Handbook of Psychology Vol. 5

Theoretical Perspectives on Key Questions in Environmental Psychology 429 Arousal Theory uncertainty of the stimulation). In ideal circumstances a stim- ulus has to be of average intensity and reasonably diverse, Arousal theory stipulates that the environment provides a cer- and it must be structured with a reasonable degree of uncer- tain amount of physiological stimulation that, depending on tainty. The level of stimulation at which an individual feels the individual’s interpretation and attribution of the causes, comfortable depends on his or her past experience, or, more has particular behavioral effects. Each particular behavior is precisely, on the environmental conditions under which he or best performed at a definite level of arousal. The relation be- she has grown up. This reference level is nevertheless subject tween levels of arousal and optimal performance or behavior to adaptation when individuals change their life environ- is curvilinear (Yerkes-Dodson law). Whereas individuals ments. If rural people can be very unsettled by urban envi- seek stimulation when arousal is too low, too-high levels of ronments, they may also adapt to this new situation after a arousal produced by either pleasant or unpleasant stimulation certain period of residence. Adaptation level theory postu- or experiences have negative effects on performance and be- lates an active and dynamic relation of the individual with his havior. Anomic behavior in urban environments is attributed or her environment. to high stimulation levels due to environmental conditions such as excessive noise or crowding (Cohen & Spacapan, Interactionist Approaches 1984). On the other hand, understimulation may occur in cer- tain environments such as the Arctic that cause unease and Analyses of the individual’s exposure to environmental stres- depression (Suedfeld & Steel, 2000). sors in terms of control and of behavioral elasticity, on one hand, and environmental cognition (cognitive mapping, envi- The Environmental Load or Overstimulation Approach ronmental evaluations, etc.), on the other hand, refer typi- cally to an interactionist rationale of individual-environment According to this model people have a limited capacity to relations. process incoming stimuli, and overload occurs when the in- coming stimuli exceed the individual’s capacity to process Stress and Control them. Individuals deal with an overloaded situation by concen- trating their attention on the most important aspects of a task or Some authors (Proshansky et al., 1970; Stokols, 1978; by focusing on a fixed goal, ignoring peripheral stimulation in Zlutnick & Altman, 1972) consider certain environmental order to avoid distraction. Paying attention to a particular task conditions to be constraining to the individual. Similarly, oth- in an overloaded situation is very demanding and produces ers (Baum, Singer, & Baum, 1981; Evans & Cohen, 1987; fatigue (Kaplan & Kaplan, 1989). Typical aftereffects of being Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) describe such situations as being exposed to an overload situation are, according to the over- stressful. Both approaches lead to conditions as being poten- load model, less tolerance to frustration, less attention, and tially constraining or stressful and introduce the concept reduced capacity to react in an adaptive way. Milgram (1970) of control. Individuals exposed to such situations engage in attributed the deterioration of social life in cities to the wide va- coping processes. Coping is an attempt to reestablish or gain riety of demands on citizens causing a reduced capacity to pay control over the situation identified as stressing or constrain- attention to others. The overload approach explains why cer- ing. According to the psychological stress model, environ- tain environmental conditions lead to undesirable behavioral mental conditions such as noise, crowding, or daily hassles consequences such as aggression, lack of helping behavior, provoke physiological, emotional, and behavioral reac- and selfishness in urban environments. tions identified as stress (Lazarus, 1966). Three types of stressors can be distinguished: cataclysmic events (e.g., vol- Adaptation Level Theory canic eruptions, floods, earthquakes), personal life events (e.g., illness, death, family or work problems), and back- Adaptation level theory (Wohlwill, 1974) is in certain ways a ground conditions (e.g., transportation difficulties, access to logical extension of arousal theory and the overload services, noise, crowding). Such conditions are potentially approach. It assumes that there is an intermediate level of stressful according to their nature provided that the individ- stimulation that is individually optimal. Three categories ual identifies them as such (Cohen, Evans, Stokols, & Krantz, of stimulation can be distinguished: sensory stimulation, 1986). social stimulation, and movement. These categories can be described along three dimensions of stimulation: intensity, An environment is constraining when something is limit- diversity, and patterning (i.e., the structure and degree of ing or prevents individuals from achieving their intentions. This may occur with environmental conditions or stressors

430 Environmental Psychology like noise or crowding, but also with specific environmental exposure (Moser, 1992). Any exposure to a constraining or features like fences, barriers, or bad weather. The constraining disagreeable stimulus invokes a neuro-vegetative reaction. situation is interpreted by the individual as being out of his or Confronted with such stimulation, the individual mobilizes her control. The feeling of not being able to master the situa- cognitive strategies and evaluates the aversive situation with tion produces psychological reactance (Brehm, 1966). Un- reference to her or his threshold of individual and situational pleasant feelings of being constrained lead the individual to tolerance, as well as the context in which exposure occurs. attempt to recover his or her freedom of action in controlling This evaluation creates a stimulation level that is judged the situation. Having freedom of action or controlling one’s against a personal norm of exposure. In response the individ- environment seems to be an important aspect of everyday life ual judges the stimulus as being weak, average and tolerable, and individuals’ well-being. When people perceive control in or strong. Cognitive processes intervene to permit the indi- a noisy situation, their performance is improved (Glass & vidual to engage in adaptive behavior to control the situation. Singer, 1972); they are less aggressive (Donnerstein & A situation in which the constraints are too high or in which Wilson, 1976; Moser & Lévy-Leboyer, 1985); and they are stimulation is excessive produces increased physiological more often helpful (Sherrod & Dowes, 1974). On the contrary, arousal, thereby preventing any cognitive intervention and the perception of loss of control produced by a stressful situa- therefore also control of the situation. tion or constraints has several negative consequences on be- havior (Barnes, 1981) as well as on well-being and health. Behavioral Elasticity Confronted with a potentially stressful condition, the indi- This model introduces the temporal dimension of exposure to vidual appraises the situation. Appraisals involve both as- environmental conditions and refers to individual norms of sessing the situation (primary appraisal) and evaluating the exposure (Moser, in press). The influence of stressors is well possibilities of coping with it (secondary appraisal). The documented, but the findings are rarely analyzed in terms of identification of a situation as being stressful depends on adaptation to long-term or before-after comparisons. Yet one cognitive appraisal. Cognitive appraisal of a situation as can assume that where there are no constraining factors, indi- being potentially disturbing or threatening or even harmful viduals will revert to their own set of norms, which are elab- involves an interaction between the objective characteristics orated through their history of exposure. The principle of of the situation as well as the individual’s interpretation of elasticity provides a good illustration of individual behavior the situation in light of past experience. The secondary in the context of environmental conditions. Using the princi- appraisal leads to considering the situation as challenging ple of elasticity from solids mechanics to characterize the with reference to a coping strategy. Coping strategies de- adaptive capacities of individuals exposed to environmental pend on individual and situational factors. They consist of constraints, three essential behavioral specificities as a con- problem-focused, direct action such as fleeing the situation, sequence of changing environmental contingencies can be trying to stop, removing or reducing the identified stressor, or distinguished: (a) a return to an earlier state (a point of refer- reacting with a cognitive or emotional focus such as reevalu- ence) in which constraints were not present, (b) the ability to ating the threatening aspects of the situation. Reaction to a adapt to a state of constraint as long as the constraint is per- stressful situation may lead the individual to concentrate on manent, and (c) the existence of limits on one’s flexibility. the task, focus on the goals, or ignore or even deny the dis- The latter becomes manifest through reduced flexibility in tracting stimuli. Repeated or steady exposure to stressors the face of increased constraints, the existence of a breaking may result in adaptation and therefore weaker reactions to point (when the constraints are too great), and the progressive this type of situation. If the threatening character of the situa- reduction of elasticity as a function of both continuous con- tion exceeds the coping capacities of the individual, this straints and of aging. may cause fatigue and a sense of helplessness (Garber & Seligman, 1981; Seligman, 1975). Returning to an Earlier Baseline. While attention is mostly given to attitude change and modifying behavior in The Stress-Adaptation Model particular situations, the stability over time of these behaviors is rarely analyzed. Yet longitudinal research often shows that In everyday life the individual is exposed to both background proenvironmental behavior re-sorts to the initial state before stressors and occasionally to excessive environmental stimu- the constraints were encountered. This has been shown, for lation. Consequently, the individual’s behavior can only be instance, in the context of encouraging people to sort their appreciated when considered in a context perceived and eval- domestic waste (Moser & Matheau, in press) or in levels of uated by the persons themselves and in reference to baseline

Theoretical Perspectives on Key Questions in Environmental Psychology 431 concern about global environmental issues (Uzzell, 2000b). involves nonadaptive reactive behavior that is clearly of a Exposure to constraints creates a disequilibrium, and the in- different order. As a consequence, breakdown and a limit on dividual, having a tendency to reincorporate initial behavior, flexibility result. Contrary to what occurs when there is elas- reverts to the earlier state of equilibrium. ticity, however, this breakdown fortunately occurs only occa- sionally and on an ad hoc basis. The third limit is the Adaptation: The Ability to Put Up With a Constraining progressive loss of elasticity as a function of the persistence Situation in so Far as It Is Continuous. Observing behav- of exposure to constraints: This has been examined under ior in the urban environment provides evidence of the con- laboratory conditions in the form of postexposure effects. straining conditions of the urban context. Residents of large Outside the laboratory, the constant mobilization of coping cities walk faster in the street and demonstrate greater with- processes, for example, for those living near airports pro- drawal than do those living in small towns: They look duces fatigue and lowers the capacity to face new stressful straight ahead, only rarely maintain eye contact with others, situations (Altman, 1975). One encounters, in particular, and respond less frequently to the various requests for help greater vulnerability and irritability as well as a significant from other people. In other words, faced with an overstimu- decrease in the ability to resist stressful events. These effects lating urban environment, people use a filtering process by demonstrate that there is a decreased tolerance threshold, and which they focus their attention on those requests that they so a decreased flexibility following prolonged exposure to evaluate as important, disregarding peripheral stimulation. different environmental constraints. The constant expression of this type of adaptive behavior suggests that it has become normative. The walking speed of The elasticity model is an appropriate framework to illus- inhabitants of small towns is slower that the walking speed of trate the mechanisms and limits of behavioral plasticity. It inhabitants in large cities (Bornstein, 1979). So we can assert may perhaps stimulate the generation of a model of behav- that such behavior provides evidence of the individual’s ca- ioral adjustments by placing an emphasis on the temporal di- pacity to respond to particular environmentally constraining mension and the cognitive processes governing behavior. conditions. Environmental cognition, cognitive mapping, and environ- mental appraisals are likely to fall within an interactionist The Extent and Limits of Flexibility. The limits of flexi- framework. While they can be individualistic, they are in- bility and, more particularly, the breakdown following con- variably set within a social context. Environmental cognition straints that are too great are best seen in aggressive behavior. would be enriched by more research in terms of social repre- The distinction between instrumental and hostile aggression sentations (Moscovici, 1989) providing the opportunity to (Feshbach, 1964) recalls the distinction between adaptive be- emphasize the role of cultural values, aspirations, and needs havior aimed at effectively confronting a threat and a reactive as a frame of reference for environmental behavior. and impulsive behavior ineffectual for adaptation. Three lim- its of flexibility can be identified. First is reduced flexibility in Cognitive Mapping the face of increased constraints. When exposure to accus- tomed constraints is relatively high, there is a lower proba- How do we form maps of the environment in our heads and bility of performing an adaptive response, and therefore an use them to navigate through the environment? Cognition increase in reactive behaviors. There is decreased flexibility and memory of places produce mental images of our envi- in the face of constraint, more so if the constraint is added ronment. The individual has an organized mental representa- onto already-existing constraints affecting the individual. tion of his or her environment (e.g., neighborhood, district, This is most clearly evident in aggressive behaviors (Moser, city, specific places), which environmental psychologist call 1984). People react more strongly to the same stimulation in cognitive maps. Cities need to be legible so that people can the urban environment than in small towns. Hostile aggres- “read” and navigate them. The study of cognitive maps has its sion thus becomes more frequent. This results in a decrease in origin in the work of Tolman (1948), who studied the way in adaptive capacities and therefore of flexibility if additional which rats find their ways in mazes. Lynch (1960), an urban constraints are grafted onto those already present. The second planner, introduced the topic and a methodology to study the limit is the existence of a breaking point when the constraints ways in which people perceive the urban environment. Lynch are too great: Intervention by cognitive processes is pre- established a simple but effective method to collect and ana- vented if stimulation produces a neuro-vegetative reaction lyze mental maps. He suggested that people categorize the that is too extreme (Moser, 1992; Zillmann, 1978). This is city according to five key elements: paths (e.g., streets, most evident with violent or hostile aggressive behavior. This lanes), edges (e.g., spatial limits such as rivers and rail tracks), districts (e.g., larger spatial areas or neighborhoods

432 Environmental Psychology that have specific characteristics and are typically named, consequent effect that this has on environmental attitudes and such as Soho), nodes (e.g., intersections, plazas), and land- behavior. marks (e.g., reference points for the majority of people). Evaluations can be carried out either in the environment Furthermore, one can distinguish sequential representa- that is being evaluated or through simulations. Horswill and tions (i.e., elements that the individual encounters when trav- McKenna (1999) developed a video-based technique for eling from one point of the city to another, rich in paths and measuring drivers’ speed choice, and their technique has the nodes) and spatial representations emphasizing landmarks advantage of maintaining experimental control and ensuring and districts (Appleyard, 1970). Cognitive maps will vary, external and ecological validity. They found that speed for example, as a function of familiarity with the city and choice during video simulation related highly to real driving stage in the life cycle. Such maps can be used to characterize experiences. Research consistently confirms color pho- either an individual’s specific environment interests or pref- tographs as a valid measure of on-site response, especially erences (Milgram & Jodelet, 1976) or the qualities and legi- for visual issues (Bateson & Hui, 1992; Brown, Daniel, bility of a particular environment (Gärling & Evans, 1991; Richards, & King, 1988; Nasar & Hong, 1999; Stamps, Kitchen, Blades, & Golledge, 1997). Way finding is a com- 1990). Stamps (1990) conducted a meta-analysis of research plex process involving a variety of cognitive operations such that had previously used simulated environments to measure as localization of the target and choosing the route and the perceptions of real versus photographed environments (e.g., type of transportation to reach the goal (Gärling, Böök, & presented as slides, color prints, and black-and-white prints). Lindberg, 1986). Sketch maps often carry typical errors that He demonstrated that there is highly significant correlation point to the cognitive elaboration of the individual’s environ- between evaluations of real and simulated (photographed) mental representation: nonexhaustive, spatial distortions (too environments. The advent of digital imaging means that it is close, too apart), simplification of paths and spaces, and over- now possible to manipulate photographs so that environ- estimation of the size of familiar places. ments can be changed in a systematic and highly convincing way in order to assess public preferences and reactions. The Environmental Evaluations photographs in Figure 17.1 were manipulated with the inten- tion of assessing the impact of different traffic calming mea- What factors are important in people’s evaluation of the built sures on drivers’ estimates of speed (Uzzell & Leach, 2001). and natural environment, and how satisfied are they with dif- ferent environments and environmental conditions? Some The research demonstrated that drivers clearly were able environmental evaluations, called the place-centered method, to discriminate between the different conditions presented in focus on the objective physical properties of the environment manipulated photographs. When estimated speeds were cor- such as pollution levels or the amount of urban development related against actual speeds along the road as it exists at pre- over the previous 10 years. The aim is to measure the quali- sent, this suggested which design solutions would lead to an ties of an environment by experts or by actual or potential increase or decrease in speeding behavior. users. Such evaluations are done without taking into account the referential framework of the evaluator (i.e. the values, Transactional Approaches preferences, or significations attached to the place). These kinds of appraisals are important, but when it is remembered Three approaches are discussed here as examples of transac- that what may be an environmental problem for one person tional approaches in environmental psychology: Barker’s may be of no consequence to another, it is clear that environ- behavior setting approach; affordances; and place theory, mental assessment has an important subjective dimension as identity, and attachment. well. This person-centered method focuses on the feelings, subjective appreciation of, and satisfaction with a particular Barker’s Behavior Settings environment (Craik & Zube, 1976; Russell & Lanius, 1984). Barker’s behavior settings approach has both a theoretical Some environmental appraisals take the form of contrast- and methodological importance because it provides a frame- ing social categories such as architects versus the public work for analyzing the logic of behavior in particular set- (Groat, 1994; Hubbard, 1994) or scientists versus laypeople tings. Barker (1968, 1990) considered the environment as a (Mertz, Slovic, & Purchase, 1998) or of categorizing people place where prescribed patterns of behavior, called programs, who hold particular attitudes (e.g., pro- vs. anticonservation; occur. There is a correspondence between the nature of the Nord, Luloff, & Bridger, 1998). The focus of attention is on physical milieu and a determined number and type of collec- the role the individual occupies or the attitudes held and the tive behavior taking place in it. According to ecological

Theoretical Perspectives on Key Questions in Environmental Psychology 433 Figure 17.1 Digitally manipulated photographs used to assess the impact of alternative traffic-calming measures on drivers’ estimates of speed. psychology, knowing the setting will provide information identified and described. Barriers between settings also de- about the number of programs (i.e., behaviors) in it. Such limit programs. Knowing about the setting (e.g., its purpose programs are recurrent activities, regularly performed by per- or intention) infers the typical behaviors of the people in that sons holding specific roles. A church, for instance, induces setting. Barker’s conceptualization permits an understanding behaviors like explaining, listening, praying, singing, and so of environment-behavior relationships such that space might on, but each type of activity is performed by persons endors- be organized in a certain way in order to meet its various pur- ing specific roles. According to his or her role, the priest is a poses. Behavior settings are dynamic structures that evolve performer and the congregation members are nonperformers. over time (Wicker, 1979, 1987). This setting also has a layout and particular furniture that fits that purpose and fixes the program (i.e., what type of behav- Staffing (formerly manning) theory completes Barker’s ior should happen in it). The so-called behavior setting (i.e., approach by proposing a set of concepts related to the num- the physical place and the behaviors) determines what type of ber of people that the behavior setting needs in order to be behavior is appropriate and therefore can or should occur. functional (Barker, 1960; Wicker & Kirkmeyer, 1976). Be- Patterns of behavior (e.g., worshipping) as well as settings sides key concepts like performers who carry out the primary (e.g., churches) are nevertheless independent: A religious of- tasks and the nonperformers who observe, the minimum fice can be held in the open air, and the church can be used for number of people needed to maintain the functioning of a be- a concert. It is their role-environment structure or synomor- havior setting is called the maintenance minimum, and the phology that create the behavior setting. Barker’s analysis maximum is called its capacity. Applicants are people seek- supposes an interdependency between collective patterns of ing to become part of the behavior setting. Overstaffing or behavior, the program, and the physical space or milieu in understaffing is a consequence of too few or too many appli- which these behaviors take place. Behaviors are supposed to cants for a behavior setting. The consequence of under- be unique in the specific setting and dependent on the setting staffing is that people have to work harder and must endorse in which they occur. Settings are delimited places such as a greater range of different roles in order to maintain the within walls, fences, or symbolic barriers. They can be functioning of the setting. They will also feel more commit- ted to the group and endorse more important roles. On the

434 Environmental Psychology other hand, overstaffing requires the fulfillment of adaptive environments. Based on his analysis of three significant books measures to maintain the functioning, such as increasing on children’s use of their environment (Barker & Wright, the size of the setting. 1951; Hart, 1979; R. Moore, 1986), Heft created a functional taxonomy of children’s outdoor environments in terms of the Behavior settings and staffing theory are helpful tools to environmental features and activities that they afford the solve environmental design problems and to improve the child. The 10 environmental features were flat, relatively functioning of environments. Barker’s approach has been smooth surface; relatively smooth slope; graspable/detached applied successfully to the analyses of work environments, object; attached object; nonrigid, attached object; climbable schools, and small towns. It helps to document community feature; aperture; shelter; moldable materials; and water. life and enables the evaluation of the structure of organiza- tions in terms of efficiency and responsibility. Heft also pointed out that as there is a developmental as- pect to the taxonomy, the value of the environment will Affordance Theory change for the developing child. As children move from pre- teenagers through to adolescence, so the affordances of dif- Gibson (1979) argued that, contrary to the orthodox view ferent types of environments change in response to their need held in the design professions, people do not see form and for social interaction and privacy (Woolley, Spencer, Dunn, & shape when perceiving a place. Rather, the environment can Rowley, 1999). Clark and Uzzell (in press) found that the use be seen as offering a set of affordances; that is, the environ- of the neighborhood for interaction decreased with age ment is assessed in terms of what it can do for us. The design and that by the time the young people had reached 11 years professions are typically taught that the building blocks of old the number of affordances was significantly lower than perception comprise shape, color, and form. This stems from for those aged 7 years old. There was no decrease in the use the view that architecture and landscape architecture are of the neighborhood for retreat. Therefore, the neighborhood often taught as visual arts rather than as ways of providing retains its importance for retreat behaviors. functional space in which people can work, live, and engage in recreation. Gibson argues that “the affordances of the en- Exemplifying the assertion by Bonaiuto and Bonnes vironment are what it offers the animal, what it provides or (1996) that the experience of small- and large-city living furnishes either for good or ill” (p. 127). Affordances are eco- is notably different, Kyttä (1995) examined children’s activi- logical resources from a functional point of view. They are an ties in the city, in a small town, and in a rural area in Finland. objectively specifiable and psychologically meaningful tax- Using the affordance approach but including categories on onomy of the environment. The environment offers opportu- social affordances and nature, Kyttä found that the number of nities for use and manipulation. How we use the environment positive affordances was highest in the rural area and lowest as children, parents, or senior citizens will vary depending on in the city. However, when the quality of affordances was an- our needs and interests, values, and aspirations. alyzed, there were no differences between the areas for 8 out of the 11 affordance categories. The attitudes of parents play This perspective suggests that the degree to which built or a significant role in how children perceive affordances. Chil- natural environments are utilized changes as people’s roles, dren with a limited autonomy over their spatial range, due to relationships, and activities in the environment change. parental restrictions through fears about safety, see little of Therefore, the environment can be seen to have a develop- the environment and therefore of its affordances. mental dimension to it. As people develop their cognitive, affective, and behavioral capacities, the resources that the Theories of Place, Place Identity, and Place Attachment environment offers change. Furthermore, the environment can be designed to facilitate, support, and encourage this. One of the earliest theories of place was proposed by Canter Heft (1988) argued that utilizing Gibson’s theory of affor- (1977), whose conceptual, as opposed to behavioral, model dances allows us to describe environmental features in terms proposed that the cognitive system contains information of their functional significance for an individual or group. He about where places are, what is likely to happen there, and postulated that to arrive at a functional description of an who is likely to be present. Canter defined place as a unit of environment, one requires three sorts of information: the environmental experience and postulated that the unit of characteristics of the person, the characteristics of the envi- place was the result of the relationships between actions ronment, and the behavior of the individual in question. Heft (i.e., behavior is associated or anticipated), conceptions, and (1988) was interested in children’s environment-behavior physical attributes. interactions, with the aim of creating a taxonomy that would describe the functionally significant properties of children’s A second influential theory of place is the transactional theory of Stokols and Shumaker (1981), who defined place

Time, Space, and the Future of Environmental Psychology 435 as the entity between aspects of meaning, physical proper- physical world. This understanding sets place identity along- ties, and relative activity. This is not so dissimilar from Can- side and independent of self-identity, rather than subsumed ter’s notions of actions, conceptions, and physical properties. within it. Stokols and Shumaker emphasize the collective perceptions of place and propose that a place has a social imageability. Although it may be possible to discuss the relationship This imageability is the collectively held social mean- between the physical environment and identity without refer- ings that the place has among its occupants or users. Within ence to a group, to have two forms of identity would focus social psychology these would be called social representa- discussion on whether identity was more “social” or more tions (Farr & Moscovici, 1984; Moscovici, 1989). Stokols “place.” This would not seem to be useful in explanatory proposed that three dimensions contribute to a group’s social terms. In addition, it contradicts environmental psycholo- imageability of place: functions, goals, and evaluations. Func- gists’ transactional perspective on place (Saegert & Winkel, tions are individual or group activities that occur within the 1990). Although we agree with Proshansky that self theorists place regularly and include the norms associated with the ac- have neglected the physical environment, we would suggest tivities and the identity and social roles of the occupants/users that rather than there being a separate part of identity con- of the place; goals can be either personal or collective and cerned with place, all aspects of identity will, to a greater or relate to the purpose of the place; evaluations include the lesser extent, have place-related implications. Although place occupants, physical features, and social functions associated identity is seen to be a crucial part of the relationship between with the place. self and environment, Proshansky never really operational- ized the concept. Breakwell’s (1986) identity process model, Thus, Stokols and Shumaker concluded that the perceived with its constructs of distinctiveness, continuity, self-esteem, social imageability of a place is the result of the functional, and self-efficacy, provides such an investigatory and analyti- motivational, and evaluative meanings conveyed by the envi- cal framework. Although these constructs have a particularly ronment. Stokols places particular emphasis on the functional social orientation in Breakwell’s formulation, they neverthe- dimension of place and the need to explore the affective and less would seem to have useful transfer relevance to other di- motivational processes in the relationship between people mensions of identity, including place (Bonaiuto, Breakwell, & and place. As Bonnes and Secchiaroli (1995) pointed out, to Cano, 1996; Uzzell, 1995). For example, distinctiveness and live in an environment does not mean structuring experiences continuity are essential elements in Korpela (1989) and Lalli’s only with respect to its physical reality. Places carry a role in (1992) conceptualizations of place identity. the fulfillment of biological, cultural, psychological, and so- cial needs of the person in the many situations that they will One important mechanism through which place identity is face over their lifetimes. supported is place attachment. Spencer and Woolley (2000), for example, argued that children gain their personal identity One such role is their contribution to personal and group through place attachment. Place attachment refers to an emo- identity. Place has been related to identity in two ways. The tional bonding between individuals and their life spaces, first could be referred to as place identification. This refers to which could be the home, the neighborhood, or places and a person’s expressed identification with a place. For example, spaces at a larger scale (Altman & Low, 1992; Giuliani, 1991; a person from London may refer to himself as a Londoner. In Giuliani & Feldman, 1993). this sense, “Londoner” can be considered to be a social cate- gory that is subject to the same rules as is a social identifica- TIME, SPACE, AND THE FUTURE OF tion within social identity theory. Hogg and Abrams (1988) ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY suggested that social identity comprises different social iden- tifications, any one of which will become salient depending Needs and Rights in Environmental Psychology on the context. Taking this position suggests that the concept of place identity is subsumed into and becomes a part of The emphasis of much environmental psychology has been social identity. on identifying and then assisting in the process of providing for and satisfying people’s needs. It is assumed within the The second way in which place has been related to iden- philosophy of Brandt and Bruntland that environmental tity is through the term place identity, a construct promoted needs should be defined by those in power (i.e., the West), not by Proshansky, Fabian, and Kaminoff (1983; Proshansky, by the people whose needs are supposedly being satisfied. 1987) that calls for a more radical reevaluation of the con- This form of donor benevolence as a strategy for tackling struct of identity. Proshansky et al. (1983) proposed that environmental deficits operates at the local, national, and place identity is another aspect of identity comparable to so- cial identity that describes the person’s socialization with the

436 Environmental Psychology international level. Thus, it is argued, we need to prevent pol- methodologies that have been oriented toward Western lution and conserve the rainforests, wildlife, energy, and assumptions and worldviews. Two topics seem to have been water supplies. The West finds it difficult to understand why neglected in environmental psychology as they have in other those experiencing environmental degradation—but also suf- areas of psychology: cultural differences and temporal fering poverty, malnutrition, poor housing, unemployment, processes. Both approaches are even more important at the and high mortality rates—have different priorities. The beginning of the twenty-first century because on the one hand needs-based approach is often carried through to be an as- the processes of globalization have the effect of destroying sumption that guides environmental psychology research. cultural differences, and on the other hand, sustainable de- velopment is seen as a way of ensuring the long-term in- An alternative approach focuses on environmental rights tegrity of biocultural systems. in which those without power define their needs themselves and try to secure the rightful access to resources to satisfy By defining sustainable development as “development those needs. There is a difficulty with trying to integrate a that meets the need of the present without compromising bottom-up rights approach with a top-down needs-driven the ability of future generations to meet their own needs,” approach because one is faced with the problem of who sets Bruntland (1987) opened the way to concerns related to qual- the agenda. Groups will have difficulties asserting their rights ity of life. The reference to needs allows not only the require- when the allocation processes and agendas are structured by ment that development be harmonious toward and respectful others. A rights approach does not mean that neither help nor of the environment, but equally for the recognition of the resources are required or given. Clearly it is essential that the individual’s own well-being. Of course, the issue just posed haves of the world continue to provide for the have nots—but requires us to consider whether we should be thinking in within a context of participation, self-determination, trans- terms of needs or rights, and, indeed, whose needs and whose parency in decision-making, and accountability by all con- rights. cerned. The essential factor is that the starting point for discussing the allocation of resources is different. Globalization and its corollary, global trade and com- munications, create pressure toward cultural uniformity in Long-term change and development will come about only lifestyles. The progressive deployment of globalization has through informed community action, rather than a depen- brought on, with reason, fear of a standardization of values dency relationship on experts and technological-fix solutions. and increased anonymity threatening both individual and The development of environmental consciousness and capac- group identity. It gives rise to movements demanding recog- ities without the simultaneous development of opportunities nition of local, regional, and national priorities and cultural for action leads to a feeling of powerlessness (Uzzell, 1999). differences and therefore also specific needs. This search For this reason cooperation between all agencies and institu- for identity finds its expression spatially. Furthermore, the tions is necessary in order to secure action opportunities. Psy- increase in regional, national, and international forced or vol- chologists in general and environmental psychologists in untary mobility (e.g., political refugees and asylum seekers, particular have the expertise and experience to play an impor- economic migration of job-seeking populations, and execu- tant role in this process. It is here that we can see the value of tives dislocated by their companies) exacerbates confronta- research in suggesting prescriptive roles and functions for an tions between cultures with different needs, values, and environmental psychology that should be taken seriously by customs. Globalization provides the impetus to situate envi- policy makers and practitioners alike. Some have suggested ronmental psychology in a more globally—and, at the same that the implementation of sustainable development through, time, culturally—relative framework. The traditional con- for example, Local Agenda 21 initiatives will be possible only cepts of local community, environmental appropriation, and with local community consensus (Robinson, 1997). Petts identity take on new meanings in the context of sustainable (1995) argued that traditional participatory approaches have development and globalization. been reactive in that the public is expected simply to respond to previously formulated plans. The trend now is for proac- The Cultural Dimension tive, consensus-building approaches that attempt to involve people in the decision-making process itself. Quality of life standards are culturally determined. Needs concerning personal space, social life in the neighborhood, Cultural Differences and Temporal Processes and urban experience are different from one culture to an- other. Furthermore, acting in sustainable ways depends on Environmental psychology, like other areas of psychology, culturally marked values concerning the environment. From has focused almost exclusively on topics, theories, and a globalization perspective, how universal is the need for

Time, Space, and the Future of Environmental Psychology 437 personal space and privacy? Are they the same everywhere? for appropriation. Currently there is a preference for homo- Research in environmental psychology has taught us that, for genization of populations within neighborhoods. Arguably, instance, spatial needs vary both from one culture to another however, such a strategy may pose more risks for the future and also on one’s stage in the life cycle (Altman, 1975; than encouraging a process of heterogeneity in terms of Sundstrom, 1978). Some studies, such as Nasar and Min the impact on how we perceive others and how we perceive (1984), show that people living in the Mediterranean region space occupied by foreigners. These are classic lessons to be and in Asia react very differently to confined spatial arrange- learned from social psychology (Tajfel, 1982). Neighbor- ments. But many such studies are conducted in a culturally hoods not directly controlled or appropriated by the individual homogeneous environment and therefore allow only for con- can lead to antagonism between culturally different commu- clusions concerning interpersonal differences related to the nities. More sociocultural research on living in areas with het- cultural origins of the research participants (see, e.g., Loo & erogeneous populations and transcultural relations should be Ong, 1984). We need more longitudinal research and inter- undertaken in order to identify barriers to integration. cultural studies such as those undertaken to study reactions to density and spatial needs. Environmental psychology has repeatedly pointed to the negative consequences of living conditions in large urban The norms, needs, and strategies for adapting to condi- centers: anonymity, insecurity, indifference to others, and ex- tions very different from our own are likely to provide us posure to various types of stress (Moser, 1992). This presents with insights on the dynamics of how people relate to the a rather dark portrait of urban living conditions. An environ- physical and social dimensions of both their and our environ- mental psychology has emerged that has deprecated urban ments. Such studies should be able to answer these questions centers and lauded the virtues of supposedly more attrac- more systematically. Privacy may signify and represent very tive suburban residential environments (Lindberg, Hartig, different conditions not only at the individual level, but also Garvill, & Gärling, 1992). Taking the Anglo-Saxon single- between different cultures (Altman & Chemers, 1980). Indi- family house as its model (Cooper, 1972; Thorne, Hall, & vidual versus collective housing preferences, as well as Munro-Clark, 1982), this approach has failed to account for the use of different facilities inside and around the dwelling, what is happening in cities such as Paris where the city cen- are all culturally defined. While individual dwelling units ap- ter is invariably highly valued as a thriving, attractive, and pear as an ideal in Anglo-Saxon cultural settings, in some lively residential as well as commercial and cultural environ- Latin American societies there is a stronger preference for ment. Two thirds of those living in the Paris region indicate collective housing units, particularly in Brazil, mainly for that they would prefer to live within Paris proper, whereas reasons of increased security. More systematic research in one fifth would prefer to live in a small provincial town and this area should be able to provide guidelines for architects only 15% show a preference for the Parisian suburbs (Moser, and designers, allowing them to take account of culturally Ratiu, & Fleury-Bahi, 2002). Such results are in direct con- dependent needs beyond the simplistic notions of conception trast to those found in the United States. The American expe- and layout (e.g., kitchens clearly separated from dining rience cannot be taken as the norm; unfortunately, this is rooms). Kent (1991) proposed a classification of different often the case in environmental psychology and other cultural groups according to their use of domestic space. branches of psychology. These differences go beyond merely Such a distinction is particularly relevant to the functional the characteristics of urban and suburban environments and segmentation of spatial arrangements. Kent noted that occu- raise questions concerning the aspirations and needs of city pants remodel their domestic environment to fit their own dwellers and the processes that are generating the transfor- cultural imperatives if they find themselves in an environ- mation of cities. Inhabitants of large cities are increasingly ment that fails to correspond to their own cultural standards. culturally diverse; as a consequence, so are their needs. How Well-being has different meanings in different cultures, and do cities manage the influx of foreign populations, some of instead of imposing Western standards, environmental psy- them culturally very different? What are the conditions of ter- chology should contribute more to identifying culturally spe- ritorial appropriation of ethnic and cultural minorities, and cific standards to enable the construction of modular spaces what is the territorial behavior of these populations (e.g., seg- to satisfy diversified needs. This becomes more important regation, assimilation, or integration in respect of the wider than ever in the context of an increasingly mobile (forced or community)? voluntary) society. Over the last few years environmental psychologists have At the neighborhood level, well-being depends on how the made tentative steps toward building models of the condi- immediate environment is able to satisfy the specific needs of tions necessary for generating behavior favorable to the culturally different people, thereby providing opportunities global environment, as a function of both values and human

438 Environmental Psychology well-being (Vlek, Skolnik, & Gattersleben, 1998). How are social environment, the temporal dimension has in general intercultural differences, particularly with respect to values, been neglected (Altman & Rogoff, 1987; Proshansky, 1987; compatible with proenvironmental benefits for future genera- Werner, Altman, & Brown, 1992). tions? Many studies point to individualistic behavior in the face of limited resources (i.e., “the tragedy of the commons”; First, the temporal dimension intervenes in different ways Hardin, 1968; Thompson & Stoutemyer, 1991), which can be in terms of spatial anchoring and individual well-being. interpreted in more familiar social psychological terms as a Anchoring is always a process that occurs within a time di- social dilemma problem (Van Lange et al., 1998). Other stud- mension. It reflects the individual’s motivations, social sta- ies focus on the different ways of envisaging our relationship tus, family situation, and projects for the future. Well-being with the environment, such as the new environmental para- has to be set within a time reference, within a time horizon digm (Arcury & Christianson, 1990; Dunlap et al., 2000). and the life cycle. Perception, attitudes, and behavior concerning the environ- ment differ from one culture to another to the extent that they Second, the temporal dimension intervenes as a reference are modulated by environmental variations, the resources in the individual’s construction of his or her own identity. available, and the societal context, including values, regula- Appropriating one’s place of residence is conditioned by the tions, infrastructure, and opportunities for action (Lévy- individual’s residential history. A sense of neighborliness in Leboyer, Bonnes, Chase, Ferreira-Marques, & Pawlik, 1996). the immediate environment can compensate for mediocre liv- For instance, the different cultural representations of water ing conditions, but such compensation does not occur if the form interpretative filters of the objective conditions and nor- person looks back with nostalgia to his or her childhood resi- mative references orienting individual and collective behav- dence (Lévy-Leboyer & Ratiu, 1993; Ratiu & Lévy-Leboyer, ior (Moser, in press). The resolution of the dilemma between 1993). Furthermore, environmental appropriation revolves individual short-term behavior and collective action that is around forming social and interpersonal relationships that common in these types of problematic situations depends on depend largely on the duration of the person’s residence. cultural values, accessibility to resources, and the perception Those who make emotional investments in their neighbor- of these resources. The representation of water is shaped by hood and develop a sense of well-being tend to be more sat- the values attached to water: Affective and aesthetic values isfied with their interpersonal relations in their neighborhood. lead to a dynamic, global-ecological vision, whereas func- This takes the form of relationships that go beyond simple tional values and spatial and temporal proximity constitute a politeness (Fleury-Bahi, 1997, 1998). On the other hand, the limited representation of the same phenomenon. lack of free time available to people living in suburbs has an impact on residents’ relationships with neighbors (Moser, The Temporal Dimension 1997). There has been a growing interest in recent years in the his- Third, how do interindividual differences, and particularly toricity of psychological processes (Gergen & Gergen, 1984). gender differences, express themselves in relation to the tem- Too often in psychology, time, like the environment, has been poral dimension in terms of spatial investment and environ- treated as noise rather than as a valid process in itself. Even mental needs? How are these two variables interrelated? in areas that have an integral temporal dimension (e.g., social What is their impact on our perceptions, needs, and behav- representations), little account is given of either the origins iors? The division of time between leisure and nonleisure or the development of the representations (Herzlich, 1973; activities (e.g., activities involving imposed time constraints Moscovici, 1976; Uzzell & Blud, 1993). There are clearly and activities) is fundamentally different when we compare difficulties in accessing the past from a psychological point urban and non-urban settings. Commuting time, due to of view (Lowenthal, 1985; Uzzell, 1998). Social structures the greater distance between home and work, reduces the free and social processes change over time, and this in turn has an time of commuters in large urban areas in an obvious way. effect on spatial structures and processes. If psychological This has not been systematically considered with respect to processes are molded and influenced by their social context, its impact on the appropriation of space. One might assume then changing social structures and regulatory mechanisms that people who appropriate their environment and feel at will affect those processes and have a consequent effect on home where they live will also care more about the environ- the individual, the group, and the environment. Although ment in general and exhibit more frequent ecologically bene- environmental psychology often hints at the temporal dimen- ficial behaviors as predicted in the Cities, Identity, and sion of people-environment relations with the physical and Sustainability model (Pol, Guardia, Valera, Wiesenfeld, & Uzzell, 2001; Uzzell, Pol, & Badenes, 2002). The cognitive and affective evaluation of the environment is contingent on temporal, historical, and cultural factors.

Conclusion: Applying Environmental Psychology 439 Analyses of the perception, evaluation, and representations dimensions that the discipline will be able to develop its own of the environment, both built and natural, generally only metatheories. It is in this context that the perspectives of sus- make implicit reference to the cultural and temporal dimen- tainable development and the consequences of globalization sions. It has been found, for example, that the cognitive can give a new impetus to environmental psychology and image of the city of Paris not only develops and is condi- help to generate theories with wider applications. tioned by the culture of origin and the sociospatial familiarity but also goes through well-defined representational stages CONCLUSION: APPLYING before becoming more or less stable (Ramadier & Moser, ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 1998). Gärling and Hartig (2000) suggested that one of the short- Increasing population mobility also raises questions con- comings of environmental psychology is that environmental cerning the rhythm of life and its consequential territorial im- psychologists have only been able to provide general princi- plications. All places have a life rhythm. For some it may be ples in response to the specific needs of practitioners. In shortlived—a period of high-intensity use either by day, short, it is suggested that there is an applications gap. While week, or season. Many leisure settings fall into this category. this may be a valid criticism of science in general, its validity Others may be 24-7 environments such as shopping malls in relation to environmental psychology should be chal- and airports that are open and used every hour of the day, lenged. If there is a gap, is it because environmental psychol- every day of the year. What differentiates the rhythm is the ogists have failed to communicate with or convince other different types of groups that occupy the spaces for different scientists and practitioners of the value of their work? Or is it reasons at different times. We know from research on leisure because environmental psychologists have not delivered the and recreation that what makes a recreation place is the social kind of answers that practitioners such as architects and de- meanings ascribed to the recreational setting rather than the signers have required or were expecting or wanted? Perhaps particularities of the activities undertaken (Cheek, Field, & environmental psychologists have been asking the wrong Burdge, 1976). An integral component of this is time. With questions? Or does environmental psychology suffer from a the development of new technologies, the notion of proxim- shortage of data? Some might argue that we need better theo- ity takes on new meanings that have not been fully explored retical ways of understanding the data that we have already. It by environmental psychologists. Finally, the temporal dimen- may also be that those who have the task of drawing upon and sion resurfaces in the context of the preservation of the envi- implementing the results of environmental psychological and ronment and natural resources. One of the conditions for other behavioral science research become frustrated at the adopting proenvironmental behaviors is the ability to project amount of time, financial resources, and effort that go into oneself into the future and to step outside one’s own life cycle generating marginal increases in the amount of variance and act in the interests of future generations. explained in a set of data. Increasing the amount of variance explained from 33% to 35% is important, but we really need Both temporal and cultural dimensions have to be taken to be far more imaginative in our theoretical and conceptual into account when addressing quality of life issues. Well- approaches in order to make serious inroads into the 65% of being depends on the satisfaction of culturally determined the variance unaccounted for. needs. Environmental anchoring and appropriation leading to identity are progressive processes and are essential for indi- Gifford (2000) argued that we need more challenging, vidual and group behavior in respect of a sustainable devel- bolder theories. Environmental psychology has an important opment. The relationship to the environment (at every spatial role to play in providing conceptual guidelines of how to look level—home, neighborhood, city, nation, planet) is mediated at and analyze a given setting with reference to its contextual by the individual’s and the group’s sense of control. Each in- framework. As we suggested at the outset, the essence of en- dividual has a personal history, a representation of the past, vironmental psychology is the context. Context is an insepa- and an anticipatory representation of the future (Doise, 1976) rable part of the explanation of people’s transactions with the that condition how he or she relates to the environment. This environment. One way of responding to Gifford’s plea for means abandoning the atemporal orientation of environmen- bolder theories is to extend our understanding of context. In tal psychology in favor of a more dynamic approach. Analy- the last section we argued that the cultural and temporal di- ses of proenvironmental behavior have demonstrated the mension of people-environment relations needs to be incor- importance of a temporal horizon, yet few research studies porated into our analytical framework. There is every reason explicitly incorporate this dimension. It is only by refocusing to argue that this should be the new thrust in environmental analysis on the person and the social group and their relation with the environment in its spatial, cultural, and temporal

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CHAPTER 18 Close Relationships MARGARET S. CLARK AND NANCY K. GROTE DEFINING QUALITY RELATIONSHIPS 447 Use of Communal Norms and Stability Is Not Enough 447 Relationship Satisfaction 453 Satisfaction Is Not Enough 448 Lack of Conflict Is Not Enough 448 Can We Follow Contingent Rules Anyway? 453 Good Relationships Foster Members’ Well-Being 448 Even If We Could Follow Contingent Norms, Do We Have Agreement on Levels of Responsibility Matters 449 Access to the Necessary Information? 454 NECESSARY ABILITIES AND FORTITUDES 451 Responding Effectively to a Partner’s Needs 451 ARE CONTINGENT RULES EVER USED Alerting Partners to Your Needs 451 IN CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS? 454 Knowing When to Be Communal 452 When Will People Switch? 455 The Situation Matters 455 LINKING RELATIONSHIP AND JUSTICE RESEARCH 452 Individual Differences Matter 456 Following Communal Norms Affords Security; Following Evidence 456 Contingent Norms Undermines Security 452 Permanent or Temporary Switches? 458 People Advocate and Follow Communal Norms 452 CONCLUSIONS 458 REFERENCES 459 In this chapter we draw links between well-being in close re- friendships, romantic relationships, marriages, and family lationships and the application of fairness rules in those rela- relationships. tionships. In doing so we discuss and link two literatures: a large (and growing) literature on close relationships and a far DEFINING QUALITY RELATIONSHIPS smaller (and increasingly less active) literature dealing with distributive justice rules and perceptions of fairness in inti- What constitutes a good, high-quality friendship, dating rela- mate relationships. In sketching out links we set forth some tionship, marriage, or family relationship? What differenti- theoretical ideas both about what constitutes a high-quality ates a high-quality close relationship from one of lower relationship and about how use of fairness norms relates to quality? Surprisingly, until quite recently most social and the quality of what are often called close relationships— even clinical psychologists had not tackled this question. We attempt to do so in this chapter. First, though, because rela- Preparation of this chapter and of some of the empirical work cited tionship quality often has been equated with relationship within the chapter was supported by the National Science Founda- stability, with relationship satisfaction, or with the lack of tion under grant 9983417. The second author’s participation was conflict in a relationship, we begin with arguments against supported by B/Start Grant 1-R03 MH57914 from the National In- using those relationship characteristics as indexes of the stitute of Mental Health. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or rec- overall quality of a relationship. ommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Founda- Stability Is Not Enough tion or the National Institute of Mental Health. The authors thank Kristin Boyd, Brooke Feeney, Patricia Jennings, and R. Virginia Although at first blush equating relationship stability and Fraser for comments on earlier versions of this manuscript. relationship quality seems reasonable, making this general assumption is unwise. After all, many stable relationships are 447

448 Close Relationships characterized by unhappiness. Interdependence theorists pro- Another reason satisfaction ratings are not terrific mea- vide straightforward explanations as to why this is sometimes sures of relationship quality is that they are generally collected the case (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Rusbult, Arriaga, & from a single individual or, at best, from each member of a re- Agnew, 2001; Rusbult & Van Lange, 1996). Satisfaction, lationship independently. However, relationship quality is the they point out, is just one determinant of commitment to stay characteristic of a dyad. It is certainly possible for one person in relationships. Other powerful determinants of relationship to report being very satisfied with a relationship and his or her stability can keep people in relationships despite unhappiness partner to report being very unsatisfied with the relationship. with that relationship. What would we then say the quality of the relationship was? For these reasons we do not believe that member satisfaction First, the more one has invested in a relationship, the is the ideal way to judge the quality of a relationship. less likely one is to leave that relationship (Rusbult, 1983). Investments include such things as joint memories, financial Lack of Conflict Is Not Enough investments, friends, possessions, and children. Second, the poorer one’s alternatives to a relationship, including the Although many researchers have used the absence of conflict alternative of being on one’s own, the less likely one is to as an index of high-quality relationships and the presence of leave the relationship (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Rusbult & conflict as an index of low-quality relationships, we believe Martz, 1995). A woman might stay in an abusive relationship that such measures are flawed for two reasons. First, it is cer- if she perceives her alternatives to be worse, including the tainly possible for a relationship to be characterized by low option of being alone with no job skills and no financial conflict and, simultaneously, by low mutual sharing of con- resources. Finally, personal and social prescriptives against cerns and low mutual support. We would not consider this to leaving relationships can keep a person within a relationship be a high-quality relationship. For instance, two spouses may in which satisfaction is low (Cox, Wesler, Rusbult, & Gaines, lead largely independent lives while sharing the same home. 1997). A person may have a quite miserable relationship with Each may go about his or her business with little or no re- his or her child yet stay due to very strong personal and soci- liance on the other. Conflict in such a relationship would be etal beliefs that one should never abandon one’s child. quite low, but so too would mutual sharing of concerns, com- fort, and support. Indeed, many researchers define interde- Satisfaction Is Not Enough pendence as the very essence of a relationship. They would not view such a relationship as being much of a relationship What about satisfaction? Are relationship members’ ratings at all, much less a high-quality one. of their own satisfaction with their relationship valid indexes of the existence of a good relationship? Such ratings often Second, we would not consider all conflict to be bad for have been used in this way, and we do believe that these are relationships. Conflict often arises when one person in a rela- better indexes of the existence of a good relationship than is tionship feels that his or her needs have been neglected. Rais- relationship stability. Problems remain, however, and interde- ing this as a concern and working it out with a partner may pendence theorists again provide us with good reasons not to give rise to conflict. However, at the same time, if the conflict accept satisfaction as the sine qua non of a good relationship. is resolved to both persons’ satisfaction, the relationship is likely to have been improved relative to what it had been prior They point out that satisfaction is only partially deter- to the conflict. This logic suggests that the presence of some mined by the rewards and costs associated with our rela- conflict in a close relationship (as long as it is dealt with in a tionships. A person’s comparison level for a relationship is constructive fashion) may actually be a positive indicator of another important determinant of satisfaction (Kelley & relationship quality. Thibaut, 1978). A person’s comparison level for a particular relationship is what that person expects (or feels he or she de- Good Relationships Foster Members’ Well-Being serves) from that relationship. It is the person’s set of stan- dards for the relationship. If a person has had poor-quality Having rejected stability and satisfaction as valid indexes of relationships in the past, a current relationship that objective good relationships, we suggest that high-quality relationships observers judge to be a bad relationship might, to that person, are ones in which members behave in such a manner as to seem quite good compared to his or her expectations. In con- foster the well-being of their partners. We define well-being, trast, if a person has had terrific-quality relationships in the in turn, as each member’s good physical and mental health past, a current relationship that objective observers judge to and each member’s being able to strive toward and reach be quite good might seem, to that person, to be quite unsatis- desired individual and joint goals. factory by comparison.

Defining Quality Relationships 449 We further suggest that the best way to define such rela- Relationship researchers do not have a single name for tionships is in terms of the interpersonal processes (and their what we are describing as a high-quality relationship. Rather, impact on individual well-being) that characterize relation- several terms currently in use describe different aspects of ships. By identifying interpersonal processes likely to foster such a relationship. We have called relationships in which well-being in relationships, not only can we define high- people assume responsibility for another’s well-being and quality relationships, but, simultaneously, we can also come that benefit that person without expecting repayments com- to understand just why such relationships are of high quality. munal relationships (Clark & Mills, 1979, 1993). However, assuming responsibility for another person’s needs and striv- This said, recent research suggests that good relationships ing to meet those needs on a noncontingent basis does not are those in which each member (a) feels an ongoing respon- necessarily imply that one is competent or successful at so sibility for the other member’s welfare and acts on that feel- doing. Other terms in the literature for relationships imply ing by noncontingently meeting the needs of the partner and success at following such norms. For example, relationships (b) feels comfortable and happy about that responsibility; in in which members successfully attend to, understand, vali- addition, in most mutual, adult, equal-status relationships date, and effectively care for one another have been called each member (c) firmly believes that his or her partner feels a intimate relationships by Reis and Shaver (1988; Reis & similar sense of responsibility for his or her own welfare and Patrick, 1996). Relationships in which members view the relies on that feeling by turning to the other for support with- other as one who does care for their welfare and themselves out feeling obligated to repay and (d) believes that the other as worthy of such are have been called secure relationships feels comfortable and happy about that responsibility. by attachment researchers (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978; Collins & Allard, 2001; Hazan & Shaver, 1987; Members of high-quality mutual friendships, romantic rela- Simpson et al., 1992). From our perspective, the exact ter- tionships, and family relationships trust each other, feel secure minology is not that important—an understanding of the in- with each other, and derive satisfaction from nurturing each terpersonal processes characterizing these relationships is other. They understand, validate, and care for each other. important. They keep track of each other’s needs (Clark, Mills, & Powell, 1986), help each other (Clark, Ouellette, Powell, & Agreement on Levels of Responsibility Matters Milberg, 1987), and feel good about doing so (Williamson & Clark, 1989, 1992). They feel bad when they fail to help It is not sufficient just to characterize high-quality friend- (Williamson, Pegalis, Behan, & Clark, 1996). They respond to ships, romantic relationships, marriages, and family relation- one another’s distress and even anger with accommodation and ships as those in which members assume responsibility for a support (Finkel & Campbell, 2001; Rusbult, Verette, Whitney, partner’s welfare. It is also important, in our opinion, for Slovik, & Lipkus, 1991) rather than with reciprocal expres- members to assume the “right” levels of such responsibility. sions of distress and anger or with defensiveness (Gottman, Of course, it is possible and easy to understand that a rela- 1979). They express their emotions to their partners (Clark, tionship might be of low quality because members of a Fitness, & Brissette, 2001; Feeney, 1995, 1999). They turn to relationship do too little to foster the other’s welfare. That one another for help (Simpson, Rholes, & Nelligan, 1992). seems obvious. A parent who fails to feed his or her child They are willing to forgive one another’s transgressions adequately clearly does not have a high-quality relationship (McCullough, 2000). Further, members of such relationships with that child. Spouses who ignore one another’s needs are likely to hold positive illusions about partners that, in turn, clearly do not have a high-quality relationship. Less obvi- bring out the best in those partners (Murray & Holmes, 1997; ously, it is also possible for members to do too much to foster Murray, Holmes, & Griffin, 1996a, 1996b; Murray, Holmes, the other’s welfare. A person who receives an extravagant, Dolderman, & Griffin, 2000) and to possess cognitive struc- expensive present from a casual friend is likely to feel quite tures in which even their partner’s apparent faults are linked to uncomfortable and indebted and is unlikely to describe the virtues (Murray & Holmes, 1993). Finally, members of such re- relationship as high quality. A very young child might feel as lationships appear ready to engage in some active relationship- if he must comfort his constantly distressed mother and do so. protecting processes such as viewing their own relationship as Objective observers would not consider this to be a sign of a being better than those of others (Johnson & Rusbult, 1989; high-quality relationship. Indeed, they are likely to consider Simpson, Gangestad, & Lerma, 1990; Van Lange & Rusbult, this to be a sign of poor parenting. So, how are we to under- 1995). All these things contribute to a sense of intimacy be- stand what degree of responsiveness to another’s needs is tween partners (Reis & Patrick, 1996; Reis & Shaver, 1988) right for a relationship? and relationship members’ having the sense that their relation- ship is a safe haven (Collins & Feeney, 2000).

450 Close Relationships We suspect that almost everyone has a hierarchy of what one another’s mail on a temporary basis, friends throw birthday we call communal relationships. By this we mean that people parties for one another and travel to one another’s weddings, have a set of relationships with others about whose needs and parents spend years raising children and tremendous they believe they ought to care and to whose needs they be- amounts of money to support those children. lieve they ought to strive to be responsive in a noncontingent fashion (Clark & Mills, 1993; Mills & Clark, 1982). These Above the cost line benefits are generally not given or relationships vary from weak to strong, with strength refer- even considered. When they are given, they are given on an ring to the degree of responsibility the person believes he or exchange basis. Consider, for instance, a relationship partner she ought to assume for the other’s welfare. One end of the who needs a car. This is a costly benefit and one that falls hierarchy is anchored by relationships in which the person above the cost line for most relationships, such as those with feels a very low degree of responsibility for the partner’s acquaintances, neighbors, or friends. Under most circum- needs (e.g., a relationship with an acquaintance for whom the stances this means that this benefit will not be given (or asked person might provide directions or the time of day with no for) in such relationships. The topic simply will not come up. expectation of compensation). The other end of the hierarchy However, a person might sell his car to a friend (an economic is anchored by relationships in which the person assumes exchange in which the parties agree that the money and the tremendous responsibility for the other’s needs (e.g., a care are of equal value). Neighbors might agree to provide parent-child relationship in which the parent would do just each other’s child with rides to and from soccer practice fol- about anything at any cost to ensure the child’s welfare.) lowing a rule of equality (half the days one person drives, half the days the other drives), and so forth. Figure 18.1 depicts one hypothetical person’s hierarchy of communal relationships. Communal relationships, from Recognizing the existence of hierarchies of communal weak to strong, are depicted on the x-axis. The costs one is relationships should help to understand the nature of high- willing to incur to meet the other’s needs (noncontingently) quality personal (communal) relationships. As we said earlier, are depicted on the y-axis. The dashed line in the figure these relationships are characterized by assumed, noncontin- depicts the costs the person is willing to incur in order to ben- gent responsibility for a partner’s needs. Here we add that the efit the other on a communal basis. level of responsibility actually assumed on the part of a care- giver or expected on the part of a person in need (in the ab- Beneath the implicit cost line benefits will be given and sence of true emergencies) ought also to be appropriate to the accepted on a communal, need, basis. Thus, for instance, location of that relationship in its members’ hierarchy of strangers give one another the time of day, neighbors take in relationships. If the costs involved in meeting the need fall beneath the implicit cost boundary shown in Figure 18.1, the High responsiveness ought to be present. If costs exceed the bound- ary, benefits should not be given, except for emergencies or in Costs involved in meeting the other’s needsNo benefits are given instances in which both members wish to strengthen the com- Strangersor exchange rules apply munal nature of the relationship. Indeed, giving a benefit that Acquaintances falls above the implicit cost boundary might harm the quality NeighborsCommunal of the relationship. So too may asking for too costly a benefit Friendsrules apply or implying the existence of too strong a communal relation- Best friends ship by self-disclosing too much (Chaiken & Derlega, 1974; Spouse/childLow Kaplan, Firestone, Degnore, & Morre, 1974) be likely to hurt the relationship. Weak Strong This should help to explain why responsiveness must be Strength of communal relationship within appropriate bounds even though responsiveness to needs is a hallmark of good relationships. A casual friend Figure 18.1 The costs one hypothetical person is willing to incur to meet should not give one an extravagant present. It exceeds the the needs of members of his or her social network on a communal basis. appropriate level of responsiveness to needs. A young child is not supposed to assume a great deal of communal responsi- bility for his or her parent. Thus, a child consistently com- forting a troubled parent is not a sign of a high-quality relationship. In contrast, a parent is supposed to assume great communal responsibility for his or her child. Thus, a parent

Necessary Abilities and Fortitudes 451 consistently comforting his or her troubled child is a sign of a particular relationship in question provide explanations for a high-quality relationship. lack of emotional fortitude in providing help. If one’s past partners (or current partner) have not been open to accepting NECESSARY ABILITIES AND FORTITUDES help in the past, then the person is likely to be reluctant to offer care. A lack of fortitude may also stem from temporary Having a hierarchy of communal relationships in which one factors. When temporarily stressed or in a bad mood, people believes one should behave communally (up to an implicit may not feel that they have the energy to help because they cost level) is one thing. Actually pulling off the task of ap- may be especially likely to anticipate that negative outcomes propriately and skillfully attending to one another’s needs in will be associated with helping (Clark & Waddell, 1983). such relationships is quite another thing. For mutually sup- portive, trusting, secure, and intimate communal relation- Alerting Partners to Your Needs ships to exist and to thrive, members must have three distinct sets of skills. One set allows for responding to one’s partner’s Next consider skills and fortitudes necessary for eliciting needs effectively. A second set allows for eliciting a partner’s needed support for the self from one’s partner. In this regard, attention to one’s own needs. The third set involves being able freely expressing one’s own need states to the partner through to distinguish successfully when one ought to behave in ac- self-disclosure and emotional expression should be impor- cord with communal rules and when the application of such tant. After all, a partner cannot respond to needs without rules is socially inappropriate. knowing what they are. Given this, it is not surprising to us that self-disclosure has been found to increase positive affect Responding Effectively to a Partner’s Needs (Vittengl & Holt, 2000), liking (Collins & Miller, 1994), and satisfaction in dating relationships (Fitzpatrick & Sollie, Skills and fortitudes necessary to respond effectively to a part- 1999), marriages (Meeks, Hendrick, & Hendrick, 1998), ner’s needs include empathic accuracy (Ickes, 1993) and the and sibling relationships (Howe, Aquan-Assee, Bukowski, ability to draw out one’s partner’s worries and emotional states Rinaldi, & Lenoux, 2000). Of course, one ought also to be (Miller, Berg, & Archer, 1983; Purvis, Dabbs, & Hopper, able to ask outright for help and accept it when it is offered. 1984). Many studies support the idea that understanding a Perhaps less obviously, possessing the ability to say “no” to spouse’s thoughts, beliefs, and feelings is linked with good requests from the partner that interfere with one’s needs marital adjustment (e.g., Christensen & Wallace, 1976; Noller, ought to be crucial to the partner’s being attentive and re- 1980, 1981; Gottman & Porterfield, 1981; Guthrie & Noller, sponsive to one’s needs. It should also be important that, over 1988). Another skill important to meeting a partner’s needs is time, one demonstrates that one does not exaggerate needs or knowing when and how to offer help in such a way that it will constantly seek help when it is not needed (Mills & Clark, not threaten the potential recipient’s self-esteem or make the 1986). This ought to increase a partner’s sense that one is potential recipient feel indebted, but will be accepted. Still an- appropriately, and not overly, dependent. other skill important to meeting a partner’s needs is the ability to give help that the partner (not the self) desires and from Although help-seeking skills might seem easy, enacting which the partner (not the self) will benefit. To do so requires them requires certain emotional fortitudes. In particular, ex- accurate perception of differences in needs between the self ercising all these skills probably requires having the firm and the partner. Many parents go wrong in this regard. They sense that one’s partner truly cares for one and will, indeed, may impose their needs on the child and may be seen by out- meet one’s needs to the best of his or her ability. Otherwise, siders as living “through their child,” often to the detriment of self-disclosure, emotional expression, and asking for help the child. seem inadvisable. Under such circumstances, one risks being rebuffed, rejected, or evaluated negatively. The partner may Some of these abilities require learning, practice, and in- even use information to mock or exploit the other. Negative telligence (e.g., the ability to draw a partner out, empathic ac- assertion on one’s own behalf may also be frightening, as it curacy, and provision of emotional support). The keys to too many provide a basis for rejection. Thus it may seem best others may lie more in emotional fortitudes. A person may not to seek help and not to assert oneself. However, if one wish to express empathy or offer help but fail to do so out of does not do so, keeping the relationship on a communal basis fear of appearing awkward or being rejected. One’s history of becomes difficult. It is for just these reasons that we believe personal relationships in general and one’s history within the that a sense of trust and security in relationships is key to following communal norms.

452 Close Relationships Knowing When to Be Communal we make the following theoretical and empirical case for this viewpoint. Applying communal rules effectively within appropriate bounds requires the skills and fortitudes just mentioned. Following Communal Norms Affords Security; Following Avoiding their use in nonemergency situations outside those Contingent Norms Undermines Security bounds may require additional fortitudes. One must be able to detect whether the other desires a communal relationship and, The reason we believe that following a communal rule is ideal if so, at what strength. Being too anxious for intimate com- for ongoing intimate relationships is that it is the only rule munal relationships may lead one to behave communally in that can afford members of the relationship the sense that the inappropriate situations. Work by attachment researchers sug- other truly cares for their welfare. If another responds to one’s gests that this is something that anxious, ambivalent, or pre- needs on a noncontingent basis, the logical inference is that occupied people often do (Hazan & Shaver, 1987; Simpson & the other truly cares for oneself. This, in turn should heighten Rholes, 1998). trust in the other and promote a sense of security. Instances in which the other benefits a person at some cost to him- or her- LINKING RELATIONSHIP AND self should be especially likely to heighten trust (Holmes & JUSTICE RESEARCH Rempel, 1989). Having reviewed some relationship work suggesting what Note that, by definition, contingent distributive justice interpersonal processes and interpersonal skills make a per- norms (equity, equality, exchange) involve receiving benefits sonal relationship such as a friendship, romantic relationship, as conditions of benefiting a person. In contrast, a need-based marriage, or family relationship a high-quality relationship, or communal norm dictates noncontingent giving and accep- we turn to linking this work to work on the use of distributive tance of benefits. Thus, communal responsiveness should be justice rules. In this regard we have already made clear that uniquely valuable in terms of providing recipients of care we believe that benefits are ideally distributed according to with a sense of being valued and cared for—two of the com- needs (and not inputs) in relationships such as friendships, ponents Reis and Shaver (1988) pointed out as essential for romantic relationships, marriages, and family relationships. attaining a sense of intimacy in relationships. We have also made clear that we believe such responsiveness should be noncontingent. Looking at this from the perspective of the person who gives help also provides insight into the importance of Our views fit well with some past work on distributive jus- following a communal norm in friendships, romantic rela- tice. Specifically, our views fit well with work supporting the tionships, and family relationships. At the same time that idea that use of a needs-based norm governing the giving and noncontingent provision of benefits should cause a recipient receiving of benefits is preferred to using other distributive to feel valued and cared for, so too should it cause the donor justice norms in personal relationships (Clark et al., 1986; of the benefit to see him- or herself as a nurturant, caring Clark et al., 1987; Deutsch, 1975, 1985, for family relation- individual. This is simply a matter of self-perception. Both ships; Lamm & Schwinger, 1980, 1983). At the same time, feeling cared for and judging oneself to be a nurturant indi- our views conflict with the arguments of many other distribu- vidual are, we suspect, deeply satisfying. It is just these feel- tive justice researchers who have claimed that following other ings, we believe, that form the essence of what people desire rules—rules such as equity (Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, from their friendships, family relationships, and romantic 1978; Sabatelli & Cecil-Pigo, 1985; Sprecher, 1986; Utne, relationships. Hatfield, Traupman, & Greenberger, 1984) or equality (Austin, 1980; Deutsch, 1975, 1985, for friendships)—are People Advocate and Follow Communal Norms best for friendships, romantic relationships, and family rela- tionships. It also conflicts with the view that an individual Not only do we believe that—ideally and often in practice— solely watching out for his or her own welfare is best in people follow a communal rule in their intimate relationships such relationships (Cate, Lloyd, & Henton, 1985; Huston & and do not keep track of individual inputs and outcomes from Burgess, 1979). a relationship, participants in our studies share our belief (Grote & Clark, 1998; Clark & Grote, 2001). What we did to Are we right? Is following a noncontingent, responsiveness- examine this is straightforward: We asked people. First, we to-needs rule best for personal relationships? Is it better than came up with prototype descriptions of a number of ways in rules of equality or equity? If so, why? We think it is best, and which people might choose to distribute benefits within their intimate relationships. That is, we made up descriptions of

Linking Relationship and Justice Research 453 communal rule, an exchange rule, an equity rule, and an equal- orientation. More important for the present point, however, ity rule. Then we had people in a number of different types of there was a main effect of being high in exchange orientation close, personal relationships (i.e., friendships, dating relation- on marital satisfaction. Those high in exchange orientation ships, marriages) rate the extent to which they viewed these reported substantially lower marital satisfaction than did rules to be ideal for their relationship (from Ϫ3 indicating “not those low in exchange orientation. They did so regardless of at all ideal” to ϩ3 indicating “extremely ideal”). They also whether they reported being underbenefited, equitably bene- rated each rule according to the extent to which they thought it fited, or overbenefited (Buunk & VanYperen, 1991). was realistic on a similar scale. Can We Follow Contingent Rules Anyway? In each case the communal rule was rated as ideal for these relationships and as substantially more ideal than were Still another reason we believe that people do not keep track any of the remaining rules (the ratings generally fell on the of inputs and calculate fairness on some sort of contingent “not ideal” ends of the scales). In each case the communal basis in well-functioning close relationships is simply that rule also was rated as being on the realistic side of the scales following any contingent rule in relationships in which levels and as being more realistic than any of the remaining rules. of interdependence are high is virtually impossible. Even to make a substantial effort to do so day to day and week to Use of Communal Norms and Relationship Satisfaction week would be so effortful as to be tremendously irritating and painful to the relationship members involved. Consider Some evidence that a tendency to follow contingent, record- the impossibility of accurately keeping track of benefits first. keeping norms is associated with lower marital satisfaction comes from studies by Murstein, Cerreto, and MacDonald Think of the sheer number and variety of benefits that are (1977) and by Buunk and VanYperen (1991). Murstein et al. likely to be given and received in an intimate relationship for (1977) measured the “exchange orientation” of one member example, between a husband and wife living together in the of a group of married couples with a scale including items same home. Each day a very large number of household tasks such as, “If I do dishes three times a week, I expect my (e.g., making beds, doing laundry, picking up clutter, prepar- spouse to do them three times a week.” They also adminis- ing food, shopping for food, putting groceries away, vacuum- tered a marital adjustment scale to research participants. ing, dusting, taking the mail in, feeding pets, changing light Among both men and women, an exchange orientation to- bulbs and toilet paper, etc.) are done. So too are a variety of ward marriage was negatively correlated with marital adjust- nonhousehold services (e.g., dropping a spouse off at work, ment. (We would note, however, that they did not find an picking up take-out food, dropping off dry cleaning, hav- analogous negative correlation between exchange orientation ing something framed, visiting relatives, etc.). Then there and satisfaction in friendships, perhaps because the friend- are benefits that fall within the categories of verbal affec- ships were weak ones.) tion, physical affection, information, instructions, and goods that are given and received. Furthermore, things such as re- Buunk and VanYperen (1991) had individuals fill out an strained behavioral impulses might be considered benefits. eight-item measure of exchange orientation and a Global How in the world can two people in a relationship accurately Measure of Equity (see Walster et al., 1978). The latter mea- track these things and still accomplish anything else in their sure asks, “Considering what you put into your relationship lives? The answer is, we think, that they cannot. relative to what you get out of it and what your partner puts in compared to what he gets out of it, how does your rela- To make matters worse, one must keep in mind that track- tionship ‘stack up’?” Respondents could indicate that they ing the equality or equity of benefits given and benefits re- were getting a much better or better deal, an equitable deal, or ceived involves far more than simply keeping track of what a much worse or worse deal than their partner. Buunk and has been given by each member of a relationship. To compute VanYperen also measured satisfaction with the relationship equality or equality one must place values or weights on the with an eight-item Likert-type scale that measures the fre- diverse benefits given and received and compute the equality, quency with which the interaction with the partner in an inti- equity, or evenness of repeated specific exchanges. What is mate relationship is experienced as rewarding and not as taking the garbage out worth? Does it matter if it is cold and aversive. rainy outside? How does it compare with another simple ser- vice such as putting the laundry in the machine or unloading As these researchers expected, perceiving oneself to be the dishwasher? Tougher yet, how does it compare with giv- over- or underbenefited relative to one’s spouse was linked ing a hug (and does the hug get discounted because both with lower relationship satisfaction among those high in ex- people benefit)? change orientation but not among those low in exchange

454 Close Relationships To push this even further, consider these questions. How ARE CONTINGENT RULES EVER USED does the ability and enjoyment of giving a benefit figure into IN CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS? the calculations? If one partner enjoys doing laundry and the other does not, is laundry done by the latter weighted higher To recap, we argued that the ideal norm for giving and re- than laundry done by the former? If one partner does not care ceiving benefits in close relationships (within an implicit cost if the living room is cluttered but the other one does, does it boundary) is a need-based, or communal, norm. We further count at all if the latter person cleans up the clutter? These noted that when such relationships are functioning well, is- questions are difficult, and they probably seem silly. We sues of fairness tend not to arise. This is not, however, to say suggest that the reason they may seem silly is precisely that that complaints and distress never arise. A need may be people simply do not try to calculate these things in their neglected, and the neglected person may become distressed day-to-day lives, primarily because in good times issues of and complain. Ideally, the partner responds to that distress fairness do not occur to them. Moreover, in times of more and complaint in such a manner as to address the need at stress, when people may have some desire to compute such hand, soothe the partner, and maintain the relationship on an things, they realize the futility of trying to compute objective even, communal keel. However, perhaps the need will not be equality or equity across diverse domains of inputs and out- addressed. It is then, we contend, that processes leading to comes. (Later we address what we suspect they actually do in concerns about fairness may begin to unfold. times of stress.) Imagine that a person neglects his or her partner’s needs; Even If We Could Follow Contingent Norms, Do We the latter complains, but the former does not respond by ade- Have Access to the Necessary Information? quately addressing the need. Even then, we suspect, the situ- ation may unfold in such a manner that issues of fairness do Imagine that one did have the cognitive capacity to keep not arise. Specifically, sometimes the partner will respond track of all benefits given and received in a relationship. Does with a benign interpretation of the behavior. For instance, that one have access to all the relevant input? We do not think so. partner may respond by blaming unstable, situational causes Again, consider a husband and wife who live together—a rather than the partner (cf. Bradbury & Fincham, 1990), and husband and wife who can surmount the obstacles to record the behavior may simply be tolerated. Rusbult et al. (1991) keeping just discussed. We still think it would be an impossi- described this action as accommodation, generally, and as an ble task to track everything that ought to be tracked simply instance of reacting with loyalty, more specifically. because each person has better access to contributions that he or she has made to the relationship than to contributions For instance, consider a woman who lives far from her that the other has made for a number of reasons. The most family of origin and misses them terribly. She tells her hus- straightforward reason is that many contributions one partner band of her desire to visit them during their next vacation. He makes to the relationship are made in the absence of the other refuses, countering that he would rather take a relaxing trip, partner. perhaps one to the beach. She then suggests that they could go for just a weekend, and he refuses again, saying that he re- Picture the husband arriving home prior to the wife. He ally wants her to stay home and get some work done and that stops at the mailbox and brings the mail into the house. he really needs her company. In other words, he does not re- He throws out the junk and leaves the rest on the table. He spond to her needs. In the face of this his wife may interpret notices that the cat has tipped over a plant and cleans up his behavior benignly by attributing it to the situation (“He’s the mess. He listens to three solicitation messages left on the very stressed. It’s not that he doesn’t love me; he just needs to answering machine and deletes them. Although tired, he relax”). She may then behave constructively by continuing chats pleasantly when his mother-in-law calls in order to on with her own communal behavior (acting loyally). She make her feel good and keep her company. He starts dinner. may even go beyond benignly attributing her partner’s be- His wife arrives. She notices the mail on the table and the havior to the nonstable, situational factors and actually con- dinner cooking, but does she know anything about the other nect her partner’s faults (as evidenced by the poor behavior) contributions to the relationship that her spouse has made? to virtues, as Murray and Holmes (1993) observed. For in- No, and he may well not mention them. The general point is stance, his reluctance to visit relatives and his desire to be that because of the lopsided accessibility of information with her alone on vacation or at home might be taken as evi- about contributions to a relationship, there will always be a dence of his love for her and of his sensible nature—he does bias to perceive that the self has made more contributions not want to take too much on. In any case, she continues on, than the partner has made. maintaining her faith in the overall communal nature of their relationship.

Are Contingent Rules Ever Used in Close Relationships? 455 But sometimes spouses do not respond in such an accom- When Will People Switch? modating manner or by connecting their partner’s faults to virtues. Instead, they may conclude that their partner really is We already suggested that switches from communal to ex- not a good partner or that they themselves are not worthy of change norms are likely to be triggered when a person feels care. In such instances, people may well experience an incli- that his or her needs have not been met. We have also sug- nation to switch to contingent rules of distributive justice, gested, however, that this will not always occur. Thus, an and they may actually do so. Doing so, we believe, is trig- important question becomes when it will and will not occur. gered by the judgment that one’s partner has not met one’s We have two answers to this question, one having to do with need combined with a judgment that this is due to a lack of the situation in which a person finds him- or herself and one true caring for the self. One might say that trust in the partner having to do with the personality of the person whose needs has evaporated. At such times, the adoption of a contingent have been neglected and who is, therefore, vulnerable to distributive justice rule in place of a communal rule is likely switching. to seem adaptive. It seems adaptive, we contend, because it is judged to be a more effective means of getting what one The Situation Matters needs from one’s partner than is trusting that partner to be noncontingently responsive to one’s needs. Our first answer is straightforward. We predict that people will be more likely to switch from communal to exchange Consider once again the woman who lives far from her equality or equity norms when they perceive that their needs family of origin and misses them terribly. This time, after she are being neglected. This may occur because a partner who suggests that they could go just for a weekend and he refuses has normally been quite responsive to the person’s needs again, saying that he really wants her to stay home and that he ceases to be so responsive to that person’s needs. This could needs her company, she becomes increasingly distressed at occur because the partner has become interested in someone her husband’s refusal to respond in any way to her needs. She or something else or because the partner is under consider- may attribute his behavior to himself rather than to the situa- able stress or is distracted from the partner’s needs. It also tion (“He’s selfish”). Alternatively, or perhaps additionally, may occur because the person who needs help has experi- she may attribute his behavior to herself (“I’m not loveable”). enced a large increase in needs that the partner cannot meet. His faults may also bring other faults to mind (“He’s selfish; If this is the case, and if the partner continues to neglect needs he’s often inconsiderate”). He is really not very insightful or despite any attempts on the person’s part to rectify the situa- intelligent. In general, he is an embarrassment to be around. tion, the person might switch to an exchange norm. In any case, the wife may conclude that the only way her Of course, there are other options available to the person husband is going to respond to her needs is if he must do so in who has lost faith in the communal norm. The person could order to receive benefits himself (a contingent, exchange per- leave the relationship altogether or switch immediately to spective). Thus, she may counter his responses by thinking, simply watching out for his or her own needs without adopt- “Well, OK, if that’s the way he’s going to be,” and saying, ing a norm such as equity or equality. “Look, if you’re not willing to visit my family, then you cer- tainly can’t expect me to go visit yours next May when we How are decisions between these options made? We can were planning on going. I’m only going to go if you do the only speculate at this point, but it seems to us that certain same for me.” variables that have long been discussed by interdependence theorists are relevant to making these decisions. If there This threat may well work in that the spouse agrees to go are few barriers to leaving (i.e., in interdependence terms, if visit her family. Unfortunately, we propose, it works with the person has good alternative options, such as being alone some costs. Switching from a communal to an exchange or forming alternative relationships), if investments in the norm sacrifices important things. First, the donor of a benefit relationship are low, and if there are few social or personal will no longer be able to derive the same sense of nurturing prescriptives to leaving, the person whose needs are being the other. He or she must attribute at least part (or maybe all) neglected might simply leave. A switch to contingent, record- of their motivation to their own selfish interests. Second, the keeping norms might never take place. We suspect this often recipient of the benefit no longer derives the same sense of happens in friendships. If a friend neglects one’s needs, peo- being cared for and security from acquiring the benefit. He or ple usually have other friends (or potential friends) to whom she must attribute at least part (or maybe all) of the donor’s they can turn. There are typically not great social or personal motivation to the donor’s own self-interest rather than to prescriptives against letting a friendship lapse, and invest- the donor’s sense of caring for them. Trust is also likely to ments in friendships tend to be lower than those in other close deteriorate.

456 Close Relationships relationships (e.g., romantic relationships, marriages, or We suspect that these chronic individual differences that parent-child relationships). people bring to their close relationships will be important determinants of switching from communal to exchange On the other hand, sometimes there are considerable bar- norms in the face of evidence that one’s partner is neglecting riers to leaving a close relationship. Investments may be high, one’s needs. We suspect that almost everyone (regardless of alternatives may not seem attractive, and there may be strong attachment style, trust, self-esteem, or communal orientation) social and personal pressures working against a person’s understands communal norms as we have discussed them. leaving the relationship. We suspect that when such barriers Moreover, we would assert that almost everyone believes that are high, people whose needs have been seriously neglected communal norms are ideal for friendships, romantic relation- will stay in the relationship but switch from adherence to a ships, and marriages and that people start off such relation- communal norm to adherence to a contingent record-keeping ships following such norms. Indeed, it is by following such norm such as equity, equality, or exchange. This may happen norms in the first place that people signal to potential partners in many marriages in which investments that cannot be that they want a friendship or romantic relationship with an- recouped have been made (e.g., children, a joint house, finan- other person. cial success, joint friends), alternatives seem poor (being poorer, living alone, leaving the house), and strong prescrip- However, we also suspect that people who are insecure, tions against leaving exist (one’s church or parents would dis- have low trust in others, are low in self-esteem, or are low in approve). In such circumstances, the best option may seem to chronic communal orientation (variables that we suspect co- be to continue relationship but to switch the basis on which occur) will be especially vulnerable to switching from a com- benefits are given in such a way that one feels more certain munal to an exchange norm in the face of real or imagined that one’s needs will be met. This may seem most workable evidence that the other is neglecting their needs. They are the even if one has to sacrifice a sense of being nurtured and of people, we assert, who react to the slightest evidence of such nurturing. neglect with conclusions that the evidence indicates that the other is selfish and does not care for them or that they are un- Individual Differences Matter worthy of care. Further, we suggest that such conclusions, in turn, lead them to back away from the relationship. Alter- We believe that it is the situation that triggers people to natively (perhaps because they also are likely to perceive switch from communal to contingent, record-keeping distrib- that they have fewer good alternatives than others do), these utive justice norms, but we also believe that personality mat- insecure individuals might be led to switch to a contingent, ters. People differ from one another in terms of their chronic record-keeping norm such as equality, equity, or exchange as tendencies to believe that others will be responsive to their a basis for giving and receiving benefits in their relationship. needs and that they are worthy of such responsiveness. This has been a major theme in recent relationship literature. It is Evidence especially evident in the attachment theory and the empirical work that has been based on that theory. Secure individuals The arguments we have just made suggest something that, are assumed to view close others as likely to respond to their to date, has not received attention in the distributive justice needs on a consistent basis, and they feel comfortable de- literature. Researchers in that tradition have typically advo- pending on others for support. Insecure people do not. How- cated that there is one real rule that governs the giving and re- ever, attachment theorists are not the only ones who have ceiving of benefits within close relationships. Some suggest it emphasized differences in how people tend to view their part- is equality (Austin, 1980; Deutsch, 1975, 1985, for friend- ners. Others have talked about people differing in their ships); some suggest it is equity (Sabatelli & Cecil-Pigo, chronic tendencies to trust other people in close relationships 1985; Utne et al., 1984; Walster et al., 1978); and some say it without necessarily referring to attachment theory (Holmes & is a need-based rule (Deutsch, 1975, 1985, for family rela- Rempel, 1989), or about how chronic levels of self-esteem tionships; Lamm & Schwinger, 1980, 1983; Mills & Clark, may relate to views of, and reactions to, close partners 1982). Whatever rule they advocate, though, it has tended to (Murray, Holmes, MacDonald, & Ellsworth, 1998). For our be a single rule, and they have suggested that people in close own part, we have discussed chronic individual differences in relationships generally follow that rule. If a person does a communal orientation, which refers to the tendency to re- good job following the particular rule, all is well. If the rule is spond to the needs of others and to expect others to respond violated, unhappiness results, and either the distress must be to one’s own needs on a noncontingent basis (Clark et al., resolved or the relationship may end. We are suggesting 1987). something quite different.

Are Contingent Rules Ever Used in Close Relationships? 457 We are suggesting that people in general start off their Time 1 - Time 2 close relationships believing in a communal norm and doing their best to follow it. Such a norm requires mutual respon- T1 Fairness .61***(.51***) T2 Fairness siveness to needs. However, it is inevitable that needs will be Ϫ.06(Ϫ.38) neglected. When this happens or when it is perceived to have Ϫ.26*(Ϫ.20) .74(.80) happened, distress will occur, as we have argued. The dis- T1 Conflict Ϫ.13(Ϫ.02) tress, in turn, sets the stage for a possible switch to a contin- Ϫ.07(.14) gent, record-keeping norm such as equity or exchange. Thus, .63(.64) it is likely that it is distress that—in most relationships some .77*** (.80***) T2 Conflict of the time and in some relationships very often—leads to record keeping. Such record keeping will, however, necessar- Figure 18.2 Links between relationship conflict and perceptions of fair- ily be retrospective at first. As such, it is very likely that it will ness in relationships across time. be biased in such a manner as to result in evidence of inequity. Perceptions of inequity will, in turn, lead to judgments of un- The results, which are shown in Figure 18.2, were as we fairness. Then, in an iterative fashion, these perceptions will expected. Conflict at Time 1 (which we felt was indicative of lead to further distress. Note that this is the reverse of what situations in which at least one person was feeling that his or has typically been argued in the past, which is that record her needs were not being met) prospectively and significantly keeping and calculations of equity come first and that distress predicted perceptions of unfairness at Time 2 controlling for results when inequities are detected (Walster et al., 1978). perceptions of unfairness at Time 1. Perceptions of unfairness at Time 1, however, were not significant prospective predic- Is there any evidence for our proposal that distress pre- tors of conflict at Time 2 controlling for perceptions of con- cedes perception of unfairness in close relationships (rather flict at Time 1. This occurs, we assert, because in low-stress than vice versa)? The answer is yes (Grote & Clark, 2001). In times when partners’ needs are being met (as we suspected a recent study we tracked both conflict and perceptions of was the case for most couples prior to the birth of an eagerly unfairness in a sample of about 200 married couples. These anticipated first child), people are not keeping track of inputs couples were enrolled in the study at a time when the wife and outcomes day to day and are not calculating fairness. was in the third trimester of her first pregnancy. Marital con- Whereas they can report on inequities in housework when a flict (distress) was tapped at that time, again a few months social scientist asks them to do so, we believe that most of after the baby was born, and a third time when the baby was our couples were not doing this on their own. That is why our about 1 year old. We also asked many questions about the di- measures of perceived unfairness did not predict conflict. In vision of household labor at all three points in time and about contrast, the early measures of conflict, we suspect, did pick how fair the husband and wife felt that division of labor to be. up on those couples including at least one member who felt (Notably, the division of labor was almost always judged to that his or her needs were being neglected. It is among these be unfair, with the wife performing more whether she stayed couples, we suspect, that record keeping (much of it ret- at home, worked part time or worked full time, and with both rospective and biased) emerged, resulting in perceptions of spouses agreeing that this was unfair.) unfairness. The longitudinal panel design of this study allowed us to Once record keeping does emerge and unfairness is per- conduct path analyses on the data in order to ascertain ceived, we have predicted that those perceptions of unfair- whether conflict at Time 1 predicted perceptions of unfair- ness will increase unhappiness further. Evidence for this ness at Time 2 (controlling for perceptions of unfairness at subsequent process emerged in the Grote and Clark data as Time 1). Our theoretical position led us to the prediction that well. Specifically, when changes in the patterns of data from it would. We were also able to test whether perceptions of un- Time 2 until Time 3 were examined, it was found that per- fairness at Time 1 would predict conflict at Time 2 (control- ceptions of unfairness at Time 2 (shortly after the baby had ling for conflict at Time 1). Traditional perspectives would been born) until Time 3 (when the baby was about 1 year old) lead to the prediction that it would. However, our theoretical did significantly predict increases in conflict, controlling for perspective led us to predict that that would not necessarily conflict at Time 2. This occurred, we believe, because once be the case. That is, we believed that the division of labor couples were stressed and record keeping commenced, find- could be inequitable and could be judged to be unfair when a ing evidence of inequities increased distress still further. One social scientist came along and asked about it but still might interesting result was that conflict measured at Time 2 did not disrupt the relationship if both partners felt that their not predict further increases in perceptions of unfairness as needs were being met and did not feel stressed. Time 3 (controlling for perceptions of unfairness at Time 2).

458 Close Relationships Thus, we have acquired and reported evidence consistent partner’s needs by the other may predict this. So too may with the notion that the existence of inequities in a marriage either partner’s long-term, pessimistic views of the likelihood will not necessarily lead to distress. We have also acquired of the other being caring (and of the self being worthy of and reported evidence consistent with the notions that dis- care) predict such a lack of resilience. These two things, in tress might be what triggers contingent record keeping and combination, may be especially likely to predict that a switch perceptions of unfairness. We do not yet have hard empirical to contingent norms will be longer term. Such a switch, as we evidence that there are individual differences in people’s ten- have already noted, is unlikely to constitute a satisfying solu- dencies to feel that their needs have been neglected and, in tion. Therefore, we believe that it will likely be followed by a turn, to switch from adherence to a communal norm to adher- further switch to purely self-interested behavior or to the dis- ence to some sort of record keeping, contingent, distributive solution of the relationship. Whether the relationship persists justice norm. However, we are currently collecting and be- long term (and perhaps happily), given the use of contingent ginning to analyze data relevant to just that question. record-keeping norms, or whether it ends will depend on the presence or absence of the sorts of barriers to leaving that in- Permanent or Temporary Switches? terdependence theorists have discussed. That is, having poor alternatives, high investments, and feeling prescriptions A final issue we wish to address in this chapter is whether the against leaving are factors likely to keep couples together de- change will be permanent or temporary once people switch spite giving and receiving benefits on what we consider to be from a communal to a contingent, record-keeping norm for nonoptimal bases. Good alternatives, low investments, and distributing benefits within their relationship. We propose low prescriptions to leaving are likely to predict relationship that most such switches will be temporary. These changes dissolution. will occur when a person is dissatisfied with how a relation- ship is going, wishes to ensure that his or her needs are met CONCLUSIONS by the partner, and (not incidentally) wishes to signal his or her distress to the partner. Indeed, communicating displea- In this chapter we described what we believe to be the char- sure may be just as important a motivator of the switch as is acteristics of a high-quality friendship, dating relationship, ensuring that one gets what one wants. Once the switch has marriage, or family relationship. We suggested that quality been made and communicated, the protest function of having ought not be defined in terms of stability, satisfaction, or con- done so is largely accomplished. So, too, may the person flict but rather in terms of the presence of interpersonal have accomplished the short-term goal of having one imme- processes that facilitate the well-being of its members. We diate need addressed. also suggested that members ought to agree implicitly on the degree of responsiveness to needs that is expected in the rela- However, once a contingent, record-keeping distributive tionship and that relationships can go bad not only if respon- justice norm begins to be used, all the disadvantages of fol- siveness to needs is not present when expected but also if it is lowing such a norm will emerge. That is, record keeping will present when it is not called for. have to be done. It is tedious; it is virtually impossible to do competently; and given all the sorts of biases already dis- Next we pointed out that viewing close relationships in this cussed in this chapter, there will inevitably be disagreements way suggests taking a new approach to understanding the use over whether equity, equality, or fair exchange have been (and nonuse) of contingent, record-keeping distributive jus- achieved. Moreover, the advantages of following a communal tice norms in intimate relationships. In well-functioning inti- norm will evaporate. The recipient of benefits will not feel that mate relationships people should respond to one another’s the other cares for him or her, and the donor of benefits will not needs in a noncontingent fashion as those needs arise. Record derive satisfaction for having nurtured a partner. These things keeping should not be an issue, and fairness should not be dis- combined with the strong societal norm that communal rules cussed. Fairness simply should not be a salient issue for people ought to characterize marriages and other close relationships in such relationships. (Of course, if some social scientist will combine to push couples back to following a communal comes along and asks participants to judge the fairness of the norm. Moreover, stresses in relationships themselves will giving and receiving of benefits in that relationship, we have often dissipate, and reminders of a partner’s true caring atti- no doubt that members will come up with such ratings. We just tudes will reemerge. Thus, we would predict that couples will do not think they do this spontaneously on their own.) Mem- often bounce back to using communal norms. bers of such relationships appear to be following a communal rule, and we believe that following such a rule promotes a On the other hand, there should also be cases when cou- sense of intimacy, security, and well-being in the relationship. ples do not bounce back. Chronic neglect of at least one

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CHAPTER 19 Altruism and Prosocial Behavior C. DANIEL BATSON AND ADAM A. POWELL WHY DO—AND DON’T—PEOPLE 464 Amalgamated Models 471 ACT PROSOCIALLY? 463 ANOMALOUS FAILURES TO ACT PROSOCIALLY 472 VARIANCE-ACCOUNTED-FOR EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS Effect of Others on Decisions Under Pressure 472 Dispositional Versus Situational Determinants 464 Blaming the Victim 473 Proliferating Predictors and Predictions 465 ANOMALOUS PROSOCIAL ACTS 473 APPLICATION AND EXTENSION The Altruism Question 474 OF EXISTING THEORY 465 Beyond the Egoism-Altruism Debate: Social Learning 465 Other Prosocial Motives 476 Tension Reduction 466 Conflict and Cooperation of Prosocial Motives 478 Norms and Roles 467 Exchange or Equity 469 RESEARCH METHOD MATTERS 478 Attribution 469 CONCLUSION 479 Esteem Enhancement/Maintenance 470 REFERENCES 479 Moral Reasoning 470 The word prosocial does not appear in most dictionaries; it question focal: “The fundamental problem of social psychol- was created by social scientists as an antonym for antisocial. ogy is the moralization of the individual by the society into Prosocial behavior covers the broad range of actions which he is born as a creature in which the non-moral and intended to benefit one or more people other than oneself— purely egoistic tendencies are so much stronger than any altru- behaviors such as helping, comforting, sharing, and cooper- istic tendencies” (p. 16). When Kurt Lewin, his students, and ating. The word altruism has at times been used to refer to a his colleagues ushered in modern social psychology in the subset of these behaviors—for example, self-sacrificial help- 1930s and 1940s, however, other questions took precedence. ing or helping in the absence of obvious, external rewards. These were the pressing social-problem questions provoked Such usage seems inappropriate, however, because altruism by the rise of Nazism, two world wars, the Holocaust, the is a motivational concept. Altruism is the motivation to in- advent of the nuclear age, the Cold War, and racial injustice. crease another person’s welfare; it is contrasted to egoism, Attention was directed to totalitarian and autocratic leadership, the motivation to increase one’s own welfare (MacIntyre, conformity and obedience to authority, aggression, prejudice, 1967). There is no one-to-one correspondence between ethnocentrism, interpersonal and intergroup conflict, propa- prosocial behavior and altruism. Prosocial behavior need not ganda, persuasion, and attitude formation and change. be motivated by altruism; altruistic motivation need not pro- duce prosocial behavior. The 1960s brought the question of why people act proso- cially to the fore once again. This question did not replace the WHY DO—AND DON’T—PEOPLE social-problem questions; it was added to the list. Several ACT PROSOCIALLY? shocking cases in which bystanders failed to help persons in desperate need raised concern about the breakdown of social Addressing the question of why people act prosocially may structure and social decency, especially in urban environ- seem natural and necessary for social psychologists. Indeed, ments. Best known is the case of Kitty Genovese, whose bru- in the field’s first text William McDougall (1908) made this tal stabbing and eventual death was witnessed by 38 of her neighbors in the Kew Gardens area of Queens, New York. Her murder took more than half an hour, and despite her 463

464 Altruism and Prosocial Behavior pleading screams, no one intervened; no one even called the dispositional or situational factors were better predictors of police. More heartening were the courageous acts of Freedom prosocial behavior. The dispositional variables studied include Riders and other civil rights workers, Black and White, who anomie, authoritarianism, autonomy, deference, intelligence, suffered beatings, imprisonment, and in some cases death to Machiavellianism, nurturance, religiosity, self-esteem, social further the cause of racial equality in the American South. desirability, social responsibility, submissiveness, and succo- Youth were in the streets to protest the Vietnam War and to rance. Not one of these, by itself, was a clear predictor. In con- proclaim the dawning of the Age of Aquarius. The times they trast, situational factors—ambiguity of need, severity of need, were a-changin’. Social psychologists were asked, Why do— physical appearance of victim, similarity to victim, friendship, and don’t—people act prosocially? number of bystanders, location (urban vs. rural), cost of help- ing, and so on—seemed powerful. These results led several Before attempting to offer an answer to this question, one reviewers (e.g., Huston & Korte, 1976; J. A. Piliavin, Dovidio, should probably inquire of the questioner, “Why do you ask?” Gaertner, & Clark, 1981) to conclude that situational variables This response is necessary because the question has been are better predictors of prosocial behavior than are disposi- asked for two very different reasons. Some have asked in tional variables. order to reach the practical goal of encouraging prosocial be- havior; others, in order to challenge currently dominant theo- Soon, however, this conclusion was challenged as part of ries of social motivation. The dominant motivational theories the general counterattack by personality researchers against in psychology, sociology, economics, and political science situationist critiques. Staub (1974) found that an aggregate are firmly founded on assumptions of universal egoism dispositional measure, a prosocial orientation index (combin- (Mansbridge, 1990; Wallach & Wallach, 1983). Can one ac- ing measures of feelings of personal responsibility, social count for all prosocial behavior in terms of egoism, or must responsibility, moral reasoning, prosocial values, and a low one make room for altruism as well? Might there be other level of Machiavellianism), was a reasonably good predictor forms of prosocial motivation besides egoism and altruism? of helping across several different measures. Rushton (1980) reanalyzed previous research (notably, the classic studies by These two reasons for asking why people act prosocially Hartshorne and May in the late 1920s) by computing aggre- beg for very different answers. So, if one is not clear which gate measures of prosocial behavior and found far better evi- reason lies behind the question, the answer provided may dence of cross-situation consistency than had analyses based appear irrelevant and the research on which it is based mis- on individual measures. guided. To avoid such confusion, this chapter addresses the two concerns in turn—first the practical, then the theoretical. Other researchers pointed to the greater predictive poten- tial of dispositional factors for the higher cost, nonsponta- VARIANCE-ACCOUNTED-FOR neous, longer term helping that occurs in the natural stream of EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS behavior outside the psychological laboratory. For example, Oliner and Oliner (1988) conducted a major study using inter- Psychologists pursuing the practical concern of promoting views and questionnaires to identify predictors of acting to prosocial behavior usually employ one of two strategies: (a) a rescue Jews in Nazi Europe. They claimed evidence for the variance-accounted-for empirical analysis or (b) application predictive power of three dispositional factors: (a) a proclivity and extension of existing social psychological theory. One to feel empathy for those in need, (b) sensitivity to normative view of science that has long been popular among psy- pressure from social groups, and (c) adherence to inclusive, chologists, especially psychologists with an applied orien- universal moral principles such as justice or care. Presumably, tation, is empirical prediction and control. From this better prediction is possible outside the laboratory because the perspective, promoting prosocial behavior requires, first, more reflective decision process involved in planned (non- identification of its most powerful predictors. Then one can spontaneous) helping permits more chance for personal val- engage in social engineering, creating an environment that ues, attitudes, and dispositions to come into play. optimizes these predictors and, thereby, prosocial behavior. The logic seems straightforward. Its apparent simplicity has, Still other researchers argued that it was an oversimplifi- however, proved deceptive. cation to expect a personality variable to relate to helping in all situations. Many pointed to the greater success of predict- Dispositional Versus Situational Determinants ing prosocial behavior using disposition-situation interac- tions (e.g., Romer, Gruder, & Lizzardo, 1986). For example, Operating with an implicit variance-accounted-for model, sev- self-confidence and independence seem to correlate with eral investigators around 1970 attempted to determine whether helping in emergency situations, especially dangerous ones, but not in response to a request to contribute to the United Way (Wilson, 1976). Snyder and Ickes (1985) suggested that

Application and Extension of Existing Theory 465 the predictive power of dispositional factors should be mani- other settings. Talk of prediction based on interactions among fest only when situational pressure is weak, not when it is person, situation, and behavior has become common (e.g., strong. Carlo, Eisenberg, Troyer, Switzer, and Speer (1991) Bandura, 1991; Carlo et al., 1991). claimed support for this distinction between weak and strong pressure when predicting prosocial behavior. Within these One need not pursue this logic very far—adding predic- more recent studies, then, dispositional predictors have tors, behaviors to be predicted, situations in which prediction fared better than in earlier work. Still, correlations between can be made, and populations for which predictions can be personality measures and prosocial behavior—however made—to realize that a general variance-accounted-for an- measured—rarely rise above .30 to .40, leaving 85% to 90% swer to the question of why people act prosocially is impos- of the variance unaccounted for. sible. All one can hope for is the identification of predictors that account for a specific prosocial behavior in a specific At the same time that dispositional predictors were being situation for a specific population at a specific time (Snyder, revived, the health of situational predictors took a turn for 1993). Although useful to address some applied questions, the worse: Their ecological validity was questioned (Bar-Tal, such research is apt to become ideographic rather than nomo- 1984). Could one expect a situational predictor of single-act thetic (Allport, 1961), with very little generalizability. helping by college students in a controlled laboratory experi- ment to be equally powerful in predicting naturally occurring APPLICATION AND EXTENSION prosocial behavior outside the lab, such as volunteerism OF EXISTING THEORY (Clary & Snyder, 1991)? Well aware of the limited, ad hoc nature of a variance- Proliferating Predictors and Predictions accounted-for approach, Lewin (1951) reminded us, “There is nothing so practical as a good theory” (p. 169). In opposi- Since 1970, proposed predictors of prosocial behavior have tion to the Aristotelian approach to science that guides the proliferated well beyond the initial dichotomy between variance-accounted-for strategy, in which the scientist’s goal dispositional and situational factors. Krebs and Miller (1985) is to identify essential features to predict outcomes, Lewin presented an interlocking three-tier classification. Most distal advocated a Galilean approach. Galileo’s goal was to identify from the specific prosocial behavior are biological and cul- underlying genotypic (conditional-genetic) constructs and tural predictors (see also Fiske, 1992). These predictors com- the highly general—even universal—relations among them bine to produce enduring dispositional characteristics, which that account for observable phenotypic events. Lewin was are more proximal. Dispositional factors then combine with convinced that explanatory theories developed and tested situational factors to produce cognitive and affective reac- following Galileo are of far more practical value than are tions, which are considered the most proximal predictors of explanations developed following Aristotle, even though the prosocial behavior. Within each of these broad classes, nu- Galilean model relies on contrived laboratory experiments merous specific variables can be identified. rather than on direct, real-world observation. In additions to proliferating predictors, there are also many Psychologists approaching the study of prosocial behavior different forms of prosocial behavior to be predicted, and the from Lewin’s Galilean perspective are not likely to look to variables that predict one form may not predict another. For empirical research to identify predictors accounting for the example, within the domain of helping are rescuing, donating, most variance. They are likely instead to look to existing the- assisting, volunteering, and giving social support (Pearce & ory about genotypic psychological processes, using research Amato, 1980). Moreover, each of these categories includes a to illustrate and document the relevance of these processes to wide range of specific behaviors. One can assist by holding a understanding prosocial behavior. At least seven broad theo- door, answering a request for directions, splinting a broken retical perspectives have been applied in this way: social leg at the scene of an automobile accident, securing false pa- learning, tension reduction, norms and roles, exchange or pers for a Jew in Nazi Europe, or enabling a suicide. One can equity, attribution, esteem enhancement/maintenance, and volunteer to serve on the board of directors for the local sym- moral reasoning. Let us briefly consider each of these. phony, to call potential blood donors, to be a buddy for some- one who has AIDS, or to join the rescue squad. Critics Social Learning claim—and research supports the claim (Levine, Martinez, Brase, & Sorenson, 1994; Omoto & Snyder, 1995)—that Social learning theory suggests that if you want to know variables accounting for variance in one form of prosocial be- why people act prosocially, you should consider their learn- havior in one setting are not likely to account for the same ing history. You should consider not only the rewards and amount of variance (if any) in other forms of behavior or in

466 Altruism and Prosocial Behavior punishments received following helping (or not), but also the behavior, without the ironic twists and the revelations of sub- relative rewards—the benefits minus the costs. You should tle faux pas for which cognitive explanations have become consider observational learning or modeling that comes from renown, social learning theory generates little excitement. watching the actions of others. You should consider self- The direct focus on behavior and reinforcement history rewards. Much research has supported a social learning expla- seems almost unpsychological in its lack of nuance. Even nation of prosocial behavior (for reviews, see Bandura, 1977; with the added emphasis on self-reward, cognitive represen- Rushton, 1980). Integrating and coordinating social learning tation, self-regulation, and reciprocal determinism (Bandura, principles, Cialdini, Baumann, and Kenrick (1981) proposed a 1977, 1991), social learning theory seems bland. Still, were three-step developmental sequence: (a) In the young child one forced to choose a single theory to explain why people prosocial behavior is a product of material rewards and pun- do—and do not—act prosocially, social learning theory ishments; (b) in the preadolescent it is a product of social as should almost certainly be the choice. “As Einstein has em- well as material rewards and punishments; and (c) in the ado- phasized, the goal is to account for the most facts with the lescent and adult it is a product of internalized self-reward, as fewest principles” (Dollard & Miller, 1950, p. 6). Social well as social and material rewards and punishments. learning theory has probably come closer to this goal than has any other theory in the history of social psychology. Mood Effects Tension Reduction Building on the idea that helping can be a basis for self- reward, Cialdini, Darby, and Vincent (1973) proposed a Tension reduction has long been a popular explanation of negative-state relief hypothesis: that adults are more likely to why people help others in need, especially others in obvious help when they feel bad. The reason is that adults have pain or distress. The general idea is that people find it upset- learned that they can reward themselves for helping and so ting to see another person suffer and that preferring not to be feel better. upset, they relieve the other’s suffering. Not only does helping have reward value for people who Perhaps the best way to describe the relationship between feel bad, but it also seems rewarding for people who feel tension reduction, which is a form of motivation, and social good. Indeed, the effect is even clearer for good mood. learning is to say that they are related by marriage. Social Across a range of studies (e.g., Isen & Levin, 1972; Weyant, learning can exist without tension reduction, as in the pure 1978), people induced to feel good have been more likely to operant theories descendant from Watson and Skinner. give help to good causes. Tension reduction can exist without social learning, as in reactions to pain, extreme temperatures, hunger, thirst, and What accounts for this pervasive reward value of helping other physiological needs. Yet social learning and tension for people in a good mood? One possibility is a desire to reduction lived together for many years in relative harmony, maintain the good mood. Seeing another person in need can housed within Hull’s (1943) general learning theory and its throw a wet blanket on a good mood, so one may help in descendants, including Dollard and Miller’s (1950) version order to shed this blanket and maintain the mood (Wegener & of social learning theory. In response to the current cognitive Petty, 1994). Isen, Shalker, Clark, and Karp (1978) suggested zeitgeist, social learning theory has of late been less attached a second possibility: Being in a good mood may bias one’s to tension reduction, showing more interest in cognitive memories about and attention to the positive and negative as- processes (Bandura, 1977, 1991). Whether this philandering pects of various activities, including helping. When in a good is grounds for divorce is hard to say. In any case, tension mood, a person is more likely to recall and attend to positive reduction has also been seen stepping out without operant rather than negative aspects of life. Applied to helping, a processes by its side, most notably in dissonance theory—at good mood makes people more likely to remember and least as originally conceived by Festinger (1957). attend to the positive, rewarding features and less likely to attend to the negative features, such as the costs involved. Why should the suffering of others upset someone? Most straightforward is the answer proposed by J. A. Piliavin et al. General Assessment (1981), among others. They suggested that witnessing an- other’s distress evokes vicarious distress that has much the Social learning theory finds itself in an awkward position in same character as the victim’s distress, and the witness is mo- contemporary social psychology. There seems little doubt tivated to escape his or her own distress. One way to escape that the theory is in large measure correct. However, perhaps is to help because helping terminates the stimulus causing the because of its relatively straightforward explanation of distress. Of course, running away may enable the witness to

Application and Extension of Existing Theory 467 escape just as well and at less cost, as long as the old adage Norms and Roles “out of sight, out of mind” works. Theories that seek to explain prosocial behavior in terms of Variations on the theme of aversive-arousal reduction have norms and roles often make heavy use of social learning prin- been provided by Hornstein (1982), Reykowski (1982), and ciples. Yet norm and role theories are not direct descendants Lerner (1982). Focusing on the self-other relationship, of classic learning theory and behaviorism. Instead, they Hornstein suggested that when certain others are in need— trace their ancestry to symbolic interactionism and its specifically, those whom one cognitively links to self as “us” analysis of social behavior using a dramaturgical metaphor and “we” rather than “them” and “they”—one experiences a (cf. Goffman, 1959; Mead, 1934). Within this metaphor, state of promotive tension in which one is “aroused by norms provide the script of the social drama, specifying what another’s needs almost as if they were one’s own” (Hornstein, should be done and said when; roles are the parts to be 1982, p. 230). Once so aroused, one is motivated to reduce this played. (More formally, norms are a group’s written or un- tension by aiding the fellow “we-grouper.” written rules of appropriate behavior for those occupying particular roles; roles are behavior patterns that are character- Reykowski’s (1982) proposed explanation, though quite istic, and expected, of a person who occupies a particular different, also involves reduction of aversive tension: “The position in a social structure.) sheer discrepancy between information about the real or pos- sible state of an object and standards of its normal or desir- In both developmental and social psychology, norms and able state will evoke motivation” (p. 361). Reykowski roles have been adopted into the social learning family; it is applied this general principle to prosocial motivation as assumed that people learn the norms and roles appropriate to follows: If a person perceives a discrepancy between the cur- a given situation through social reinforcement and modeling. rent state and the expected or ideal state of another person At the same time that people are learning that acting proso- (i.e., perceives the other to be in need), cognitive inconsis- cially can bring rewards, they are also learning the norms for tency and motivation to reduce this aversive inconsistency prosocial behaviors that should be performed by individuals will result. Relieving the other’s need is one way to remove in various roles in different social situations. These norms the inconsistency and escape the situation. Another, less dictate that one should help people in need—at least some prosocial way is to change one’s perception and decide that people under some circumstances—to avoid social or self- the other’s suffering is acceptable, even desirable. administered sanctions. Lerner’s (1980, 1982) just-world hypothesis led him to an Reciprocity explanation similar to but more specific than Reykowski’s. Lerner suggested that most people believe in a just world—a One prosocial norm that has been studied extensively is reci- world in which people get what they deserve and deserve procity. Gouldner (1960) suggested that this norm tells people what they get. The existence of a victim of innocent suffering both that they should help people who help them and that they is inconsistent with this belief. In order to reduce the arousal should not injure these people. He believed that this norm was produced by this inconsistency, a person may help another in universal, an important part of the moral code of every culture. need. Alternatively, the person may derogate the innocent He also believed that the pressure on a person to comply with victim, making the suffering appear deserved. the norm of reciprocity depends on the circumstances under which the initial help was given—including (a) how badly one At first glance, Cialdini’s negative-state relief model may needed help, (b) one’s perception of how much the other appear to be another example of aversive-arousal reduction. person gave relative to his or her total resources, (c) one’s In fact, it is not. Although it too begins with the proposition perception of the other person’s motives for helping (was it a that seeing someone in need evokes a negative affective state, bribe?), and (d) whether the other person helped voluntarily or from this common starting point the two explanations was pressured into it. Much evidence supports the claim that diverge. The negative-state relief explanation claims that the people are motivated to comply with the norm of reciprocity goal of helping is to obtain mood-enhancing self-rewards that (e.g., Wilke & Lanzetta, 1982). one has learned are associated with helping; aversive-arousal reduction explanations claim that the goal of helping is to Social Responsibility eliminate the mood-depressing stimulus. Negative-state re- lief is a social learning explanation that assumes that the in- A second norm that psychologists have suggested motivates creased need for some type—any type—of mood-enhancing helping is social responsibility. This norm dictates that one reward motivates helping; aversive-arousal reduction expla- nations make no assumptions about prior learning history but focus instead on reduction of current tension.

468 Altruism and Prosocial Behavior person should help another in need when the latter is depen- How can we account for these seemingly contradictory dent on the former—that is, when others are not available to findings? One possibility is that given their different social help and thus the second person is counting specifically on roles in different situations, Blacks and Whites—and men the first. Although this norm does seem to exist, its effect on and women—may feel more or less obligated to help a helping has been surprisingly difficult to demonstrate. After dependent other. For example, Black students on a predomi- more than a decade of research attempts to do so, Berkowitz nantly White campus, acutely aware of their minority status, (1972) concluded, “The findings do not provide any clear-cut may feel strong responsibility for helping a fellow Black stu- support for the normative analysis of help-giving. . . . The dent but very little responsibility for helping a White student; potency of the conjectured ‘social responsibility norm’ was White students may be more likely to help a Black student greatly exaggerated” (pp. 68, 77). when failure to do so clearly violates norms proscribing racial prejudice. Helping may be more normative for men Why has evidence that the norm of social responsibility than for women in one situation—for example, intervening in leads to prosocial behavior been so elusive? Darley and a potentially dangerous emergency. Helping may be more Latané (1970) suggested that this norm may be at once too normative for women than for men in another situation—for general and too specific. The norm may be too general in that example, providing sympathy and support after a friend’s everyone in our society adheres to it. If this is true, it cannot breakup with her fiancé (Eagly & Crowley, 1986). A role- account for why one person helps and another does not. On the sensitive normative analysis renders the apparent inconsis- other hand, the norm may be too specific in that it comes with tencies comprehensible. a complex pattern of exceptions, situations in which an indi- vidual may feel exempt from acting in accordance with the Norm Salience norm. The norm may be characterized not simply by a rule that says, “If someone is dependent on you for help, then help,” but Some researchers have suggested that the problem with by a more complex rule that says, “If someone is dependent on social norms lies in norm salience and focus of attention. you for help, then help, except when . . .” There may be indi- Only when attention is focused on the norm as a standard for vidual differences in readiness to accept exceptions—that is, behavior is concern about violating it likely to affect behav- to deny responsibility (Schwartz, 1977). Moreover, excep- ior (Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 1991). Consistent with this tions may vary for individuals in different roles and in differ- suggestion, Gibbons and Wicklund (1982) found that if nor- ent social situations. One advantage of remembering the mative standards of helpfulness were salient and thus a focus dramaturgical roots of the concept of norms is that it makes of attention, then focusing on oneself increased helping. explicit their role specificity. Presumably, being self-focused when the norm was salient highlighted the threat of sanctions for failing to act in line Darley and Latané (1970) also pointed out that in addition with personal standards. In the absence of salient standards to norms for helping, there are norms for not helping. A per- for helpfulness, however, self-focus led to less helping; son may be taught, “Help those in need,” and at the same time, it seemed to inhibit attention to others’ needs (see also “Mind your own business.” Which norm is the one to follow? Karylowski, 1984). If the former, one may help; if the latter, probably not. Personal Norms Effects of Race and Sex Because broad social norms like social responsibility have Exceptions to and conflicts among norms may account for the limited ability to predict whether a person will help, highly inconsistent effects on prosocial behavior of demo- Schwartz (1977) proposed a change of focus in thinking graphic variables such as race and sex. It has sometimes been about norms. Rather than thinking about social norms, found that same-race helping is more frequent (e.g., Gaertner & Schwartz suggested that we should think of more specific, Bickman, 1971), sometimes that cross-race helping is more personal norms. By personal norms he meant internalized frequent (Katz, Cohen, & Glass, 1975), and sometimes that the rules of conduct that are socially learned, that vary among in- race of the victim or helper makes no difference (Wispé & dividuals within the same society, and that direct behavior in Freshley, 1971). Similarly, sometimes men help more than particular situations. women (West, Whitney, & Schnedler, 1975), sometimes women help more than men (Wegner & Crano, 1975), and Applied to helping, a personal norm involves a sense of sometimes the sex of the helper makes no difference (J. A. obligation to perform a specific helping act. For example, Piliavin & Piliavin, 1972). It does appear, however, that women people may say (either publicly or to themselves), “I ought to are generally more likely to be helped than are men (Gruder & give a pint of blood in the blood drive.” Such statements Cook, 1971).

Application and Extension of Existing Theory 469 appear to be far more predictive of whether a person will give Attribution blood than are statements of agreement with broad social norms like the norm of social responsibility—at least if the Attribution theory concerns inferences drawn about the person in question is one who believes in acting responsibly causes of events (Heider, 1958; Jones & Davis, 1965). Attri- (Schwartz & Howard, 1981). Specific statements like this are butions can affect prosocial behavior in two major ways. particularly powerful as predictors when one also takes into First, attributions about why a person is in need are made not account extenuating circumstances, such as whether an indi- only by potential helpers and bystanders but also by the per- vidual was in town during the blood drive, had no major son in need, with consequences for each. Second, attributions scheduling conflicts, and was physically able to give blood about the character of a person who helps are made not only (Zuckerman & Reis, 1978). At this level of specificity, how- by the helpers themselves but also by the persons helped, ever, it is not clear whether the statement about giving blood again with consequences for each. reflects a sense of personal obligation stemming from an in- ternalized rule of conduct (i.e., a personal norm) or simply an Attributing the Cause of Others’ Needs intention to act in a particular way. People are far more likely to help innocent victims than to Exchange or Equity help those who bring their troubles on themselves (Weiner, 1980). Although this relationship is no surprise, the reason Perhaps the most direct extension of social learning princi- for it is not entirely clear. Perhaps causing one’s own need (or ples into interpersonal relations is exchange or equity theory. not working to prevent it) violates ingrained standards for When developing exchange theory, Homans (1961) explic- self-sufficiency and prudence; perhaps causing one’s own itly and proudly declared his agenda to be the reduction of need but not suffering the consequences violates our sense of social relations—including cooperation, helping, and other justice; perhaps it seems inequitable to those who perceive prosocial behaviors—to reinforcement principles operating themselves to have exerted effort to avoid need. In any case, within the individual. Equity theorists were not so reduction- people are less likely to help those who bring their troubles ist. They considered social relations to have emergent prop- on themselves, even though the explanation for this behavior erties that were irreducible to the benefits and costs for the has never been carefully explored. individuals involved. In their view, social learning teaches one to value equitable relations, in which the ratio of out- Attributing the Cause of One’s Own Need comes to inputs is equal for the relating individuals. Walster, Berscheid, and Walster (1973) claimed that equity theory was People in need may be predisposed to attribute their need to a general theory that subsumed social learning theory (and situational causes, as something thrust upon them by un- psychoanalytic theory). Although this may seem a myopic avoidable circumstances and carrying no implications about inversion, equity theory does add an important dimension to personal ability or worth. This attribution may, however, be the understanding of prosocial behavior by introducing both hard to sustain when the need is produced by failure on a task social comparison and distributive justice. Needs and bene- that one expected to perform successfully, especially when fits are no longer defined by looking at the individual alone; comparable peers succeed (Fisher, Nadler, & Whitcher- the definition is broadened to include needs based on relative Alagna, 1982). To avoid an esteem-damaging dispositional deprivation (Adams, 1965). attribution, the person in need may attempt to deny the failure and not seek or appreciate help (Nadler, 1991). Homans (1961) pointed out that if a recipient of help can- not return the favor in a tangible way, then he or she must re- Attributing the Cause of Help turn esteem and deference. Otherwise, the relationship will not remain beneficial to both parties and thus will not con- Helpers make attributions about the nature and cause not only tinue. Walster et al. (1973) argued that not only the relatively of others’ needs but also of their own helping. A helper may underbenefited but also the relatively overbenefited are moti- ask, “Why did I help in this situation?” Possible answers in- vated to restore equity (although they acknowledged that clude the following: (a) because I am a kind, caring, helpful inequity in one’s favor is more tolerable than the reverse). person—a dispositional attribution likely to be self-rewarding Acting prosocially to redistribute resources more fairly is one and encourage one to help in a range of situations in the way to restore equity—but only one. Equity may also be re- future; (b) because I am the kind of person who helps in this stored psychologically by enhancing the perceived inputs of particular situation (e.g., I am a blood donor; J. A. Piliavin, the advantaged or devaluing the inputs of the disadvantaged, Callero, & Evans, 1982)—a dispositional attribution likely to thereby justifying the difference in outcomes.

470 Altruism and Prosocial Behavior encourage one to help again in this situation; (c) because of As an explanation for prosocial behavior, these models gen- situational pressure—a situational attribution not likely to in- erally assume that people act prosocially to enhance or re- crease helping in the future, at least not when situational pres- cover self-esteem (Brown & Smart, 1991). sure is absent; and (d) because I am a compliant schnook and a pushover who cannot say no—a dispositional attribution One might expect perceptions of the esteem-enhancing likely to be self-punishing and to discourage future helping. potential of helping to follow the same three-step devel- Grusec (1991) traced the development and demonstrated the opmental sequence outlined by Cialdini et al. (1981). For prosocial benefits of children attributing their helping to a the young child, gaining material rewards for doing good en- broad disposition to be helpful. hances esteem; for the middle child, social approval enhances esteem; by adolescence, self-directed and uncoerced—even An attributional analysis suggests a complicating limit on anonymous—help may be necessary to feel good about the effects of social learning. To the extent that subsequent oneself. helping is mediated by self-attributions of helpfulness, induc- ing help by providing material or social rewards in the form Not only benefactors, but also recipients, may act and of incentives or salient models, norms, and so on may actu- react with an eye to their self-esteem. Fisher et al. (1982) pro- ally diminish rather than increase subsequent helping, much posed an esteem-loss explanation for recipients’ negative as providing extrinsic incentives can diminish activity based reactions to receiving aid. Consistent with the comparative on intrinsic motivation (Lepper, Greene, & Nisbett, 1973). aspects of self-esteem, Nadler, Fisher, and Ben-Itzhak (1983) Consistent with this possibility, research suggests that provid- found that when individuals were having trouble on a task ing incentives—whether money, models, or norms—reduces that reflected on their abilities, receipt of help from a friend self-perceived altruism following helping (e.g., Thomas, produced more negative self-evaluation than did receipt of Batson, & Coke, 1981). help from a stranger. These results reveal a dilemma. One important source of DePaulo, Nadler, and Fisher (1983) pointed out that con- motivation to help, the external reward that comes from pay- cern over loss of esteem both in others’ and in one’s own eyes ment or praise for helping, actually undermines a second may go a long way toward explaining reticence to seek help important source of motivation to help, the self-reward that when in need. To seek help is to admit that you lack the com- comes from seeing oneself as a good, kind, caring person. petence, knowledge, or other valuable resources necessary to Consider the long-term consequences. As self-reward is un- cope and, moreover, that the person from whom you seek dermined, additional external pressure may be necessary to help has these resources. Consistent with this analysis, peo- coerce the person to help. This additional external pressure ple are less likely to seek help to the degree that they hold further erodes the helper’s chances for self-reward. Over themselves in high esteem and do not anticipate a chance to time, the result may be a slide toward a more and more cyni- reciprocate the help (Nadler, 1991). cal self-concept, in which personal kindness plays an increas- ingly minor role and help is offered only for a price. This analysis must be qualified by roles and norms, how- ever. For the young child, seeking help from his or her par- The person helped is also likely to make attributions about ents is not likely to be upsetting or damaging to self-esteem. why the helper acted. The most obvious and most frequently For a middle-level executive who finds himself out of a job, studied attributions for helping are that the helper acted the thought of applying for welfare assistance to feed his (a) out of concern, with no strings attached, or (b) in order to family may be devastating. indebt, control, or demean the recipient. Attributions of the second kind may be especially problematic when made by re- Moral Reasoning cipients of international aid. Research by Greenberg and his colleagues (e.g., Greenberg & Frisch, 1972) demonstrated, as Moral reasoning theories (also called cognitive developmen- expected, that aid is not appreciated to the degree that it is tal or rational developmental theories of morality) build on perceived as an attempt to control. In return, the benefactor the classic work of Piaget. Typically, they accept his account is likely to receive hostility rather than gratitude (Tesser, of intellectual development as a process of adaptation Gatewood, & Driver, 1968). through assimilation and accommodation proceeding in an invariant developmental sequence from sensorimotor to pre- Esteem Enhancement/Maintenance operational to concrete operational to formal operational thought (Piaget, 1926). They also accept Piaget’s (1932) Models of esteem enhancement/maintenance have been both application of this model of intellectual development to moral popular and numerous in social psychology since about 1980. judgment. Moral reasoning theories, of which Kohlberg’s (1976) is the best known, treat situations in which one person

Application and Extension of Existing Theory 471 might act to benefit another as problems or puzzles to be reasoning. Finally, she claimed that this apparent superiority solved, much like the problems in volume conservation that will disappear if one listens to the moral voice of women, Piaget gave his children. The key to prosocial action is the who speak more of care than of justice. level of moral reasoning used to solve the puzzle or dilemma. In Kohlberg’s (1976) words, “To act in a morally high way Evidence for the claimed sex difference in use of per- requires a high stage of moral reasoning. . . . Moral stage is a spectives of justice and care has been limited and weak good predictor of action” (p. 32). (Walker, 1991). But research has supported Gilligan’s claim that moral dilemmas can be approached from a perspective Kohlberg claimed to have identified a universal and in- of care rather than justice (Gilligan, Ward, & Taylor, 1988; variant sequence of six stages in moral reasoning, grouped in Walker, 1991). It remains unclear, however, what a care per- pairs into three levels: (a) preconventional (judgment based spective is. Is it (a) a reflection of Kohlberg’s conventional on immediate consequences for self), (b) conventional (judg- stage of morality, (b) an alternative mode of moral reasoning ment based on social norms, rules, and laws), and (c) post- with its own developmental sequence, or (c) not a form of conventional (judgment based on universal moral principles moral reasoning at all but an emotional reaction or bond? that at once transcend and undergird the moral conventions of In sum, although the distinction between justice and care society). The moral principle that Kohlberg considered most seems to have value, considerably more conceptual preci- important was a neo-Kantian principle of justice whereby sion is needed to know the nature and significance of this each individual is accorded equal rights and dignity in a distinction. Kingdom of Ends. Amalgamated Models Controversy has surrounded moral reasoning theories from the start. First, evidence that moral reasoning develops One need not rely on just one of these seven theoretical per- universally in the invariant sequence of stages that Kohlberg spectives to explain prosocial behavior. It is possible to in- described is equivocal at best (Kurtines & Greif, 1974). Sec- voke more than one in a given situation or to invoke one in ond, the link between level of moral reasoning and prosocial one situation and another in a different situation. It is also behavior is far less clear than one might expect (Blasi, 1980; possible to combine perspectives into an amalgamated Eisenberg, 1991). In defense, supporters of moral reasoning model. Sometimes, such an amalgamation has been created models have pointed out that (a) adequate measurement of by the integration of different theoretical perspectives (e.g., moral reasoning is difficult and (b) in almost any moral social learning and norm theories); more often, it has resulted dilemma one may justify a given course of action in different from arranging perspectives in sequence, adding boxes and ways, using different levels of moral reasoning. Both points arrows to a flowchart of steps that lead ultimately to prosocial seem true, but they reduce the explanatory power of moral behavior. The impetus for creating amalgamated models reasoning theories, casting doubt on Kohlberg’s claim that seems to be the desire to be comprehensive, a desire that moral stage is a good predictor of prosocial action. Modified stems from the same aspirations for prediction and control models of moral reasoning that incorporate social learning that underlie the more ad hoc variance-accounted-for ap- principles offer better explanatory power (e.g., Eisenberg, proach. But in amalgamated models, this desire takes advan- 1986). One must ask of these models, however, whether the tage of existing theories to pull together and organize a range social learning principles do all the explanatory work. of explanations. In addition to being challenged from outside by re- Perhaps the best known and most enduring amalgamated searchers who question the value of moral reasoning as a suf- model is the arousal/cost-reward model originally proposed ficient or even necessary explanation of prosocial behavior, by I. M. Piliavin, Rodin, and Piliavin (1969) and devel- Kohlberg’s focus on justice as the capstone of moral maturity oped and elaborated by J. A. Piliavin et al. (1981), Dovidio has been challenged from inside the moral-reasoning camp. (1984), and Dovidio, Piliavin, Gaertner, Schroeder, and The most notable challenge has come from his former student Clark (1991). Originally, this model combined a tension- and colleague Carol Gilligan. In addition to an ethic of justice reduction motivational component with a cost-reward assess- and fairness, Gilligan (1982) called for recognition of an ment of the various behavioral means to reduce the tension. ethic of care. Although she believed that both men and Over the years, norms, equity concerns, and attribution women display reasoning based on justice and reasoning processes have been incorporated as well, producing a flow- based on care, she claimed that the former is more character- chart with 8 boxes and 17 arrows that is too complex to istic of men and the latter more characteristic of women. She describe here. Other amalgamated models include those de- also claimed that Kohlberg’s exclusive focus on justice led veloped by Bar-Tal (1982), who relies most heavily on social to a perception that men are superior to women in moral

472 Altruism and Prosocial Behavior learning and moral-reasoning perspectives, and by Schwartz ANOMALOUS FAILURES TO ACT PROSOCIALLY (1977), who relies most heavily on norms, especially per- sonal norms. The anomalous aspects of prosocial behavior have been of particular interest to those concerned with the theoretical Amalgamated models make three useful contributions. rather than practical implications of why people do—and First, they remind us of the complexity of prosocial behavior don’t—act prosocially. At times, a failure to act prosocially and thereby caution against simplistic explanations. Second, can be baffling. How can individuals who were raised in car- they sketch a causal ordering of the various psychological ing and nurturing homes, whose parents rewarded them for processes assumed to be operating—although these orderings showing concern, who become upset when they hear about are rarely tested. Third, they provide a mnemonic for relevant suffering in remote corners of the world, who have a well- psychological processes and theoretical perspectives. developed sense of duty, justice, and social responsibility, and who are highly sensitive to how they look in others’ eyes Amalgamated models have potential liabilities too. First, as well as in their own fail to respond to the needs of others, the desire to be comprehensive exerts pressure toward prolif- even when it would cost little to do so? Given all the pressure eration of boxes and arrows. As more intervening steps are that society brings to bear, failures to act prosocially can added and more arrows are drawn, multiple paths connect seem quite anomalous, almost amazing. Yet they happen. postulated antecedent and consequent variables. This makes achieving clear causal prediction increasingly difficult. The Let’s return to the murder of Kitty Genovese. At the time, models become less explanatory and more purely descrip- explanations bandied about in the media focused on the tive. It seems to be a general and ironic rule in science that the breakdown in modern urban society of moral fiber, social greater the number of different explanatory models com- norms, and sense of community. Her death was said to be a bined, the less the resulting explanatory power (recall product of apathy, alienation, anomie, and angst. Einstein’s admonition to account for the most facts with the fewest principles). Effect of Others on Decisions Under Pressure Second, having accepted the goal of making an amalga- Bibb Latané and John Darley (1970) came up with an inge- mated model comprehensive, one can expend much energy nious alternative to these dispositional explanations. Their trying to make anomalous data fit. The breadth and complex- explanation was based in part on existing psychological the- ity of these models make success almost inevitable. With ory and in part on new theoretical insights. They observed effort, data can be made to fit even when they do not. The that once we notice a possible emergency situation, we must consequence is that opportunities for new insight and under- make several decisions in order to help. We must decide that standing are lost—or at least discouraged. This is a very seri- an emergency exists, that it is our personal responsibility to ous liability if, as we wish to suggest in the next section of act, and that there is something we can do to help. To compli- this chapter, the anomalous aspects of prosocial behavior are cate matters, these decisions must be made under pressure; what have contributed the most to psychology. emergencies involve threat, ambiguity, urgency, and stress. The presence of other bystanders can influence this pressure- The seven perspectives reviewed thus far reveal the scope packed decision sequence at each step, tipping the scales and power of existing psychological theory available to toward inaction. explain why people act prosocially. Yet in spite of this scope and power, these existing theories sometimes seem inade- Is a scream in the night a woman being attacked or harm- quate. Even after hearing their explanations, one may ex- less high-spirited play? Uncertain, bystanders may turn to perience a nagging sense of “yes, but” when faced with others present, seeking cues to help them decide. No one a dramatic display of concern for another’s welfare—or a wishes to appear foolishly excited over an event that is not an dramatic display of callousness. Such displays have long emergency, so each individual reacts initially with a calm intrigued and puzzled not only psychologists but also philoso- outward demeanor, while looking at other people’s reactions. phers and other behavioral and social scientists. They call for Others do the same. No one appears upset, creating a state of a rethinking of our existing theories about why people do and pluralistic ignorance (Miller & McFarland, 1987). Everyone do not act prosocially, even a rethinking of our assumptions decides that since no one else is upset, the event must not about human nature. be an emergency (Latané & Darley, 1968; Latané & Rodin, 1969). By attending to these anomalies, researchers have ex- tended and altered our theories of social motivation. Attempts Even if one decides that the situation is an emergency and to explain prosocial anomalies have not caused a total rewrite that someone is in dire need of help, the presence of others can of our theories, of course, but they have caused some rewrit- ing, and likely there will be more.

Anomalous Prosocial Acts 473 still discourage action. To explain how, Darley and Latané results. For most of us, this belief in contingency leads in turn (1968) moved beyond existing theory and proposed a diffu- to a belief in a just world, a sense of appropriateness—that sion of responsibility. If others are available, each individual people get what they deserve (and deserve what they get)— may feel less personal obligation to come forward and help. necessary for trust, hope, and confidence in our future. One call to the police is as helpful, if not more helpful, than Witnessing the suffering of innocent victims violates the be- 20 calls. In the Kitty Genovese case, her neighbors may have lief in a just world. In order to reduce the discomfort produced seen lights in other windows and assumed that other neigh- by this threat, we may help. But there is an alternative: We bors had heard the screams and that someone else had already may derogate or blame the victims (if they have less, they called. Some may have thought, “Something should be done, must deserve less; that is, they must be less deserving). Lerner but why should I be the one to do it?” Thoughts like these, and his associates provided extensive evidence that witness- made possible by awareness of other bystanders without ing an innocent victim suffer can lead to derogation (see knowing what the others are doing, diffuses the responsibility Lerner, 1980, for a review). The insight that a natural—even to help among all the bystanders present and makes it less noble—belief in justice, when carried into an unjust world, likely that any one bystander will help. can itself become a source of injustice has proved major. Latané and Darley’s (1970) answer to the question of why ANOMALOUS PROSOCIAL ACTS none of the 38 witnesses to the murder of Kitty Genovese helped has stood up remarkably well to experimental test (see In the 1960s, heightened social conscience focused attention Latané & Nida, 1981). Still, the psychological process that on anomalous failures to act prosocially. In the broader sweep underlies diffusion of responsibility remains unclear. Do the of Western thought, this focus is itself anomalous. Through costs of helping lead to a motivated, optimistic redefinition the centuries, the puzzle that has intrigued those contemplat- of the situation (“I’m sure someone else has already helped, ing the human condition has not been why people fail to care so there is no longer a need”)? Is there a recognition of con- for others in need; the puzzle has been why people care. tinuing need but denial of personal responsibility, either by reasoning that others present are better qualified to act From Aristotle and Aquinas through Hobbes and Bentham (“Somebody’s got to do something, but not me; they’re the to Nietzsche and Freud, the dominant view in Western ones who know what to do”) or shifting from a prescriptive to thought has been that people are, at heart, exclusively self- a descriptive norm (“I can’t be blamed; no one else is doing interested. Given this view, what explains the enormous ef- anything either”)? Might some people fail to act out of defer- fort and energy directed toward benefiting others? At times, ence or modesty (“I’ll let someone else be the hero”)? Each what people do for others can be spectacular. Soldiers have of these processes involves the effect of others on decision thrown themselves on live grenades to protect their com- making under pressure, and they are often confounded in rades. Crews worked around the clock in extreme danger to research; yet these processes are distinct. Any or all could free the trapped victims of the Oklahoma City bombing. operate, suggesting that more research is needed. Firemen died directing others to safety when the World Trade Center towers collapsed. Surviving an airline crash, Arland Blaming the Victim Williams lost his life in the icy waters of the Potomac be- cause he repeatedly gave others his place in the rescue Another important theoretical development stimulated by helicopter. Mother Teresa dedicated her life to the dying of reflection on bystander “apathy” was Melvin Lerner’s (1970, Calcutta, the poorest of the poor, bringing care and comfort to 1980) just-world hypothesis. The anomaly on which Lerner thousands. Rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe, such as Miep focused was not the failure to help victims of accidents, Gies (1987), who helped hide Anne Frank and her parents, attacks, or other emergencies, but rather the more pervasive and Oskar Schindler, risked their own lives—and often the and pernicious tendency for the haves in society to be unre- lives of their loved ones—day after day for months, or even sponsive to the needs of the have-nots. Lerner observed, as years. did Ryan (1971), that people often not only fail to notice need or to show concern for victims, but that they actively dero- How can we reconcile these actions with a view that gate and blame victims. people are exclusively self-interested? Could some people, to some degree, under some circumstances, be capable of hav- To explain this apparent anomaly, Lerner turned to the ing another person’s interest at heart? Is it possible for one seemingly prosocial principle of justice. He reasoned as fol- person to have another person’s welfare as an ultimate goal lows. If children are to delay gratification and pursue long- (altruism), or is all helping simply an instrumental means of term goals, they must develop a belief that effort brings

474 Altruism and Prosocial Behavior obtaining one or another form of self-benefit (egoism)? This sympathy (Wispé, 1986). If another person is in need, these has been called the altruism question (Batson, 1991). empathic emotions include sympathy, compassion, tender- ness, and the like. The empathy-altruism hypothesis claims The Altruism Question that these emotions evoke motivation with an ultimate goal of benefiting the person for whom the empathy is felt—that is, One easy answer to the altruism question that can quickly be altruistic motivation. Various forms of this hypothesis have laid to rest goes like this: Even if it were possible for a person been espoused by Thomas Aquinas, David Hume, Adam to be motivated to increase another’s welfare, such a person Smith, Charles Darwin, Herbert Spencer, and William would be pleased by attaining this desired goal, so even this McDougall, as well as in contemporary psychology by apparent altruism would be a product of egoism. In the Hoffman (1975), Krebs (1975), and Batson (1987). words of Tolman’s (1923) well-turned epithet, this argument is “more brilliant than cogent” (p. 203). Philosophers have Considerable evidence supports the idea that feeling em- shown it to be flawed by pointing out that it involves a confu- pathy for a person in need leads to increased helping of that sion between two different forms of psychological hedonism. person (see Batson, 1991; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987, for re- The strong form of hedonism asserts that the ultimate goal of views). Observing an empathy-helping relationship, how- human action is always the attainment of personal pleasure; ever, tells us nothing about the nature of the motivation that the weak form asserts only that goal attainment always brings underlies this relationship. Increasing the other person’s wel- pleasure. The weak form is not inconsistent with the altruistic fare could be (a) an ultimate goal, producing self-benefits as claim that the ultimate goal of some action is to benefit an- unintended consequences; (b) an instrumental goal on the other rather than to benefit oneself; the pleasure obtained can way to the ultimate goal of gaining one or more self-benefits; be a consequence of reaching this goal without being the goal or (c) both. That is, the motivation could be altruistic, egois- itself. The strong form of psychological hedonism is incon- tic, or both. sistent with the possibility of altruism, but to affirm this form is simply to assert that altruism does not exist, an empirical Egoistic Alternatives to the Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis assertion that may or may not be true (see MacIntyre, 1967, for discussion of these philosophical arguments). Three general classes of self-benefits can result from helping a person for whom one feels empathy. Such help can (a) re- More serious advocates of universal egoism argue that duce one’s empathic arousal, which may be experienced as some specific self-benefit is always the ultimate goal of help- aversive; (b) enable one to avoid possible social and self- ing; benefiting the other is simply an instrumental goal on the punishments for failing to help; and (c) enable one to gain way to one or another ultimately self-serving end. They point social and self-rewards for doing what is good and right. The to all the self-benefits of helping: the material, social, and self- empathy-altruism hypothesis does not deny that these self- rewards received; the material, social, and self-punishments benefits of empathy-induced helping exist. It claims that they avoided; and aversive-arousal reduction. Advocates of altru- are unintended consequences of the empathically aroused ism counter that simply because self-benefits follow from helper reaching the ultimate goal of reducing the other’s benefiting another, this does not prove that the self-benefits suffering. Proponents of egoistic alternatives to the empathy- were the helper’s ultimate goal. These self-benefits may be altruism hypothesis disagree. They claim that one or more of unintended consequences of reaching the ultimate goal of these self-benefits are the ultimate goal of empathy-induced benefiting the other. If so, the motivation would be altruistic, helping. In the past two decades more than 30 experiments not egoistic. have tested these three egoistic alternatives against the empathy-altruism hypothesis. Advocates of altruism claim more than possibility, of course. They claim that altruistic motivation exists, that at The most frequently proposed egoistic explanation of the least some people under some circumstances act with the empathy-helping relationship is aversive-arousal reduction. ultimate goal of increasing another person’s welfare. This explanation claims that feeling empathy for someone who is suffering is unpleasant, and empathically aroused in- The Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis dividuals help in order to benefit themselves by eliminating their empathic feelings. Benefiting the victim is simply a Over the centuries, the most frequently proposed source of means to this self-serving end. altruistic motivation has been an other-oriented emotional response congruent with the perceived welfare of another Over half a dozen experiments have tested the aversive- person—today usually called empathy (Batson, 1987) or arousal reduction explanation against the empathy-altruism hypothesis by varying the ease of escape from further exposure

Anomalous Prosocial Acts 475 to the empathy-evoking need without helping. Because em- clear that the motivation to help evoked by empathy is not pathic arousal is a result of witnessing the need, either termi- directed toward the egoistic goal of negative-state relief. nating this need by helping or terminating exposure to it by escaping should reduce one’s own empathic arousal. Escape A second interesting variation on an empathy-specific does not, however, enable one to reach the altruistic goal of reward explanation was proposed by Smith, Keating, and relieving the victim’s need. Therefore, the aversive-arousal Stotland (1989). They claimed that rather than helping to gain explanation predicts elimination of the empathy-helping rela- the rewards of seeing oneself or being seen by others as a tionship when escape is easy; the empathy-altruism hypothesis helpful person, empathically aroused individuals help in order does not. Results of these experiments have consistently to feel joy at the needy individual’s relief: “It is proposed that patterned as predicted by the empathy-altruism hypothesis the prospect of empathic joy, conveyed by feedback from the and not by the aversive-arousal reduction explanation, casting help recipient, is essential to the special tendency of empathic doubt on this popular egoistic account (see Batson, 1991, for a witnesses to help. . . . The empathically concerned witness to review). the distress of others helps in order to be happy” (Smith et al., 1989, p. 641). A second egoistic explanation invokes empathy-specific punishment. It claims that people learn through socialization Some early self-report data were supportive, but more that additional obligation to help, and thus additional shame rigorous experimental evidence has failed to support this and guilt for failure to help, is attendant on feeling empathy for empathic-joy hypothesis. Instead, experimental results have someone in need. As a result, when people feel empathy, they once again consistently supported the empathy-altruism are faced with impending social or self-censure beyond any hypothesis (Batson et al., 1991; Smith et al., 1989). The general punishment associated with not helping. They say to empathic-joy hypothesis, like other versions of the empathy- themselves, “What will others think—or what will I think of specific reward explanation, seems unable to account for the myself—if I don’t help when I feel like this?” and then they empathy-helping relationship. help out of an egoistic desire to avoid these empathy-specific punishments. Once again, experiments designed to test this A Tentative Conclusion explanation have failed to support it; the results have consis- tently supported the empathy-altruism hypothesis instead Reviewing the empathy-altruism research, as well as related (Batson, 1991). literature in sociology, economics, political science, and biol- ogy, J. A. Piliavin and Charng (1990) concluded that The third major egoistic explanation invokes empathy- specific reward. It claims that people learn through socializa- There appears to be a “paradigm shift” away from the earlier tion that special rewards in the form of praise and pride are position that behavior that appears to be altruistic must, under attendant on helping a person for whom they feel empathy. closer scrutiny, be revealed as reflecting egoistic motives. As a result, when people feel empathy, they think of these Rather, theory and data now being advanced are more compati- rewards and help out of an egoistic desire to gain them. ble with the view that true altruism—acting with the goal of ben- efiting another—does exist and is a part of human nature. (p. 27) The general form of this explanation has been tested in several experiments and received no support (Batson et al., Pending new evidence or a plausible new egoistic explana- 1988, Studies 1 & 5; Batson & Weeks, 1996), but two varia- tion of the existing evidence, this conclusion seems correct. tions have also been proposed. Best known is the negative- It appears that the empathy-altruism hypothesis should— state relief explanation proposed by Cialdini et al. (1987). tentatively—be accepted as true. Cialdini et al. suggested that the empathy experienced when witnessing another person’s suffering is a negative affective Implications of the Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis state—a state of temporary sadness or sorrow—and the per- son feeling empathy helps in order to gain self-rewards to If the empathy-altruism hypothesis is true, the implications counteract this negative state. are wide ranging. Universal egoism—the assumption that all human behavior is ultimately directed toward self-benefit— Although this egoistic alternative received some initial has long dominated not only psychology but other social and support (Cialdini et al., 1987; Schaller & Cialdini, 1988), sub- behavioral sciences as well (Campbell, 1975; Mansbridge, sequent research has revealed that this was likely due to pro- 1990; Wallach & Wallach, 1983). If individuals feeling cedural artifacts. Experiments avoiding these artifacts have empathy act, at least in part, with an ultimate goal of increas- instead supported the empathy-altruism hypothesis (Batson ing the welfare of another, then the assumption of universal et al., 1989; Dovidio, Allen, & Schroeder, 1990; Schroeder, Dovidio, Sibicky, Matthews, & Allen, 1988). It now seems

476 Altruism and Prosocial Behavior egoism must be replaced by a more complex view of motiva- Todd, 1994; Stotland, Mathews, Sherman, Hansson, & tion that allows for altruism as well as egoism. Such a shift in Richardson, 1978). There seems to be, then, egoistic motiva- our view of motivation requires, in turn, a revision of our tion to avoid altruistic motivation. underlying assumptions about human nature and human potential. It implies that we humans may be more social More positively, experiments have tested the possibility that than we have thought—that other people can be more to us empathy-induced altruism can be used to improve attitudes than sources of information, stimulation, and reward as we each toward stigmatized out-groups. Thus far, results look quite seek our own welfare. To some degree and under some circum- encouraging. Inducing empathy has improved racial attitudes, stances, we can care about their welfare as an end in itself. as well as attitudes toward people with AIDS, the homeless, and even convicted murderers (Batson, Polycarpou, et al., The evidence for the empathy-altruism hypothesis also 1997; Dovidio, Gaertner, & Johnson, 1999). Empathy-induced forces us to face the question of why empathic feelings exist. altruism has also been found to increase cooperation in a com- What evolutionary function do they serve? Admittedly spec- petitive situation (a prisoner’s dilemma), even when one knows ulative, the most plausible answer relates empathic feelings that the person for whom one feels empathy has acted compet- to parenting among higher mammals, in which offspring itively (Batson & Ahmad, 2001; Batson & Moran, 1999). live for some time in a very vulnerable state (de Waal, 1996; Hoffman, 1981; McDougall, 1908; Zahn-Waxler & Radke- Other Possible Sources of Altruistic Motivation Yarrow, 1990). Were parents not intensely interested in the welfare of their progeny, these species would quickly die out. Might there be sources of altruistic motivation other than Empathic feelings for offspring, and the resulting altruistic empathic emotion? Several have been proposed, including motivation, may promote one’s reproductive potential not by an altruistic personality (Oliner & Oliner, 1988), principled increasing the number of offspring but by increasing the moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1976), and internalized pro- chance of their survival. social values (Staub, 1974). There is some evidence that each of these potential sources is associated with increased Clearly, however, empathic feelings extend well beyond prosocial motivation, but as yet, it is not clear whether this one’s own children. People can feel empathy for a wide range motivation is altruistic. It may instead be an instrumental of individuals (including nonhumans) as long as there is no means to the egoistic ultimate goals of (a) maintaining one’s preexisting antipathy (Batson, 1991; Krebs, 1975; Shelton & positive self-concept or (b) avoiding guilt (Batson, 1991; Rogers, 1981). From an evolutionary perspective, this exten- Batson, Bolen, Cross, & Neuringer-Benefiel, 1986; Carlo sion may be attributed to cognitive generalization whereby et al., 1991; Eisenberg et al., 1989). More and better research one “adopts” others, making it possible to evoke the primi- exploring these possibilities is needed. tive and fundamental impulse to care for progeny when these adopted others are in need (Batson, 1987; MacLean, 1973). Beyond the Egoism-Altruism Debate: Such cognitive generalization may be possible because of Other Prosocial Motives (a) human cognitive capacity, including symbolic thought, and (b) the lack of evolutionary advantage for sharp discrim- Thinking more broadly, beyond the egoism-altruism debate ination of empathic feelings in the small hunter-gatherer that has been the focus of attention and contention for the bands of early humans. In these bands, those in need were past two decades, might there be other forms of prosocial often one’s children or close kin, and one’s own welfare was motivation—forms in which the ultimate goal is neither to tightly tied to the welfare even of those who were not close benefit oneself nor to benefit another individual? Two possi- kin (Hoffman, 1981). bilities seem especially worthy of consideration: collectivism and principlism. The empathy-altruism hypothesis also may have wide- ranging practical implications. Given the power of empathic Collectivism: Benefiting a Group feelings to evoke altruistic motivation, people may some- times suppress or avoid these feelings. Loss of the capacity Collectivism involves motivation to benefit a particular group to feel empathy for clients may be a factor, possibly a central as a whole. The ultimate goal is not to increase one’s own wel- one, in the experience of burnout among case workers in the fare or the welfare of the specific others who are benefited; the helping professions (Maslach, 1982). Aware of the extreme ultimate goal is to increase the welfare of the group. Robyn effort involved in helping or the impossibility of helping Dawes and his colleagues put it succinctly: “Not me or thee effectively, these case workers—as well as nurses caring for but we” (Dawes, van de Kragt, & Orbell, 1988). They also terminal patients, and even pedestrians confronted by the suggested that collectivist prosocial motivation is a product of homeless—may try to avoid feeling empathy in order to avoid the resulting altruistic motivation (Shaw, Batson, &

Anomalous Prosocial Acts 477 group identity (Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Tajfel, 1981; Turner, Kant (1724–1804) have shunned altruism and collectivism as 1987). well. They reject appeals to altruism, especially empathy- induced altruism, because feelings of empathy, sympathy, and As with altruism, however, what looks like collectivism compassion are too fickle and too circumscribed. Empathy is may actually be a subtle form of egoism. Perhaps attention to not felt for everyone in need, at least not to the same degree. group welfare is simply an expression of enlightened self- They reject appeals to collectivism because group interest is interest. After all, if one recognizes that ignoring group needs bounded by the limits of the group; it may even encourage and the common good in a headlong pursuit of self-benefit doing harm to those outside the group. Given these problems will only lead to less self-benefit in the long run, then one with altruism and collectivism, moral philosophers have typ- may decide to benefit the group as a means to maximize over- ically advocated prosocial motivation with an ultimate goal of all self-benefit. Appeals to enlightened self-interest are often upholding a universal and impartial moral principle, such as used by politicians and social activists trying to encourage justice (Rawls, 1971). We shall call this moral motivation prosocial response to societal needs. They warn of the long- principlism. term consequences for oneself and one’s children of pollution and squandering natural resources. They remind that if the Is acting with an ultimate goal of upholding a moral prin- plight of the poor becomes too severe, those who are well off ciple really possible? When Kant (1785/1898) briefly shifted may face revolution. Such appeals seem to assume that col- from his analysis of what ought to be to what is, he was lectivism is simply a form of egoism. ready to admit that even when the concern we show for others appears to be prompted by duty to principle, it may The most direct evidence that collectivism is independent actually be prompted by self-love (pp. 23–24). The goal of of egoism comes from research by Dawes, van de Kragt, and upholding a moral principle may be only an instrumental Orbell (1990). They examined the responses of individuals goal pursued as a means to reach the ultimate goal of self- who had been given a choice between allocating money to benefit. If so, then principle-based motivation is actually themselves or to a group. Allocation to oneself maximized in- egoistic. dividual but not group profit, whereas allocation to the group maximized collective but not individual profit. The self-benefits of upholding a moral principle are conspicuous. One can gain the social and self-rewards of Dawes et al. (1990) found that if individuals faced with being seen and seeing oneself as a good person. One can also this dilemma made their allocation after discussing it with avoid the social and self-punishments of shame and guilt for other members of the group, they gave more to the group failing to do the right thing. As Freud (1930) suggested, soci- than if they had no prior discussion. Moreover, this effect ety may inculcate such principles in the young in order to bri- was specific to the in-group with whom the discussion oc- dle their antisocial impulses by making it in their best curred; allocation to an out-group was not enhanced. Based personal interest to act morally (see also Campbell, 1975). on this research, Dawes et al. claimed evidence for collec- Alternatively, through internalization (Staub, 1989) or devel- tivist motivation independent of egoism, arguing that their opment of moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1976), principles may procedure ruled out the two most plausible egoistic explana- come to be valued in their own right and not simply as in- tions: (a) enlightened self-interest (by having no future con- strumental means to self-serving ends. tact and only one allocation round) and (b) socially instilled conscience (a norm to share, if evoked, should increase shar- The issue here is the same one faced with altruism and ing with the out-group as well as the in-group). There is rea- collectivism. We need to know the nature of the underlying son to doubt, however, that their procedure effectively ruled motive. Is the desire to uphold justice (or some other moral out self-rewards and self-punishments associated with con- principle) an instrumental goal on the way to the ultimate science. The research on norms reviewed earlier suggests goal of self-benefit? If so, this desire is a form of egoism. Is that norms can be more refined than Dawes and his cowork- upholding the principle an ultimate goal, and the ensuing ers allowed. We may have a norm that says “share with self-benefits merely unintended consequences? If so, princi- your buddies” rather than a norm that simply says “share.” plism is a fourth type of prosocial motivation, independent of So, although this research is important and suggestive, more egoism, altruism, and collectivism. and better evidence is needed to justify the conclusion that collectivist prosocial motivation is not reducible to egoism. Recent research suggests that people often act so as to appear moral while, if possible, avoiding the cost of actually Principlism: Upholding a Moral Principle being moral (Batson, Kobrynowicz, Dinnerstein, Kampf, & Wilson, 1997; Batson, Thompson, Seuferling, Whitney, & Not only have most moral philosophers argued for the impor- Strongman, 1999). This research also suggests that if moral tance of a prosocial motive other than egoism, but most since motivation exists, it is easily overpowered by self-interest. Many of us are, it seems, quite adept at moral rationalization.

478 Altruism and Prosocial Behavior We are good at justifying to ourselves (if not to others) why a Each of the four possible prosocial motives that we have situation that benefits us or those we care about does not identified has its strengths. Each also has its weaknesses. The violate our moral principles—for example, why storing our potential for the greatest good may come from strategies that nuclear waste in someone else’s backyard is fair, why terrorist orchestrate these motives so that the strengths of one can attacks by our side are regrettable but necessary evils whereas overcome the weaknesses of another. Strategies that combine terrorist attacks by the other side are atrocities, and why we appeals to either altruism or collectivism with appeals to prin- must obey orders even if it means killing innocent people. The ciple seem especially promising. For example, think about the abstractness of most moral principles, and their multiplicity, principle of justice. Upholding justice is a powerful motive, makes rationalization all too easy (see Bandura, 1991; but it is vulnerable to rationalization. Empathy-induced altru- Bersoff, 1999; Staub, 1990). ism and collectivism are also powerful motives, but they are limited in scope. They produce partiality—special concern But this may be only part of the story. Perhaps in some for a particular person or persons or for a particular group. If cases upholding a moral principle can serve as an ultimate we can lead people to feel empathy for the victims of injustice goal, defining a form of motivation independent of egoism. If or to perceive themselves in a common group with them, we so, perhaps these principles can provide a basis for respond- may be able to get these motives working together rather than ing to the needs of others that transcends reliance on self- at odds. Desire for justice may provide perspective and rea- interest or on vested interest in and feeling for the welfare of son; empathy-induced altruism or collectivism may provide certain other individuals or groups. Quite an “if,” but it seems emotional fire and a force directed specifically toward relief well worth conducting research to find out. of the victims’ suffering, preventing rationalization. Conflict and Cooperation of Prosocial Motives Something of this sort occurred, we believe, in a number of rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe. A careful look at data col- To recognize the range of possible prosocial motives makes lected by the Oliners and their colleagues (Oliner & Oliner, available more resources to those seeking to produce a more 1988) suggests that involvement in rescue activity frequently humane, caring society. At the same time, a multiplicity of began with concern for a specific individual or individuals for prosocial motives complicates matters. These different mo- whom compassion was felt—often individuals known previ- tives for helping others do not always work in harmony. They ously. This initial involvement subsequently led to further can undercut or compete with one another. contacts and rescue activity and to a concern for justice that extended well beyond the bound of the initial empathic con- Well-intentioned appeals to extended or enlightened self- cern. Something of this sort also lay at the heart of Gandhi’s interest can backfire by undermining other prosocial motives. and Martin Luther King’s practice of nonviolent protest. The Providing people with money or other tangible incentives for sight on the TV news of a small Black child in Birmingham showing concern may lead people to interpret their motiva- being literally rolled down the street by water from a fire hose tion as egoistic even when it is not (Batson, Coke, Jasnoski, under the direction of Police Chief Bull Connor, and the & Hanson, 1978). In this way, the assumption that there is emotions this sight evoked, seemed to do more to arouse a only one answer to the question of why we act for the com- concern for justice than did hours of reasoned argument and mon good—egoism—may become a self-fulfilling prophecy appeals for equal civil rights. (Batson, Fultz, Schoenrade, & Paduano, 1987) and may cre- ate a self-perpetuating norm of self-interest (Miller, 1999; Something of this sort also can be found in the writing of Miller & Ratner, 1998). Jonathan Kozol. Deeply concerned about the “savage inequal- ities” in public education between rich and poor communities Nor do the other three prosocial motives always work in in the United States, Kozol (1991) does not simply document harmony. They can conflict with one another. For example, the inequity. He takes us into the lives of individual children. altruism can—and often does—conflict with collectivism or We come to care deeply for them and, as a result, about the principlism. We may ignore the larger social good, or we may injustice. compromise our principles, not only to benefit ourselves but also to benefit those individuals about whom we especially care RESEARCH METHOD MATTERS (Batson, Batson, et al., 1995; Batson, Klein, Highberger, & Shaw, 1995). Indeed, whereas there are clear social sanctions Efforts to explain prosocial behavior, especially its seemingly against unbridled self-interest, there are not clear sanctions anomalous aspects, have raised thorny issues about research against altruism. Batson, Ahmad, et al. (1999) found that altru- methods that, though not specific to this area, flourish here. ism can at times be a greater threat to the common good than is egoism.