วารสารวิชาการ ป.ป.ช. ปีที่ 9 ฉบับที่ 1

วารสารว�ชาการISSN1906-2087 ป.ป.ช. NACC Journal ปท ี่ 9 ฉบบั ที่ 1 (มกราคม - มิถนุ ายน 2559) Anti-Corruption Articles Book Reviews สำนักงานคณะกรรมการปองกนั และปราบปรามการทุจรติ แหงชาติ

วารสารวชิ าการ ป.ป.ช. NACC Journal ISSN 1906-2087 ปีที่ 9 ฉบบั ที่ 1 (มกราคม - มถิ นุ ายน 2559) เจ้าของ ทป่ี รกึ ษา ส�ำนักงาน ป.ป.ช. ศาสตราจารย์ ดร. เมธี ครองแกว้ เลขที่ 361 ถนนนนทบุรี ตำ� บลท่าทราย สถาบนั บัณฑติ พฒั นบรหิ ารศาสตร์ อ�ำเภอเมืองนนทบรุ ี จงั หวัดนนทบุรี 11000 ผู้ขัดเกลาภาษาอังกฤษ โทรศัพท์ 0 2528 4800 ตอ่ 5814 Dr. William Wyn Ellis โทรสาร 0 2528 4800 ต่อ 5814 ESCAP E-mail: [email protected] วัตถปุ ระสงค์ Website: http://www.nacc.go.th  เพื่อเป็นแหล่งรวบรวมความรู้และเผยแพร่ บรรณาธิการ ผลงานวิจัยและผลงานทางวิชาการอื่น ๆ รองศาสตราจารย์ ดร. สริ ลิ กั ษณา คอมนั ตร์ ด้านการป้องกันและปราบปรามการทจุ รติ ส�ำนกั งาน ป.ป.ช.  เพ่ือสนับสนุนการใช้ประโยชน์จากผลงาน กองบรรณาธกิ าร รองศาสตราจารย์ ดร. โกวทิ ย์ กงั สนนั ท์ วิจัย ผลงานวิชาการ และการสร้างความ ตระหนกั รว่ มกนั ในการตอ่ ตา้ นการทจุ รติ สถาบันบณั ฑิตพฒั นบรหิ ารศาสตร์  เพื่อส่งเสริมเครือข่ายความร่วมมือและ ดร. ณฐั วัฒน์ อริย์ธัชโภคิน ประสานงานในการบริการจัดการข้อมูล ศูนยพ์ ฒั นานวตั กรรมตอ่ ตา้ นคอรร์ ปั ชัน งานวิจัยด้านการป้องกันและปราบปราม ผชู้ ว่ ยศาสตราจารย์ดร.ดารารตั น์ อานนั ทนะสวุ งศ์ การทุจริตระหว่างหน่วยงานและสถาบัน สถาบนั บัณฑติ พัฒนบริหารศาสตร์ วจิ ัยต่าง ๆ ดร. อรพินท์ สพโชคชยั  เพ่ือให้มีการแลกเปล่ียนข้อมูลข่าวสารและ นกั วิชาการอสิ ระ เอกสารส่ิงตีพิมพ์ต่าง ๆ กับหน่วยงานและ รองศาสตราจารย์ ดร. อัจนา ไวความดี เครือขา่ ยทเี่ กีย่ วขอ้ ง นกั วิชาการอิสระ กำ� หนดพมิ พเ์ ผยแพร่ กองการจัดการ นางสาวฉนั ทช์ นก เจนณรงค์ ปลี ะ 2 คร้ัง ดังน้ี ฉบับท่ี 1 มกราคม – มิถุนายน นางสาวพัชรี มนี สขุ ฉบบั ท่ี 2 กรกฎาคม – ธันวาคม นายศักด์ินนั ท์ คุณเอนก นางสาวเสาวณีย์ ทพิ อุต นางสาวอนัญญา แม้นโชติ เน้อื หา/ข้อความในวารสารน้เี ปน็ ความคิดเหน็ ของผู้เขยี น ไม่จ�ำเป็นต้องเปน็ ของ สำ� นกั งานคณะกรรมการป้องกนั และปราบปรามการทุจรติ แห่งชาติ

NACC Journal ISSN 1906 – 2087 Vol. 9 No. 1 (January - June, 2016) Publisher Advisor Office of the National Anti-Corruption Medhi Krongkaew Commission 361 Nonthaburi Road, Thasaai District English Language Editor Amphur Muangnonthaburi, William Wyn Ellis Nonthaburi Province 11000 Thailand Tel: +66 2528 4800 Ext. 5814 Objectives Fax: +66 2528 4800 Ext. 5814 E-mail: [email protected]  To serve as a knowledge center for Website: http://www.nacc.go.th disseminating research findings and Editor other academic works on corruption Sirilaksana Khoman prevention and suppression. Editorial Board  To encourage the use of the research Kowit Kangsanan Nattawat Aritatpokin finding and academic works and to Dararatt Anantanasuwong enhance public awareness to collectively Orapin Sopchokchai counter corruption. Atchana Waiquamdee  To promote networking and cooperation Managerial Board Chanchanoke Chennarong among academic and technical agencies Pacharee Meensuk on countering corruption among the Sakdinan Khunanek agencies and research institutions. Saowanee Thip-ut Ananya Manchot  To promote the exchange of information and documents among relative agencies and networks. Publication Period Bi-annual: No.1 January – June No.2 July – December Views expressed in the articles published in this Journal exclusively belong to the authors and do not necessarily reflect of the official position of the NACC.

Contents Prevention of Corruption in Public Procurement in 1 German Local Communities 10 Matthias Einmahl 20 36 A Public Administration Reform in the Philippine Bureau of Customs: 46 The Case of Following and Not Following Customs Regulations 61 Renalyn C. Estiller Hotspots of Corruption Adam Graycar The Weakest Link: Investigation and Prosecution of Procurement-Related Corruption Cases in Tanzania and Uganda Annika Engelbert Modification of Public Contracts as Source of Corruption: The Spanish Case Xavier Codina How to Improve Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Expertise: Public Procurement Case Andrei Ivanov Book Reviews 84 92 นติ เิ ศรษฐศาสตร์ วา่ ดว้ ยการต่อตา้ นการทจุ ริต โดย เมธี ครองแกว้ วิจารณ์โดย เดอื นเด่น นคิ มบริรกั ษ์ สรุ พล นิตไิ กรพจน์ นิติเศรษฐศาสตร์ ว่าด้วยการท�ำงานของ ป.ป.ช. โดย สรรเสรญิ พลเจยี ก วิจารณโ์ ดย สจุ ติ รา ชำ� นิวกิ ยก์ รณ์ ตรี ณ พงศม์ ฆพัฒน์ อดุ ม รัฐอมฤต



From the Editor-in-Chief This volume contains articles selected from papers presented at the Third Conference on Evidence-Based Anti-Corruption Policies in June 2015 organized by the National Anti-Corruption Commission in collaboration with the World Bank, with support from Transparency International Thailand. The conference provided a forum for exchange of knowledge and experiences, as well as innovative ideas among researchers, anti-corruption officials, civil society advocates, and other stakeholders. The fight against corruption is a difficult one, especially since the forms of corruption have evolved from simple acts such as outright bribery into highly sophisticated and complex forms, often involving connected dealings that may be veiled under the semblance of legality. The theme of the conference was “Combating Organized Corruption”, seen as the most insidious form of corruption, involving ring-leaders in high places, which can include elected officials, government, business and industry. Medhi Krongkaew discusses the legal accountability of elected officials, the culpability of top government officials and legal precedence. Understanding organized corruption, involving top-level players, requires study of the whole process from the path to power, the role of ethics, compliance programs, enterprise risk management, as well as effective prosecution and new forms of deterrence such as civil lawsuits and asset recovery. With respect to the path to power, Matthew Stephenson examines the relationship between corruption and democratic institutions and identifies key factors that may influence this relationship. The conclusions, though still tentative, add to our understanding of the effect of democratic institutions and electoral systems on corruption. Adam Graycar identifies “hotspots of corruption” in the crime triangle: offender and motivation, target and opportunity, and place and ability. Preventive measures are discussed by Matthias Einmahl with reference to German local communities, while Renalyn Estiller proposes public administration reform in the Philippine Bureau of Customs. These papers emphasize the need to take into account the social and economic realities and constraints of each situation. Organized corruption is indeed an insidious threat, not only to national security and a country’s immediate financial position, but also to long-term economic and social development and moral fabric. Abuse of public office for private gain can manifest itself in many shapes and forms, through patronage and nepotism, theft of state assets, or diversion and misuse of state budgets, and procurement is a vehicle through which corruption can occur with impunity. Annika Engelbert, Xavier Codina and Adrei Ivanov concentrate on the most vulnerable areas of procurement and offer solutions. Sirilaksana Khoman



วารสารปีที่ 9 ฉบบั ท่ี 1 (มกราคม - มถิ นุ ายน 2559) 1 Prevention of Corruption in Public Procurement in German Local Communities Matthias EinmahlІ บทคัดยอ่ การจัดซ้ือจัดจ้างภาครัฐเป็นภาคส่วนหนึ่งของการบริหารงานภาครัฐท่ีมีความเสี่ยงต่อการ เกิดการทุจริตมากท่ีสุดของหน่วยงานภาครัฐในประเทศเยอรมนี บทความน้ีศึกษามาตรการของ เจ้าหน้าที่รัฐเพ่ือต่อต้านการทุจริตในการจัดซ้ือจัดจ้าง โดยมุ่งเน้นองค์กรปกครองส่วนท้องถิ่น (ชุมชนและมณฑล) ซ่ึงใช้เงินงบประมาณในการจัดซ้ือจัดจ้างมากท่ีสุดของประเทศ และมี ความเสี่ยงเกิดทุจรติ รุนแรงที่สุด บทความน้ี เนน้ เคร่อื งมือตอ่ ต้านการทุจริตตา่ ง ๆ ไดแ้ ก่ การวิเคราะห์ความเสยี่ ง การแบง่ หน้าท่ีโดยเฉพาะการรวมศูนย์กระบวนงานบางส่วนของการจัดซื้อจัดจ้าง การเข้าไปมีส่วนร่วมของ เจา้ หน้าท่ีรัฐฝ่ายต่าง ๆ ในกระบวนการจัดซ้ือจัดจ้าง (ภายใตห้ ลกั การร่วมสอดสอ่ ง) การหมุนเวยี น เจ้าหน้าที่รัฐ (ท่ีเกี่ยวข้องในกระบวนการจัดซ้ือจัดจ้าง) การใช้ระบบจัดซื้อจัดจ้างอิเล็กทรอนิกส์ การตรวจสอบทางบัญชี การจัดให้มีคณะกรรมการต่อต้านการทุจริตโดยเฉพาะการท�ำหน้าท่ีผู้รับ สญั ญาณจากผูแ้ จง้ เบาะแส คำ� สำ� คญั : การปอ้ งกนั การทจุ รติ การใหส้ นิ บน การจดั ซอ้ื จดั จา้ งภาครฐั องคก์ รปกครองสว่ นทอ้ งถน่ิ Abstract Public procurement is the most corruption-prone field of public administration in Germany. The paper explores the standard measures taken by public authorities in Germany to counter the threat of corruption in this field. It has a special focus on the local level (local communities and counties), which holds the biggest part of the national procurement budget and where the corruption danger is most acute. І Professor at the University for Public Administration for the region of North Rhine-Westphalia Cologne, Germany

2 วารสารวชิ าการ ป.ป.ช. The paper specifically deals with the following anti-corruption tools: risk analysis, division of functions, especially by centralizing parts of the procurement process, involvement of several civil servants in the procurement process (multiple eyes principle), the rotation of civil servants, use of e-procurement systems, auditing, anti-corruption commissioner and here especially its function to act as a contact person for whistle-blowers Keywords: prevention, corruption, bribery, public procurement, local communities 1. Introduction relationships with people outside of Corruption is usually defined as the administration in the context misuse of public office for private gain of their professional tasks. Public (e.g. by Transparency International1). procurement is the most important This wide definition also comprises area in which these relationships can nonspecific types of behaviour like more or less automatically develop. This fraud or embezzlement. This paper will is especially true for the procurement only deal with prevention measures of construction works by local against types of corruption that are communities. Civil servants who work in typical to the field of public the building departments of contracting procurement: bid rigging, kickbacks authorities are usually architects or and conflict of interests where the construction engineers. They very often public official has personal interests in have work experience in the private the winning company (see also PwC sector. Their interlocutors on the supplier study, 2013). side have a similar professional Procurement is the field of background and socialization. They German public administration which usually work for or own medium-sized is the most corruption-prone. Overall, construction companies with deep roots public administration in Germany is not and connections within the community. riddled by rampant corruption. Petty This can lead to structural corruption corruption based on a casual encounter in which the same protagonists develop (e.g. police officer in traffic control) is corruptive behavioural patterns over a very rare (European Commission, longer period of time (Dölling, 2007). Eurobarometer on Corruption, 2013). Prevention of corruption in Substantial corruption risks arise Germany in public procurement where civil servants develop closer thereforefocuses on preventing the 1 Go to www.transparency.org/whoweare/organisation/faqs_on_corruption/2/. (accessed March 12, 2015).

วารสารปีท่ี 9 ฉบบั ท่ี 1 (มกราคม - มถิ นุ ายน 2559) 3 development of these corruption-prone in the field of public procurement. structures or at least manage them Because of the scarcity of regulation effectively. Two aspects are important its role as a key element to prevent here: The process of procurement itself corruption is very often underestimated. (e.g. by procuring via public tender) and the organisation of the administrative 2. Risk Analysis entity which procures (e.g. by sensible Prevention of corruption seeks centralization). While the former has to minimize corruption risks. Every received considerable attention by the prevention strategy must therefore legislator in form of a complex public begin with a risk analysis. No area of procurement law, the latter is only little public procurement is immune against regulated. The responsibility to ensure corruption but the risks are not evenly organizational corruption safeguards spread. The result of the analysis is a largely lies with the administrative risk map. It is the basis for an efficient entity itself. The national government allocation of the resources available for has taken extensive organisational prevention efforts. The development of measures for its administration to a risk map is a legal obligation for local combat corruption (e.g. centralization communities only in the federal state of of procurement activities). The same North Rhine-Westphalia.3 is true for the states2 concerning their The development of a risk map administration. The majority of public should follow a two-step procedure procurement activities however occurs (Federal ministry of interior, on the local level (local communities, implementation advice risk map, 2012). counties). Here, vast differences in taking The first step consists of analyzing each up that responsibility can be observed. post dealing with procurement with the Some local communities take this issue help of general criteria (e.g. using seriously (typically those with high job descriptions or the administrative profile corruption scandals in the past, distribution plan). The main criteria like the cities of Cologne and Wuppertal). pointing to a heightened corruption Others have a negligent approach. risk are: This article will explore standard - Importance of the procurement organisational measures against budget corruption which are taken (or should - Concentration of tasks within be taken) by German local communities the procurement process 2 Germany has a federal structure (comparable to the US) with 16 federal states with their own parliaments and governments. 3 Art. 19 (2) anticorruption statute NRW (Korruptionsbekämpfungsgesetz Nordrhein-Westfalen). North Rhine-Westphalia is the most populous federal state with 18 out of 82 million inhabitants.

4 วารสารวิชาการ ป.ป.ช. - Freedom of discretion for the Broens, 2011, Leifeld, 2005). The involved personnel procurement department is usually The second step is the closer in charge of the formal procurement analysis of those posts which have procedure while the technical department a heightened risk potential (e.g. with remains in charge of the technical the help of interviews, spot-check file issues and the implementation of the analysis or statistics). Again, the use of contract (e.g. school department for the criteria is very useful, this time however planning prior to the tender procedure more focused on concrete facts. The and for the construction of the school most important criteria here are: itself). However, the concrete task - Cases of corruption or assignment for the procurement corruption suspicion in the past department varies greatly from one - Number of procurement local community to the next. Some procedures without public tender procurement departments have only the - Length of period of time a task to send the bidding documentation certain staff member is holding the post to potential bidders, to take in the bids - Expert knowledge on the and to open them after closure of the managerial level as precondition for tender procedure. In such a case, the effective supervision procurement department is little more - Quality of documentation of than an auxiliary assistant to the procurement procedures technical department. The corruption prevention effect of such a 3. Division of Functions “centralisation” is very limited. The division of functions seeks to Centralisation can only become an make the emerging of corruption-prone effective anti-corruption tool if the structures more difficult by assigning procurement department gets enough the responsibilities for the numerous resources (especially in form of decisions in the course of a procurement personnel) and power to influence the process to different posts. A key element procurement process in a meaningful of this approach is the creation of a way. Key decisions for which a centralised procurement department procurement department will usually (Bekemann, 2007, Dimitri et al., 2006) be suited are the choice of the bidding which can be found in a majority of procedure4, the choice of potential German local communities (Glock/ bidders in procurement procedures 4 Open procedure where every company can bid, restricted procedure where the buyer will select those companies allowed to bid, negotiated procedure where the buyer not only selects the company allowed to bid but also has the right to negotiate with the bidders in the course of the process. Negotiated procedures usually carry the highest corruption risk.

วารสารปีที่ 9 ฉบับท่ี 1 (มกราคม - มถิ นุ ายน 2559) 5 other than the open procedure5 or it can reduce the necessity of other determining the most economically prevention measures (especially the favourable bid (the two latter decision many eyes principle) and thus save usually in cooperation with the costs. technical department). The procurement department can also be assigned tasks 4. Many Eyes Principle in the field of contract implementation. The many eyes principle is a This should be especially considered classical instrument of prevention of for contract expansions in the course of corruption. Its application is nearly the implementation of big construction ubiquitous in procurement of German projects.6 These expansions are very local communities although an common and carry important corruption obligation for it only exits in North risks.7 Rhine-Westphalia.8 Division of functions is possible The efficiency of the many eyes in technical departments too. It could principle essentially relies on the e.g. be fixed that the person in charge technical competence and the time of setting up the performance resources of the staff member having description should not take part in to approve the transaction (usually a the choice of bidders or in the selection superior). This co-signing person must of the most economically favourable at least be able to perform spot check bid. controls. If that is not the case, the Smartly designed and many eyes principle only gives a implemented division of function does wrong feeling of security. There not only contribute to the prevention are no studies about the practical of corruption. It also contributes to implementation of the many eyes specialisation of personnel and thus to principle in public procurement in more effective work. Division of Germany. In any case, the many eyes function comes with unavoidable principle does not make the necessity friction loss due to a higher number of a system of unforeseen external in interfaces in the process, thus controls obsolete. generating costs. On the other hand, 5 See prior footnote. 6 Example: The city awards a contract to refurbish a building for 200.000 Euro. In the course of the refurbishment, the contractor claims an additional fee of 50.000 Euro for additional work which is allegedly necessary because of the unforeseen poor state of some parts of the building. 7 The city of Cologne has a very effective procurement department, which handles this task very successfully. 8 According to Art. 20 anticorruption statute NRW (see footnote 3) for any procurement transaction above a volume of 500 Euro.

6 วารสารวชิ าการ ป.ป.ช. 5. Rotation of Personnel but the impression of the author is that Corruption in public procurement this instrument is only fairly rarely is nearly always structural corruption used. Even local communities in North (see introduction) which requires the Rhine-Westphalia seem to ignore their involved personnel being on the legal obligation in that respect more relevant posts over a longer time. The often than not. most effective prevention instrument here is the rotation of personnel. Local 6. Use of e-procurement systems communities with more than 25.000 E-procurement is the use of inhabitants in North Rhine-Westphalia information technology to carry out the are obliged to rotate all staff members procurement procedure. E-procurement on “particularly corruption-prone has two elements: The first element is posts” after a period of five years.9 the communication between the buyer An exemption is only possible for and the bidders. There is an EU- “compelling” reasons and this has wide obligation to ensure that this to be reported to the supervising communication is carried out authority.10 electronically by 201811 if the estimated The rotation of personnel is a contract volume exceeds a certain very controversial instrument, threshold.12 The second element is the which usually meets a considerable internal processing of the procurement amount of resistance within public act within the organisation of the administration, not least amongst buyer. Both elements can help prevent the directly concerned staff. The corruption because they substantially organisation loses precious knowhow, increase the transparency of the process two staff members must familiarize and thus make manipulations more with their new task. If the rotation difficult (e.g. by manually altering one takes place against the will of the of the offers after the closure of the concerned staff members, their work bid). As things stand now, the number satisfaction and subsequently the of local communities introducing quality of their work can suffer. There e-procurement solutions for their are no known studies on this subject communication with potential bidders 9 Art. 21 (1) anticorruptions statute NRW (see footnote 3). 10 Art. 21 (1) anticorruption statute NRW (see footnote 3). 11 For contracting authorities who act as centralized procurers for other public entities, this obligation comes into effect two years earlier. 12 5.186 Mio. Euro (5.65 Mio. USD) for construction contracts, 207.000 € (225.500 USD) for most other contracts (USD figures on the base of Euro-USD exchange rate on April 4th 2015).

วารสารปีที่ 9 ฉบับท่ี 1 (มกราคม - มถิ นุ ายน 2559) 7 is increasing constantly. It can be 7. Auditing expected that the deadline 2018 will be German local communities are met and that most local communities legally required to set up an audit will take advantage of the situation to department which has the task of introduce this element of e-procurement controlling the whole municipal for procurement acts below the administration.13 The audit department threshold mentioned below. has an independent place within the The second element of public administration: It is not integrated in e-procurement, the internal processing, the administrative hierarchy; the is facing much more problems to mayor has no managerial authority. impose itself. There are several It is subject to the authority of the products on the German market enabling municipal council alone and thus its a more or less completely digitalized tool to control the administration. In this internal workflow for the procurement function, the auditing of procurement procedure. However, the reception for is one of its important tasks. It has the these solutions has been mixed. As of authority to look into any current or past today, only a minority of contracting procurement procedure as its sees fit. authorities use one of them. The more In practice however, it is rare that the procurement process is decentralized, the audit department will uncover the more workplaces need to be corruption in an audit unless it has equipped with the new software, thus been tipped off before (e.g. by a whistle increasing costs for licences, training blower, see also next paragraph). etc. At the same time, decentralization The reason for this is that you will facilitates corruption. As a consequence, not usually identify corruption when contracting authorities with a highly looking into a procurement procedure decentralized procurement face a unless you more or less know what dilemma: Decentralization carries a you are looking for. The audit department higher corruption risk and at the same has also the task to advise the time higher costs for one of the tool administration on matters of corruption to reduce the risk. prevention. However, this advice is not binding and in practice the role the audit department can play very much depends on the persons involved. Measures to prevent corruption are often seen as exaggerated and bureaucratic 13 E.g. for North Rhine-Westphalia art. 103 Local Community Act NRW.

8 วารสารวิชาการ ป.ป.ช. complications. If leading staff members therefore important to highlight the sharing this opinion have a strong possibility to report in an appropriate position within the organization, they way (e.g. by placing it in a prominent will tend to impose their views towards position on the municipality’s website) the municipal council and/or the mayor. and to give informants the possibility to The importance of an independent audit remain anonymous. Another important department as such should therefore success factor is the position of the not be overestimated. It can be an commissioner: To be taken seriously, a effective tool to prevent corruption if certain degree of seniority is required. its head is strong and if other key An ideal candidate for such a post is the players in the administration take head of the audit department. prevention seriously. If these conditions Providing potential informants are not met, its role will be limited. the possibility to report is an often underestimated anti-corruption tool. 8. Anti-Corruption Commissioner Its practical effectiveness and its An anti-corruption commissioner psychological impact are considerable. is a person within the administration At the same it does not use up many which is entrusted with certain resources. Practical experience shows anti-corruption tasks. One possible duty that the number of wilfully misleading can be the risk analysis (see above) tips is small. as well as providing anti-corruption The law doesn’t proscribe to set training for other staff members. up an anti-corruption commissioner. However, its most important function Nevertheless, many but by far not all is to be a contact person for people local communities in Germany have an inside or outside the administration anti-corruption commissioner (Leifeld, who want to report on a possible case 2005, Einmahl, 2011).14 The number of corruption. Giving this possibility to of local communities who entrust their potential informants is a very effective commissioner with the task of acting way to prevent corruption. First, it sends as a contact person in a very visible a clear message to potential wrongdoers way is however small (Einmahl 2011). that there is a heightened risk of Anti-corruption commissioners are exposure. Second, it will encourage usually senior staff members (Leifeld, potential informants, who will often 2005). be reluctant to come forward. It is 14 In the study undertaken by Leifeld 10 out of 32, in the study undertaken by Einmahl 22 out of 29.

วารสารปีท่ี 9 ฉบบั ท่ี 1 (มกราคม - มถิ ุนายน 2559) 9 9. Conclusion European Commission (2013). Special Overall, German local Eurobarometer 397 – Corruption, communitiesonly face few legal http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/ obligations to take effective corruption archives/ebs/ebs_397_en.pdf prevention measures. Standard (accessed March 21, 2015). measures to prevent corruption are Federal Ministry of the Interior. (2012). widespread in one form or another. implementation advice risk Their effectiveness however very map (Handreichung der AG much depends on whether the local Standardisierung zur Feststellung leadership perceive corruption as a besonders korruptionsgefährdeter subliminal and present threat, even if Arbeitsgebiete). it is largely invisible, and if it has the Glock, C., & Broens, M. (Eds.). (2011). political will to counter that threat. Organisation of public procurement (Organisation des öffentlichen References Einkaufs), B+G Wissenschaftsverlag, Bekemann, U. (2007). Prevention of Würzburg. corruption on the local level Leifeld, T. (2005). anticorruption (KommunaleKorruptionsprävention), measures counties, cities and Kohlhammer, Stuttgart. town in North Rhine-Westphalia Nicola, D., Piga, G., & Spagnolo, G. (MaßnahmenderKorruptionsprävention (2006), Handbook of procurement, in den Kreisen, Städten und Cambridge University Press, Gemeinden des Landes Nordrhein- Cambridge. Westfalen), Logos: Berlin. Dölling, D. (Ed.). (2007). Handbook of PricewaterhouseCoopers. (2013). corruption prevention (Handbuch Identifying and reducing corruption der Korruptionsprävention), in the field of public procurement, Munich, C.H. Beck. http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/ Einmahl, M. (Ed.). (2011). Prevention documents/anti-fraud-policy/ of corruption vs. reduction of research-and studies/identifying Bureaucracy(Korruptionsbekämpung _reducing_corruption_in_public_ und Bürokratieabbau), Cologne, procurement_en.pdf (accessed Fachhochschule für öffentliche March 12, 2015). Verwaltung NRW.

10 วารสารวิชาการ ป.ป.ช. A Public Administration Reform in the Philippine Bureau of Customs: The Case of Following and Not Following Customs Regulations Renalyn C. EstillerІ บทคัดย่อ โดยธรรมเนียมปฏิบัติท่ีผ่านมา การทุจริตในส�ำนักงานศุลกากรจัดว่าร้ายแรงมาก แต่วันน้ี ชาวฟิลิปปินส์สามารถพูดได้ว่า เป็นห้วงเวลาที่ต้องชมเชยผลงานท่ีมาจากการปฏิรูปการบริหาร ราชการ ซึ่งประธานาธิบดีเบนิกโน อากีโน ท่ี 3 (Benigno Aquino III) ได้ด�ำเนินมาตรการ หลายประการในการกวาดล้างและต่อต้านการทุจริตในภาครัฐ รวมถึงการทุจริตในส�ำนักงาน ศุลกากร ผลการศกึ ษาการต่อตา้ นการทจุ รติ ในฟลิ ิปปนิ สข์ องปาเรย์โน (Parayno) เมอ่ื ปี พ.ศ. 2556 กล่าวถึงการที่รัฐต้องสูญเสียรายได้จ�ำนวนมหาศาลอันเป็นผลมาจากการทุจริต โดยส่วนท่ีเป็น การลกั ลอบขนสนิ คา้ หนภี าษเี ขา้ ประเทศ เชอื่ ไดว้ า่ เกดิ ความสญู เสยี ระหวา่ งรอ้ ยละ 12 ถงึ รอ้ ยละ 53 ของปรมิ าณการน�ำเขา้ ทมี่ กี ารบันทกึ ไว้ บริษัทน�ำเข้าชิ้นส่วนอิเล็กทรอนิกส์ (สารก่ึงตัวน�ำ) และอุปกรณ์อิเล็กทรอนิกส์ในประเทศ ฟิลิปปินส์ เป็นกลุ่มบริษัทส�ำคัญท่ีต้องด�ำเนินการตามกฎระเบียบและวิธีการทางศุลกากรท่ีก�ำหนด โดยส�ำนักงานศุลกากร ระเบียบก�ำหนดว่าสินค้าประเภทนี้จ�ำเป็นต้องผ่านการพิจารณาอนุมัติ ก่อนท่ีจะมีการน�ำเข้า โดยเฉพาะสินค้าควบคุมบางประเภทที่ระบุในระเบียบ ส�ำนักงานศุลกากร เปน็ หนว่ ยงานหลกั ทม่ี หี นา้ ทร่ี บั ผดิ ชอบ ในการควบคมุ และตดิ ตามการนำ� เขา้ และสง่ ออกของประเทศ ซ่ึงบทบาทหน้าที่เช่นนี้เป็นช่องทางที่น�ำไปสู่การทุจริต หากหน่วยงานนี้ปราศจากข้ันตอนที่ ยุ่งยากและยืดยาวและปลอดจากการทุจริตก็จะเป็นประโยชน์โดยตรงต่อเศรษฐกิจของ ประเทศ ได้แก่ การท่ีประเทศมีรายได้จากการน�ำเข้าสินค้าเพ่ิมข้ึน การจัดสรรทรัพยากรอย่าง เหมาะสมน�ำไปสู่การก�ำหนดค่าใช้จ่ายที่ดีข้ึน และการลดข้ันตอนส�ำหรับการด�ำเนินธุรกิจของ บริษัทจะกระตุน้ นักลงทนุ เพิม่ ข้ึนในประเทศ ซึง่ มีผลต่ออตั ราการจ้างงานเพ่ิมข้นึ ด้วย І HGST Philippines Corporation, Philippines

วารสารปีที่ 9 ฉบบั ท่ี 1 (มกราคม - มถิ นุ ายน 2559) 11 การศึกษาเก่ียวกับการปฏิรูประบบบริหารราชการในส�ำนักงานศุลกากรของ ฟิลิปปินส์ ท่ีศึกษากรณีตัวอย่างของสถานประกอบการท่ีด�ำเนินงานตามกฎระเบียบและกรณีที่ ไม่ด�ำเนินงานตามกฎระเบียบของบริษัทท่ีน�ำเข้าชิ้นส่วนอิเล็กทรอนิกส์และอุปกรณ์ อิเล็กทรอนิกส์ ด�ำเนินการศึกษาจากการวิเคราะห์จากการส�ำรวจการน�ำเข้าสินค้ากลุ่มนี้ ของบริษทั ทต่ี ง้ั อยู่ในเขตเศรษฐกิจพเิ ศษของฟลิ ิปปนิ ส์ (Philippine Economic Zone Authority, PEZA) ในภูมิภาคที่ 4 เอ ซึ่งเรียกกันว่า “คาลาบาร์ซอน” (CALABARZON) การศึกษาน้ี เน้นตอบค�ำถามวิจัยดังน้ี (1) การน�ำเข้าชิ้นส่วนอิเล็กทรอนิกส์ (สารก่ึงตัวน�ำ) และอุปกรณ์ อิเล็กทรอนิกส์ ทั้งการน�ำสินค้าเข้าทางอากาศและทางทะเลของบริษัทที่ด�ำเนินงานตาม กฎระเบียบท่ีก�ำหนดโดยส�ำนักงานศุลกากร และบริษัทท่ีไม่ด�ำเนินงานตามกฎระเบียบฯ จะมี นัยส�ำคัญต่อระยะเวลาการด�ำเนินงานทางศุลกากรและค่าใช้จ่ายในการด�ำเนินงานอย่างไร และ (2) มีข้อเสนอแนะแนวทางวิธีการอย่างไร ส�ำหรับบริษัทที่น�ำเข้าช้ินส่วนอิเล็กทรอนิกส์ (สารกึง่ ตวั น�ำ) และอุปกรณ์อเิ ลก็ ทรอนกิ ส์ ที่ตงั้ อยู่ในเขตเศรษฐกิจพเิ ศษของฟิลปิ ปนิ ส์ เพอ่ื ปอ้ งกนั การกกั สินคา้ ของศุลกากร อันเป็นหนทางในการลดการทุจริต การศึกษาน้ี เป็นการส�ำรวจความคิดเห็นของเจ้าหน้าท่ีระดับผู้จัดการด้านจัดซื้อจัดจ้าง และกระบวนการด�ำเนินงานที่ท�ำงานในเขต PEZA ใน “คาลาบาร์ซอน” ระหว่างเดือนเมษายน ถึงกรกฎาคม พ.ศ. 2557 โดยการศึกษาและการวิเคราะห์เชิงสถิติ พบว่า บริษัทที่ไม่ด�ำเนินงาน ตามกฎระเบียบฯ จะต้องใช้เวลาในกระบวนการขนส่งสินค้ายาวนานกว่าบริษัทที่ด�ำเนินงาน ตามกฎระเบียบที่ก�ำหนดโดยส�ำนักงานศุลกากร นอกจากนี้ บริษัทท่ีไม่ด�ำเนินงานตามกฎ ระเบยี บฯ จะมีคา่ ใชจ้ ่ายพเิ ศษเพิ่มขนึ้ ส�ำหรับกระบวนการขนส่งสนิ คา้ ในขณะท่ีบริษทั ทดี่ ำ� เนนิ งาน ตามกฎระเบียบที่ก�ำหนดโดยสำ� นกั งานศลุ กากร ไม่มีคา่ ใชจ้ า่ ยสว่ นน้ี ค�ำส�ำคัญ: การปฏิรูปกฎระเบียบและวิธีการทางศุลกากร การป้องกันการทุจริตในกระบวนการ ศลุ กากร ฟิลิปปินส์ Abstract Traditionally, corruption in the Philippine Bureau of Customs was so rampant. Today, Filipinos can say that the time has come to appreciate the reforms in public administration. Philippine president, Benigno Aquino III, has made a lot of cleansing in combating corruption in the government including the Bureau of Customs. Parayno (2013), in his study about combating corruption in the Philippine Customs services, mentioned huge customs revenue losses due to corruption.

12 วารสารวิชาการ ป.ป.ช. The extent of smuggling in the Philippines is widely believed to go between 12.2% and 53% of recorded imports. The semiconductor and electronics companies in the Philippines among other significant businesses in the country are required to comply with the regulations of the Bureau of Customs. The regulatory requirements of customs must be considered before importing goods, particularly the regulated ones. The Bureau of Customs is considered as one of the lead agencies responsible for controlling and monitoring the import and export flow in the Philippines. Comes with its mandate is its likelihood of falling into corruption. If this bureau does not have red tapes and corruption, there will be direct benefits to the Philippine economy such as more revenues from import goods, proper allocation of customs resources leading to better cost usage, and ease of doing business thereby attracting more investors in the country, thus creating more jobs for Filipinos. This study about public administration reform in the Philippine Bureau of Customs, specifically the case study of following and not following customs regulations, is made via analysis of a survey conducted in the importation of the semiconductor and electronics companies in the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) in Region IV-A, widely known as CALABARZON. In evaluating this study, it was designed to answer the following research questions: (1) Are there significant effects on the companies’ leadtime and cost between those companies who are following and not following the Bureau of Customs in both air and sea shipments? and (2) What will be the recommended model to be used by the semiconductor and electronics companies in PEZA to prevent holding of their goods in the Bureau of Customs, thus minimizing corruption? In this study, a survey was carried out from April 2014 until July 2014, with procurement and logistics managers working in PEZA in CALABARZON as respondents. Gathered data were statistically tested to determine the effect of following and not following the Bureau of Customs regulations. The results of this study suggested that in terms of shipment by air or by sea, those semiconductor and electronics companies who were not following customs regulations got longer shipment lead time, while those semiconductor and electronics companies who were following customs regulations got shorter shipment lead time. Additionally, in terms of cost, it was revealed that those who were not following customs regulations got extra shipment cost, while those who were following customs regulations got zero extra shipment cost. Keywords: customs regulations and procedures reform, customs corruption prevention, Philippine

วารสารปีท่ี 9 ฉบับท่ี 1 (มกราคม - มถิ นุ ายน 2559) 13 1. Introduction following and not following Customs The main function of Bureau of Regulations requirements. Philippine Customs is to assess and collect the senator Sonny Angara, in one of his lawful revenues from import goods and speeches, mentioned that a big drain in all other dues, such as charges, fines government’s coffers was smuggling. and penalties ensuing under the tariff A 2014 Global Financial Integrity report and customs laws. The other functions found that the Philippine government of customs include the prevention and lost up to USD23 billion since 1990 suppression of smuggling, frauds, and in customs revenue due to trade the supervision and control over the misinvoicing or misdeclaration entrance and clearance of aircraft and (“technical smuggling”). According to vessels engaged in foreign commerce, Angara (2015) such could have been the enforcement of the tariff and custom used to improve more classrooms, equip laws and all other laws, rules and more hospitals, and build better roads. regulations relating to the tariff and The Government Financial Investment customs laws, the rules and regulations report found that such illicit financial relating to the tariff and customs flows fund an “underground economy” administration. that by virtue of its informality, not to It is mandatory for the mention its criminality, further drains semiconductor and electronics government coffers. For this reason, the companies in the Philippine Economic Aquino Government continues the push Zone Authority (PEZA) to comply with for a Customs Modernization and Tariffs the customs regulations as mandated by Act (CMTA), meant to comply with the the state. As such, semiconductor and Revised Kyoto Convention (RKC) on electronics companies are required to the simplification and harmonization of comply with these two major acts of the customs procedures and to help all efforts Philippines: (1) RA 1937, an Act to at trade facilitation in the country. This Revise and Codify the Tariff and government initiative helps to rationalize Customs Laws of the Philippines and speed up the customs procedures so Section 2530 Property Subject to that it makes more economic sense to Forfeiture, and (2) RA 6425, the comply rather than take the backdoor Dangerous Drugs Act. and go underground. The requirements This study is the first of its kind of Bureau of Customs must be in the Philippine setting. There are considered before importing the goods, many studies about corruption in the particularly the regulated ones. With Philippine government, especially this, the goods would be put on hold corruption in the Bureau of Customs, but at the Philippine Customs if those were none did a research about the effect of imported without import permit, and

14 วารสารวชิ าการ ป.ป.ช. as a penalty, the importers need to pay PDEA are pre importation requirements the duties and taxes. In the case of hold for mostly chemical shipments and regulated commodities, all of the should be available before order necessary requirements must be placement. presented such as complete composition This study further showed that of material data safety sheet (MSDS), in terms of shipment by air, those complete certificates from Philippine semiconductor and electronics Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), companieswho were not following certification from Environmental the customs regulations had a longer Management Bureau (EMB), and other leadtime, with an average of 9 days pertinent documents needed in order to and with a maximum leadtime of 33 release the shipments. days, while those semiconductor and electronics companies who were 2. The effect of not following customs following customs regulations got an regulations average leadtime of 1 day and with a The effect of not following maximum of 1 day. customs regulations in the lead time In terms of cost for shipment by and facilitation cost of semiconductor air, those who were not following the and electronics companies can be see customs regulations had an average from the survey. cost of USD73 dollar, with a maximum In the survey of following and not cost of USD116 dollar, while those who following the customs regulations, this were following the customs regulations study showed that out of two thousand had zero cost as shown in Table 1. three hundred six (2,306) shipments In terms of sea shipment, the from April 2014 until July 2014, with results show that those who were not the total respondents of 60 companies, following the customs regulations had 45 companies were found doing a an average leadtime of 4 days with facilitation. These 45 companies were maximum leadtime of 21 days, while used to hand-over to the customs those who were following had an employees an average of USD3,600 average of 3 days with a maximum of dollar, mostly to chemical clearance at 18 days. Considering the cost, those district collector due to non-compliance who were not following the customs for material data safety sheet (MSDS), regulations got an average cost of lack of Environmental Management USD42 dollar, with a maximum cost of Board (EMB) certificate, Philippine USD349 dollar, while those who were Drug Enforcement Agency certificate following had zero cost. (PDEA), etc. In general, MSDS, EMB,

วารสารปีที่ 9 ฉบับท่ี 1 (มกราคม - มถิ ุนายน 2559) 15 Table 1: Leadtime and cost of semiconductor and electronics companies following and not following the customs regulations Freight Min Average Max Min Average Max Leadtime Leadtime Leadtime Facilitation Facilitation Fee Facilitation Fee Fee (USD) (days) (days) (USD) (USD) Air - 9 33 12.00 73.00 116.00 Follow - 1 1 - - - Not Follow - Sea - 4 21 - 42.00 349.00 Follow - 3 18 - - - Not Follow - On the other hand, Table 2 requirements leads to delay in releasing describes the reasons why goods were of goods that affects the company’s put on hold at the Bureau of Customs. productivity, incurs penalty, and Is was observed that most of the encourages facilitation fee to some shipments that were put on hold was corrupt customs employees. The actual due to regulatory requirements such as findings also showed that the average Customs Narcotics Interdiction Unit facilitation fee by the importer was (CNIU) requires a certificate or special amounting to USD35 and the lack of import permit from Philippine Drug MSDS for chemicals has an average Enforcement Agency (PDEA) and facilitation fee of USD333, these fees certificate from Environmental can be prevented if the importer can Management Board EMB, lack of legally secure these requirements Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS), from the shipper’s abroad which were and others This lack of pre-importation available to every supplier.

16 วารสารวชิ าการ ป.ป.ช. Table 2: Reasons for importation hold in the Bureau of Customs for the semiconductor and electronics companies of not following the customs regulations requirements Reason of Holding of Goods at The Bureau of Customs Average Average Leadtime Facilitation Fee (days) (USD) CNIU require PDEA Special Import Permit 6 35 CNIU require certificate from EMB 3 111 Expired PDEA certificate 3 11 Need PICCS certificate from EMB 8 77 Need SQI certificate from EMB 9 75 No PICCS certificate 33 22 Weight exceeded as per CNIU for the required kilos to Import as base on SQI certificate 4 11 5 days processing of payment of duties and taxes at Bureau of Customs-Manila International Container Port 7 100 Adjust schedule of release Documents, Invoice, Air Way Bill delayed 13 35 Lack of MSDS for tapping paste 21 35 Lack of MSDS for Ethanol Absolute 8 333 Late received of Bill of Lading from consignee 4 78 Need to upload additional importable - 22 on AIP (misinvoicing) Late received of CTC documents from consignee 10 35 Need to upload additional importable on AIP 10 - 7 -

วารสารปีท่ี 9 ฉบบั ท่ี 1 (มกราคม - มถิ นุ ายน 2559) 17 In order to help the semiconductor (EMB), Dangerous Drugs Board and electronics companies of PEZA, Certificate (DDB), Pre-Manufacture and Table 3 provides a working model Pre-Importation Certificate (PMPIN) that will guide the flow of their must be prepared and accomplished customs transactions. The following prior importation. This model if use requirements such as Material Safety correctly will prevent any delay and Data Sheet (MSDS), Philippines Drug regulatory issues. It will surely benefit Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the importers as this model will be Philippine Inventory of Chemicals their potent guide if they intend to buy and Chemical Substances (PICCS), overseas, especially chemical goods Small Quantity Importation (SQI), which require stricter requirements. Environmental Compliance Certificate Table 3: Recommended guide model to prevent holding goods in the Bureau of Customs for the semiconductor and electronics companies of PEZA Trade Responsible Regulatory Sources Pre-requisite Prevent show Action Export Requirements stopper 100% 1. Supplier will Complete the Seller MSDS Supplier composition provide MSDS requirements of with 100% before substances composition importation 2. Supplier can have an option to disclose the information direct to EMB instead of their customers in the event that supplier wanted to protect trade secret Import Buyer PDEA permit PDEA MSDS MSDS not Import Buyer MSDS available Import Buyer PICCS DENR- MSDS MSDS not Import Buyer certificate EMB MSDS available DENR- MSDS not SQI EMB available EMB certificate PDEA MSDS not available

18 วารสารวชิ าการ ป.ป.ช. 3. The Reforms in the Philippine special import requirements. This system Bureau of Customs addresses the problem as it was found TheAquino Government has been that one of the reasons why most of doing a lot of cleansing in the government the semiconductor and electronics specially in the Bureau of Customs. This companies of PEZA were not following bureau which was notoriously ranked as customs regulations was because of “terrible” in the past governance surveys their inconsistencies in verifying the due to its history of corruption, had complete requirements of Bureau of introduced a number of changes and Customs. Also, most of them do not most were focused on cleansing its ranks have training and are not well-versed and getting the right people in place to on importation guidelines. It was also implement good systems. Part of a strong found that before their shipments leave in and reliable system to cleanse corruption the country of origins, many companies in the Bureau of Customs is the did not properly coordinate with their migration of the Automated Customs suppliers and brokers. Operating System (ACOS) to the Another part of the cleansing Electronic to Mobile (E2M) system. process is the implementation of This E2M approach to fight smuggling penalties of duties and taxes and and customs corruption is an effective suspension of PEZA accreditation for solution against corruption in the the importers who found to be non- Bureau of Customs. Since this system compliant to the new E2M. Furthermore, is unified, the semiconductor and several memorandum orders were electronics companies list of importables issued limiting the level of control (LOI) and the list from the Bureau of officials to handover the clearance of Customs are harmonized and tariff codes goods as a means of reducing corruption should match to prevent misdeclaration in the Bureau. Sevilla (2014) said that and under valuation of goods which lead more or less 300 customs personnel-many to disapproval of import permit, holding of them senior officers were removed in of goods, possible embargo, and payment their positions. The administration also of corresponding duties and taxes. streamlined the cargo clearance process With this new electronic to to limit the number and participation of mobile (E2M) processing system, there law enforcement agencies. will be little to zero opportunity for With information technology as illegal facilitation, because most of essential enabler, Bureau of Custom the areas will have a pre-shipment (BOC) systems and procedures are inspection for container shipments, now better put in place to discourage central valuation reference for all corruption. commodities, and compilation of all

วารสารปีท่ี 9 ฉบบั ท่ี 1 (มกราคม - มถิ นุ ายน 2559) 19 4. Conclusions References Contrary to the traditional belief Angara. (2015). Speech on Balance that when the semiconductor and between government and citizen, electronics companies of PEZA will European Chamber of Commerce not follow the customs regulation and of the Philippines, March 10, 2015, instead do the facilitation to some Manila A&B Function Room, corrupt customs officers, the leadtime Makati Shangri-la. will be shorter and the cost will be Estiller, R. (2014). Factors Affecting cheaper as compared to those who the Choice of Incoterms of Selected followed the rules of customs, the result Semiconductor and Electronics of this survey revealed that it is the Companies of Philippine Economic other way around - that it is better to Zone Authority in CALABARZON follow the rules and regulations of the Towards a Logistics Management Bureau of Customs rather than not Model, DLSU-Dasmarinas, following them. More so, penalty will Philippines. be given to the importers if found Parayno. (2013). Combating corruption violating the rules and regulations in the Philippine customs services. with any existing PEZA/BOC rules Downloaded, March 2, 2015 from such as losing the importers privilege to http://press.anu.edu.au/wpcontent/ import the goods or worse automatic uploads/2013/03/ch12.pdf cancellation of their import licenses. Sevilla. (2014). Customs: A year after With the reform in public SONA. Downloaded, March 28, administration of BOC, the 2015 from http://www.rappler.com/ semiconductor and electronics industry business/211-governance/ is now pushed to strengthen their 64555-customs-reforms-sona- importation processes by doing what shaming is right and by changing their mindset to decline facilitation. With the use of BOC’s full process automation, it is eyed to minimize if not totally eradicate officer intervention/facilitation, queues and choke points, and remote lodgment facilities. With this, the Philippine Economic Zone Authority can expect ease of doing business resulting to more investors and more jobs for Filipino people.

20 วารสารวชิ าการ ป.ป.ช. Hotspots of Corruption* Adam GraycarІ บทคัดยอ่ จุดเส่ียงต่อการทุจริตน้ัน มีทั้งที่เป็นสถานท่ีและกิจกรรม บทความนี้วิเคราะห์คดีทุจริต จากงานวิจัยสองชิ้น เพ่ือหาทางระบุว่าจุดเสี่ยงเหล่าน้ันอยู่ที่ใด การวิเคราะห์มุ่งเน้นไปที่ องค์ประกอบหรือลักษณะส�ำคัญในแต่ละคดี เพ่ือหาลักษณะองค์ประกอบของแต่ละมิติ ในสามเหล่ียมอาชญากรรม นั่นคือผู้กระท�ำการทุจริตและแรงจูงใจ เป้าหมายและโอกาส รวมทั้ง สถานที่และความสามารถท่ีจะกระท�ำได้ บทความน้ี แยกแยะคดีออกเป็นสามกลุ่มซ่ึงส�ำแดง พฤติกรรมการทุจริตท่ีแตกต่างกัน กลุ่มแรกคือกลุ่มนักการเมืองท่ีกระท�ำการทุจริตเป็นจ�ำนวนเงิน มูลค่าสูง กลุ่มท่ีสองคือกลุ่มเจ้าหน้าท่ีรัฐระดับหัวหน้าหรือผู้คุมงานที่สร้างโอกาสเพื่อการทุจริต ในกระบวนการจัดซื้อจัดจ้างและการท�ำสัญญา และกลุ่มท่ีสามคือกลุ่มผู้ตรวจหรือคุมงาน โดยเฉพาะในภาคโครงสร้างพื้นฐานมีโอกาสเรียกรับสินบนมูลค่าไม่มากแลกกับการละเมิดกฎ ระเบียบ บทความน้ีวิเคราะห์จุดเสี่ยงต่อการทุจริตของแต่ละกลุ่มภายใต้หลักการการป้องกัน อาชญากรรม เพ่ือพัฒนากลยทุ ธใ์ นการปอ้ งกันการทุจรติ คำ� สำ� คญั : จุดเสีย่ ง สามเหล่ยี มอาชญากรรม กลยุทธ์ในการปอ้ งกนั การทจุ รติ * The author wishes to acknowledge the contribution of Dr Louise Porter of Griffith University, Queensland, Australia. Dr Porter analysed the data in the study and provided great insight into the understanding of hotspots, and co-authored an article on some of the material covered here. See Porter & Graycar in references І Flinders University, Victoria, Australia

วารสารปีท่ี 9 ฉบบั ท่ี 1 (มกราคม - มถิ นุ ายน 2559) 21 Abstract Hotspots of corruption are both places and clusters of activity. This paper analyses corruption cases from two research studies to explore a way of identifying such clusters. Cases are analysed according to features that represent the elements of the crime triangle: offender and motivation, target and opportunity, and place and ability. Three groups of cases, exhibiting different patterns of corrupt activity are identified. Group one involves politicians involved in high value financial corruption. Group two primarily involves supervisors who create opportunities involving procurement and contracts. Group three involves inspectors, particularly in the infrastructure sector, who are involved with low value bribes to violate regulations. Each is discussed in relation to crime prevention principles to develop possible strategies for prevention. Keywords: hotspots, crime triangle, strategies for corruption prevention In the same way that some impoverish the powerless, and apart places have more crime than others, from the tangible ill effects, it affronts some have more corruption than citizens who expect principles, others. While hotspots of crime can processes and laws to underpin regular be identified by geographical factors, authoritative interactions. urban amenity, and structures that are Corruption is extremely hard to poorly designed and thus create measure because we are not always opportunities for crime, hotspots of sure what we are measuring. (For corruption are very different. These are more on measurement issues see not necessarily geographical places, as Kaufmann et al. 2006; Sampford et al. hotspots are traditionally understood. 2006). Many people make judgements Corruption causes harm to about how much corruption there communities and undermines security. might be, and often focus on a bad Where it exists it can, among other event or two to draw a judgement things, increase the costs of doing that corruption is rife. It is however business, ration essential services important to try to measure corruption unfairly, diminish the quality of social, for two main reasons. First, it is an educational and health services, create indicator of how well a society is unsafe infrastructure, cause dreadful performing in terms of a government’s harm to the environment, diminish contract with its citizens. If there is the capacity of local and national bribery, extortion, misappropriation, government, and undermine the rule self-dealing; if major capital and of law. It can enrich the powerful and development projects serve an

22 วารสารวชิ าการ ป.ป.ช. individual’s financial interests rather perceptions of its incidence and than the public interest; if corporations perceptions of its nature (de Lancer bribe public officials to exploit natural Julnes and Villoria 2014; Graycar and resources; if human rights abuses are Prenzler 2013, 35). Most measures are tolerated; if justice administration is in effect, proxy measurements. These inconsistent with the rule of law; are not measures of the damage caused then that society is more corrupt than by corruption. Also it cannot be assumed those in which these behaviours are less that perceptions translate into incidence or not part of the social fabric. Second, or help us understand prevalence. It is if we know how much corruption there precisely because of the difficulty in is within a jurisdiction and the nature administratively counting corruption and quantity of those corrupt events, that many of the measures of corruption then remedial actions can be put in we see are not therefore measures of place and preventive measures can corrupt behaviour. be implemented. Third, if we know if The Global Corruption Barometer, corruption is concentrated and how it published by Transparency International is distributed, our prevention processes in 2013 give us some understanding are enhanced. of the experiences and perceptions of Because it is nearly always a corruption. Almost one in five people hidden activity and done in secret, many in Thailand reported that they had paid of the measures of corruption are a bribe for a public service (Table 1). not therefore measures of corrupt This is nowhere near the levels in some behaviour, but instead measures of African countries, but considerably more people’s perception of corruption – than in most European countries Table 1: Bribes paid for public service last year (%) Country % Thailand 18 Sierra Leone 84 Zimbabwe 62 Kyrgyzstan 45 Liberia 75 Finland 1 Denmark 1 Japan 1 Australia 1 Source: Transparency International (2013)

วารสารปีท่ี 9 ฉบบั ท่ี 1 (มกราคม - มถิ ุนายน 2559) 23 When asked about confidence in education sector, Thais have as much institutions, and whether they are confidence in their institutions as say, perceived as corrupt, the data on people in Germany of Australia. Thailand is interesting. Apart from the Table 2: Perceptions of corruption by institution Country Parliament Education Judiciary Media Thailand 45 32 18 20 Sierra Leone 53 64 74 47 Zimbabwe 69 67 69 65 Kyrgyzstan 77 82 89 37 Liberia 96 87 89 53 Finland 31 7 9 35 Denmark 18 6 5 30 UK 55 18 24 69 Germany 48 19 20 54 Australia 36 19 28 58 Note: Percentage of population regarding that institution/sector as corrupt Source: Transparency International (2013) As stated above, hotspots of anything that we do not already know, corruption are not geographical places, nor does it help us with an analysis but might be institutions or practices. of hotspots. To say that Parliament in Note that in Table 2 people in the richer Liberia, or the education system or countries perceive the media to be more the judicial system in Kyrgyzstan and corrupt than other institutions, while Liberia are hotspots of corruption starts in the African countries the media are the discussion. perceived to be less corrupt than other In identifying hotspots the first institutions. steps are to understand what the concept A note of caution needs to be of “corruption” covers, and to break expressed. Using the nation state as it down into manageable and tangible the unit of analysis is not always helpful components. Corruption primarily is in understanding corruption or in about a breach of trust. Without spending understanding hotspots. Examining the time on definitions we can take some tables above and saying that Finland of the standard descriptions, “abuse of or Denmark are less corrupt than Sierra public position/ entrusted office for Leone or Zimbabwe does not tell us private gain” (Transparency International,

24 วารสารวิชาการ ป.ป.ช. 2010), or “unauthorised trading of that corruption involves doing wrong entrusted authority” (de Speville, 2010). things, or failing to do something one Not all corruption, however, is the should do, or doing something same (Graycar & Prenzler, 2013), and permissible, but purposely doing it in it plays out differently in different an improper manner, then the unit of contexts It may, therefore, be helpful analysis should not be corruption in to see corruption as a set of behaviours. a country or an organisation, or a Types of corruption, such as corrupt offender, but rather a corrupt bribery, extortion, misappropriation, event. The event may arise from self-dealing, patronage, abuse of structural features, in which corruption discretion, creating or exploiting conflict is embedded in processes and tolerated, of interest, nepotism, clientelism and sometimes it is situational and fleetingly favouritism occur in the performance of opportunistic. Sometimes the participants various activities. Everyday activities in are willing, so the behaviour involves which corrupt behaviour can take place collusion, sometimes one participant is include appointing personnel, buying unwilling, and thus the behaviour is things (procurement), delivering extortionate. programsor services, managing disasters, To better understand hotspots, making things (construction / we can turn to Routine Activity Theory manufacturing), controlling activities (Cohen & Felson, 1979) which explains (licensing / regulation / issuing of permits), how offenders, targets and locations administering (justice for example). converge to create opportunities for These activities take place in public crime. For example, Clarke and Eck’s sectors such as health, tax administration, (2003) crime triangle explains that crime energy regulation and delivery, social occurs when a motivated offender and services, environment & water, customs suitable target converge in an opportune & immigration, legal system, as well as place in the absence of effective in a host of private sector activities such guardianship. Crime Pattern Theory as banking, agriculture, sports etc. And explains that crimes do not occur it all occurs in specific places, such randomly across geographical and as countries, regions, localities, temporal contexts, but that patterns corporations, work places etc. of convergence can be seen in the This analysis, known as TASP existence of ‘hotspots’ (Brantingham & (type, activity, sector, place) is a Brantingham, 2008). working framework for the analysis of Three points shape hotspots, corruption (Graycar 2015). TASP sets offender, target and guardian (absence the stage for a situational crime of). If any one of these is removed, there prevention analysis of corruption. Noting will be no corrupt situation to deal with.

วารสารปีที่ 9 ฉบับท่ี 1 (มกราคม - มถิ นุ ายน 2559) 25 We can easily identify offenders. There guardianship process, either as are people who take bribes, people who organisational in house training for offer bribes, people who do deals that the community as a whole, making breach their position of trust, people who all aware of the damaging effects of use patronage, people who self deal and corruption. In more formal terms give contracts to companies owned by guardianship might include the law, but themselves or their families, I am sure only if it is actually enforces, and one you can identify many more. Targets mechanism of guardianship might also might include organisations that supply be an anti-corruption agency. public goods where the demand exceeds Carmel-Gilfilen (2013, p.84) supply, or organisations where there is a describes an inner crime triangle great deal of discretion, or organisations (Figure 1) composed of the offender, that do not have processes to adequately place and target, and an outer triangle safeguard their assets. Targets might also composed of motivation, ability and be processes, or they might be actual opportunity, respectively. These cash, or goods, or positions. “represents the environmental Guardians are not necessarily the circumstances that can be adapted in police or those who prevent things from order to deter [offending]”. In this happening. Guardianship might include analysis details of the Offender, Target political leadership; it could cover and Place provide information on the culture in an organisation, the that ‘who’ ‘what’ and ‘where’, of corruption ethics are adhered to and shared, events, while details of the Desire, and particularly the management Opportunity and Ability provide commitment to ethics and fair information on ‘how’ corruption can process. Often this might result in a surface. These are all elements that comprehensive management strategy. make up hotspots and that can be Education is also a part of the targeted for prevention.

26 วารสารวิชาการ ป.ป.ช. TARGET Figure 1: Inner Crime Triangle Opportunity OFFENDER Motivation PLACE Ability Application government, the DOI consists of This study reported here uses the elements of the crime triangle to identify attorneys, investigators, forensic patterns of how activities converge to produce or encourage corruption. If auditors, computer forensic specialists there are discernible patterns to these elements, then this would suggest that and administrative personnel. ‘hotspot’ analysis of this kind might be a beneficial way for anti-corruption An earlier study (Graycar & Villa agencies to identify the common problems in their jurisdictions. This 2011) commenced with one hundred will shape possible ways of preventing corruption. cases which the DOI had investigated The cases that comprise this study were taken from the Department and which had been successfully of Investigation (DOI) of the City of New York. This is a large and traditional prosecuted. Beginning with cases in anti-corruption agency, which focuses both on administrative and political 2009 and going backwards, 100 cases corruption. Founded in 1873 to serve as an independent and non-partisan were selected in chronological order, and watchdog for the New York City only open source information was used to inform the descriptions and analysis. However, not all were corruption cases. 28 cases were eliminated because they were criminal activities such as assault, theft, fraud or forgery. The final sample comprised of 72 cases. You can read these examples and identify offenders, targets and potential guardians. Some examples of the type of cases are:

วารสารปีท่ี 9 ฉบับท่ี 1 (มกราคม - มถิ ุนายน 2559) 27 - A factory operator offered - Two government officials were USD700 to a Department of Buildings arrested and charged with embezzling (DOB) boiler inspector to overlook millions of federal dollars that had been unsafe boiler violations in the factory. provided to their agency by submitting - Seven employees of the invoices for goods and services that New York City Human Resources were never provided or by padding Administration / Department of Social invoices for computer services and Services and eight other individuals software purchased following the generated Medicaid cards (meant for September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the city’s neediest and most vulnerable New York City. They had been the people) in exchange for a cash fee of Director of Records and the Director approximately USD300-USD400 per of Management Information Systems. card. This scheme led to the Medicaid - A technician accepted a Program losing an estimated USD3.9 USD100 bribe to alter drug test results. million. Her role was to collect urine samples - A New York State assembly as part of pre-employment testing of woman offered her help to a private all job applicants for the New York contractor to acquire city-owned land City Housing Authority. in her district and in exchange the - A summer camp manager was contractor had to build a house for her arrested for allegedly offering to wire valued in USD500,000. USD10,000 into the personal bank - A housing inspector of the account of an upstate New York City Department of Housing Preservation Department of Environmental and Development accepted USD100 Protection (“DEP”) employee to from a house owner to overlook a overlook wastewater treatment violation creating hazardous conditions violations at the children’s camp. in an illegal basement apartment. - A clerical employee of the - A Plumbing Inspector Department of Housing Preservation employed with the New York City and Development (HPD), was arrested Department of Buildings (DOB), for accepting and retaining two cash solicited and accepted a USD500 payments, of USD40 and USD50, in bribe from a plumbing contractor in exchange for providing the investigator exchange for filing false certificates with a total of five certified copies of inspection with the DOB. He also of building registrations that should falsely claimed that he had performed have cost USD8 each, payable to the mandated inspections on two residential City. sewer connections

28 วารสารวิชาการ ป.ป.ช. - A former New York State Table 3 shows the six variables Assemblyman and labor leader indulged chosen to represent the elements of in racketeering. He misappropriated interest. millions of dollars by conjuring up a - The offender element was phantom employee on his legislative characterised by the type of public staff, taking a portion of the fictitious servant involved. employee’s supposed salary and draining - The desire, or motivation, was funds from organisations for which he characterised by the value of the bribe sought funding. or kickback. - A water use inspector was - The nature of activity describes arrested for allegedly soliciting and whether the target was regulations receiving bribes from four people who (that were controlled or implemented), faced stiff fines for water use violations procurement/contracts, or finance (i.e. and/or costly repairs to their water stealing or misusing money). meters. He offered to overlook violations - The opportunity describes in return for payments of between whether the person violated procedure USD100 and USD250. or proactively created the opportunity Six characteristics were identified for him/herself. in these cases, as per Figure 1, a suitable - The place, rather than being target with opportunity available, the the physical location, is taken to be ability to acquire this product in a the sector in which the person was specific place and desire on the part of working. the offender to complete the crime” - The ability is reflected in the (framework derived from Carmel- nature of the infraction, that is, the Gilfilen 2013, p. 83.). violation, theft, or abuse of influence that was enabled by the individual’s position.

วารสารปีที่ 9 ฉบบั ท่ี 1 (มกราคม - มถิ นุ ายน 2559) 29 Table 3: Triangle Components and Occurrence Triangle Element Variables Frequency ƒ % Offender / Kind of public 1. Inspector 35 49 servant involved 2. Low-level worker 3. Supervisor 17 23 4. Politician 14 19 5 7 Desire / Size of bribe / 1. Low (<USD10,000) 49 68 kickback 2. High (>USD10,000) 16 22 Target / Nature of activity 1. Regulations 52 72 2. Procurement/Contracts 3. Finance 14 19 6 8 Opportunity / Process 1. Violation of procedure 46 64 2. Creation of opportunity 26 36 Place / Sector 1. Infrastructure 30 42 2. Human Services 21 29 3. Health & Environment 20 28 4. Whole of government 1 1 Ability / Kind of infraction 1. Violating regulations 2. Theft 55 76 3. Abuse of political influence 13 18 4 6 The six variables showed some human services and health and clear patterns. The most common environment sectors were also features of the cases include the commonly involved (29% and 28%, involvement of inspectors (49%), low respectively). About three quarters of value bribes under USD10,000 (68%), the sample involved violating regulations, and activity relating to controlling or with smaller numbers involved in theft implementing regulations (72%). Most and abuse of influence. frequently the cases involved a violation In trying to understand hotspots of procedure (64%), rather than creating we grouped our cases into three profiles the opportunity (36%), and were in the (Table 4) infrastructure sector (42%), although

30 วารสารวิชาการ ป.ป.ช. Table 4: Profiles of Activities Triangle Element Triangle Element Triangle Element Politician Supervisor Inspector High value High value Low value Finance Procurement/Contracts Regulations Create opportunity Creation of opportunity Violation of procedure Human Services Human Services Infrastructure Abuse of political influence Theft Health & Environment Violating regulations Group 1 consists of only five for this, the contractor had to build her cases but was distinctive because all a house valued at USD500,000. cases involved politicians. These cases Group 2 consists of 14 cases and, all involved the creation of the while some distinct patterns can be seen opportunity, and all involved high value within the group, it did show somewhat (over USD10,000) bribes/kickbacks. more variation across the categories. The In four out of the five cases the target majority (approximately two thirds) of was financial, and in four of the five the cases in this group involved cases this was enabled through supervisors, high value bribes/kickbacks, abuse of their political influence. Most procurement and administrating commonly, these cases involved the contracts in the human services sector, human service sector, although one and a creation of the opportunity that case involved infrastructure and one the amounted to theft. However, up to a whole of government. An example case third of cases showed some variation that typifies this group is as follows: on these features. An example case that A State Senator used his position typifies this group is as follows: and influence to obtain financing funds Supervisor of adoptions at the for two non-profit organizations. Part City Administration for Children’s of this money was diverted to pay his Services fabricated adoption cases, personal expenses for an amount of authorizing undue payments for a total approximately USD575,000. In that of USD411,775 in exchange for example, the politician creates the receiving a portion of that money. opportunity, with his position enabling Other examples include him misappropriate funds for his private employees of the City’s Health and use. In another case, a New York State Hospitals Corporation (HHC) selling assembly woman used her position in confidential patient information to her district to help a private contractor personal injury attorneys, and the head acquire state owned land. In exchange of a construction company falsifying

วารสารปีที่ 9 ฉบับท่ี 1 (มกราคม - มถิ ุนายน 2559) 31 contract documents to avoid an A further example can be seen obligation to subcontract part of in the case of a low-level employee the work, and keep the full contract of the City Department of Parks and payment amount. Recreation (DPR) who received a low Group 3 consists of the largest value bribe of USD120 from a person number of cases (n= 45). All cases in obligated to perform community service this group involved low value bribes/ (Human Services sector) as part of an kickbacks, all related to controlling or alternative sentence program. The aim implementing regulations and all of the bribe was to let the person violated regulations. Those involved leave early without performing the were typically inspectors (71%) or services. This would constitute a low level workers (27%) who violated violation of procedures through not procedures (80%) rather than creating enforcing the regulations that govern the opportunity. While there was some community service program. variation in the sector involved, almost half involved the infrastructure sector. Prevention Further, this group is the only group of This paper analysed public sector the three that also includes cases from corruption cases from the New York the health and environment sector. An Department of Investigation to identify example case that typifies this group is common themes that may indicate as follows: opportunities for targeted prevention. An Inspector of the City Using the framework of the crime Department of Buildings (DOB) was triangle, three groups of cases were offered a USD300 payment to not distinguished in the data, based upon issue a violation and stop work order different combinations of features when the company failed to follow relating to the ‘offender’, ‘target’ and constructions plans. ‘place’(sector). Three different ‘hotspots’ This example clearly shows an of corruption; that is, three primary inspector in the infrastructure sector ways in which offenders, locations and who, rather than creating an opportunity opportunities for corruption converged for corruption, is offered a low value bribe in the sample cases. The presence of in exchange for violating procedures such hotspots shows that, while not (not issuing the violation and stop work all corruption incidents are the same, order). The violation concerned the equally they are not all unique. This inspector not implementing the means that, instead of responding to regulations regarding construction corruption on a case-by-case basis, plans. prevention can be focused toward broad types of activity. Thus, prevention

32 วารสารวิชาการ ป.ป.ช. can be tailored to each particular type different forms of corruption; for (based on the particular elements example, increasing guardianship involved) to increase effectiveness, as through transparency and accountability well as targeted at the most frequent of processes, and reducing rewards (or likely) types, to prevent the most through introducing penalties for cases. corruptbehaviour. Such strategies can Three principles of prevention be targeted to particular forms of can be applied: increase the effort to behaviour by particular people behave corruptly; increase the risks (positions) in particular sectors. Each of of corrupt behaviour; and reduce the the three groups of cases are summarized rewards of corrupt behaviour. These and discussed in terms of proposed principles are discussed in relation avenues for prevention encompassing to corruption (Graycar and Prenzler the SCP principles (summarised in 2013) and it is clear that certain strategies table 5). are likely to apply to a number of Table 5: Example prevention techniques proposed for each corruption group. Group 1 Increase the effort Increase the risks Reduce the rewards • Politician • High value Oversight and hearings Financial audit Financial • Finance penalties; • Create opportunity by authoritative of personal moral penalties • Human Services • Abuse of political expenditure and business influence committees; media accounts vigilance and publicity; scrutiny by citizen groups Group 2 Increase the effort Increase the risks Reduce the rewards • Supervisor Layered decision-making Setting and Penalties for • High value procurement • Procurement/Contracts enforcement of breaches • Creation of procurement guidelines opportunity • Human Services • Theft Group 3 Increase the effort Increase the risks Reduce the rewards • Inspector Oversight of decisions Audits of Financial • Low value • Regulations decisions relating penalties • Violation of procedure to regulations; • Infrastructure integrity testing • Health & Environment • Violating regulations

วารสารปีที่ 9 ฉบับท่ี 1 (มกราคม - มถิ ุนายน 2559) 33 Group 1: Politicians in terms of accountability mechanisms In the sample analysed, that could increase the risks and effort, politicianswere most vulnerable to high as well as reduce the rewards. For level financial corruption, due to their example, using a process of layered position of political influence. While decision-making, particularly for comprising only a small proportion of contracts that represent a high value, cases, the financial cost associated with could increase the visibility of these incidents was high, with further supervisors’ decisions and reduce potential cost to public confidence in individual discretion. The setting and government. The focus of these cases enforcement of procurement guidelines, on high personal financial gain would including the use of penalties for suggest that the prevention principle procurement breaches could also be of decreasing the rewards may be effective. Regular and random audits particularly effective. Strategies to of accounts may also increase the risk achieve this might include large of exposure of theft. financial penalties, exclusion from future employment in the political/ Group 3: Inspectors government sphere, as well as moral Group three suggested that NYC penalties, such as public naming and inspectors are vulnerable to low value shaming. Further, the risks of such bribes to violate regulations, due to their behaviour could be increased, for decision-making positions, particularly example through mandatory financial in the infrastructure sector but also audits of both personal and business within the health and environment accounts of politicians. Identification of sector. This group was revealed to “red flags’ is important, and there is be the most common type among the a literature on the identification of red sample cases. While involving low value flags (see for example, Grabosky & bribes/kickbacks, the damage resulting Duffield 2001, Ware et al 2011) from such cases could be extensive. For example, overlooking building Group 2: Supervisors code or environmental violations could The data showed that seriously affect public safety. supervisors, particularly in the Human Given that these cases typically Services sector, can create opportunities involve violations rather than around procurement and administrating individuals creating opportunities, contracts that amount to high value effective prevention might be targeted theft and distortion of policy priorities. at increasing the effort and risks This suggests that those working in this associated with such violations. This field might need greater guardianship could include mechanisms of oversight

34 วารสารวชิ าการ ป.ป.ช. to increase the transparency and of research – identifying opportunities accountability of inspectors’ decisions. and their locations. Rotation of inspectors for particular The identification of three jobs may also increase the effort and specific themes within the data shows risk necessary for those offering bribes, that not all corruption cases are the as each inspection will involve a new same, but that the main features can person to be approached. Further, while be distilled into broad types that share bribes/kickbacks were of low value, there common features. The advantage of are possible strategies to reduce the such identification is that prevention rewards. For example, removing pension can be targeted to such themes. This rights of convicted employees might has potential cost-benefit improvements make low value bribes less attractive, over an individualistic case-by-case as this would ensure too low a reward response, where resources can be for the risk involved. targeted at multiple incidents but specific features to ensure the greatest Conclusion impact. The method for uncovering the patterns found in the NYC cases can References be applied to any data set of cases Brantingham, P., & Patricia. (2008). that have enough detail to inform Crime pattern theory. in R. Wortley & knowledge about the offenders and L. Mazerolle (Eds.), Environmental their motivation, the target and the criminology and crime analysis, opportunity, and the place and the 78-93. Cullompton: Willan. ability. Such analysis on a new data set, Carmel-Gilfilen, C. (2013). Bridging perhaps in Thailand, for example might security and good design: uncover groups that are different to Understanding perceptions of those identified here. This is because expert and novice shoplifters. different jurisdictions will likely Security Journal, 26, 80-105. experience different problems, due to Clarke, R. V., & Eck, J. (2003). Become different opportunity structures (and a problem-solving crime analyst. prevention strategies that may already be London: Jill Dando Institute of in place). In other words, anticorruption Crime Science. agencies need to conduct their own Cohen, L.E., & Felson, M. (1979). Social analysis of cases in their jurisdiction to change and crime rate trends: A uncover what the ‘hotspots’ of activity routine activity approach. American are, and tailor prevention accordingly. Sociological Review, 44(4), Indeed, corruption follows opportunity, 588-608. and this is the key next task for this type

วารสารปีท่ี 9 ฉบบั ท่ี 1 (มกราคม - มถิ ุนายน 2559) 35 de Lancer Julnes, Patria, & Villoria, Porter, L.E. & Graycar, A. (2013) M. (2014). Understanding and Hotspots of corruption: applying addressing citizens’ perceptions of a problem-oriented policing corruption: The case of spain. approach to preventing corruption International Review of Public in the public sector, Security Administration, 19(1), 23-43. Journal (advance online publication; de Speville, B. (2010). Overcoming doi: 10.1057/sj.2013.38) corruption:Theessentials.Richmond Sampford, C., Shacklock, A., Connors, UK: de Speville & Associates. C., & Galtung, F. (2006). Measuring Grabosky, P., & Duffield, G. (2001). corruption. Burlington, VT:Ashgate. Red flags of fraud. Trends and Issues Transparency International. (2013) in Crime and Criminal Justice. 'Global Corruption Barometer 2013', http://aic.gov.au/publications/ Berlin: Transparency International, current%20series/tandi/181-200/ available at http://www.transparency. tandi200.html org/gcb2013 Graycar, A., & Villa, D. (2011). The Transparency International. (2010). loss of governance capacity Frequently asked questions about through corruption. Governance: corruption. Berlin, Transparency An International Journal of Policy, International, http://archive. Administration, and Institutions, transparency.org/news_ room/faq/ 24 (3), 419-438. corruption_faq Graycar, A., & Prenzler, T. (2013). Ware, Glenn, Shaun Moss, Edgardo Understanding and preventing Campos, & Noone Gregory. (2011). Cor- corruption. Basingstoke, UK: ruption in procurement. in Graycar A. Palgrave Macmillan. & Russell G. S. (Ed.), Handbook Graycar, A. (2015). Corruption: of global research and practice in Classification and analysis. Policy corruption, 65-121. Cheltenham UK: and Society, 34 (2). Edward Elgar. Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., & Mastruzzi, M. (2006). Measuring corruption: Myths and realities. World Bank Institute, Washington, DC. http:// www1.worldbank.org /publicsector/ anticorrupt/corecourse2007/ Myths.pdf

36 วารสารวชิ าการ ป.ป.ช. The Weakest Link: Investigation and Prosecution of Procurement-Related Corruption Cases in Tanzania and Uganda* Annika EngelbertІ บทคัดยอ่ ประเทศก�ำลังพัฒนาส่วนใหญ่ ได้จัดตั้งหน่วยงานป้องกันการทุจริตตามสนธิสัญญา ระหว่างประเทศเพื่อป้องกันและปราบปรามการทุจริต โดยอาศัยการบังคับใช้กฎหมาย โดยอัตรา การลงโทษคดีทุจริตยังคงต่�ำมาก ซ่ึงท�ำให้ประสิทธิภาพในการป้องปรามการทุจริตลดลง งานวิจัย ทผี่ า่ นมาเปน็ การศกึ ษาถงึ ปจั จยั ภายนอกทท่ี ำ� ใหห้ นว่ ยงานปราบปรามการทจุ รติ ประสบความสำ� เรจ็ แต่บทความน้ี จะโต้แย้งพิสูจน์ให้เห็นว่ากลไกความร่วมมือท่ีมีประสิทธิภาพระหว่างหน่วยงาน ป้องกันและปราบปรามการทุจริตกับหน่วยงานติดตามตรวจสอบในภาคท่ีมีแนวโน้มสูง ในการทุจริต เช่น การจัดซื้อจัดจ้าง และหน่วยงานด�ำเนินคดีของรัฐ เป็นส่ิงส�ำคัญในการควบคุม การทุจริต โดยใช้กรณีศึกษาเปรียบเทียบจากแทนซาเนียและยูกันดา เพื่อส�ำรวจว่าแนวทาง ความร่วมมือที่เหมาะสมควรเป็นการรวมศูนย์อ�ำนาจหรือกระจายบทบาทหน้าท่ีในการป้องกัน และปราบปรามการทุจริต การวิเคราะห์เป็นการศึกษาจากกฎหมาย และการสมั ภาษณผ์ ู้เชีย่ วชาญ รวมท้ังรายงานจากหน่วยงานรัฐในการจดั ซ้อื จัดจ้างและจากสอื่ สารมวลชน ค�ำส�ำคญั : การจดั ซือ้ จัดจ้างภาครัฐ ความรว่ มมือ การตรวจสอบ การสืบสวน การด�ำเนินคดี Abstract In most developing countries, anti-corruption agencies were established in compliance with international treaties to prevent and combat corruption through law enforcement. Yet conviction rates in corruption have remained very low, undermining the deterrent effect arising from a high risk of detection. Whereas previous research * This conference paper is a short version of a working paper published in 2014 (Engelbert, 2014) І Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Germany

วารสารปีที่ 9 ฉบบั ท่ี 1 (มกราคม - มถิ ุนายน 2559) 37 has focused on identifying external success factors for anti-corruption agencies, this paper argues that effective collaboration mechanisms between the agencies, monitoring bodies in corruption-prone sectors such as public procurement, and public prosecution are crucial for curbing corruption. By means of a comparative case study of Tanzania and Uganda, it shall be explored whether a more streamlined or dispersed collaboration approach is more promising in a highly corrupt setting. Besides national laws, the analysis is based on findings from expert interviews and on reports by procurement authorities and the media. Keywords: public procurement, collaboration, detection, investigation, prosecution 1. Introduction established to streamline national Corruption remains a serious anti-corruption efforts, and to investigate threat to the main objective of public and – depending on their mandate – also procurement systems, which is to achieve to prosecute criminal offences in value for money, i.e. to acquire goods, corruption matters. ACAs therefore works or services of highest quality, assume a crucial role in combating at best price. Considering the fact that corruption in public procurement at government contract volumes can be the very interface of administrative and high and that complex administrative criminal law. procedures facilitate the concealment Scientific research in the last of corrupt practices, it is not surprising years has concentrated on identifying that many big corruption scandals in factors suitable for alleviating the East Africa during the last years were current widespread ineffectiveness of related to government contracts; what ACAs (Camerer, 2001; De Jaegere, is striking, though, is the fact that none 2012; Doig, Watt & Williams, 2006; of these cases have ever led to a Heilbrunn, 2004; Johnston & Kpundeh, conviction of high-ranking officials in 2002; Meagher, 2004; Pope & Vogl, a court of law (Human Rights Watch, 2000; Recanatini, 2011; Speville, 2008; 2013). Regulatory authorities overseeing Transparency International, 2000; UNDP, procurement processes can detect 2005; USAID, 2006). Yet it has not been corruption through internal and external extensively researched how ACAs are monitoring mechanisms, such as audits interlinked with other law enforcement and review procedures, but are limited bodies, which forms of cooperation exist in their investigatory powers and not and which chances and challenges arise authorized to prosecute alleged from different institutional arrangements. corruption cases.Anti corruption agencies This paper aims to fill this gap by (ACAs), on the other hand, have been emphasizing necessities and conditions

38 วารสารวชิ าการ ป.ป.ช. for cooperation between ACAs and bodies monitoring good governance other law enforcement bodies in in public administration (for example procurement-related corruption. The audit departments, revenue services, paper will present two exploratory case procurement authorities). ACAs have studies of Tanzania and Uganda from very limited opportunities to detect an institutional-functional comparative corruption, as they are not involved in perspective, based on respective national the day-to-day business of corruption- legislation and reports of procurement prone sectors. Furthermore, not all authorities and enriched with findings ACAs are mandated to prosecute from expert interviews conducted in corruption, but investigate corruption May and June 2013 onsite and media matters and refer them to the general reports. prosecutor when evidence is compiled. Based on the specific body of evidence, 2. The role of anti-corruption agencies public prosecution takes the decision in combating corruption in public whether to bring cases to court where procurement actual jurisdiction takes place (UNDP, The core activities of ACAs 2005). In cases where public prosecution depend on their strategic focus, which continuously fails to bring charges can be investigation, enforcement, against allegedly corrupt actors, the prevention, awareness and education, reasons can be manifold: It may be a or a combination of some or of all of lack of independence of the public these. Each of these general areas prosecutors themselves – a widespread involves a long list of responsibilities problem in deeply corrupt political (USAID, 2006). By the sheer number and systems - or their unwillingness to the fragmented nature of anti-corruption recognize the professional investigation activities, it seems evident that one single work of the ACA (Pope & Vogl, 2000; agency cannot operate in isolation from UNDP, 2005). On the other side, there other organizations. It is therefore not might be a capacity problem within the expected from the ACAs that these carry ACA to prepare cases adequately for out the tasks alone, but that they “provide litigation. The interface between centralized leadership in […] core areas investigation and prosecution is therefore of anti-corruption activity” (Meagher, critical (Chêne, 2012; UNDP, 2005). 2004: 3; USAID, 2006: 5). In brief, the procedural relationship of The authorities charged with detection, investigation and prosecution investigating and prosecuting corruption in corruption requires strong cooperation cases (ACAs, public prosecution, police, among monitoring and law enforcement courts of law) have an informational bodies. disadvantage in relation to those

วารสารปีท่ี 9 ฉบบั ท่ี 1 (มกราคม - มถิ นุ ายน 2559) 39 The function of ACAs in anti-corruption in their public investigation and prosecution of procurement systems. Despite many procurement-related corruption cases institutional analogies, different ways can take various forms. First, the ACA of collaboration between public might be the sole law enforcement body procurement authorities, national to cooperate with public procurement ACAs, and prosecution services were authorities in corruption or one of several established, which shall be discussed competent authorities. This cooperation below. can be either stipulated by law or based 1) Collaboration betweenACAs on more informal agreements. Second, and prosecution services ACAs can be vested with full, The two Tanzanian ACAs, the subordinated or no prosecutorial Prevention and Combating of powers at all; the interplay with public Corruption Bureau (PCCB) and the prosecutions is dependent thereon. Zanzibar Anti-Corruption and By means of two in-depth case studies, Economic CrimesAuthority (ZACECA), the following chapter shall discuss dispose of enhanced investigatory different institutional concepts with powers, yet are not mandated to bring regard to their respective capacities for alleged corruption cases to court improving the fight against corruption without the written consent of the in public procurement. Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP); their prosecutorial powers are hence 3. Case studies subordinated.2 The interplay between Each year, an important the PCCB and the DPP has been subject percentage of the Tanzanian and to concern, as several interview partners Ugandan national budgets are spent mentioned that both the PCCB and the through public procurement (Akech, DPP are exposed to considerable 2006). At the same time, the states are pressure from the political class and highly affected by corruption,1 and that their successful functioning corruption scandals brought to the depends on the political will of the attention of the general public via the executive. It was reported that in many media originate mostly from distorted cases, the PCCB was put under pressure procurement procedures. Thus, both by the government and had to play down states have strong incentives to foster allegations in the investigation reports. 1 Uganda ranks 142 and Tanzania 119 out of 175 countries on the Corruption Perceptions Index 2014 published by Transparency International. 2 The PCCB’s claims for full prosecutorial powers have yet been refused by Tanzanian judges (The Citizen, June 15, 2013; see also Transparency International Kenya, September 4, 2013).

40 วารสารวชิ าการ ป.ป.ช. These corruption cases were only made PCCB, the Ugandan legal framework public because other bodies investigated provides for greater independence of its the case simultaneously and came up ACA as the IGG is primarily accountable with the evidence. It is hence arguable to Parliament, not to the President. whether in a situation where corruption Drawing from the legislation, the IGG has become systemic, investigative seems to enjoy more autonomy in powers should be channeled through investigating and prosecuting corruption, only one ACA or, on the contrary, rather especially in those cases affecting the be dispersed amongst as many agencies political sphere, as potential influence- as reasonable, in order to make political taking from the executive is contained influence-peddling more difficult. A rather effectively. bilateral donor organization confirmed In order to “foster the elimination moreover that the DPP has often been of corruption” (Art. 225 (1) (b) held back by the government when trying Constitution of Uganda), the IGG is to bring cases to court. As a result, only vested with enhanced investigatory corruption cases on a minor scale have powers as well as with the mandate been convicted, whereas those not only to recommend, but also to perpetrators involved in bigger scandals execute prosecution on corruption are usually better connected to matters. Contrary to the Tanzanian influential politicians and not impeached anti-corruption laws, the Ugandan at all (Human Rights Watch, 2013). The legislation does not make provisions on low conviction rate in corruption has collaboration of law enforcement had a negative impact on the public’s bodies in corruption matters; Part IV perception of the PCCB’s ability to of the Anti-Corruption Act of 2009 bring major corruption scandals to court however grants the exact same (Thomson Reuters Foundation, April 12, investigatory powers to the IGG and to 2013; Freedom House, 2012): Further the DPP. Accordingly, the prosecution research would be needed to shed light function for alleged corruption is on the question whether this is due to the shared by the two law enforcement ACA’s incapacity to compile sufficient bodies. It is not specified in the law evidence for the corruption case or rather in which way the two bodies shall the result of restricted independence, as coordinate their operations. Overlapping the analysis above suggests. mandates without a clear definition of Unlike the legal foundations of responsibilities, however, can be a severe the Tanzanian ACAs, the Ugandan drawback in combating corruption. Inspectorate of Government (IGG) is It has indeed occurred that the IGG constitutionally established. Compared and the DPP conducted investigations to the provisions on the Tanzanian on the same case, but came to contrary

วารสารปีที่ 9 ฉบับท่ี 1 (มกราคม - มถิ นุ ายน 2559) 41 conclusions which severely hampered the procurement process during auditing prosecution (in more detail: Human the procuring entities. This audit Rights Watch, 2013). system has been well institutionalized 2) Collaboration betweenACAs and is closely interlinked with the PCCB and public procurement authorities via a Memorandum of Understanding The Tanzanian and the Ugandan that aims to strengthen collaboration public procurement authorities dispose between the regulatory authority and the of investigatory powers, but only in PCCB.3 All audit reports of procuring relation to procurement contracts and not entities and contracts scoring 20% and to criminal proceedings. Accordingly, above on the red flags scale are submitted their capacity to sanction corrupt to the PCCB, together with investigation actions in procurement is restricted to reports on suspected fraud, for further contractual matters by means of tender investigation. Although red flag rejection, debarment of bidders or checklists are included in every audit, disciplinary sanctions against the coverage of the system is limited as procurement officers. Interaction audits are based on stratified sampling with law enforcement bodies is hence due to practical reasons. It is also necessary for those procurement important to note that a detected red procedures where the regulatory flag is not in itself evidence of corruption, authorities’ investigatory mandate is but can also be an indication for not sufficient. operational deficiencies related to The Tanzanian public capacity gaps (Public Procurement procurement system uses mainly two Regulatory Authority (PPRA), 2013). mechanisms to detect corruption: First, In Uganda, the IGG itself is not administrative reviews can be requested mentioned in the Public Procurement by unsatisfied bidders, including Act as an agency in charge of handling those that were aggrieved by corrupt criminal corruption matters. Interviewees activities during the tender phase. The have confirmed that this loophole has regulatory authority can take further created general confusion among all action whenever there are sufficient involved parties about the responsible grounds (Sec. 99 (4) Public Procurement institution to which the regulatory Act). Secondly, the regulatory authority authority should hand over alleged has established a system of “red flags” to corruption cases. In total, five public measure the likelihood of corruption in bodies have the mandate to investigate 3 Signed on February 11, 2010; see PPRA: Annual Procurement Evaluation Report for 2009/10, chapter 4.6.4.3. Details on the red flag checklist are included in Annex 5.5 of the PPRA’s Annual Procurement Evaluation Report for 2012/13.

42 วารสารวชิ าการ ป.ป.ช. corruption cases: Besides the IGG overlapping mandates often lead to and the DPP, these are the Criminal parallel investigations issuing divergent Investigations and Intelligence decisions and recommendations. Department (CIID) under the Uganda Secondly, the quality of investigation Police Force, the Office of the Auditor- results is not always good enough, so General and the Public Accounts that the preparation of litigation is not Committee (PAC) of the Parliament. adequate and charges are eventually The regulatory authority itself has dropped. Last but not least, the IGG and stated in interviews that they usually the DPP are still considered to be under refer suspected corruption cases to the extensive control of the government (cf. CIID. In addition to cases that are directly Human Rights Watch, 2013). Taking all sent from the procurement authority factors together, there was consensus to the law enforcement body, the PAC among interview partners that can – based on reports submitted to collaboration between the regulatory Parliament by the PPDA, the Auditor- authority and law enforcement bodies General and IGG respectively – request must be better defined. a second opinion from either the Auditor-General or the IGG on alleged 4. Conclusion corruption. If the second law enforcement Summing up, the institutional body agrees that the case requires approach to combat corruption in further investigation, it is handed over public procurement applied in Tanzania to the CIID and eventually prosecuted appears to be more centralized as by the DPP. responsibilities among law enforcement Contrary to the Tanzanian bodies are better defined. Although this streamlined approach that involves strategy supports efficiency, it makes the mainly two authorities, Uganda has system more vulnerable to control by the opted for the widespread dispersion of political elite. The Ugandan system has prosecutorial and especially investigatory chosen the opposite way and distributes powers in corruption matters. The investigation and prosecution functions procedure described above is among many authorities. Experience has customarily applied, yet not a prescribed shown, however, that inefficiencies due standard. It seems not only extremely to overlapping mandates and unclear time consuming, but also rather jurisdictions are detrimental to anti- unstructured with all of its ill-defined corruption efforts as well. The role of responsibilities. It is therefore not anti-corruption agencies in investigating surprising that experts in Uganda and prosecuting procurement-related consider investigation to be the main corruption cases is certainly stronger in problem in combating corruption: First, anti-corruption systems following the

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