Handbook of Psychology Vol. 5

The Psychology of the Victim of Prejudice and Discrimination 529 ethnicities. Lifetime SSE scores enhanced prediction (over procedures. Some alternative theoretical models failed to re- and above generic stress measures) of total HSC symptoms ceive support. for older women but not for younger ones. Stereotype Threat Buffers for Discrimination-Related Stress Not only do women and minority members confront preju- Not all members of oppressed groups will suffer the stress of dice and discrimination, but they also must deal with broadly discrimination in the same way or to the same extent. The shared, negative stereotypes about their groups by majority personality construct of hardiness—a composite of self- group members, which can have pernicious and deleterious esteem and sense of control—may be one factor that buffers effects upon their academic and athletic performance. Black the stress of experiencing or perceiving discrimination to- Americans, for example, confront low expectations in the ward oneself and one’s group. Dion et al. (1992) explored the realm of academic ability, whereas women in the United role of personality-based hardiness in a study of Toronto’s States, Canada, and some other societies are presumed by Chinese community. As they predicted, the relationship of consensually shared stereotypes to be inferior in mathematics discrimination to psychological symptoms was markedly compared to men. higher among Chinese community respondents who were low in hardiness than among those high in hardiness. Indeed, Steele (1997; Steele & Aronson, 1995) and his colleagues for those scoring high in hardiness, discrimination and re- contended that negative stereotypes impugning the abilities ported psychological symptoms were effectively unrelated, of stigmatized group members constitute a powerful situa- whereas they related reasonably strongly for those low in har- tional threat with two notable consequences. First, in a testing diness. In addition, alternative interpretations in terms of situation involving an ability where one’s group is negatively differential life stresses or differential exposure to discrimi- stereotyped, the performance of those members who care nation in the two hardiness groups were ruled out as rival ex- about the ability and doing well on the test can be adversely planations (see Dion et al., 1992). affected. Second, chronic experiences of stereotype threat can lead members of stigmatized groups to disidentify by Foster and Dion (2001) explored whether the beneficial denying the importance of the ability for themselves. At the relationship of personality-based hardiness to discrimination- college level, this disidentification can lead to academic related stress is due to buffering or denial in an experiment in dropouts among Black Americans and proportionally fewer which women confronted gender discrimination on an exam- women enrolling in math, science, and engineering programs ination. The findings favored a buffering interpretation and where mathematical ability is prerequisite. suggested that the buffering was due to the types of attribu- tions that hardy women made relative to their less hardy Initial Studies counterparts. Specifically, hardy women made specific, un- stable attributions rather than global, stable ones; that is, they Steele and Aronson (1995) reported the first set of four ex- tended to see the gender discrimination as a unique and un- periments documenting the impact of stereotype threat on the usual occurrence, even though there were no differences performance of Black American university students, relative between the hardy and nonhardy women in perceived un- to their White American counterparts, at Stanford University, fairness of the discrimination. an elite U.S. university. These investigators told participants that difficult and challenging items from the Graduate Record Whereas hardiness may provide a personality-based Examination (GRE) either were diagnostic of their intellec- buffer and coping dimension, in-group identification has tual ability (the diagnostic or stereotype threat condition) or been hypothesized to be important in predicting reliance on were a test of problem-solving with no implications for diag- group-based responses to coping with discrimination and nosing their intellectual ability (the nondiagnostic or no- buffering self-esteem. Branscombe and Ellemers (1998) pro- stereotype-threat condition). In all four studies, participants’ posed a rejection-identification model suggesting that greater previous Scholastic Achievement Test (SAT) scores in high willingness to make attributions to prejudice among Black school were statistically controlled in the analyses by means Americans heightens their minority-group identification as of analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) procedures. well as hostility toward the dominant White group but has a negative effect on personal and collective sense of well- The first two studies by Steele and Aronson (1995) demon- being. Minority-group identification, however, has a buffer- strated that Black American participants in the diagnostic ing effect in sustaining well-being. Branscombe and her or stereotype threat condition completed fewer items and colleagues tested and supported this model with SEM

530 Prejudice, Racism, and Discrimination attained lower accuracy (i.e., number of items correct relative GRE test equalled that of men. By contrast, in the threat to the number attempted) than did either Black or White par- condition, women underperformed men. Finally, their third ticipants in the other conditions. Steele and Aronson’s third experiment demonstrated that the stereotype threat effect experiment demonstrated that the diagnostic ability manipu- was obtainable at a state university in the U.S. whose lation elicited among Black participants who were expecting academic standards were less rigorous and selective than to take a difficult test (but did not do so) the racial stereotype the elite university samples in prior studies and further ex- of Blacks held by Whites as well as an avoidance of self- plored possible mediating processes. The mediational tests characterization in terms of this stereotype, and even an excluded evaluation apprehension and self-efficacy as a basis avoidance of indicating one’s racial status on a demographic for the impact of stereotype threat on women’s math perfor- postquestionnaire, relative to nondiagnostic and control con- mance. Anxiety emerged as a weak mediator of stereotype ditions. In Study 4, priming race by merely having partici- threat. pants indicate their race on a demographic questionnaire before attempting a challenging intellectual test served to in- Finally, recent studies by different sets of investigators hibit performance by Black participants and presumably to show that stereotype threat can affect the performance of elicit stereotype threat. Steele and Aronson proposed that the White majority group members and does not require that one mechanism underlying the impact of stereotype threat on the be a member of a historically stigmatized group. Aronson test performance of their Black American participants was et al. (1999) conducted two experiments in which White probably an inefficiency of cognitive processing, not unlike students of high math ability at an elite U.S. university were that produced by other evaluative pressures. presented information that Asian Americans outperform Whites in math (stereotype threat condition) or not (no threat Croizet and Claire (1998) extended the applicability of the condition). Additionally, in the second study they selected stereotype threat concept to those of low socioeconomic sta- math-oriented students who scored on the bottom and top tus (SES) outside the United States. Using a predominantly tertiles of rated importance of mathematics ability to their female sample of French university students, these investiga- self-concept as a means of assessing low versus high identifi- tors likewise found that under stereotype threat, students of cation with this domain. Their first study showed that White low SES obtained fewer correct answers, attempted fewer students performed less well on a challenging math test when items, and had lower overall accuracy on verbal GRE items. threatened with a racial stereotype indicating their inferiority By contrast, much like Steele and Aronson (1995) had previ- relative to Asians. Their second study showed that this ously found in comparing Black and White American partic- stereotype effect occurred only when the White students were ipants, there was no difference in test performance between math-identified and that evaluation apprehension was a participants of low and high SES when the same test was weak, potential mediator. described as nondiagnostic of one’s intellectual ability. Vary- ing the salience of SES before the test by having participants Stone, Lynch, Sjomeling, and Darley (1999) took advan- indicate their parents’ occupation and educational level, how- tage of a golf test that they presented to Black and White ever, had no effect in this study. Princeton University participants as indicating their “natural athletic ability” or their “sports intelligence.” Their first study Recent Studies showed that performance by Black students on the golf test suffered more when it constituted a stereotype threat (an in- Spencer, Steele, and Quinn (1999) themselves applied stereo- dication of sports intelligence—a negative stereotype for type threat theory to U.S. women’s math performance in three Whites) than when it did not (an indication of natural athletic studies including math-oriented students who had taken cal- ability—a positive stereotype for Blacks). By contrast, for culus and had performed highly on the high-school mathemat- White participants for whom the opposite was true (i.e., ics section of the SAT. Their first experiment demonstrated sports intelligence is a positive stereotype, and natural ath- that a gender difference, with women underperforming men, letic ability is a negative or less positive stereotype than for occurred only when the math GRE items used to assess math Blacks), the reverse pattern was obtained, as predicted from performance were difficult rather than easy. Spencer and his stereotype threat theory. Their second study, focusing on colleagues varied stereotype threat in the next two studies by White participants only, showed that the detrimental effects informing participants either that there was a gender differ- of stereotype threat on performance on the golf test occurred ence previously obtained with the math GRE items they were only for “engaged” participants for whom performance in the to solve (threat condition) or not (no stereotype threat). In athletic domain was important to their self-worth and not for the no threat condition, women’s performance on the math those who were “disengaged.” In addition to showing the im- portance of engagement for the stereotype threat effect, their

The Psychology of the Victim of Prejudice and Discrimination 531 explorations of mediators for White participants implicated framework that tries to predict when and why members of an performance anxiety and lowered expectations when the oppressed group will respond to their disadvantage with task’s difficulty became apparent. attempts to instigate social change, such as political protest. As its name implies, RDT assumes that one’s feelings of de- In sum, accumulating evidence suggests that the stereotype privation are not absolute but instead depend on the individ- threat effect is real and that its effects can be demonstrated ual or group with whom one compares. among historically stigmatized groups such as Black Americans and White women as well as nonstigmatized RDT proposes different types of deprivation as defined by groups. Also, apart from the obvious importance of a person two dimensions. One dimension concerns the focus of com- being engaged and identified with the domain (e.g., math, parison and defines the distinction between egoistic and fra- athletics, etc.), the precise mechanisms responsible for ternalistic relative deprivation (RD). Egoistic RD occurs the stereotype threat effect remain somewhat ambiguous. when an individual feels deprived relative to others in their The preceding studies have assessed an array of potential membership group. Fraternalistic RD (also called collectivis- mediators—such as self-handicapping and situational and tic RD by those of us preferring a gender-neutral label) oc- trait anxiety, as well as test anxiety, evaluation apprehension; curs when one’s group is perceived to be at a disadvantage to self-concept, and so on—with self-report measures. Weak one or more out-groups. The second dimension concerns the evidence of potential mediators has emerged, though not the cognitive-affective distinction. Cognitive RD concerns the same ones across studies and groups. Perhaps different perception of inequality, whereas affective RD refers to re- mechanisms will ultimately be shown to be important for dif- sentment over inequalities. Taken together, these two dimen- ferent target groups. What seems clear at present is that the sions define four types of RD. Reviews of RDT (e.g., Dion, stereotype threat effect is not due to a lowering of effort, as 1986) indicate that of these four types, it is primarily affec- stereotype-threatened individuals typically work or try harder tive, collectivistic RD (i.e., resentment over poorer treatment than their nonthreatened counterparts. On the other hand, of one’s group compared to other groups) that best predicts stereotype threat seems to act as a distractor and an additional desires and attempts at social change. pressure that reduces one’s effectiveness for successfully completing challenging tasks at the limit of one’s ability in a In a series of studies, I and my colleagues have pitted per- given domain. ceived discrimination against measures of RD types to assess their relative efficacy at predicting attitudinal measures of de- Advocates of stereotype threat theory suggest that their sires to take corrective action (Dion, 2002). With groups in perspective is optimistic in that it points to a situational stres- Canada such as lesbians and gays, Chinese university stu- sor as a key factor in underperformance by negatively stereo- dents, and women, we have consistently found that perceived typed and stigmatized groups, in contrast to dispositional discrimination is a more powerful and consistent predictor of interpretations of innate inferiority in ability, genetic factors, reported desires to corrective action than are the different RD and so on. Stereotype threat theory also provides a viable ex- types, with the notable exception of affective, collectivistic planation for why academic achievement tests have lower RD (e.g., Birt & Dion, 1987; Dion & Kawakami, 2000). To- criterion validity for stigmatized groups in the U.S. and else- gether, perceived discrimination and affective, collectivistic where than for nonstigmatized ones. Once the deleterious ef- RD predict desires to take corrective action in response to fects of stereotype threat are identified and understood, steps group disadvantage quite well. Relatedly, Foster (2000) has to counteract them in standardized testing and in academic shown that global attributions of gender discrimination (i.e., learning environments can be developed—a process that seeing gender discrimination as affecting many situations in Steele and his colleagues have already begun with some no- one’s life) was also associated with greater proneness to sup- table success (see Aronson, Quinn, & Spencer, 1998; Steele, port collective action in U.S. college women. Thus, the vic- 1997; see also the chapter on reducing prejudice by Dovidio tim’s perceptions of discrimination—whether it is seen as in this volume). being global in its effects, whether it affects one’s group, and whether it evokes a negative affective response—make a dif- Relative Deprivation, Perceived Discrimination, ference in stimulating desires to take corrective action and to and Desire for Corrective Action mobilize one’s efforts with others to create social change. Paradoxically, members of oppressed groups do not always, Conclusion or even often, respond to stereotypes, disadvantage, de- privation, and discrimination by seeking redress or social Perceived prejudice and discrimination are pivotal in the psy- change. Relative deprivation theory (RDT) is one conceptual chology of ethnic and intergroup relations. The literature on

532 Prejudice, Racism, and Discrimination the psychology of being a victim of prejudice and discrimina- the methodological and theoretical challenges of exploring tion that was reviewed earlier suggests several conclusions. the reciprocal interactions between bigot and victim. First, for some groups and for some individuals within op- pressed groups, perceptions of prejudice and attributions of REFERENCES setbacks to prejudice may buffer self-esteem and maintain well-being. However, the buffering effect of attributed preju- Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D. J., & Sanford, dice is probably a weak one, may occur for only some groups, R. N. (1950). The authoritarian personality. New York: Harper involves a tradeoff between types of self-esteem and per- & Row. ceived control, and is mediated or moderated by in-group identification. Somewhat perversely, the buffering effects of Allison, K. W. (1998). 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CHAPTER 22 Justice, Equity, and Fairness in Human Relations LEO MONTADA THE CONCERN FOR JUSTICE—THE THE JUSTICE OF RETRIBUTIONS 551 JUSTICE MOTIVE 537 Just Retribution and Punishment 551 Justice: A Means to Serve Self-Interest? 538 Perpetrator’s Responsibility and Blameworthiness 552 Justice as an End in Itself 538 Blameworthiness, Apologies, and Retribution 553 Empirical Evidence for the Justice Motive as a Victims’ Need for Retribution 554 Primary Motive 539 Traps of Reductionism 540 THE JUSTICE OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS AND POLITICS 554 Trade-Offs Between the Justice Motive and Imbalances of Justice at the Societal Level 554 Other Motives 541 What Is Unjust and What Would Be Just? 556 JUSTICE: A UNIVERSAL CONCERN WITH AVOIDING AND SETTLING JUSTICE CONFLICTS 556 DIVERGING VIEWS 542 Procedural Justice 556 Settling Justice Conflicts by Mediation 557 THE JUSTICE OF DISTRIBUTIONS 543 Standards of Distributive Justice 543 JUSTICE AS A PERSONAL AND The Choice of a Principle 543 SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION 559 Social Comparisons as a Basis for Justice Appraisals 544 Justice Appraisals: Intuitions or Moral Reasoning? 559 Dispositional Factors in Appraisals of Justice 560 JUSTICE IN SOCIAL RELATIONS 546 The Social Construction of Justice by Social Movements 561 Forms and Contents of Social Exchanges 546 Coping With Injustice 561 What Is Fair and Just in Social Exchanges? 547 Justice Within Close Relationships 549 CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK 562 The Effects of Social Exchanges on Third Parties 551 REFERENCES 563 THE CONCERN FOR JUSTICE—THE believe in a just world in which everybody gets what he or JUSTICE MOTIVE she deserves. Lerner has assigned the belief in a just world (BJW) a key role in his theory of the justice motive: When- Claims for justice and protests against injustice are ubiquitous ever people are confronted with injustices, their BJW is in social life. Political movements, revolutions, and wars challenged and they try to preserve what Lerner calls the are initiated under the banner of justice. Justice is a prominent fundamental delusion either by efforts to restore the violated issue in all fields of politics. The courts are swamped with law justice in the real world or to restore it mentally by reinter- suits, and their judgments are accepted without protest or preting the reality to minimize injustice. According to Lerner, bitterness only when they are considered to be just. Perceived people build up a personal contract whereby they are oblig- injustices are at the core of everyday conflicts in private life. ated to observe rules of justice, expecting that others do the Close relationships are put at risk by experienced injustice. same. Victims of misfortune have to cope with the perceived injus- tice of their fate and—not seldom—with being derogated and Can this human concern for justice be explained? And blamed by others who try to preserve their belief in a just world what would such an explanation mean? It is indisputable that by reconstructing the observed misfortune as deserved. views of what is just and what is unjust in general and in par- ticular vary among individuals, subcultures, and cultures. Humans are averse to injustice—they have a justice mo- Some individuals and cultures are more concerned about jus- tive. Lerner (1977, 1980) was the first to outline the essential tice than others are. Moreover, their views are subject to psychological features of the justice motive. He has empha- intra-individual and to historical changes. It is worth explor- sized the human need for justice, including the need to ing the sources of these variations and changes: cultural 537

538 Justice, Equity, and Fairness in Human Relations traditions, acculturation, information about the implications observation can be considered to be rational choices in the of applying specific rules of justice, personal and socially well-understood self-interest of individuals, especially when shared values, the impact of social roles and positions (for the social system is structured in a way that even the weak, reviews, see Tyler, Boeckman, Smith, & Huo, 1997), person- less fortunate, and less able individuals participate in the ality traits, and basic belief systems (cf. Schmitt, 1994, for a common wealth (Rawls, 1971). review). It is not the aim of this chapter to review and discuss this kind of research. Rather, the influential theory that the For several reasons, this rational choice modeling of the concern for justice has the instrumental function of maximiz- justice motive is disputable. ing self-interest is disputed. • What is missing in these theoretical accounts is the norma- Justice: A Means to Serve Self-Interest? tive, prescriptive core of justice. Justice is an ought, a moral imperative for social life. It is not a means to achieve The view that people care about justice purely as a means to personal aims, but rather an end in itself (Montada, 1998a). pursue their own self-interest is prominent in social psychol- People are obligated to observe the norms of justice re- ogy (a review is provided by Tyler et al., 1997). It forms gardless of whether this is in their self-interest. Moreover, the core assumption in the equity theory of social ex- they are entitled to claim justice from other actors, organi- change (Adams, 1965; Homans, 1961; Walster, Berscheid, & zations, state institutions, and so on, not only for them- Walster, 1978), which states that people prefer equity as a selves but also for others. strategic choice to maximize their individual gains within so- cial exchanges on either the short or the long term. • The model does not fit to empirical data showing that justice concerns are not reducible to self-interests and may Thibault and Walker (1975) took a similar approach to in fact conflict with self-interests. explain people’s preference rankings for different ways of settling conflicts with others—by negotiation, mediation, • There is no empirical proof of the reductionistic view of arbitration, or court decisions. They supposed that people’s the model; it is merely an anthropological assumption. As preferences were guided by their personal self-interests. The such, it is part of a belief system and is not a testable sci- best strategy is to keep control over the outcome. In situations entific hypothesis. These three arguments are elaborated in which people have only limited control over the outcome in more detail in this section. because authorities have decisional power, people seek pro- cedural control and attempt to influence the outcome by hav- Justice as an End in Itself ing a voice and by presenting arguments, their views, and evidence. Therefore, people view those procedures in which In every rational-choice explanation of the justice motive, it they have voice and influence as fairer than others. That is not the concern for justice that is the primary motivational means that the fairness ratings given to procedures are factor—rather, it is concerns for one’s self-interests. If justice dependent on the indirect control over the outcome that these matters at all, then it matters only insofar as it serves these procedures allow. other concerns. This implies that justice is not acknowledged as a prescriptive normative standard. The reasons given for this reduction of the concern for jus- tice to a concern for self-interest mirror social contract theo- When the equity principle is applied, inequity is unjust ries in political philosophy. Philosophers—from Hobbes and needs to be rectified. The disadvantaged are entitled to (1648/1970) to Rawls (1971)—have tackled the question of claim equity, and anybody observing inequity is entitled or why individuals living in a fictional “original” prestate situa- even obligated to claim equity for the disadvantaged. Those tion consented to build a state with powerful institutions, who are overbenefited within an exchange relation are laws, and rules of justice. The basic answer is that it was to morally obligated to reestablish equity. their best mutual advantage to restrict their egoistic fight for their own interests by establishing a system of social norms The prescriptive nature of justice norms is not dependent which would and could regulate their rights and obligations on the actors’ self-interest or on observers’ sympathies with in competition as well as in cooperation. If this idea is gener- the advantaged or disadvantaged party in a social exchange alized slightly, informal social norms (like most justice relationship. Of course, self-interest may motivate actors to norms) can also be regarded as serving the mutual advantage interpret and to balance the investments and benefits to their of all (Hardin, 1996). Both the establishment of a state with a own advantage, and observers’ sympathies with advantaged system of rules and of powerful institutions to ensure their actors, for instance, may motivate them to discount the in- vestments or overestimate the benefits of the disadvantaged in order to avoid or cope with feelings of injustice. Such biased distortions of so-called objective justice, however, do

The Concern for Justice—The Justice Motive 539 not mean that justice and its standards are disregarded. They applied by everyone in similar cases. It can be assumed that can perhaps be interpreted as trade-offs between self-interest concerns for justice—if they exist at all—will be trumped by and justice motives, but not as a reduction of the justice the actors’ primary concerns if there ever were a conflict motive to self-interest; this is not what Walster et al. (1978) between the two motives. and others wanted to explain by referring to self-interest. What they wanted to explain was why people care about This is not the case when justice is the actors’ primary justice in the first place. concern or at least one of his or her main concerns. In these cases, actors are committed to establishing, reestablishing, or Concern for justice may mean that people claim justice for maintaining justice—whatever they may hold to be just. In themselves—for example, equitable shares in their social ex- such cases, concerns for justice are not easily trumped by changes, voice in disputes, and so forth; it is incontestable other concerns. that this serves self-interest. But concern for justice means also that people claim or (at least) that they concede justice It is well known in psychology that actors usually have for all parties involved, equitable shares for all actors, or more than one concern in a given situation and that different equal voice for all. Equal justice for all involved does not and concerns may come into conflict. We need to use valid diag- must not result in maximum benefits for the subject who nostic measures to show that justice was one of the concerns raises these claims: Equitable shares are usually less than the taken into consideration in a given situation, even if it was ul- maximum share, and voice may benefit the other party if he timately trumped by other concerns. If justice was only con- or she has the better arguments. There is consensus among sidered for tactical reasons, actors who neglected justice in philosophers of justice that the crucial test of whether actions order to achieve the desired outcomes should not be expected are based on a concern for justice is whether the actor not to show signs of moral disquiet about their behavior. only claims justice for him- or herself, but at least concedes justice for others, if not claiming it for them. In cases in which justice is a concern in itself, its neglect causes feelings of guilt and possibly also efforts to correct Of course, the rules of justice may be applied for reasons one’s actions, compensate for the resulting injustice, beg for other than establishing justice. Self-interest and further con- pardon, excuse or justify one’s actions, minimize the unjust cerns may provide the motivation. consequences mentally, deny the injustice by blaming the victims or the disadvantaged, and so on. These are possible • Politicians may fight for more justice merely in order to indicators for the neglect of justice concerns by acting win the votes of those whose claims they are voicing. subjects. • In business exchanges, equity rules may be observed be- In social interactions, the rules of justice may be neglected cause the actors expect that this will pay off in the long run. or violated by others. In this case, subjects’ concern for justice may be indicated by explicit claims for justice, resent- • Companies may expect just wages to increase efficiency ment of others’ behavior, criticism of this behavior, punish- by stabilizing the motivation and performance of their ment, or retaliation; but this concern may also be indicated employees. by mental reconstructions aiming at minimizing or denying the perceived injustices, as shown in the literature on belief in • Retaliation may be used for the rational reason that it will a just world and observed injustices (cf. Lerner, 1977, 1980; stop continued defection (egoistical behavior) by another Montada & Lerner, 1998, for overviews), as well as by cop- party. ing with suffered injustice (cf. Montada, 1994). Both victims of injustices and observers who are not directly affected may • Applying the rule of parity in allocations within a group have concerns for justice and have to cope with experienced may be a rational choice aimed at furthering the social or perceived injustice in one way or the other. cohesion of the group. Empirical Evidence for the Justice Motive • Responsiveness to needs of one’s spouse may express as a Primary Motive one’s sympathy and love (and may not be an application of the need principle of justice). Looking at empirical research, we find much evidence that does not fit the rational-choice modeling of the justice con- In these cases, justice is not the primary concern—if it is a cern. Instances of resentment in which the resenting subjects concern at all—but rather comes into play as a means of pur- do not have any vested interests of their own but nonetheless suing the actors’ other concerns. This is a tactical use of jus- commit themselves to costly and potentially risky attempts to tice that does not require that the actors have internalized the restore justice are especially significant in this respect. It is not relevant justice principles, that they believe in their validity, or that they are convinced that these principles should be

540 Justice, Equity, and Fairness in Human Relations unusual for social movements to be initiated and supported by emotions in large heterogeneous samples, rather than being people without any vested interests of their own. Think of rare or exotic abnormalities. Guilt and resentment have mean- Keniston’s (1970) study of young radicals involved in the ingful correlates; some examples include perception of the anti–Vietnam-war movement, and of the studies Haan, Smith, existing inequalities as unjust, cognitions that one’s own and Block (1968) and Fishkin, Keniston, and McKinnon higher standard of living and the lower standard of living of (1973) have conducted about activists in the 1960s civil rights others are causally related, or cognitions that the inequalities movement. Moral orientations and social responsibility were could be reduced by redistribution—and preference for the motivational bases identified here. Phenomena such as the the need-based principle of distributive justice (over the survivor guilt described for Holocaust survivors (L. Baron, contribution-proportional principle). It has been shown that 1987), Hiroshima survivors (Lifton, 1967), and released pris- both guilt and resentment dispose people to perform prosocial oners of war (Lifton, 1954) demonstrate that not all people activities in favor of the disadvantaged (guilt is more closely who have been favorably advantaged are able to enjoy their associated with personal sacrifices, resentment with political good fortune. protest). It could also be proved that guilt and resentment were not reducible to self-interests of the privileged which They perceive the disadvantaged victims as belonging to was also assessed in these studies—namely, in terms of fear of their own community of solidarity (Deutsch, 1985), whereby losses through forced redistribution and anger at the disad- equality and need are postulated to be the preferred justice vantaged because of their lack of self-help. Guilt and resent- principles (Deutsch, 1975) and communal orientations are ment proved to be not reducible to fear of loss or to anger at prevalent (Clark & Chrisman, 1994; Lerner & Whitehead, the disadvantaged. 1980). Managers’ feelings of guilt after layoff decisions (Lerner, 1996) indicate that members of the management feel In these studies, we tried to disentangle justice and self- more obligations toward the staff than expected. Guilt felt by interest by looking more closely at people who are better off survivors of layoffs (Brockner, 1994) is another example. As than others are, consider their views and standards of justice Cohen (1986) has pointed out, the application of standards of violated to their own advantage, and feel morally uneasy justice depends on the psychological boundaries of the com- about this situation. They feel responsible for helping to cor- munity one has in mind. Susan Opotow (1996) uses the term rect the injustice. Other researchers (De Rivera, Gerstman, & scope of justice to depict the fact that some people draw their Maisels, 1994; Edelstein & Krettenauer, 1996) have come to personal boundaries much wider than do others. Those who similar conclusions. Such findings recall those of equity re- are concerned about global inequalities (Olson, 1997) have a search, in which distress was observed in people who were wide scope of justice. If self-interest is the dominant concern, overbenefited. the scope of justice will not be extended to include those who are disadvantaged relative to oneself. Whereas justice claims arising from a position of relative deprivation can easily be interpreted to be self-interested, this We have studied the ways in which relatively privileged is not the case when justice is claimed for the disadvantaged people respond to the misery, the problems, and the poor life by those in a more privileged position. From the perspective conditions of less fortunate others: poor people in developing of rational choice theory, one could of course ask Isn’t it a countries, unemployed individuals in their own countries, rational choice, serving self-interest in the long run, to physically handicapped people, and foreign guest workers correct the gross inequalities existing all over the world, for with unfavorable working and living conditions (Montada, instance, to prevent violent rebellion by the disadvantaged? Schmitt, & Dalbert, 1986; Montada & Schneider, 1989, 1991; The counterquestion to this would be Why guilt and re- Montada, Schneider, & Reichle, 1988). How do people in rel- sentment instead of fear of their violent efforts to restore atively privileged life situations respond emotionally when equality—or instead of cool, strategic deliberation how to confronted with the hardships and the misery of the disadvan- prevent their violent attacks at the status quo? taged? Do they respond with sympathy or angry reproaches, pride in their own achievements, satisfaction about their Whenever self-interest has been assessed and factor ana- higher standards of living, feelings of guilt about their rela- lyzed together with justice scales, the independence of these tively privileged situations (which they may not consider to variables was demonstrated (e.g., Montada & Schneider, be entirely deserved), or resentment about the unjust treat- 1990; Moschner, 1998). ment of the disadvantaged? We found large interindividual differences in these emotional responses. Guilt feelings— Traps of Reductionism which in this case we called existential guilt and resentment— were with respect to their intensity normally distributed Reducing the number of human motives seems to correspond to the ideal of parsimony in theory construction. Of two

The Concern for Justice—The Justice Motive 541 theories, the one with fewer postulates is the more parsimo- motive, and moral obligation are not tested and excluded nious. Such a comparison presupposes that both theories by empirical data. Furthermore, the seeming parsimony of a explain the same empirical phenomena and allow the same single-motive model is offset by the necessary increase in the predictions. A motivation theory that posits only a small number of corollary hypotheses needed to predict and explain number of motives—or even a single one—would seem to the behavioral variance and the diversity of behaviors ob- be more parsimonious than would one that offers a larger served. Single-motive conceptions may best be understood as number of motives. anthropological predecisions without scientific validity or utility. They are part of a belief system, not of a scientific The parsimony argument may have added to the reduc- knowledge system. tionistic stance that the justice motive (as well as other mo- tives such as altruism, social responsibility, love, etc.) can in Trade-Offs Between the Justice Motive fact be reduced to or unmasked, so to speak, as self-interest. and Other Motives The economic analysis of behavior (Ramb & Tietzel, 1993) suggests that a great variety of behavior (if not all) can be ex- Lerner (1977, 1980, 1998) has stressed the categorical nor- plained by assuming some degree of self-interest as the basic mative quality of the justice motive as a primary motive and motivation. This idea is illustrated in the following examples as an aim in itself. After it is internalized as a normative stan- (cf. Montada, 1998a): dard, justice imposes itself as an ought—valid for oneself and for others, not as an option that can be rationally deliberated • Hypothetically, caring for disabled parents can easily be and chosen when it seems functional for a particular goal or traced back to selfish motivations such as the desire to cul- disregarded without moral disquiet if other options arise. tivate a favorable public image or to ensure that the par- Defining justice as an ought implies that unjustified viola- ents do not withdraw their love or financial support. tions evoke moral emotions—guilt when the subject him- or herself has failed to meet the requirements of the ought by • Hypothetically, improvements in community or state care action or omission, and resentment when others have done so for the poor can be interpreted as enhancing political (Montada, 1993). leaders’ chances of being elected by these less privileged voters. We agree that the justice motive may come into conflict with other motives such as self-interest, but can it be trumped • As mentioned previously, the avoidance of opportunistic by egoism without remorse (cf. Lerner, 1996, on managers’ and selfish behavior can reasonably be interpreted as self- guilt after layoff decisions)? Lerner doubts whether humans serving in the context of continued social exchanges. can give up the fundamental delusive belief that the world is a place where everybody gets what he or she deserves— The economic theory of behavior allows elegant so-called ultimately, at least. This motivated belief in a just world explanations of every action by tracing a path to some basic (BJW) is supported by what Lerner has called the personal hypothetical self-interest (e.g., Baurmann & Kliemt, 1995). contract to observe the rule of justice. With some ingenuity, it is possible to generate hypotheses re- ducing every surface motive to an underlying self-interest, or Lerner has contributed and instigated a wealth of empiri- to unmask it as ultimately serving self-interest. This kind of cal studies showing that the justice motive does not always hypothesizing may be creative, but it clearly does not consti- appear as a straightforward application of standards of jus- tute valid scientific proof of the hypotheses proposed. Instead tice. Trade-offs between what one deserves and what others of asking the scientific question What explains X?, rational- deserve are elaborated in specific situations, as are trade-offs choice theorists ask How might a rational-choice theory between justice concerns and other concerns such as self- explain X? (Green & Shapiro, 1994, p. 203). Bunge has interest (Montada, 1998b). The three psychologically fasci- therefore criticized rational-choice modeling, arguing that it nating phenomena described in the following passage can be has “inhibited the search for alternatives” (1989, p. 210). interpreted as examples of trade-offs between justice con- cerns and self-interests. Approaching the scientific task of explaining the interindi- vidual and intra-individual variance of human behavior with a Blaming innocent victims is a phenomenon observed in single-motive model is counterproductive because this single many experiments conducted by Lerner and his students motive (maximizing one’s self-interest) does not contribute to (cf. Lerner, 1980), as well as in studies carried out elsewhere the explanation of the behavioral variance. The statement that (cf. Furnham, 1998; Maes, 1998; Montada, 1998b). Blaming a person’s behavior is motivated by self-interest has no infor- victims is plausibly interpreted as subjects’ doing an injustice mational value and no scientific validity as long as alternative in an attempt to preserve their belief in a just world, which is motives such as altruism, social responsibility, the justice

542 Justice, Equity, and Fairness in Human Relations or would be threatened by the victimization of innocent JUSTICE: A UNIVERSAL CONCERN people. Belief in a just world can be assumed to be a psycho- WITH DIVERGING VIEWS logical resource that may be defended by attributing respon- sibility and blame to the victims themselves, thus reframing The concern for justice seems to be an anthropological uni- the injustice of their victimization. versal. However, there does not appear to be a universal con- sensus on what is considered to be just or unjust. We speak of Another exciting phenomenon is the exchange fiction, justice in the singular as if there were only one single, just discussed in more detail in works by Holmes, Miller, and solution for every social system and for every problem or Lerner (cited in Lerner, 1977) and Lerner (1980). It has been conflict; yet frequently, there are diverging views about what observed that many people tend to prefer buying an over- would be just, which criteria should be applied, and how they priced article when they know that the profits will go to should be applied in order to establish justice. This is true for needy people, rather than directly donating an amount of all domains of social life in which justice is critical: distribu- money corresponding to the price difference. The explana- tions, social exchanges, and the retribution and acknowledge- tion for this phenomenon is that helping a needy person es- ment of deeds. The application of different standards of tablishes a commitment and personal responsibility for this justice results in diverging and conflicting outcomes. A com- and other needy persons. Thus, any act of helping is prob- mon view about what is just and what is unjust would be lematic in several respects: It implies an acknowledgment of helpful to avoid and to settle social conflicts in private and undeserved neediness which is threatening the belief in a just business contexts, as well as in the political arena within and world; it creates a continuing and generalized responsibility between societies. for needy people, a responsibility that may interfere with personal concerns; and finally, it creates further injustices The normative nature of justice is obvious. The aim of nor- with respect to all other similarly needy people who have not mative disciplines is to analyze and account for normative been helped. Yet provided that they are not to blame for hav- standards, to elaborate reasonable and just solutions for ing inflicted their hardships upon themselves, needy people specific cases, and to conceive criteria and procedures for just deserve to be helped. This conflict is best solved by an ex- decision-making. The ultimate challenge for normative ap- change fiction that allows the donation to be masked as a proaches may be to find universally valid solutions. In view of purchase. the difficulty of that task, the focus may be displaced from the concrete solutions to the procedures of finding a solution— The third phenomenon is called the free riding dilemma. precisely as in discourse ethics (Ackerman, 1980) in which Everyone will agree that free riding—profiting without ideal rules of discourse are considered a guarantee for the eth- investing—serves self-interests. Those who do invest resent ical truth of the result. free riders for their selfishness. A relevant observation here is that opinion polls conducted in Europe during the 1990s It is not the aim of empirical approaches to propose the revealed that two thirds of employees were in principle will- best standards of justice and the best solutions for justice ing to reduce their working hours and income (on average problems. Instead, the following questions are investigated: by 10% to 20%), if this would result in the creation of new What do people consider to be just and unjust? How diver- jobs for unemployed persons. However, this willingness gent or convergent are the views about justice? Which are the was very rarely translated into action. At least two hypothe- belief systems and dispositions that influence people’s per- ses explain this discrepancy: (a) Self-interest (preserving ceptions of justice and injustice? What is the motivational one’s level of income) finally outweighs the justice motive, impact of experienced or observed injustice? How do people and (b) moving the targets of social comparison changes the cope with experienced or observed injustices? How can objects and contents of the justice motive. When considering justice conflicts be settled? How can one-sided views of jus- mass unemployment and its undeserved sequelae, it would tice be qualified? What is the impact of procedures on the be a just decision for the relatively privileged to share their appraisal of decisions? working time and income. When comparing themselves with free riders (other full-time employees who are not willing to There are interfaces between normative and empirical share their privileges), however, subjects who do choose approaches: Philosophical theories of justice imply anthro- to share would feel relatively deprived. Thus, not sharing pological assumptions that need to be tested empirically can be justified as long as free riding is not prevented at the (e.g., Frohlich & Oppenheimer, 1990, on Rawls’ theory of societal level. What at first glance appears to be selfish be- justice), and the ethical validity of empirically assessed havior may well be motivated by justice concerns (Montada, views about justice and injustice as well as the claims for 1998b). justice has to be examined normatively and cannot be taken for granted.

The Justice of Distributions 543 THE JUSTICE OF DISTRIBUTIONS the preferred standards of distributive justice vary be- tween and within cultures and they are subject to historical Standards of Distributive Justice changes. In the domain of distributions—that is, the allocation or the This fact applies across all fields of distributive justice. existing distribution of material resources or symbolic goods, For instance, the populations of postcommunist states are less rights, duties, positions, power, opportunities, taxes, and so tolerant of inequalities, and they claim more responsibility on, within as well as between groups and populations— for individual welfare from the governments than do the pop- equality certainly constitutes the basic idea of justice. How- ulations of states with a liberal tradition (Kluegel, Mason, & ever, equality can be specified in many different ways. It may Wegener, 1995). The rules of justice for the allocation and mean equal shares for all human beings or—if that is impos- withdrawal of scarce goods such as scholarships, state- sible or dysfunctional—equal opportunities. Alternatively, subsidized housing, jobs, and so on vary largely within and according to Aristotle, it may mean equal shares or equal op- across states (Elster, 1992). In the dismissal of employees, portunities for all equal human beings. This second view im- for instance, the criteria applied include the employees’ plies that human beings differ and that specific individual seniority, acquired skills, current productivity, neediness, differences justify unequal allocations and given inequalities responsibility for a family, age, and gender. Although it in the distribution of resources, rights, duties, and so forth may be possible to justify the application of each of these cri- (e.g., according to citizenship, social status, specific merits, teria, each could result in different decisions—not a single professional qualifications, productivity, age, conventional just solution. Therefore, the application of different justice rights, gender, neediness). In this sense, equality means equal principles can result in grossly diverging outcomes. Given shares for all those with the same status, for all those with this multitude of justice criteria, conflicts about which ones the same kinds of merits, needs, conventional rights, and so would be appropriate in which cases are not surprising. forth. That implies unequal shares for people with different status, merits, and so forth. A particular variant of the equal Although a long list of justice principles has been identi- opportunity rule is the equal chance rule, in which a lottery fied empirically (Reis, 1984), psychological research has procedure is used when it is impossible for goods to be split largely been limited to three of them: equality (equal shares up (e.g., in the allocation of organs for transplantation), or the for all those within specified social boundaries), allocation rotation schedule, which may be appropriate when it would according to merit or to contributions (achievements, in- be dysfunctional for a position to be split. Equal opportunity vestments, etc.), and allocation according to needs. More- may also mean providing similar material, physical, and so- over, most empirical research has focused on the application cial conditions for development, for a good life, for health, of these principles in single concrete allocations of material and so on. goods. Fewer psychological studies are available on the al- location of symbolic goods, rights, and positions, on the Walzer (1983) somewhat neutralized the justice problems withdrawal of positions, or on the allocation of loads (e.g., with inequalities in allocations and existing distributions by tasks, taxes; for a comprehensive review, see Törnblom, his concept of complex equality, which postulates that distri- 1992). Data have been gathered on individual preferences butions in different spheres of justice (material wealth, social for a particular justice principle in specific cases and con- recognition in various contexts, political power, education, texts (e.g., Schmitt & Montada, 1981), and for culturally kinship and love, recreation time, etc.) are not perfectly cor- shared preferences (e.g., Bierbrauer, 2000; Schwinger, related. Thus, a lower rank in one sphere may be compen- 1980). sated by a higher ranking in another. Moreover, the subjective importance of the different spheres of justice varies within a The Choice of a Principle population, so that the perceived overall inequalities may be reduced further. Viewing the application of a justice principle as a choice raises a question as to the goals of a specific choice: Is the objective However, the question of which differences between peo- merely to act or evaluate justly, or to avoid disharmony, to ple justify which inequalities in allocations and distributions strengthen solidarity, to demonstrate solidarity, to motivate remains open. In the ongoing discussions, arguments are in- performances or effort, to punish laziness, to enhance produc- spired by cultural traditions and social philosophies such as tivity within a social system by stimulating competitiveness, egalitarianism, liberalism, social welfarism, utilitarianism, or perhaps to further the health and growth of the recipients? and the human and civil rights movements. We are far Deutsch (1975), for instance, has argued that people who from having reached a general consensus on this question; pursue economic productivity should use proportionality to

544 Justice, Equity, and Fairness in Human Relations contributions as the allocation principle (because this kind of contexts, and the contribution principle is more often used in allocation can be expected to motivate recipients to give their economic contexts (e.g., Schmitt & Montada, 1981). best), whereas people trying to foster enjoyable and harmo- nious social relationships should use the equality principle, Social Comparisons as a Basis for Justice Appraisals and those aiming to foster personal growth and welfare may well consider the need principle to be appropriate. Equity Theory However, as is discussed later in greater detail, these Much attention has been paid to the equity theory of distribu- goals per se have little to do with justice. Justice as a set of tive justice—equity as a criterion in the valuation of social social norms creates entitlements and duties (cf. Lerner, exchange relationships is tackled later in this chapter—which 1987). Which goals allocators pursue has nothing to do with was originally developed in the context of work organiza- justice unless they are actively trying to discharge their own tions to explore employees’ reactions to their wages and duty to observe rules of justice, to observe the entitlements promotions (Adams, 1965). The basic components are of recipients, or—in the case that they have to impose tasks, (a) proportionality of contributions (performance, effort, in- loads, and risks—the legal and moral obligations of the ad- vested time, expertise, etc.) and outcomes (benefits, grades, dressees. The relevant question, which was also posed by acknowledgements etc.), and (b) equal ratios of contributions Deutsch (1975), is not what choice is functional for which and outcomes for similar actors. goal, but what ought to be chosen for the reason of justice. Although equality, equity, and need are principles of dis- Later on, the concept of equity was used in an inflationary tributive justice, not every allocation according to one manner and was taken as a synonym for what people sub- of these criteria is for doing justice. In many empirical stud- jectively considered to be just or fair, regardless of the crite- ies the aim of applying a specific principle of distribution— rion they may apply to judge whether their outcomes were doing justice or pursuing another goal—is not adequately equitable: contributions, status, membership, need, or others. assessed. The assumption was that equity is in the eye of the beholder (Walster & Walster, 1975). Used this broadly, equity is no For instance, Barrett-Howard and Tyler (1986) found that longer conceived as one justice criterion or principle among proportionality to contributions is more likely to be used as others, but rather is synonymous with the justice of out- an allocation principle when productivity is the goal, comes. The criteria used by the beholders were not assessed, whereas the equality and the need principles are preferred probably because the authors were only interested in the pre- when harmony and welfare are the goals. In experimental diction and explanation of the emotional and behavioral con- studies, Mikula and Schwinger observed that most partici- sequences of the experience of injustice, and not in the pants are polite when asked to propose a way of distributing prediction of experienced injustice on the basis of specific joint earnings. Those who (were made believe to) have con- criteria (Mikula, 1980). tributed more to the joint undertaking tended to propose equal shares, and those who (were made believe to) have Equity theory predicts that people will be satisfied when contributed less propose that the earnings should be allocated they consider their outcomes (e.g., their wages) to be equi- according to the respective contributions (Schwinger, 1980). table. They resent receiving too little and feel uneasy about It is open to question, however, whether the participants in receiving too much. Many studies have supported the basic these studies considered their allocation proposals to be a just assumptions of equity theory. People feel satisfied with solution or to be functional for some other goal like social equitable outcomes and those who feel underbenefited are harmony. angry—but also those who feel overbenefited feel uneasy (for a review, see Tyler et al., 1997). This has been demon- It may well be that justice counts less in some social con- strated by subjects’ self reports, by physiological measures of texts (e.g., in intimate relationships) and situations (e.g., in the emotional arousal (Markowski, 1988), and by observa- emergencies) than in others. But it should be assessed tion of behaviors aimed at restoring justice (e.g., adjusting whether justice is at stake or some other goal. When respon- one’s job performance, cf. Greenberg, 1988). The first finding dents are explicitly asked to rate several alternative criteria that people are dissatisfied when receiving less than would be for allocations with respect to their justice, it emerges that equitable does not allow any discrimination between a justice the equality and the need principles are more frequently ap- motive and self-interest. The second finding, that people feel plied within close relationships (e.g., between friends or distressed when overbenefited, is stronger evidence for the within stable cooperative working groups), the need princi- justice motive, which is discussed in the next section. ple is more frequently applied in health care and welfare

The Justice of Distributions 545 The conclusion that equity and inequity are in the eye implies that a person views his or her social group or the so- of the beholder does not only mean that various criteria of cial category to which he or she belongs as disadvantaged justice may be applied. Rather, subjects may view the values compared with another social group or category. It is remark- of their own contributions and benefits in an entirely different able that in Western societies with a liberal tradition, even way from the way they see the contributions and benefits of large inequalities in material wealth between social groups others. A self-serving bias in appraisals of contributions and or categories are not viewed as being unjust by the majority benefits has been identified in a few studies (Lerner, Somers, of the population, and consequently do not cause feelings of Reid, Chiriboga, & Tierney, 1991; Schlenker & Miller, group deprivation (Shepelak & Alwin, 1986). This can be ex- 1977). Therefore, justice conflicts may also arise in cases in plained by the dominant liberal ideology that everybody is which all parties apply the equity principle (Montada, 2000). personally responsible for his or her success and welfare. When discrimination is made salient and is clearly perceived, The Theory of Relative Deprivation however, feelings of group deprivation may become more prevalent. Research on distributive justice was instigated by the concept of relative deprivation developed by Stouffer, Suchman, Conceptually, group deprivation does not imply personal DeVinney, Star, and Williams (1949). These authors ob- deprivation: The two have different comparison targets. served that soldiers’ satisfaction with the promotion system Personal deprivation occurs when individuals perceive that within their section of the army was not determined by their they are disadvantaged compared with others of similar so- current position nor by the objective probability of promo- cial status. Group deprivation is based on comparisons with tion. (In fact, dissatisfaction was more prevalent in the air groups of dissimilar status. However, high levels of group force than in military police although the air force had a deprivation are less frequent among individuals ranking at higher promotion rate.) Rather, comparisons with similar oth- the lower end of their group’s objective deprivation range— ers had a considerable impact on their level of satisfaction. that is, among those who are (objectively speaking) the most They were dissatisfied when they felt that they were disad- deprived. In fact, the more advantaged members of disadvan- vantaged (deprived) in relation to similar others. Depending taged groups are, the more likely it is that they will resent the on the availability and the choice of comparison referents, difference between their group and more advantaged groups people in the same objective situation may be either satisfied and engage in protest actions (e.g., Pettigrew, 1964). An ex- or dissatisfied. In most studies, the objective social situation planatory hypothesis is that they compare themselves with correlates only weakly with feelings of personal deprivation. members of the more advantaged group and feel personal de- What are the circumstances leading to feelings of relative privation in relation to them (D. M. Taylor & Moghaddam, deprivation? 1994). For instance, women in higher-status positions who earn significantly more money than does the average woman Crosby (1976) proposed five necessary and sufficient pre- resent the gender-bound inequalities in earnings more than conditions that can be illustrated using the example of wages. do women in low-wage groups (Crosby, 1982). Thus, rela- A person must (a) see that someone else has a higher wage, tive group deprivation may be mediated by a perceived per- (b) want to have this higher wage as well, (c) feel entitled to sonal deprivation because the choice of comparison target this higher wage, (d) think it is feasible to be paid a higher may cross the borderline between social groups (Zanna, wage, and (e) lack a sense of personal responsibility for not Crosby, & Lowenstein, 1987). receiving this higher wage. The denial of any personal re- sponsibility for one’s relatively disadvantaged situation is a The 1960s civil rights movement in the United States necessary condition for feeling entitled to claim the wanted emerged during a period in which the disadvantaged were good. Feasibility can be defined by using one of the postu- making economic social gains. The observation that protest lates in Folger’s referent cognition theory (1986): Resent- against discrimination becomes more probable within up- ment will occur when persons can easily imagine obtaining ward economic and social development can be explained by the wanted good, implying that they do not perceive any seri- the hypotheses (a) that comparisons with advantaged groups ous objective restrictions or barriers. If they do not, some become more likely (Pettigrew, 1972), and (b) that reality actor or agency must be responsible for withholding the cannot keep pace with raised expectations and feelings of en- wanted good. titlement to further improvement (Gurr, 1970). Runciman (1966) has distinguished between egoistical Fraternal (group, collective) deprivation has different con- (personal) and fraternal (group) deprivation. The latter sequences from those of personal deprivation. People are more likely to admit the existence of an unjust discrimination

546 Justice, Equity, and Fairness in Human Relations and disadvantaging of their group than of themselves. This by outrage. Outrage against group relative deprivation may be corresponds to the well-known better-than-average phenom- inflamed by unexpected and noticeably unjust losses and loads enon: I am personally better off than the average member of decreed by those in power (Moore, 1978), especially when my group (e.g., Crosby, 1982, for women’s appraisal of jus- losses were preceded by upward economic and social devel- tice in wages). People are more likely to engage in protest opment that has set higher standards for the appraisal of the when they perceive their group as relatively deprived (e.g., present unsatisfactory state (Davies, 1962). The justice princi- Dion, 1986; Dubé & Guimond, 1986). One explanatory ple violated is the right to preserve the status quo and to pre- hypothesis is that personal deprivation is more likely to be as- serve the present conditions of life and the acquired rights, an sociated with symptoms of depression than with outrage issue that is referred to very frequently in political disputes. against an unjust system (Hafer & Olson, 1993). Another hy- Latent feelings of group relative deprivation may flare up as a pothesis is that protest against personal relative deprivations reaction to events of enraging victimization of members of the can be attributed to envy, an emotion and motive that has own minority group; such reactions may explode collectively negative connotations. Protest against fraternal relative de- in riots, especially when the state authorities violate their privation means both solidarity with one’s group and a fight duties by contributing to the unjust action or by failing to in- for more social justice: Both motivations are respectable. If tervene in ongoing victimization (Lieberson & Silverman, oneself is better off than the average of one’s group, one’s 1965): The withholding of basic civil rights by representatives protest even has a prosocial—not an egotistical—touch of the state is especially enraging. (Montada, 2001a). The cases referred to by Moore (1978) and by Lieberson Relative deprivation theory emphasizes the role of per- and Silverman (1965) are characterized by an unequal distri- ceived injustice in comparison to referents in the emergence bution of power. If the disadvantaged groups do not see the of resentment and assertive actions both in the personal con- possibility to push through their claims by taking legal ac- text or in the political arena. But the theory does not specify tion, outrage may bring the empowerment to take collective which standards of justice are applied, nor which referents action to correct disadvantageous decisions, to change the are chosen for comparison by whom—nor does it specify any power structure, or to retaliate the victimization. other antecedents. Therefore, relative deprivation theory works well as a post hoc framework for interpretation. It is JUSTICE IN SOCIAL RELATIONS less suited to predict resentment and protest. For instance, the spectrum of options for choosing comparison referents and Justice in social relations means justice with respect to the standards of justice is large, and these choices are motivated exchanges between the members of social systems, the ex- whether they are deliberated or spontaneous. Those who are changes between social groups, corporations, and organiza- motivated to avoid or reduce feelings of unjust discrimina- tions, and between individuals and institutions—but it also tion have the option of downward comparisons. Findings re- concerns the exchanges of casual encounters. vealing that the majority of subjects state that they are personally better off than the average member of their social Forms and Contents of Social Exchanges group demonstrates the motivated nature of this choice (Crosby, 1982; S. E. Taylor & Brown, 1988). The majority of Exchanges are ubiquitous in social life—between individu- those belonging to disadvantaged groups tend to avoid com- als, groups, organizations, and states, between individuals parisons with advantaged groups (Major & Testa, 1988), or to and groups, individuals and organizations, and so forth. underestimate the size of the inequality (Wegener, 1987). Exchanges may be direct, for instance, when two individuals These and further coping strategies may help them to keep an express their liking for one another, conclude a contract, or emotional balance by controlling feelings of injustice. attack one another. Exchanges may also be indirect, for in- stance, when an individual donates money to a charity that The question of how an active movement against injustice provides help to people in need, or when the state collects arises has led to many explanatory hypotheses (Major, 1994; taxes from its citizens, using this income to pay for educa- J. Martin & Murray, 1986). Latent feelings of relative depri- tion, law and order, and so on. Exchange relationships may vation may be made conscious as a result of public condemna- be sequentially chained. For instance, each adult generation tions of existing discrimination and injustice. Participation in cares for the welfare and development of the younger gener- public protests may be dependent on a rational calculation of ation, as well as the welfare of the aged parent generation. the expected personal costs and benefits, on the strength of The next generation will in turn do the same, thus abiding by one’s feelings of solidarity with one’s group, and of moral the terms of the generation contract. obligations to support it. Participation may be triggered

Justice in Social Relations 547 What are the contents of social exchanges? Not only prod- systems of sports, in the bylaws of organizations, and so forth. ucts and money, but also status (e.g., by a marriage or by These legal and conventional rule systems correspond to and granting citizenship), commitment to a relationship, atten- are shaping the sense of justice within the population. tiveness, information, services, support, good mood, love, loyalty, and—on a less positive note—burdens (such as health Justice Principles problems, addictions, and depression), criticism, blame, harm, mistrust, and hostility. Many social exchanges are not subjected to legal or role- bound norms but still have to be fair and just. Which stan- What Is Fair and Just in Social Exchanges? dards of justice are operating here? Modified forms of the equality criterion are standards for appraising the fairness of Fair Contracts exchange relationships, especially the principles of reciproc- ity and equity. Social exchanges are regarded as just if reci- The contract is a prototypical form of social exchange. procity is established. This is true for positive exchanges, in Contracts are regarded as just when the partners are equally which equal mutual advantage is the normative standard, as informed and equally free to consent (Nozick, 1974). Justice well as for negative exchanges, as portrayed in the biblical is threatened if relevant information is withheld, if pressure is rule of “an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.” exerted, or if one party is not free to refuse to enter into the contract because of a certain predicament. Equal mutual advantages have also been postulated in Hobbes’ (1648/1970) social contract conception of the state Because contracts are of eminent importance in social and in the sociological theory of role-bound exchanges life, many legal norms have been established that specify the (teacher-student, physician-patient, employer-employee, obligations of the partners to provide all relevant informa- leader-follower; cf. Parsons, 1951). However, the general tion, to observe the contractual agreements, to respect social truth of Parson’s equal–mutual-advantage assumption for norms in the contents of the contract, and so forth. A contract reciprocal social roles has been criticized with good reason only has to be fair ex ante: Valid contracts have to be ful- (Gouldner, 1960): Some social roles or positions are certainly filled, even if they turn out to be unfavorable for one party more attractive, powerful, prestigious, and profitable than because of circumstances beyond the control of the contrac- others. And the equal opportunity assumption, which means tual partner (e.g., unexpected significant changes in market that all citizens have equal opportunities to receive the more prices). Moreover, specific legal regulations have been es- favorable positions, is illusory. tablished to protect the supposedly less powerful parties— with respect to rent control, industrial law, and product Equity has been proposed as the normative standard for liability. social exchanges, implying equal ratios of investments/costs and outcomes/benefits for all parties involved (Homans, Laws and Social Role Norms 1961). Equity is to assess easily only when the investments and outcomes are quantifiable—for instance, in money Legal regulations have also been established for many non- equivalents. This is possible for market exchanges. contractual relationships, specifying the rights and duties of the exchange partners (e.g., married couples, parents and chil- The claim that equity is the general justice principle in dren, administrations and citizens, police and citizens, etc.). exchange relationships (Walster et al., 1978) is exaggerated. Most important is, of course, the criminal law (addressed in One reason is that equity theory is too vaguely defined to be this chapter’s section on retributive justice) containing nega- applicable in qualitatively and structurally different relation- tive exchanges that are banned by law in a society. ships. How should the ratio of contributions to benefits be calculated, for example, for the employer and the employee, Many exchange relationships are regulated not by laws but the mother and the child, the players in a tennis match, or the by informal social norms, for example, by the system of reci- victim of an accident and his or her rescuer? All actors in procal social roles. Many normative scripts for social roles are these relationships have obligations or entitlements, but they conventional in character. They prescribe the rights and oblig- are not entitled an equal ratio of contributions to benefits. The ations of the actors, and they shape the normative expecta- entitlements are based on contracts, on particular social and tions held by the actors and by the public with respect to the moral norms, or on the norms of fair play. Every citizen main- reciprocally related roles. Further regulations are found in the tains an exchange relationship with the state. The citizens behavioral codes of professional associations, in public con- and the state (in the same way as the insured and their insur- ventions regarding politically correct behavior, in the rule ance companies) have reciprocal rights and obligations that cannot be represented in the equity formula. Nevertheless, the

548 Justice, Equity, and Fairness in Human Relations relationships can be evaluated as just if all parties meet their appropriate reciprocal treatment. And these expectations obligations. have a normative character; violations may be valuated as un- deserved. One limit, however, is that people, as mentioned The equity principle is less precise than it was contended previously, consider different justice rules as appropriate to be in more informal social exchanges, in which its assess- depending on the kind of the relationship (e.g., equal distrib- ment is based on subjectively focused and subjectively ution or distribution according to needs within close rela- valued exchanges (of goods, services, love, respect, trust, tionships but equitable distributions in market exchange). loyalty, harm, negligence, hostilities, etc.), and indirect and Relationship issues are also an important topic of procedural chained exchanges (e.g., services to third parties or to the justice research (Tyler et al., 1997) and are addressed later in community that are of indirect benefit to the exchange part- this chapter. The way people are treated by authorities—as ner) may or may not be included in subjective evaluations. representatives of social systems, communities, or social Nevertheless, it has been proposed as the justice principle in groups—is informative with respect to their social status. If social relations, even in close personal relationships. As it is the treatment is not felt to be in accordance with their subjec- worthwhile to have a closer look at close relationships this tive entitlements, it is considered unjust. These entitlements issue will be taken up in a later section. are part of implicit psychological contracts. Implicit Contracts Within Social Relationships Entitlement to Respectful Treatment Not every aspect of a relationship can be explicitly articu- One aspect of social interactions has attracted much attention lated in a contract. For instance, employment contracts imply in justice research—respect. Miller (2001) has recently pro- that employees use working time for the employer and not for vided an excellent review. A few examples are mentioned private interests, that they are conscientious, that they do not here. Lind and Tyler (1988) have stressed the eminent impor- misuse the contract by spying for a competitor, and so on. In tance of respectful and decent treatment in their group value return, the employer does not require employees to perform theory of procedural justice. Mikula (1986) studied unjust ex- inappropriate tasks (e.g., those that are below the employee’s periences of students in daily life and found frequently men- qualification level) and also takes care to ensure a safe work- tioned unjustified accusation and blame, the giving of orders ing environment. in an inappropriate form, and ruthless misuses of status and power (see also Clayton, 1992). Bies and Tripp (1996) found Moreover, existing, practiced relationships create new, that humiliation and wrongful accusation by superiors were contract-like expectations. For instance, significant changes instances of reported injustices. Insult and disrespectful treat- in the task structure that was practiced for a long time by an ment have been identified as powerful instigators of resent- employee cannot simply be assigned by the employer to the ment and aggression (R. A. Baron, 1993; Bettencourt & employee; rather, they have to be negotiated. People believe Miller, 1996; Folger & Skarlicki, 1998; Heider, 1958). that employers have obligations to their current employees People in general seem to expect respect from others in social but not to those requesting employment (Kahneman, interactions, and they seem to feel entitled to respectful treat- Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986). There is a widespread view that se- ment and interaction. The right of being treated with dignity niority (defined here as the length of continuous employment is the first of the human rights. However, what respect and with an employer) is an important factor protecting against disrespect mean in concrete social encounters may vary a lot layoff in the case of workforce reduction (Elster, 1992; between individuals, settings, kinds of relationships, social Engelstad, 1998). The period of notice that tenants must be groups, subcultures, and cultures. Nevertheless, what has given is dependent on the length of the tenancy; in many been named interactional justice (Bies & Moag, 1986) seems countries, this issue is regulated by law. People are expected to be agreed upon in psychological contracts about a code of to keep to existing exchange relationships, even if the pre- conduct (Robinson, Kraatz, & Rousseau, 1994; Rousseau, vailing market situation would allow one party to make more 1995) defining what is and what is not acceptable in a rela- profit elsewhere. Rousseau has investigated the implicit psy- tionship. As the code of conduct frequently is neither explic- chological contracts (and the entitlements derived from itly articulated nor negotiated between interaction partners, them) that are built up in ongoing relationships (Rousseau & the normative expectations have to be derived from observed Anton, 1988; Rousseau & Parks, 1993). Respectful treat- resentment and reproaches, from aggressive responses, and ment, meaningful work, and a safe working environment from further behavioral manifestations of feeling vio- constitute important parts of these implicit contracts. lated (e.g., withdrawal, reduced commitment, cf. Miller, It may well be that the perceived quality of an existing relationship shapes the expectations of what would be an

Justice in Social Relations 549 2001). These responses function also as a measures to edu- considered just, one has to look at the balances that are actu- cate the offender whose apologies and remorse are healing ally made. The global measure of equity generally used in the relationship (Ohbuchi, Kameda, & Agarie, 1989; research—that is, asking subjects what they contribute to a Montada & Kirchhoff, 2000). The range of normative expec- relationship and what they get out of it—relative to their part- tations may encompass the acknowledgement of expertise, ner(s) is unsatisfactory. The precise balances have to be spec- performances and efforts, granted supports, loyalty, consider- ified if we are to learn how appraisals of equity and inequity ation of one’s preferences, sympathies, aversions, fears, are generated. handicaps, and vulnerabilities: All these have to be respected. Moreover, codes of politically correct behavior and language One major problem is the validity of global measures of that have to be respected have gained much attention. equity. Respondents who do not really balance contributions and outcomes for themselves and for their partners may use Disrespect is experienced as an offence to the personal the terms equity and justice synonymously. Detailed mea- and social identity. Some of the victims’ responses to disre- sures across numerous exchange dimensions—which may spect are meant as a defense or restoration of their violated additionally be weighted according to personal importance— self (Vidmar, 2000). In case of public disrespect, the aim of are possible, however (e.g., Lujansky & Mikula, 1983; Van responses may be to restore social status in the eyes of others. Yperen & Buunk, 1994). The correlations between detailed Violent acts may have these functions to restore the self- and global measures are generally modest or near zero esteem and social status (Megargee & Bohn, 1979; Toch, (Sprecher & Schwartz, 1994). Thus, using global measures of 1969; for a review, see Streng, 1995)—evening the score by equity does not really clarify which justice standards are retaliation (Greenberg & Scott, 1996). actually used by respondents. The motive to even the score may also be given in re- Nevertheless, in accordance with hypotheses derived from sponses like reduction of commitment at the workplace or in equity theory, some studies have found that not only respon- close relationships, reduction of trust, and silent or explicit dents who feel deprived compared to their partner but also rejection of proposals. The positive effects of respectful treat- those who feel advantaged are less satisfied with their rela- ment by authorities on the acceptance of their decisions and tionship than are respondents who perceive their relationship on generalized trust in them (Lind & Tyler, 1988) mirror this as equitable (Buunk & van Yperen, 1991). The effects of eq- hypothesis in positive terms. uity ratings on satisfaction in the partnership and the stability of the relationship are, however, generally weak or nonexis- Justice Within Close Relationships tent (Sprecher & Schwartz, 1994). “The rule most frequently advocated as the rule governing all Thus, we do not have robust evidence in favor of the equity relationships, including intimate ones, is equity” (Clark & model in close relationships, such as those between family Chrisman, 1994, p. 17). Participants are expected to be more members, in intimate partnerships, and best friendships. Re- satisfied with the relationship, which is in turn expected to be search about justice in close relationships is reported and re- more stable when equity is realized. Participants strive to viewed in a volume edited by Lerner and Mikula (1994) and a make inequitable relationships equitable by changing their special issue of Social Justice Research (Vol. 11, 3) edited by contributions, their expected outcomes, or both by requesting Mikula (1998). One might question whether justice actually change in the contributions made by their partners or by reap- matters at all in these kinds of relationships, which ideally are praising their own or their partners’ contributions and out- characterized by mutual love, trust, and caring. However, as comes (Walster et al., 1978). Because equity is in the eye of Desmarais and Lerner (1994) argue, the degree of “closeness” the beholder, so to speak, reappraisals may be functional for is not the same at all times and for all parties, and it may vary establishing subjective equity. from an identity relationship (in which the parties’ identities are merged), to a unit relationship (in which equal but inde- It is indisputable that exchanges can be balanced on vari- pendent partners cooperate), and even to a nonunit relation- ous dimensions (e.g., those emphasized by Foa and Foa ship (in which the parties compete with one another). (1980)—love, status, money, material goods, services, and According to Desmarais and Lerner (1994), strong effects of information): Information can be compensated by money, equity ratings on satisfaction are not to be expected within services by love, and so on. In our culture, parents typically identity relationships—“where meeting a partners’ needs is do not expect that their investments into their children’s care, most likely to create harmonious relations, while equal and development, and education would be reciprocated by the reciprocal treatment may be alienating in close relationships” children. Instead, they feel more than compensated when they (p. 45)—in which the partners are not looking for long-term are loved by their children. To assess whether a relationship is reciprocity. In a study with married couples, Desmarais and

550 Justice, Equity, and Fairness in Human Relations Lerner found that, for respondents who believe that they are An exchange orientation implies the normative expectation in an identity relation with their partner, satisfaction with the that one’s own investments (definable as the material, social, relationship correlates higher with the partner’s outcomes and personality resources one brings into the relationship) will than with the respondent’s own outcomes. be repaid or yield profits—if not immediately, then in the long run. This economic view of close relationships would suggest Lerner’s distinction of an identity relationship from a unit that partners keep track of their own investments and out- and a nonunit relationship (Lerner & Whitehead, 1980) corre- comes and—in the equity version of the model—of their part- sponds to Clark and Mills’distinction between the communal- ner’s as well. The few studies investigating this aspect have versus the exchange-norm orientation in intimate partnerships found that respondents who desire or already have communal (1979). The communal-norm orientation means feeling relationships do not tend to keep track of the respective invest- responsible for and being responsive to the other’s needs ments and outcomes (Clark & Chrisman, 1994). Furthermore, without expecting repayment. It is satisfying enough to meet as shown by Grote and Clark (1998), communal relationships the other’s needs. The partner’s outcomes are no less impor- represent the widely preferred ideal for partnerships. In the tant than one’s own outcomes; on the contrary, they take same study, these authors found the perceived fairness of the precedence. Extending the authors’ argumentation slightly, distribution of housework and child-care responsibilities to the following could be stated: Whereas with exchange-norm be positively related to adherence to communal norms in the orientations, outcomes (benefits) are balanced against inputs partnership (for women) and negatively related to an adher- (costs), in communal-norm orientations the ratio between out- ence to exchange norms (for men and women). comes and costs is not decisive because one’s own inputs are viewed not as costs, but rather as welcome opportunities to However, it is open to question whether the responsive- meet the partner’s needs. Any ensuing rewards are interpreted ness to the other’s needs, which is typical for a communal not as profits on one’s own investments, but rather as an orientation, is motivated by love, sympathy, altruism, or jus- expression of the partner’s affection and love. tice. The justice motive implies an awareness of the partner’s entitlements and of one’s own perceived obligations. Love However, conflicts are not unusual in close relationships, and sympathy, same as altruism, may motivate to satisfy the and because these conflicts are essentially justice conflicts, it other’s desires and needs without conceiving these as entitle- is worthwhile to examine which justice principles are applied ments and without feeling obliged to do that. In social rela- when conflicts occur. As long as an identity relation exists, all tionships, applying the need principle of justice, feeling investments, all self-sacrifices, and all burdens are not bal- sympathy with the needs of the loved one, and being altruis- anced with one’s outcomes, but the balances may be made tic may motivate an actor to choose the same behavioral com- when the partner withdraws his or her love (Montada & Kals, mitments. Nevertheless, the justice motive and sympathy, 2001). altruism, and love are distinct motives, and conflicts between them may occur or be induced (cf. Batson, 1996). The behav- Research by Cate and colleagues (Cate, Lloyd, Henton, & ioral commitments are not informative with respect to the Larson, 1982; Cate, Lloyd, & Henton, 1985) and Desmarais question how they are motivated. We need valid assessments and Lerner (1989) has shown that the level of received re- of the actors’ motives behind their responses to the needs of a wards (e.g., in the six resource areas of love, status, services, loved one. To assume a justice motive, one has, at least, to goods, money, and information) predicts relationship satis- ask respondents explicitly about the others’ entitlements or faction better than does global equity (and equality as well), their deservingness. Another approach is to observe or ask regardless of whether the relationship is traditional or modern respondents about their emotions that imply perceived own in terms of gender-role orientation (M. W. Martin, 1985). Do violations of justice norms, namely feelings of guilt or of these findings mean that self-interest is the dominant motive indebtedness—and to explore the justice appraisals assumed in close relationships? To answer this question, the partner’s to be necessary components of these emotions. rewards (stemming from the respondents’ own responses to their partner’s needs) also need to be assessed. It may well be The justice motive may also be inferred from resentment that those relationships that both partners experience as re- of the partner. Freudenthaler and Mikula (1998) offer an ex- warding are satisfying. One kind of empirical findings seems ample of this approach with their investigation of women’s to support this interpretation: Rusbult (1987) and Hays sense of injustice regarding the unbalanced division of (1985) found that own rewards minus costs (investments) housework. In their interview study with employed women predict relationship success less well than own rewards plus living in a partnership, perceived violations of entitlement are costs (which may mean the partner’s rewards). The latter predicted by four variables related to household chores: un- index may reflect the mutual responsiveness of the partners to fulfilled wants, social comparisons of their partner’s with each other’s needs (Clark & Chrisman, 1994).

The Justice of Retributions 551 other men’s commitments, normative social expectations of would have provided jobs for the unemployed. Even in close partner’s commitments, and lack of justification as to why relationships, adverse effects on third parties are not unusual. their partner is contributing less than expected. Perceived Parents may enjoy the loyal support of their partner in cases violations of entitlement together with attributions of respon- of conflict with their adolescent child who in turn considers sibility to the partner and lack of justification predicted 53% this loyalty to be a coalition at his or her own cost. of the criterion variable blaming the partner. This set of vari- ables includes the key variables for the perception of injus- Therefore, it is adequate to expand the view from the tice: entitlements on the basis of some justice norm and directly concerned exchange parties and to examine the con- violation of these entitlements by a responsible actor who sequences for others and for the social system. does not have convincing justification (cf. Lerner, 1987; Montada, 1991). To predict perceptions of violated entitle- THE JUSTICE OF RETRIBUTIONS ments, it is necessary to assess the justice norms applied by the individual. The phrase retributive justice normally means the justice of retribution for crimes and negligence, as well as the justice Another example based on a similar conceptual model of- of compensations for caused damages and harm. However, fers a questionnaire study conducted by Reichle (1996) about special achievements (intellectual, artistic, moral, etc.), losses and restrictions experienced by spouses after the birth especially those that go beyond the call of duty, are also to be of their first child. Anger (resentment) toward the spouse was repaid or acknowledged. Because the justice of acknowl- predicted by attributing responsibility for one’s own losses edgement of special achievements has received little research and restrictions to the spouse, which was moderated by the attention thus far, it is only mentioned here; the retribution perceived injustice of the losses and a negative balance for crimes and negligence is treated in more detail. of perceived gains and losses (explained variance = 74%). Marital dissatisfaction was explained by anger toward the Just Retribution and Punishment spouse, extent of the experienced losses, number of losses at- tributed to the spouse, and attribution of responsibility for the Though just retribution for crimes is anchored in criminal losses to the spouse (explained variance = 77%). Within this law, in criminal justice proceedings, and in precedents in sample, strong preferences for using the equality and the court judgments, empirical social and behavioral sciences need principle in distributions of tasks, opportunities, and can contribute significant insights, because the sense of jus- restrictions (in contrast to gender specific traditional norms) tice held by the general public does not perfectly coincide and strong preferences for negotiations as the just way to with that reflected by the legal code and court decisions. proceed in cases of disagreement were observed (Reichle & Gefke, 1998). What is just retribution for the violation of criminal law? A first answer could be reparation for the damages caused, The Effects of Social Exchanges on Third Parties analogous to the equity principle of social exchanges. Such regulations exist in the civil code, as can be seen in liability Assessing the justice of social exchange relationships would laws: The defective product must be replaced; the damage be incomplete without examining the effects of exchanges must be compensated; the price must be reduced if services on third parties. Adverse effects of exchange relationships on are insufficient; the caused secondary costs (expenses, oppor- third parties raise justice problems—but to my knowledge, tunity costs) are to be balanced out. Compensation for dam- they have not yet been an object of psychological research. ages is not a prevalent goal in criminal justice. Contracts that are fair to the contractual parties may incur For most people’s sense of justice, equitable compensa- serious disadvantages for others. For instance, cartel con- tion would be an inadequate atonement for a crime. This is tracts may be fair for the contract parties, but they are made at true not only for crimes which have caused irreversible the expense of others. Exclusive contracts of sale put other losses: How could, for example, the murder of a person, per- suppliers at a disadvantage. Granting government subsidies manent health impairments following a physical injury, or to a big company in financial trouble may be viewed as fair by psychological damage caused by terror or humiliation be its employees but as unfair by its competitors. Labor contracts compensated? This is generally true because the violation of between employers’ organizations and unions may be viewed criminal law means a violation of the moral consensus with- as a fair distribution of profits but may cause rationalization out which the social community cannot survive (Miller & measures leading to the dismissal of part of the workforce, or Vidmar, 1981). Regardless of the amount of damage, this in- they may prevent the expansion of the workforce, which jury to the moral code of society demands punishment. The

552 Justice, Equity, and Fairness in Human Relations violation of the basic values of the community, those which finally taken the rights of victims seriously—for example, make up its identity and its self-esteem, as well as violation their need for acknowledgement of their status as victims, of the sacred symbols of a society (e.g., its religious tenets, its which will be documented by the conviction of the perpetra- flag) demand retribution. The primary purpose of retribution tor (Fischer, Becker-Fischer, & Düchting, 1998). is atonement. The various goals of legal punishment may conflict with The rational-choice model also offers an explanation of one another and thus create their own problems of justice: Is why compensation alone is insufficient. If the bank robber the retributive sentencing of a young offender for robbery with could compensate the crime simply by returning the money, grievous bodily harm to the victim just, or is a mild sentence there would be no deterrent: He or she could attempt it again with an attempt at his resocialization more just? When general and again without risk, in the hopes of one day not being deterrence is the objection, the mitigating factors associated caught. Therefore, retribution must be independent of com- with the individual offense may easily be overlooked. pensation for damages. Alongside atonement and compensa- tion for damages, a third purpose in legal punishment is Perpetrator’s Responsibility and Blameworthiness deterrence, which is supposed to have an effect on the perpe- trator as well as on the public at large. Additional functions of In criminal law the severity of the crime is the first decisive legal punishment are considered: building up or reinforcing a factor in determining the degree of guilt and blameworthiness sense of justice in the population, resocializing the perpetra- of the offender (recognizable by the range of penalties for a tor, and protecting the community by incapacitation of the crime). Moreover, mitigating and aggravating circumstances offender (e.g., by imprisonment or death penalty). are considered. Special importance is given to the assessment of the offender’s responsibility for the criminal act and to po- Analyzing the valuations of the various functions of legal tential justifications of this act. This practice coincides with punishment, Vidmar & Miller (1980) identified two main mo- the sense of retributive justice in the public. tives: a controlling and a retaliation motive. The retaliation motive emphasizes the perpetrator’s guilt and the severity of A guilty verdict presupposes the attribution of responsibil- the crime. The function of atonement is placed in the fore- ity to the perpetrator. The assessment of the defendant’s ground. The controlling motive aims at keeping the criminal responsibility is a core problem in jurisprudence. Defendants in check and protecting society. Of importance are the dan- may use any of eight arguments to deny or to diminish their gerousness of the criminal and the degree of harmfulness of responsibility for their behavior and its consequences the crime. Miller and Vidmar also differentiate the motives (cf. Hamilton & Hagiwara, 1992; Heider, 1958; Montada, according to whether they are directed at the perpetrator or at 2001b; Semin & Manstead, 1983): a third party: A motive for retaliation can also be to dampen public outcry. We should take this psychological analysis a 1. Denial of agency. Persons may deny that their behavior step further and distinguish between deterring the perpetra- was under their voluntary control. Reasons given for the tors and resocializing them because different measures seem lack of volitional control include lack of competence, fa- to be appropriate for those two goals. tigue, external influences, effects of drugs, intense affects, and so on. In the courtroom, for instance, insanity, intense It is remarkable that the victims of crimes are only mar- emotional states, or being under the influence of drugs ginally considered in the functions of retribution, if at all. In are sometimes accepted as factors that exclude or reduce fact, in the historical development of criminal justice in the actors’ responsibility for their deeds. modern age, the main focus was protecting society and guar- anteeing fairness to the perpetrator, not to providing justice to 2. Lack of foreseeability of consequences. Persons may deny the victim. For a long time, the victim played exclusively the that the consequences of their actions could have been role of a witness in criminal proceedings. The witness does foreseen. not have a powerful role: He or she does not control the pro- cedure, and his or her credibility and reputation may be 3. Lack of intent. Persons may deny that the negative effects doubted. Only recently have victims had the right to function of their actions were intentional; this may lower the de- as joint plaintiffs in such crimes as rape and bodily injury, gree of responsibility assigned to them, but does not free thereby gaining a bit more control in the course of the trial; them of responsibility in every case (Heider, 1958). this should be relevant for their assessment of procedural The person may be judged not to be malevolent, but he or justice, according to hypotheses forwarded by Thibault and she may still be blamed for carelessness. Walker (1975). Whether the victim received justice was of no concern to the criminal justice system. Victimology has 4. Assigning coresponsibility to others. Persons may try to reduce their own responsibility by attributing responsibil- ity to coactors.

The Justice of Retributions 553 5. Displacing responsibility. Persons may deny their own re- 8. Persons may legitimize their action by referring to con- sponsibility by ascribing the responsibility for their actions sensus information, either that “most people act or would or omissions to others, asserting that they were seduced, have acted the same way” or that “most people approve of persuaded, misinformed, or forced by these third parties. A the legitimacy of the action.” special subcategory of this type is the displacement of re- sponsibility to authorities who have given orders for the Arguments to deny or diminish responsibility on the one action to be taken. hand and justifying arguments on the other may be presented by defendants (cf. Sykes & Matza, 1957, on the defense pleas 6. Mental retardation and developmental immaturity. of criminals in general; Deegener, 1997, on men charged with sexual child abuse), or by the defendants’ representatives. 7. Lack of adequate socialization and education. Disadvan- Even victims trying to cope with intense outrage and hatred taged childhood and adolescence, deficient socialization, against the offender may use such arguments to calm down and a lack of education are arguments frequently used their emotions. by lawyers to deny the defendant’s responsibility, because these factors are widely believed to cause behavior There is much empirical proof suggesting that the puni- disorders. tiveness of victims as well as that of observers who were not directly affected is dependent on the attributed level of 8. Denial of having caused damages or harm. Even if the offenders’ responsibility; this also holds true outside the person does not deny responsibility for an action or omis- courtroom. sion, he or she may deny the presumed effects of that action, either by doubting the existence of any harm or In people’s sense of justice, responsibility and justifica- damage or by denying that harm or damage was caused by tions do have much weight (Burnstein & Worchel, 1969; the action or omission in question. Kolik & Brown, 1979; Shklar, 1990; Zillmann & Cantor, 1977; and others). In a vignette study, Schmitt, Hoser, and Apart from arguments to deny or diminish responsibility, Schwenkmezger (1991) distinguished six grades of responsi- blameworthiness can be reduced by justifications of one’s bility for an injury: (a) intended injury; (b) awareness and ac- action or omission. Justifications do not deny responsibility. ceptance of possible injury; (c) careless action; (d) impulsive Rather, they offer reasons such as the following that are action, forced action, or unforeseeable effects; (e) benevolent expected to reduce their blameworthiness and liability for action performed in a clumsy manner; and (f) behavior not compensation: under volitional control. They found a high correlation be- tween these levels of responsibility and the mean state-anger 1. Persons may make reference to their benevolent intent or scores of respondents taking the perspective of victims in the to the positive effects or benefits of their actions or omis- vignettes. The perceived blameworthiness of actors may be in- sions. They may claim that any negative effects are bal- ferred from these state-anger scores. Montada and Kirchhoff anced out by positive ones. (2000) have demonstrated that credible justifications substan- tially reduce victims’ anger at the offender, as well as the 2. Persons may assert that the victim had been informed and degree of punishment the victims regard as appropriate. had consented (e.g., to participate in a high-risk medical research program or to engage in sexual contact). Retributive justice requires a valid assessment of the of- fender’s responsibility and blameworthiness. The offender’s 3. Persons may legitimize their action as a just retaliation or own views of his or her blameworthiness must be given a punishment. The victim is viewed as an offender who careful hearing. Giving voice to the offender is a central prin- deserves to be punished. ciple of procedural justice; yet other’s views and information by others also need to be included in the decision-making 4. Persons may derogate the victim as being inferior or dan- process. gerous, and may assert that their own actions are appro- priate for this kind of person (cf. Bandura, 1990, on Blameworthiness, Apologies, and Retribution dehumanization of victims). According to the concept of retribution as atonement, a 5. Persons may justify their actions by referring to legitimate penalty is just when it is proportionate to the degree of guilt. self-interests, whether personal or communal. The penalty is reduced, however, if sincere apologies by the offender are offered. Goffman (1971) named the following 6. Persons may legitimize their actions by referring to their normative obligations or higher-order values (e.g., group norms, obligations of obedience, religious norms). 7. Persons may interpret their action as defense of their rep- utation (e.g., their face, so to speak).

554 Justice, Equity, and Fairness in Human Relations components for honest apologies in a private context: The THE JUSTICE OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS perpetrator must (a) express remorse and emotional distress AND POLITICS because he or she has violated a legal and moral norm and has harmed the victim; (b) he or she accepts responsibility The justice of allocations and existing distributions in general for the violation and liability for blame; (c) he or she credi- can be assessed for different levels, for instance, within pri- bly expresses willingness to observe the moral rule in the mary groups, within casual social formations as realized in future; and (d) acknowledges that it is up to the victim to most laboratory experiments, within organizations and insti- accept or to refuse the apology, and that forgiveness is a tutions (Elster, 1992, speaks of local justice), at the level of grace granted by the victim which cannot be claimed by the the society (Brickman, Folger, Goode, & Schul, 1981, speak perpetrator. of macrojustice), and at the international level. It has been empirically proven that sincere apologies rec- It is important to note that for assessing the justice of allo- oncile victims and judges (as well as observers not directly cations and distributions, one needs to determine social bor- involved) and reduce their desire for retribution and their derlines that specify who is principally entitled to receive a punitiveness (Miller & Vidmar, 1981; Montada & Kirchhoff, share of the resources to distribute, who is obligated to bear a 2000). Goffman (1971) explained this phenomenon as fol- share of the tasks and loads to be allocated, and so on (Cohen, lows: By showing remorse, the perpetrator accepts the valid- 1986). However, the determined borderlines may be criti- ity of the violated norm, accepts his or her own guilt and cized as unjust. Should the inheritance of a deceased person blameworthiness, brings him- or herself once again back to who has not made his or her will be distributed only among the normative consensus of the community, and confirms the his or her descendants, or should those persons be included views of the victim. Therefore, apologies attenuate the ret- who have self-sacrificingly cared for him or her for years? ributive counteraggression of victims as well as of the puni- Should the profits of a business be distributed exclusively to tiveness of the broader public (Ohbuchi et al., 1989). The the shareholders or should the stakeholders participate? Who perpetrator’s attempt at reparation has similar effects (Darley has to bear the losses? Should the tax revenues of rich states & Shultz, 1990). Some courts also reduce the penalties if in be distributed exclusively within the state or should develop- perpetrator-victim compensation an agreement was reached ing states also participate? (Rössner, 1998). Because the constitution, the legal system, and the institu- Victims’ Need for Retribution tions of a society have an impact on distributions, these compo- nents of the societal system are also the objects of justice Whereas the assessment of appropriate penalties has been appraisals—for example, the economic system, the labor laws, widely studied, only a few studies exist of the victim’s needs the health and welfare system, the educational system, envi- for retribution. It is known, however, that for the victims of ronmental protection laws, immigration rules, the generation violent crimes, retributive reactions by the state are more im- contract; all of these may be valued as basically just or may be portant than are reparations (Baurmann & Schädler, 1991; criticized as unjust, as well as the politics responsible for their Pfeiffer, 1993). The large majority of victims assess sen- implementation and adaptation. Constitutions may be criti- tences as too mild in their own cases (Richter, 1997). cized for failing to guarantee human rights, the protection of the environment, or animal welfare; the economic and tax systems A study of victims of violent crimes (rape, physical injury, may be criticized for allowing the development of huge in- attempted murder, robbery, kidnapping) done by Orth equalities in wealth or for demotivating individual productiv- (2000)—on the average 4 years after the crime and 2 years ity; the educational system may be blamed for failing to provide after the court trial—pointed out that two thirds of the sample equal opportunities for the socially disadvantaged or failing to were dissatisfied with the court’s judgment; and those who meet the needs of gifted students. Justice arguments can be were dissatisfied tended to react with pronounced feelings of found to support or censure any given policy, and all parties indignation, disappointment, helplessness, mistrust in the concerned usually seem convinced that their view is the only legal system, a diminished belief in a just world, reduced valid one; this is how normative standards are conceived—as self-esteem, and reduced trust in the future. The effects of generally valid and as binding for all concerned. dissatisfaction, however, were moderated by victims’ ap- praisal of the proceedings as just. Procedural justice was as- Imbalances of Justice at the Societal Level sessed by some of Leventhal’s (1980) criteria and by the relational criteria proposed by Lind and Tyler (1988) that will Not every claim, not every evaluation of social conditions, be discussed in a following section. and not every protest against injustice is justified. Claims and

The Justice of Social Systems and Politics 555 protests are often based on a one-sided subjective concept of inequalities are recognized by many of those who doubt that justice: Unbalanced claims—for the preservation of the sta- the concrete policy of affirmative action will result in new in- tus quo, of freedom rights, of the equality principle, of the justices. This is also true for affirmative action in the realm of need or the equity principle, and so on—lead to unjust solu- ethnic inequalities in education and in the job market (cf., for tions because all other principles of justice have been vio- instance, Bobocel, SonHing, Holmvoll, & Zanna, 2002). lated. This idea may be illustrated by a few case examples that are currently disputed. Environmental Protection Policies Affirmative Action There is little doubt that current and future environmental pollution entails not only health risks, but also the risk of cli- Not seldom, efforts to correct one injustice result in the cre- mate changes with incalculable consequences. There is also ation of another. A prominent example is the affirmative action little doubt that the current pollution of air, soil, and water en- taken to correct the indisputable historical disadvantages of tails gross injustices. Because pollution is a side effect of pro- women in the labor market, problems that still persist to this ductive processes in agriculture, industry, and business, and day. For instance, women are still underrepresented in top- of traffic, air conditioning, and so on, the justice concern is level positions. Interpreting this fact as unjust discrimination about the allocation of the profits, costs, and risks resulting against women, various types of affirmative action have been from these processes and activities. Some people and some taken to give preference to female applicants over their male populations benefit more than do others from these processes, competitors. The justice problem with this policy is that it aims and those who profit most are unlikely to be those who have to correct a historical problem by reversing gender privileges most to lose from the risks and disadvantages of pollution (cf. in today’s generation of students and young professionals. the concept of environmental racism, Clayton, 1996). Today’s young women have certainly suffered fewer injustices in education and in the labor market than have earlier genera- The costs of pollution are still typically externalized—that tions of women, and today’s young men are less privileged is to say, the costs and risks are mainly borne not by those than were their male predecessors. Therefore, it is problematic who have caused them, nor by those who have most to gain for these historical injustices to be corrected by affirmative ac- from the processes in question. The externalization of costs tion’s affecting only the present generation of young women bears always the risk of an injustice. One of the policies for and men, with no impact on preceding generations. The ques- reducing pollution injustices is the internalization of the costs tion is whether it is just that the costs of this measure have to be by means of pollution taxes. However, pollution taxes may borne exclusively by young men. Moreover, justice—at least result in new justice problems. in terms of equity—is more frequently valuated at the level of individuals, not at the level of groups or collectives. Therefore, First, there is no guarantee that the taxes raised will be as D. M. Taylor and Moghaddam (1994) argue, many people used to compensate the victims of pollution. In fact, not even have justice problems with affirmative action policies. all of the victims of pollution can be identified because its harmful effects are long lasting, interact with many other fac- This approach to correcting a historical injustice is based tors, and are cumulative. Furthermore, air and water pollution on an implicit assumption advanced by the new feminist extend across regional and state boundaries, and such pollu- movement—namely, that the gender categories male and tion may involve delayed risks for the future when coming female were in fact social groups. Would it not be a mistake to generations may be affected by the greenhouse effect. believe that the whole group of women will vicariously partic- ipate in and profit from the success of some—mostly already Second, pollution taxes may intensify social inequalities. privileged—young women? Women are not a social group, They may be ruinous for poorer firms, but not for richer ones; but rather a social category. This distinction is psychologically they may be prohibitive for poorer car owners, but not for an important one (cf. Griffith, Parker, & Törnblom, 1993). more affluent drivers who can easily afford to pay the new Individually, most women are members of gender-mixed so- taxes. The result may be the bankruptcy of some firms, the cial groups such as families, where they are bound not only to consequent dismissal of employees, and the aggravation of daughters, sisters, and mothers, but also to sons, husbands, social inequalities (Montada & Kals, 2000; Russell, 2000). brothers, and fathers. They may be proud of the careers of the Looking at the branched systemic effects of every interven- male as well as of the female members of their family. tion, it is not easy to avoid new injustices. This is not to deny the continuing existence of unjust Justice for the Defendant Versus Justice for the Victim gender inequalities in the labor markets. Unjust gender The principle of giving defendants the benefit of the doubt is uncontested in criminal law, but the practice violates the

556 Justice, Equity, and Fairness in Human Relations victims’ claims to retribution, at least in the case of those vic- contributions as currently is paid to the pensioners; this is tan- tims who have no doubts as to the guilt of the defendant. tamount to an exploitation of the younger generation. Second, Many such victims experience an acquittal or a light sentence parents with children are exploited by the pension system in- by the judges as a secondary victimization (Orth, 2000) after sofar as their investments in time and money in the develop- the state was not able to protect them from primary victim- ment and education of their children represent an essential ization by the crime. contribution for the future performance capabilities of the pen- sion system, but the parents do not receive equitable financial Underserved Welfare Benefits compensation for their investments. In addition, if they reduce their paid work to save time for caring for their children, as The fact that an ostensibly indolent unemployed father prof- mothers frequently do, their own pensions will be lowered. its from the generous welfare benefits accorded to his family is unjust. It may be justified, however, by the constitutional What Is Unjust and What Would Be Just? guarantee of equal opportunity for all citizens: The children’s opportunities have to be safeguarded, and they are not re- It is much easier to reveal injustices than it is to establish jus- sponsible for their father’s unemployment. Furthermore, the tice within complex social systems. Pointing to imbalances is economic system does not allow the father to be forcibly not yet a generally accepted solution. As justice conflicts and employed. The assessment of justice requires looking at the justice dilemmas become apparent, the question is how they social system as a whole, and (frequently) considering which may be resolved. There are several approaches to avoid or to of several injustices is to be less tolerable. settle justice conflicts and to resolve justice dilemmas: State Subsidies to Business • Just procedures in decision making help to avoid creating feelings and perceptions of injustice. Subsidizing uncompetitive business sectors aids those employed in these sectors and thus can be justified by the • When more than one principle of justice is valid in a case, principle of need; but it may hinder modernization. Subsidies a mixed application of principles would be helpful to for preservation instead of investment in the future can place avoid gross imbalances. a mortgage on the future and a burden on the next generation. Every instance of subsidization by means of public funds that • Mediation methods can settle justice conflicts in which has no sustainable effect is an injustice to the needs of the (ideally) all concerned have a guided discourse about all next generation. The concerns of the next generation should issues and perspectives at stake and have a chance to find carry the same weight as those of the present generation. a mutually accepted solution. In political conflicts, the principle of preserving acquired These approaches are outlined next. It should become obvi- rights is frequently asserted. In the spring of 1997, coal miners ous that justice is a personal and social construction. in Germany took to the streets to force a continuation of the hitherto-granted government subsidies, which consisted of AVOIDING AND SETTLING JUSTICE CONFLICTS about LSD 55000-per job position per year. If an equal amount of subsidy had been demanded to create new jobs for all the Procedural Justice four million unemployed persons searching for jobs (the un- employment rate was 10.4%), that would have required the en- Given the broad spectrum of options for appraising, con- tire federal budget. Applying the equality principle of justice structing, and realizing justice in the various fields of social in this conflict would have demonstrated the injustice of a one- life, conflicts about justice are unavoidable. How can these sided application of the principle of acquired rights preserva- conflicts be settled? How can peace be preserved? One answer tion and would have undercut the miners’ demands. is to ensure fair decision-making—using procedures that are broadly accepted as just within the population (Luhmann, Pension Systems on a Transfer Basis 1983). This solution holds for parliamentary procedures, elec- tions, institutional decisions, decisions of courts, arbitration, The current pension system in Germany raises at least two and decisions of other authorities. The separation of powers justice problems. First, with the current shift in the age pyra- is a crucial element in the appraisal of justice in a given mid, the younger generations can no longer be guaranteed that society—this includes the right to appeal against decisions of they will receive a pension of an equal ratio to their authorities, also against institutional and parliamentary deci- sions in administrative and constitutional courts.

Avoiding and Settling Justice Conflicts 557 Extensive empirical research has confirmed the impact of procedural justice has inspired a wide range of research activ- fair procedures on conflict resolution and on the acceptance ities and has generated an impressive body of knowledge about of authoritative decision-making. From a normative perspec- the favorable impact that perceived respectful and decent treat- tive, the question of which procedures are just is a crucial ment by authorities has on one’s own perceived status, on one. Although Thibaut and Walker’s (1975) book is entitled one’s self-esteem, on the acceptance of decisions, and on one’s Procedural Justice, the authors address the issue of control trust in authorities’ fairness and the legitimacy of institutions more than they do that of justice. Preferences for procedures (Tyler et al., 1997; Vermunt & Törnblom, 1996). of conflict resolution that give more control over to the par- ties involved may well be motivated by self-interest—as One question as to the justice component of group value Thibaut and Walker have argued—and not by a justice theory remains open, however: Is everyone entitled to claim motive. Therefore, it is crucial to ask whether the parties in- decent, respectful treatment by authorities? Even those who volved claim to have control by voice only for themselves or have seriously violated the law and social norms? Respectful equally for the other party. Leventhal (1980) has drawn up a treatment by benevolent authorities may enhance self- set of justice rules for the procedures of decision making— esteem, and it may produce further beneficial effects, includ- for example, impartiality of the authorities, consistent use of ing the willingness to accept the authorities’ decisions, but arguments, consideration of relevant information, objectivity that alone does not imply that justice is involved. Only if au- in the review of information, and revision of decisions if new thorities were obliged to treat everyone in a respectful or information becomes available. The granting of a voice to all even friendly manner, everybody would be entitled to claim concerned is also essential—all concerned should be given this kind of treatment, regardless of whether they deserve it. the opportunity to present their views and claims and to take But is everyone truly entitled to receive respectful treatment? influence on the decision-making process by having their Or is this kind of treatment only deserved and claimable by views and claims considered by the authorities. These are certain people—for example, by law-abiding citizens, by criteria that have emerged in Western cultures as procedural people who have accumulated merits, by employees who al- rights to be claimed by everyone. There is ample general ways have given their best? evidence of what has been dubbed the fair procedure effect, which refers to the phenomenon that perceived procedural Brockner et al. (1998) and Heuer, Blumenthal, Douglas, fairness helps the parties involved to accept even those and Weinblatt (1999) have made first steps to approach this decisions or outcomes that are less favorable than they had question empirically. They could identify subjects’self-esteem expected or hoped for (Greenberg & Folger, 1983). as a moderator variable: Specifically, having a voice and influ- ential informational input into an ongoing dispute is correlated However, a higher level of education is probably required more closely with perceived procedural fairness among for individuals to understand exactly what is actually meant by people with high self-esteem than it is among those with low Leventhal’s list of criteria—and to determine whether author- self-esteem. Respondents with high self-esteem seem to as- ities observe these rules or violate them. Intellectually less sume that they deserve and are entitled to respectful treatment demanding criteria for procedural fairness would therefore be as well as to being given a voice. Consequently, they and only helpful. The concept of respectful and decent treatment by au- they tend to associate respectful treatment with fairness to thorities is easy to grasp. In their group value theory of proce- resent unfairness if they do not get what they expect. dural justice, Lind and Tyler (1988) emphasize the way people are treated by authorities. According to their theory, people Nevertheless, positive effects that are analogous to the fair care about their valuation and status in their group, commu- procedure effect may well be observable also in cases in nity, company, or society, and they infer this status from the which perpetrators are benevolently treated respectfully and way they are treated by authorities. Because the way one decently by legal authorities: Such defendants may gain trust is treated by authorities is informative with respect to one’s that the sentence is fair, may accept the authority of the judges social status and has an impact on one’s self-esteem—as is as- instead of opposing them, may feel accepted as members of sumed by political theorists such as Lane (1988) and Rawls the community, and may reciprocally accept the rules of that (1971), as well as by psychologists (cf. Tyler, Degouey, & community. Benevolence and grace may well have signifi- Smith, 1996; Van den Bos, Lind, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1997)— cant integrating power, even if they are not to be claimed. the concern for respectful and decent treatment in conflict- resolution procedures would appear to be motivated by the Settling Justice Conflicts by Mediation striving to gain or to maintain high self-esteem and a positive self-concept. Lind and Tyler’s (1988) group value theory of There is good reason to assume that at their core, all hot social conflicts are conflicts of justice (Montada, 2000). Insights into procedural justice—as well as insights into the prevalence of

558 Justice, Equity, and Fairness in Human Relations justice dilemmas and knowledge of how to deal with justice Imparting Insight Into the Dilemma Structure dilemmas—are helpful to settle social conflicts. We can dif- of Conflicts of Justice ferentiate several strategies for dealing with conflicts of jus- tice in a mediation setting; they are outlined in the following Settling conflicts is made easier when insight is gained that discussion. divergent principles of justice do exist and may be valid and that justice dilemmas result from this fact (Montada & Kals, Articulating Conflicting Concepts of Justice 2001). The normative character of justice implies that every- one is convinced that his or her own conception of justice is Existing justice conflicts are often not clearly articulated at valid for everyone else. Each party involved draws the unre- the beginning of a mediation. The conflicts manifest them- flected conclusion that others are either in error in their dif- selves as emotions, specifically as resentment of the opposing fering viewpoints or are egoistic, perhaps even maliciously party. It happens on occasion that the parties cannot clearly violating justice. If the person, however, recognizes that a articulate their views of justice and require assistance with justice dilemma exists, then he or she no longer views the po- this articulation. To be able to assist, the mediators need an sition of the other parties as completely illegitimate and his or repertory of hypotheses concerning the principles of justice. her own position as the only legitimate one. In conflict medi- Only clearly articulated concepts of justice can be communi- ation, the questioning of the exclusive validity of every single cated and reflected. principle of justice by pointing to the concurrent validity of competing principles is an important strategy (Montada & Mediators must keep in mind that the manifest objects of a Kals, 2001). conflict are not necessarily identical with the underlying deep structure of the conflict—an example can be found, for in- The justification of the validity of a moral rule or principle stance, in the many conflicts between parents and their ado- is to be distinguished from the justification of decisions in lescent children: the demands of the children for autonomy concrete cases in which competing principles are relevant and the demands of the parents for maintaining authority and (Habermas, 1993). This step requires concrete attempts to the acceptance of their norms and values by the children. The qualify all conflicting claims for justice. Does this mean gen- manifest conflicts about dress, hairstyle, neatness, contacts eral relativism of values, a questioning of their validity? No! with peers, and so on do not directly reflect their deep struc- Not one of the aforementioned principles of justice is un- ture. Thus, solutions to the manifest conflicts do not always founded. Their validity can be established with good argu- lead to a lasting settlement because the deep structure of con- ments. As this applies, however, to all conflicting principles, flicting demands is not articulated and not addressed in the this implies that none of these principles is valid exclusively. agreement. We must counter a negative relativism that states Nothing is valid with the positive relativism No principle is valid ab- Imparting Understanding for the Other Party’s solutely; many principles are valid. Making one principle ab- Concepts of Justice solute and applying it to the exclusion of others would violate all other principles. After the proper articulation of the conflicts, the second step in the process is imparting an understanding of the respective It is the wisdom of institutions to consider various princi- demands and normative concepts of the other party. Under- ples of justice in their regulations and decisions. The social standing does not mean that their demands and normative market economy, for instance, is an attempt to harmonize the concepts were adopted and accepted as justified. Each party rights of the individual citizen to free economic activity with should, however, reformulate the other party’s views of jus- the maxims of the social welfare state. Rawls’ maximin- tice and injustice in such a way that this party feels itself to be principle is also a suggestion toward integration of the free- correctly understood; this is analogous to giving and having a dom of all citizens to economic activity (which ensures best voice in decision making, and it is a sign of reciprocal re- collective wealth) with the rights of every citizen to partici- spect. If, in addition, each party can be induced to formulate pate in the general prosperity (1971). arguments for the views of the respective opposing party, then a great deal has been achieved; this is in line with Regulations for decision making and individual decisions principles of discourse ethics and the ideal communication seem to find rather broad acceptance when several principles situation (Habermas, 1990). of justice are considered at the same time; this can be seen in the research on the distribution of scarce goods such as university study places, subsidized housing, and transplant organs, as well as in the research on the layoff of employees

Justice as a Personal and Social Construction 559 (Elster, 1992). If the decision procedures are, moreover, mediators; therefore, the fairness of the proceedings depends judged as being just, then their acceptance can be expected. also on the parties’ behavior. Qualifying Norms of Justice Empirically It is true that one cannot oblige parties to the conflict to be impartial—an essential principle of procedural justice. But If the parties are claiming different principles to apply in the one can oblige them not only to listen to the positions and pending conflict, it can be helpful to show that each party is arguments of the opposing party, but also to show with their applying completely different standards of justice in different own reformulation of those arguments that they have under- situations and contexts; this shall demonstrate that the parties stood the other party’s position. When this action is coupled accept more then one standard as valid and the debate can be with a respectful and appreciative attitude, shown by Lind, focused on the reasons that one principle is preferred in the Tyler, and others to be significant, a proper precondition is specific case at conflict. A further possibility of qualifying created to judge the mediation as fair proceedings. It is easier principles empirically consists of pointing to the application to come to an agreement under this precondition, and the last- of a multitude of principles and their intermixing in various ing acceptance of this agreement is more probable. areas of society. Here we can also point to empirical studies on institutional distribution procedures in the allocation or JUSTICE AS A PERSONAL withdrawal of goods in short supply (Elster, 1992) as well as AND SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION to Walzer’s (1983) observations that various norms of justice are used in different spheres of justice. Although the justice motive is universal, divergent views about justice are indisputable. This becomes evident in Communicating the Subjective Implementations historical changes, cultural differences, and the ubiquitous of Justice Principles debates and conflicts in the private sphere—in the political arenas as well as in the courtrooms. The debates and conflicts If the conflict is not about which principle of justice is to have two different topics: (a) Which principle or rule of jus- be applied—that is, if the parties to the conflict apply the tice is the right one to be applied?, and (b) What is the right same principle but think they have contradicting justifiable application of a principle? With respect to the distribution of claims—the justifications of these claims must be finely ana- a scarce good, it may (a) be debated whether the equality, the lyzed. As an example may few cases of divorce mediation in equity, the need, or some other principle is the right one to which at least one party claims a fair balancing of the former apply; and it may (b) be debated who at all is entitled to be exchanges. That means that everything must be disclosed— considered for the distribution, who is more or less needy, all resources, all achievements, all sacrifices, all the love and who has contributed more, and so forth. The first topic is the loyalty invested in the marriage, all burdens borne, and also choice of a principle (or a set of principles); the second topic all returns. There can be no guarantee that a proper balance is its implementation. will be reached in a divorce settlement. But just communicat- ing an understanding for the subjective assessments of the Justice Appraisals: Intuitions or Moral Reasoning? other party may be a step toward improving the relationship. In many situations we experience and perceive injustices Adhering to Principles of Procedural Justice spontaneously and emotionally (Lerner, 1998). Those who are outraged have no doubts that justice was violated; that Mediation requires that the rules of procedural justice will be means they have a sense of justice telling them what is just observed—the impartiality of the mediators, extensive prob- and unjust in the specific case at stake. This is not a deliber- ing into personal perspectives and demands, careful consid- ated, reflected, thoroughly proofed judgment, but rather is an eration of information presented, a respectful and polite intuitive appraisal. It may well be that the outrage will disap- interaction, and so on. In mediation, the decision is made not pear when the case is reappraised, when new hypotheses by a third party (e.g., a judge), but rather by the parties them- about the facts are formed and tested (Bernhardt, 2000) or are selves. For the mediation proceedings to be judged as fair, the offered by credible others, by the offender (Montada & mediators’ behavior is important. The mediation is conflict Kirchhoff, 2000), or by observers (e.g., Zillmann & Cantor, settlement worked out in common by the parties and the 1977).

560 Justice, Equity, and Fairness in Human Relations Referring to Shweder and Haidt (1993), who have distin- judgment, and ending with coping processes of victims guished between two categories of moral judgments, those who try to reduce their aversive feelings of being unjustly based on cognitive intuitions and those based on reasoning, victimized. Lerner (1998) has distinguished between preconscious expe- riential processes and rational processes in coming to conclu- Dispositional Factors in Appraisals of Justice sions about justice and injustice. The moral emotions of resentment and guilt are mostly based on preconscious expe- Various dispositions have been conceived and operationalized riential processes. The belief in a just world (BJW) is a that have an impact on the appraisal of justice and injustice. A “fundamental delusion” (Lerner, 1980) that is preconscious couple of them are mentioned in this section. There are indi- in character and motivated by the desire for a trustworthy, re- vidual preferences for specific principles of distributive justice liable world. When adult people answer questionnaire items that have characteristic consequences for the appraisal of the regarding whether the world is basically a just place where reality and for the motivation of activities. Those who prefer everybody gets what he or she deserves, most respondents the need principle tend to resent, for instance, gross social in- hesitate to agree with such a statement. The rational system is equalities more and are more ready to support socially disad- activated, and too many instances of undeserved victimiza- vantaged people than are those who prefer the merit principle. tion and discrimination begin to surface. But even if this ma- In contrast, the latter tend more to blame the disadvantaged for jority of respondents do not concede that the world is really a lacking efforts to improve their life situation and for having just place, there remain significant interindividual differences self-inflicted their problems (e.g., Montada et al., 1988). in their ratings to test hypotheses derived from BJW theory. Those preferring the merit principle tend, for instance, to In the large majority of questionnaire studies, the theoreti- oppose assertive action policies that use preferential treatment cally expected pattern of results was found to corroborate (at least, if the unfairness of the status quo is not made salient; BJW theory (cf. Furnham, 1998; Maes, 1998; Montada, cf. Bobocel et al., 2002). 1998b). As the justice motive may compete with self-interests, the Like the frequently preconscious cognitions implied in centrality of justice in one’s life was measured and found to emotions (e.g., Epstein, 1984), intuitions of justice and injus- predict voluntary prosocial commitments (e.g., Moschner, tice are often preconscious—not reflected, well articulated, 1998). or well reasoned. Nevertheless, they are cognitions that can be modeled as personal or social constructions (Cohen, 1989) People vary in their sensitivity to befallen injustice; those of an idea about what is or what would be just in a category who score high on this trait measure perceive themselves of cases or in specific cases. The large variety of criteria or more frequently unfairly disadvantaged (Schmitt & standards of justice defining entitlements and obligations has Mohiyeddini, 1996). already been depicted here. Some process of selection must be assumed—whether it occurs spontaneously, habitually, or Belief in a just world is challenged by observed injustices. done after thoughtful personal deliberation, or done by for- Those scoring high on BJW scales tend more to blame malized decision making as in court trials. Even if an indi- socially disadvantaged people for having self-inflicted their vidual person’s sense of justice was shaped by socializing situation problems. They do this because they want to protect agents and socializing experiences, the internalization of nor- their view of a just world in cases in which equalizing unjust mative standards can be understood as a personal choice social inequalities would be very costly or even impossible (Montada, 1993). Moreover, entitlements and obligations (Lerner 1977; Reichle, Schneider, & Montada, 1998). have to be attributed in concrete cases (e.g., on the basis of some principle of justice). The appraisal of an injustice im- As mentioned before, people with high self-esteem seem plies that a subject’s entitlements have been neglected by to feel more entitled to have a voice in decision procedures some agent or agency who is considered responsible. than do those with low self-esteem (Brockner et al., 1998; Heuer et al., 1999). Looking at unreflected or reflected appraisals of justice and injustices as a process of selection and construction open A case can be viewed from the victim’s perspective, the the eyes for the spectrum of options given to evaluate a case. observer’s perspective and the offender’s perspective. Sup- Psychological research has tried to identify factors that have posing self-serving biases, one might expect that the victim is impact on this process of construction. To illustrate, a couple attributing more responsibility and blameworthiness to the of research lines shall be mentioned, beginning with dis- offender than the offender is ready to concede, while the ob- positional factors that influence the fabrication of justice servers’ appraisals may depend on their attitudes toward the victim, the offender, and the experienced threat of their BJW. However, the self-serving bias was not observed in harmo- nious intimate relationships: Questioning couples separately

Justice as a Personal and Social Construction 561 about injustices they have committed against the partner and group or community; they can try to forget the case; they can about those they have suffered from the partner, Mikula ruminate on the case, thus alimenting their resentment and bit- (1998) found with harmonious couples that the appraisal of terness; they can pray for a just punishment; they can excuse injustices suffered by the partner was more lenient than of and forgive the wrongdoer; and finally, they can cope with those oneself had committed to the partner. In disharmonious their resentment. With regard to the construction of justice are partnerships, the self-serving bias was the rule. those cases of interest in which an equitable compensation and a just retaliation are not possible and the resentment is not The role of attitudes toward victims and toward offenders calmed down by a honest apology of the wrongdoer. How to was intensively studied in research on juries. Prejudices cope with the continuing feelings of resentment and bitter- against defendants have a significant impact on the attribu- ness. According to an analysis of the cognitions implied in the tion of blameworthiness and on sentencing. emotion of resentment (Montada, 1994), the coping can take one of four strategies: The Social Construction of Justice by Social Movements • The suffered harm and losses can be reappraised: Are the Social movements are stipulated by focusing a social harm and the losses really that severe? Is it, for instance, injustice—for example, the withholding of civil rights from that violating to have been insulted by a person who has minorities, the discrimination against women in the labor mar- such a bad reputation? In cases of objectively severe and ket, the exploitation of natural resources by the living genera- even irrevocable losses the victims may look for com- tion at the costs of future generations, the discrimination pensating positive experiences; this was called search for against homosexuality, the exploitation of children by child meaning in experienced losses. For instance, the victims labor, the huge inequalities between the rich and the poor may have found their true friends through this event, or nations, the torture practiced in many countries, and so on. they may be proud of the way they have mastered their fate. Gains are counterbalancing the losses. Social movements try to appeal to and if necessary change the public sense of justice. Their views about injustices do not • Victims may think about their entitlements or the norms of always reflect common sense and are not always shared by the justice violated by the offender and may qualify the validity majority. Even the disadvantaged (the victims themselves) of these norms. This point is addressed in more detail in this might not share their views: The women in the workforce chapter’s section about mediation in justice conflicts. comparing themselves not with men but with other women (Crosby, 1982) did not feel disadvantaged. The children • Victims may think about the offenders’ responsibility: Has in child labor may consider their lot as normal, or they may the offender really acted malevolently, intentionally, reck- even be proud to contribute a bit to the survival of their fami- lessly, merely carelessly, or even with good intentions but lies. Homosexual persons in earlier times may have not clumsily? Was he or she responsible alone or were others protested against unjust discrimination but may have de- responsible too? The victims can even attribute some plored their “deviant” desires. responsibility to themselves in what has been called self- blame (Bulman & Wortman, 1977). The diffusion of re- The social movements must present convincing arguments sponsibility (e.g., the poor education of the offender), that the status quo, the current social practice, is unjust. They especially the attribution of a bit of coresponsibility to must gain public attention in the media, but ultimately they oneself calms down resentment (Montada, 1992). Acci- have to convince the majority—at least the majority in the cen- dent victims actively use reattributions of responsibility as ters of power. Major (1994) has outlined some of the psycho- a strategy to cope with their feelings of resentment and logical processes and strategies to change the public injustice (Montada, Schneider, & Seiler, 1999). A compre- awareness of entitlements and obligations. hensive review of research about the effects of self- responsibility is provided by Dalbert (2001). Coping With Injustice • Victims may think about possible justifications of the Persons who are suffering an injustice have (in principle) offender, misconceptions, conflicting obligations, own several options to respond: They can claim correction of the provoking behavior, and so on. Imagined justifications existing injustice, they can claim an equitable compensation calm down resentment and hostility (Bernhardt, 2000; from the wrongdoers, respectively from those who are liable; Montada & Kirchhoff, 2000). they can start a lawsuit; they can retaliate the victimization; they can claim an apology from the wrongdoer; they can These coping strategies, if effective, result in a changed view appeal for social support and some compensation from their of the case and of its injustice.

562 Justice, Equity, and Fairness in Human Relations Observers whose belief in a just world is shattered by only a few standards of justice and has not paid attention to being confronted with victims of injustice either commit the whole spectrum of criteria. themselves to restore justice if that would be feasible (e.g., Lerner & Simmons, 1966); claim justice from powerful oth- An enlightened discourse has to take several perspectives ers as the state (e.g. Schmitt, 1998); or they deny the injus- at a problematic case or a justice conflict. Being aware of the tices by derogating the victims (Lerner & Simmons, 1966), prevalence of justice dilemmas—meaning that two or more blaming the victims for having caused their own fate, or valid principles of justice are conflicting—should help to denying that harm and losses are serious (e.g., Montada, avoid and to overcome one-sided views. 1998a). Looking at the character of justice appraisals, Lerner’s CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK distinction between preconscious, intuitive, and experiential versus rational processes in coming to judgments about jus- We have good reasons to assume that the concern for justice tice and injustice is a very important one (Lerner, 1998). Many is universal, and we have ample empirical evidence that a appraisals of injustice are intuitive and not consciously re- universal consensus on what is to be considered as just or flected upon. Furthermore, the parties of justice conflicts have unjust is the exception rather than the rule. We can observe primarily intuitive beliefs about justice and rarely have diverging views between individuals, groups, and cultures, founded their positions on reflected moral reasoning. What is and we know of significant historical changes. This is not to the problem with that? Experienced and observed injustices say that no cases would exist in which views about justice are may motivate actions that have good and productive conse- shared in a culture: Experimental social psychology has no quences: Protest may assert the validity of a justice norm, stop problems finding and arranging cases that are considered further violations, motivate compensation for the victims, and unjust by nearly everybody. But the omnipresence of con- so forth. But it is also true that experienced and observed in- flicts and debates about what is unjust and what would be justices may motivate terrible actions, up to homicide, war, just—in private lives, in public debates, and in the political and genocide. Moreover, they may mean a serious impairment arena on the local, national, and international levels—gives of the well-being and mental health of individuals. Therefore, evidence of diverging views. it might be well-advised to subject these intuitions of justice and injustice to reflected moral reasoning. Two kinds of social conflicts and debates should be dis- tinguished: (a) conflicts about the standards or principles of For this purpose, the typical use of the singular form when justice to be applied, and (b) conflicts about facts that are rel- speaking of justice may be counterproductive because it evant when a specific standard of justice is applied. For in- may suggest that a single view of justice is valid: Which view stance, in conflicts about the layoff of employees, the choice should be valid other than the own intuitively compelling and the weight of different standards or criteria of justice may one? Whenever views of justice and injustice instigate emo- be disputed (seniority, merit, current productivity, or needi- tions or motivate actions that have negative effects for the ness of the employees vs. equal chances of all or an equal subjects, for others, or for the social systems, moral reason- cutback of wages and working time for all, an alternative to ing may help to demonstrate that no single view can claim layoffs). Otherwise it may be disputed who has more or fewer absolute validity: Accepting one view, one principle absolute merits, who is more or less productive, or needy, and so forth. would violate all others. Trying to integrate and to balance The first kind of conflict is obviously a justice conflict, but various principles of justice in their decisions and regulations the latter is also a justice conflict, insofar as criteria of proce- is the wisdom of institutions and authorities. dural justice may subjectively seem violated when one’s own view of the facts is not shared by everybody—namely, the Moral reasoning and discourses about justice are one way criteria of voice, impartiality, or objectivity. that views about justice are built up or changed; these are not the only ways, however. The socialization and adoption of It is an important task of empirical research to identify the views of justice takes many more ways. Social facts as well standards of justice that are applied and to describe the cul- as the dominant ideologies and traditions have a coining tural and individual preferences that may be specific to con- effect on people’s minds, at least as long as they are not crit- texts and cases. On the basis of such information, a reliable icized by trustworthy people as unjust. assessment of the conflicting views in actual disputes is pos- sible; such an assessment is a precondition for a discourse A look at social movements and the psychological and for conflict settlement. Until now, research has focused processes and strategies used to change the public awareness about entitlements and obligations is informative, as Major (1994) has shown. It is no less informative to examine psychological barriers against changes of the worldview—a consolidated belief in a just world, the conviction that the

References 563 status quo is justified or deserved, self-serving biases, or Barrett-Howard, E., & Tyler, T. R. (1986). Procedural justice as a prejudices. criterion in allocation decisions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50, 296–304. At the individual level, the construction of justice can also be observed in victims of injustice, in observers, and in per- Baurmann, M. C., & Kliemt, H. (1995). Zur Ökonomie der Tugend petrators. The coping strategies of victims who try to avoid or [About the economy of virtue]. Ökonomie und Gesellschaft, 11, to reduce burning outrage and hatred against their victimizers 13– 44. or who search for answers to the question Why me? are well described. Observers who are not able or not willing to bear Baurmann, M. C., & Schädler, W. (1991). Das Opfer nach der the costs of correcting undeserved victimizations of others Straftat—seine Erwartungen und Perspektiven [The victims reconstruct a case in order to preserve their belief in a just of crime—their expectations and perspectives]. Wiesbaden, world (Lerner, 1980), which is to be considered a personal Germany: Bundeskriminalamt: BKA-Forschungsreihe, Bd. 22. resource (Dalbert, 2001). And the perpetrators try to justify their deeds as Sykes and Matza (1957) and others have de- Batson, C. D. (1996). Empathy, altruism, and justice: Another scribed; these are examples of the motivated malleability of perspective on partiality. In L. Montada & M. J. Lerner (Eds.), justice views. Current societal concerns about justice (pp. 49–66). New York: Plenum Press. On the other side, we have many examples that justice views can impose themselves compellingly and uncontrol- Bernhardt, K. (2000). 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CHAPTER 23 Aggression, Violence, Evil, and Peace JOSEPH DE RIVERA AGGRESSION 569 EVIL 583 Social Learning Theories 570 Conceptions of Evil and Its Experience 583 Emotional Bases 571 The Ambiguous Role of Religion 584 Biological Perspectives 572 Conflict Theories 573 PEACE 585 Peace Through Strength 586 VIOLENCE AND ITS CONTROL 574 Peace Through Negotiation 587 Personal Violence 574 Peace Through Justice 588 Community Violence 577 Peace Through Personal Transformation 589 Societal Violence 579 Developing Cultures of Peace 590 Structural Violence 582 REFERENCES 592 Although aggression, violence, and evil are interrelated, con- violence is poverty. Such violence is masked and occurs be- temporary research is so specialized that it is unusual to cause of unjust economic and political structures. And when group them together, and this chapter is unique in considering we turn to examine evil we find that a difficult moral judg- them together with ideas and research on peace. Why place ment is involved. Although most contemporary judgment such disparate fields in the same chapter? In part, it is because considers violence to be evil, much of our striving for peace we study aggression and violence in order to avoid the evil and justice involves us in violence that we do not acknowl- that they occasion and to achieve peace. However, if peace edge as evil. This is one of the facts that requires us to base were simply the absence of violence, it would not require any quest for peace (valued as good) on a thorough under- separate treatment; and if peace were a completely indepen- standing of violence and evil. In this way, we will not be dent field, it would be better to make use of separate chapters. naive when we finally come to consider how peace may be Typically, there are separate chapters on aggression and attained. prosocial behavior. Here, however, we argue that the achieve- ment of peace rests on an understanding of aggression, vio- AGGRESSION lence, and evil, yet requires us to go beyond that material to include not only what is usually conceived as prosocial Aggression has different meanings that focus our attention on behavior but the use of aggression in a struggle with violence different aspects of behavior and lead to the creation of dif- and evil. Hence, we must consider these topics in conjunction ferent approaches to its understanding. We may distinguish at with one another. The attainment of peace requires us to have least three different definitions: an understanding of aggression, and the pitfalls of violence and evil, as well as the various paths that may lead toward a 1. Aggression as behavior intended to hurt an other, whether peaceful world. this intent is motivated emotionally (as by anger, pain, frustration, or fear) or instrumentally, as a means to an end We begin with aggression because although it is often (as in punishing misbehavior or intimidating an other to violent, aspects of aggression may be necessary for the attain one’s end.) There are two caveats to this definition. achievement of peace. We will then sample the voluminous First, the intention to hurt may be embedded in larger in- literature on forms of violence and the ways in which it may tentions that have quite different meanings. Although the be controlled. Although many of these forms are clearly related to aggression, Gandhi asserted that the worst form of 569

570 Aggression, Violence, Evil, and Peace definition succeeds in avoiding the inclusion of hurting promotes aggression. The frequency of physical punishment that is accidental or an unavoidable aspect of helping (as is linearly related to the frequency of aggression toward sib- in washing a wound that needs to be cleaned), it does lings (as well as toward parents) across a wide range of ages include behaviors as disparate as a swat on the bottom to (Larzelere, 1986). correct a child and the dropping of a nuclear bomb to win a war. Second, the other who is hurt may be the self (as in The modeling of aggression may occur in families, neigh- suicide) and may include animals. borhoods, or on TV, and in each of these cases numerous studies show that children exposed to aggressive models are 2. Aggression as assertive, moving-out behavior that is more apt to engage in aggressive behavior. Children growing aimed at getting what one desires (sometimes without up in abusive families are apt to assault their own children regard for the wishes of others). (Silver, Dublin, & Lourie, 1969); higher rates of aggressive behavior occur in neighborhoods where there is a subculture 3. Aggression as the assertion of one’s power in a rela- of violence that provides models and rewards aggressive be- tionship and the removal of challenges to what one be- havior (Wolfgang & Ferracuti, 1967); children exposed to a lieves ought to exist. film depicting police violence show more violence during a subsequent game of floor hockey than do children who had If we work from the first definition, we may view aggres- just watched an exciting film on bike racing (Josephson, sion as behavior that is clearly to be discouraged and socially 1987); the general aggressiveness of teenagers (as rated by controlled. However, the second definition is much more teachers and classmates) is correlated to the amount of vio- positive, at least in an individualistic culture, and we may lence that they watched on TV when they were children want to support such behavior as long as it is balanced by a (Turner, Hesse, & Peterson-Lewis, 1986); and both self- concern for others. The third definition raises a number of reported aggression and the seriousness of criminal arrests at evaluative issues. It is morally neutral if one accepts chal- age 30 is predicted by the violence level of the TV show per- lenges or power as a fact of life, but its presumption of a sons watched at age 8 (as reported by their mothers 22 years power relationship between persons or groups may be earlier; Eron, Huesmann, Lefkowitz, & Walder, 1972). viewed as morally repugnant. These alternatives may be kept in mind as we examine four major approaches to aggres- From the perspective of social learning theory, aggression sion: as socially learned, as emotion based, as biologically is neither instinctive nor produced by frustration. It is a pat- grounded, or as embedded in conflict. tern of learned behavior that has been rewarded so that it is efficacious within a given society. Aggressive cultures as- Social Learning Theories sume that aggression is innate and natural, without realizing that there are other cultures where aggressive patterns of be- Focusing on aggression as behavior that results in personal havior do not occur or occur with far less frequency. Although injury or property destruction, Bandura (1973) showed how emotional conditions often precede aggression, numerous people may learn such behavior by modeling the aggressive studies have shown that loss, frustration, or anger lead to ag- behavior of others. Shown an adult striking a large inflatable gression only when an aggressive pattern of behavior has “Bobo” doll, children learn the observed pattern of behavior. been learned and reinforced. For example, Nelson, Gelfand, The pattern is then encouraged or inhibited by what happens and Hartmann (1969) involved children in competitive or to the model. If the behavior is rewarded, the model is liked noncompetitive play and then had them observe either an ag- and chosen for emulation. Even when children are critical of gressive or a nonaggressive model. Those who had lost in the aggressive means that are used, the amount of their competitive play were most prone to behave aggressively, but aggression increases. If the model is punished, the child’s only when they were exposed to the aggressive model. subsequent aggression decreases. Models also function by suggesting the social acceptability of some forms of behav- We may see aggression as a pattern of learned behavior, ior, thus facilitating patterns of behavior that have already but Huesman (1986) has proposed that we may also concep- been learned. tualize it as a more general social script, a program of how to act in problematic social situations. Children learn such Since the direct punishment of aggression is itself aggres- scripts by observing how others behave in life and on TV. sive, it models aggression at the same time that it discourages Realistic violence by a perpetrator with whom the child can it. Thus, although small amounts of nonabusive spanking can identify is highly salient and easily leads to fantasy and re- be beneficial in disciplining children between the ages of 2 hearsal as a way of solving problems. Aggressive scripts may and 6 years (Larzelere, 1996), physical punishment generally be used in quite different circumstances and provide ways to gain attention and get one’s way. Among middle-class peers,

Aggression 571 the use of such scripts is likely to result in unpopularity. The by using advantageous moral comparison. It is facilitated by resulting social isolation may lead to increased television displacing responsibility for the damage that is done (as in viewing, and an even greater reliance on the use of aggressive Milgram’s, 1974, experiments), by diffusing responsibility scripts, eventually producing the habitual use of violence. (Zimbardo, 1995), and by increasing the distance between persons and evidence of the pain that they are inflicting In Huesmann’s (1998) informational processing model, (Kilham & Mann, 1974). Finally, moral disengagement oc- people use a heuristic search process to retrieve a script that is curs when dehumanization prevents empathic responsiveness relevant for their situation. The use of an aggressive script (see Bandura, Underwood, & Fromson, 1975). Personally, I will depend on how situational cues are interpreted, the avail- would argue that we witness the contrast between moral en- ability of aggressive scripts, the normative evaluation of such gagement and moral disengagement whenever we either em- a script once it is activated, and the interpretation of conse- pathize with the struggles of an ant or step on the nuisance. A quences. Regarding the last factor, Huesmann pointed out that scale measuring the extent of moral disengagement has been if a child is beaten for aggression, the child may feel disliked used in different nations and shown to be positively related to rather than interpret his or her behavior as unprofitable. support for military action (McAlister, 2001). Although most researchers focus on the use of aggressive Emotional Bases scripts by delinquents, the scripts are as available for use in international conflicts as in bullying and gang wars. In Bandura’s work on the modeling of aggressive behavior, McCauley (2000) pointed out that while the least socialized the meaning of the behavior as intent to harm is implicit. are more involved in personal violence, it is the best social- Berkowitz (1993) emphasized that this meaning may be cru- ized who are often involved in the intergroup violence of war. cial. This becomes apparent if we focus on aggressive ideas In fact, personal scripts are an aspect of the societal myths and emotions. If one person tackles another in a football that we shall consider when we deal with the concept of evil, game, we may see the skillful, determined act of an athlete, or and Schellenber (1996) pointed out that interpersonal vio- we may see a deliberate attempt to injure another person. For lence may be more influenced by the extent to which a soci- Berkowitz, it is only in the latter case that the model may ety engages in war than the reverse. Thus, Ember and activate the aggressive thoughts and emotional reactions that Ember’s (1994) analysis of the relationship between war and may lead to aggressive behavior. He pointed out that model- interpersonal violence in 186 societies suggested that social- ing is more apt to occur when a person identifies with the ization for aggression and severity of childhood punishment aggressor and when negative emotional states exist. He also appear to be more a consequence rather than a cause of war, distinguishes between instrumental aggression that occurs as and it is this socialization that is most directly related to a means of achieving some planned end and emotional interpersonal violence. aggression that is grounded in passion and is typically spon- taneous and unplanned. The deliberate “taking out” of a star Aggressive scripts are available for use in any social con- player is quite different from a blow thrown in temper. flict, and if aggressive behavior is perceived as justified, an observer is more apt to identify with the aggressor and more Berkowitz tends to focus on emotional aggression, which apt to model the behavior. In the context of competition, the he sees as pushed out, impelled from within, although this goal of winning may entail a willingness to hurt, and this is impulsion can be influenced by external cues. He sees such easily conflated with a willingness to hurt in order to win. aggression as having both a motoric component (tightened Paradoxically, the fact that context affects the meaning of a jaw and fists, striking out, etc.) and an urge to hurt, injure, and behavior is an argument for Bandura’s behavioral definition destroy. He makes two major points. First, he argues that the of aggression as that which results in (rather than intends) emotional state that underlies emotional aggression is not harm. For example, bomber pilots often do not intend to hurt only anger, but all negative affect. He shows that the discom- civilians. Any intention to harm is embedded in the goal of fort produced by heat, cold, noise, overcrowding, frustration, carrying out a mission, and attention is directed toward mun- or free-floating annoyance lead to the increased probabil- dane means (the pilot who carried the Hiroshima bomb was ity or strength of aggressive behavior. For example, when a primarily concerned that added weight might prevent a safe student makes a mistake, other students behave more ag- takeoff). gressively when they are in a hot room (Baron, 1977), and they use more punishment than reward when they are in Many social forces inhibit aggression, and Bandura pain. Riots are more apt to occur in hot spells (Baron & (1999) has extended his earlier work by examining how ag- Ransberger, 1978), and domestic assaults occur more gression is more likely to occur when a person is morally disengaged from the victim. Such disengagement may occur by justifying the aggression, by using euphemistic labels, or

572 Aggression, Violence, Evil, and Peace frequently when air pollution is high (Rotton & Frey, 1985; reproduction of the organisms that possessed them. In its see also Berkowitz, 1982; Anderson & Anderson, 1998). original conception, instinctual behavior was viewed as a sort of drive that, like hunger, was directed toward a goal, build- Second, he asserts that the emotional state consists of a ing if it were not satisfied and becoming less and less partic- network of feelings, ideas, memories, and expressive motor ular about the ideal goal object until it could be satisfied by reactions that are associated with one another so that the acti- something that would not ordinarily be chosen. However, it is vation of one part of the net will activate other parts. Un- difficult to imagine the goal of an aggressive drive because pleasant memories will promote a negative mood, and this there are so many different functions for aggression. There is will increase the probability of negative thoughts and ag- the aggression involved in predation, in the defense of the gressive behavior. An external cue that has an aggressive young, in the struggle between males for mates, and so on. It meaning (e.g., a weapon) may activate aggressive thoughts may be better to consider instinctual aggression as comprised and—particularly if negative feelings are present—lead to an of particular behavior patterns that can be released by partic- increased probability of aggressive behavior. Thus, in the ular cues in the environment. We may then consider both classic experiment by Berkowitz and LePage (1967), angered internal and external factors that may influence these aggres- subjects delivered more shocks to their partner when guns sive patterns, as well as how the patterns may have adaptive rather than badminton rackets were in the room (for further significance. For example, in most species males engage in findings see Turner, Simons, Berkowitz, & Frodi, 1977). more intraspecies aggression than females, and this aggres- Even more disturbing, Berkowitz argued that cues associated sion is involved in the competition to fertilize females. In with pain, frustration, suffering, and aversive stimuli in gen- some species the struggle for mates involves the establish- eral may activate negative affect and increase the probability ment and defense of territory and may function to spread of aggression. Thus, Berkowitz and Frodi (1979) showed that members of a species out over territory, thus preserving food when women university students were angered and dis- supplies. tracted, they were more punitive when the child they were supervising was “funny looking” and stuttered. The activa- When we examine the human species, we find that soci- tion of negative affect does not necessarily lead to aggression. eties vary widely in the amount of aggression. However, Such behavior may be inhibited by either fear of punishment within any given society males always appear more aggres- or empathic concerns, and a person may learn to respond with sive than females. Observational studies find boys more ag- other behaviors. However, a person is susceptible to the influ- gressive than girls (E. E. Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974); teenage ence of negative moods and external stimulation, and aggres- males are more apt to offer more violent solutions (Archer & sive behavior is a “natural” response to negative affect that McDaniel, 1995); and violent crimes are more apt to be com- will tend to occur whenever self-control is reduced. mitted by men (J. Q. Wilson & Herrnstein, 1985). However, Straus and Gelles (1990) suggested that within-family Biological Perspectives aggression may be as prevalent in females. From a biological perspective, many species of animals ex- The sex differences in aggression that are found appear to hibit aggressive behavior, and we may consider a good deal of be related to testosterone, which seems to influence both the this to be instinctually based. Inasmuch as this is so, there development of the brain and some of the physiology underly- are constraints on the ease with which we can modify aggres- ing current behavior (R. T. Rubin, 1987). However, the exact sive behavior. The concept of instinct can be approached from relationship between testosterone and aggression is unclear, the view of contemporary behavioral evolutionary theory or in part because behaving aggressively appears to affect the from its original conception as used by Freud. release of testosterone and because testosterone levels may be related more to dominance behavior than to aggression as in- Behavioral Evolution tent to hurt. Mazur and Booth (1998) argued that testosterone both rises in response to a challenge to dominance and in- Rather than view aggressive behavior as a learned response, creases in winners and decreases in losers. Alternatively, van we may conceptualize aggression as the product of evolu- Creveld (2000) argued that males gravitate toward violence tionary processes, that is, behavior patterns based on genetic because their bodies are better adapted for aggressive combat influences that have persisted because they have been adap- and because the exercise of this advantage is a way for men to tive, helping members of a species survive in specific envi- solve the existential problem posed by the fact that they cannot ronments. Thus, we may find aggressive patterns of behavior bear children. They justify their existence by insisting on the programmed into the nervous system because the genes that necessity of violence and their preeminence in its exercise. served as the basis for these programs were selected by the In humans, as in other animals, it is easy to imagine how aggressive behavior in a conflict between males could result

Aggression 573 in the reproductive advantage of stronger males and, hence, by group union, there is no way to contain aggression be- that the genes of aggressive males would be more likely to be tween groups. Some propose the ideal of a union between reproduced in specific environments (Daly & Wilson, 1985). groups, but a mere ideal is not sufficient to overcome the ag- However, if we imagine early humans as existing in hunter- gressive drive of independent groups, and powerful groups gatherer groups, it seems clear that cooperative behavior are unwilling to grant sufficient power to a superordinate within the group would also contribute to survival. Even body. when the sacrifices involved in such cooperation might result in a disadvantage for a particular individual and his or her In spite of the apparent cogency of the previous argu- genes, genes related to cooperative behavior might be pre- ments, it should be noted that the consensus of contemporary served if the cooperation favored kin or others who recipro- social scientists is that there is no instinctual press for war cated the cooperation, or if the penalty of not cooperating was per se. Thus, the group gathered at Seville to examine the high, or (in certain conditions) if the group itself benefited problem declared, “It is scientifically incorrect when people (see D. S. Wilson & Sober, 1994). It seems probable that the say that war cannot be ended because it is part of human na- genetics favoring cooperative behavior may offset those fa- ture” (UNESCO, 1991, p. 10). The reasoning behind such a voring male in-group aggressiveness. However, this may not statement is well explicated by Fromm (1973). He pointed out be so when we consider intergroup combat. Thus, it has been that war, like slavery, is a human institution. Early hunter- noted that boys evidence more intragroup cooperation than gatherer groups had no reason to engage in warfare because girls when their group is in competition (Shapira & Madsen, there were no goods to plunder. Far from being an aspect of 1974). In his studies on the conflict between Hindus and “primitive” man, warfare develops along with the develop- Muslims, Kakar (1996) observed that when boys and girls ment of civilization. Agriculture and animal husbandry lead were asked to construct an “exciting” scene with toys and to surpluses and the development of specializations and hier- dolls identifiable as Hindu or Muslim, the boys constructed archies of power that then become involved in the conquest of scenes of violence whereas the girls created scenes of family other peoples. Fromm pointed out that there were and still are life. Further, Thompson (1999) has pointed out that group se- peaceful peoples, as well as evidence for a relatively high de- lection may also have favored the selection of aggressive gree of civilization in a number of matrilocal societies that individuals who are willing to die for their group when it is in existed before warfare began. Of course, these facts do not combat. preclude a possible instinctive base for the in-group biases that are so prevalent whenever groups must share resources. Freudian Theory Culture interfaces with a biological base for both cooperation and violence. Although chimpanzees show extensive cooper- Freud’s psychoanalytic theory is written from a biological ative behavior, Blanchard and Blanchard (2000) pointed out perspective that is based on the older idea of instincts as dri- that they also form raiding parties and that this aggressiveness ves or needs. The development of his thinking about aggres- is inhibited when they are afraid. sion is complex and has been described and critiqued by Fromm (1973). Taken literally, few would agree with Freud’s Conflict Theories conceptualization. However, on a metaphoric level his theory allows a rather elegant statement of a viable theoretical posi- Rather than focus on aggression as the response of individu- tion, best expressed in his letter to Albert Einstein on the als, we may examine the role it plays in the relations between cause of war (Freud, 1933). Working in the manner of evolu- people, as a way of wining conflicts, establishing dominance, tionary biologists today, Freud assumed that early humans or managing impression. This more sociological approach lived in small groups. He postulated that these groups were may be linked to both emotion and biology. Regarding emo- initially dominated by the compelling aggression of the tion, I proposed that anger is best regarded as a response to a strongest male. This dominance could eventually be over- challenge to what a person asserts ought to exist (de Rivera, come by an aggressive union of weaker males. However, 1977, 1981). I argued that when persons become angry, they such a union had to be maintained by the growth of law and are attempting to remove a challenge in a way that is analo- feelings of unity. As Freud (1933, p. 276) put it, “Here, I be- gous to an animal defending territory. Learned aggressive lieve we have all the essentials: violence overcome by the responses are recruited to serve this end. transference of power to a larger unity, which is held together by emotional ties between its members.” As Freud surveyed Considering aggression as an aspect of conflict is close to history he was not encouraged by what he saw. Although ag- the biological perspective in that it considers the function of gression within groups is contained by laws that are enforced aggression in a specific cultural environment. In game theory the choice of a competitive or mistrustful, rather than cooper- ative, strategy may be regarded as involving aggression in the

574 Aggression, Violence, Evil, and Peace sense that benefits to the self are sought without regard for in- make it difficult for the conflict to subside. These involve psy- jury to the other. Research shows how many situations se- chological transformations. When groups are involved, there duce persons to play aggressively even when this is not in are changes in group and community dynamics. The psycho- their best interest (Deutsch, 1958). And the game theory used logical changes that occur involve the development of nega- in the study of conflict is enriched by utilizing the perspective tive attitudes and beliefs about the other, the development of of evolutionary biology (D. S. Wilson, 1998). competitive and hostile goals, and the deindividuation and dehumanization discussed earlier. As R. K. White (1984) de- Scheff (1999) asserted that emotional sequences play a scribed, an intensely negative image of the other begins to de- crucial role in both interpersonal and intergroup conflict, and velop, and the other becomes regarded as immoral, inhuman, he focused on the roles of pride and shame as signals of soli- and evil. When groups are involved, they become polarized. darity and alienation. He argued that if shame is acknowl- They become increasingly extreme in hostile attitudes and de- edged, connections of solidarity and trust can be built. velop norms that resist compromise as well as contentious However, shame is often unacknowledged. Such unacknowl- group goals that contribute to in-group solidarity at the ex- edged shame may involve painful feeling with little ideation pense of the out-group. They select militant leaders, become and is often signaled by furtiveness. When it is bypassed, it more liable to the problems of groupthink (Janis, 1983), and involves rapid thoughts that occur with little feeling and is initiate the development of militant subgroups. The entire accompanied by hostility or withdrawal from the other in community may become polarized as members are forced to ways that mask the shame. The unacknowledged shame feeds choose sides and neutrality becomes impossible without one’s on itself, and the person becomes ashamed that he or she is loyalty becoming questioned. ashamed, experiences a panic state, or enters a humiliated fury. A typical pattern is to mask the shame with anger, and VIOLENCE AND ITS CONTROL Scheff sees such shame-anger loops at the heart of destruc- tive conflicts. He suggested that they account for the need for Violence seems to imply a damaging of the other, a hurting vengeance and are at the heart of deterrence strategy. The that is more than temporary pain. However, what is consid- danger of appearing weak, the underlying unacknowledged ered to be violent often seems to depend on one’s side. Thus, shame, is euphemistically treated as face-saving and status Blumenthal, Kahn, Andrews, and Head (1972) found that competition. persons tend to distinguish between the violence of those they dislike and the “justified force” of groups they favor. Seeing aggression as an aspect of conflict reminds us that Further, the violence that is ordinarily considered is the direct at least two parties are involved and that aggression increases violence involved in using force to injure, damage, or destroy as the parties respond to one another. In their examination a person or to violate unjustly a person’s rights. We tend to of conflicts between individuals, groups, and nations, J. Z. overlook indirect violence. In this section on violence we Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim (1994) described how conflicts esca- consider the many forms of direct violence that occur be- late in aggressiveness. This escalation occurs in different tween persons, within communities, and in and between soci- ways: Influence attempts move from light to heavy tactics, eties. However, we also consider the violence that is done from persuasive attempts to threats and violence; issues pro- when human beings are distorted and prevented from devel- liferate from small to large so that parties become increas- oping their potential, the structural violence described by ingly involved in the conflict and commit more resources to Galtung (1969). it; issues move from the specific to the general so that the relationship between parties deteriorates; motivation shifts Personal Violence from simply doing well for the self to winning and then to hurting the other; and participants may grow from few to Violence often occurs in an interpersonal context. We first many. Thus, the strength of the aggressive responses (from a consider men who are particularly prone to violence, and harsh word to a physical threat), the generalization of the at- then examine family violence, rape, and bullying. tack (from one aspect of behavior to a description of charac- ter), and the extensity of the conflict (from a disagreement Violent Men over one thing to disagreements over many) all may increase. Men committed about 90% of the violent crimes between Fortunately, such conflicts often subside, decreasing as for- 1960 and 1980 in the United States (J. Q. Wilson & bearance prevails, tempers cool, and apologies are made. This is particularly true when the parties to the conflict have com- mon interests and a history of cooperation. However, conflicts that spiral and escalate may lead to structural changes that

Violence and Its Control 575 Herrnstein, 1985). Although this percentage is changing (it is involved in Toch’s bullying category) from violent thrill now 83%), men are more apt to be involved, and some are seeking. They argued that the former is an addictive process, particularly prone to violence. Thus, Berkowitz (1993) cited while the latter is more the sporadic sensation seeking of the a number of studies that present evidence for a degree of vio- bored (and often drunk and impulsive). They estimated that lent consistency across situations and across time. For exam- sadism may develop in about 5% of persons who are repeat- ple, Farrington (1989) reported on a longitudinal study of edly violent and possibly explained by Solomon’s (1980) 400 working-class males that lived in a section of London. opponent process theory. By contrast, they saw violent thrill Youths and their parents were periodically interviewed; seeking as motivated by boredom combined with high sensa- teachers rated their behavior; and court records were exam- tion seeking and low impulse control (and more likely to ined. Of the 100 youths who were most aggressive at age 9, occur under the influence of alcohol). Both processes are, of 14% had been convicted of a violent offense by age 21 as course, opposed by any guilt feelings an individual may have. compared with 4% of the other boys. A third process involves threatened egoism and, at first Aggressive scripts appear to be much more prevalent in glance, appears to be related to Toch’s category of self-image some subcultures, are available to groups, and are promoted promoting and defending. However, Toch views his category by negative affect. Thus, Dunning, Murphy, and Williams as involving persons who are not convinced of their own (1988) documented how the British football hooligans, who worth, while Baumeister and Campbell feel that the process “have an aggro” and violently attack strangers, are working- they are describing is more a reaction when a narcissistic class males who grow up in families where they witness, re- view of the self is threatened. This disparity may involve ceive, and are coached in violence until many enjoy the skills some important distinctions (along with some semantic and and thrills involved. However, it should also be noted that the measurement issues). Baumeister, Smart, and Boden’s (1996) studies showing how particular people are prone to violence literature review seemed to show that aggressors tend to have also reveal the inaccuracy of prediction over time. Many peo- favorable, even grandiose, views of the self, and Bushman ple change to become more or less aggressive as they age. and Baumeister’s (1998) laboratory study showed the highest And it must also be realized that the reactions of others can aggression coming from the injured self-esteem of insulted amplify initial marginal deviance so that greater problems narcissists. However, the review article often involved the develop (Caprara & Zimbardo, 1996). aggression of psychopaths and rapists whom Toch would classify as egocentric, and narcissism also implies egocen- What are the motivations behind violent crime? Using tricity. We may need to distinguish the inflated (and narcis- peer interviews of 69 men who had records for repeated vio- sistic) self-esteem of the bully from the poor self-esteem of lence, Toch (1969/1993) distinguished nine types of motiva- other violent persons. tional processes. His most frequent classification (used to describe 28 cases) involved the promoting or defending of a The previous analyses are useful in understanding persons self-image that seemed to be constructed as a compensation whose violence is not condoned by the society in which they for the fact that the person was not convinced of his own live, but how may we understand the tolerated violence of worth. By contrast, another 16 cases involved a basic ego- leaders such as Hitler, Stalin, or Poi Pot, lieutenants such as centrism that evidenced a complete lack of empathy with Himmler or Goering, or the masses involved in publicly others, who were simply seen as objects. Although Toch sponsored killings such as those that occurred in the Roman demonstrated that his classification can be used with some coliseum or any number of blatant purges and massacres? reliability, it is clear that often more than one process is in- Although we may assume a certain amount of egocentricity, volved, and his main concern was to point out that violence objectification, and lack of empathy, there appear to be should not be treated as homogeneous. He also pointed out deeper motivational reasons, the sort of instinctual tendency that once a man has been involved in violence, he may de- for destruction postulated by Freud. An alternative is sug- velop a habit of using violence. Violence creates its own gested by Fromm’s (1973) analysis of destructive character needs and reinforces the very insecurities and egocentricity structure. Fromm distinguished between a biologically adap- that was its source, and a person may define the self in a way tive aggression that humans share with other animals and a that makes violence more probable in the future. malignant aggression that is distinctly human and maladap- tively destructive, a point discussed more fully when we con- Baumeister and Campbell (1999) distinguished three dis- sider the nature of evil. One of the character structures he tinct processes that they believe may be involved in an intrin- describes involves the worship of technique and the fusion of sic appeal to commit violent acts (as opposed to instrumental technique with the destructiveness seen in modern warfare. motives for either selfish or idealistic ends). They differenti- This may be objectively measured and related to political ated sadism (the pleasure of inflicting suffering or terror

576 Aggression, Violence, Evil, and Peace attitudes that favor military power and the repression of dis- have more or less parental and social skills, impulse control, sent (see M. Maccoby, 1972). and ability to manage stress. And the interaction occurs in a context that may or may not provide helpful or aggressive Family Violence models, be stressful, or lend social support. To some extent this overall model for understanding may also be applicable Although there are obvious differences between child abuse to sexual abuse. However, sexual abuse seems less dependent and domestic violence, it seems important to relate these on societal stress and more on personality factors such as two types of violence to each other and to the rather ne- high familial dependence, psychopathy, or pedophilic ten- glected topic of sibling abuse. For example, Patterson (1982) dencies (Rist, 1979), or, more generally, as having its origin showed that the families of antisocial and abused children within perpetrators rather than in the interaction between per- fail to provide consistent and effective discipline when chil- petrator and victim (Haugaard, 1988). dren are aggressive, fail to monitor their whereabouts, and do not provide positive reinforcement for prosocial skills. He Domestic abuse in the sense of partner abuse is often suggested that in such families, a problem child learns to be attributed to male batterers, and the U.S. Department of Justice aggressive by attacking and dominating siblings, and a sam- (1995) reported about twice as many wives and girlfriends ple of such children shows that they attack siblings at almost killed by husbands and boyfriends as the converse 10 times the normal rate, as well as being involved in hitting (1,500:700). However, a telephone survey of 6,000 married or their fathers and mothers and being hit by them (Patterson, cohabiting couples found that as many females as males ap- 1986). peared to be involved in partner violence (Straus & Gelles, 1990). In many cases of extreme violence the superior physi- One often thinks of child abuse as involving physical or cal strength of the males was offset by the more frequent use of sexual abuse. However, by far the most prevalent form of weapons by females. In a similar vein, surveys of lesbian cou- abuse involves neglect. Thus, Sedlak (1990) reported an inci- ples have found as much or more violence as in heterosexual dence rate of 14.6 per 1,000 as contrasted with rates of 4.9 for couples (Waldner-Haugrud, Gratch, & Magruder, 1997). physical abuse and 2.1 for sexual abuse. Parental neglect usu- ally occurs in situations of low family income and education Regardless of the degree to which violence in perpetrated and often where there is a high level of stress and a lack of so- by males, it seems important to distinguish between differ- cial support (Garbarino, 1991). In such situations there is ent sorts of perpetrators. Holtzworth-Munroe (2000) distin- probably less parental maturity, less knowledge about child guished between three groups of men involved in marital development, and a greater degree of attachment distur- violence: Those who become violent within the family only bances. Further, mothers (and one presumes fathers) may be as a result of an inability to manage conflict escalation; those quite depressed, and this may contribute to the neglect of who have difficulty with trust issues and become overly de- children (see Pianta, Egeland, & Erickson, 1989). Poverty pendent on their wives, resorting to violence when their and the lack of social support also appear to be a factor in needs are not met; and those who are antisocial and violent in both physical and sexual abuse. all relationships. Clearly, the management of domestic abuse in each of these cases requires quite different strategies. In Azar (1991) pointed out that in order to understand fully some cases couples therapy seems appropriate, but in others how abuse occurs we must look at the interpersonal dynam- it would simply prolong abuse. In some cases separation of- ics that occur within the social context. Her investigations of fers a solution. However, Hart (1992) reported that about abusive mothers reveal that they often misperceive a child’s 75% of emergency room visits and calls to law enforcement, behavior. If a 3-year-old spills a glass of milk, the mother and 50% of the homicides, occur after separation. may perceive willful disobedience and may lack the skills to cope with what she perceives as a challenge to her authority. Intervention programs attempting to teach men anger Learned patterns of aggression that occur in a situation per- management and conflict resolution skills in small groups ceived as a struggle for dominance may account for a good typically report a 53% to 83% success rate (Edleson, 1996). deal of physical abuse. In any case, in their review of theories Although these rates are encouraging, the lower percentages of child abuse, Azar, Povilaitis, Lauretti, and Pouquette occur when there is a longer follow-up time and when suc- (1998) argued that the best way to understand child abuse is cess is based on the reports of the victims or on arrest rates. to focus on how a parent interacts with a child in a social sit- Further, the rates are based on men who complete the pro- uation that is influenced by both societal and cultural factors. grams (which last from 10 to 36 sessions) and appear to The interaction will be influenced by a child who may be ignore differences in different types of abusers. In one eval- more or less pleasing and difficult and by a mother who may uation, of about 500 men who contacted the program, only 283 attended the first session, and only 153 completed the

Violence and Its Control 577 sessions. Programs are also available for the treatment of (Boulton & Underwood, 1992). So defined, Bernstein and aggressive women (see Leisring, Dowd, & Rosenbaum, Watson (1997) reported that from 7% to 10 % of U.S. school in press), although these may face the same attendance prob- children are victimized by about another 7% of the children lems as do the men’s programs. who are active bullies. Similar percentages are found in Great Britain (Atlas & Pepler, 1998), with prevalence highest in the Rape middle-school years. The average bully appears to have nor- mal self-esteem (see Bernstein & Watson, 1997), and the Estimation of the prevalence of rape depends a great deal average victim has less self-perceived social competence on how it is defined and how the statistics are collected compared with other members of their peer group (Egan & (Muehlenhard, Powch, Phelps, & Giusti, 1992). In a well- Perry, 1998). There are a number of detrimental aspects to designed study involving over 3,000 college women, 15% bullying. Those who are bullied feel unsafe at school and ap- reported that they had experienced unwanted sexual penetra- pear to be at risk for illness, failure, and depression (Wylie, tion because a man had used physical force or given them 2000). The bullies begin to think that they can get what they alcohol or drugs, and an additional 12% reported having had want by using power to dominate others, something that to resist physical force (Koss, Gigycz, & Wisniewski, 1987). often fails to work in adult life (Oliver, Hoover, & Hazler, Few of these instances were reported, and many may not 1994). In addition, the majority of children who witness the have been termed “rape” or recognized as such. bullying typically feel fear and fail to intervene. Thus, they may be being trained to be ineffective bystanders. Fortu- After years of study, Malamuth (1998) presented data nately, it is possible to train teachers, students, and parents in showing that coercive sex is most apt to be perpetrated by ways to intervene. Such training, involving the entire com- males who have both an orientation toward impersonal sex munity, has proven effective in Scandinavia, where programs (often related to a violent childhood) and a hostile masculin- have reduced bullying by 50% (Olweus, 1991, 1993). ity (involving feelings of rejection and a desire to dominate women). To some extent these risk factors may be mitigated Community Violence by the ability to empathize. Although it sometimes takes personal forms, some types of If the problem of sexual aggression were only a problem violence are more communal than interpersonal. Among such of restraining a relatively small percentage of males, it might forms are riots, gang extortion and warfare, and police vio- be fairly easily addressed. Unfortunately, it seems clear that lence. Although space considerations prevent an adequate larger percentages can be influenced by subcultural norms in discussion of these forms of violence, some contemporary some gangs, military units, sports teams, and fraternities. work may be noted. These subcultures suggest that what seems like rape to some is merely normal masculine action. Such norms encourage Riots the objectification of women as sexual objects and the rein- forcement of rape myths (O’Toole, 1997). Fortunately, it ap- The failure of structural factors in predicting which cities pears that it may be possible to create intervention programs would have the most commodity riots, together with difficul- that decrease the acceptance of such norms (Flores & ties in satisfactorily predicting which individuals would par- Hartlaub, 1998). However, it may also be possible to create ticipate in them, has led McPhail (1994) to abandon both conditions such as war that lead men to rape. structural strain and relative deprivation as predictors and to advocate extending Snyder’s (1979) work of examining the Although we have been examining rape as a form of factors that affect the interpersonal processes that assemble a personal violence, rape may also be used impersonally as an riot. Such an approach inquires into communication patterns instrument of war (Copelon, 1995). Enloe (2000) pointed out and the motives of individuals as they assemble to engage in the different ways in which such militarized rape may be collective goals. McPhail argued that it is important to distin- used to achieve political objectives and may become institu- guish between collective goals that do not intend violence tionalized. The brutality of such rape is particularly devastat- (although violence may result) and collective goals that do ing because victims are often subsequently rejected by their intend violence (as is the case with England’s football hooli- own communities (Turshen, 2000). gans). It would also seem wise to consider the group emo- tions that can occur when group members share attitudes and Bullying and Malicious Gossip have a common sentience (see K. K. Smith & Crandell, A defining aspect of bullying is that the behavior occurs re- peatedly so that there is a pattern of abuse and intimidation

578 Aggression, Violence, Evil, and Peace 1984). Such group emotion may play a role in the generation created by gang warfare (and by civil war in general) is the of crowd violence in cases where police suppositions of vio- impact that violence has on children. Kostelny and Garbarino lence may create a self-fulfilling prophecy of violence in (2001) pointed out that in some Chicago neighborhoods, 38% sports fans (Stott & Reicher, 1998). of elementary school children have seen a dead body outside, and 21% have had someone threaten to shoot them. They A nuanced account of the group emotions involved in have noted how repeated violence often leads to regression, a riots is provided by Kakar’s (2000) description of the pro- loss of trust, sense of no future, and increased aggressive be- tracted communal clashes between Hindus and Muslims in havior. They propose a series of measures to counteract these Hyderabad, India. After a skillful delineation of economic, affects, including home visiting and early education pro- political, historical, demographic, social-psychological, and grams, as well as specific violence prevention programs at psychoanalytic accounts, he focused on the psychological both the elementary- and middle-school levels. shifts that occur at the outbreak of violence. He noted how the character of rumors begins to change from general threats to One might think that children who have suffered the sort rumors that the body is threatened by previously benign sub- of violence that occurs when civil society has disintegrated stances, how the boundaries of individuals with peaceful reli- would themselves become violent. However, this is not nec- gious identities and a basic sense of trust become replaced by essarily so. What sort of moral character might develop in a transcendent communal identity with a propensity for anxi- South Africa, where, after the violence of apartheid, children ety and violence, how individual behavior becomes governed were subjected to criminal, domestic, and vigilante violence, by a different sort of morality, and how a history of coexis- often with a lack of clarity about the reasons for the violence? tence is replaced by a history of violence. Of course, these Dawes (1994) reported that the majority of children do not shifts are perpetrated by demagogues, and much of the vio- appear to have become violent or even to seek retaliation. In lence is perpetrated by gangs of young people, but Kakar’s fact, many evidence an increased empathy. He points out that point is that the entire community is caught up in altered moral behavior is learned in a sociocultural context. People identities and that certain norms are still in existence that en- construct their identities and reputations as members of able people to return to their traditional religious identities groups and learn moral conduct in settings that assign re- and live in relative harmony after the violence subsides. sponsibility to the roles that people chose to play. Hence, children may learn that violence is called for in one situation Gangs and Gang Warfare but immoral in another. Although a culture may arise and lead some to assume violent roles, such violence is not automati- In 1996 there were about 31,000 gangs with approximately cally produced by being exposed to violence but is subject to 846,000 members in the United States (Office of Juvenile Jus- the rhetoric and morality developed by a group in a situation. tice and Delinquency Prevention, 1998). It seems likely that gangs develop whenever societies fragment and lower-class Merely increasing the number of police in an area high in males lack access to legitimate sources of power and prestige. gang crime does not seem to be effective, but a study by It might be interesting to study gangs as quasi states. Fritsch, Caeti, and Taylor (1999) suggested that if the addi- Certainly, delinquent gangs involve symbols of identification tional police focus on curfew and truancy enforcement, it is for group membership, territorial claims, leadership power possible to reduce gang-related crime. However, many inves- struggles, in-group protection, and out-group antagonism tigators argue that suppression is less effective than social in- (Capozzoli & McVey, 2000). When the Soviet Union terventions that offer centers of activity for at-risk youth collapsed, hundreds of violent groups emerged who, as before they become involved in gangs (Spergel & Grossman, Volkov (2000, p. 709) noted, “intimidated, protected, gath- 1997), and there is some evidence that such centers are effec- ered information, settled disputes, gave guaranties, enforced tive alternatives (Thurman, Giacomazzi, Reisig, & Mueller, contracts and taxed.” He argued that these entrepreneurs 1996). of violence created organizations that were essentially “violence-managing agencies.” The more successful gradu- The Use of Violence in Social Control ally became legitimized by becoming involved in prosocial activities and absorbed in the process of state formation. Unfortunately, the process of maintaining social control often involves violence and far more violence than appears justifi- Hill, Howell, Hawkins, and Battin-Pearson (1999) noted able. In fact, it may be argued that punishment and the use of four risk factors that predict adolescent involvement in any violence, as opposed to an aggressive use of force and gangs. On the community level these include poverty, high physical restraint, fails to deter violence and cannot be justi- rates of mobility, and dysfunctional norms. A crucial problem fied (Gilligan, 2000). When violence is used, it may occur in