that all things, including hu- perspective. Each perspective presents a man behavior, could be explained in terms of different way of understanding the prob- church dogma. The questioning of church author- lem of learning. (p. 1075) ity began in the Renaissance and eventually led to

656 CHAPTER 21 more objective modes of inquiry. Individuals such theme of questioning the existence of universal as Newton, Bacon, and Descartes demonstrated the truth, which began in ancient philosophy, was re- explanatory power of reason that was unencum- born in romantic and existential philosophy and has bered by authority and bias. The Enlightenment been perpetuated into contemporary psychology by ensued, and experience and reason were empha- “third-force” or humanistic psychology (see sized in the quest for knowledge (see Chapter 7). Chapter 18). What postmodernism shares with the The terms modernism and Enlightenment have Sophists, Skeptics, romantics, existentialists, and hu- come to be used synonymously (Norris, 1995, p. manistic psychologists is the belief that “truth” is 583). The ideals of the Enlightenment began to always relative to cultural, group, or personal per- be challenged by such philosophers as Hume and spectives. In fact, postmodernism has been referred Kant (see Chapters 5 and 6), who demonstrated the to as “radical relativism” (Smith, 1994, p. 408). limitations of human rationality. Also, romanticism Fishman (1999) provides an overview of and existentialism (see Chapter 7) can be viewed as postmodernism: a reaction against the Enlightenment belief that hu- man behavior can be explained in terms of abstract A core idea in postmodernism is that we are universal laws or principles. Kierkegaard’s claim that always interpreting our experienced reality “truth is subjectivity” and Nietzsche’s “perspecti- through a pair of conceptual glasses— vism” are two clear examples of this opposition. glasses based on such factors as our present Later, William James’s concepts of radical empiri- personal goals in this particular situation, cism and pragmatism (see Chapter 11) showed a our past experiences, our values and atti- similar disdain for universalism. In fact, James re- tudes, our body of knowledge, the nature ferred to absolutism as “the great disease of philo- of language, present trends in contempo- sophical thought” (1890/1950, Vol. 1, p. 353). rary culture, and so forth. It is never possi- Since about the mid-1960s, postmodernism ble to take the glasses off altogether and (also called social constructionism and deconstruc- view the world as it “really is,” with pure tionism) has renewed the attack on Enlightenment objectivity. All we can do is change glasses ideals. In essence, the postmodernist believes that and realize that different pairs provide dif- “reality” is created by individuals and groups within ferent pictures and perspectives of the various personal, historical, or cultural contexts. world. (p. 5) This, of course, contrasts with the modernist (Enlightenment) belief that reality is some immuta- ble truth waiting to be discovered by experience, Ludwig Wittgenstein unbiased reason, or the methods of science. Postmodernism has much in common not only Language Games. Postmodernists find support with romanticism, existentialism, and aspects of for their relativism in the concept of language James’s psychology but also with the ancient philos- games proposed by the influential Austrian philos- ophies of the Sophists and Skeptics. In Chapter 2 opher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951). In his we noted that the Sophists believed that there Philosophical Investigations (1953/1997), published was not one truth but many truths, and these truths posthumously, Wittgenstein argued that the only varied with individual experience. It was Protagoras meaning that terms and concepts have is that which who said, “Man is the measure of all things,” thus is assigned to them within a community. According anticipating much of postmodernism. In fact, to Wittgenstein, language is a tool used by mem- Roochnik (2000, lecture 7) says, “The contempo- bers of a community to communicate with one rary Sophist is called a postmodernist.” In Chapter 3 another. Each community determines the meaning we noted that the Skeptics questioned all dogma- of its own language and determines the rules ac- tism; that is, all claims of indisputable truth. This cording to which language is used. That is, each

CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGY 657 community creates its own language games, which, that world. Rather, he argued that people can, and in turn, create its own “form of life.” Clearly, do, give their experiences a wide variety of mean- Wittgenstein did not employ the term game in a ings. Sluga and Stern (1996) give an example: “A frivolous or unimportant sense. To understand a coin is currency, but that doesn’t destroy its reality community is to understand its language games. as a metal disc existing independently of our belief Wittgenstein (1953/1997, pp. 11–12) provided a in it” (p. 359). Furthermore, there must be regular- partial list of language games that may characterize ity to our experience of the physical world for some a community; they include the accepted ways of language games to have meaning, Wittgenstein giving and obeying orders, describing and measur- gives, as an example, the weighing of a commodity ing objects, reporting and speculating about events, to determine its buying and selling price: “The pro- forming and testing hypotheses, making up and cedure of putting a lump of cheese on a balance and reading stories, acting, singing, telling jokes, solving fixing the price by the turn of the scale would lose arithmetic problems, asking questions, cursing, its point if it frequently happened for such lumps to greeting, and praying. suddenly grow or shrink for no obvious reason” For Wittgenstein, then, it is wrong to view (1953/1997, p. 56). language as reflecting a mind-independent reality. According to Wittgenstein, most, if not all, dis- Instead, he said, language creates reality. Thus he, putes among philosophers and psychologists could like the postmodernists, rejected the “correspon- be resolved by understanding that different philo- dence theory of truth” (see Chapter 1). Comm- sophical and psychological paradigms reflect their unication problems occur when language games own language games. In other words, paradigms from different communities are mixed or when lan- must be understood within the context of their guage games within a community are misused. own meanings and their own agendas. For Wittgenstein didn’t deny the existence of a physical Wittgenstein the great philosophical debates that world nor that our senses bring us into contact with occurred over the centuries were not over conflict- ing realities but over conflicting language games. For example, “Wittgenstein calls our attention to the fact that the explanation [of behavior] by causes and the explanation by reasons correspond to two different language games” (Bouversse, 1995, p. 73). Likewise, the traditional debates over material- ism versus idealism, free will versus determinism, rationalism versus empiricism, nominalism versus realism, science versus nonscience, and those con- cerning mind-body relationships are, according to Wittgenstein, debates over linguistic practices. What then is the role of philosophy? According to Wittgenstein, “Philosophy is a battle against the Images bewitchment of our intelligence by means of lan- guage” (1953/1997, p. 47). In agreement with Archive/Stringer/Getty Wittgenstein, Gergen (2001) says, “Theoretical ac- counts of the world are not mirror reflections of the world but discursive actions within a community” © Hulton (p. 811). It should be clear that Kuhn’s philosophy of science (see Chapter 1) has much in common with Wittgenstein’s philosophy. In fact, Kuhn con- Ludwig Wittgenstein cluded his highly influential The Structure of Scientific

658 CHAPTER 21 Revolutions (1996) with this very Wittgensteinian games, horses are horses, and beautiful things are statement: “Scientific knowledge, like language, is beautiful things not because each instance of such intrinsically the common property of a group or things reflects a universal essence but because there else nothing at all. To understand it we shall need is a family resemblance among them. Eleanor to know the special characteristics of the groups that Rosch and Carolyn Mervis (1975) found empirical create it” (p. 20). support for Wittgenstein’s contention that family resemblances, not defining features (essences), are Family Resemblance. Beginning with Socrates, utilized in human categorization. Plato, and Aristotle and continuing through According to Wittgenstein, there is nothing to Scholasticism to the present, there have been phi- be discovered by rational analysis. When one de- losophers who believed that to be a member of a scribes how words are actually used, one discovers category required the possession of some defining that general categories are formed on the basis of characteristic. That is, to be a member of a cate- family resemblance, not on the basis of essence. gory, an instance must manifest the essence of that Again, Wittgenstein argued that most, if not all, category. For example, for something to be consid- philosophical debates can be resolved by noting ered beautiful or just, it must possess the essence of how language is actually used within a verbal com- beauty or justice. Wittgenstein rejected this argu- munity. He believed philosophy should be descrip- ment. Once again, he beckons us to observe how tive rather than theoretical, saying, “We must words are actually used within a community. As an do away with all explanation and description example, he describes the numerous activities we alone must take its place” (1953/1997, p. 47) and refer to as “games” (1953/1997, pp. 31–32). He “Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and notes that there are board games, card games, ball neither explains nor deduces anything. Since every- games, and Olympic games, among others. Some thing lies open to view there is nothing to explain. require considerable intellectual or physical skill, For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to others less. Some can be played alone; others can- us”(1953/1997, p. 50). Stroll (2002) summarizes not. Some involve winning and losing; others do Wittgenstein’s position as follows: not. What is the common element among these Wittgenstein is urging that one compare activities that make them all games? According to and contrast cases in order to see how Wittgenstein, there is none. Instead, they are re- words like “number,”“game,” and “tool” lated in the same way that family members are are used in ordinary life. The method is related. Family members may share many character- applicable to all concepts traditional phi- istics. For example, they may tend to have similar losophers have explored. It replaces the eyes, noses, chins, heights, hair colors, tempera- search for the essence of things and the ments, gaits, and so forth. However, not all family need to “penetrate phenomena” by an members share the same characteristics. A child may example-oriented, case by case description have its father’s eyes and its mother’s hair. Another of the uses of words. (p. 116) child may have its grandmother’s sense of humor and its grandfather’s chin, and so forth. In other Both Wittgenstein and the postmodernists words, there is a cluster of traits that “overlap and agree that what is considered “true” within one crisscross” within a family, but there is no essence or community may not have validity beyond the com- universal characteristic shared by all family mem- munity that defined it as such. Gergen (1994) gives bers. So it is with games and all other concepts. an example: For Wittgenstein, then, the search for essences or universals is doomed to failure. Thus, Wittgenstein We are urged to consider, for example, the replaced the traditional concept of essence or uni- effects on the culture of such terms as versal with that of family resemblance. Games are depression, defined as a psychological

CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGY 659 disorder, reified in our measures, and treated as only one approach, among many, to understand- chemically. How is it that peoples in other ing humans. In any case, a sometimes heated debate cultures and preceding centuries manage(d) between modernism and postmodernism exists in without such a concept, yet contemporary contemporary psychology. For arguments in favor psychologists detect depression in all corners of postmodernism, see, for example, Gergen, 1991, of society (now even in infants), and over six 1994, 2001. For arguments against postmodernism, million Americans now “require” Prozac? see, for example, M. B. Smith, 1994. What professions stand to profit by this As has been the case with most dichotomies in particular set of constructions and practices? psychology’s history, compromises have been sug- Is it possible that the public has served as an gested between modernism and postmodernism. unwitting victim? (p. 414) For proposals that contain elements of both mod- ernism and postmodernism, see, for example, In other words, according to Gergen, and Fishman (1999), who features pragmatism in his others (for example, Szasz, 1974), it is possible compromise, and Schneider (1998), who features that a psychological community has created the romanticism. Also, the approach to unifying psy- concept of depression, and other forms of “mental chology suggested by Sternberg and Grigorenko illness” because doing so has meaning, and benefits, (2001; discussed earlier) is similar to the approach for members of that community. This, however, to studying psychology suggested by the postmod- should not be taken as evidence that such illnesses ernist. Both argue that psychology’s problems actually exist in some more objective sense. They would be best solved by approaching them from represent language games created and utilized by a multiple perspectives. specific psychological community for its own purposes. The tension between modernism and post- IS TH ERE ANYTHING N EW IN modernism continues in contemporary psychology. When psychology became a science in the late 19th PS YCHOLOGY? century, it sought the laws that govern the human mind. The goal was to understand the human mind No doubt, some aspects of psychology are newer in general, not in particular. Techniques and theo- and better than they have ever been. A number of ries have changed through the years, but the search techniques have been developed that have vastly for the general laws governing human conduct has increased our ability to study brain functioning. never waned. This belief that science can unveil the These techniques include electroencephalography truth about human nature has been, and is, a major (EEG), magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), com- theme in the history of psychology. For the scien- puterized tomography (CT), and positron emission tifically inclined psychologist, the methods used to tomography (PET). Also, a variety of new drugs understand human behavior are the same as those have provided psychobiologists with powerful re- used by the natural scientists to understand the search tools. In addition to their involvement in physical world. Postmodernism rejects this natural biological research and their use as a model for un- science model. derstanding cognitive processes, computers allow Perhaps another way of understanding the cul- for complex data analysis that only a few years tural differences within psychology discussed earlier ago would have been impossible. So the answer in this chapter is in terms of modernism and post- to the question, Is there anything new in psychol- modernism. Psychologists embracing modernism ogy? must be yes. But note that our examples were value the methods of natural science in their search all technological rather than conceptual. When we for the general laws governing human behavior. look at the larger issues, the answer to our question Psychologists embracing postmodernism see science seems to be negative. Throughout psychology’s

660 CHAPTER 21 history, emphases have changed and research tools come insensitive to many things of very have improved, but it seems that psychology is still great importance. Theology, on the other addressing the same questions it has addressed since hand, induces a dogmatic belief that we its inception. Because we elaborated on psychol- have knowledge where in fact we have ogy’s persistent questions and issues in Chapter 1, ignorance, and by doing so generates a we will simply list them here: kind of impertinent insolence towards the universe. Uncertainty, in the presence of ■ What is the nature of human nature? vivid hopes and fears, is painful, but must ■ How are the mind and body related? be endured if we wish to live without the ■ To what extent are the causes of human be- support of comforting fairy tales. It is not havior innate as opposed to experiential? good either to forget the questions that philosophy asks, or to persuade ourselves ■ To what extent, if any, is human behavior that we have found indubitable answers to freely chosen as opposed to completely them. (p. xiv) determined? ■ Is there some vital (nonmaterial) force in hu- In his book The Limits of Science (1985), Peter man nature that prevents a completely mech- Medawar agrees with Russell that science’s ability anistic explanation of human behavior? to answer certain questions is unequaled, but there are crucial questions that science cannot answer. ■ To what extent do the irrational aspects of Medawar argues that such questions are more ap- human nature (for example, emotions, intui- propriately addressed by philosophy, or even—con- tions, and instincts) contribute to human be- trary to Russell—by theology. havior as opposed to the rational aspects? However, it is not necessary to label psychol- ■ How are humans related to nonhuman ogy’s persistent questions as philosophical to animals? demonstrate that they cannot be answered with ■ What is the origin of human knowledge? certitude. As seen in Chapter 1, Popper said that there are no final truths even in science. The high- ■ To what extent does objective (physical) reality est status that a scientific explanation can have is determine human behavior as opposed to sub- “not yet disconfirmed.” Although Popper and jective (mental) reality? Kuhn differed in their basic conceptions of science, ■ What accounts for the unity and continuity of both believed in the dynamic nature of “scientific experience? truth.” Kuhn said, “All past beliefs about nature ■ Are there knowable universal truths about the have sooner or later turned out to be false. On world in general or people in particular, or the record, therefore, the probability that any cur- must truth always be relative to an individual or rently proposed belief will fare better must be close group perspective? to zero” (Kuhn, 2000b, p. 115). All explanations, even scientific explanations, will eventually be Psychology’s persistent questions are essentially found to be false; the search for truth is unending. philosophical questions, and so proposed answers to Thus, important questions, whether approached them will always be tentative and uncertain. The philosophically or scientifically, must be persistent following point made by Bertrand Russell (1945) questions. pertains to the major questions addressed by both It also appears that through the centuries, phi- philosophy and psychology: losophers, theologians, and psychologists have dis- Science tells us what we can know, but covered partial truths about humans and have what we can know is little, and if we for- confused them with the whole truth. When these get how much we cannot know we be- individuals were convincing and the time was right,

CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGY 661 their ideas became popular enough to grow into one of the forms of human thought. schools. Perhaps to ask whether the voluntarists, (p. 41) structuralists, functionalists, behaviorists, Gestaltists, psychoanalysts, and the humanistic psychologists Where does this leave the student of psychol- were right or wrong is to ask the wrong question. ogy? Psychology is not a place for people with a A better question might be, How much of the truth low tolerance for ambiguity. The diverse and some- about humans was captured by each of these view- times conflicting viewpoints that characterize con- points? Perhaps they are all partially correct, and temporary psychology will undoubtedly continue perhaps there are many other truths about humans to characterize psychology in the future. There is not yet revealed by any viewpoint. As Jung growing recognition that psychology must be as (1921/1971) said, diverse as the humans whose behavior it attempts to explain. For those looking for the “one truth,” The assumption that only one psychology this state of affairs is distressing. For those willing to exists or only one fundamental psycholog- ponder several truths, psychology is and will con- ical principle is an intolerable tyranny, a tinue to be an exciting field. If Heraclitus was cor- pseudo-scientific prejudice . … Even rect in believing that “all things are born in flux,” when this is done in a scientific spirit, it contemporary psychology is in a perfect position to should not be forgotten that science is not have multiple births. the summa of life, that it is actually only … SUMMARY Contemporary psychology is a diverse discipline Because large numbers of World War II veterans that reflects a wide variety of historical influences. needed psychotherapy, the Veterans Administration In contemporary psychology, there is a spirit of funded programs to train psychologists as psy- eclecticism, a willingness to employ whatever chotherapists. Gradually, psychotherapy became the methods are effective in studying various aspects primary function of clinical psychologists. As the of humans. Psychology’s great diversity is shown number of applied psychologists (such as clinicians) in the 54 divisions of the APA. From its inception, increased, they began creating their own organiza- there was tension within psychology between those tions independent of the APA through which to pur- wanting it to be purely scientific and those seeking sue their professional interests. Eventually, the APA to apply psychological principles to the solution of reacted by creating divisions that reflected both scien- practical problems. When the APA was founded in tific and applied interests. The resulting peace was 1892, its goal was to promote psychology as a sci- only temporary because applied psychology came to ence; however, most of the charter members were dominate the APA. As the applied psychologists had also sympathetic toward applied psychology. An done earlier, scientific psychologists began to perceive exception was Titchener who, like his mentor themselves as second-class members of the APA, and Wundt, had disdain for applied psychology. they reacted by creating their own organizations. The The clinical psychology founded by Witmer in tension between pure, scientific psychologists and ap- 1896 had little in common with modern clinical plied psychologists also manifests itself in the current psychology. Until World War II, the primary func- controversy concerning the training of clinical psy- tion of clinical psychologists was to administer psy- chologists. One view is that clinical psychologists chological tests and evaluate test performance. As should receive the same rigorous training as does the emphasis on testing grew, so did the tension any other PhD in psychology. That is, clinicians between pure, scientific and applied psychologists. should be scientist-practitioners. The other view is

662 CHAPTER 21 that clinical psychologists should be trained in the or the Enlightenment, ensued. Stimulated by the professional application of scientific principles but work of such individuals as Newton, Bacon, and not trained in scientific methodology. That is, clini- Descartes, a search for the universal laws or princi- cians should earn PsyDs. As clinical psychologists en- ples governing human behavior began. This search tered the realm of psychotherapy, they were brought was stimulated by Newton’s success in explaining into conflict with psychiatrists, and numerous court most physical phenomena in terms of only a few battles ensued concerning the rights of clinical psy- scientific principles. Modernism embraced objective chologists. With the recent granting of prescriptive rationality and empirical observation in its search for privileges to clinical psychologists in New Mexico truth and came into full fruition in British and and Louisiana, the services legally provided by psy- French empiricism and positivism. Philosophers chiatrists and psychologists in those states are essen- such as Hume and Kant demonstrated limitations tially the same. There is little doubt that other states in the ability of humans to understand physical re- will also grant prescriptive privileges in the near ality, and the ideals of modernism began to be ques- future. tioned. For example, the romantic and existential James noted that a philosopher’s temperament philosophers questioned whether human behavior inclines him or her toward tender-minded (subjec- could be explained in terms of universal, abstract tive) philosophy or tough-minded (objective) principles. Instead they embraced perspectivism, philosophy. The scientist-novelist C. P. Snow ob- saying that “truth” is determined by individual or served that the values accepted by scientists and group circumstances. The third-force orhumanistic those accepted by individuals in the humanities psychologists also rejected universalism.This belief are so distinct as to reflect two separate cultures. in the relativity of truth ushered in postmodernism. Kimble provided evidence that something like The relativistic position of postmodernism found James’s two temperaments and Snow’s two cultures support in Wittgenstein’s concept of language also exist in contemporary psychology. Perhaps the games. According to Wittgenstein, each commu- tension between pure, scientific and applied psy- nity creates the meaning of its own language and, chologists might be explained by the existence of therefore, to understand a language one must un- two incommensurable cultures within psychology. derstand how it is used within the community that In 1892 James concluded that psychology was created it. For Wittgenstein, philosophical disputes still hoping to become a science. In 1933 reflect conflicting language games, and it is the job Heidbreder reached more or less the same conclu- of philosophy to clarify this fact. Wittgenstein sion. More recently, Koch argued that although sought to replace the ancient philosophical concept some aspects of psychology are scientific, most are of essence with that of family resemblance. For him, not. Also, Staats observes that psychology is a dis- membership in a category can be attained by the unified discipline, but he suggests that with consid- possession of one or more features from a set, or erable effort it could become a unified science. family, of features that characterize a category; not Only rarely does someone claim, as Matarazzo just by possessing one feature considered essential. does, that psychology is a unified science. Several Within contemporary psychology, there is much in suggestions have been offered as to how psychology common among the ancient philosophies of the might become a unified discipline, but contempo- Sophists and Skeptics, humanistic (third-force) psy- rary psychology remains highly diversified. Now, as chology, and postmodernism. throughout history, psychology’s status as a science Psychology has provided considerable informa- is difficult to determine. tion about such things as learning, memory, brain Premodernism refers to the belief held during functioning, and childhood and adult thinking and the Middle Ages that religious dogma explains ev- has refined many of its research tools because of erything. Starting with the Renaissance humanists, technological advances. In a broader sense, how- religious authority was questioned and modernism, ever, psychology continues to respond to questions

CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGY 663 that the early Greek philosophers posed. Although have no final answers and, on this point, Popper the emphases have changed—as well as research and Kuhn were in agreement. It is also possible tools and terminology—psychology continues to that various philosophies and psychological schools address the same issues and questions that it has have provided only partial truths about human na- always addressed. It may be that psychology’s per- ture and that many more truths will be forthcom- sistent issues and questions are philosophical in na- ing. For those with a high tolerance for ambiguity, ture and therefore have no final answers. According psychology is and will continue to be an exciting to Popper, even if psychology’s persistent questions discipline. are scientific rather than philosophical, they still DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 1. What evidence supports the claim that con- 9. What characterized premodern philosophy and temporary psychology is highly diverse? What psychology? accounts for this diversity? 10. What is modernism? Who were its champions 2. Summarize the history of the controversy and what were its ideals? concerning psychology as a pure, scientific 11. Define postmodernism and give examples of discipline as opposed to an applied discipline. how postmodernist thinking manifested itself 3. What was the primary function of clinical throughout the history of psychology. psychologists before World War II? After 12. Describe the relevance of Wittgenstein’s con- World War II? cept of language games to postmodernism. 4. Discuss the steps taken by the APA through the 13. How, according to Wittgenstein, are traditional years to reduce the tension between pure, sci- philosophical debates best understood and entific psychology and applied psychology. resolved? 5. How were conflicts between clinical psychol- 14. Discuss Wittgenstein’s concept of family re- ogists and psychiatrists resolved? What conflict semblance. What older philosophical concept remains? was he attempting to displace with this 6. Summarize the arguments for and against the concept? PsyD degree. 15. Make a case that the answer to the question, Is 7. Support or refute Kimble’s contention that there anything new in psychology? is both yes contemporary psychology consists of at least and no. two incommensurable cultures. 16. Why are psychology’s persistent questions so 8. Is psychology a science? Summarize the various persistent? answers to this question reviewed in this chapter. SU GGE STIONS FOR FURTHER READING Fishman, D. B. (1999). The case for pragmatic psychology. Gergen, K. J. (2001). Psychological science in a post- New York: New York University Press. modern context. American Psychologist, 56, 803–813.

664 CHAPTER 21 Grayling, A. C. (2001). Wittgenstein: A very short intro- Sternberg, R. J. (Ed.). (2005). Unity in psychology: duction. New York: Oxford University Press. Possibility or pipedream? Washington, DC: American Hacker, P. M. S. (1999). Wittgenstein on human nature. Psychological Association. New York: Routledge. Sternberg, R. J., & Grigorenko, E. L. (2001). Unified Powell, J. (1998). Postmodernism for beginners. New York: psychology. American Psychologist, 56, 1069–1079. Writers and Readers Publishing. Viney, W. (1989). The cyclops and the twelve-eyed Schulte, J. (1993). Experience and expression: Wittgenstein’s toad: William James and the unity-disunity problem philosophy of psychology. New York: Oxford in psychology. American Psychologist, 44, 1261–1265. University Press. GLOSSARY Doctor of Psychology (PsyD) The doctoral degree in observation were emphasized. The period during which clinical psychology that emphasizes training in the pro- this belief prevailed is called the Enlightenment. fessional application of psychological principles rather Postmodernism Opposes the search for abstract, uni- than in scientific methodology. versal laws or principles thought to govern human be- Eclecticism The willingness to employ the most ef- havior. Instead of being governed by abstract, universal fective methods available in solving a problem. laws or principles, human behavior, say the postmoder- Family resemblance Wittgenstein’s contention that a nists, can be understood only within the cultural, group, category does not have a defining feature (essence) that or personal contexts within which it occurs. must be shared by all members of the category. Rather, Premodernism The belief that prevailed during the there is a set of features distributed among members of a Middle Ages that all things, including human behavior, category, with no single feature essential for inclusion in can be explained in terms of religious dogma. the category. Weltanschauung Worldview or world-design. Language games According to Wittgenstein, the lin- Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1889–1951) Argued that guistic conventions that guide activities within a com- philosophical debates are over the meaning of words munity. Taken collectively, language games describe a rather than over some truth or truths that exist inde- community’s “form of life.” pendently of linguistic conventions. In other words, he Modernism The belief that improvement in the hu- argued that philosophical debates are over language man condition can come about only by understanding games. He also argued that the ancient concept of es- and applying the abstract, universal principles that govern sence should be replaced by the concept of family re- the universe (including human behavior). In the search semblance. (See also Family resemblance and for these principles, unbiased rationality and empirical Language games.)

Appendix ✵ Significant Individuals and Events in the History of Psychology Thales (ca. 625–547 B.C.) Begins to replace super- Plato (ca. 427–347 B.C.) Postulates a dualistic universe natural explanations of the universe with naturalistic consisting of abstract forms and matter. Because only the ones; encourages criticism and improvement of his forms are changeless, they alone can be known with teachings. certainty. Heraclitus (ca. 540–480 B.C.) Observes that every- Aristotle (384–322 B.C.) Argues that an understanding thing in the empirical world is in a constant state of flux of nature must begin with its direct examination. and therefore can never be known with certainty. Everything in nature has an inherent purpose that seeks Anaxagoras (ca. 500–428 B.C.) Proposes a universe to manifest itself. consisting of an infinite number of elements or “seeds.” Pyrrho of Elis (ca. 360–270 B.C.) Observes that be- Each seed contains all the others, but objects become cause the arguments for or against any belief are equally differentiated depending on which seed dominates. Mind valid, the only reasonable position is Skepticism or the is an exception because it contains no other seeds and is withholding of belief in anything. responsible for life. Epicurus of Samos (ca. 341–270 B.C.) Encourages Protagoras (ca. 485–410 B.C.) Argues that “truth” can living a simple life of moderation and one that is free of be understood only in terms of an individual’s percep- superstition. Such a philosophy came to be called tions and beliefs. Epicureanism. Hippocrates (ca. 460–377 B.C.) Argues that both Zeno of Citium (ca. 335–263 B.C.) Founds the phi- mental and physical disorders have natural causes; a losophy of Stoicism with his beliefs that nature is gov- physician’s primary task is to facilitate the body’s natural erned by a divine plan and that living in accordance healing ability. with that plan with courage and dignity is the ultimate Democritus (ca. 460–370 B.C.) Proposes a completely good. materialistic universe wherein everything consists of Philo (ca. 25 B.C.–A.D. 50) A Neoplatonist, preaches atoms. that God will reveal knowledge to souls properly pre- Antisthenes (ca. 445–365 B.C.) Preaches Cynicism or a pared to receive it. back-to-nature philosophy whereby life is lived free from Galen (ca. 129–199) Perpetuates the naturalistic medi- wants, passions, and the conventions of society. cine of such Greeks as Hippocrates into the Roman 665

666 SIGNIF ICANT INDIVIDU ALS AN D EVENTS IN TH E HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY empire and extends the theory of four humors into a < 1487 Heinrich Kramer and James rudimentary theory of personality. Sprenger Publish Malleus Maleficarum (The Witches’ Constantine (ca. 272–337) Signs the Edict of Milan in Hammer). 313, making Christianity a tolerated religion in the Philippus Paracelsus (1493–1541) Among the first Roman empire. physicians to suggest that the unusual behavior displayed Augustine (ca. 354–430) Combines Stoicism, by “witches” and those bewitched have natural rather Neoplatonism, and Judaism into a powerful Christian than supernatural origins. teleology, according to which evil exists because people < 1517 Martin Luther (1483–1546) Nails his Ninety- choose it and God can be experienced personally Five Theses on the door of Wittenberg Castle Church, through introspection. thereby beginning the Reformation. < 400–1000 The Dark Ages. Europe is generally Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592) Reintroduces dominated by mysticism and superstition. radical Skepticism into the late Renaissance. Avicenna (980–1037) A Muslim philosopher/physi- Francis Bacon (1561–1626) Argues for an inductive cian, applies Aristotelian philosophy to a wide range of science based on the direct examination of nature and topics and attempts to make it compatible with Islamic the careful generalization of those observations. Theory theology. must be avoided because it biases observations. Believes Anselm (ca. 1033–1109) Adds reason to the ways of science should provide practical information. knowing God with his ontological argument for the Galileo (1564–1642) Through experimentation, finds existence of God. many previously held beliefs about nature to be false. Peter Lombard (ca. 1095–1160) Argues that God can This brings Galileo into conflict with the church because be known through the scriptures, through reason, or by many of these fallacies were part of church dogma. studying nature. Denies that cognitive experience can be studied scien- Maimonides (1135–1204) A Jewish scholar and physi- tifically, thereby inhibiting the development of experi- cian, attempts to reconcile Judaism and Aristotelian mental psychology. philosophy. Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) Views humans as matter Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) Succeeds in making in motion and argues that all knowledge is derived from Aristotelian philosophy the basis of Christian theology. sensory experience and that all human motivation and William of Occam (ca. 1285–1349) Argues that ex- emotions are reducible to hedonism. Governments are planations should always be as parsimonious as possible formed to protect people from one another. (Occam’s razor). In the realist-nominalist debate, he sides Pierre Gassendi (1592–1655) Like Hobbes, says hu- with the nominalists, thereby encouraging Empiricism. mans consist of nothing but matter, thus rejecting dual- Francesco Petrarch (1304–1374) Sometimes consid- ism in favor of physical monism. ered the father of the Renaissance, argues for the full René Descartes (1596–1650) Uses the method of exploration and manifestation of human potential. doubt to confirm the validity of his subjective experi- Desiderius Erasmus (1466–1536) Opposes fanaticism, ences. Concludes that several important ideas are innate religious ritual, and superstition. Argues that fools are and that humans consist of a physical body and a non- better off than “wise” persons because fools live in ac- physical mind. The human mind provides consciousness, cordance with their true feelings. free choice, and rationality. Nicolaus Copernicus (1473–1543) Writes De < 1600 Giordano Bruno (1548–1600) Burned at the Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium (The Revolutions of the stake for heresy.r Heavenly Spheres; published in 1543), in which he pro- John Locke (1632–1704) Forcefully argues against the poses the heliocentric theory of the solar system. existence of innate ideas, saying instead that all ideas are Cornelius Agrippa (1486–1535) The first physician to derived from experience. Once they exist, however, urge that witch hunts be stopped because those accused ideas can be rearranged in countless ways by reflection. of being witches, or of being bewitched, are actually Also distinguishes between primary and secondary mentally disturbed. qualities.

S I GNIFICA NT IN DIVIDUAL S AND EVEN TS IN THE HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY 667 Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677) Equates God and nature, psychology cannot be scientific because introspection is and claims mind and matter are inseparable. All things in an unreliable method of studying the mind. nature, including humans, are governed by natural law Franz Anton Mesmer (1734–1815) Claims to cure and thus free will does not exist. disorders by redistributing animal magnetism in his Isaac Newton (1642–1727) Describes the universe as a patients. complex, lawful machine governed by the law of gravi- Jean Lamarck (1744–1829) Publishes his Philosophie tation and precisely describable in mathematical terms. Zoologique in 1809, in which he elaborates his theory of Explanations of nature must be parsimonious and devoid the inheritance of acquired characteristics. of theological considerations. Benjamin Rush (1746–1813) Sometimes referred to as Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz (1646–1716) Argues the first psychiatrist in the United States, argues against that experience can only actualize ideas that already exist slavery, capital and public punishment, and the inhu- within us. Everything in nature consists of monads, mane treatment of prisoners and the mentally ill. which vary in their ability to think clearly. For an ex- perience to be conscious, aggregates of monads must Philippe Pinel (1745–1826) Appointed director of the exceed a threshold; otherwise the experience remains Bicêtre Asylum in 1793 and begins releasing inmates unconscious. from their chains. In addition, he segregates different types of patients, encourages occupational therapy, bans George Berkeley (1685–1753) Denies the existence of punishment and exorcism, and maintains precise case a material world, saying instead that only perceptions (ideas) exist. Thus, “To be is to be perceived.” histories and statistics on patient cure rates. Franz Joseph Gall (1758–1828) Claims that the extent David Hartley (1705–1757) Supplements association- ism with speculations about neurophysiology. to which one possesses various faculties can be deter- mined by examining the bumps and depressions on the Julien de La Mettrie (1709–1751) Publishes L’Homme skull. Gall’s colleague Johann Gasper Spurzheim Machine (Man a Machine) in 1748; in it he embraces (1776–1832) called such an examination phrenology. physical monism and argues that the differences between Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) Views human and nonhuman animals is quantitative, not the universe as an interrelated whole, which he called the qualitative. Absolute, and argues that nothing can be understood Thomas Reid (1710–1796) Argues that we can assume except in its relationship to the Absolute. Understanding physical reality is as we perceive it because it makes of the Absolute is approached via the dialectic process. common sense to do so. Innate faculties of the mind facilitate the accurate perception of the physical world. James Mill (1773–1836) Argues that any idea, no mat- ter how complex, can be understood in terms of the David Hume (1711–1776) Argues that humans can simple ideas it comprises. never know the physical world with certainty because all we ever experience are the ideas created by that world Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776–1841) Argues that (for example, causation is a mental habit and may or may ideas compete for conscious expression; successful ideas not correspond to anything in the physical world). become part of the apperceptive mass, but unsuccessful ideas remain unconscious. Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) Initiates the modern romantic movement by claiming that human Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) Argues that the feelings are better guides for living than rational only relief from the unending cycle of needs and need- deliberations. satisfaction comes from the sublimation, denial, or re- pression of those needs. Only a strong will to survive Étienne Bonnot de Condillac (1715–1780) Demonstrates that a statue capable of only sensation, memory, and the prevents most people from committing suicide. feelings of pleasure and pain can display all human faculties Pierre Flourens (1794–1867) Performs experiments and abilities. that demonstrate the cerebral cortex functions as an in- Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) Argues that external re- terrelated whole, not divided into discrete faculties as the ality can never be known because conscious experience phrenologists had claimed. always results from the interaction between sensory ex- Ernst Heinrich Weber (1795–1878) Observes that just perience and the innate categories of thought. Believes noticeable differences (jnds) in variable stimuli

668 SIGNIF ICANT INDIVIDU ALS AN D EVENTS IN TH E HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY correspond to a constant fraction of a standard stimulus Francis Galton (1822–1911) Publishes Hereditary (Weber’s law). Genius: An Inquiry Into Its Laws and Consequences in 1869; Auguste Comte (1798–1857) Promotes positivistic in it he argues that intelligence is largely inherited and philosophy according to which only publicly observed therefore eugenics should be practiced. Galton’s intense phenomena can be known with certainty; metaphysical interest in individual differences inspired him to create a speculation is to be actively avoided. number of methodologies that have become standard in psychology (for example, questionnaires, word associa- Johannes Müller (1801–1858) Formulates the doc- trines of specific nerve energies and adequate stimulation. tion tests, twin studies, and the correlational technique). Paul Broca (1824–1880) Conclusively demonstrates Gustav Theodor Fechner (1801–1887) By noting that that an area on the left hemisphere of the cortex is spe- for sensations to rise arithmetically, the magnitude of the cialized for speech (Broca’s area). Also perhaps incor- physical stimulus must rise geometrically, creates the field rectly concludes that brain size and intelligence are pos- of psychophysics. Also creates the field of experimental itively correlated. esthetics. Jean-Martin Charcot (1825–1893) Speculates that in Dorothea Lynde Dix (1802–1887) Campaigning for over 40 years, vastly improves the plight of the mentally individuals predisposed to hysteria, trauma may cause ill in the United States and Europe. certain ideas to become dissociated from consciousness and grow strong enough to cause the symptoms associ- John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) Argues that simple ideas ated with hysteria. Charcot’s speculations significantly can combine and form ideas different from the simple influenced Freud. ideas of which they are comprised (mental chemistry). Ivan M. Sechenov (1829–1905) Founds Russian ob- Believes that a science of psychology is possible, which jective psychology with the publication of Reflexes of the would describe human nature in general, and that the Brain in 1863. discipline of ethology would explain individual differences. Wilhelm Maximilian Wundt (1832–1920) Founds voluntarism, psychology’s first school. This school was Charles Darwin (1809–1882) Publishes On the Origin very much in the rationalistic tradition with its emphasis of Species by Means of Natural Selection in 1859; in it he on will and purpose. Founds the journal Philosophische describes how animals with adaptive features survive and Studien (Philosophical Studies) in 1881. reproduce and how those without such features do not. Ewald Hering (1834–1918) Offers a nativistic expla- Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855) Urges a return to the nation of space perception and color vision. personal, introspective religion described by Augustine. Truth must be understood in terms of what is privately Ernst Mach (1838–1916) Promotes a positivistic phi- and emotionally embraced by an individual; thus, “Truth losophy according to which sensations are all that hu- is subjectivity.” mans can be certain of; therefore, scientists must deter- mine the relationships among sensations. As with Alexander Bain (1818–1903) Seeks the biological Comte’s version of positivism, metaphysical speculation correlates of cognition and behavior. His analysis of is to be actively avoided. voluntary behavior resembles the later analyses of Thorndike and Skinner. Marks the transition between Franz Clemens Brentano (1838–1917) Observes that philosophical and scientific psychology. Founds the mental acts always refer to (intend) events outside of journal Mind in 1876. themselves. With his emphases on mental acts and in- tentionality, creates the field of act psychology. Herbert Spencer (1820–1903) Erroneously generalizes Darwinian principles to societies, thus creating social Hippolyte Bernheim (1840–1919) Under the influ- Darwinism. ence of Auguste Ambroise Liébeault (1823–1904), becomes the major spokesperson of the Nancy school of Hermann von Helmholtz (1821–1894) Promotes hypnosis, which claimed that all people can be hypno- positivist medicine, measures the rate of nerve conduc- tized because all people are suggestible. tion, and makes significant contributions to an under- standing of color vision, hearing, and perception in William James (1842–1910) Publishes The Principles of general. Psychology in 1890. This text is often cited as marking the beginning of the school of functionalism.

S I GNIFICA NT IN DIVIDUAL S AND EVEN TS IN THE HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY 669 Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844–1900) Views life ness. Anticipates many of the features of Watsonian as a struggle between the Apollonian (rational) and the behaviorism. Dionysian (irrational) aspects of human nature and an Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) Proposes a pure phe- individual’s personality as an artistic blending of these nomenology that describes all the mental processes two aspects. available to humans in their efforts to understand the Granville S. Hall (1844–1924) Founds the APA in world. 1892 and serves as its first president. Makes significant John Dewey (1859–1952) Publishes “The Reflex Arc contributions to developmental psychology but opposes in Psychology” in 1896, which is often viewed as the coeducation of adolescents and young adults. Invites marking the beginning of the school of functionalism. Freud and Jung to Clark University in 1909. Founds the James McKeen Cattell (1860–1944) Uses the term American Journal of Psychology in 1887. mental test in 1890 and is a key figure in the school of Christine Ladd-Franklin (1847–1930) Offers a theory functionalism and in the development of applied of color vision based on evolutionary theory. psychology. George John Romanes (1848–1894) Does early work Hugo Münsterberg (1863–1916) Replaces William on comparative psychology, but his conclusions are James as director of the Harvard Psychology Laboratory supported only by anecdotal evidence. in 1892. Makes significant contributions to such applied Ivan Petrovich Pavlov (1849–1936) Receives the areas as clinical, forensic, and industrial psychology. 1904 Nobel Prize for his research on digestion, during Mary Whiton Calkins (1863–1930) Does pioneering which he discovers the conditioned reflex. Believes the research on memory and creates an influential version of conditioned reflex provides an objective, physiological self psychology. In 1905 becomes the first female presi- explanation for what psychologists and philosophers had dent of the APA. called associationism. Charles Spearman (1863–1945) Does pioneer work Hermann Ebbinghaus (1850–1909) Publishes On on the statistical technique later called factor analysis. Memory: An Investigation in Experimental Psychology in Argues that intelligence consists of two factors—specific 1885, marking the first time learning and memory are abilities (s) and general intelligence (g)—and that g is studied experimentally. mostly inherited. Hans Vaihinger (1852–1933) Argues that acting “as if” Henry Herbert Goddard (1866–1957) Translates the certain fallacious concepts are true is essential for societal Binet–Simon scale into English, but unlike Binet con- living (for example, the concept of free will). cludes that intelligence is largely inherited and therefore Conwy Lloyd Morgan (1852–1936) Argues that in the feeble-minded should be discouraged from explaining animal behavior one should not postulate reproducing. faculties beyond those that are required to explain the Edward Bradford Titchener (1867–1927) Founds behavior in question (Morgan’s canon). the school of structuralism, which seeks to describe the Emil Kraepelin (1856–1926) Publishes a list of mental basic elements of thought and to explain how those disorders in 1883 that was so thorough it was utilized elements combine in accordance with the laws of worldwide until recent times. associationism. Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) With Joseph Breuer Lightner Witmer (1867–1956) Establishes the first (1842–1925), publishes Studies on Hysteria in 1895, psychological clinic in 1896. In 1907 founds the journal thereby founding the school of psychoanalysis. The Psychological Clinic, and coins the term clinical psy- Alfred Binet (1857–1911) With Theodore Simon chology in its first issue. (1873–1961), publishes the Binet–Simon scale of intelli- Robert Sessions Woodworth (1869–1962) A key gence in 1905. The scale was revised in 1908 and again functionalist at Columbia University, promotes dynamic in 1911. psychology with an emphasis on motivation. Vladimir M. Bechterev (1857–1927) Argues that hu- Alfred Adler (1870–1937) Following the termination man behavior is reflexive and that it can and should be of his affiliation with Freud, goes on to develop his own studied and explained without reference to conscious- theory of personality featuring such concepts as feelings

670 SIGNIF ICANT INDIVIDU ALS AN D EVENTS IN TH E HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY of inferiority, worldviews, fictional goals, lifestyles, and Ludwig Binswanger (1881–1966) Integrates psycho- the creative self. analytic theory and the writings of Husserl and William Stern (1871–1938) Introduces the term mental Heidegger. age (determined by performance on the Binet–Simon Clark Leonard Hull (1884–1952) Creates a test) and suggests mental age (MA) be divided by chro- hypothetico-deductive theory of learning that he be- nological age (CA), yielding the intelligence quotient lieves to be self-correcting. Most of the intervening (IQ). variables in this theory are physiological. William McDougall (1871–1938) Defines psychology Karen Horney (1885–1952) Creates a version of psy- as the science of behavior as early as 1905. Focuses on choanalysis in which dysfunctional social relationships are purposive behavior that is instinctive and has perceptual seen as the causes of mental disorders instead of the in- and emotional components. trapsyche conflict proposed by Freud. In 1923, begins Margaret Floy Washburn (1871–1939) In 1894 be- writing a series of articles of special relevance to women. comes the first woman to receive a PhD in psychology. Publishes Self-Analysis in 1942, which is considered one In 1908 publishes The Animal Mind. In 1921 becomes the of psychology’s first self-help books. second female president of the APA (Calkins was first). Leta Stetter Hollingworth (1886–1939) Does pio- Edward Lee Thorndike (1874–1949) A transitional neering work in the education of exceptional children. figure between functionalism and behaviorism. Her Gifted Children (1926) becomes a standard text in Experimentally studies trial-and-error learning and at- schools of education. tempts to explain that learning without reference to Edward Chace Tolman (1886–1959) Publishes consciousness. Along with Woodworth, tests the claims Purposive Behavior in Animals and Men in 1932; in it, of the “mental muscle” approach to education and finds learning is explained primarily in terms of cognitive them to be incorrect. processes. Carl Jung (1875–1961) Following the termination of Edwin Ray Guthrie (1886–1959) Creates a highly his affiliation with Freud in 1914, goes on to create his parsimonious theory of learning that embraces the law of own theory of personality featuring powerful, inherited contiguity but rejects the law of frequency. dispositions (archetypes) that have developed throughout Frederic Charles Bartlett (1886–1969) Publishes human evolution. Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology Robert Yerkes (1876–1956) Is largely responsible for in 1932. creating the Army testing program during World War I Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) Introduces into psy- and for supporting the argument that many of the na- chology such existential concepts as Dasein, authenticity, tion’s ills are caused by people of low intelligence, thus and thrownness. agreeing with Goddard and Terman. Kurt Lewin (1890–1947) Applies Gestalt principles to Lewis Madison Terman (1877–1956) Significantly such topics as personality, motivation, conflict, and group modifies the Binet–Simon scale, thus creating the dynamics. Stanford–Binet scale that was used to identify gifted Karl S. Lashley (1890–1958) Summarizes his research children for further study. The first results of Terman’s on brain functioning in his 1929 APA presidential ad- study of gifted children was published as Genetic Studies of dress. Publishes Brain Mechanisms and Intelligence, also in Genius in 1926, and the study continues to the present. 1929. John Broadus Watson (1878–1958) Publishes < 1892 The American Psychological Association (APA) “Psychology as a Behaviorist Views It” in 1913, thereby is founded under the leadership of G. Stanley Hall. founding the school of behaviorism. Percy W. Bridgman (1892–1961) Publishes The Logic < 1879 Wilhelm Wundt establishes the first experi- of Modern Physics in 1927; in it, he proposes that abstract mental psychology laboratory. concepts be operationally defined. Max Wertheimer (1880–1943) Publishes “Experimental Studies of the Perception of Movement” < 1894 The journal Psychological Review was founded by James McKeen Cattell and James Mark Baldwin. in 1912, thereby founding the school of Gestalt psychology. Norbert Wiener (1894–1964) Publishes Cybernetics in 1948.

S I GNIFICA NT IN DIVIDUAL S AND EVEN TS IN THE HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY 671 Anna Freud (1895–1982) Extends psychoanalytic < 1919 APA creates the Division of Clinical principles to the treatment and understanding of chil- Psychology. dren, makes significant contributions to the development < 1920 On June 14 Francis Cecil Sumner becomes the of ego psychology, and becomes the official spokesper- first African American to obtain a PhD in psychology. son for psychoanalysis following her father’s death. < 1929 Edwin G. Boring (1886–1968) publishes A Jean Piaget (1896–1980) In 1926 begins publishing an History of Experimental Psychology. influential series of articles and books on intellectual de- < 1941 APA removes the requirement that for full velopment (genetic epistemology). membership in the organization an applicant must have Carl Rogers (1902–1987) Publishes Counseling and published research beyond the PhD dissertation. Psychotherapy: Newer Concepts in Practice in 1942, creating what many consider the first viable alternative to psy- < 1943 Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts anticipate choanalysis. Creates a theory of personality featuring such new connectionism by speculating about “neuro-logical concepts as the organismic valuing process, need for networks.” positive regard, conditions of worth, unconditional pos- < 1944 APA reorganizes itself into 18 divisions. itive regard, and incongruency. < 1946 APA first publishes American Psychologist. Karl Popper (1902–1994) Publishes The Logic of < 1946 Veterans Administration (VA) funds training Scientific Discovery in 1935. programs for clinical psychologists whose functions < 1904 Edward Titchener founds the Experimentalists. would include psychotherapy. Donald Hebb (1904–1985) Publishes The Organization < 1949 Boulder Conference on Training in Clinical of Behavior in 1949; it describes his speculations about cell Psychology endorses the scientist-practitioner model. assemblies and phase sequences and does much to pro- < 1949 Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver publish mote cognitive and physiological psychology. The Mathematical Theory of Communication, thereby creat- Burrhus Frederic Skinner (1904–1990) Proposes a ing information theory. positivistic theory of behavior that avoids theory by < 1950 Edwin G. Boring publishes the second edition concentrating on how behavior is modified by its of A History of Experimental Psychology. consequences. < 1950 Alan Turing (1912–1954) creates the field of < 1905 Mary Whiton Calkins becomes the first female artificial intelligence with his article “Computing president of the American Psychological Association. Machinery and Intelligence.” George Kelly (1905–1967) Creates a largely existential < 1953 Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations theory of personality according to which people create is published. construct systems to facilitate the accurate anticipation of < 1956 Jerome Bruner, Jacqueline Goodnow, and future events; so-called mental disorders are actually George Austin publish A Study in Thinking. perceptual problems, and therefore the therapist’s job is to help clients perceive life differently. < 1956 George Miller publishes “The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on our Abraham Maslow (1908–1970) Usually considered the founder of humanistic (third-force) psychology. Creates a Capacity for Processing Information.” theory of personality featuring a hierarchy of needs < 1958 Allen Newell, J. C. Shaw, and Herbert Simon ranging from physiological needs to self-actualization. mark the transition between artificial intelligence and information-processing psychology with their article Rollo May (1909–1994) Introduces existential philos- “Elements of a Theory of Problem Solving.” ophy and psychology into the United States. < 1958 Frank Rosenblatt describes an early neural Roger Wolcott Sperry (1913–1994) In the 1950s, network. begins an influential series of experiments on hemi- spheric functioning using the split-brain preparation. < 1959 The Psychonomic Society is founded. < 1917 G. Stanley Hall founds the Journal of Applied < 1959 Noam Chomsky publishes his review of Psychology. Skinner’s Verbal Learning (1957). < 1917 The American Association of Clinical < 1960 Donald Hebb publishes his 1959 APA presi- Psychologists (AACP) is founded. dential address “The American Revolution,” in which

672 SIGNIF ICANT INDIVIDU ALS AN D EVENTS IN TH E HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY he argues that the rigorous scientific methods employed < 1980 John Searle presents his “Chinese Room” re- by the behaviorists be applied to the study of cognitive buttal to proponents of strong artificial intelligence. processes. < 1981 Roger Sperry shares the Nobel Prize in medi- < 1960 George Miller and Jerome Bruner create the cine/physiology with David Hubel and Torsten Wiesel Center for Cognitive Studies at Harvard. for his work on hemispheric specialization using his split- < 1960 Robert I. Watson (1909–1980) publishes “The brain preparation. History of Psychology: A Neglected Area.” < 1984 Gregory Kimble publishes “Psychology’s Two Cultures.” < 1961 Marian and Keller Breland publish “The Misbehavior of Organisms.” < 1986 David Rumelhart, James McClelland, and other members of the Parallel Distributed Processing < 1962 Thomas Kuhn publishes The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. (PDP) group publish Parallel Distributed Processing: Explorations in the Microstructure of Cognition. < 1967 Ulric Neisser publishes Cognitive Psychology. < 1986 Albert Bandura publishes Social Foundations of < 1968 University of Illinois offers the first Doctor of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive Theory. Psychology (PsyD) degree. < 1988 American Psychological Society (APS) is < 1969 California School of Professional Psychology founded. The name is later changed to the Association (CSPP) is founded. Offers the PsyD independently of for Psychological Science (still APS). any college or university. < 1994 Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles Murray < 1969 Journal of Cognitive Psychology is founded. publish The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in < 1969 Marvin Minsky and Seymour Papert criticize American Life, which rekindled many of the old scientific, neural networks, thereby significantly reducing interest moral, and political debates concerning the nature of in them. intelligence. < 1973 Karl von Frisch, Konrad Lorenz, and Niko < 2002 New Mexico becomes the first state in which Tinbergen share a Nobel Prize for their work in clinical psychologists gain prescription privileges. ethology. < 2004 Louisiana becomes the second state in which < 1973 Vail Conference on Training in Clinical clinical psychologists gain prescription privileges. Psychology endorses freestanding professional schools < 2007 Membership in the Association for and the PsyD. Psychological Science (APS) exceeds 18,000. < 1975 Edward Wilson publishes Sociobiology: The New < 2007 The number of members and affiliates of the Synthesis, thereby creating the field of sociobiology. APA exceeds 148,000. < 1976 Ulric Neisser publishes Cognition and Reality. < 1977 Albert Bandura publishes Social Learning Theory.

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