The English version of the Cambridge Philosophical History 1870-1945

section fifteen LAW AND POLITICS Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

62 HANS KELSEN AND NORMATIVE LEGAL POSITIVISM stanley l. paulson Hans Kelsen’s fundamental contributions to legal philosophy are accompanied by seminal work in political theory and on problems of constitutional law and public international law. There are also forays into anthropological speculation, important studies of classical philosophers, most notably Plato, and much more of interest along the way. It is in legal philosophy, however, that Kelsen made his mark. As early as 1934,the erudite Roscoe Pound wrote that Kelsen was ‘unquestionably the leading jurist of the time’ (Pound 1933–4: 532), and to this day many in jurisprudential circles endorse Pound’s assessment. Three phases of development in Kelsen’s theory can be distinguished: an early phase, ‘critical constructivism’ (1911–21); then the long, ‘classical’ or ‘Neo- Kantian’ phase (1921–60), including in the 1920s the formation, around Kelsen, of the Vienna School of Legal Theory; and, finally, the late, ‘sceptical’ phase (1960–73). The early phase is seen most clearly in Kelsen’s first major treatise, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre (Kelsen 1911). One of Kelsen’s central aims in the early phase – but not just there – is to establish legal science as a ‘normative’ discipline, by which he understands a discipline that is addressed to normative material and whose statements are formulated in normative language. Toward this end, he attempts to ‘construct’ the fundamental concepts of the law, for, as he argues, to understand these concepts correctly is to understand them as peculiarly normative – and not, then, as amenable to expression in factual terms. Kelsen’s classical or Neo-Kantian phase is commonly known as the Pure Theory of Law. Lasting four decades, it is ushered in by two major develop- ments. First, going well beyond the work of his early phase, Kelsen begins in the 1920stoattempt to set out the rudiments of a Neo-Kantian argument, not only for some of the constructions of the Hauptprobleme and other early writings, but also, and more fundamentally, as a means of resolving the normativity proble- matic (to which I return below). Second, no later than 1923,Kelsen adopts lock, stock, and barrel Adolf Julius Merkl’s doctrine of hierarchical structure (Stufenbaulehre) (see Kelsen 1923–4: 377–408), which offers a dynamic charac- terisation of the law ‘in motion, in the constantly regenerating process of its 739 Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

740 Stanley L. Paulson self-creation’ (Kelsen 1934: §43 [1992: 91]; Merkl 1917 is an early statement of the Stufenbaulehre;the most complete statement is Merkl 1931). Kelsen aside, Merkl was far and away the most significant figure in the Vienna School of Legal Theory. Kelsen’s adoption of Merkl’s Stufenbaulehre is also the genesis of Kelsen’s fruitful interest in questions on the character of the legal system. Finally, Kelsen’s late, sceptical phase emerges in the period 1959–62, marking his abandonment of the Kantian doctrines familiar from the classical phase. Now he defends a voluntaristic or ‘will’ theory of law instead, the very type of theory he criticised so vehemently in both earlier phases. 1.THE NORMATIVITY THESIS The aspect of Kelsen’s theory that has enjoyed the most attention is the norma- tive dimension of his legal positivism. Kelsen recasts the terms of the traditional debate, and it is well to begin there, lest the force of his own arguments be missed. When Kant, in a well-known passage in the Rechtslehre, poses the classical philosophical question ‘What is law?’ (Kant 1797: §B[1991: 55, trans. altered]), he is following a juridico-philosophical tradition that extends over two millennia. Couched in terms of reason or, alternatively, in terms of will, the leading answers are familiar – natural law theory on the one hand, legal positivism or legal voluntarism on the other. Indeed, the tradition in legal phi- losophy is often said to consist of variations of these two types of legal theory (see e.g. Alexy 1992 [2002]). Going a step further, many writers assume that natural law theory and tra- ditional, fact-based legal positivism are together exhaustive of the possibilities on the ‘nature of law’ problematic: tertium non datur,there is no third possibility (see e.g. the papers in Maihofer 1962). Pretenders, theories that purport to be distinct from both traditional types of theory, turn out to be disguised versions of one or the other. The argument on behalf of tertium non datur is straightforward: since natural law theory is characterised in terms of the morality thesis, namely, the idea that there is a conceptually necessary connection between the law and morality at some juncture or another, and since legal positivism is characterised in terms of the separation thesis, the contradictory of the morality thesis, the theories exhaust the possibilities. This is Kelsen’s point of departure. But far from endorsing the idea that natural law theory and traditional, fact-based legal positivism together exhaust the possibilities, Kelsen challenges it. So long as the competing types of theory are characterised in terms of a single pair of theses (the separation and morality theses), they will indeed appear to be together exhaustive of the possibilities. Kelsen insists, however, that a second pair of theses, the facticity and normativity Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

Hans Kelsen and normative legal positivism 741 theses, plays every bit as fundamental a role in the ‘nature of law’ problematic as the traditional pair, the separation and morality theses. Seen historically, Kelsen is drawing this second pair of theses, facticity and normativity, from the Baden or Heidelberg Neo-Kantians, who in the name of ‘methodological dualism’ insisted on a hard and fast distinction between Sein and Sollen, ‘is’ and ‘ought’ (Kelsen 1911: 7–11 et passim,and see Paulson 1996 [1998: 27–32]). Seen, however, from the standpoint of Kelsen’s juridico-philosophical reconstruction of the traditional theories, the facticity thesis has it that the law is ultimately explicable in terms of a concatenation of fact, and precisely this position is denied by the normativity thesis, the contradictory of the facticity thesis. Appealing to both pairs of theses to show that the two traditional types of theory are not together exhaustive of the possibilities after all, Kelsen places his own theory within this framework as a new type of theory, representing a ‘middle way’ (Kelsen 1960: §34(g) [1967: 211], see generally Paulson 1992; Raz 1981 [1998]). His theory is new in bringing together the separation and normativity theses, and it counts as a middle way between the traditional theories in taking from each of them what is defensible (the separation thesis from legal positivism and the normativity thesis from natural law theory) (see, on the latter, Kelsen 1911: 7; Raz 1974 [1998: 67]; Ross 1961 [1998: 159–61]), while leaving behind what is not defensible (the facticity thesis from legal positivism and the morality thesis from natural law theory). In defending a version of the separation thesis, which in later formulations resembles its British counterpart (see Hart 1957–8 [1983]), Kelsen is speaking as the legal positivist. In replying to a host of European predecessors and colleagues in the field, however, he takes a tack that distinguishes his position sharply from the legal positivism of the continental tradition. Whereas proponents of traditional legal positivism defend the facticity thesis, Kelsen, defending the normativity thesis, calls for an explication of the law – and of legal obligation in particular – altogether independently of fact. The ensuing theory – the Pure Theory of Law – has given rise to a great variety of interpretations. Kelsen’s own persuasion is Neo-Kantian. A number of doctrinal themes of Kantian import are evident in Kelsen’s texts, among them – sketched below – the juridico- transcendental question, the constitutive function of legal science, and peripheral imputation as intellectual category. In addition, there is the inevitable question of how Kelsen’s basic norm is to be understood. 2.THE PURE THEORY OF LAW Kant writes in the Critique of Pure Reason that he will call ‘all cognition tran- scendental that is occupied not so much with objects but with our manner of Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

742 Stanley L. Paulson cognition of objects insofar as this is to be possible a priori’ (Kant 1787:B25 [1998: 133 and 133 note a]). This distinctive reading of ‘transcendental’ flags the conditions for the possibility of Erkenntnis or cognition. Kelsen, following the lead of other fin de si` ecle Neo-Kantians who sought to apply elements of Kant’s transcendental philosophy to the standing disciplines, looks to the conditions for the possibility of Rechtserkenntnis or legal cognition. In ‘Rechtswissenschaft und Recht’, he alludes to a formulation of the juridico-transcendental question proffered by his younger colleague Fritz Sander (Kelsen 1922b: 128), and then, in Philosophical Foundations of Natural Law Theory and Legal Positivism,heposes the juridico-transcendental question himself: ‘How is positive law qua object of cognition, qua object of cognitive legal science, possible?’ (Kelsen 1928 [1945: 437, trans. altered]). In effect, Kelsen is asking for an argument in support of the constitutive function of cognitive legal science. This constitutive function of cognitive legal science remains prominent throughout Kelsen’s classical phase. Cognitive legal science has the task of cre- ating a ‘unified legal system’ from the ‘chaotic material’ of the law, from its ‘statutes, regulations, judicial decisions, administrative acts, and the like’ (Kelsen 1922b: 181–2). Just as natural science ‘creates’ its object, namely, nature qua sys- tem of synthetic a priori judgements, so likewise cognitive legal science ‘creates’ its object, the law qua materially unified system of legal norms (1922b: 181). That which is constituted by cognitive legal science manifests the structure of the hypothetically formulated or ‘reconstructed’ legal norm (see e.g. Kelsen 1925: §10(e), pp. 54–5,and see Kelsen 1934 [1992:Appendix I, at Suppl. Note 5, 132–4]). The key to its distinctive structure lies with the intellectual category of cognitive legal science. Imputation qua category of cognitive legal science, Kelsen argues, can be com- pared directly to causality qua category in the natural sciences (see Kelsen 1934: §11(b) [1992: 23–4]). Specifically, Kelsen understands the category as making possible the attribution of a material fact (say, the elements of a delict) to a sub- ject, thereby establishing the subject’s legal liability. When Kelsen writes that the legal ‘ought’ designates ‘a relative apriori category for comprehending empiri- cal legal data’ (§11(b) [24–5]), he has the category of imputation in mind. It is ‘cognitively and theoretically transcendental in terms of the Kantian philosophy, not metaphysically transcendent’ (§11(b) [25]). The basic norm, too, is a concept profoundly informed by Kantian doctrines. ‘In formulating the basic norm, the Pure Theory of Law is not aiming to in- augurate a new method for jurisprudence.’ Rather, it ‘aims simply to raise to the level of consciousness what all jurists are doing (for the most part unwit- tingly) when, in conceptualizing their object of enquiry, they . . . understand the positive law as a valid system, that is, as norm, and not merely as factual Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

Hans Kelsen and normative legal positivism 743 contingencies of motivation’ (§29 [p. 58]). A more exacting description of the basic norm presupposes, however, a reconstruction of Kelsen’s theory from within the framework of this or that Neo-Kantian persuasion. Though Kelsen himself refers at several points in his writings to Hermann Cohen, the leading figure of Marburg Neo-Kantianism, the textual evidence suggests that here, too, Kelsen’s primary debt is to the Baden or Heidelberg Neo-Kantians. Kelsen’s programme is not in the end workable. Unlike Kant’s own enterprise, it shares a flaw fatal to various species of Neo-Kantianism. In Kant’s theory, fail- ure to satisfy the conditions for cognition that are set by the categories of the understanding undermines cognition altogether; there is no alternative basis for cognition. The various species of quasi-Kantian category, however, adduced by the Neo-Kantians for application to one or another of the standing disciplines, have no comparable force; an alternative explanation of the data in question is always at hand. Be that as it may, Kelsen succeeds in singlehandedly recast- ing the terms of the juridico-philosophical debate – itself an achievement of fundamental significance. In lending a new perspective to the problem of normativity in the law and in introducing useful analytical devices, among them the legal sentence or propo- sition (Rechtssatz)asapropositional counterpart to the legal norm (see Kelsen 1941–2 [1957: 268–9], Kelsen 1960 [1967]: §16 [pp. 71–5], cf. von Wright 1963: 104–5), Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law is forward looking. But his fascination with the idea, adapting Kant’s phrase, of putting the study of the law on the sure path of science – unmistakable in the Pure Theory from beginning to end – harks back to nineteenth-century constructivism in the law (see chapter 23 in this volume, ‘Legal theory’). From this standpoint, the Pure Theory is anachro- nistic. Its survival in an environment increasingly hostile to nineteenth-century constructivism is a tribute to Kelsen’s genius generally and to the appeal of his approach to the problem of normativity in particular. Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

63 THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC STATE: DEFENCES AND DEVELOPMENTS richard bellamy The allies portrayed their defeat of Germany in 1918 as the triumph of liberal democracy over authoritarianism, a victory marked by the establishment of the League of Nations and the creation of the Weimar Republic. However, the Russian Revolution, the rise of fascism and the economic depression of the 1930s almost immediately placed liberal democrats on the defensive. Critics argued that mass democracy and the spread of bureaucracy within both the private and public sectors had rendered the liberal ethic of the autonomous individual an anachronism. The corporate manager had replaced the entrepreneur within the economy, and the manipulation of popular opinion by the media and party machines had supplanted rational debate between disinterested individuals in politics. Individual identity and will were shaped by functional, ethnic and cultural group membership rather than innate preferences and capabilities, the exercise of reason, or effort. New social and economic conditions required novel forms of political and industrial organisation that combined decisive and expert leadership with efficient administration, thereby harnessing popular support and energy to the collective good in a manner supposedly unavailable to liberals. The economic crisis was taken as confirming this diagnosis of liberal democracy’s malaise. The challenge to liberal democracy was threefold, therefore, involving an attack on the contemporary relevance of the market, representative democracy, and the values underlying them. In their various defences against such criticisms, the divisions amongst liberals were often as sharp as (and frequently mirrored) those between them and their opponents. Like the pre-war debates, disagree- ment centred on the role and nature of the state, the legitimacy and efficacy of its interventions in social life, and the parts played by democracy and leader- ship within its operations. Progressive liberals continued the attempt to find a via media between individualism and collectivism in economics, democracy and expertise in politics, and between both religion and scientific humanism, on the one hand, and universalism and a progressive and pragmatic historicism, on the other, in ethics and epistemology (Kloppenberg 1986). They conceded certain 744 Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

The liberal democratic state: defences 745 of their critics’ objections but argued the liberal ethos could be preserved and rethought in ways suited to the new circumstances of the mass, corporate age. However, others counter-attacked with a robust defence of laissez-faire and in- dividual rights, many simply equivocated, combining elements of both these strategies in occasionally inconsistent ways, whilst an appropriately small camp adopted a somewhat elegiac and often elitist tone, whereby liberalism became the creed of a happy few. Finally, a number of liberals, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, changed their allegiance to either fascism or communism. Which position predominated was as much a reflection of the political and social en- vironment as the predilections of individual thinkers. We shall first examine the established liberal democracies of Britain and the United States, therefore, where a more social democratic liberalism prevailed, and then turn to countries such as Germany, Austria, and Italy, where liberal democracy was under threat and a sharper division between liberalism, on the one hand, and socialism and democracy, on the other, appeared appropriate. 1.TOWARDS SOCIAL DEMOCRACY: BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES The liberal grounds for state regulation and welfare had been largely laid out at the turn of the century by British new liberals, such as L. T. Hobhouse, the French Solidaristes, such as Leon Bourgeois, and American progressives, such as John Dewey (Bellamy 1992; Kloppenberg 1986). Though the war led some of these thinkers to distance themselves from any possible charge of neo-Hegelian state worship and to stress their differences with non-liberal versions of collecti- vism (Hobhouse 1918), they remained remarkably settled in their views. The following summary of their case from Dewey’s 1935 tract Liberalism and Social Action could easily have come from Hobhouse’s Liberalism of 1911,for example. Dewey argued that: Since liberation of the capacities of individuals for free, self-initiated expression is an essential part of the creed of liberalism, liberalism that is sincere must will the means that condition the achieving of its ends. Regimentation of material and mechanical forces is the only way by which the mass of individuals can be released from regimentation and consequent suppression of their cultural possibilities . . . The notion that organised social control of economic forces lies outside the historic path of liberalism shows that liberalism is still impeded by remnants of its laissez-faire phase, with its opposition of society and the individual. The thing which now dampens liberal ardour and paralyzes its efforts is the conception that liberty and the development of individuality as ends exclude the use of organised social effort as means. Earlier liberalism regarded the separate and competing economic action of individuals as the means to social well-being as the end. We must reverse the perspective and see that socialised economy is the means of free individual development as the end. (Dewey 1935 [1987: 63]) Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

746 Richard Bellamy Like the pre-war new liberals, Dewey’s argument (and those of similarly minded contemporaries) elaborated a line of reasoning with its origins in T. H. Green but adapted it to a world of organised labour, mass industrial production and bureaucratic management (Ryan 1995: 89–97). The crux of their case was to counter criticism of the egoism and atomism of liberal individualism via a more holistic and positive view of individual liberty (Bellamy 1992: ch. 1, 2000: ch. 2). According to this analysis, an individual’s freedom resulted not only from the absence of intentionally imposed, coercive constraints resulting from particular individual actions, such as physical assault, but also required the elimination of social and economic constraints that were the cumulative effect of numerous, and otherwise innocuous, individual decisions. Though these consequences were unintended by the individuals themselves, they were entirely predictable out- comes of a certain kind of social system. We were morally responsible, therefore, to take what Dewey called ‘intelligent action’ to avoid them. At one level, this argument neatly placed welfare and especially unemploy- ment insurance on a par with a police force and a regular legal system. Both involved the removal of humanly imposed limitations on liberty. This stratagem allowed its proponents to stress the continuity of the new with the old liberal- ism. However, the thesis that freedom had a social dimension cut deeper. It was not just disadvantages that were produced by social forces; so were most of the advantages people had hitherto ascribed to their own efforts. To cite Hobhouse’s notorious example: ‘the value of a site in London is something essentially due to London, not to the landlord’ (Hobhouse 1911 [1964: 100]). Two important corollaries were held to follow from this supposed fact. First, the opportunities and even the capacity for autonomous choice on which individual freedom depended were now portrayed as social products. As the representative of the collectivity, the state had a responsibility not only to ensure equal protection from such socially created bads as crime, unemployment, and poverty, there- fore, but also to ensure access to the social goods necessary for the exercise of freedom, such as schooling and libraries. To omit to open the requisite doors by denying access to social resources hindered an individual’s liberty as much as deliberately closing them by coercive action. Second, progressive taxation to pay for public education and welfare was not so much a tax on individual effort as a reclaiming of the social contribution to that person’s success. Liberal state intervention was distinguished from socialist planning and redis- tribution on the grounds that the former merely aimed at securing the conditions for individual freedom. It did not seek to substitute for or to take away from the individual’s own attempts to make the best of him or herself. A progressive teleol- ogyunderlay this argument, whereby the self-development of each was deemed to be ultimately compatible with and supportive of the freedom of others. Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

The liberal democratic state: defences 747 New liberals, however, divided over the role of the state in promoting this goal. The radicals argued that the very nature of the state had to be changed if some of the authoritarian aspects of collectivism were to be avoided. Moderates maintained it was sufficient simply to change the goals of state policy (Freeden 1986). Radical progressive liberals advocated a system of industrial democracy. They believed patterns of ownership and class struggle were not the source of the oppression of workers and the poor, so that state control of industry per se could not resolve it. The problem lay in the prevailing type of economic government, which allowed certain interests to be ignored. Self-determination in the eco- nomic sphere fostered and preserved liberty in much the same way as it did in politics. Political discussion and the need to reach agreement made all aware of their mutual dependence and ensured each contributed to the common goods on which their respective liberties depended. This system was claimed to be essentially open, allowing individuals to innovate whilst at the same time acco- modating the evolving needs and changing choices of others (e.g. Dewey 1927; Hetherington and Muirhead 1918). This scheme had certain similarities with fascist corporatism and communist ‘workers’ councils’, even if these were never more than paper realities. Progres- sive liberals were nonetheless keen to stress their distance from such arguments. Thus Dewey argued that ‘an immense difference’ existed between the fascist and communist notion of a ‘planned society’ and the ‘democratic liberal’ ideal of ‘a continuously planning society’: The former requires fixed blue-prints imposed from above and therefore involving re- liance upon physical and psychological force to secure conformity to them. The latter means the release of intelligence through the widest form of cooperative give-and-take. The attempt to plan social organisation and association without the freest possible play of intelligence contradicts the very idea in social planning.For the latter is an operative method of activity, not a predetermined set of final ‘truths’. (Dewey 1939 [1988: 321]) This ‘democratic liberalism’ had much in common with the Guild Socialism of G. D. H. Cole and Harold Laski as well as the theories of certain syndicalist writers (Ryan 1995: 179, 309–10). They too were motivated by a desire to find a middle way between state collectivism and market individualism (Hirst 1989). As Bertrand Russell approvingly remarked, their ideas had a strong appeal for ‘all those who still care for the ideals which inspired liberalism, namely the problem of combining liberty and personal initiative with organisation’ (Russell 1916). Like them, Dewey saw the extension of democracy throughout society as a way of remedying the apparent impotence of both the state and the individual to control the numerous private as well as public bodies influencing people’s Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

748 Richard Bellamy lives (Dewey 1927 [1984: 295–7]). Though sympathetic to such ideas, which in Britain influenced the setting up of the Whitley Councils, most new and progressive liberals were nonetheless unwilling to embrace them fully. They feared that it was unworkable since planning required expertise, and gave too much power to producers. Only the state had the capacity to act in the general interest (Freeden 1986: 66–77;Hobson 1934: 89–92). Much as before the war, more moderate new liberals sought to influence policy without greatly changing the character of the political system. J. M. Keynes and William Beveridge are often taken as emblematic figures of this centrist liberal position, with Roosevelt’s New Deal in the United States and the British Liberal Party’s ‘Yellow Book’ and the Beveridge Report the chief fruits of the moderate progressive programme (Freeden 1986: 154–73, 366–72). Certainly both thinkers stressed their liberal as opposed to socialist sympathies and Keynes in particular had some intellectual influence within the British Liberal Party between the wars, notably via the Liberal Summer Schools (e.g. Keynes 1925;Beveridge 1945). Their relationship to liberalism is ambivalent nonetheless and highlights certain problems within the progressive position when moving from theory to practice. Keynes, a Treasury representative at the Paris Peace Conference, had, in The Economic Consequences of Peace (1919), offered a prescient analysis of the dilem- mas confronting liberal capitalism in the aftermath of the war. He identified achief cause of war in the ‘competitive struggle for markets’, the origins of which he traced to the inadequacy of traditional liberal economic policies in tackling unemployment by stimulating growth. His remedy, however, was an extension of the old liberalism more than a move towards the new. Keynes regarded the ‘main political problem of today’ as ‘the establishment of an eco- nomically efficient and economically just society in the changed conditions’ arising from ‘the new organisation of the wage-earning classes’ and the ‘arrival of a new industrial revolution’ (Keynes 1927 [1981: 639]). However, his concern wasprincipally with efficiency rather than social justice. Indeed, he believed the removal of unemployment via an efficient economy was all workers were enti- tled to demand. Moreover, his arguments for strategic state intervention were classical rather than new liberal. His famous essay ‘The End of Laissez-Faire’, for example, raised not moral but technical objections to a totally free market that echoed public goods arguments familiar to Smith, Bentham, and J. S. Mill. He stressed the state’s function was ‘not to do those things which individuals are doing already, and to do them a little better or a little worse; but to do those things which at present are not done at all’ (Keynes 1926 [1972: 291]). Where traditional economic liberals went wrong was in their ‘hopelessly out of date’ view of the economic world, since ‘the picture of numerous small Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

The liberal democratic state: defences 749 capitalists, each staking his fortune on his judgement, and the most judicious surviving, bears increasingly little relation to the facts’ (Keynes 1927 [1981: 641]). For reasons familiar to students of social choice, individuals had little or no incentive to implement the measures Keynes deemed necessary to ensure the optimal output needed to secure as full employment as practicable – namely currency and credit controls and encouragements to save and invest. On the contrary, many had good self-interested reasons to aggravate the very problems these mechanisms sought to overcome. Though he thought the volume of output was ‘determined by forces outside the classical scheme’, he raised ‘no objection . . . against the classical analysis of the manner in which private self- interest will determine what in particular is produced, in what proportions the factors of production will be combined to produce it, and how the value of the final product will be distributed between them’ (Keynes 1936 [1973: 378–9]). ‘Intelligent control’ of the economy was some distance, therefore, from ‘State Socialism’ and did not entail either the direction or ownership of the means of production (Keynes 1936 [1973: 378]). Such control was a matter for experts, however, rather than democracy. Keynes wasnot an advocate of Deweyean democratic ‘social planning’. Rather, he shared the traditional liberal concerns about the newly enfranchised masses, fearing that ‘in the ignorant blind striving after justice Labour may destroy what is at least as important and is a necessary condition of any social progress at all – namely, efficiency’ (Keynes 1927, 1981: 639]). Nothing could be further from the progressive’s credo than Keynes’s suspicion ‘that some measure of social injustice has often been the necessary condition of social progress’ (Keynes 1927 [1981: 639]). Not surprisingly, his view of liberty remained narrowly negative, its purpose largely to preserve the dynamism of society. The new liberals had also abhorred the contemporary authoritarian state systems and stressed the need for personal liberty and choice. But their understanding of freedom embraced aconcern for social issues absent from Keynes’s analysis. Far from sharing their desire for an ethical liberalism that would unite individuality and solidarity, he worried that ‘the reaction against the appeal to self-interest may have gone too far’ (Keynes 1936 [1973: 380]). If Keynes departed from progressive liberals in ignoring their social agenda, Beveridge was distinctive in remaining outside the debates over economic plan- ning that had preoccupied the inter-war generation. Instead, he explicitly linked his Report to the pre-war Social Insurance policies of Lloyd George. His defence of the liberal character of his proposals echoed the characteristic new liberal tactic of justifying social justice in terms of an extended view of liberty as ‘more than freedom from the arbitrary power of governments. It means freedom from economic servitude to Want and Squalor and other social evils; it means Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

750 Richard Bellamy freedom from arbitrary power in any form’ (Beveridge 1945: 10). Similarly con- ventional arguments led him to distinguish his position from that of socialists. Making liberty rather than equality the basis of greater state intervention meant that his policy was not a matter of levelling to benefit certain sectional interests, but aimed at offering all citizens the opportunities ‘of service and earning in accordance with their powers’ (Beveridge 1945: 38). Beveridge claimed to avoid the authoritarianism of socialist planning by al- lowing individuals the liberty to contribute in a manner most conformable to their own talents. However, he did insist that a duty to cooperate with others for the common good was an entailment of a claim to social rights. Moreover, he shared Keynes’s belief that such a system favoured efficiency. This association of freedom with social duty and efficiency raises many of the traditional wor- ries concerning positive accounts of freedom: namely, that individuals are only deemed genuinely free if they pursue ends of a socially useful and morally ap- proved kind. Before the war this aspect of new liberalism had surfaced in debates about eugenics. The insistence by radical liberals on the democratic negotiation and setting of society’s goals was intended to counter these sorts of dangers. Of course, Keynes and Beveridge assumed that the state was democratic in the sense of holding regular elections and having certain standard constitutional safe- guards for individual civil liberties. But where such liberal mechanisms could not be taken for granted, liberals were unsurprisingly more sceptical about the likelihood of state action fostering rather than hindering freedom. 2.LIBERALISM UNDER THREAT: CONTINENTAL EUROPE Though a few diehards in Britain and the United States bemoaned the way progressive and centre liberal measures ‘day by day, in the well-meaning effort to ease somebody’s little trouble, . . . take away a little bit of discretion or liberty from the rest of the 40 millions of us’ (Ernest Benn, quoted in Freeden 1986: 267), such complaints were in a minority. In the relatively recent liberal democracies of continental Europe, by contrast, liberals found themselves ousted from power by mass socialist parties and confronted by a growing communist and fascist threat. Here democracy appeared a danger to liberalism and the surest rationale for liberty lay with the market. Indeed the most powerful criticisms of social liberalism came from political economists and social theorists such as Ludwig von Mises and F. A. Hayek in Austria, Luigi Einaudi and Vilfredo Pareto in Italy, and Max Weber in Germany. These thinkers contended that notions of a common good or general will were meaningless. Individuals pursued a plurality of goods and held very different evaluative standpoints and moral codes. There were no social goals or public Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

The liberal democratic state: defences 751 purposes, only the diverse ideals and interests of a society’s individual mem- bers. The market’s genius – indeed its very functioning – lay in its harnessing of people’s capacity to choose autonomously and pursue a plurality of goods. Any attempt to constrain that capacity via central planning would prove both economically less efficient than the market and entail coercion on a totalitarian scale. The development of this argument by the Austrians in particular was highly original. Their case was essentially epistemic. Its basic elements were first de- veloped by von Mises in the context of the socialist calculation debate of the 1920s (Hayek 1935;Lavoie 1985). He argued that rational economic planning required an efficient allocation of resources and that this in turn depended upon a knowledge of prices, which provide information on the relative scarcities of capital goods. In a market of any size and complexity, these prices are deter- mined by the innumerable interactions between buyers and sellers and are in constant flux. He believed it would be impossible for socialist planners to solve millions of simultaneous equations in order to determine the relative value of productive resources. Such information could only be provided by a market based on private property in the means of production. In fact, economists now believe that in principle the relevant equations could be solved. However, Mises’s writings also contain a more profound thesis that suggests that monetary prices act as necessary ‘aids to the human mind’ that could only be generated within the context of a market-exchange system based on private property. According to this view, the requisite knowledge needed by planners would not exist outside of a free market economy. Hayek and later Austrian theorists picked up on this aspect of his work but gave it a somewhat dif- ferent epistemological basis (Hayek 1935). Hayek pointed out that the difficulty confronting planners is not computational but practical. It relates to the prob- lem of how one central agency could gather the huge amount of information necessary for accurate pricing, much of it of a concrete and contextual nature, such as the capacity of the available machines and workforce in a given locale, which is hard to represent in statistical form and which is in any case constantly changing. Moreover, much of this knowledge is tacit, embodied in practices, dispositions, and intuitions that are unformulatable and often not fully conscious to the individuals concerned. Central planning not only cannot employ such knowledge, it would also probably destroy it by attempting to articulate it in an explicit manner. The achievement of the market was its ability to collect and transmit this dispersed, local, and largely transient knowledge in an intelligible and undistorted form through price signals. By contrast, a planned economy severed the connection between rewards and services essential to the market’s efficiency, replacing it with a set of inevitably distorted incentives that have more Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

752 Richard Bellamy to do with the whims of bureaucrats than with what people wanted or might have desired in a world where entrepreneurs can invent new products. Planning by socialist or social democratic states was not only inefficient, how- ever, but also tyrannical (Mises 1932;Hayek1944). For it involved substituting the free choices of individuals for those of the planner. Indeed, the plan would only have a chance of success if the innovations and changing preferences of producers and consumers were deliberately suppressed. Invoking social justice to justify such interventions did not change their arbitrariness for the plurality of opinions meant that there could be no settled criteria. The chief candidates, need and desert, not only clashed themselves but each could be interpreted in a variety of ways that produced rival outcomes when applied to particular cases. However well-intentioned, appeals to the collective welfare always reflected the partial perspective of their proponents and so inevitably entailed imposing their vision on others. Moreover, redistributive taxation and public social ser- vices reproduced all the distorted incentives of planning and involved a similarly coercive interference with people’s own choices. Democracy did not enhance either the legitimacy or effectiveness of planning and welfare. It merely increased the risk of such mistaken policies being pursued. Pareto in particular devoted considerable energy to investigating how political elites wooed the voters with illusory appeals to social justice and the com- mon good (Pareto 1902–3, 1916, 1921; Bellamy 1992: ch. 3). In fact, the only beneficiaries of these policies were the politicians themselves and the various special-interest groups which surrounded them. The taxation required to fund this expanded state sector was in effect a rent imposed on the efforts of others. Unrestrained, democracy replaced economic with political incentives, encour- aging groups to organise and influence the machinery of government towards their ends with ultimately devastating effects for freedom and prosperity. These thinkers attributed the electoral success of socialist parties to an atavis- tic herd instinct and yearning for organic community that was totally at odds with modern societies (Pareto 1902–3). Whereas the new liberals accepted that the trend within modern societies was towards big government, corporate busi- ness, and mass organisations, these neo-classical liberals held on to the notion that entrepreneurship and individual initiative remained crucial and that these developments must and could be resisted (Mises 1927). They advocated a min- imal constitutional framework to uphold civil and especially property rights within which individuals could freely contract with each other. Hayek, the chief elaborator of this doctrine, went so far as to castigate all departures from fixed, known, and general laws as arbitrary acts at variance with the Rule of Law that disturbed and distorted the spontaneous order emerging from numerous indi- vidual interactions (Hayek 1944). He believed these criteria rendered planning Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

The liberal democratic state: defences 753 and redistributive taxation illegimate, since both entailed formulating ever more special regulations aimed at particular groups of people. Government, on his account, was to be limited to policing infractions of the Rule of Law not break- ing it itself, with democracy serving the purely protective function of allowing the peaceful removal of tyrannical or incompetent governments. An exile to Britain and an admirer of the British liberal tradition, Hayek saw the New Liberalism as but a step along the road to serfdom, with little differentiating it from socialism or fascism – themselves equated with each other in this view. Not all continental liberal theorists were so pessimistic or economistic in their views. Debating the nature of liberalism with Luigi Einaudi in Italy, for example, Benedetto Croce argued that his compatriot had confused the market mech- anism with the liberal ethic that animated laissez-faire accounts of it (Einaudi 1928;Croce 1928;Bellamy 1992:ch.3). The liberal ethic endorsed the free market only to the extent that it offered the best means of preserving the liberal values of human inventiveness and autonomy. He believed it simple dogmatism to exclude a priori the possibility of a ‘liberal socialism’ such as Hobhouse’s. Nonetheless, Croce objected equally strongly to those fellow Italians, such as Guido de Ruggiero, who advocated a social liberalism involving the recon- ciliation of liberty and justice (De Ruggiero 1925 and 1946;Bellamy 2000: ch. 3;Calogero 1940–4). Once again, he argued that this confused the practical need to accommodate the demands of the working classes with the liberal ideal motivating such policies (Croce 1943). Democracy was similarly a contingent means, of value only to the extent that it furthered liberal ends. Croce followed the youthful Pareto and Gaetano Mosca in rejecting the democratic principle of equality as a socialist denial of the importance of individuality whilst seeing democratic procedures as potentially useful for ensuring a circulation of ideals and elites. Ultimately, Croce conceived liberalism as a ‘metapolitical’ philosophy, to be identified with his historicist view of history as the product of autonomous individual thought and action, rather than a specific set of policies (Croce 1928). In Germany, Weber similarly believed that the classic liberalism invoked by the Austrians and others was unrealistic in modern societies (Beetham 1985; Bellamy 1992: ch. 4). Weber contended that the liberal faith in legal formalism implied by notions of the Rule of Law, such as Hayek’s, was as impossible within today’s complex societies as the bureaucratic proceduralism advocated by socialist planners (Weber 1918a and b, 1919). Just as entrepreneurs remained important in the economic sphere to innovate and direct commercial activity, so leadership was vital within the political sphere. Pluralism rendered coherent collective choice impossible and meant that general norms covering all spheres of activity could not be formulated. Even a regulative as opposed to a planning state would need to make special and particular directives to meet the peculiar Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

754 Richard Bellamy circumstances of different functions, communities, and locations. Meanwhile, events were always likely to throw up exceptional cases calling for decisive executive action. With the mass of the population locked into the organisational ‘iron cage’ of modernity, only charismatic leaders could make the requisite existential decisions capable of giving an organisation and its members a sense of purpose. He reconceived competitive elections as an electoral market aimed at producing such individuals. He believed such mechanisms explained why the liberal democratic Allies had defeated authoritarian Germany’s more efficient military machine, which had failed to prevail due to an absence of leadership and an over-reliance on formal rules and procedures (Weber 1918a). Weber was nonetheless all too aware that even such a realist view of liberal democracy would only prove beneficial within a culturally liberal environment that modernity tended to undermine rather than foster. Though the Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter (1943; Bellamy 2000: ch. 5) later developed his model into an influential characterisation of post war liberal democratic politics, the immediate social and political reality proved rather different from the ideal. The leader thrown up in Weber’s native Germany lacked almost all the qualities he had hoped for and plunged both liberalism and democracy into a deeper crisis than ever before. 3.CONCLUSION If declarations of the death of liberalism by socialists and fascists were premature in intellectual terms, they proved all too accurate a description of its status as a political force. The inter-war years saw the dramatic decline if not the demise of liberal political parties across Europe and on the continent the brief eclipse of all liberal democratic regimes. By 1945, most liberal intellectuals and politicians together with the bulk of their electoral following had deserted to either social democratic or conservative parties. However, their arguments shaped ideological debates within Western democracies for the rest of the century. If centrist liberal economic and welfare policies dominated until the mid-1970s, the challenge of the New Right in the 1980sand1990swas largely inspired by the ideas of economic liberals such as Hayek. Meanwhile, the contemporary search for a ‘third way’ between these two positions has frequently involved exploring the various alternatives of fifty years ago, with Dewey and Hobhouse amongst others becoming fashionable once again. Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

64 THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC STATE: CRITICS walter adamson The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear. Antonio Gramsci (1975 [1971: 276]) Following the catastrophe of the First World War, philosophical critics on both left and right posed their challenges to liberal-democratic politics in terms of a crisis of civilisation. The First World War had ushered out the last vestiges of Europe’s old regime; no one imagined a new Metternich-legitimist restoration. But what might be the ‘new regime’ of modernity that could resolve the crisis? The answer depended in part upon one’s national vantage-point. The focus here will be on the central and southern European contexts where communist revolutions were launched in 1919–20 only to be supplanted by fascist reactions thereafter. In France, the political outcomes were different but the intellec- tual environment, similar. Only in Britain and the United States did bourgeois institutions appear largely unchallenged. While even partisans of liberal democracy understood that ‘rescuing bourgeois Europe meant recasting bourgeois Europe’ (Maier 1975: 594), its critics sought to sweep it aside in a bold revolutionary stroke. For them, fin-de-si` ecle fears that a looming mass society would become a quantitative, materialist nightmare had been borne out, necessitating a turn to radical solutions. A radical conservatism demanding new institutions to restore old values came into full flower, particu- larly in Germany, where the fears had run deepest, while Marxists, emboldened by the Bolshevik triumph in 1917, sought to theorise the nature of, and precon- ditions for, a new basis of Western civilisation. Both extremes appreciated the raw power of ‘Americanism’ as a principle of social organisation, but despite oc- casional admirers (like Gramsci), most detested it as an alien invasion. Likewise, they viewed European forms of democracy as either sui generis (Britain), weak (France, Italy), or imposed (Germany). For the right, liberal democracy would simply encourage further chaos because of its alleged tendency towards leader- lessness, mechanicity, and an inability to deal decisively with crises. The left 755 Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

756 Walter Adamson hoped that the new global mode of production might provide the foundation for a dialectical synthesis of objective and subjective experience (Georg Luk´ acs) or a new ‘regulated society’ (Gramsci). Yet their ‘Western Marxist’ emancipatory hopes were dashed by defeats in Germany (1919), Hungary (1919), and Italy (1920), unleashing the bitterly polarised politics of the Third International that ultimately turned Gramsci against Stalin and Luk´ acs despairingly towards him. With the worldwide depression, the rise of Hitler, Franco’s victory in Spain, the Soviet purges, and the Hitler–Stalin pact, the stage was set for the black turn of Western Marxism made by Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer in the Dialektik der Aufkl¨ arung (Dialectic of Enlightenment)written during the war. Despite obvious differences of policy and principle, there were many con- vergences in the analyses offered by left and right of the present historical crisis and, even more importantly, in the intellectual sources on which they relied. In both the Germanic world and Italy, critics of liberal democracy drew upon the categories and conceptual strategies of Kant, Hegel, Marx, and above all Nietzsche, though in the former case the philosophical tradition was enriched by the sociological theory of Ferdinand T¨ onnies, Georg Simmel, and especially Max Weber, all of whom were then largely unknown in Italy. The common reliance upon grand theories meant that while the sense of crisis made for politicised philosophy, few turned to political theory per se.Ofthe thinkers to be considered here, only two – Gramsci and Carl Schmitt – might be considered political theorists, and even they cast their intellectual nets very widely. 1.THE ITALY OF GENTILE AND GRAMSCI The great problem of early twentieth-century Italian political intellectuals was the legacy of the Risorgimento: the political unification of Italy had not in- volved the masses either directly in a mass-based political movement or indirectly by morally engaging their hearts and souls. As Gaetano De Sanctis had famously lamented in the 1870s, ‘political unification is in vain without intellectual and moral redemption’ (Prezzolini 1909: 1). For Gramsci it was the political failure that mattered most, for Giovanni Gentile the moral one; but they were united in their assessment that the roots of the postwar Italian crisis lay here. Gentile had never written on politics until 1915,but he then developed the argument that the Italian moral crisis could only be resolved through a new conception of the ‘ethical state’, which he conceived as the realisation of Mazzinian ‘liberalism’ and a break with the positivistic and ‘materialistic’ liberalism that was institutionalised in Italy after 1870 (Gentile 1927: 295). For Gentile, true liberalism conceived liberty from the point of view of the state Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

The liberal democratic state: critics 757 and not from that of the atomised individual. The state, in turn, was a spiritual, ethical entity, more like a secular church than a narrowly juridical or economic- managerial instrument. Here he followed Hegel. Yet unlike Hegel, Gentile saw the state not as part of objective Spirit (a category he rejected) but rather as the ‘act’ of a subject who thereby creates and continually recreates the political world. ‘Every individual acts politically, is a statesman, and holds the state in his heart; he is the state . . . The state for that reason is not inter homines but in interiore homine’ (Gentile 1937: 129). Unlike Hegel’s state, which is articulated in relation to family and civil society and subordinated ultimately to absolute Spirit, Gentile’s ethical state is unlimited. For him the greater the strength of the state, the fuller the potential realisation of liberty. Gentile was very much the enthusiast of an abstract logic in which, once premises are accepted, conclusions inexorably follow. His adhesion to fascism wasofthis sort. In a 1923 letter to Mussolini, he declared: ‘Liberal by deep and sound conviction ...,Ihavebeen persuaded that liberalism . . . is today represented in Italy not by liberals who are more or less openly against you, butprecisely, by you’ (Calandra 1987: 8). Unlike Italy’s other famous idealist, Benedetto Croce, with whom Gentile had frequently collaborated, he was not attracted to fascism as a temporary fix for the Italian liberal state or for any other instrumental reason. Rather he believed that his ethical state was in the historical cards, desperately wanted to see it realised, and convinced himself that fascism was its incarnation. Unlike Croce, whose respect for empirical history was too great to allow him to fall into any Hegelian panlogism even as he borrowed greatly from Hegel’s dialectical method, Gentile rejected the method but adopted the panlogism. Yet Hegel, he thought, in holding fast to transcendental idealism by underwriting his epistemology with an ontological argument about the development of Geist or Spirit, failed to appreciate the nature of human freedom. Gentile insisted upon a standpoint of ‘absolute immanence’ in which subjective thought takes on the faculties Kant had located in the transcendental subject and Hegel in Spirit. In this sense thought is a presuppositionless ‘pure act’, and there is no reality beyond thought. Truth therefore lies within the thought of the historical agent, and philosophy and history must ultimately coincide. Yet by grounding history exclusively in the creative activity of the agent, Gentile had no basis for understanding the coordination of actions among individuals and, thus, the intersubjective nature of community, a problem he resolved in practice by simply identifying the Italian ethical state he anticipated with Mussolini. The young Gramsci of 1916–17 was strongly drawn to Gentile’s philoso- phy of the pure act, as he was to other voluntarist viewpoints such as those of Henri Bergson, Georges Sorel, and the interventionist Mussolini. Though his Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

758 Walter Adamson Marxism, which he also came to early, made him appreciate objective condi- tions as a constraint upon action and as the context in which acts are histor- ically framed, he rejected Marxist positivisms aiming at laws of social action. Theory, for Gramsci, was an account people used in understanding and acting, in this sense inherently unified with practice and immanent in a Gentilian way. ‘Objective’, he argued, ‘always means “humanly objective” which can be held to correspond exactly to “historically subjective”; in other words, objective would mean “universal subjective”’ (Gramsci 1975 [1971: 445]). Gramsci was awestruck by the Bolshevik victory in 1917, which he char- acterised as ‘the living out of Marxist thought’ as a ‘revolution against Capital’ rather than a result of ‘the canons of historical materialism’ (Gramsci 1982 [1994: 39–40]). After Italy’s ‘mutilated victory’ in the war reopened the revolutionary door, he sought to extend Lenin’s creativity to Italy by leading a factory-council movement in Turin. The movement failed, and its quasi-syndicalist ideal of direct democracy through the workplace soon appeared to him na¨ ıve, but it established his independence from any dogmatic Marxism or Leninism. Gramsci understood his political activism as an effort to create the ‘effective Jacobin force’ that had been missing in the Risorgimento and that ‘in other nations [had] awakened and organised the national-popular collective will’ (Gramsci 1975 [1971: 131]). Political change in modern Italy (not least the ad- vent of fascism) had always come in the form of ‘passive revolutions’ from above, which meant that urban–rural and North–South cleavages were not only not faced but even exacerbated. The current ‘crisis of authority’ would persist until an ‘organic’ solution based on a Jacobin-led ‘national-popular’ movement could be created. Such a solution would put rulership in the hands of those who had organised a ‘hegemony’ of active consent among the class or classes central to the mode of production. If the current crisis was particularly acute in Italy, there were reasons to believe that Europe generally would find it difficult to develop such new ‘organic’ forms of politics. Unlike in America, where ‘there do not exist numerous classes with no essential function in the world of production, in other words classes which are purely parasitic’, Europe is ‘characterised precisely by the existence of such classes’ (Gramsci 1975 [1971: 281]). Moreover, they play an essential role in its parliaments and effectively prevent even the non-parasitic bourgeoisie from developing an organic solution to the current crisis. That is why even far- sighted liberals, such as Piero Gobetti, had come to see that parties representing the industrial proletariat were the key to Europe’s future. Yet, since such parties were now currently stymied, the only hope was a long-range strategy of ‘war of position’ through which ‘national-popular’ cultural forces might create the potential for a future organic politics. Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

The liberal democratic state: critics 759 2.THE GERMANY OF SCHMITT AND HEIDEGGER The abruptness of Germany’s transformation from a newly formed nation-state in 1871 to the leading power in Europe on the eve of the First World War, its defeat in the war, the postwar political and economic instability that followed, and the formation of the ill-conceived and ill-fated Weimar Republic in 1919, all helped make its sense of crisis the deepest of any European country. Attacks on parliamentary democracy, the market, and the pluralism of value systems in the name of a ‘conservative revolution’ were consequently widespread among the German intellectual mandarinate. No single figure better exemplifies this reaction than Carl Schmitt. Shaken by Max Weber’s analysis of modernity as an ‘iron cage’ of instrumental rationality, Schmitt aimed to comprehend the current European crisis through an histor- ical analysis of the interconnected rise of Protestantism and technical progress, an analysis inspired by Weber but very much his own (on the connection be- tween Schmitt and Weber, see McCormick 1997: 32–42 and Mommsen 1959 [1984: 382–9]). Since the sixteenth-century wars of religion, he argued, Europe had sought to escape conflict by ‘striving for a neutral sphere’. From theo- logical conflict it turned for respite to seventeenth-century metaphysics, and thence to eighteenth-century moralism, nineteenth-century economics, and twentieth-century technology. Yet the history has been dialectical: ‘Europeans always have wandered from a conflictual to a neutral sphere, and always the newly won neutral sphere has become immediately another arena of struggle, once again necessitating the search for a new neutral sphere’ (Schmitt 1963 [1993: 137–8]). The nineteenth-century neutral sphere, pace Weber, involved ‘an appar- ently hybrid and impossible combination of aesthetic-romantic and economic- technical tendencies’ (Schmitt 1963 [1993: 133]). While the latter disenchanted, the former re-enchanted, hence the peculiarly fused character of modernity as the triumph both of instrumental rationality and of a romantic mythol- ogy, whether as ‘new Soviet man’ or as ‘Marlboro man’. Thus, although the economic-technical thinking that capitalism and communism share is shock- ingly indifferent to qualitative considerations – a ‘silk blouse’ and a ‘poison gas’ are both treated simply as products (Schmitt 1925 [1996: 14–15]) – the systems do retain a connection to the qualitative, albeit as irrational forms of life. Ye tthe effort to retain a neutral sphere of liberal universalism and democracy becomes politically untenable in the new conditions of modern mass soci- eties. Liberalism assumes that state and civil society are separate, such that the former can rationally adjudicate among competing social interests. It assumes that parliaments are capable of deliberating expediently and arriving at rational Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

760 Walter Adamson solutions to political issues. It assumes that the Rule of Law can operate as the impartial application of universally binding, already promulgated rules. Such assumptions are unrealistic in a complex system that necessarily breaks down the divide between state and civil society, burdening the state with social and economic regulation, overwhelming parliaments with a floodtide of conflicting interests, and transforming the legal system into a mechanism for compromise among equally rational, competing claims on resources. Here lie the roots of the contemporary crisis. To overcome it, modern politics must define an ag- gressive role for executive leadership, do away with parliaments, and reconceive the legal system on a ‘decisionist’ model of efficient compromise. Most funda- mentally, we must abandon the notion of a neutral sphere and restore the true concept of the political, which rests on the firm distinction between ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’. As a prominent conservative jurist during Weimar, and an adherent of Nazism beginning in 1933, Schmitt sought to foster a politics of radical intervention by elites to actualise fully and rationally modernity’s qualitative moment, to assert the rights of a particular people (he referred variously to Europe, Central Europe, and Germany) against the universalism of his leftist enemies, and to overcome the paralysis of the modern, liberal-democratic state. His answer to the crisis of modernity was to re-empower states to decide the question of friend and enemy and to deal effectively with emergencies, which he termed ‘the exception’. In awell-institutionalised modern politics, ‘sovereign is he who decides on the exception’ (Schmitt 1934 [1985: 5]). Unlike Schmitt and other German conservative revolutionaries, Martin Heidegger did not elaborate a political philosophy, and his concerns were rather different from the human problems (freedom, happiness, justice) that have con- cerned most political philosophers. For him, philosophy’s basic attitude should always be one of questioning, and to assemble such theses as would be neces- sary for a political theory or ethics would be to miss the essential point of the activity. Moreover, philosophy’s fundamental question, that of ‘Being’, can only be properly pursued when one breaks with the humanist metaphysics that has dominated the Western tradition from Plato’s eternal eidos to Nietzsche’s will to power. In this tradition’s failure to pursue the question of Being lie the deepest roots of the current crisis. Heidegger saw his own philosophy, then, as a way out of a crisis of nihilism produced by the search for truth in a wilful mode rather than according to pre-Socratic aletheia whereby phenomena themselves unveil truth. In this sense, his philosophy was always politically engaged. Moreover, his understanding of the crisis of nihilism grew out of his perception of the First World War – as one of the senseless self-destruction of Europe – and of the struggle for world Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

The liberal democratic state: critics 761 dominion that had followed in its wake. Philosophy was crucial to the hope that this struggle might be settled in a broadly cultural rather than a narrowly military way. So strong was Heidegger’s sense of the historical role of philosophy that he allowed it to justify his adherence to Nazism in 1933 despite the apparent contradiction between this adherence and his conception of philosophy as ques- tioning. Like Gentile before him, Heidegger succumbed to the delusion that what philosophy required of the actual political world the latter had miracu- lously produced. For a few months at least, he even believed, in the words of his friend Karl Jaspers, that he could ‘lead the F¨ uhrer’ (den F¨ uhrer f¨ uhren)toaspir- itual alternative to capitalist and communist materialisms (Dallmayr 1993: 25). Though that confidence would wane after 1934, Heidegger remained a member of the Nazi party until the end of the Second World War and, even after the war, continued to believe in the ‘inner truth’ of Nazism. Such a desperate gamble was partly a failure of practical judgement, but it also reflected Heidegger’s sense of what was at stake. Though the theme of tech- nology and its connection with nihilism is commonly thought of in relation to the late Heidegger, he had already perceived its significance in his lectures at Freiburg in the early 1920s. By the 1930s, influenced by Ernst J¨ unger’s provoca- tive analysis of the present age as a ‘total mobilisation’ to decide world-historical supremacy, Heidegger saw that ‘Europe, in its ruinous blindness forever on the point of cutting its own throat, lies today in a great pincers, squeezed between Russia on one side and America on the other [which] from a metaphysical point of view . . . are the same; the same dreary technological frenzy’ (Heidegger 1953 [1961: 31]). For Heidegger the essence of technology is not technical but a way of being in the world. Technological societies force entities to reveal themselves in terms consistent with human goals; nature becomes ‘enframed’ as a ‘standing-reserve’ for human use (Heidegger 1954 [1977: 298, 301]). Technology, then, is the logical outgrowth of Western philosophy, and the only antidote to it is the openness towards being represented by aletheia.Heidegger believed that such openness can be attained through a ‘world-disclosing’ work of art (Kunstwerk) but also through a work of thought (Denkwerk)orawork of state (Staatwerk) (Wolin 1990: 100). 3.WESTERN MARXISM IN EXILE If the perception of world crisis led Heidegger to gamble on Nazism, it led Georg Luk´ acs to an equally desperate gamble on Bolshevism. Reared in a wealthy Jewish family in Budapest, Luk´ acs wrote passionate early essays Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

762 Walter Adamson inspired by Kierkegaard. Their essential problem concerned the inability of works of art, committed as they must be to ‘form’, to express the ‘soul’ of the artist (Luk´ acs 1910 [1974]). Thus, in a world in which spiritual life has become impoverished, works of art are tragically unable to restore value. During the war, Luk´ acs extended this conclusion in a social and historical direction, por- traying the ‘abstract systematisation’ of the modern world against the backdrop of the organic, ‘integrated civilisation’ of ancient Greece to which, however, all possibility of return was foreclosed (Luk´ acs 1920 [1971]: 29, 70). Despite such intimations, however, Luk´ acs stunned everyone in Budapest’s intellectual circles when, in December 1918,hesuddenly converted to Marxism and joined the Communist Party. Concurrently, his analysis of modernity shifted to a sociological register: the suppression of life’s qualitative dimension that Marx had located in commodity fetishism and Weber in rationalisation, he now located in an amalgam of the two called ‘reification’ (Luk´ acs’s debt to Weber reflected his participation in the latter’s Heidelberg circle from 1913 to 1915). This triumph of cold abstraction would be historically transcended however by the ‘proletariat’, which he cast as history’s ‘identical subject-object’, that in which ‘the contradictions of history that have become conscious’ (Luk´ acs 1923 [1971: 147, 178]). In his major work of 1923, Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein (History and Class Consciousness), Luk´ acs sought to redefine Marxist ‘orthodoxy’ in terms of a dialectical method of investigation rather than as any closed body of re- ceived truths. To establish the method, he set forth a relentless critique of ‘bourgeois thought’ from Kant through Hegel, arguing that it necessarily ended in ‘antimonies’ of phenomena and ‘things-in-themselves’, object and subject, fact and value, and form and content, antimonies it was unable to transcend except in a purely formal way. A true resolution of this philosophical crisis, which was also modernity’s crisis, necessarily implied the dialectical transcen- dence of bourgeois life, a movement that only a properly constituted Marxist theory could grasp. This solution, set forth with formidable rigour, made sense so long as the reader accepted the characterisation of the proletariat. The trouble arose with a question that lurked just below the text’s surface: how can we know that the historical role assigned to the proletariat by philosophy corresponds to its actual consciousness and practice in the world? Efforts to face up to this question led Luk´ acs down a precipitous slope to Stalinism. Initially, he tried to circumvent the problem theoretically with the notion of ‘imputed’ class consciousness (Luk´ acs 1923 [1971: 325]). By 1924, the year of his book on Lenin and of Lenin’s death, he had clearly accepted the latter’s solution of the vanguard party, though this Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

The liberal democratic state: critics 763 hardly saved him from the excoriating criticism of Soviet leaders at the Fifth Comintern Congress that July. From that Congress until the last days of the Stalin era, Luk´ acs lived mostly in exile in the Soviet Union and his public answer to questions of politics was invariably the simple dogma that the party is always right. The problem of the historical role of the proletariat was bequeathed by Luk´ acs to a group of German theorists, led by Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, who would come to be known as the Frankfurt School, though many of their best years were spent in exile in the United States. They accepted Luk´ acs’s History and Class Consciousness as a magnum opus and regarded its view of ‘orthodoxy’ as a paradigm for their project of a Western-oriented Marxist ‘critical theory’ adequate to the present, but they were increasingly troubled by the painful gap between the proletariats of theory and history. Moreover, even as they redoubled their efforts to deal with the gap by studying contemporary political and familial structures, the problems of alienation and mystification resulting from modern cultural life seemed to redouble as well. Coupled with the catastrophic political developments of the 1930s, the emancipatory hopes that they still held at the beginning of the decade retreated and then plummeted during the war to the nadir represented by Dialectic of Enlightenment. In this book, Adorno and Horkheimer effectively shifted the paradigm of critical theory from class-conflict within capitalism to the bourgeois domina- tion of nature, a story they traced back to the Homeric world. In a breath- taking reading of the Odyssey, they sought to show how the enlightenment project was bound up with mythic fear and instinctual renunciation, as when Odysseus has himself tied to the mast of his ship to avoid seduction by the song of the Sirens. Primitive magic, they argued, is untrue, yet it does not seek to dominate nature; enlightenment purchases truth at the price of dominating the ‘other’ of nature. The two processes were in fact entwined: ‘Just as the myths already realise enlightenment, so enlightenment with every step becomes more deeply engulfed in mythology’ (Adorno and Horkheimer 1944 [1972: 11–12]). The inescapable conclusion was that reason itself was responsible for the historical crisis of modernity. Enlightenment ‘excises the incommensurable. Not only are qualities dissolved in thought, but men are brought to actual conformity’ (12). Fascism and anti-semitism were enlightenment’s children. Yet the reason at issue was the instrumental variety that had so preoccupied Weber, the reason that had eliminated the dialectical negative, replaced concepts with formulas, and voiced the demands of the powerful while silencing the oppressed. Heroically, they declared their ‘petitio principii – that social freedom is inseparable Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

764 Walter Adamson from enlightened thought’ and held out the prospect of ‘a positive notion of enlightenment which will release it from blind domination’ (xvi). Yet unlike Gentile, Gramsci, Schmitt, Heidegger, and Luk´ acs, they no longer had any sense of how to attach their hopes to an historical actor. Thus, while saved from the delusions of the former, they also appeared impotent in the face of the future. Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

BIOBIBLIOGRAPHICAL APPENDIX Adorno, Theodor (1903–69). Born in Frankfurt, Adorno was precocious intellectually and musically, writing a dissertation on Edmund Husserl at twenty-one and then studying with the Arnold Schoenberg circle in Vienna. Returning to Frankfurt in 1927,hebegan his lifelong collaboration with Max Horkheimer’s Institute and, in 1931, began teaching at the university. After the Nazi seizure of power, he first lived in London, then joined Horkheimer in New York in 1938.Throughout the 1930sand1940s, he did important studies in social psychology and in the sociology of music and culture. With Horkheimer, he wrote the Dialectic of Enlightenment (1947)andthen, after returning to Frankfurt in 1949,composed his own major works, Negative Dialectics (1966)andAesthetic Theory (1970). Important studies of him include Buck-Morss, S. (1977), The Origin of Negative Dialecties: Theodor W. Adorno Walter Benjamin, and the Frankfurt Institute (New York: Free Press); Jay, M. (1984), Adorno (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press); and Rose, G. (1978). The Melancholy Science: An Introduction to the Thought of W. Adorno (New York: Columbia Press). Ajdukiewicz, Kazimierz (1890–1963). Ajdukiewicz studied in Lvov with Twardowski, gaining his PhD in 1913 and his Habilitation in 1920.Hewas an associate professor in Lvov from 1921 to 1926,aprofessor in Warsaw from 1926 to 1928,inLvovfrom1928 to 1939,inPoznan from 1945 to 1952,and finally once more in Warsaw from 1952 to 1963. His main writings (available in English) are Pragmatic Logic (Warsaw: Polish Scientific Publishers and Dordrecht: Reidel, 1974)andThe Scientific World-Perspective and Other Essays, 1931–1963, ed. J. Giedymin (Dordrecht: Reidel). Secondary literature: Coniglione, F., Poli, R., and Wole´ nski, J. (eds.) (1993), Polish Scientific Philosophy: The Lvov-Warsaw School,Amsterdam: Rodopi; Sinisi, V. and Wole´ nski, J. (1995), The Heritage of Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz,Amsterdam: Rodopi; Skolimowski, H. (1967), Polish Analytical Philosophy,London: Routledge; Wole´ nski, J. (1989), Logic and Philosophy in the Lvov-Warsaw School,Dordrecht: Kluwer and Boston: Lancaster. Alexander, Samuel (1859–1938). Alexander is now primarily remembered for espousing an ‘emergentist’ position in biology. He was born in Sydney, but studied at Oxford and then spent his career at Manchester. Alexander’s most famous work is Space, Time and Deity (London: Macmillan, 1920), based on his Gifford lectures. In this work of systematic metaphysics he adopts arealist position, basing his position on ‘motions’ – space-time units. There are then various levels of complexity, involving matter, life, mind, and (perhaps) deity, each of which ‘emerges’ from the preceding one, in the sense that its complexity sustains distinctive new properties not reducible to those of lower levels. 765 Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

766 Biobibliographical appendix Austin, John (1790–1859). Born in Creeting Mill near Ipswich, Suffolk, on 3 March 1790, Austin practised law as an equity draftsman in Lincoln’s Inn before being appointed in 1826 as professor of jurisprudence at the newly founded University of London. To prepare for his lectures, Austin spent two years in Bonn studying pandect law and German legal science. Al- though his early lectures were attended by J. S. Mill and others from Bentham’s circle, Austin regarded his efforts as unsuccessful and resigned his chair in 1832.Hedied in Weybridge on 17 December 1859.But for the efforts of his remarkable wife, Sarah Austin (n´ ee Taylor), he would not have published at all. Main works: The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1832); Lectures on Jurisprudence, 2 vols. (1863). Secondary literature: Moles, R. N. (1987). Definition and Rule in Legal Theory,Oxford: Blackwell; Rumble, W. E. (1985). The Thought of John Austin,London: Athlone Press. Ayer, Sir Alfred Jules (1910–89). Ayer was the most influential British member of the logical empiricist movement. In 1933 he became a lecturer at Christ Church Oxford; after war service he was appointed Grote Professor of Philosophy in London (1946–59)andthen Wykeham Professor of Logic at Oxford (1959–78). Ayer’s early work was much influenced by the work of the logical empiricists in Vienna, and his first book Language, Truth and Logic (London: Gollanez, 1936)isthe classic statement in English of the logical empiricist position. In subsequent works, such as The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge (London: Macmillan, 1940), he progressively refined his empiricist account of knowledge. Although in later writings he moved away from the reductive empiricism of his earlier work, he remained committed to a philosophy which combines the rigour of logical reasoning with empiricist methods of enquiry. In 1973 he published The Central Questions of Philosophy (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1973). Secondary literature: Foster, J. (1985). A. J. Ayer,London: Routledge. Bachelard, Gaston (1884–1962). Bachelard began his work life with the Postes et Tele- graphes and taught high-school science from the end of the First World War until 1930,after receivinghisdoctorate in 1927.After ten years as professor of philosophy at Dijon, he went to the Sorbonne in 1940,where he remained as professor of history and philosophy of science until his retirement in 1954.Itisplausible to speak of Bachelard’s philosophy as a constructive rationalism, since he believed that reason actively builds scientific knowledge through the rationalisation of the empirical world via experiment and mathematics. Science (and art no less) is a project. His main works were: Valeur inductive de la relativit´ e (Paris: Vrin, 1929); Les intuitions atomistiques: essai de classification (Paris: Vrin, 1933); Essai sur la connaissance approch´ ee (Paris: Vrin, 1969); Le Nouvel Esprit scientifique (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1973). Secondary literature: McAllester, M. (ed.) (1989), The Philosophy and Poetics of Gaston Bachelard, Washington, DC: University Press of America; Tiles, M. (1985), Bachelard: Science and Objectivity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bakunin, Mikhail Aleksandrovich (1814–76). Born in Tver province to a gentry family, Bakunin studied at the Artillery School in St Petersburg from 1828 to 34;from1836 to 1840 he studied philosophy in Moscow, where he became part of the Stankevich Hegelian circle. In 1840 he moved to Berlin, where he became involved in the Hegelian left. He moved to Zurich in 1843,toParis in 1845,and to Brussels in 1847.Hewasactive during the revolutions of 1848 in Bohemia and Germany; took part in 1849 Dresden insurrection, and was sentenced to death in both Saxony and Austria, but eventually extradited to Russia in 1851.Having been released from prison and exiled to Siberia in 1857,heescaped from Siberia and made his way to London 1861.In1864 he moved to Italy and joined the First International. He moved to Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

Biobibliographical appendix 767 Switzerland in 1867 and his factional struggle with Marx culminated in his expulsion from the International in 1872. His main works were: ‘Die Reaktion in Deutschland’, Deutsche Jahrb¨ ucher f¨ ur Wissenschaft und Kunst, 1842,trans.anded.1965 J. M. Edie, J. P. Scanlon, and M.-B. Zeldina, ‘The Reaction in Germany’, Russian Philosophy (3 vols., Chicago: Quadrangle Books), vol. I, 384–406; Gosu- darstivennost’ I anarkhiia (Geneva, 1873,trans.1900 M. S. Shats, Statism and Anarchy,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Secondary literature: Carr, E. H. (1975), Michael Bakunin,London: Macmillan; Kelly, A. (1982), Michael Bakunin. A Study in Psychology and Politics of Utopianism,Oxford: Clarendon Press. Barth, Karl (1886–1946). Barth was the most important theologian of the twentieth century. He was a German-speaking Swiss and trained in Switzerland and Germany. In 1922 he was called to the chair of Reformed theology in G¨ ottingen; in 1925 he moved to Munster, and then in 1930 to Bonn; but he was dismissed in 1935 for refusing to take an oath of loyalty to Hitler. He returned to Switzerland and held a chair of theology at Basle until 1961.Barth’s first major work washis discussion of The Epistle to the Romans (Zurich, 1922)inwhich he affirmed the absolute ‘otherness’ of God. This work initiated the ‘theology of crisis’ but gave rise to the question: how can we then have any understanding of God? Barth’s response to this was that there is no other source than the Word of God, and he worked this out in his monumental Church Dogmatics (Munich, 1932–67)towhichhe devoted the rest of his life. Secondary literature: Ford, D. (1981), Barth and God’s Story, Frankfurt: Verlag Peter Lang; Sykes, S. (ed.) (1989), Karl Barth: Centenary Essays,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Berdiaev, Nikolai Aleksandrovich (1874–1948). Born near Kiev into an aristocratic family, Berdiaev was brought up in the French manner. He became a student radical, which led to his expulsion from Kiev University in 1898.In1900,hewasbanished to Vologda Province. There hewroteSub” ektivizm i individualizm v obshchestvennoi filosofii (Subjectivism and Individualism in Social Philosophy) (St Petersburg: Popova, 1901), a critique of Mikhailovskii which sought to reconcile Marxism and transcendental idealism. In 1908,hemovedtoMoscow and became prominent in the spiritual searching of the ‘silver age’, contributing to Vekhi (Signposts)(1909). His influences included German idealism, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Soloviev, Rozanov, Dostoevsky, and Tolstoi. He adopted a form of religious personalism influenced by the mysticism of Jakob Boehme, which he set out in Smysl tvorchestva (The Meaning of Creativity) (Moscow: Leman and Saklavov, 1916). He was briefly a professor at Moscow University, but was expelled from Russia in 1922.Hesettled in Paris in 1924,where he became the best known of the Russian ´ emigr´ e philosophers. He continued to develop his blend of Christian existentialism and personalistic socialism in many subsequent books (e.g. Sonysl istor¨ u,Berlin: Obolisk, 1923; Orabstve i Svobode cheloveka,Paris: YMCA Press, 1939), and wrote perceptively about Russian communism. F. Nucho, Berdyaev’s Philosophy (London: Gollancz, 1966), is the best monograph on his work. N. Lossky, History of Russian Philosophy (New York: International University Press, 1951), ch. 16,isagoodshortaccount. Bergson, Henri (1859–1941). Bergson entered the ´ Ecole Normale Sup´ erieure in 1878, received his agr´ egation in 1881,andhis doctorate in 1889.After some years of teaching in lyc´ ees, he was named professor at the Coll` ege de France in 1900.Hebecame a member of the Acad´ emie des sciences morales et politiques in 1901, became officier de la L´ egion d’honneur in 1902,received an honorary doctorate from the University of Oxford in 1909,and became a member of the Acad´ emie franc¸aise in 1914.From1916 he was sent on high-level diplomatic missions by the Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

768 Biobibliographical appendix French government to Spain, and the United States, where he received a great welcome. He received the Nobel prize for literature in 1928.Works which appeared during his lifetime were: Quid Aristoteles de loco senserit (doctoral thesis, 1889); Essai sur les donn´ ees imm´ ediates de la conscience (Paris: Alcan, 1889); Mati` ere et M´ emoire: essai sur la relation du corps ` a l’esprit (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1896); Le Rire: essai sur la signification du comique (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1900); L’Evolution cr´ eatrice (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1907); L’Energie spirituelle (Paris: Alcan, 1919); Dur´ ee et simultan´ eit´ e: propos de la th´ eorie d’Einstein (Paris: Alcan, 1922); Les Deux Sources de la morale et de la religion (Paris: Alcan, 1932); La Pens´ ee et le Mouvant: essais et conf´ erences (Paris: Alcan, 1938). Other texts were later gathered and published as M´ elanges (Presses Universitaires de France, 1972). Despite the prohibition in Bergson’s will, his lyc´ ee courses have also now been published: as Cours I, II, III (1990–4). Of the massive secondary literature, the following may be mentioned: Deleuze, G. (1966), Le Bergsonisme,Paris: Presses Universitaires de France; Gouhier, H. (1964), Bergson et le Christ des Evangiles,Paris: Fayard; Hude, H. (1989–1900), Bergson,Paris: Editions Universitaires; Lacey, A. R. (1989), Bergson, The Arguments of the Philosophers,London: Routledge; Moore, F. C. T. (1996), Bergson: Thinking Backwards.Modern European Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Russell, B. A. W. (1914), The Philosophy of Bergson,Cambridge: Bowes and Bowes; Soulez, P. (1997), Bergson,Paris: Flammarion; Worms, F. (1992), Introduction ` a Bergson: l’ˆ ame et le corps,Paris: Hatier. Blondel, Maurice (1861–1949). Born in Dijon and educated at the local lyc´ ee,heentered the Ecole Normale Sup´ erieure in Paris in 1881,where he studied with Emile Boutroux and L´ eon Oll´ e Laprune. In 1893 Blondel submitted his thesis, L’Action,totheSorbonne.Hetaught briefly at lyc´ ees and the University of Lille, and then was appointed professor at Aix-en-Provence where he taught from 1894 until his retirement in 1927.Blondel’s writings influenced several Catholic Modernists; his works, however, were critical of both Neo-Thomism on the right and the Modernists on the left. His Letter on Apologetics (1896,trans.1964 A. Dru and I. Trethowan, London: Harvill Press) was sent to the Holy Office in Rome, but he was never condemned. Blondel also influenced the transcendental Thomists, Pierre Rousselot and Joseph Mar´ echal. Later in the 1930sand1940s, Blondel’s writings were again influential, for example, on the Nouvelle Th´ eologie and the French Existentialists Gabriel Marcel and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Among Blondel’s other writings are his trilogy: La pens´ ee, 2 vols. (Paris: Alcan, 1934), L’Etre et les ˆ etres (Paris: Alcan, 1935), and Action, 2 vols. (Paris: Alcan, 1936–7). The latter work is not to be confused with L’Action (Paris: Alcan, 1893). Also, La philosophie et l’esprit chr´ etien, 2 vols. (Paris: Alcan, 1944–6), and Exigences philosophiques du christianisme (1950). Helpful guides to Blondel’s philosophy include: Henri Bouillard, Blondel and Christianity (Washington, DC: Corpus Books, 1969); Gabriel Daly, Transcendence and Immanence: A Study in Catholic Modernism and Integralism,Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980,chs.2 and 4;Alexander Dru and Illtyd Trethowan (eds.), Maurice Blondel: The Letter on Apologetics and History and Dogma, London: Harvill Press, 1964 which includes an important 124-page Introduction; Henri Dum´ ery, La philosophie de l’action (Paris: Aubier, 1948); Jean Lacroix, Maurice Blondel: An Introduction to the Man and His Philosophy (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1968); James M. Somerville, Total Commitment. Blondel’s L’Action (Washington, DC: Corpus Books, 1968); Claude Tresmontant, Introduction ` alam ´ etaphysique de Maurice Blondel (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1963). Boltzmann, Ludwig (1844–1906). Austrian physicist-philosopher; born in Vienna, edu- cated in Linz and Vienna, Boltzmann taught physics and epistemology in Graz, Munich, and Vienna. He recognised the importance of Maxwell’s electromagnetic and atomic theories; to Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

Biobibliographical appendix 769 the latter he made seminal contributions: he proved the equipartition theorem (in a molecule, every degree of freedom contributes the same quantity of energy); he moreover identified the statistical character of the notion of entropy by linking it to that of thermodynamic probability (see Vorlesungen ¨ uber Gastheorie, Leipzig: J. Barth, 1896). In philosophy (see Popul¨ are Schriften, Braunschweig Wiesbaden: Vieweg 1979), he defended materialism and a Darwinian reduction of biology and psychology to physics. Secondary literature: Blackmore, J. (ed.) (1995), Ludwig Boltzmann: His Later Life and Philosophy, 1900–1906, 2 vols. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 168, 174,Dordrecht: Kluwer. Bosanquet, Bernard (1848–1923). As a student at Balliol College, Oxford (1866–70), Bosanquet was much influenced by T. H. Green’s idealism and by his example of active citizen- ship. In 1871 he was elected a fellow of University College, Oxford (beating F. H. Bradley), and taught philosophy and Greek history. Becoming financially independent on his father’s death, Bosanquet moved to London in 1881,tohave time to write, and to engage in social work and adult education. Besides publishing prolifically in philosophy, he was prominent in the Charity Organisation Society, which aimed to put private philanthropy on a systematic and scientific footing. From 1903 to 1908 he was professor of moral philosophy at St Andrews University. He gave the Gifford lectures in 1911 and 1912.Hewas President of the Aristotelian Soci- ety from 1894 to 1898. His main works were: Knowledge and Reality: A Criticism of Mr. F. H. Bradley’s ‘Principles of Logic’ (London: Kegan Paul, 1885); Logic, or the Morphology of Knowledge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888); Essays and Addresses (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1889); A History of Aesthetic (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1892); The Civilization of Christendom and Other Studies (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1893); The Essentials of Logic (London and New Yo rk: Macmillan, 1895); A Companion to Plato’s Republic for English Readers (London: Rivingtons, 1895); Psychology of the Moral Self (London and New York: Macmillan, 1897); The Philosophical Theory of the State (London: Macmillan, 1899); The Principle of Individuality and Value (London: Macmillan, 1912); The Value and Destiny of the Individual (London: Macmillan, 1913); Three Lectures on Aesthetic (London: Macmillan, 1915); Social and International Ideals, Being Studies in Patriotism (London, 1917); Some Suggestions in Ethics (London: Macmillan, 1918); Implication and Linear Inference (London: Macmillan, 1920); What Religion Is (London: Macmillan, 1920); The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy (London: Macmillan, 1921); Science and Philosophy and Other Essays, ed. J. H. Muirhead and R. C. Bosanquet (London: Allen and Unwin, 1927); Selected Essays, ed. W. Sweet (Bristol, 1999); Essays on ‘Aspects of the Social Problem’ and Essays on Social Policy, ed. W. Sweet (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1999). Secondary literature: Bosanquet, H. (1924), Bernard Bosanquet: A Short Account of his Life,London: Macmillan; Gaus, G. F. (1994), ‘Green, Bosanquet and the Philosophy of Coherence’ in C. L. Ten (ed.), The Routledge History of Philosophy,vol.VII:The Nineteenth Century,London: Routledge, 408–36;Houang, F. (1954), Le N´ eo-h´ eg´ elianisme en Angleterre: la philosophie de Bernard Bosanquet, Paris, Vrin; Milne, A. J. M. (1962), The Social Philosophy of English Idealism,London:George Allen and Unwin; Muirhead, J. H. (1935), Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends: Letters Illustrating the Sources and the Development of His Philosophical Opinions,London: Allen and Unwin; Otter, S. den (1996), British Idealism and Social Explanation: A Study in Late Victorian Thought,Oxford: Clarendon Press; Randall, J. H., Jr. (1996), ‘Idealist Social Philosophy and Bernard Bosanquet’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 24: 473–502;Sweet, W. (1997), Idealism and Rights: The Social Ontology of Human Rights in the Political Thought of Bernard Bosanquet, Lanham, MD: University Press of America; Sweet, W. (1998), ‘Bernard Bosanquet’ in E. N. Zetla (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Stanford, CA: CSLI; Vincent, A. and Plant, R. (1984), Philosophy, Politics and Citizenship: The Life and Thought of the British Idealists,Oxford: Blackwell. Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

770 Biobibliographical appendix Bradley, Francis Herbert (1846–1924). Born in London on 30 January 1846,theson of a famous evangelical vicar and brother of A. C. Bradley, the Shakespearian critic. Educated at University College Oxford, he became a fellow of Merton College Oxford in 1870,oneyear after his degree. The next year he was struck with a severe kidney disease and was for the rest of his life a retired semi-invalid who kept his own company or the company of a few friends. He never lectured and never had any students (the later idealist philosopher, R. G. Collingwood remarked that although he had lived near him in Oxford for sixteen years, he had never to his knowledge set eyes on him). Illness did not prevent Bradley from travelling fairly extensively and he often wintered abroad for the sake of his health, managing to keep himself alive until 18 September 1924.Hewasawarded the Order of Merit in 1924. His chief works are Ethical Studies (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1876)andAppearance and Reality (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1906). Secondary literature: Manser, A. and Stock, G. (eds.) (1984), The Philosophy of F. H. Bradley, Oxford: Clarendon Press; and Nicholson, P. P. (1990) The Political Philosophy of the British Idealists, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brentano, Franz (1838–1917). Born in Marienberg (Germany) into a distinguished Italian- German family, Brentano studied in Berlin under Adolf Trendelenburg and in W¨ urzburg, where he also took holy orders. After his rejection of the dogma of Papal infallibility he withdrew from the priesthood in 1873;one year later he became professor of philosophy in Vienna, where for twenty years he taught, among others, Edmund Husserl, Anton Marty, Christian von Ehrenfels, Kazimierz Twardowski, Carl Stumpf, Alexius Meinong, and Sigmund Freud. He moved to Florence in 1896 and toZurichin1915. His work, much of it published posthumously, extends across all areas of philosophy: Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seineden nach Aristotle (Freiburg: Herder, 1862); Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt (Leipzig: Duncker and Humboldt, 1874); Vom sinnlichem und noetischen Bewusstsein (Leipzig: Meiner, 1928); Wahrheit und Evidenz (Leipzig: Meiner, 1930); Kategorienlehre (Leipzig: Meiner, 1933), Philosophische Untersuchungen zu Raum, Zeit, und Kontinuum (Hamburg: Meiner, 1976); Deskriptive Psychologie (Hamburg: Meiner, 1982). Secondary literature: McAlister, L. L. (ed.) (1976), The Philosophy of Brentano,London:Duck- worth; Smith, B. (1986), ‘Austrian Economics and Austrian Philosophy’ in W. Grassl and B. Smith (eds.), Austrian Economics; Historical and Philosophical Background,London: Croom Helm. Bridgman, Percy W. (1882–1962). Bridgman received his PhD from Harvard University in 1908 and joined the faculty the same year. He became Hollis Professor of Mathematics and Natural Philosophy in 1926.Bridgman’s empirical work was in materials under extremely high pressure, for which he received a Nobel Prize in 1946.Yetit is as a philosopher of physics, in such books as The Logic of Modern Physics (New York: Macmillan, 1927), The Nature of Physical Theory (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1936), and Reflections of a Physicist (New York: Philosophical Library, 1955), that Bridgman made his greatest impact. Ever an operationalist, Bridgman forcefully defended the principle that it is meaningless to interpret physical concepts except as they are capable of observation, particularly through experimental operations. A whole generation of physicists, and several generations of psychologists, were brought up in Bridgman’s philosophical tradition. Secondary literature: Walter, M. L. (1990), Science and Cultural Crisis, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Broad, C. D. (1887–1971). Charles (Charlie) Broad was educated at Cambridge University, where he read Natural Sciences Part I and Moral Sciences Part II. He was elected to a prize Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

Biobibliographical appendix 771 fellowship at Trinity College in 1911,and was lecturer at St Andrews University from 1911 to 1914 and then professor at Bristol until returning to a fellowship at Trinity College, Cambridge, in 1923.Hewas elected to the Knightbridge Chair of Moral Philosophy at Cambridge in 1933, and held the chair until his retirement in 1953. His major works (not just on moral philosophy) were: Scientific Thought (London: Kegan Paul, 1923); The Mind and its Place in Nature (London: Kegan Paul, 1925); ‘Analysis of some Ethical Concepts’, Journal of Philosophical Studies, 3 (1928); Five Types of Ethical Theory (London: Kegan Paul, 1930); ‘Is “Goodness” a Name of a Simple Non-Natural Quality?’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 34 (1934); ‘Some Reflections on Moral-Sense Theories in Ethics’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 45 (1945). Secondary literature: Schilpp, P. A. (ed.) (1959), The Philosophy of C. D. Broad,NewYork: Tudor. Brouwer, Luitzgen Egbertus Jan (1881–1966). The founder of the ‘intuitionist’ move- ment in logic and the philosophy of mathematics. Brouwer spent his career in Amsterdam, where he was a professor from 1912 until 1955.Brouwer rejected the view that there is a mind- independent mathematical reality which may, or may not, be discovered by mathematicians. Instead he held that mathematical truth depends on the possibility of constructing proofs, and this led him to reject non-constructive methods of argument in mathematics. Although he rejected the logicist thesis that logic is the foundation of mathematics, his approach to math- ematical reasoning can be generalised to logic, where it constitutes ‘intuitionist logic’ which departs from classical logic by rejecting the law of excluded middle. His main works were ‘De onbetrouwbaarheid der logische principes’ (Tijdsschrift voor wijsbegeerte 1: 152–8;trans.1975 by A. Heyting, ‘The Unreliability of the Logical Principles’ in A. Heyting (ed.), L. E. J. Brouwer, Collected Works,vol. I, Amsterdam: North-Holland, 107–11); and ‘Consciousness, Philosophy and Mathematics’ (Proceedings of the 10th International Congress of Philosophy, Amsterdam, 1948, 1235–49. Repr. 1975 in A. Heyting (ed.), L. E. J. Brower, Collected Works,vol. I, Amsterdam: North-Holland, 480–94). Secondary literature: Dummett, M. A. E. (1973), ‘The Philosophical Basis of Intuitionistic Logic’ in H. E. Rose and J. C. Shepherdson (eds.), Logic Colloqium 1973, 5–40. Repr. 1978 in Truth and Other Enigmas,London: Duckworth, 215–47;Dummett, M. A. E. (1977), Elements of Intuitionism,Oxford: Clarendon Press. Brunschvicg, L ´ eon.(1869–1944). Brunschvicg received his licence ` es lettres and licence ` es sciences from the Ecole Normale Sup´ erieure in 1891 and his Sorbonne doctorate in 1897 for his thesis, La Modalit´ edujugement.After teaching in several lyc´ ees, he returned in 1909 to the Sorbonne, where he held various chairs until the Nazis occupied Paris in 1940.Hewasafounder of the Revue de m´ etaphysique et de morale and oftheSoci´ et´ efranc¸aise de Philosophie. Brunschvicg’s general position combined an epistemological and a metaphysical idealism, based mostly upon Kant, but with an historical methodology. During his time he was the leading spokesman of general French philosophy. His main works were: La modalit´ edujugement (The Modality of Judgment)(Paris: Alcan, 1897); L’Exp´ erience humaine et la causalit´ ephysique (Human Experience and Physical Causality)(Paris: Alcan, 1922); and Le Progr` es de la conscience dans la philosophie occidentale (The Progress of Consciousness in Western Philosophy)(Paris: Alcan, 1927). Secondary literature: Boirel, R. (1964), Brunschvicg,Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Campbell, Norman R. (1880–1949). A fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge; he worked under J. J. Thomson in Cambridge from 1904 to 1910 and then became honorary fellow for research in physics at Leeds. After the First World War, he became a researcher for General Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

772 Biobibliographical appendix Electric until retirement in 1944.Because of his rich physics experience, Campbell brought real, practical knowledge to his philosophical thought – hence his emphasis upon analogy and measurement. Campbell’s depth is well indicated by the fact that his highly regarded Physics: The Elements (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1920)was later reprinted as Foundations of Science (New York: Dover, 1957). Probably his best-known work, however, remains the short, extremely accessible What is Science? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1921). Secondary literature: Nagel, E. (1961), The Structure of Science,NewYork:Harcourt Brace. Cantor, Georg (1845–1918). Cantor was the founder of set theory and the modern theory of infinite numbers. He secured a teaching position at Halle in 1869,and remained there for the rest of his life. He developed his theory of sets in parallel with his investigations into the size of sets. In 1874 he developed the famous ‘diagonal argument’ by which he was able to show that the size (cardinal number) of the set of real numbers is greater than that of the natural numbers. ‘Cantor’s theorem’ is the generalisation of this result, and states that the cardinal number of the power set of a set S is always greater than the cardinal number of S itself. This sets up ahierarchy of infinite cardinal numbers (‘Cantor’s heaven’). Cantor postulated that there is no infinite cardinal between the number of the natural numbers and that of the real numbers (Cantor’s ‘continuum hypothesis’). Cantor also developed a theory of transfinite ordinal numbers alongside his theory of infinite cardinals, and showed that these have a distinctive arithmetic. His main works were ‘ ¨ Uber unendliche lineare Punctmannigfaltigkeiten, 5’ (‘On Infinite Linear Manifolds of Points’) (Mathematischen Annalen 1883); ‘Beitr¨ age zur Begr¨ undung der transfiniten mengenlehre’ (Mathematischen Annalen 1895, 1897.Trans. Contributions to the Founding of the Theory of Transfinite Numbers (New York: Dover, 1955)). Secondary literature: Dauben, J. W. (1979), George Cantor: His Mathematics and Philosophy of the Infinite,Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Hallett, M. (1984), Cantorian Set Theory and Limitation of Size,Oxford: Clarendon Press. Carnap, Rudolph (1891–1970). Carnap was one of the leading figures in the Vienna Circle and had a decisive influence in the United States after he had moved there. He studied under Frege at Jena and wrote his doctoral thesis there on the philosophy of physics. In 1926 he began teaching at Vienna, where he joined the Vienna Circle; in 1931 he moved to a chair at the German University in Prague. But in 1935 he moved to Chicago and began a new career in the United States. In 1956 he moved to UCLA, where he ended his career. Carnap’s first major work was Der logische Aufbau der Welt (Berlin: Weltkreis Verlag, 1928.Trans.1967 The Logical Structure of the World (Berkeley, CA: University of Californi` aPress)), in which he sought to show how the structure of the world can be constituted on the basis of experience. In the 1930sCarnapturnedtoenquiries into the logical structure of language in order to clarify the structure of scientific knowledge and developed a pragmatic, conventionalist, conception of the role of logic. In accordance with this account, he held that all philosophical questions are best regarded as questions about language. In his later writings in the United States Carnap turned to questions of semantics and to the clarification of logical probability; he also defended his pragmatically based analytic/synthetic distinction against Quine’s criticism that the distinction itself was misconceived. Carnap’s other main works were Scheinproblems in der Philosophic (Pseudoproblems in Philosophy)(Berlin: Weltkreis, 1928); ‘Uberwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache’ (Erkenntnis 2, 1932: 219–41.Trans.1959 ‘The Elimination of Metaphysics through the Logical Analysis of Language’, in A. J. Ayer, ed., Logical Positivism (Glencoe, IL: Free Press)); Logische Syntax der Sprache (Vienna: Verlag Julius Springer, 1934.Trans.1937 The Logical Syntax of Language (London: Kegan Paul)); Logical Foundations of Probability (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950); ‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology’ (Revue internationale de philosophie 4, 1950: 20–40). Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

Biobibliographical appendix 773 Secondary literature: Coffa, J. A. (1991), The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap: To the Vienna Station,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Friedman, M. (1987), ‘Carnap’s Aufbau Reconsidered’, Noˆ us 21: 521–45 and (1992), ‘Epistemology in the Aufbau’, Synth` ese 93: 15–57. Cassirer, Ernst (1874–1945). Cassirer continued the Neo-Kantian tradition of philosophy into the first half of the twentieth century, showing how Kant’s conception of the categories could be modified and extended to apply as ‘symbolic forms’. He studied in Marburg with Hermann Cohen, and lectured at Berlin from 1906 until 1919 when he accepted a chair at Hamburg. Cassirer left Germany in 1933,and after brief spells in Oxford and Sweden settled at Yale in 1941.Cassirer’s main work is Philosophie der Symbolischen Formen (The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms)(Berlin: B. Cassirer and Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1923–9) in which he offers a unified account of symbolic representations, including myth, religion, language, art, and science. Cassirer gives a Hegelian phenomenology of these symbolic forms, arguing that they exemplify the different relations between symbols and the symbolised. Cassirer also wrote a series of works on the history of philosophy, which include important studies of the Renaissance and Enlightenment. Other important works include An Essay on Man (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1944); and Die Philosophie der Aufkl¨ arung (T¨ ubingen: Mohr, 1932. Trans. 1961 The Philosophy of the Enlightenment,Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). Secondary literature: Krois, J. H. (1987), Cassirer: Symbolic Forms and History,NewHaven, CT: Yale University Press. Church, Alonzo (1903–1995). Church is best known as the creator of the λ-calculus, a formalism for defining functions that is of great importance in computer science, and for his Thesis (1934)thatalleffectively computable functions are λ-definable. In 1936 Church showed that the valid sentences of Peano arithmetic do not form a recursive set. One of the founders of the Association for Symbolic Logic, Church served as editor of its Journal from 1936 to 1979.He wasamember of the faculty at Princeton from 1929 to 1967 and atUCLAfrom1967 to 1991. His principal works were: ‘An Unsolvable Problem of Elementary Number Theory’, American Journal of Mathematics 58, 345–63;‘ANote on the Entscheidungsproblem’, Journal of Symbolic Logic I(1936): 40–1 and 101–2;‘Abibliography of symbolic logic’, Journal of Symbolic Logic I (1936): 121–216 (additions and corrections 3: 178–92); and The Calculi of Lambda Conversion (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1941). Secondary literature: Anderson, C. A. (1998), ‘Alonzo Church’s Contributions to Philosophy and Intensional Logic’, The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 4: 129–71;Barendregt, H. (1997), ‘The Impact of the Lambda Calculus in Logic and Computer Science’, The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 3: 181– 215;Enderton, H. B. (1998), ‘Alonzo Church and the Reviews’, The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 4: 181–203; Sieg, W. (1988), ‘Step by Recursive Step: Church’s Analysis of Effective Calculability’, The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 3: 154–80. Chwistek, Leon (1884–1944). Chwistek studied in Cracow, gaining his PhD in 1906 and his habilitation in 1928.Hewas a professor in Lvov from 1930 to 1939. His main work was his Outline of Logic and of the Methodology of the Exact Sciences,London:Kegan Paul, 1948. Secondary literature: Jordan, Z. (1945), The Development of Mathematical Logic and of Logical positivism in Poland Between Two Wars,Oxford: Oxford University Press. Clifford, William Kingdon (1845–1879). English mathematician and philosopher, born and educated in Exeter and, at the age of fifteen, at King’s College, London. In 1863 he entered Trinity College, Cambridge, where his mathematical genius was recognised and where he be- gan, as an undergraduate, to publish mathematical papers. At Cambridge he was a member of Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

774 Biobibliographical appendix the elite club, the Apostles, and was a spirited supporter of High Church Anglo-Catholicism. Through his study of Darwin and Herbert Spencer, who were dominant influences on him, Clifford became an agnostic and was one of the leading Victorian unbelievers, through his highly effective and popular lectures and essays. In 1868 Clifford was elected a fellow of Trinity College, where he remained until his appoint- ment in 1871 as professor of applied mathematics at University College, London. In 1874 he was elected to the Royal Society and became a valuable member and contributor to the discussions of the famous Metaphysical Society. In the last four years of his life he suffered from advancing tu- berculosis; he died in Madeira on 3 March 1879.Some of Clifford’s mathematical papers remain classics in the field. His philosophical position set forth in numerous papers on epistemology and metaphysics has been referred to as idealistic monism. He defended freedom and rejected purely mechanistic explanations of matter and mind and pure phenomenalism. All entities in nature have elementary feelings or mind-stuff that have mental or psychic characteristics. Hence the physical and mental are two modes of apprehending the same world. Main works: all of Clifford’s important papers on philosophy and ethics were published together posthumously by F. Pollock and L. Stephen (eds.), Lectures and Essays, 2 vols. (London: Macmillan, 1879). Volume 1 includes a life of Clifford by Pollock. Clifford’s Mathematical Papers (London: Macmillan, 1882)are edited by R. Tucker, with an introduction by H. J. S. Smith. Clifford’s fragmentary Common Sense of the Exact Sciences (London: Kegan Paul, 1885)was edited and partly written by Karl Pearson and has been reissued with a preface by Bertrand Russell and a new introduction by James R. Newman (New York, 1955). Secondary sources: For Clifford’s contribution to the debate on the ethics of belief, see McCarthy, Gerald D. (1986), The Ethics of Belief Debate,Atlanta: Scholars Press; Livingston, James C. (1974), The Ethics of Belief: An Essay on the Victorian Religious Conscience,Tallahassee, FL: Scholars Press. Cohen, Hermann (1842–1918). German philosopher and one of the founders of the Mar- burg school of Neo-Kantianism. He was born in 1842 in Coswig. His early university interest centred on the Greeks but shifted to Kant. As a student of F. A. Trendelenburg, he defended him against Kuno Fischer but modified that position in Kants Theorie der Erfahrung (Berlin: D¨ ammler, 1871), a commentary on the The Critique of Pure Reason.Healso wrote commentaries on Kant’s second and third Critiques (Berlin: D¨ ammler, 1877, 1889). He went to Marburg in 1873, be- friending Lange, and after Lange’s death took over the chair in philosophy. In 1880 Paul Natorp joined him, beginning a productive relationship. Cohen retired in 1912 and moved to Berlin where he worked on religious questions. He died in 1918. Secondary literature: Poma, A. (1988), Filosofia Critica di Hermann Cohen,Milan: Ugo Mursia editore. Trans. 1997 J. Denton, The Critical Philosophy of Hermann Cohen,Albany, NY: State University of New York. Collingwood, Robin George (1889–1943). Trained as an historian who worked on the Roman period of British history, Collingwood become the foremost philosopher of history in England in this period. Not only did he distinguish first-person historical knowledge from positivist conceptions of scientific enquiry in his Idea of History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946), he also attempted to provide the metaphysical foundations of his antireductionist view in An Essay on Metaphysics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940). On Collingwood’s philosophy of history, see W. J. van der Dussen, History as a Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981)andLewis Mink, Mind, History and Dialectic (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1969). Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

Biobibliographical appendix 775 Croce, Benedetto (1866–1952). Croce was the leading Italian philosopher of the twentieth century and gave a distinctive new form to the Hegelian tradition, especially as it concerned the philosophy of art and of history. He studied at Rome and began writing as a private scholar; his first important works on aesthetics, logic, practical philosophy, and philosophy of history were conceived as a four-part ‘Philosophy of Spirit’ (1902, 1907, 1909, 1917). His views in all these areas developed during the next decades, as Croce defended the value of art as a distinctive way of giving content to our emotions, argued that ‘all history is contemporary history’ (because, as distinct from a mere chronicle, it involves interpretation), and opposed utilitarian reductions of ethical value. Croce also wrote a large number of historical studies, especially concerning the Baroque period and the kingdom of Naples. His main works are Estetica come scienza dell’espressione e linguistica generale (Milan, Palermo and Naples: Sandron, 1902;trans.1909 D. Ainslie, Aesthetic,London: Macmillan); Logica come scienza del concetto puro (Bari: Laterza, 1905;trans.1917 D. Ainslie, Logic,London: Macmillan); Filosofia della practica, economia ed etica (Bari: Laterza, 1909;trans.1917 D. Ainslie, Philosophy of the Practical, London: Macmillan); Teoria e storia della storiografia (Bari: Laterza, 1917;trans.1921 D. Ainslie, Theory and History of Historiography,London: Harrap). Secondary literature: Orsini, G. N. G. (1961), Benedetto Croce, Philosopher of Art and Literary Critic, Carbondale IL: Southern Illinois University Press; Roberts, D. D. (1987), Benedetto Croce and the Uses of Historcism,Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. de Finetti, Bruno (1906–1985). Italian mathmatician and probabilistic thinker. He de- veloped a distinctive positivist philosophy of probability on the basis of ideas found in Italian pragmatist philosophy early in the twentieth century, and was also influenced by Bridgman’s op- erationalism. Probability was interpreted as a degree of belief, not determined by external facts. Degree of belief manifests itself in the subject’s behaviour in situations of uncertainty. Probability statements gain operational numerical meaning in situations such as betting, but only if all events meet strict criteria of empirical verifiability. His main works were: ‘Sul significato soggettivo dell probabilit` a’ (‘On the Subjective Significance of Probability’, Fundamenta Mathematicae 17 (1931) 298–329)and‘La pr´ evision: ses lois logiques, ses sources subjectives’ (Annales de l’Institut Henri Poincar´ e 7 (1937), 1–6;trans.1964 ‘Foresight: Its Logical Laws, Its Subjective Sources’ in H. Kyburg and H. Smokler (eds.), Studies in Subjective Probability,NewYork:Wiley). Secondary literature: von Plato, J. (1994), Creating Modern Probability,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dewey, John (1859–1952). Dewey was the most important philosopher in the United States during the first half of the twentieth century, as well as an influential public intellectual. His philosophical corpus is vast and wide ranging, systematically expressed in works such as his Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (New York: Henry Holt, 1938). Motivated by a non-reductive naturalism and a broad understanding of democracy, Dewey saw the political importance of science in complex societies as a matter of making it a democratic form of social enquiry and problem- solving in Liberalism and Social Action (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1935) and The Public and Its Problems (New York: Henry Holt, 1927). Recent literature on Dewey is vast, including comprehensive works by Robert Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991)andAlan Ryan, John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism (New York: Norton, 1995). Dilthey, Wilhelm (1833–1911). Dilthey devoted himself to providing a ‘Critique of His- torical Reason’ which would do for the human sciences what Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason had Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

776 Biobibliographical appendix achieved for the natural sciences. He was appointed in 1882 to Hegel’s chair at Berlin. In his first work, his 1883 Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften (Leipzig), Dilthey argued that neither metaphysics nor the natural sciences provides a methodology that is appropriate to the human sciences. In order to develop such a methodology he first argued that psychology needs to be reconceived, not as a natural science, but as a description of lived experience which aims at providing an ‘understanding’ of human life. He later came to think that a descriptive psychology of this kind needed to be enriched by a ‘hermeneutic’ approach which looks to levels of mean- ing that are not manifest in experience. This approach led him back to Hegel’s conception of ‘Objective Spirit’ as the general framework for his self-reflexive critique of historical reason. His other main works are: ‘Ideen ¨ uber eine beschriebende und zergliedernde Psychologie’ (1894; trans. 1977 R. Zaner and K. Heiges, ‘Ideas Concerning a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology’ in R. A. Makkreel (ed.), Descriptive Psychology and Historical Understanding (The Hague: Nijhoff), and ‘Enstehung der Hermeneutik’ (1900;trans.1966 R. A. Makkreel and K. Rodi, ‘The Rise of Hermeneutics’ in R. A. Makkreel (ed.), Hermeneutics and the Study of History,Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). Secondary literature: Makkreel, R. A. (1992), Dilthey: Philosopher of the Human Studies, 2nd edn Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Duhem, Pierre M. (1861–1916). Duhem studied physics in Paris, and, after publishing a major book on thermodynamics, moved to the faculties of science at, successively, Lille (1887), Rennes (1893), and Bordeaux (1895–1916). His interest in the systematic and formal aspects of scientific theories led to his most important philosophical work, the anti-metaphysical account of scientific theory in La Th´ eorie physique: son objet et sa structure (Paris: Chevalier and Rivi` ere, 1906). Duhem’s belief that a subject’s history formed an essential part of its nature led to his important Les Origines de la statique (Paris: A. Hermann, 1905–6)and the monumental ten-volume history of astronomy Le Syst` eme du morde (Paris: A. Hermann, 1913–59). Today’s Duhem Problem is an offshoot of Duhem’s view that there are no crucial experiments in science because no scientific hypothesis can be independently tested. Secondary literature: Ariew, R. and Banker, P. (eds.) (1990), Pierre Duhem: Historian and Philoso- pher of Science, special issue of Synth` ese 85;Martin,R.N.D.(1991), Pierre Duhem,LaSalle, IL: Open Court. Durkheim, Emile (1858–1917). Durkheim was one of the founders of sociology. Although he is famous for insisting on the distinctiveness of ‘social facts’, his sociology was informed by a social philosophy which relied on an evaluative distinction between ‘normal’ and ‘pathological’ social phenomena. He began his academic career in 1887 in Bordeaux; in 1902 he moved to the Sorbonne in Paris, where he taught until his death in 1917. In his firstwork,De la division du travail social (The Division of Labour in Society)(Paris: Alcan, 1893,trans.1933 G. Simpson, New York: Macmillan), Durkheim contrasted the structure of modern and traditional societies, arguing that the introduction of the division of labour is not just an economic phenomenon, but brings with it a profound reorganisation of social structure and the values of social solidarity (see The Rules of Sociological Method,Paris: Alcan, 1895). In pathological situations, these values are threatened, leading to ‘anomie’ and the collapse of social solidarity. Durkheim then used this analysis to argue (in Le Suicide (Paris: Alcan, 1897,trans. 1951 A. Spaulding and G. Simpson, Glencoe, IL, Free Press)) that suicide, which looks on the face of it a distinctively individual phenomenon, is in fact a social phenomenon. For suicide is typically a product of social pathologies such as anomie. In his last work, Les Formes ´ el´ ementaires de la vie religiense (The Elementary Forms of Religious Life)(Paris: Alcan, 1912,trans.1915 J. W. Swain, New York: Macmillan), Durkheim extended much further his emphasis on the priority of social life, arguing that society is the source of all that makes us human. Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

Biobibliographical appendix 777 Secondary literature: Lukes, Steven (1973), Emile Durkheim: His Life and Work,NewYork:Harper and Row. Einstein, Albert (1879–1955). Einstein was the most famous scientist of the twentieth century. He was born in Ulm in Germany, but in 1901 acquired Swiss citizenship and worked as a patent examiner in Berne until 1909.After holding academic positions in Zurich and Prague he moved to a research professorship Berlin in 1914.Hebecame a celebrity in 1919 after confirmation of his General Theory of Relativity and was awarded a Nobel Prize in 1922.In 1933 he left Germany and worked at Princeton until his death. In 1905 Einstein published his Special Theory of Relativity, in which he reconciled the observed constancy of the speed of light with the thesis that all inertial states of motion are equivalent. During the next ten years he developed his General Theory of Relativity to show that gravitation is inseparable from space-time geometry. At the same time he worked on the foundations of quantum theory, and in his later years he sought to develop a unified field theory which would bring together electromagnetic and gravitational fields in a new physics. During this period he criticised standard quantum theory for its acceptance of a statistical, non-deterministic, framework which he held to be incompatible with our experience of macroscopic phenomena. His main works were ‘Zur Elektrodynamik bewegter K¨ orper’ (Annalen der Physik 17 (1905): 891–921); ‘Die Grundlagen der allgemeinen Relativit¨ atstheorie’ (Annalen der Physik 14 (1916): 769–822); ‘Kosmologische Betrachtungen zur allgemeinen Relativit¨ atstheorie’ (Sitzungsberichte der Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Math.-Phys. Kl.(1917), trans. 1923 W. Pe r r ett and G. B. Jeffrey in H. A. Lorentz, A. Einstein, H. Minkowski, and H. Weyl, The Principle of Relativity (repr. New York: Dover, 1952), 175–88); ‘Geometrie und Erfahrung’ (Sitzungsberichte der Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Math.-Phys. Kl.(1917), separately issued 1923 by W. Perrett and G. B. Jeffrey in expanded form and trans. as ‘Geometry and Experience’ in Sidelights on Relativity,NewYork:E.P.Dutton,27–56). Secondary literature: Earman, J., Glymour, C., and Stachel, J. (eds.) (1977), Foundations of Space- Time Theories,Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press; Pais, A. (1982), ‘Subtle is the Lord’, The Life and Science of Albert Einstein,New Yo rk: Oxford University Press. Engels, Friedrich (1820–95). Born in Barmen to a family of Protestant mill-owners; worked in Manchester for the family firm Ermen and Engels, obtaining the materials for The Condition of the Working Class in England (1845)(Die Lage der arbeitende Klasse in England, Leipzig: no publisher. Trans. in K. Marx and F. Engels, Collected Works (1975–98), London: Lawrence and Wishart). He was Marx’s closest friend and collaborator from 1844 onwards; took part in armed struggles in Elberfeld and the Palatinate during the death-agony of the 1848 Revolution; worked at Ermen and Engels in Manchester 1850–69,providing the Marx family with indispensable family support; edited the second and third volumes of Capital after Marx’s death. During the last twenty-five years of his life, his home in London became one of the main centres of the British and international labour movement. Secondary literature: Arthur, C. J. (ed.) (1996), Engels Today: A Contenary Appreciation,London: Macmillan; Canven, T. (1989), Friedrich Engels: His Life and Thought,Basingstoke: Macmillan. Ewing, A. C. (1899–1973). Alfred Ewing was born in 1899.Hestudied at University College, Oxford, and then taught at the University of Michigan and University College, Swansea, before moving to Cambridge in 1931 as lecturer in moral science. He was elected to a readership in 1954 and retired in 1966.Hewrote mainly on idealism and on moral philosophy. His major works were Kant’s Treatment of Causality (London: Kegan Paul, 1924); The Morality of Punishment (London: Kegan Paul, 1929); Idealism: A Critical Survey (London: Methuen, 1934); The Definition of Good (London: Routledge 1947); Second Thoughts in Moral Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1959). Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

778 Biobibliographical appendix Fischer, Kuno (1824–1907). German philosopher and historian, Kuno was born in 1824 in Silesia. He studied at Leipzig and Halle. He became Privatdozent at Heidelberg in 1850 butwas dismissed three years later because of his pantheistic views. He returned to teaching at Jena in 1856 and then in 1872 moved to Heidelberg where he remained until retiring in 1903.Heisremembered for his fight with F. A. Trendelenburg over Kant’s notion of space and for his multi-volume Geschichte der neuern Philosophie (1852–93 (Heidelberg: Carl Winters Universit¨ atsbuchhandlung)) which was popular because of his sympathetic understanding and clarity. His other major work is Kants Leben und Grundlagen seine Lehre (Heidelberg: Carl Winters Universit¨ atsbuchhandlung, 1860). He died in 1907. Secondary literature: K¨ ohnke, K. C. (1986), Entstehung und Aufstieg des Neu-Kantianismus, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, trans. 1991 R. J. Hollingdale as The Rise of Neo-Kantianism,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Frege, Gottlob (1848–1925). Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob Frege was born in Wismar, and studied mathematics at the Universities of Jena and G¨ ottingen. In 1879 he published the Begriffsschrift,which inaugurated the modern era in logic with the introduction of quantifiers, relations with any number of terms, truth-functional connectives, and an axiomatised version of the predicate calculus. His professional life was spent as a mathematician at the University of Jena, where he devoted himself to implementing his ‘logicist’ programme, according to which arithmetic and analysis can be shown to be reducible to pure logic. In the process he articulated atheory of meaning for formal and natural languages based on the twin distinctions between function and object, and between sense and reference. In 1902 he learned from Bertrand Russell that his logicism was fatally flawed. He died, bitter and unacknowledged, in 1925. Since then his genius has come to be recognised, and his thought has had a formative influence on the development of twentieth-century philosophy. His main works were: Begriffsschrift, eine der arith- metischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens (Conceptual Notation: A Formula-Language of Pure Thought, Modelled on the Language of Arithmetic) (Halle: L. Nebert, 1879,trans.1972 T. W. Bynum, Conceptual Notation and Other Articles,Oxford: Oxford University Press); Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, eine logisch-mathematische Untersuchung ¨ uber den Begriff der Zahl (The Foundations of Arithmetic. A Logico-Mathematical Investigation of the Concept of Number). (Breslau: W. Koebner, trans. with German text 1953 J. L. Austin, The Foundations of Arithmetic,Oxford: Blackwell); ‘ ¨ Uber Sinn und Bedeutung’, Zeitschrift f¨ ur Philosophie und philosophische Kritik 100 (1892): 25–50,trans.1984 M. Black, ‘On Sense and Meaning’, in G. Frege (ed. B. McGuinness) Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell), 157–77; Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (volume I) (Jena: H. Pohle, 1893, partial trans. M. Furth 1964, The Basic Laws of Arithmetic: Exposition of the System,Berkeley, CA: University of California Press); Grundge- setze der Arithmetik (vol. II) (Jena: H. Pohle, 1903, partial trans. M. Furth 1964, The Basic Laws of Arithmetic: Exposition of the System,Berkeley: University of California Press); ‘Der Gedanke. Eine Logische Untersuchung’ (‘Thoughts. A Logical Investigation’), Beitr¨ age zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus I(1918): 58–77 (trans. 1984 P. Geach and R. Stoothoff, ‘Thoughts’ in G. Frege (ed. B. McGuinness), Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy Oxford: Blackwell, 351–72). Secondary literature: Dummett, M. A. E. (1973), Frege, Philosophy of Language,London: Duckworth, also (1981), The Interpretation of Frege’s Philosophy,London:Duckworth, and (1991), Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics,London: Duckworth; Kneale, W. C. and Kneale, M. (1962), The Development of Logic,Oxford: Oxford University Press; Resnik, M. (1980), Frege and the Philoso- phy of Mathematics,Ithaca: Cornell University Press; Wright, C. (ed.) (1983), Frege: Tradition and Influence,Oxford: Blackwell. Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

Biobibliographical appendix 779 Freud, Sigmund (1856–1939). Freud was born in Moravia, of Jewish parentage. He com- pleted a medical training at Vienna, specialised in neurology and then psychopathology, and studied in Paris under J. M. Charcot. Until forced by the Gestapo in September 1939 to flee to London, where he died, Freud worked in Vienna. The Vienna Psychoanalytical Society, founded by Freudin1908,inaugurated the psychoanalytic movement. Die Traumdeutung (Frankfurt on Main: Fischer Verlag, 1900)isFreud’s first properly psychoanalytic publication; important later works include Zur Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens (1904), Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie (1905), Jenseits des Lustprinzips (1920), and Das Ich und das Es (1923). Secondary Literature: Jones, E. (1953–7), Sigmund Freud: Life and Work 3 vols., London: Hogarth Press; Gay, P. (1988), Freud: A Life for Our Time,London: Dent; Hook, S. (ed.) (1964), Psychoana- lysis, Scientific Method and Philosophy,New Yo rk: New York University Press; Lear, J. (1990), Love and its Place in Nature: A Philosophical Reconstruction of Psychoanalysis,London: Faber; Ricoeur, P. (1965) De l’interpr´ etation: essai sur Freud,Paris: Editions du Seuil, trans. 1970 D. Savage, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay in Interpretation,New Haven: Yale University Press; Wollheim, R. (1974), Freud: A Collection of Critical Essays New York: Anchor Doubleday, and (1991) Freud, 2nd edn, London: Fontana Collins; Wollheim, R. and Hopkins, J. (eds.) (1982), Philosophical Essays on Freud,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gentile, Giovanni (1875–1944). Born in Castelvetrano, Sicily, Gentile studied philosophy in Pisa, then began teaching in Naples and collaborating with Benedetto Croce on La Critica in 1903.The collaboration continued for two decades, but they increasingly disagreed philos- ophically (Gentile’s actualist idealism was more radical than Croce’s idealism) and politically (Gentile was an interventionist in the First World War, Croce a neutralist). In 1922 Gentile joined Mussolini’s cabinet as minister of public instruction and sought to restructure the education system with the reforms known as La riforma Gentile (1923). He remained a fascist stalwart until the day he was murdered by communist partisans in 1944. His major works are Teoria generale dello spirito come atto puro (Bari: Laterza, 1915,trans.H.W.Carr,The Theory of Mind as Pure Act, London: Macmillan) and Fondamenti della filosofia del diritto (Pisa: Mariotti, 1916). Important studies of him include G. Calandra (1987), Gentile e fascismo,Rome and Bari: Laterza; S. Romano (1984), Giovanni Gentile: La filosofia al potere,Milan: Bompiani; D. Veneruso (1984), Gentile e il primato della tradizione culturale italiana: Il dibattito all’interno del fascismo,Rome: Edizioni Studiuin. Gierke, Otto von (1841–1921). Born in Stettin (in Prussia) on 11 January 1841 and edu- cated in Berlin, Gierke held professorial posts in Berlin, Breslau, and Heidelberg. He served in Bismarck’s wars of 1866 against Austria and 1870–1 against France. Gierke died in Berlin on 10 October 1921.Major works of juridico-philosophical interest include: Das deutsche Genossen- schaftsrecht, 4 vols. (Berlin: Weidmann, 1868–1913); ‘Die Grundbegriffe des Staatsrechts und die neueren Staatsrechtstheorien’, Zeitschrift f¨ ur die gesamte Staatsrechtswissenschaft, 30 (1874); Johannes Althusius und die Entwicklung der naturrechtlichen Staatstheorien (Breslan: Marcus, 1880); ‘Labands Staatsrecht und die deutsche Rechtswissenschaft’, Schmollers Jahrbuch f¨ ur Gesetzge- bung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reiche, 7 (1883); Naturrecht und Deutsches Recht (Frankfurt: R¨ utter und Loening 1883); Die Genossenschaftstheorie und die deutsche Rechtsprechung (Berlin: Weidmann, 1887); Das Wesen der menschlichen Verb¨ ande (Berlin: Gustar Schade 1902); Die historische Rechtsschule und die Germanisten (Berlin, 1903); ‘Recht und Sittlichkeit’, Logos, 6 (1916–17). Secondary literature: Mogi, S. (1932), Otto von Gierke: His Political Teaching and Jurisprudence, London: P.S.King. Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

780 Biobibliographical appendix G ¨ odel, Kurt (1906–1978).Considered the greatest logician of the twentieth century, G¨ odel was born in Brno, Moravia, and educated at the University of Vienna, where, in his doctoral dissertation (1930), he established the semantic completeness of first-order logic. The following year, in his epochal incompleteness paper, he showed that no consistent, recursive axiomatisation of number theory can prove all statements true in the natural numbers and that, in particular, no such theory can prove its own consistency. Consequently, the goals of Hilbert’s proof theoretic programme could not be fully realised. In 1938 G¨ odel demonstrated the consistency of the axiom of choice and of Cantor’s continuum hypothesis relative to Zermelo- Fraenkel set theory, and in 1949 he exhibited solutions of Einstein’s equations of gravitation that permitted time travel into the past. G¨ odel emigrated to the United States in 1940,wherehe accepted an appointment at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey. His main works were: ‘Die Vollst¨ andigkeit der Axiome der logischen Funktionenkalk¨ uls’, Monatshefte f¨ ur Mathematik und Physik 37 (1930): 349–60;‘ ¨ Uber formal unentscheidbare S¨ atze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme I’, Monatshefte z¨ ur Mathematik and Physik 38 (1931): 173– 98; The Consistency of the Axiom of Choice and of the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis with the Axioms of Set Theory,Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press (1940); ‘An example of a new type of cosmological solutions of Einstein’s field equations of gravitation’, Reviews of Modern Physics 21 (1949): 447–50; Collected Works (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press). Secondary literature: Dawson, J. W., Jr. (1997), Logical Dilemmas: The Life and Work of Karl G¨ odel, Wellesley, MA: A. K. Petens, Ltd; Shanker, S. G. (ed.) (1988), G¨ odel’s Theorem in Focus,London: Croom Helm. Gramsci, Antonio (1891–1937). Born in Ales, Sardinia, he studied linguistics in Turin and became a socialist in 1913,but supported Italian intervention in the First World War. After the war, he led a factory-council movement in Turin and, after its defeat, helped to found the Italian Communist Party (1921). In the early 1920sherepresented the Party in the Comintern, was elected a parliamentary deputy, and then served as Party leader until his arrest in October 1926. Sentenced to twenty years in prison, he took up a scholarly life but died before he could complete his most important work, the Prison Notebooks,which was first published in 1947. Important studies of him include R. Bellamy and D. Schecter (1993), Gramsci and the Italian State, Manchester: Manchester University Press; Femia, J. (1981), Gramsci’s Political Thought: Hegemany, Consciousness and the Revolutionary Process,Oxford: Oxford University Press; and W. L. Adamson (1980), Hegemony and Revolution: Antonio Gramsci’s Political and Cultural Theory,Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Green, Thomas Hill (1836–82).BornatBirkin in Yorkshire, Green was the youngest of the four children of Valentin Green, an evangelical rector, and Anna Barbara Vaughn Green. He was educated at Rugby and at Balliol College, Oxford, where he became a fellow in 1860 and probably the first layman ever appointed as a tutor in 1866.Greatly admired for his per- sonal qualities, Green rose to prominence in the university as the most inspiring teacher of his generation. He was elected Whyte’s Professor in 1878,afew years before his untimely death. A radical in politics, Green was active in university reform, in the temperance movement, and as an Oxford town councillor. He married Charlotte Symonds in 1870.His main writings were: ‘General Introduction to Vol. I’ and ‘Introduction to Moral Part of the Treatise’ in D. Hume, Treatise of Human Nature (ed. T. H. Green and T. H. Grose) (London: 1874); Prolegomena to Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1883), Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (1886). Secondary literature: Greengarten, I. M. (1981), Thomas Hill Green and the Development of Liberal- Democratic Thought,Toronto: Toronto University Press; Nettleship, R. L. (1888), Works of Thomas Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

Biobibliographical appendix 781 Hill Green,London:Longmans, Green; Nicholson, P. P. (1990), The Political Philosophy of the British Idealists,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Richter, M. (1964), The Politics of Conscience: T. H. Green and His Age,London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson and Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Thomas, G. (1987), The Moral Philosophy of T. H. Green,Oxford: Clarendon Press; Vincent, A. (1986), The Philosophy of T. H. Green,Aldershot: Gower. H ¨ agerstr ¨ om, AxelAnders (1868–1939). Born at the parsonage of Vireda, near J¨ onk¨ oping, in the Swedish province of Sm˚ aland, on 6 September 1868,H ¨ agerstr¨ om showed great promise at a young age, doing outstanding work in school in ancient languages and math- ematics. Influenced by deeply religious parents and, for a time, by the evangelical revivalism of his day, H¨ agerstr¨ om enrolled in Uppsala University with the intention of studying theology. He quickly turned to philosophy, however, taking his doctorate in 1893.Hewas thereupon named Privatdozent or unsalaried lecturer at Uppsala, where, in 1911,hewon a professorship, which he held until his retirement in 1933.H ¨ agerstr¨ om died in Uppsala on 7 July 1939. His main works were: Kants Ethik im Verh¨ altnis zu seinem erkenntnistheoretischen Grundgedanken (Uppsala: Alqvist and Wiksell, 1902); Das Prinzip der Wissenschaft, I. Die Realit¨ at (Uppsala: Alqvist and Wiksell, 1908); Till fr˚ agan om den g¨ allande r¨ attens begrepp (Uppsala; Alqvist and Wiksell, 1917); Der r¨ omische Obligationsbegriff im Lichte der allgemeinen r¨ omischen Rechtsanschauung,vol. I (Uppsala: Alqvist and Wiksell, 1927), vol. II (1941). Some of H¨ agerstr¨ om’s papers, and selections from his treatises, translated from Swedish and German, are brought together in two volumes: Inquiries into the Nature of Law and Morals,trans. C. D. Broad (Uppsala: Alqvist and Wiksell, 1953); Philosophy and Religion,trans. R. T. Sandin (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1964). Secondary literature: Passmore, J. (1961), ‘H¨ agerstr¨ om’s Philosophy of Law’, Philosophy 36: 143–60. Hartmann, Eduard von (1842–1906). Born in Berlin, he served for several years as an artillery officer, before in 1867 settling in Berlin to pursue the development of his philosoph- ical system. His principal work, Philosophie des Unbewußten (Berlin: C. Duncker, 1869), was spectacularly successful, ran to several editions, and remained influential past the turn of the cen- tury. Hartmann’s numerous later writings included further metaphysical studies (Kategorienlehre (Doctrine of Categories) Leipzig: Haacks, 1896), studies in the history of philosophy (Geschichte der Metaphysik, Leipzig: Haacks, 1899–1900), and works on ethics and aesthetics (Ph¨ anomenologie des sittlichen Betwußtseins,Berlin: C. Duncker, 1879, Philosophie des Sch¨ onen, Leipzig: W. Friedrich, 1887). Secondary literature: Darnoi, D. (1967), The Unconscious and Edward von von Hartmaan: A Historico-Critical Monograph, The Hague: Nijhoff; Windelband, W. (1892), Geschichte der Philoso- phie Freiburg, §§44, 46. Heidegger, Martin (1889–1976). Born in Messkirch in southwestern Germany, Heidegger is generally regarded as the leading Western philosopher of the twentieth century, though his reputation has been damaged by posthumous revelations about the depth of his commitment to Nazism. Catholic by background, he broke with the faith in 1919 and, as a student of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology, wrote his masterwork, Sein und Zeit (T¨ ubingen: Niemeger, 1927, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson, Being and Time,Oxford: Blackwell, 1962), which greatly influenced subsequent existentialism. After the Nazi takeover, he became rector at Freiburg for two years. His later, ‘antihumanist’ philosophical essays, such as The Question Concerning Technology (1953), were similarly pathbreaking for hermeneutics (H. G. Gadamer) and post-structuralism (Jacques Derrida). Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

782 Biobibliographical appendix Important studies of him include Dallmayr, F. (1993), The Other Heidegger,Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press; Safranski, R. (1994), Ein Meister aus Deutschland: Heidegger und Seine Zeit, Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, trans. 1998 E. Osers, Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Wolin, R. (1990), The Politics of Being: The Political Thought of Martin Heidegger,New Yo rk: Columbia University Press; Zimmerman, M. (1990), Heidegger’s Confrontation with Modernity: Technology, Politics, and Art,Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Helmholtz, Hermann von (1821–94). Helmholtz was born in Potsdam in 1821. His father was a man of great enthusiasms, especially for the arts and for philosophy. As a child Helmholtz was surrounded by passionate debates. Training as a doctor, he managed to attend science courses at the university. He served as an army surgeon but was released to take up a post in physiology at Konigsberg, and then to Bonn. He married in 1849. His research interests covered all the senses including the kinaesthetic. He moved back to Berlin in 1891,andbegan the study of electromagnetism, having Hertz as his assistant. His return marked his steady elevation into the most powerful and influential person in German science, despite a marked personal diffidence. In later life he suffered periods of intense depression, relieved only by music and walking in the hills. He died in Berlin in 1894. Main works: Kahl, R. (ed.) (1971), Selected Writings of H. von Helmholtz,Middleton, CT: Wesleyan University Press. Secondary literature: Cahan, D. (ed.) (1993), Hermann von Helmholtz and the Foundation of XIX Century Science,Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Hertz, Heinrich Rudolph (1857–94). Born in 1857, Hertz came from a distinguished Protestant family. He had a very strict schooling, and showed a marked talent not only for languages, but also for practical hobbies. His higher education took him towards a career as a professional engineer, but by 1877 he decided to prepare himself for scientific research. At the University of Munich he showed the combination of mathematical skill and laboratory technique that was characteristic of his whole career. In 1880 he became research assistant to Helmholtz as the great man turned more and more to studies in electromagnetism and gas physics. Following the usual German career pattern, Hertz moved to Kiel as a Privatdozent in mathematical physics, reading a great deal of philosophy, but soon moved to a general physics appointment at Karlsruhe from 1885 to 1889,where he could be back at the laboratory bench. Here he began the work on ‘electric waves’ that gave him international fame. Soon he was at work on the foundations of physics again. From about 1888 he suffered a series of painful operations on his jaw, and contracting an infection in the course of the last of these he died of septicaemia in 1894. His main works were: Die Prinzipien der Mechanik (Leipzig: Barth, 1894,trans.1899 D. E. Jones and J. T. Walley, The Principles of Mechanics,London: Macmillan); Mulligan, J. (ed.), Heinrich Rudolf Hertz (1857–94): A Collection of Articles and Addresses (New York: Garland, 1994). Secondary literature: Buchwald, J. Z. (1994), The Creation of Scientific Effects: Heinrich Hertz and Electric Waves,Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Hilbert, David (1862–1943)wasborn in K¨ onigsberg, where he also received his doctorate and began his professorial career. One of the most preeminent mathematicians of his age (rivalled only by Henri Poincar´ e), his breadth of mathematical achievements spanned the fields of invariant theory, algebraic number theory, integral equations, axiomatics of geometry and logic, and mathematical physics. In 1895 Hilbert accepted a call to G¨ ottingen and there carried on the mathematical tradition established a century earlier by Carl Friedrich Gauss. In 1900,inhis Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

Biobibliographical appendix 783 address to the International Congress of Mathematicians, he posed twenty-three problems as challenges for the century ahead, and in 1917 he initiated the study of proof theory,whose development he hoped would secure the foundations of mathematics. His main works were: Grundlagen der Geometrie (Leipzig: Teubner, 1899); ‘Mathematische Probleme’ (Nachrichten von der k¨ oniglichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu G¨ ottingen, 1900: 253–96); Grundz¨ uge der theoretischen Logik (Berlin, 1928) (with W. Ackermann); Grundlagen der Mathematik (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 1934) (with P. Bernays); Gesammelte Abhandlungen (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 1935). Secondary literature: Bernays, P. (1967), ‘Hilbert, David (1862–1943)’ in P. Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy,vol.III,496–504,New Yo rk: Macmillan and Free Press; Browder, F. E. (ed.) (1976), ‘Mathematical Developments Arising from Hilbert Problems’, Proceedings of Symposia in Pure Mathematics, XXVIII, Providence: American Mathematical Society; Reid, C. (1970), Hilbert,New Yo rk: Springer Verlag; Sieg, W. (1997), ‘Step by Recursive Step: Church’s Analysis of Effective Calculability’, The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 2: 338–48. Hobhouse, Leonard Trelawny (1864–1929). An undergraduate at Corpus Christi Col- lege, Oxford (1883–7), Hobhouse became a prize fellow of Merton College, then returned to Corpus in 1890 as tutor and later fellow. He taught philosophy, but also studied psychology, soci- ology, and the labour movement. From 1897 to 1902 he worked on the staff of the great Liberal newspaper, the Manchester Guardian,thenmovedtoLondon where he continued his journal- ism but also developed his interest in sociology. In 1907 he was appointed (jointly with E. A. Westermarck) to the Martin White Professor of Sociology at the London School of Economics and Political Science, the first chair of sociology in Britain. His main works were: The Theory of Knowledge (London: Methuen, 1896); Mind in Evolution (London: Macmillan, 1901); Democracy and Reaction (London: Fisher Unwin, 1904); Morals in Evolution (London: Chapman and Hall, 1906); Liberalism (London: Williams and Norgate, 1911); Social Evolution and Political Theory (New York: Columbia University Press 1911); Development and Purpose (London: Macmillan, 1913); The Metaphysical Theory of the State (London: George Allan and Unwin, 1918); The Rational Good (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1921); The Elements of Social Justice (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1922); Social Development (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1924). Secondary literature: Clarke, P. (1978), Liberals and Social Democrats,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Collini, S. (1979), Liberalism and Sociology: L. T. Hobhouse and Political Argument in England 1880–1914,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Freeden, M. (1978), The New Liberalism: An Ideology of Social Reform,Oxford: Clarendon Press; Hobson, J. A. and Ginsberg, M. (1931), L. T. Hobhouse: His Life and Work,London: George Allen and Unwin. Holmes, Oliver Wendell (1841–1935). Born in Boston on 8 March 1841,Holmes studied at Harvard College and then volunteered for service in the Civil War. After the war, he enrolled at the Harvard Law School. Appointed to the law faculty at Harvard a year after the publication of The Common Law,Holmes left the academy for an appointment as associate justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, where he served for twenty years, followed by another twenty-five years on the United States. Supreme Court. He died in Washington, DC, on 6 March 1935.Holmes’s main book-length work is The Common Law (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1881). In addition, there are important collections: The Formative Essays of Justice Holmes, ed. Frederic Rogers Kellogg (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1984) (Holmes’s essays from the period 1870–80); Collected Legal Papers (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co. 1920) (essays from the period 1885–1918,including the celebrated paper, ‘The Path of the Law’); Holmes– Pollock Letters. The Correspondence of Mr Justice Holmes and Sir Frederick Pollock 1874–1932, ed. Mark DeWolfe Howe, 2 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1941); Holmes–Laski Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

784 Biobibliographical appendix Letters. The Correspondence of Mr Justice Holmes and Harold J. Laski 1916–1935, ed. Mark DeWolfe Howe, 2 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1953); The Essential Holmes, ed. Richard A. Posner (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1992) (selections from letters, speeches, judicial opinions). Sidney Hook (1902–89). An American naturalist and pragmatist whose lectures and writings on politics, morality, law, and education gave him the status of a ‘public philosopher’. At first a Marxist, he became a staunch advocate of democratic socialism. Among his major works were The Metaphysics of Pragmatism (Chicago: Open Court, 1927), From Hegel to Marx (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1936)andPragmatism and the Tragic Sense of Life (New York: Basic Books, 1975). Secondary literature: Hook, S. (1987), Out of Step: An Unquiet Life in the 20th Century,New Yo r k : Harper and Row; Phelps, C. (1997), Young Sidney Hook: Marxist and Pragmatist,Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Horkheimer, Max (1895–1973). One of the founding members of the Frankfurt School of Western European Marxism (or Critical Theory), Horkheimer was its leading philosopher and lifelong director. After becoming Director of the Frankfurt-based Institute for Social Research in 1929,Horkheimer elaborated the philosophical basis for its programme of a critical social science in his methodological writings from the 1930s, published in the Institute’s Zeitschrift f¨ ur Sozialforschung.Besides his work in the Institute and his special role in its empirical analyses of fascism, Horkheimer’s more philosophical works include analyses of the paradoxical character of Enlightenment rationality written in the dark days of the Second World War in Dialektik der Aufkl¨ arung (Dialectic of the Enlightenment)(Amsterdam: Quierdo, 1944, with T. W. Adorno). The most comprehensive works on Horkheimer and the Frankfurt School are Held, D. (1980), Introduction to Critical Theory,Berkeley, CA: University of California Press; Wiggershaus, R. (1994), The History of the Frankfurt School,Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Husserl, Edmund (1859–1938). Born in Prossnitz (then within the borders of the Austro- Hungarian Empire, now in the Czech Republic) to a German-speaking Jewish family. He studied in Leipzig with W. Wundt, and attended lectures given by Weierstrass and Kronecker in Berlin, before moving to Vienna in 1881 where he studied with F. Brentano. In 1887 he become Privatdozent in Halle where he met C. Stumpf and G. Cantor and completed his habilitation, which was published as Philosophie der Arithmetik (Halle: Pfeffer, 1891). After the publication of volume 1 of his Logische Untersuchungen (Logical Investigations)in1900 (Halle: Niemayer), which was especially influential through its critique of all forms of psychologism, Husserl joined the faculty at G¨ ottingen in 1901.During this period he developed his ‘phenomenological’ method of enquiry which led to the development of the phenomenological movement. His most influential work in this respect was Ideen zu einer reinen Ph¨ anomenologie und ph¨ anomenologischen Philosophie I(1913; Husserliana III, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1950). From 1916 until 1928 he was professor in Freiburg where his students included A. Reinach, R. Ingarden, E. Stein, M. Heidegger, E. Levinas, and G. Marcel. After his retirement he continued to write prolifically and his later books include: ‘Formale und transzendentale Logik’ (1929;Husserliana XVII, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1974), M´ editations cart´ esiennes (Paris: Colin, 1931), and Die Krisis der europ¨ aischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Ph¨ anomenologie (1936;Husserliana VI, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1954), which is often now regarded as his most interesting book. Secondary literature: Smith, B. and Smith, D. W. (eds.) (1995), The Cambridge Companion to Husserl,Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

Biobibliographical appendix 785 Huxley, Thomas Henry (1825–95).English biologist, influential educator in the field of science, and eminent Victorian intellectual. Born at Ealing, near London, he was essentially self- educated, studying history, geology, logic, and languages as an adolescent. At fifteen he was apprenticed to a medical practitioner but soon received a scholarship to Charing Cross Hospital Medical School in London, where he won many prizes and published his first research paper. From 1846 to 1850 he served as assistant physician on HMS Rattlesnake,whichsurveyed the Australian waters. During these voyages, Huxley studied marine specimens and sent home his researches, which were published in eminent journals. This established his reputation as a leading biologist and, on his return in 1851 he was elected Fellow of the Royal Society at the age of twenty-six. Huxley secured a part-time lectureship at the government School of Mines in London, where he remained, helping to transform it into the great Royal College of Science. He was an early and tenacious defender of Darwin after the appearance of the latter’s Origin of Species in 1859. He became known as Darwin’s bulldog. Huxley carried out valuable research in paleontology, taxonomy, and ethnology while expanding his influence on educational reform in the sciences and as a popular, provocative lecturer and essayist on a wide range of philosophical, political, and religious questions. Though Huxley was not a professional philosopher, his essays and his books on Descartes and Hume were influential. He coined the word ‘agnostic’ to define his own position, and he was looked to as the leader of the agnostic movement. He was highly critical of supernaturalism and traditional Christian claims, but he accepted a somewhat Spinozistic form of theism. Huxley’s final position on ethics set forth in Evolution and Ethics in 1894 (London: Macmillan) opposes Herbert Spencer’s evolutionary ethics and sees nature in conflict with human morality. His main works were: Evidence as to Man’s Place in Nature (London: Williams and Norgate, 1863); Hume (London: Macmillan, 1879); Collected Essays, 9 vols. (London: Macmillan, 1893–4); Scientific Memoirs, ed. M. Foster and E. R. Lankester, 5 vols. (London: Macmillan, 1898– 1902). Secondary sources: Bibby, C. (1960), Scientist, Humanist and Educator,NewYorkandLondon: Horizon Press; Desmond, A. (1997), Huxley: From Devil’s Disciple to Evolution’s High Priest, Reading, MA: Addison Wesley: Huxley, L. (ed.) (1900), Life and Letters of Thomas Henry Huxley, 2 vols., London: Macmillan. James, William (1842–1910). Born in 1842,William James was professor of psychology and of philosophy at Harvard University. His Principles of Psychology wasanimportant spur to the development of scientific psychology, and he achieved prominence through his writings on pragmatism and philosophical issues concerning religious belief. He died in 1910. His main publications were: The Principles of Psychology (New York: Henry Holt, 1890); The Will to Believe and other Essays in Popular Philosophy (New York and London: Longmans, Green, 1897); The Var ieties of Religious Experience (New York and London: Longmans, Green, 1902); Pragmatism: A New Name for some Old Ways of Thinking (New York and London: Longmans, Green, 1907); The Meaning of Truth (New York and London: Longmans, Green, 1909); A Pluralistic Universe (New York and London: Longmans, Green, 1909); Essays in Radical Empiricism (New York and London: Longmans, Green, 1912). Secondary literature: Bird, G. (1986), William James,London: Routledge; Ford, M. (1982), William James’s Philosophy: A New Perspective,Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press; Myers, G. E. (1986), William James: His Life and Thought,New Haven, CT: Yale University Press; Putnam, R. A. (ed.) (1997), The Cambridge Companion to William James,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jevons, William Stanley (1835–82).BorninLiverpool,Jevonstaught logic and eco- nomics, first at Owens College, Manchester, and then, in 1876,atUniversity College London. Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

786 Biobibliographical appendix Although he drowned at the age of forty-six, Jevons had already left his mark on numerous disciplines, notably economics, statistics, philosophy, logic, meteorology, and physics. He was one of the first to advance the logicist view and to popularise, thanks to a clear system of notation, the sentential logic set out by Augustus De Morgan and George Boole. His Principles of Science (London: Macmillan, 1874) emphasised a fallibilist and inductivist approach to scientific knowl- edge, and was the leading text in the period between J. S. Mill and Karl Pearson. His main works were: Pure Logic (London: E. Stanford, 1864); Theory of Political Economy (London: Macmil- lan, 1871); Principles of Science (London: Macmillan, 1874); Studies in Deductive Logic (London: Macmillan, 1880). Secondary literature: Schabas, M. (1990), AWorld Ruled by Number: William Stanley Jevons and the Rise of Mathematical Economics,Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Jhering, Rudolf von (1818–92). Born in Aurich on 22 August 1818,Jhering studied in Heidelberg, G¨ ottingen, Munich, and Berlin, and held professorial posts in Basle, Rostock, Kiel, Giessen, Vienna, and G¨ ottingen, where he died on 17 September 1892.Precocious and witty, Jhering, once he began dismantling his own constructivist system, took to twitting his former allies, the constructivists. As a civil lawyer, legal historian, and legal theorist, Jhering counts as one of the leading figures in nineteenth-century German legal science; only Savigny is comparable in influence. Main works: Geist des r¨ omischen Rechts (in three parts, the second of which is divided into two volumes) (Leipzig: Breitkopf and H¨ artel, 1852–65); Der Kampf um’s Recht (Vienna: G. J. Manz, 1872); Der Zweck des Rechts, 2 vols. (Leipzig: Breitkopf and H¨ artel, 1877–83); Scherz und Ernst in der Jurisprudenz (Leipzig: Breitkopf and H¨ artel, 1884). Jhering’s correspondence with Carl Friedrich von Gerber is collected in Der Briefwechsel zwischen Jhering und Gerber, ed. Mario G. Losano (Ebalsbach: Gremer, 1984). Kautsky, Karl Johann (1854–1938). Born in Prague to a theatrical family, and raised in Vienna, but spent most of his life in Germany. Editor of Die Neue Zeit,the SPD weekly, 1883–1917;author of numerous books and pamphlets, and editor of various of Marx’s works, notably Theories of Surplus-Value. Dismissed from the editorship of Neue Zeit for his opposition to the First World War; returned to Vienna in 1924.TheNazi Anschluss of March 1938 forced him to flee to Amsterdam, where he died. Secondary literature: Geary, D. (1987), Karl Kautsky,Manchester: Manchester University Press. Kelsen, Hans (1881–1973). Born in Prague on 11 October 1881, Hans Kelsen was educated in Vienna. After playing a key role in the drafting of the Austrian Federal Constitution of 1920, he served throughout the 1920sasajudge on the Constitutional Court and as professor of law at the University of Vienna. His dismissal from the Court, early in 1930 (for failing to do the bid- ding of the ruling Christian-Social Party), prompted him to accept a professorship in Cologne. Dismissed from that post by the Nazis in the spring of 1933,Kelsen held a professorship in Geneva until he left Europe, in 1940,for America. After several uncertain years on the East Coast, he accepted a professorship at the University of California in Berkeley, where he spent thirty years. Kelsen died in Berkeley on 19 April 1973. His major jurisprudential works were: Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1911), Das Problem der Souver¨ anit¨ at (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1920), Der soziologische und der juristische Staatsbegriff (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1922), Allgemeine Staatslehre (Berlin: Springer, 1925), Die philosophischen Grundlagen der Natur- rechtslehre und des Rechtspositivismus (Charlottenburg: Rolf Heise, 1928), Reine Rechtslehre, 1st edn (Leipzig: Deuticke, 1934), General Theory of Law and State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1945), Reine Rechtslehre, 2nd edn (Vienna: Denticke, 1960), Allgemeine Theorie der Normen (Vienna: Manz, 1979). Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008